CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY AND THE HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA: STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

by Major Ian MacVicar

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I do think it is likely that most Canadians would be surprised if they knew how little their country is doing — and is capable of doing — in real terms, relatively to how much noise it makes about its efforts.

— Dennis Stairs, Speak Loudly and Carry a Bent Twig

INTRODUCTION

Soldiers trust that they will receive a clear mission statement and the capability to fulfil their assigned role before they are “put in harm’s way”. This trust does not always reflect the reality of defence decision-making in Canada. Wartime failures in assessing capability against commitment include Hong Kong and Dieppe. These tragedies emphasize the folly of making commitments before verifying that sufficient resources exist to fulfill all assigned and implied tasks. Miscalculations also occur in the peacekeeping realm. Despite the proud record of participation in more peacekeeping missions than any other nation, Canada has never adequately matched the “troops to the (foreign policy) task” successfully. Imminent financial concerns will soon drive a further wedge between Canadian Foreign and Defence Policies.

On 21 March 2001, Minister of National Defence (MND) Art Eggleton announced that he is considering an “early-in/early-out policy” on peacekeeping because the CF can no longer afford long-term missions. If this proposal is confirmed, the CF will not be able to support the Human Security (HS) Agenda of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).

The tendency to underestimate the ramifications of a policy decision is not a uniquely Canadian trait. The arguably Canadian aspect is that there have been gaps between commitments and capabilities for years, despite acknowledgement that defence policy should flow from, and support, foreign policy. One commitment/capability issue receiving recent criticism is the HS Agenda. Former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy defined “Human Security” as covering the gamut of international relations — from conflict prevention through humanitarian intervention, to post-conflict remediation. According to Axworthy:

The lack of action in Rwanda and Srebrenica raised the question. NATO’s action in Kosovo sparked the debate…
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan took up the challenge, laid out the arguments and made clear the stakes. It is now a discussion that the UN Security Council — indeed the international community — must engage in…. three things need to be addressed: strengthening the norms and practices regarding the protection of civilians; mobilizing the political will to act when necessary; and developing the military and civilian capacity to succeed.\(^6\)

The HS Agenda expresses the Canadian national will to help people at risk. Unfortunately, Canadian Defence Policy does not adequately support Canadian Foreign Policy due to an incomplete understanding of the military requirements of the HS Agenda. The Canadian Armed Forces must be structured to project, command, and sustain “Expeditionary Forces” if Canadian defence policy is to adequately support the Human Security Agenda. This argument will be supported by an evaluation of how well the 1994 Defence White Paper complements the 1995 Foreign Policy document, Canada in the World. The adoption of the HS Agenda will not be debated, but the military capabilities required to implement it will be assessed to demonstrate the commitment/capability gap. Ultimately, the HS Agenda is only a label describing a foreign policy theme with overseas military applications.\(^7\) Thus, the issues of power projection, force structure, and sustainment must be assessed. The paper will conclude with recommendations for each area. The confluence of world events, the humanitarian bent of Canadian foreign policy, and evolving CF capabilities place the nation in a position to lead the implementation of the HS Agenda.

**CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY AND THE HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA**

The HS Agenda and “Soft Power” can be seen as a logical evolution of Canadian national values and international involvement.\(^8\) This assertion requires an explanation of the events that brought Canada to such a position prior to its acceptance.

**Canada — Midwife to the Birth of the HS Concept**

The HS concept broadens collective security to include protection of all threatened peoples. The concept deems the violation of national sovereignty necessary if the International Community approves intervention.\(^9\) NATO’s New Strategic Concept, signed 24 April 1999, supports humanitarian intervention outside its borders. This is a marked *virage* from the traditional Article V collective security obligations. Thus it appears that the HS concept has “staying power” as an international agenda item.\(^10\)

Canada founded the Human Security Network with Norway after signing the Lyons Agreement on 20 May 1999. At the Second Ministerial Meeting in Lucerne, 11–12 May 2000, 13 nations pledged their support for the Network. Although the HS concept has yet to be codified in a doctrinal framework there are several criteria relevant to defence policy.\(^11\) Firstly, by redefining security it redefines and prioritizes threats. Secondly, by expanding security obligations beyond borders or alliance boundaries, it imposes the need for power projection capabilities in excess of those currently held. Lastly, as the goal of the HS concept is the protection of threatened populations, it imposes restraints on the degree of force used in a crisis. In the absence of universally accepted criteria for intervention in HS crises, this paper assesses the military capabilities required in the context of roles in the Conflict Prevention, Humanitarian Intervention, and Post-Conflict Remediation phases of a Peace Support Operation (PSO). Prior to recommending restructuring the CF, it is useful to
understand the complicated relationship between foreign and defence policies in Canada.

**Linkage Between Canadian Foreign and Defence Policies**

Canada is blessed by the isolation conferred by its geography, and the protection of having the world’s only superpower as its closest ally. Despite questions of credibility that characterized the Canadian commitment/capability debate during the Cold War, there was a degree of congruency among commitments, force structure, and training for a high-intensity war in Central Europe. The HS agenda is a logical extension of the Forward Defence concept if agreed that Canadian security is best assured by dealing with remote threats before they become immediate. According to Paul Heinbecker (former ADM Global and Security Policy within DFAIT and current Ambassador to the United Nations),

Canadian foreign and security policy has always been aimed at addressing threats that, while being geographically distant, could compromise the stability of the international system or come eventually to threaten us. Our reliance on multilateralism and our quest for a rule-based international system are rooted in this geostrategic reality. Human security is very much a forward defence.\(^{12}\)

This congruency is much less apparent in the military resources committed to the HS Agenda. Discrepancies are apparent between the 1994 White Paper on Defence and the 1995 DFAIT document *Canada in the World*.

**The 1994 White Paper**

CF missions, as stated in the *White Paper* and confirmed in the 2001 *Departmental Outlook*, are, in order of priority:

- the defence of Canada and the protection of Canadian sovereignty;
- the bilateral defence of the North American continent, in cooperation with the United States; and
- contributions to international security.\(^{13}\)

Operations of the past few years have used armed force, under multilateral auspices, to enforce the will of the international community — not only in cases of conflict between states, but within states as well. Recent operations have included:

- the enforcement of economic sanctions or arms embargoes;
- the use of armed forces to create secure conditions for the delivery of aid;
- the denial of airspace through which hostile forces could prosecute a military campaign or attack civilian populations (‘no-fly zones’);
- the protection of civilian populations and refugees in ‘safe areas’; and
- the provision of deterrence or defence for a UN or NATO member state against armed attack.

The *White Paper* provides insight on the developing consensus for multilateral intervention and the broader implications for the Canadian Forces.

Even when Canada’s interests are not directly engaged the values of Canadian society lead Canadians to expect their government to respond when modern communications technologies make us real-time witnesses to violence, suffering and even genocide in many parts of the world.\(^{14}\)
This statement is qualified with the condition that “the design of all missions should reflect certain key principles…in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada’s participation should be accepted by all parties to the conflict.”\textsuperscript{15} Notwithstanding Canadian participation in interventions in Kosovo, Rwanda, and elsewhere, our defence policy does not explicitly permit unilateral intervention in a peace support role.

Peacekeeping operations have been the principal tool used by the international community to contain armed conflict over the last 45 years. Traditional peacekeeping missions require the belligerents’ agreement to neutral intervention. The HS concept requires intervention with or without agreement.

**Canada in the World**

The three key objectives of Canadian foreign policy described in *Canada in the World* are “the promotion of prosperity and employment, the protection of our security, within a stable global framework, and the projection of Canadian values and cultures.”\textsuperscript{16} The second objective is amplified with the statement, “All of this demands a broadening of the focus of security policy from its narrow orientation of managing state to state relationships, to one that recognizes the importance of the individual and society for our shared security.”\textsuperscript{17} While these are no doubt noble objectives, they are not clear, prioritized descriptions of Canada’s national interests. These vague descriptions make development and application of a congruent defence policy difficult.\textsuperscript{18} One of the glaring inconsistencies between Canadian foreign and defence policies has been the extraordinary number of commitments generated for the CF by the executive branch of government. Canada has participated in more peacekeeping missions than any other nation. While this is a source of pride for many Canadians, the Cabinet may be unable to discern between a security threat and what simply constitutes a human tragedy. Although Canada has supported a “global view” of the world for many years, it does so with a questionable global reach.\textsuperscript{19} The main cause of this discrepancy is the different world-views held by DFAIT and DND.

**Fusion of the DFAIT and DND Views of the World**

Some detractors argue that Human Security is nothing more than peacekeeping and that it contributes to a continued deterioration in war-fighting capability.\textsuperscript{20} This view narrows the concept. The changing nature of conflict and recent focus on the protection of peoples has forced these missions to evolve into multidisciplinary peace support operations with goals beyond keeping exhausted belligerents apart. The HS Agenda is broader as it emphasizes protection of threatened civilians. The five pillars of the Canadian HS Agenda are:\textsuperscript{21}

- Protection of Civilians, concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce the human costs of armed conflict;\textsuperscript{22}
- Peace Support Operations, concerned with building UN capacities and addressing the demanding and increasingly complex requirements for deployment of skilled personnel, including Canadians, to those missions;
- Conflict Prevention, concerned with strengthening the capacity of the international community to prevent or resolve conflict, and building local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence;
• Governance and Accountability, concerned with fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions in terms of established norms of democracy and human rights; and

• Public Safety, concerned with building international expertise, capacities and instruments to counter the growing threats posed by the rise of transnational organized crime.

Of the five pillars, only Peace Support Operations (PSO) requires military participation. Conflict Prevention emphasizes engagement of the root sources of conflict. A potential military role in the post-conflict phase will be assessed later in the paper. Due to the breadth of HS Agenda, precise military roles are difficult to define as each crisis has its own unique economic, historical, political, and religious circumstances that will influence the response.

Canada can choose the extent of its security arrangements but it cannot fashion the security environment to suit its policies. The security environment must be depicted accurately if foreign and defence policies are to complement each other. Canadian foreign policy decision-makers cannot predict the ex-act demands they may make of the CF at some future date. They can, however, ascertain the full implications of the HS concept, hold a general idea of why and where future threats to Canadian security may arise, and be prepared to accept that some commitments require developing new military capabilities. This assertion was recognized in The Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in April 2000.

The Senate Committee asserted that there is a “need to provide a solid foundation for the concept of human security in Canada’s foreign policy.”23 This doctrinal foundation must be supported by capabilities to project, command, and sustain power abroad. These new capabilities must be linked to the HS concept and traditional peacekeeping in order to gain acceptance of capital expenditures. In the absence of an accepted framework, military planners should base their assumptions on common HS circumstances that can guide acquisition or enhancement of capabilities that will support the HS Agenda.

MILITARY RESPONSES TO HS CRISIS

Four of the five Canadian HS pillars focus on diplomatic effort to resolve conflict. Despite the emphasis on negotiation, military forces must back up the wishes of the international community before, during, and after intervention in an HS crisis.

Conflict Prevention — The need for quick deployment of the “Carrot and the Stick”

Victory in war goes to he who gets thar fustest with the mostest.

— General Nathan Bedford Forrest, CSA

The HS concept assumes that distant state or non-state actors influence the welfare of distant nations due to the interdependence brought by trade, communications and immigration. Modern communications speed limits the effectiveness that distance once lent preventive diplomacy. Consequently, rational state decision-makers using the HS paradigm should order intervention before an aggressor has the opportunity to deploy the full weight of his forces. Intervention is fraught with concerns of sovereignty violation that can slow the response time.24 As Axworthy recognized, interventions must be multilateral to make questions of self-interest irrelevant and to isolate the aggressor. Thus, rapid deployment and interoperability with likely allies are key requirements for successful HS
deterrent operations.

Ultimately, the intervening force must influence the decision-makers and the populace of the aggressor. This goal requires the capability to rapidly deploy overwhelming combat power to a crisis area and communicate to the decision-making elites the willingness to use it. Air forces are the ideal instrument to assert power in the pre-conflict stage. Multi-role combat aircraft visibly display deterrent power to an aggressor, power which can be swiftly asserted if he chooses not to be deterred. Transport aircraft can play a dual role in the projection of land combat forces and in the transport of relief supplies. Naval forces would assume the traditional role of transporting the army:

For limited war, intervention or policing action, the basic maritime requirement is for general purpose, versatile forces which can cooperate with other services...a capability is needed for escorting and transporting army units to almost any area in the world where trouble might develop and support them.

Persuasive means such as early warning and negotiations belong in the diplomatic sphere. Others, such as preventive deployment and preventive disarmament, are better placed in the military intervention envelope, as they are more coercive in nature.

**Humanitarian Intervention — Designing the “Stick”**

The way we make war reflects the way we make wealth — and the way we make anti-war must reflect the way we make war.

— Alvin and Heidi Toffler

As the definitions of “enemy” and “victory” in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) are elusive, the force used must be more multifaceted than in war-fighting. Military commanders must harness multi-level and combined political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, military, police-based, and civilian bureaucratic activities that can be brought to bear on the causes of conflict as well as the belligerents.

The ambiguities of HS crises have changed how we define “conflict”. While war is its ultimate expression, “conflict” must be broadened to include other circumstances short of war. Such a paradigm shift must allow that the new “Centres of Gravity” and “Decisive Points” along a “Line of Operation” will be primarily political in nature, and will require other means in concert with traditional military capabilities to achieve the end state of a sustainable peace. As intrastate conflict now involves societies under media scrutiny, conflict has become multi-organizational, multilateral, and multidimensional in scope. Consequently, the unity of effort required to obtain the end state of peace must be viewed from a multi-organizational, multinational, and multidimensional perspective. The most important element of a deterrent action is the clarity of the communication between an intervening force and the aggressor. Communication of the intent to use either the “carrot” or the “stick” capability could be through diplomatic means reinforced by Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams. CIMIC teams can disseminate information concerning appropriate “carrots” that deflates aggression and emphasizes the applicability of international humanitarian law. UNSCR 1296 encourages the formation of a “mass media component” to conduct such operations.

Customary international law and the HS concept require that military operations protect civilian lives and property to the maximum degree practicable while achieving military goals. The traditionally accepted
le-gal criteria include that damage caused must be proportionate to the objective sought, and is ordered by a lawful authority. Thus, mil-itary operations to protect threatened people must be planned to ensure a minimal loss of life. The legal and moral imperatives herein require the capability to limit damage to le-gitimate aggressor targets, and that the strikes do not put additional pressure on the threat-ened populace. This necessitates shared near-real-time intelligence (a Relevant Common Picture or RCP) among allies and throughout the chain of command. The RCP will facili-tate swift targeting decisions in an environment with tight ROE, particularly as most post-Cold War conflicts are civil wars in “failed states”. Of the 108 armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War, 101 have been fought within rather than between states. Approximately 90 per cent of the casualties have been civilians, as the objectives of these wars have not been to hold territory or to kill another state’s soldiers, but to change the in-ternal ethnic makeup of a state or to control its resources.

The majority of post-Cold War OOTWs were conducted in “failed states” undergoing violent realignment of their po-itical power structures. The Centre of Gravity in such conflicts is not usually the armed forces, but the political leadership’s hold on the allegiance, and/or its domination of the civilian populace. In many such circum-stances it is more important for the interven-ing force to “win hearts and minds” than to kill enemy soldiers or to take and hold ground. “War-fighting” must not be ruled out as a contribution to the security of threatened populations, even if collateral dam-age occurs. Recent interventions, such as Desert Storm and the NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia, are questionable successes with-in the HS context. General Sir Michael Rose wrote:

In humanitarian warfare, the main po-itical and military effort must be di-rected towards preserving the condition of the civil populations. It is clear that NATO’s strategic planners failed to un-derstand this shift. They wrongly con-centrated their resources on the de-struc-tion of the military capability of the Yugoslav forces, with disastrous results for the Kosovo Albanians.

It seems incongruous that a military operation could be criticized for attacking the opposing military forces, but the goal of the campaign was ostensibly to protect Kosovar Albanians, not to defeat the Yugoslav Armed Forces. NATO military strategy was planned within the context of traditional coercive de-terrence rather than Human Security, (eg, “We will hit you until you change your be-haviour”). The change in behaviour did not occur, creating a dilemma for NATO leader-ship as to whether a land invasion would be worth the cost. NATO failed in its first bona fide HS operation, as it did not prevent mass killing or displacement of the civilian populace it was supposed to protect. According to Henry Kissinger, “fear of the pictures of allied casualties caused [NATO] to adopt a military strategy that, perversely, magnified the suffering of the populations on whose be-half the war was ostensibly being fought.”

HS interventions must take control of terri-tory, and provide security/police operations to physically protect threatened populaces. HS Network nations must risk the lives of their servicemen and -women to intervene in HS crises. The HS concept collapses without this moral imperative. Thus, it appears that we must find a “middle way” between peacekeeping and war-fighting to make this aspect palatable to Western nations.

Back to Basics: the Six Combat Func-tions Revisited

The six combat functions are firepow-
er, protection, manoeuvre, command, sustain-
ment, and information operations. The first
three are the basis of all tactics. They are the
*sine qua non* of any military force that pro-
tects itself while manoeuvring to strike a le-
thal blow at an enemy. Despite the HS re-
quirement to develop lines of operation on
the moral, and often strategic, planes, the re-
quirement remains to be able to respond with
overwhelming force across the spectrum of
conflict. History and observation teach us
that force, or the threat of its use, is necessa-
ry to deter or to resist aggression. The ca-
pability to destroy, defeat, or reduce an ag-
gressor’s operational centre of gravity must
be maintained. In most circumstances, this
is the offensive combat capability of the ag-
gressor armed forces.

Although essential for success in HS
interventions, the traditional imperative to
defeat an enemy force has diminished in im-
portance. The three tactical combat functions
of firepower, protection, and manoeuvre have
changed their traditional alignment with sus-
tainment, information operations, and com-
mand. As they define the “staying power” of
any intervening force, the three supporting
fundamentals assume greater importance in
PSO. The supporting functions are also the
“most likely” potential PSO roles as success
can no longer be measured by the “most dan-
gerous” criteria of ground taken, enemy cas-
ualties, aircraft lost, or ships sunk.

Despite the shift in emphasis, military
intervention capabilities must reflect all six
functions. Commanders of interventionary
forces must be prepared to conduct opposed
as well as permissive entries into a theatre.
US XVIII Corps staff planned Operations
Uphold Democracy (permissive) and Restore
Democracy (opposed) to cater to both contin-
gencies during the September 1994 interven-
tion in Haiti. The Commander had logistics
plans to support both opposed and permissive
entries. A major difference in the operations
was the projected end strength of the troops
in theatre. The permissive operation required
20,000 troops, the opposed intervention
10,000. An agreement was signed with the
Bahamas to permit use of the island of Great
Inagua as a staging base. Similar agreements
will be necessary for future Canadian partic-
ipation in distant base. While contracts can
be signed as required, the speed of deploy-
ment in an HS crisis requires that detailed
staff checks be conducted prior to deploy-
ment for many regions of the world. These
staff checks must be continually updated to
ensure currency when pulled “off the shelf”.
Pre-planning is essential to ensure the availa-
bility of initial quantities of combat supplies,
for facilities reservations, and for power pro-
jection.

Power projection for an HS, or any
other intervention, implies logistics. A surge
capability for air- and sealift is required for
the introduction of forces into theatre. It al-
so implies Host Nation (HN) support for
land-based pre-positioned stocks of equip-
ment and HN port and airhead support. Ironi-
cally, an unopposed intervention is more dif-
cult as the facilities must be contracted for
rather than taken. If Canada leads HS inter-
ventions, it must assume some responsibility
for the acquisition, distribution in theatre, and
sustainment of HS Network allies, particular-
ly when the ally possesses little or no power
projection capability. Disposition, or dona-
tion, of equipment will have to be considered
in the initial staff checks for the same reason.
Acquisition of consumable supplies in theatre
must shift from the coalition leader to the
HN, as most nations do not have the trans-
port capacity to move bulk consumable items
around a theatre of operations.

Once deployed in an HS intervention,
service members must be mentally flexible.
They must be able to make an abrupt transi-
tion from peacekeeper to “war-fighter” with-
in tightly controlled Rules of Engagement (ROE). Superior commanders hold ROE tightly to contain conflict within prescribed bounds. Commanders at all levels must share an RCP to allow quick engagement of fleet ing targets. Employment of precision guidance and mapping technologies will be necessary at all levels of the chain of command if junior commanders are to be able to respond quickly and with lethal effect against “legitimate targets”. RCP capability is also essential to facilitate unity of command. As middle powers such as Canada will operate within a coalition, the RCP is essential to ensure a common understanding of the battlefield. Therefore, Canada must acquire the capability to share information with allies to support the HS concept. Despite the security risk, intervening nations must also be prepared to share selected information with trusted civilian relief organizations.

NGOs value their neutrality above all, as it provides access to threatened populations and is their best guarantee of safety. Major International Organizations (IOs), such as Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Committee of the Red Cross have established a reputation for maintaining neutrality over the last 30 years. Their efforts focus on not exacerbating crises or prolonging a war and thereby further endangering threatened people. The same criterion must be considered in planning military operations in the HS concept. The preponderance of civilian organizations in HS crises necessitates coordination of efforts to avoid interference with military operations and unnecessary casualties amongst aid workers. Experience in PSOs over the past decade has confirmed the requirement for combined military–civilian organizations to coordinate the multitude of activities needed to achieve peace.

Due to the difficulty in distinguishing the enemy from the surrounding civilian populace in an OOTW environment, enhanced civil–military relations, psychological operations, public affairs, and non-lethal weapons (NLW) capabilities are necessary. Such specialities will soon be focused in what was described by Major-General Doug Dempster as the “Command Support Battalion” (CSB). The CSB will take much of the information management tasks away from the commander and staff and assign it to specialists from the domains of intelligence, Public Affairs, CIMIC, and EW. Coordination of military and civilian peace-building activities within the HS concept must be developed if the CSB potential is to be realized. Canadian doctrine currently assigns this task to the CIMIC function.

Traditionally the CIMIC role is regarded as being of secondary importance as “a hearts and minds” sub-campaign and as an adjunct to gathering local political intelligence on the warring factions. Under the HS concept, military forces support diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives undertaken by IOs and NGOs which may be in theatre before the interventionary force arrives. Current CIMIC doctrine should be broadened to include the concept of interagency cooperation and coordination at the strategic, operational, and tactical command levels. The US doctrinal publication, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, is an example of the integrated concept the CF should adopt. The key concept of “interagency” includes a variety of specific organizations that must be integrated, and coordinated, at the various levels of command within military operations. Adoption of a similar doctrine and establishment of personnel positions would multiply the effectiveness of our military efforts. IOs and NGOs can no longer be treated as an afterthought in conflict theatres, but as allies that should be encouraged in some circumstances.
The CF battle groups and brigade groups responding to an HS crisis must be able to “punch above their weight” across the spectrum of conflict. This can be achieved by combining information technology, specialized individual training and proven “niche capabilities”. The CF must maintain an “RCP” in the joint and combined operations that characterize the HS agenda. Existing capabilities such as CIMIC, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), JTF 2, MIST, and C4I must be enhanced if the CF is to exert strategic influence with the limited forces at its disposal. Amending the doctrinal foundations to emphasize the importance of such organizations will strengthen planning the transitory phase between humanitarian intervention and post-conflict remediation.

**Post-Conflict Remediation — When does the Stick become a Carrot?**

Force is never more operative than when it is known to exist — but is not brandished.

— Alfred Thayer Mahan

Historically, a wartime “end state” occurs with victory over an enemy. Doctrine concerning defeat does not exist beyond describing forcing the enemy’s surrender. Traditional peacekeepers have a clear idea of when defeat occurs, as they separate the victors and the vanquished. Formal surrender following a defeat does not often occur in OOTW. Thus, an interventionary force commander must also understand, predict, and manipulate the circumstances of an HS conflict to contain its spread or flare-ups. As it is difficult to define either the enemy or victory in PSOs, it is difficult to define appropriate “end states” marking the end of an HS crisis. It is doubly difficult to define transition points in each phase of an operation. It is difficult — but not impossible. Transition from “war-fighting” to peace support or traditional peacekeeping operations can begin with the selection of proper HS objectives during the Operations Planning Process. Planning limited objectives is not new — the difficulty is in facilitating or causing the transition from high-intensity, opposed entry to policing and security operations.

A third party can bring a conflict to a close through either mediation or coercion. Mediation is a cooperative process that attempts to convince belligerents that they have each achieved something. The mediating party must be seen as neutral, with neither an interest in the outcome of the conflict, nor the means to influence the outcome. As any military force has some capacity to influence the outcome of a conflict, mediation lies mainly in the diplomatic realm. Although mediation can occur throughout an HS crisis (or war), by the time an interventionary force is committed the time for talking has probably passed. Successful coercion is accomplished by convincing one or more of the warring parties that they have lost and must terminate hostilities. In effect, the intervening force must either defeat or intimidate one or all belligerents to end a conflict. The traditional combat functions of firepower, protection, and manoeuvre accomplish the first goal. Command and sustainment are essential for victory, but are not primary functions. Information Operations are useful, but not essential, in achieving victory. Intimidation requires creating the perception, if not the reality, of imminent defeat for the belligerents. This second goal is accomplished by emphasizing superior sustainment, command, and tactical capabilities in proactive Information Operations.

Superior sustainment is vital to provide clear and convincing evidence that the intervening force has the capacity to outlast
the belligerent. The increased use of civilian Third Party Contractors, sustainment support for, and from, coalition partners, and increased reliance on HN support for bulk consumables are likely to become salient factors in the sustainment of interventional forces.\(^{49}\) Command is facilitated by technology permitting the passage of an RCP to coalition allies, and throughout the chain of command. This technology bridges the gap between the command function and information operations as message traffic of all types has increased exponentially. The volume of message traffic has surpassed the ability of a commander and his traditional G-staff to react. According to Colonel Steven Rotkoff, 30 years ago a corps headquarters received 400 radio teletype messages a day. Today the same headquarters receives 4000 messages an hour.\(^{50}\) The CSB is essential in this type of environment. The role of the CSB is “data fusion” of the traditional battlefield reports, staff analysis, and Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition Reconnaissance (ISTAR) through Information Management tools.\(^{51}\) Thus, the CSB will form the bridge between the combat functions of command and information operations. A practical concern with the CSB is interoperability — which information management systems will be used by our allies. The key dilemma is whether Canada asks its traditional allies what they want us to do in responding to the HS Agenda, or acquires these enhanced capabilities and then tells the allies what it is prepared to do as a coalition leader or key member.

**Conflict Termination Problems**

The game isn’t over till it’s over.

— Yogi Berra, New York Mets Manager

Brigadier-General J.J.R. Gagnon’s campaign plan for the UN Force in Haiti described the end state as occurring “when all forms of security tasks will have ceased without prejudice to the stability of Haiti.”\(^{52}\) Substantial problems not seen in conventional war-fighting operations are possible in HS crises, such as:

- Assistance to Other Government Departments in reintegrating child warriors back into society;
- Demobilization and disarmament;
- Demining and or training assistance to demining activities;
- Assistance to Emergency Relief Organizations;
- Support to War Crimes Tribunals, including MP, civilian police and Legal Branch personnel to investigate genocide, mass rape, and recruitment of child soldiers; and
- Conflict Prevention — traditional monitoring of buffer zones, cease-fire violations, inspection of arms caches, and intelligence on guerrilla leaders and agitators. The 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms offers opportunity for arms control to expand into the domain of small arms.

These non-traditional problems necessitate a closer integration of military and civilian responses to the prevention and containment of conflict. The HS Agenda requires military leaders who can react to novel situations relying on their education, experience, and a willingness to use all assets to resolve a humanitarian crisis.

**CONCLUSION**

Never, never, never believe that any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter.
“Human Security” is a useful construct for garnering support for multilateral intervention in times of crisis. It appeals to the better instincts of most democratic peoples. It will fail, however, if it is not supported by a semi-permanent coalition of like-minded nations who are prepared to act. Such nations must be able to deploy interventionary forces capable of exerting overwhelming combat power long enough to deter or defeat an aggressor.

The HS concept resembles in many respects the peacekeeping operations that Canada has conducted for over 45 years. The main divergence from traditional peacekeeping is that security is expressed in terms of protection of threatened peoples rather than separation of exhausted belligerents. It appears that the HS concept has achieved wide acceptance, at least in theory, from most middle powers. It remains to be seen if consensus can be reached on when the need to intervene can be reconciled with respect for state sovereignty, or when superpower capabilities must be enlisted. Even if the will to intervene is present, the capability does not exist in most of the nations constituting the HS Network. Although HS interventions must include broad-based multidisciplinary teams that will include civilian specialists, the backbone of the intervening force must be military. It must be able to rapidly project overwhelming combat power over great distances, operate within a multinational framework, and be prepared to stay in the crisis region for months. The six combat functions of “firepower, protection, manoeuvre, command, sustainment, and information operations” must guide tailoring of contingency forces and equipment acquisition. If Canada is to lead implementation of the HS Agenda she must be prepared to demonstrate the following military capabilities:

- rapidly deployable armed forces that can operate with coalition allies;
- military airlift and sealift capabilities without dependence on commercial sources;
- a “relevant common picture” of the conflict that can be passed laterally and vertically through all levels of the chain of command; and
- decisive reaction to threats while minimizing collateral damage.

Canadian Expeditionary Forces must be prepared to integrate the activities of numerous civilian organizations, and continually update doctrine to reflect the changing nature of conflict. A Canadian interventionary force must be structured to enhance the combat functions of sustainment, information operations, and command if force projection operations are to support the HS Agenda. While these supporting combat functions may assume greater importance in PSO it is crucial that the “war-fighting” functions of firepower, protection, and manoeuvre be retained and upgraded over time as the requirement remains to be able to respond across the spectrum of conflict. Despite the apparent shift towards “Soft Power”, the CF must maintain the capability to respond across the spectrum of conflict to at least mid-intensity conflict if “Soft Power” is to have any credibility.

The challenge in using interventionary forces lies in the magnitude of the political objective they are sent to achieve. The broader the political objective, the wider the problems associated with its resolution. Quick, easy results will not be the norm in most HS crises. Even if national decision-makers maintain the aim of the interventionary force throughout the HS crisis, there is no guarantee that the intervention will ulti-
mately be successful. Nations supporting HS interventions must also be able to sustain military forces capable of integrating multidimensional peace support activities over a sustained period if they are to succeed in resolving the crisis. If we do not structure the CF to project, command, and sustain expeditionary forces we must resign ourselves to more of the same ad hoc and ineffectual responses to human security crises.

NOTES

1 John Marteinson, *We Stand on Guard* (Montreal: Ovale Publications, 1992), p 250. The Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of Canada arrived in Hong Kong in November 1941 with insufficient vehicles, heavy weapons, and ammunition. The contingent was lost in the Japanese invasion in December. On 19 August 1942 the 2nd Canadian Division conducted a frontal attack on the port of Dieppe with inadequate fire support. The raid cost 3400 casualties of the 5000 troops embarked and the highest RCAF/RAF losses for one day in the war.


4 The HS Agenda is a prime foreign policy objective. In September 2000, Canada sponsored the International Conference on War-Affected Children in Winnipeg, and hosted the inaugural meeting of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 5/6 November 2000 in Ottawa.

5 Lloyd Axworthy, then Foreign Minister, address to the New York University School of Law, February 10, 2000. <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca> 29/01/01 4:10 PM. Other interpretations include the fight against transnational crime, the drug trade, child warriors, and slavery.

6 Axworthy, address to NYU School of Law, February 10, 2000. <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca> 29/01/01 4:10 PM.

7 Maloney, “Global Mobile”, pp 20–23. The 1960s foreign policy debate recommending UN Armies resembles the current debate on HS coalition operations.

8 The concept of Soft Power originated with US political scientist Joseph Nye. Soft Power emphasizes achieving foreign policy goals through persuasion rather than coercion.

9 The 78-day Kosovo air campaign is a recent example of the implementation of the concept.

10 The HS concept is gaining broad acceptance from the UN General Assembly, middle powers and American academia. A plan to establish an independent “Commission on Human Security” was announced after a meeting between UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Mrs. Sadako Ogata on 24 January 2000. The Commission will hold its inaugural meeting in New York before July 2001.


18 They also permit the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to designate virtually anything as a “national interest”. The ad hoc nature of this policy reduces the effectiveness of an HS intervention as the CF could deploy to regions having no Canadian interests in any form.

19 Global reach can be defined in terms of both national influence and the ability to project power.

21 Freedom From Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy For Human Security, <http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreign>, 29/01/01, 3:49 PM. There have been few DFAIT references to military roles in implementing the HS Agenda since its promulgation in 1997.

22 UN Security Council Resolution 1296 (2000) was adopted by the Security Council at its 4130th Meeting, on 19 April 2000 while Canada presided over the UNSC.


24 Interventions in Croatia, Somalia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, and Rwanda all suffered due to this concern.

25 Limitation of collateral damage assumes greater importance in PSO. Fighter aircraft may meet strict ROE by use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW).

26 The Strategic Airlift Program is an essential component of an Expeditionary Force as the C-130 Hercules lacks the “global reach” required to quickly project power beyond North America.

27 1961 Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives (Brock Report) quoted in Maloney, “Global Mobile”, p 25. The Afloat Logistics Ship Concept (ALSC) is a modern version of an old concept.

28 An assessment of the motives and cultural assumptions of the aggressor is crucial, as the political–military communication to the aggressor must be swift and persuasive, and promise a punishment (or reward) not worth the risk of continued aggressive behaviour. A low-level technique used for over 10 years with varied success is trading weapons for food at demobilization centres.


30 Freedom From Fear: Canada’s..., <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign> 29/01/01, 3:49 PM. Only 10 per cent of World War I casualties were civilian.

31 The Sierra Leone civil war typifies the HS crisis. The warring parties are fighting for control of the diamond trade. Child soldiers, including girls as young as 10, fight on both sides. Systematic rape is used to intimidate and to indoctrinate. There are an estimated 120,000 child soldiers in Africa.

32 Tanzania’s 1978 intervention in Uganda is regarded as a success as it hastened the downfall of a despotic regime.


34 Henry Kissinger, “The End of NATO as We Know It?”, Los Angeles Times Syndicate, 15 August 1999. The immediate impact of the campaign was to accelerate ethnic cleansing. The long-term impact appears to be a hardening of the positions of both parties to the dispute.

35 B-GL-300-001/FP-000, Conduct of Operations — Operational Doctrine for the Canadian Army, p 24.

36 E.g., The Republican Guard artillery and armoured forces were designated the operational Centre of Gravity of the Iraqi Army during the Gulf War.


38 Ibid., p 24.

39 The future US Army “Force XXI” will project maximum combat power with minimum weight through reliance on a “Relevant Common Picture”. It will rely on its “Legacy Force” until 2015 for Major Theatre War while developing “Interim Brigade Combat Teams” based on medium equipments.

40 Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) played a key role in diffusing tensions in Haiti.

41 Maj Gen D. Dempster, Address to CSC 27 and Army Tech Staff Course, Fort Hood, TX, 23 Feb 01. Existing and future C4I systems can be “leveraged” to provide the “Relevant Common Picture” essential to battlefield success. Up to 70% of army tactical message traffic concerns locations of friendly and enemy units, and its verification between the levels of command. New RCP systems will reduce this dependence and speed up the decision action cycle.

42 B-GG-005-004/AF-023, Civil–Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis, and War, Ch. 5.

43 Civil–Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis, and War was published in 1997 and later revised to include lessons learned by CIMIC officers deployed with SFOR.

45With the acquisition of the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) and the Coyote Reconnaissance Vehicle the Canadian Army stands poised to develop a “world class” medium army. Essential capital projects to support a new “Canadian Expeditionary Force” would include the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs), and Non-Lethal Weapons (NLWs).


48MIST (see note 31) comprising Public Affairs, Intelligence, and CIMIC personnel, emphasized the superiority of UNTMIH forces in Haiti in every aspect.


50Col. (US) Steven Rotkoff, Commander 504th Military Intelligence Brigade, in a presentation to CFC LCP students, Fort Hood, TX, 27 Feb 01.

51Maj. B.T. Pickard, DLCI Brief to Asst CLS on Command Support Force Generation Issues, 9 Mar 01. The CSB will become a reality in 2004. The Joint Operations Group, J2CIS, TCCS & LFC2IS (SICF/Athena) must be brought into service if the HS Agenda is to be adequately supported.