

TOWARD A PRACTICAL LEADERSHIP MODEL AND BETTER LEADERS: RECOGNISING, FOSTERING AND DEVELOPING EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

by Lieutenant-Colonel Greg Loos

Lieutenant-Colonel Greg Loos joined the Canadian Forces in 1985 and obtained a degree in Electrical Engineering from Queen's University in 1988. A Communications and Electronics Engineering Officer, he served in communication squadrons in Lahr and Baden before obtaining his Master of Electrical Engineering from the Royal Military College. He has served as the Regimental Operations Officer for 79 Communication Regiment and, prior to attending the Canadian Forces College, Major Loos commanded the 8 Air Communication and Control Squadron. Lieutenant-Colonel Loos is posted to NDHQ, in the Directorate of Information Management Requirements.

Most of the leadership definitions...seem to emphasise rational, cognitive processes. For many years it was common to view leadership as a process wherein leaders influence followers to believe it is in their best interest to cooperate in achieving a shared task objective. Until the 1980s, few conceptions of leadership recognised the importance of emotions as a basis for influence. In contrast, many recent conceptions of leadership emphasise the emotional aspects of influence much more than reason. According to this view, only the emotional, value-based aspects of leadership influence can account for the exceptional achievements of groups and organisations. Leaders inspire followers to willingly sacrifice their selfish interests for a higher cause. For example, soldiers risk their lives to carry out an important mission or to protect their comrades.¹

— Gary Yukl

INTRODUCTION

The environment in which military officers must lead continues to rapidly change. There are shifts from traditional war-fighting to low-intensity conflict and operations other than war (OOTW), and from state-versus-state actions to more organisationally and politically complex coalition operations. Added to these geopolitical shifts are rapid technology insertion and revolutionary developments in the battlespace. The “human in command” is therefore more important than ever in this changing environment, having to face a resulting increase in the challenge of effectively leading military forces and organisations.

In this context, it is surprising to find that the Canadian Forces (CF) does not have a current overarching leadership model to help address these challenges, even in the face of growing attention to its leadership failures in the 1990s and the subsequent and ongoing efforts to improve the state of its leadership. Such a model would provide the theoretical and practical backbone for a number of important processes related to leadership screening, training, development, assessment and selection.

Since 1995 there has been growing attention to the concepts of emotional intelligence (EI) and a related emotional quotient (EQ) which address in broad terms many areas of interpersonal and emotional competen-

cy. Drawing from two of the pioneer researchers in the field who first coined the term, Mayer and Salovey, the working definition of EI to be used in this essay is as follows:

Emotional intelligence involves the ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion; the ability to access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth.²

Consistent with its early stages of research and development, EI currently has many conceptions that vary to certain degrees in the extent and detail of their taxonomies, with some debate as to the intellectual rigour of these theories. Notwithstanding their evolving nature, they have nonetheless been embraced as a useful and coherent prescription of very important skills by various fields of endeavour including education and business. A growing body of research suggests that EQ will provide a superior measure of “success” in life than the more traditional measures of cognitive intelligence (such as intelligence quotient or IQ), and EI supporters make a strong case that unlike IQ, an individual’s EQ can be *improved* via a number of methods. The transformational model of leadership, also relatively new in the field of leadership studies, is a promising model for military leaders, and an emerging research correlation between EI and this model serves to further underscore the importance of considering EI in the context of addressing CF leadership doctrine.

Practical application of EI concepts in day-to-day CF human resources (HR) functions might include many aspects of a military officer’s career, from “cradle to grave”, such as recruiting, education and training, leadership development, performance assessment, and selection processes for promotion and key leadership positions. Ultimately, if the CF is to

meaningfully address past deficiencies and future challenges in leadership, a rigorous model of competencies is required to enable a coherent approach to leadership development and related HR activities, and this model must in some way incorporate the important skills and abilities practically described as emotional intelligence.

CHANGING ENVIRONMENT FOR MILITARY ENDEAVOUR

I believe that, if anything, the future will present even greater challenges at a fast-er rate of change. Now is the time to apply the lessons learned to better prepare new generations of officers for the future demands. This means thinking creatively, avoiding complacency, inspiring dedication to the profession of arms and emphasising intellectual development through life-long learning. We need caring, inspirational leadership.³

— General J.M.G. Baril

To make the case for an improved leadership model for the CF, one must examine the context or environment in which military officers will be expected to carry out their functions as leaders. Much has been written in an attempt to forecast this environment, and an exhaustive review of all trends is beyond the scope of this discussion. It will suffice to consider the nature of a few of the more telling areas of global, technological, and societal change, with a view to drawing out those aspects that reaffirm the importance of the “human in command” and might therefore have possible connections to emotional competencies in those human commanders.

With the end of the Cold War, the likelihood of large-scale, interstate warfare has receded, replaced by isolated pockets or regions of international political instability. This has direct ramifications for the CF, implying high-er activity in OOTW, low-intensity

conflict, and worldwide deployments to participate in joint and/or coalition operations. Canadian army doctrine points to the requirements for more flexibility in doctrine, training and leadership, stating in part that “in addition to traditional methods of using lethal force, soldiers must be capable of applying non-lethal responses, including information, and interpersonal skills such as negotiation to achieve success on operations.”⁴

Interest in coalition warfare is on the rise, where coalitions are defined as military forces that are “ad hoc, short term, and established for a specific purpose.”⁵ One of the most sensitive and contentious issues for coalition operations is command and control, more specifically who will command a given nation’s forces and with what authority. General Eisenhower, a supreme allied commander in World War II, provided instructive comments on the concept of allied command and the requisite characteristics of the commander:

The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The true basis lies in the earnest co-operation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theatre. Since co-operation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly upon the individuals in the field. This is true if for no other reason than [that] no commander of an allied force can be given complete administrative and disciplinary powers over the whole command. It will therefore never be possible to say the problem of establishing unity in any allied command is ever completely solved. This problem involves the human equation and must be met day by day. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality,

and firmness, are absolutely essential.⁶

Some of the CF’s lessons in Somalia serve to highlight current and future needs arising out of global employment on OOTW, especially some of the complex psychosocial forces and responses that might be encountered.⁷ In an insightful article on the apparent lack of response on the part of many service personnel who either overheard or directly observed fellow members of the CF abusing Shidane Arone, ultimately leading to his death, Lieutenant-Colonel Shorey discusses this theme. He says in part:

Considering the often dangerous and morally taxing context of contemporary peace support operations, the matter of self and unit monitoring is, to say the least, a demanding personal and professional challenge. The stressors associated with peace support missions can generate a simmering undercurrent of emotions, from frustration and anger, to despondency, guilt and revenge. Under such conditions, maintenance of a disciplined, professional self and unit perspective may prove one of the core challenges for deployed military personnel in the 21st century.⁸

The CF believes that if it prepares and trains for war, then the command skills necessary for OOTW will also be satisfied.⁹ However, with more frequent military deployments of this nature, it might be argued that the “degree of tact, patience, and negotiation skills commanders will require to deal with OOTW may not be commensurate with the type and level of training they currently receive.”¹⁰

In the context of OOTW in a multinational environment, Major-General Clive Milner provided some insight into the selection of United Nations (UN) force commanders, and the qualities that such commanders ought to have, along with some of the challenges those individuals might face.¹¹ Apart from the

list of traditional qualities for a commander, he goes on to add optimism, boundless energy and enthusiasm as key qualities. Given the various contributing contingents, the commander will then have to bring together different nationalities, languages, religions, races, cultures and levels of experience and forge them into a team. In sum, Milner states, “The primary — indeed the most important — factor in all of this teamwork, though, is the commander. So much depends on the individual, his personality, if the thing is going to work.”¹² Certainly command and control in this context are among the most challenging tasks that the military officer will have to face now and likely well into the future. The commander must have skills and abilities beyond those traditionally outlined for military leaders in combat; he or she must have competencies not currently addressed in CF training, development or doctrine.

Arising from the instability of the shifting geopolitical situation, consider as well the pace and tempo of CF operations and the related leadership challenges, mainly in the area of combat or operational stress. In a 1995 report drawn from questionnaires of army personnel deployed on UN peacekeeping missions, the CF Personnel Applied Research Unit revealed the prevalence and nature of the stressors experienced.¹³ Top reported stressors were: double standards among the ranks when it comes to applying the rules; superiors overreacting to situations; feelings that unit members were treated like children; and the feeling that the UN was powerless to affect the situation. Several items in the leadership and management category of stressors reflected soldiers’ dissatisfaction with these critical dimensions, in addition citing “a lack of support from superiors” and “a lack of trust in superiors” as causes for stress.¹⁴ While clearer mission statements and better pre-deployment training were identified as measures to help with this challenge, ultimately it was leadership and confidence in a com-

mander that would make a bigger difference. That confidence has been seen to depend on “a leader’s proficiency, credibility as a source of information and the amount of care and attention paid to the soldier.”¹⁵

Technological change is another area of importance in the characterisation of the future military environment. Its effect on leadership and command will be most profound in the areas of control systems and information warfare. Even now, large and complex headquarters have come to the fore in modern military forces, forming what are essentially control systems that can be unwieldy and challenging to lead, and proving that command is more than a simple matter of mission and authority. In a growing body of work, McCann and Pigeau have worked to clarify the world of command and control (C²), especially in the context of proliferating technology. Among their persuasive arguments and analysis are two important messages: that command is exclusively a *human* activity requiring human leadership, flexibility and creativity; and that a greater emphasis on *control* has resulted in complex systems and technologies that have actually *interfered* with the ability of human commanders to exercise responsible leadership.¹⁶ Thus even in the complex, technology-based military environment of the 21st century, it is still the commander, the leader — the flexible, creative and emotion-susceptible *human* — who must make decisions and ultimately lead others to attain objectives. Human factors count in C², and by extension, human emotions are thus a part of the process.

Consider as well the pace of organisational and technological change that currently is faced by the military. The *revolution in military affairs* (RMA), though not precisely and consistently defined, involves changes of a revolutionary nature, where the magnitude of the change is great compared to pre-existing capabilities. It is suggested that the full reali-

sation of an RMA is contingent upon three pre-conditions, those being technological development, doctrinal innovation and organisational adaptation.¹⁷ Organisational change may often be an emotional process, if only for the stresses it places on individuals above and beyond the normal requirements of their duties. This is especially true when the stakes are such that a purported RMA either unwisely embraced or stubbornly shunned might lead to catastrophic failure in future operations.

Though not exhaustive, the foregoing touches on some of the relevant global, technological, and societal pressures that provide a backdrop for the following discussion of leadership models and emotional competencies. What do these changes collectively mean for military leadership? What kind of leaders does the military need to succeed in this future environment?

A NEW CF LEADERSHIP MODEL AND OFFICERSHIP 2020

I shall desire all and every officer to endeavour by love and affable carriage to command his soldiers, since what is done for fear is done unwillingly, and what is unwillingly attempted can never prosper.

— Earl of Wessex, at Worcester, 24 September 1642¹⁸

There are no easy answers to the above-mentioned questions, but surely the answers begin with the study and development of a fundamental leadership model for the CF. There is currently no core body of knowledge and co-herent and well-defined CF doctrine that forms the foundation of the profession of arms in Canada, nor the role of leadership in that profession. The only existing reference, *Leadership Volume 2: The Professional Officer*,¹⁹ dates from 1973, and has not benefited from the intervening 30 years of development and findings of applicable research in behavioural sciences, leadership, and, for the purposes of this discussion, EI.

In general, the CF's dated doctrine on leadership is in need of development, revision and expansion.

In a strategic document, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)*,²⁰ the CF has taken a first step toward re-dressing the leadership shortfalls that became apparent in the past decade. The scope of *Officership 2020* is to realign the attitudes and philosophies underlying CF officership; to identify the core attributes, education, training and self-development required by CF officers in the future; and to implement a strategy for developing the officer corps over the long term.²¹ This initiative recognises more broadly the changing future environment discussed briefly above, identifies officership capability gaps, and lays out key initiatives and strategic objectives as part of its implementation strategy.

Some of the identified officership capability gaps which are particularly pertinent are:²²

- a shortfall in ability to operate intra- and inter-governmentally at the strategic level, and a lack of the specific skill sets required to function at the strategic and operational levels of conflict which are not fully defined or developed;
- a lack of trust in superiors, and lack of support (loyalty) generally;
- the need for a change in emphasis on leadership theory and models to place great emphasis on development/mentoring and adaptability to change;
- an inability of superiors at higher headquarters to engage with and to earn the trust of members in subordinate formations;
- a lack of effective communications training for leaders;
- officers being perceived as not being held

- accountable for their decisions and actions;
- a lack of the core competencies to lead effectively in a modern high-tempo environment; and
- truth and candour not always being positively reinforced.

Within its outlined Strategic Objectives, however, there is an emphasis on the “Application of Sound Leadership”²³ and developing an “Officer Who Thinks Critically,”²⁴ where in both cases *intellectual* development and competencies are particularly highlighted. It is therefore possible that the “estimate” of what skills and abilities any future revised CF model of military leadership might incorporate has already been “situated”.

Surely the veritable explosion of research in human sciences should be reviewed and leveraged to invest in the development of our leadership model and program. In addition to useful and relevant leadership and organisational dynamics research from the civilian world, the international defence research community is specifically addressing command issues such as “individual and team decision-making, stress, continuous operations, leadership style, etc.”²⁵ If the CF’s leadership theory and model were to embrace a new and perhaps more holistic approach, that is, one which incorporated emotional competencies, would this have any impact on *Officership 2020*’s implementation strategy or its underlying assumptions, implications and objectives?

OVERVIEW OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE CONCEPTS

To arrive at a plausible answer to the preceding question, one needs to know more about EI before determining if it is both important and appropriate in the military context. As stated previously, there is no consensus about the exact nature of EI, as a number of authors have put forward conceptual frameworks that include different factors. Initially

appearing in academic articles in the early 1990s, studies of EI and interest in the concept in general have grown considerably over the past decade. The early work of Mayer, Salovey, et al contributed much of the initial theoretical development and have carried on with what appears to be the most rigorous scientific investigation.²⁶ In 1995, Daniel Goleman started most of the popular interest in EI and its potential for predicting success with his popular book *Emotional Intelligence*. It combined much of the scientific literature on EI, and additional research on connections between emotions and brain functioning and social behaviour respectively, as well as school-based programs to aid children develop emotional and social skills.²⁷ Since then the general notion has appeared in more popular books, and in newspaper and magazine articles. Over the past several years “EQ” has become the widely accepted shorthand as an expression for the EI equivalent of IQ, even though no standardised test has been broadly accepted by all in the field.

Expanding on Mayer and Salovey’s definition given earlier, their revised model or taxonomy of EI’s constituent skills is detailed at Annex A. This chart lays out EI abilities in four branches from basic to higher psychological processes going from left to right across the chart. The four representative abilities in each branch are shown in normal order of emergence from top to bottom, and people high in EI are expected to progress more quickly through these abilities and master more of them.²⁸ Many other references provide greater detail on these concepts and trace their development through empirical and theoretical study.²⁹

Reuven Bar-On has provided another popular model of EI. He defines EI as “an array of noncognitive capabilities, competencies, and skills that influence one’s ability to succeed in coping with environmental demands and pressures.”³⁰ His model is directly re-

lated to his Emotional Quotient Inventory (BarOn EQ-I), a self-report measure of non-cognitive (emotional, personal and social) intelligence that was empirically developed over several years. *The EQ Edge: Emotional Intelligence and Your Success*, authored by Steven Stein and Howard Book, elaborates on this particular formulation with many relevant examples and advice for practical application and self-improvement.³¹ The Bar-On model's major areas of skills and specific abilities are summarised in the table at Annex B.

Goleman defines EI as the abilities which "include self-control, zeal and persistence, and the ability to motivate oneself."³² His model's organisation of emotional competencies is provided at Annex C.

DISCUSSION OF EI MODELS

The models described above represent examples of mental ability models as well as mixed models. Although Mayer and Salovey's initial work included discussion of personality characteristics as part of their EI model, they have since restricted their theoretical work to a mental ability conception only, where the focus is on emotions themselves and their interactions with thought.³³ These researchers contend that it is important to distinguish between mental ability models like their own and the commercially popular variants that comprise mixed models.³⁴ The latter models, like those of Goleman and Bar-On, include mental abilities as well as a mix of other characteristics such as motivation, states of consciousness, and social activity as a single entity.³⁵

One of the more appealing aspects of all of these models is that they are subject to measurement. Mental ability models may be assessed by direct measurement through emotional ability tests as well as through self-reported ability questionnaires. The Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) is one example of a full-fledged test of EI as a set of

mental abilities that has proven a reliable measurement tool. For mixed models there are several self-report measures such as Bar-On's EQ-i. Although these self-report methods may be subject to filtering through an individual's (perhaps inaccurate) self-concept or a desire to impress, their proponents assert that their tools are "capable of providing a reliable and valid measure of noncognitive intelligence."³⁶ Overall, much remains to be done in the validation of EI measurement tools, as professional sentiment towards them varies. The HR community is found to be generally supportive, the training community somewhat more sceptical, and the field of personnel psychology in a state of mild curiosity.³⁷

Of course there is dissent to the theoretical and empirical validity of EI research. As an example, from their investigation of measures of EI, traditional human cognitive abilities, and personality, the conclusions of Davies et al were not supportive in general.³⁸ They assessed that the relatively low reliability of self-report measures, and the loading on some of the personality factors in mixed models, limited the EI construct.

Notwithstanding the dissent, what is perhaps most interesting and exciting is that all of the researchers claim that EI measures have been able to predict success, or significant potential for success, in various fields from education through business to leadership in general. Psychologists recognise that general intelligence predicts some aspects of success, where it may account for 10 to 20%, leaving much room for EI to predict a portion. Much of the growing body of research has shown a higher correlation between EI and (broadly defined) success than between IQ and success.³⁹ EI identifies a previously overlooked area of ability critical to certain human functioning. What is important in the context of this paper is the vital link between EI and success in the human function known as leadership.

EI AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Therefore conflict remains ultimately an activity of human creativity and intuition powered by the strength of human will. It requires intuition to grasp the essence of unique situations, creativity to devise innovative solutions and the strength of purpose to act. Conflict is above all a moral undertaking. As a result, moral forces exert a more significant influence on the nature and outcome of conflict than do physical.

— B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *Conduct of Land Operations — Operational-Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*⁴⁰

The human heart is the starting point in all matters pertaining to war.

—Maurice de Saxe: *Reveries*, 1732⁴¹

How then, to more directly relate the concepts of EI to military leadership? The scope here will allow a brief consideration of EI in relation to the CF's model of the past, and to potential models for the future. Although not a treatise on the shortfalls of *Leadership Volume 2: The Professional Officer*, some discussion will be useful to give an indication of potential future application of EI to CF leadership doctrine. *The Professional Officer's* overall theoretical explication of officer leadership combines a "trait" and a "situational" approach. The trait approach was one of the earliest to be used for studying leadership, emphasising the personal attributes of leaders; however, massive research in this area failed to identify traits that would guarantee leadership success.⁴² The situational approach considers more the contextual factors such as the characteristics of the followers, the nature of the work performed by the group to be led, and the external environment.⁴³ *The Professional Officer's* discussion of leadership might loosely be described as "transactional" in nature, although no specific model, ideal or otherwise, is enunciated or pre-

scribed for the military leader in this reference.⁴⁴

This dated CF reference could readily be made more lucid, robust and intellectually sound with the application of the tenets of EI to the elaboration of its points. Intuitive links to EI's "abilities" can be easily drawn to many aspects of *The Professional Officer*, from its outlined "qualities" and "skills" to its discussion of leadership approaches.⁴⁵ With a more radical approach to its rewrite, starting from first principles which include EI at its core, the result could be something much more coherent, intuitively logical, and ultimately more useful.

As an example, this volume discusses leadership approaches, defining them by the level of interaction between leader and follower, and the fact that they may be applied in different situations. The approaches cited are "authoritative", "participatory" and "free rein". Annex D replicates the table that discusses the potential results when an inappropriate approach is used in a situation calling for another. What is common to all the poorly matched "leader approaches" to "situational requirements" is that the results described might also be called *symptoms* that must be *recognised* by the astute leader, to allow him or her to properly adjust the approach. The majority of these symptoms as outlined are actually *emotional* responses such as aggression, apathy, loss of morale, follower resistance, indecision, irritated followers, distraction, confusion, and no sense of satisfaction. This suggests some kind of EI would be necessary to be able to become aware of, and properly interpret, those emotions.

With respect to decision-making, the current leadership guide is somewhat naïve and misleading, portraying it as a rational, logical process when it is in fact fraught with emotion in a wide range of circumstances, especially on the battlefield. It warns a leader of the *limitation* of "emotional involvement"

vis-à-vis problem solving and decision-making.⁴⁶ More informed leadership doctrine would underscore the likely *presence* of emotional factors, both within oneself and externally among superiors, peers, subordinates or adversaries; would encourage heightened *awareness* of these factors; and then perhaps suggest means or strategies to put these emotions *to use* as an aid. Leadership theorist and researcher, Gary Yukl, supports this point by painting a more accurate picture of decision-making:

Leaders are seldom observed to make major decisions at a single point in time, and they are unable to recall when a decision was finally reached. Some major decisions are the result of many small actions or incremental choices taken without regard to larger strategic issues. Decision processes are likely to be characterised more by confusion, disorder, and emotionality than by rationality.⁴⁷

Rather than simply revise this older transactional model of leader, the CF may choose to adopt transformational leadership in future military doctrine as some other Western militaries are doing.⁴⁸ In the field of leadership studies, transformational leadership is the current theory attracting the most research and support, largely due to its documented positive effects such as enhancing subordinates' satisfaction and trust in leadership, as well as employees' emotional commitment and improved organisational performance.⁴⁹ Transformational leadership has been defined as superior leadership performance that occurs when leaders "broaden and elevate the interests of their employees, when they generate awareness and acceptance of the purposes and mission of the group, and when they stir their employees to look beyond their own self-interest for the good of the group."⁵⁰

Recent research has begun to investigate how transformational leadership develops, and one factor receiving a great deal of at-

tention is its relationship to EI and EQ. Many prominent EI theorists have proposed that for effective leadership, handling emotions effectively will likely contribute to how one deals with the needs of individuals, motivates subordinates and creates a positive "feeling" at work.⁵¹ Empirical research is now bearing out these propositions,⁵² with exploratory field studies showing strong correlation between EI and transformational leadership's key attributes of idealised influence⁵³, inspirational motivation⁵⁴, and individualised consideration.⁵⁵ Other research argues that the EI ability of self-awareness in particular is critical to transformational leadership effectiveness.⁵⁶ Although more empirical research must be done for validation, the implications of these findings are that EI is fundamentally linked to transformational leadership, and therefore any adoption of this leadership theory would benefit from a similar incorporation of the tenets of EI theory.

Closely related to leadership theory and doctrine, ongoing theoretical developments in the area of C² being worked on by McCann and Pigeau should also be considered. Although C² is not synonymous with leadership, they are closely linked, and the relation of EI to their work is of interest to this discussion. These researchers have proposed a new human-centred definition of C² as: "the establishment of common intent and the subsequent transformation of intent into coordinated action."⁵⁷ They argue that common intent is made up of explicit intent (public) and implicit intent (intent not overtly stated), and that the "principle role of command is to develop shared implicit intent so that common intent for a mission can be effectively and quickly established."⁵⁸ This shared implicit intent is a preparatory activity achieved by establishing a command climate wherein "trust, confidence, leadership, motivation, creativity, initiative, pride and esprit de corps can be developed."⁵⁹ Further, they address the subject of leadership as it relates to

C², positing that leadership establishes the motivation for sharing intent and provides the means by which it is facilitated. Leadership in C² is defined as “the act of resolving intra- and inter-personal conflicts for the purpose of achieving common intent.”⁶⁰

They further define command as “the creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish a mission.”⁶¹ As command is a *human* endeavour, closely related to leadership, they propose four necessary personal areas of competency: physical, intellectual, emotional, and interpersonal. The field of EI has the potential to contribute to this C² development by addressing two of these areas, the emotional and interpersonal competencies. Their proposed “emotional competency” is related to emotional “toughness” or resilience, hardiness and the ability to cope under stress.⁶² For “interpersonal competency,” or dealing with people, they identify social skills as its basis, and relate it to being able to develop trust, respect, and empathy to get effective teamwork.⁶³ One can see many parallels here between the proposed competencies and the abilities comprising the various EI models, especially some of the mixed models. The emotional and interpersonal competencies for command pointed to by McCann and Pigeau are underpinned by EI and are indeed important underlying factors for fleshing out this new schema of C² and leadership.

Concluding this essay on emerging EI theory and its relevance to current and future CF leadership doctrine, it is apparent that with only this cursory analysis, there is great potential benefit for incorporating EI in this context. If one now agrees with the premise that EI competencies are important for military leadership, it follows that EI should form part of its future leadership model. Further, it should then be practically implemented by establishing desired levels of individual EQ achievement, and standards for EI competencies to be used throughout various HR processes. Be-

yond the potential for developing better leaders, these practical applications to be discussed next will provide value to the CF in many direct and meaningful ways.

POTENTIAL PRACTICAL UTILITY OF EI

There is a burgeoning EI consultant industry as many in business and educational fields have moved quickly to gain benefit from “the beginning stages of what many authorities believe will be the next revolution in business.”⁶⁴ Businesses and health care institutions are hiring EQ consultants to conduct audits, provide workshops, and administer off-site reading and writing assignments tailored to group and individual EQ profiles.⁶⁵ As Goleman asserts, there can be costs to a business’ “bottom line” due to low levels of EI, including decreased productivity, an increase in missed deadlines, more mistakes, and an exodus of employees to more congenial settings.⁶⁶

Accepting the premise that EI is important to the success of organisations, the next step would be practical implementation. The additional premises that EI is *measurable* and *teachable* are the keys to many of the possible benefits of embracing EI. As the evidence gathers to buttress these latter two claims, the potential for many important HR functions is obvious. Recruiting, leadership training and development, performance evaluation, and selection for promotion and key appointments would all potentially benefit from the use of EI assessments and/or instruction.

Recruiting. Recruiting might benefit in a number of ways including selection of recruiters themselves, better screening of potential recruits, and ultimately improved intake results for CF recruiting efforts. One of the largest and most often quoted EI studies involved US Air Force efforts to improve recruiting using EI. To counter a problem with high turnover of their recruiters, they combined individual self-report Bar-On EQ-i results with

assessments of assigned quota performance to find a 45% correlation with the 15 components of EI in the Bar-On model.⁶⁷ This was a much higher correlation than could have been predicted by cognitive intelligence alone, and the information was used to reorganise recruiter training on the five aspects that were assessed as critical: assertiveness, empathy, happiness, self-awareness and problem-solving. A customised computer “model” version of the EQ-i that correlated with recruiting success was created to use as part of the selection process for picking new recruiters. As a result of these efforts, retention for recruiters went from 50% to 92%, and these air force recruiters outperformed those of other services by twice as much.

Given the emerging link between EI and the desired aspects of transformational leadership, EI testing could also provide an initial, early indication of leadership potential, and would provide the military a means of selecting leaders from potential recruits.⁶⁸ Thus, benefits might be found on both sides of the recruiting equation.

Officer leadership training and development. The leadership requirements of the new military environment are in turn placing high demands on our leadership-training programme to inculcate the necessary skills in leaders throughout their military career. Ultimately these demands will not be met if the CF fails to properly identify the fundamental models and principles to be taught.

As Goleman says of EI:

It is fortunate, then, that emotional intelligence can be learned. The process is not easy. It takes time and, most of all, commitment. But the benefits that come from having a well-developed emotional intelligence, both for the individual and the organisation, make it worth the effort.⁶⁹

If EI can be developed through training,

as suggested by Goleman and others, then individuals and the military as a whole could gain significant benefit by providing this training and adding EI development objectives to the officer leadership development program.⁷⁰ Since EI addresses leadership at a fundamental level, the growing pool of tools, products and courses developed for the same leadership purposes in other fields such as business and education would likely require little modification for use by the military. The financial benefits of providing some of any future military EI training requirements through the latter Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) approach are obvious.

Many leading educational institutions such as the University of Michigan, University of Pennsylvania, and Harvard are addressing EQ in their MBA and MHA programs.⁷¹ The Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University developed an innovative course called Managerial Assessment and Development that follows the “guide-lines for best EI practices” outlined by Goleman’s *Consortium for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organisations*.⁷² Many of Weatherhead’s MBA students have thus profited by choosing a specific set of competencies to strengthen, and then pursuing a highly individualised learning plan based on these desired target areas. EQ measurements of these students, taken before and after, showed marked improvement in the target areas, improvements that were assessed to have stuck with them for up to three years in follow-up testing.

Thus the CF would have recourse to a number of avenues in training and development, from COTS products to be used in a decentralised or self-study fashion, to accredited short courses or workshops loaded and administered centrally through the Integrated Training Management Information System (ITMIS). Individuals would make use of self-assessment tests to identify their own EI

weaknesses and thus tailor their own development path by seeking those workshops or short courses that addressed their needs. Military post-graduate students might opt for studies at leadership and management schools that offered the desired EI programmes and courses. As well, CF institutions such as the Royal Military College or Canadian Forces College would draw from the revised leadership model and the wealth of other related research material to add EI to leadership modules in their respective curricula. Finally, those officers assessed with higher EQs might be so earmarked as part of some future formalised approach to a mentoring programme. The research shows that they would be better mentors in general, and would specifically be able to *pass on* key EI skills and abilities to those mentored.

Performance assessment and promotion selection. Also relying on valid measurement tools geared to desired military EQ profiles, performance assessment could receive a large boost from EI. By introducing EI formally as part of a revision to the CF Performance Assessment System (CFPAS), and to the Personnel Evaluation Report (PER) itself, it may be possible to put the assessment process into a more coherent and logical framework that is easier to understand and to teach to supervisors. With the addition of assessment factors related to EI competencies that have proven to be *measurable* contributors to transformational leadership, and adding an intuitive explanation of how those factors combine to create better leadership, performance assessment would improve. Ultimately, PERs are used for promotion selection. If officers are promoted based on technical proficiency but they do not possess the EI for success at the higher ranks where they will ultimately be responsible for the (emotional) well-being of greater numbers of people, then the system is deficient as a promotion selection process.

The latest update to the CFPAS had as one of its objectives a desire to improve the

feedback aspect of the supervisor–subordinate relationship. With this in mind, a further step might add a self-report such as the EQ-i to the supervisor’s assessment to provide more meaningful feedback, identify potential areas for improvement, and augment the counselling aspect of the process.⁷³ This test of self-awareness, by comparing self-report to external feedback, has been shown by research to be very important. In other words, good self/other agreement points to good self-awareness, which in turn highlights a higher EI and a better transformational leader.⁷⁴ If the comparison shows poor self/other agreement, simply *carrying out the comparison* would help to ameliorate that weakness, and an individual would also have a well-defined set of performance areas or competencies as a starting point for personal development.

Selection for key appointments/assignments. Closely related to performance evaluation and promotion selection is the selection process for key appointments and positions such as command of formed or ad hoc units for operational deployment, or important senior staff positions in UN or other coalition missions. There is potential to add some rigour, based on EI principles among others, to the present ad hoc selection process for these key appointments as an effort to ensure that the as-yet-unheralded EI criteria for leader success are properly considered. Once the short list for potential appointees has been assembled, self-report or other objective EQ tests could be administered to candidates to assist in discrimination and final selection. At the very least, selection board members would have additional, meaningful, measurable data to aid in their decision-making. Ideally, the “right” leader would be chosen more often, making for greater success on these missions, less operational stress on those being led, and fewer debacles resulting from failed leadership.

CONCLUSION

If IQ rules, it is only because we let it.

And when we let it rule, we choose a bad master.

— Robert Sternberg⁷⁵

The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.

— B.H. Liddel Hart,
Thoughts on War, 1944⁷⁶

The demanding military environment of the 21st Century will require the very best in leadership if the CF is to succeed in assigned missions, roles and tasks. Technological advances, a continued focus on OOTW, a reliance on coalition action and societal pressures will all combine to require individuals who possess competencies above and beyond those traditionally delineated for the military leader. This requirement for new competencies related to some of the “soft skills” of interpersonal interaction, negotiation, empathy, patience and emotional control will challenge the traditional notions of the “ideal” military leader.

Assessing this environment and reacting to some cases of leadership failure, the CF is rightly addressing leadership development as a strategic issue for the organisation, and these initiatives will hopefully see the introduction of a new leadership model as a core vision to which other developmental activities may be anchored. The time is therefore ripe for a broad consideration of the wealth of research into social psychology, leadership and group dynamics that has been conducted since the last time CF leadership doctrine was published almost three decades ago. A new model and vision thus developed on valid and insightful new leadership research would provide a sounder footing on which to construct the officer leadership development program outlined in *Officership 2020*.


Emerging concepts in the field of EI indicate that it would be prudent to review them specifically in this context. In this new area of investigation, more research will be necessary to quell controversy and achieve consensus on

EI definitions and more widely accepted measures for EQ. This paper’s review has shown that EI principles can be easily linked to CF leadership doctrine of the past, but more importantly, it appears that EI theory may also assist in developing new approaches to C² and in making the transition from a transactional to a transformational leadership model.

With its connections to transformational leadership and its successes in business and education fields already well documented, EI seems poised to be a defining theory for organisational success well into the future. The CF need not wait for a new leadership model to be complete, as benefits to various HR functions could be realised *today* using the off-the-shelf EI products currently available. Recruiters could come closer to achieving recruitment quotas, and more easily pick out leadership potential among new recruits. Leadership training might receive an immediate boost if the CF were to support attendance at various external EI short courses or workshops, with the additional aim of assessing these training means for relevancy to military officer requirements. EQ self-reporting and other currently available testing could similarly be implemented on a trial basis as adjuncts to the CFPAS superior/subordinate feedback process, and as an additional tool for use on command selection boards. In the longer term, with *customisation* of EI tools based on a completed leadership model and unique military environment requirements, the improvements in these HR functions would be further increased.

Emotional intelligence thus provides exciting new concepts that will greatly assist the CF in its quest to redefine, develop and implement a new strategy for leadership. In the end, success for the CF in this effort will be contingent on properly shaping its leadership vision and key HR functions in terms of important emotional competencies.

ANNEX A: MAYER AND SALOVEY'S MODEL OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE⁷⁷



ANNEX B: CONCEPTUAL COMPONENTS OF BAR-ON'S MODEL OF EMOTIONAL AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE⁷⁸

Intrapersonal Components	
Emotional Self-Awareness	The ability to be aware of, and understand, one's feelings.
Assertiveness	The ability to express feelings, beliefs, and thoughts and defend one's rights in a nondestructive manner.
Self-Regard	The ability to be aware of, understand, accept, and respect oneself.
Self-Actualization	The ability to realize one's potential capacities and to do what one can do, wants to do, and enjoys doing.
Independence	The ability to be self-directed and self-controlled in one's thinking and actions and to be free of emotional dependency.
Interpersonal Components	
Empathy	The ability to be aware of, to understand, and to appreciate the feelings of others.
Social Responsibility	The ability to demonstrate oneself as a cooperative, contributing, and constructive member of one's group.
Interpersonal Relationship	The ability to establish and maintain mutually satisfying relationships that are characterized by emotional closeness, intimacy, and giving and receiving affection.
Adaptability Components	
Reality Testing	The ability to assess the correspondence between what is emotionally experienced and what objectively exists.
Flexibility	The ability to adjust one's emotions, thoughts, and behaviour to changing situations and conditions.
Problem Solving	The ability to identify and define problems as well as to generate and implement potentially effective solutions.
Stress Management Components	
Stress Tolerance	The ability to withstand adverse events, stressful situations, and strong emotions without "falling apart" by actively and positively coping with stress.
Impulse Control	The ability to resist or delay an impulse, drive, or temptation to act, and to control one's emotions.
General Mood Components	
Optimism	The ability to look at the brighter side of life and to maintain a positive attitude, even in the face of adversity and negative feelings.
Happiness	The ability to feel satisfied with one's life, to enjoy oneself and others, and to have fun and express positive feelings.

ANNEX C: GOLEMAN’S MODEL OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE⁷⁹

Major Area of Skills	Specific Examples
Knowing One’s Emotions	Recognising a feeling <i>as it happens</i> .
	Monitoring feelings from moment to moment.
Management of Emotions	Handling feelings so they are appropriate.
	Ability to soothe oneself.
	Ability to shake off rampant anxiety, gloom, or irritability.
Motivating Oneself	Marshaling emotions in the service of a goal.
	Delaying gratification and stifling impulsiveness.
	Being able to get into the “flow” state.
Recognising Emotions in Others	Empathic awareness.
	Attunement to what others need or want.
Handling Relationships	Skill in managing emotions in others.
	Interacting smoothly with others.

ANNEX D: TYPICAL RESULTS COMPARING APPROACH REQUIRED TO APPROACH ADOPTED (FROM A-PD-131-002/PT-001, LEADERSHIP, VOL 2: THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICER)⁸⁰

	Authoritative Approach Adopted	Participative Approach Adopted	Free-rein Approach Adopted
Authoritative Approach Required	Satisfactory Results	Indecision and loss of time Failure to meet deadlines Failure to select and maintain the aim Loss of control	Confusion Failure to accomplish mission Emergence of leader to take place of formal leader
Participative Approach Required	Performance goals Achieved Recreational goals not achieved Work drops off when leader absent Both aggression and apathy in followers Loss of morale and group solidarity	Satisfactory Results	Work goals not achieved Recreational goals achieved Work irregular and disorganized No sense of satisfaction by followers Much activity to no purpose
Free-rein Approach Required	Follower resistance and sabotage Information kept from leader Followers withdraw from situation	Followers irritated by leader’s interference Loss of working time Distraction from objectives	Satisfactory Results

NOTES

¹Gary Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* (4th ed; New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998), p 4.

²John D. Mayer and Peter Salovey, "What is Emotional Intelligence?," in *Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence*, ed by Peter Salovey and David J. Sluyter (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p 10.

³Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance for the Canadian Forces Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System* (Ottawa: DND Canada, February 2001), p ii.

⁴Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *Conduct of Land Operations — Operational-Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1996), p 1-5.

⁵Anthony J. Rice, "Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare," *Parameters*, Vol XXVII, No 1, Spring 1997, p 152.

⁶*Ibid.*, p 159.

⁷LCdr George Shorey, "Bystander Non-intervention and the Somalia Incident," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 1, No 4 (Winter 2000–2001), p 20.

⁸*Ibid.*, p 27.

⁹DND, B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *Conduct of...*

¹⁰Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau, "Taking Command of C²," *Second International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology* (Market Bosworth, UK, 24–26 September, 1996), p 12.

¹¹Clive Milner, "Command and Control of International Forces," in *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*, ed by Alex Morrison (Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995).

¹²*Ibid.*, p 174.

¹³Captain K.M. Farley, "Stress in Military Operations Working Paper 95-2" (unpublished research paper, Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, Ontario), September 1995.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p 17.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p 17.

¹⁶Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, "Putting 'Command' back into Command and Control: the human perspective," *Proceedings of Command and Control Conference, Canadian Defence Preparedness Association* (Congress Centre, Ottawa, 25 Sept. 1995), p 3.

¹⁷James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, "Revolutions in Military Affairs," *Joint Force Quarterly* No 4, Spring, 1994, p 25.

¹⁸From Michael Dewar, ed, *An Anthology of Military Quotations* (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1990), p 141.

¹⁹Department of National Defence, A-PD-131-002/PT-001, *Leadership, Volume 2: The Professional Officer* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1973), p 1-1.

²⁰DND, *Canadian Officership in the 21st.....*

²¹*Ibid.*, p 1.

²²*Canadian Officership in the 21st Century Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance for the Canadian Forces Officer Corps and the Officer Professional Development System* (Ottawa: DND Canada, February 2001), p I-12 to I-17.

²³*Ibid.*, p I-23.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p I-26.

²⁵McCann and Pigeau, "Taking Command...", p 13.

²⁶See among others:

Peter Salovey and John D. Mayer, "Emotional Intelligence," *Imagination, Cognition and Personality*, Vol 9, No 3, 1990, pp 185–211;

John D. Mayer and Peter Salovey, "The Intelligence of Emotional Intelligence," *Intelligence*, Vol 17, 1993, pp 433–442; and

John D. Mayer, David R. Caruso, and Peter Salovey, "Emotional Intelligence Meets Traditional Standards for an Intelligence," *Intelligence*, Vol 27, No 4, 2000, pp 267–298.

²⁷Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, "Models of Emotional Intelligence," in *Handbook of Intelligence*, ed by Robert J. Sternberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p 396.

²⁸Mayer and Salovey, "What is Emotional Intelligence?," in *Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence*, ed by Peter Salovey and David J. Sluyter (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p 14.

²⁹See among others:

Mayer and Salovey, "What is...", pp 3–31.

Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, "Models of...", pp 396–420; and

Peter Salovey, Brian T. Bedell, Jerusha B. Detweiler and John D. Mayer, "Current Directions in Emotional Intelligence Research," in *Handbook of Emotions*, ed by Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), pp 504–520.

³⁰Reuven Bar-On, *The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): Technical Manual* (Toronto: Multi-Health Systems, 1997).

³¹Steven J. Stein and Howard E. Book, *The EQ Edge: Emotional Intelligence and Your Success* (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co Ltd, 2000).

³²Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence* (New York: Bantam, 1995), p xii.

³³Salovey and Mayer, "Emotional Intelligence," *Imagination, Cognition and Personality*, Vol 9, No 3, 1990, pp 185–211.

³⁴Mayer, "Emotional intelligence: popular or scientific psychology?", *APA Monitor*, Vol 30, No 8 (September 1999).

³⁵Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, "Models of...", p 403.

³⁶See:

Reuven Bar-On, "Development of the Bar-On EQ-I: A Measure of Emotional and Social Intelligence," Paper presented at the 105th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Chicago, August 1997, p 25; and

Darek Dawda and Stephen D. Hart, "Assessing emotional intelligence: reliability and validity of the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-I) in university students," *Personality and Individual Differences*, Vol 28, 2000, pp 797–812.

³⁷James Kierstead. "Human Resource Management Trends and Issues: Emotional Intelligence (EI) in the Workplace", <http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/pr_cb/rd/pdr/docs/ei_e.htm>.

³⁸Michaela Davies, Lazar Stankov and Richard D. Roberts, "Emotional Intelligence: In Search of an Elusive Construct," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol 75, No 4, 1998, pp 989–1015.

³⁹Mayer and Salovey, "What is Emotional ...", p 18.

⁴⁰B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *Conduct of Land Operations...*, p 1-5.

⁴¹From Michael Dewar, ed, *An Anthology of Military Quotations* (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1990), p 151.

⁴²Yukl, *Leadership in ...*, p 8.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p 10.

⁴⁴Transactional leadership has been described as that which motivates followers by appealing to their self-interest, involving those values relevant to the exchange between leader and follower such as honesty, fairness, responsibility, and reciprocity. From *Leadership in...*, p 325.

⁴⁵A-PD-131-002/PT-001, *Leadership*, Volume 2, *The Professional Officer* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1973), p 2-5.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p 10-7.

⁴⁷Yukl, *Leadership in...*, p 20.

⁴⁸Major Carl M. Johnson (US Army), "Leadership in Force XXI: Is the Army's Current Leadership Model and Leader Development Doctrine Properly Addressing the Challenges Brought About by the Transition to Force XXI?" (unpublished research report, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1999), p 21.

⁴⁹Julian Barling, Frank Slater and E. Kevin Kelloway, "Transformational leadership and emotional intelligence: an exploratory study," *Leadership & Organization Development Journal*, 21/3, 2000, p 157.

For specific comment on benefits of transformational leadership in the military context, see also: Bernard M. Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industry, Military, and Educational Impact* (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998).

⁵⁰B.M. Bass and B.J. Avolio, *Transformational Leadership Development: Manual for the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire* (Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1990), p 21.

⁵¹Benjamin Palmer, Melissa Walls, Zena Burgess, and Con Stough, "Emotional intelligence and effective leadership," *Leadership & Organization Development Journal*, 22/1, 2000, p 5.

⁵²Barling, Slater and Kelloway, "Transformational leadership and...", 2000, pp 157–161.

⁵³"Idealised influence" or charisma refers to transformational leaders who serve as a role model for their followers, thereby enhancing followers' trust in and respect for leaders. From Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations* (New York: Free Press, 1985).

⁵⁴"Inspirational motivation" or charisma refers to transformational leaders who motivate and inspire their

subordinates to work toward common goals. From Bass, *Leadership and...*

⁵⁵“Individual consideration” refers to transformational leaders who pay special attention to the achievement and developmental needs of subordinates. From Bass, *Leadership and ...*

⁵⁶John J. Sosik and Lara E. Megerian, “Understanding leader emotional intelligence and performance: The role of self–other agreement on transformational leadership perceptions,” *Group & Organization Management*, Vol 24, No 3 (Sep 1999), p 367.

⁵⁷McCann and Pigeau, “Taking Command...”, p 3.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p 4.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p 4.

⁶⁰Pigeau and McCann, *Re-defining Command and Control* (unpublished — third in series, Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, 1998), p 17.

⁶¹McCann and Pigeau, “Clarifying the Concepts of Control and Command,” *Proceedings of the 1999 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium* (US Naval War College, 29 June–1 July 1999), p 5.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p 7.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p 7.

⁶⁴Robert Cooper and Ayman Sawaf, *Executive EQ: Emotional Intelligence in Leadership Organizations* (New York: Perigee, 1997), p xi.

⁶⁵Robert J. Grossman, “Emotions at work,” *Health Forum Journal*, Vol 43, No 5 (Sep/Oct 2000), pp 20–21.

⁶⁶Daniel Goleman, “The emotionally competent leader,” *The Healthcare Forum Journal*, Vol 41, No 2, p 36.

⁶⁷Steven J. Stein and Howard E. Book, *The EQ*

⁶⁸Barling, Slater and Kelloway, “Transformational leadership and...”, 21/3, 2000, p 160.

⁶⁹Daniel Goleman, “What Makes a Leader?”, *Harvard Business Review*, Vol 76, November–December 1998, p 102.

⁷⁰Barling, Slater and E. Kevin Kelloway, “Transformational leadership and...”, 21/3, 2000, p 160.

⁷¹Grossman, “Emotions ...”, p 22.

⁷²Anne Fisher, “Success secret: A high emotional IQ,” *Fortune*, Vol 138, No 8, p 298.

⁷³Bass, *Transformational Leadership: Industry, Military,...*, p 84.

⁷⁴Sosik and Megerian, “Understanding leader emotional...”, p 367.

⁷⁵Robert K Cooper, “Applying emotional intelligence in the workplace,” *Training and Development*, Vol 51, No 12, p 31.

⁷⁶From Michael Dewar, ed, *An Anthology of Military Quotations* (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1990), p 151.

⁷⁷Adapted from John D. Mayer and Peter Salovey, “What is Emotional Intelligence?,” in *Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence*, ed by Peter Salovey and David J. Sluyter (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p 11.

⁷⁸Reuven Bar-On, *The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): Technical Manual* (Toronto: Multi-Health Systems, 1997).

⁷⁹Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence* (New York: Bantam, 1995).

⁸⁰Department of National Defence, A-PD-131-002/PT-001, *Leadership, Volume 2: The Professional Officer* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1973), p 3-10.

Edge: Emotional Intelligence and Your Success (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co Ltd, 2000), p 225.