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THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES:

THE STRATEGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF CANADA'S 3D APPROACH TO INTERVENTION

By/par

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Abstract

This paper critically examines the status of Canada's 3D or whole-of-government approach to international intervention. In so doing, the modern context of 3D is framed by tracing the history and evolution of the approach from pre-Confederation Canada to post-WWII Germany to modern interventions in Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The paper asserts that the current policy is neither sufficiently inclusive nor supported by the doctrinal and governmental structures necessary to maximize effects in the field.

Although the strategic and institutional foundations of the policy are weak, its rationale is not. Canada has publicly and internationally committed to the 3D approach, and through this policy has the potential to not only contribute to greater global security, but to enhance its reputation on the world stage. Thus, the paper concludes with five broad recommendations designed to bolster the probability of the policy's success. These recommendations involve change in the following areas: the recognition of what the 3D approach entails; the resolution of the Canadian International Development Agency's mandate; the clarification and development of the policy; the necessity of 'branding' and selling the policy; and the creation of the governmental structures and mechanisms to support it.

The paper contends that in the end, the success or failure of this approach to international intervention will be determined not in Afghanistan or other far-off lands, but in the nation's capital.

By mutual confidence, and mutual aid,
Great deeds are done, and great discov'ries made…[1]

-Homer, *The Iliad*, c. 800 B.C.

Introduction

The dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signalled not only the denouement of the Soviet Empire, but the beginning of new world order in which the security needs of states were radically transformed. While an unparalleled period of world calm and prosperity was anticipated, these utopian dreams were forever shattered by the events of 11 September 2001. It is now clear that the early 21st century is, in the continuum of world history, a period of significant instability and uncertainty. Indeed, a recent strategic assessment from Canada's Department of National Defence states that the world is now experiencing a 'power earthquake' the likes of which have been seen only twice during the last two centuries – the Napoleonic Wars and the so-called German Wars of the first half of the 20th century.[2]

Since the end of the Cold War, arguably preventable humanitarian crises like Srebrenica and Rwanda have provoked considerable thought amongst diplomats, humanitarian activists and academics with regard to state behaviour and responsibilities in the new world order. Canada took a lead in this regard and announced, at the September 2000 United Nations (UN) General Assembly, that the International

[1] Homer, *The Iliad*, Book X, trans. Alexander Pope, 1763 (Chicago: William Benton, 1921), 67.
[2] Department of National Defence, *Strategic Assessment 2005*, Policy Planning Division, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Technical Report 2005-32 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005), 6. This assessment makes the distinction between 'power earthquakes' and 'power constellations.' The former is a major period of world upheaval where power relationships are altered; the latter is a more stable period where power relationships remain relatively unchanged.

Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) would be established to examine ethical, legal, political, moral and operational aspects of 'humanitarian intervention' in the new millennium. The 2001 ICISS report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, is a landmark document in that it not only stipulates that states have a humanitarian obligation to intervene in the internal affairs of other sovereign states, but that intervening states "act irresponsibly if they intervene without the will to restore peace and stability, and to sustain a post-intervention operation for as long as necessary to do so."[3]

Given the references to intervention in failed and failing states in Canada's 2004 National Security Policy (NSP), there is little doubt that the ICISS report was used as a foundation document[4] in drafting "Canada's first-ever comprehensive statement of national security policy which provides an integrated strategy for addressing current and future threats."[5] The need to better integrate national resources was enunciated for the first time in the NSP where the assertion was made that "the international policy that results…will reflect our increasingly integrated approach to…[the 3Ds:]… defence, diplomacy and development."[6] The 3D approach tacitly acknowledges that military power alone is insufficient – and often counterproductive – to addressing security

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[3] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 64.
[4] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: PCO, 2004), 50. Although *The Responsibility to Protect* is not mentioned explicitly in this document, the concepts contained therein are. Phrases such as "When Canada engages internationally to protect human rights…" reinforce the linkage. In the subsequent International Policy Statement (IPS) (see Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World," Overview, 5. http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview2-en.asp; Internet; accessed 27 January 2007), the link is reinforced with explicit reference to *The Responsibility to Protect* and the need to hold governments accountable for the safety and security of their citizens, intervening if necessary.
[5] Privy Council Office, iii.
[6] *Ibid*., 47.

concerns in the 21st century. By integrating the traditionally separate governmental functions of diplomacy, defence and development, a strategic and long-lasting effect can be achieved that is greater than the sum of the parts.[7]

The growing emphasis on departmental integration was reinforced in Canada's 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS). In the introduction to the document, Prime Minister (PM) Martin stated that "the best way for Canada to make a difference in post-conflict situations is to pursue a '3D' approach."[8] It would appear that in the scant year that separated the NSP and IPS, the 3D approach was wholeheartedly embraced by government as both the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) made direct references to the fact that "military power, diplomacy and development are intimately linked and complement one another."[9] Although not quite as quick to rally to the clarion call of 3D, International Cooperation Minister Aileen Carroll did, in her forward to the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA's) Policy Statement, acknowledge that there was a new "whole-of-Government approach to development cooperation."[10] Testimony given to

[7] The trend to integrate is neither uniquely Canadian nor is it a top-down initiative. The 'traditional' fields of diplomacy, defence and development have been converging for some time, a phenomenon linked to the widespread instability created by the end of the Cold War and by terrorism. This mutual interdependence has also been characterized by a growing world-wide realization that without development, there can be no lasting security and that without security, there can be no development.

[8] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World," 5. Changing terminology associated with the 3D approach is a source of confusion and will be discussed later in this paper. For the sake of consistency, the term '3D approach' will be used throughout this paper.

[9] Department of National Defence, "Defence Policy Statement," 1. http://www.dnd.ca/site/reports/dps/main/05_e.asp; Internet; accessed 27 January 2007.

[10] Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA Canada's International Policy Statement," 1. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ips-development. Internet; accessed 27 January 2007.

parliamentary committees reinforced the widespread understanding that "3D…[was]…an underpinning of the ISP."[11]

Given the rapidity and the completeness with which 3D permeated the federal lexicon, and the degree to which references were made in speeches, the media and on official web sites, the casual observer might well be led to believe that 3D is the cornerstone of a "new Canadian internationalism [that] could become an instrument of pan-Canadian unity, taking us beyond the boundaries of language and race and religion, drawing on all elements of a truly diverse society."[12] Heady words indeed, but is 3D really embraced, understood and achievable as official government statements would like us to believe?

In addressing these questions, this paper will examine the historical antecedents and context of 3D, tracing its development through relevant Canadian examples from British North America to post-WWII Germany to modern interventions in Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan. This will be followed by a discussion of the major shortcomings of the policy including strategic-level inclusiveness, doctrine and governmental structure. In the section dealing with inclusiveness, it will be argued that key enablers – in particular trade, police, disarmament and democratic reform – have been overlooked. In the doctrine section, shortcomings with respect to ownership of the doctrinal space of development are discussed, as well as a lack of criteria for success, a murky understanding of the 3D approach and the need for an effective communication plan. In the third and final section, current Canadian and foreign governmental structures are examined and contrasted to highlight both strengths and weaknesses with respect to inter-

[11] House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 14 June 2005," p 4. http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=123371, Internet; accessed 27 January 2007.

departmental collaboration. The paper will conclude with five broad recommendations, as well as a brief explanation as to why it is so critical that the Government of Canada underwrites its nascent 3D policy.

Background and Context

In attempting to understand the 3D approach, it is useful to clarify what it is not. While it may be tempting to describe 3D as nation-building, occupation, peacekeeping, stabilization, reconstruction or peace enforcement, these terms do not adequately convey all that the term implies. The 3D approach is more complex and ambitious than the post Second-World War Marshall Plan; it goes well beyond what was attempted in Haiti and Kosovo, and it is only now, through the intervention in Afghanistan, that Canada is beginning to appreciate its associated implications and obligations. In fact, the trend of modern interventions is one of increasing scope and complexity where diplomacy and development frequently occur 'under fire.'

The idea of employing multiple government functions in far-off lands to achieve foreign policy aims is hardly new. In this regard, it is instructive to review a number of historic and post-Cold War examples to highlight not only the evolution of the 3D approach, but emerging complexities and trends. This review will begin with an examination of pre-Confederation Canada as the historical antecedent of Canada's current 3D approach. This will be followed by a discussion of the key aspects and relevancy of the Marshall Plan to the 3D construct. The section will conclude with overviews of three recent international interventions – Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan –

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[12]Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 2003), 203.

in which Canada has played a key role and in which the foundations of 3D have been developed.

It is strangely fitting that one does not have to look any farther than pre-Confederation Canada to find a relatively successful example of a 3D intervention. While British imperatives were far more economic than altruistic, a 3D approach to maintaining peace and good order was clearly evident. After the French defeat, the British reacted with "a good deal of forbearance and even sophistication"[13] in developing government and the foundations of democratic structures. In a move that "is almost unique in history,"[14] the defeated were allowed to have a province of equal status to the almost exclusively Anglo-Saxon province of Upper Canada. Defence against the American threat was perhaps the pre-eminent preoccupation of the British, but the rebellions of 1837 underscored the need to deal with civil unrest. With Imperial encouragement, funding and training, local militia units were created to bolster British regulars and to permit the War Office to reduce the number of troops overseas. On the development side, British rule provided a steady and reliable market for Canada's vast natural wealth. From furs to masts for Royal Navy frigates, Canadian goods made their way to England and economic development in British North America proceeded apace.

The very existence of Canada as a nation can be linked to Britain's 3D approach. Britain's economic support of the American Confederacy during the Civil War created growing concern over a Union threat to British North America. The Fenian Raid of 1866 reinforced these fears, and Canada's Confederation in 1867 was, in many respects, a logical and inevitable outcome of the 'defence' component of 3D. Indeed, even the

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[13] Edward Grierson, *The Imperial Dream* (London: Collins, 1972), 59.
[14] *Ibid.*

construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) was a pre-Confederation idea that was driven not so much by economic imperatives, but by worries regarding American expansionism in the West. Thus, the very birth of Canada and the railway that tied the nation together are outcomes of a 3D approach.[15]

In modern times, the post-WWII occupation of German and the implementation of the Marshall Plan "set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not since been matched."[16] While Germany provides an excellent example of what can be achieved under ideal conditions, the example can be deceptively misleading. Comparisons to modern interventions should be undertaken with caution given Germany's pre-war industrialization, ethnic homogeneity, and prior experiences with democracy. Furthermore, Germany possessed a cultural and religious foundation that was very similar to those nations that devised and contributed to the Marshall Plan. In this regard, it is highly unlikely that such a desirable 'start state' could be achieved in the future. Nevertheless, any analysis of the roots of the 3D approach must include the Marshall Plan because the methods employed are universal.

Thoroughly defeated with its infrastructure, economy and government in collapse, Germany posed an enormous challenge not only in the scope of the problem, but in reaching an Allied consensus as to how it would be addressed. Again, diplomacy, defence and development were intertwined to rapidly transform a former enemy into an ally. On the diplomatic front, the occupiers were compelled, by necessity, to govern the country. Setting up military governments in their respective zones,[17] the Americans,

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[15] Sir John A. Macdonald's 'National Policy,' on which he based his successful 1878 election campaign, can be characterized as a 3D policy with particular emphasis on industrial development.
[16] James Dobbins, *et al*, *America's Role in Nation Building* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003), xiii.
[17] Oft overlooked, Canada played a role in the British sector during this period. In fact, a Canadian officer – Brigadier W.S. Ziegler, CBE, DSO, ED – served as the Deputy Commander of the Hannover Region.

British and French merged these zones into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. This was done not only to facilitate good governance, but to stimulate economic growth through common policies. Militarily, Allied troops remained in Germany to deal with potential insurgencies that were anticipated by rogue Nazi groups and selected elements of the population. When this threat did not materialize, it soon became apparent that forward defence was necessary against the Soviet menace. In what had seemed unimaginable in 1945, the Allies made the decision to re-arm West Germany at the onset of the Korean War and occupying troops set about creating the *Bundeswehr*.

Perhaps the greatest achievement in post-war Germany was with regard to development. Germany was awash in some 15 million refugees in 1945.[18] The Allies, and in particular the Americans, sought to increase German economic output as fast as possible not only to reduce human suffering, but to stop the drain on war-depleted treasuries. Plants, factories and mines were re-opened as early as 1946, motivated in part by the need to pay reparations to Russia and France. In spite of these reparations, the economy soared and there was "double-digit growth in German GDP from 1947 to 1952."[19] The Allies, led by the United States (US), provided not only substantial loans and assistance, but implemented economic reform that included the promulgation of import/export policies, the disintegration of cartels and the encouragement of private business. These measures contributed to trade liberalization, ultimately paving the way for the 1957 Treaty of Rome which created the European Economic Community.[20]

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[18] Dobbins, 13.
[19] *Ibid*., 19.
[20] In fact, the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was the real precursor of European economic cooperation. Through this treaty, former enemies began to share in the production and processing of coal and steel, two commodities essential to war. Collectively, both the 1951 Treaty of Paris and the 1957 Treaty of Rome are known as the Treaties of Rome.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an awakening, particularly amongst those in uniform, to the fact that military power alone is insufficient to bring about the desired change in so-called failed and failing states. This idea was encapsulated in a seminal article by General Charles C. Krulak in which he asserted that junior leaders must be trained to make critical decisions in "amorphous conflicts…[where they are]…confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges within the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks."[21] These challenges ranged from humanitarian operations to peace support operations to mid-intensity combat. The 'Three-Block War' has since become a cornerstone of Canadian Forces doctrine,[22] and has spawned new procedures and units that serve to underscore the growing emphasis on military involvement in the developmental and humanitarian aspects of international interventions.

Three recent interventions that illustrate Krulak's concept of the Three Block War, in which Canada has played a role, are Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan. They are typical of the current genre of international interventions in that they constitute failed or failing states; are complex endeavours for which military solutions alone do not exist; and all continue to experience international involvement to varying degrees. In the case of Haiti, there was no extreme violence or urgent humanitarian crisis on which to base an intervention. Nonetheless, corruption and international concern with regard to a coup-installed dictator, General Cedras, precipitated the establishment of the US-led

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[21]Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marine Corps Gazette* 83, No. 1 (January 1999), 21.

[22] Department of National Defence, "A Soldier's Guide to Army Transformation," 1. http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/LF/English/5_4_1_1.asp?FlashEnabled=1&. Internet; accessed 6 February 2007.

Multinational Force in 1993 followed by the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in 1994.

In addition to stabilizing the country through an armed presence, these missions sought to utilize diplomacy and development to create enduring governmental institutions that would not only enhance public safety, but stimulate the economy. Unfortunately, international insistence on rapid results caused more harm than good as improvements made in governmental structures and organizations failed because "they were grafted onto an unsound political structure still rooted in corruption and personal dominance."[23] Such an observation supports the assertion that no single component of the 3D approach can achieve success on its own. Although the UN provided 'instant' security, this was no guarantee of long-term stability or good governance. The fact that there have been six subsequent UN-sanctioned missions[24] in Haiti underscores the need for a coherent and long-term emphasis on the diplomatic and developmental aspects of the problem.

In the case of Kosovo, NATO intervention was justified on the premise that the bloodshed being perpetrated by Serbs against the Kosovar Albanians had to be stopped.[25] In addition to the bombing campaign, NATO ultimately deployed five brigades into the area to stabilize the situation. A decade of Serb repression had resulted in over one

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[23] Andrea Kathryn Talentino, *Military Intervention After the Cold War* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005), 152.

[24] The six missions are the UN Support Mission in Haiti (1996-97), the UN Transitional Mission in Haiti (1997), the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (1997-2000), the UN Civilian Mission in Haiti (1997-2000), the International Support Mission in Haiti (2000-2001) and the current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

[25] While NATO's stated reason for bombing Serbia was the situation in Kosovo, there can be little doubt that previous experiences in the Balkans contributed to this decision. In particular, the need to avoid genocidal actions, such as was experienced at Srebrenica in July 1995, was a factor. See Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 59. Clark states that the United Nations Protection Force had unlimited obligations to protect civilians, but very little authority to do so. Under NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and the subsequent Kosovo Force (KFOR), commanders were given considerably more authority to take preventive measures.

million Kosovar Albanian refugees and wide-scale destruction of infrastructure. The diplomatic and developmental aspects of this intervention were massive. Under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, a provisional government was established. The European Union took responsibility for reconstruction, establishing a sound economic policy to channel large donations.[26] Yet despite a relatively large and coordinated 3D approach, Kosovo remains an international protectorate "even though no other region in the world has had so many influential external state and non-state actors present for over a decade, all trying to promote or directly establish stability and democracy."[27]

Although Canada pursued, to varying degrees, a 3D approach in Haiti and Kosovo, it is Afghanistan where this approach has been applied for the first time since explicitly outlined in the NSP and the ISP. In a country with a history of ethnic tension, weak central government, and decades of devastation, the situation is considerably more challenging than that presented by Haiti or Kosovo. Security concerns are manifest not only regarding the Taliban, but in widespread banditry and corruption. There are very few Afghans who have experience in government or bureaucracy which in turn hinders progress in establishing a viable Afghan government. Development is progressing[28] and

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[26] World Bank and European Commission,

virtually every major NGO is present. Nevertheless, the size, complexity and composition of the intervention is such that "the international players [currently] suffer from conceptual problems and do not display any uniform strategy."[29]

Jennifer Welsh stated that "[o]ur geography, history, and identity demand engagement with the wider world,"[30] an assertion that recent governments seem to have supported based on Canada's commitments in Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan. At the same time, this engagement on the world stage has revealed the difficulties and complexities of the post 9/11 world, and with it the suspicion that the "optimism of purpose"[31] surrounding Canada's 3D approach has been "accompanied by an optimism of means."[32] In this regard, the 3D approach will now be examined from a strategic-level framework of inclusiveness, doctrine and governmental structure.

Inclusiveness

Canada's 2005 IPS "declares that the best way for Canada to make a difference…is to pursue a '3D' approach."[33] The problem with such a declaration is that the casual observer directly links outcomes exclusively to diplomacy, defence and development. In reality, evidence from post-Cold War interventions would seem to suggest that there are other precursors for success. For example, it is very hard to pursue diplomacy and development in a lawless society where authority comes from the barrel of a gun.

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[29] Rangan Dadfar Spanta, "Afghanistan: Nation-building in the Shadow of the Warlords and the 'War on Terror'" in *Nation Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?* Ed. Jochen Hippler, pp 70-80 (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 77.
[30] Jennifer Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 2004), 237.
[31] Denis Stairs, "The Menace of General Ideas in the Making and Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy," (O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture, Ottawa, 25 October 2006), 10.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World," Overview, 5.

Development is a laudable goal, but it is doomed to failure if the economic infrastructure and, perhaps even more importantly, markets are not created and sustained. By confining official terminology to '3D,' there is a natural and potentially damaging propensity to ignore other factors that could well be more important, at times, than any one of the '3Ds.' As such, this discussion of inclusiveness will examine the importance of key enablers from recent interventions, including trade, police and disarmament.[34] The section will conclude with a short discussion of the relative merits of pursuing democratic reform.

Trade and commerce can be powerful tools in creating stable societies and governments. Post-WWII Germany is the most successful intervention model in the last century, but is unlikely to be replicated today. Despite the damage sustained during the Second World War, the country still possessed considerable physical infrastructure and, perhaps more importantly, the human capital necessary to recreate a once powerful industrialized nation. These two key components do not exist in most countries in which the 3D approach is being applied today, and it takes one, two or even three generations to build the human capital necessary to achieve rapid results. Nevertheless, the German example is useful because it does illustrate the correlation between economic growth and stability. The development of a sustainable economy with export markets[35] created jobs, which in turn led to greater prosperity with several positive results. The Allies recognized that the potential for civil unrest would diminish as more jobs were created. At the same time, employment created disposable income which, in turn, created even

[34] 3D, as well as trade, police and disarmament, fall under the broader rubric of security sector reform (SSR). The term SSR refers to any aspect, factor or area that contributes to a more stable and secure environment. It is, by definition, broad and all encompassing; for this reason, this section will discuss only key aspects of SSR.

[35] In post-war Germany's case, the traditional heavy industries of coal and steel figured prominently.

more jobs. In analyzing the Marshall Plan, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is one of the most obvious measures of success. Between 1946 and 1953, the German per capita GDP climbed from 75 to 175 per cent of the pre-conflict level.[36]

Haiti is a textbook case where lack of economic development has led to perpetual poverty and political instability. Since the installation of François 'Papa Doc' Duvalier as president in 1957, the economy has been decidedly aid-driven rather than mercantilist. Attempts have been made to stimulate trade, notably tax and labour incentives offered to American companies to set up manufacturing firms in the 1970s. Many did, but fiscal policy in Haiti was such that the government's generous incentives to the American firms forced it to heavily tax the already poor population. This, in turn, led to higher food prices, and "…it was no coincidence that the revolution in 1986 to remove ["Baby Doc"] Duvalier from office began with food riots."[37] Ultimately, the riots led to even more instability, the withdrawal of the American companies, and a rapid disintegration of a growing manufacturing base that could well have broken the cycle of poverty and political instability in the country. Once again, Haiti became a chronically aid-dependent state, where political unrest continues to serve as a major dissuasion to trade and foreign direct investment.

Kosovo, on the surface, would seem to have more potential. It was an agricultural and lightly industrialized region prior to the conflict; thus the journey to economic and political stability is, in theory, shorter. In 2003, Kosovo received 25 times the per capita aid of Afghanistan.[38] Furthermore, 50 times more troops per capita were deployed to

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[36] Dobbins, 159-160.
[37] Andrew S. Thompson, "Canada in Haiti: Considering the 3-D Approach," Report on the Conference held at the Center for International Governance Innovations, Waterloo, Ontario, 12-14 May 2005, 9.
[38] Dobbins, xix.

Kosovo than to Afghanistan.[39] Kosovo also received substantially more per capita aid. Expressed in 2001 US dollars, the per capita aid allocated to Germany in 1946-1947 was $280; Kosovo received almost $850 in 2000-2001.[40] Despite the comparatively heavy amount of aid and military involvement, the results are disappointing. Looking at per capita GDP, the country has not even reached its pre-conflict level five years after the termination of hostilities, a startling comparison to the German example of 140 per cent over the same time frame.[41] Unemployment is estimated to be as high as 50 per cent which has led to civil unrest. The underlying cause of many of Kosovo's problems – and the major factor that explains the disappointing results when compared to Germany – is the failure to develop a sustainable market economy. The most recent data available indicates that "[t]he region's imports outpace exports by a factor of 26."[42] The obvious deduction from these statistics is that aid alone, encapsulated in the third of the 3Ds, can easily become a vicious circle by creating dependency and not addressing the root cause of the problem. In fact, funds allocated for development are generally of short-term utility and will not bring long-term stability unless they are "appropriately targeted at building a market economy and opportunity."[43]

Although the above mentioned discussion suggests that trade is essential to economic and political stability, the word was not even mentioned in the International Security Chapter of the NSP.[44] A trade policy section was included in the IPS in a

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[39] International Crisis Group (ICG), "Kosovo: Toward Final Status," ICG Europe Report 161, Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2005, 7.
[40] Dobbins, xviii.
[41] Dobbins, 159.
[42] Julian Wright, "Lost in Transition: Canada and the Search for a 3-D Solution in Kosovo," *IRPP Policy Matters*, Volume No. 7, Number 1 (January 2006), 12.
[43] *Ibid*., 23.
[44] Privy Council Office, 47-52.

chapter entitled "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Commerce." It was in this section that commerce (trade) was portrayed as a belated addition to the 3D approach by the inclusion of the words diplomacy, defence, development *and commerce* on the cover.[45] Disappointingly, this is where the linkage ended. There is not a single mention in the 23-page document as to how trade/commerce (T/C) is integrated within the 3D approach, nor is there any mention of the critical role that T/C plays in international security.

This is a startling omission given Canada's professed long-term commitment to the economic development of Afghanistan, a country characterized by a lack of ethnic homogeneity, poor education and stone-age infrastructure - coupled with a predominantly narcotics-based agrarian economy - constitute an unprecedented economic challenge. The current poppy eradication program is a case in point. While the issue is really one of demand more than supply, eradication of poppy crops before viable – and hopefully legal – export options are created is an "act of war on farming communities, dealing the last blow to the fast deteriorating relationship between local Afghans, the international community and the Karzai government."[46] If the international community is truly serious about creating and sustaining economic growth in Afghanistan, then T/C must be encouraged, even if that means buying Afghan poppies in the short term to manufacture codeine and morphine,[47] or subsidizing and buying alternate crops. It follows that T/C

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[45]Department of International Trade, "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Commerce," pp 1-23. http://itcan-cican.gc.ca/ips/menu-en.asp; Internet; accessed 16 February 2007.
[46]Senlis Council, "Hearts and Minds Campaign in Southern Afghanistan," Conclusions and Recommendations, p 2. http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/017_publication. Internet; accessed 20 January 2007.
[47] Bruce Campion-Smith, "Sell Afghan Poppies for Medicine: Dion Wants Ottawa to Back Pilot Project to Turn Opium into Medicinal Painkillers," *Toronto Star*, 23 February 2007, A3.

must be considered in any discussion of the 3D approach, whether it be in Afghanistan or any other failed or failing state.

The second component that seems to be missing in the 3D approach is policing. Civil order is essential to stability and security, and it is for this reason that the foundations of the rule of law,[48] and the mechanisms to protect and enforce it, must be established as soon as possible. In most nations where intervention is required, there is no distinction between external security forces and police. This often results in a form of policing that could only be described as arbitrary and sometimes brutal by Western standards. Separating these two functions is a Herculean task, "let alone efforts to encourage the forces to work in concert with each other, as opposed to in competition with each other."[49] As Figure 1 below illustrates, policing is normally the purview of the military in the initial stages of an intervention, yet there must be a rapid and well-managed transition to a distinct body charged with civil security.



Figure 1: The Military-Police Primacy Spectrum[50]

[48] The rule of law is much bigger than policing and includes, *inter alia*, a transparent and independent judiciary as well as human rights and gender equality. Perhaps even more significantly, the establishment of the rule of law in failed and failing states requires normative change that is measured not in weeks, but often in generations. Nevertheless, policing – in parallel with judicial reform – is a key 'first step' in establishing the rule of law.

[49] Campion-Smith, A3.

[50] Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, "Military and Postconflict Security," *Choices: National Security & Interoperability,* Volume 9, Number 3 (July 2004), 10.

While Western nations tend to think of the establishment of an independent civil police force as the solution, this may well be unachievable for a number of cultural and historical reasons. What is essential is a separation of the functions of internal and external security, and that they not be viewed as competing entities. In doing so, it may be more appropriate and efficient to establish a form of gendarmerie instead of a distinct police force. In many countries, there are historical antecedents for police forces that are auxiliaries of the military and it is for this reason that Western-style independent police forces may be less appropriate than para-military organizations.

Haiti provides a case study of a failed state in need of an independent and professional police force. The UN concentrated heavily on separating the police from the military, and on professionalizing the force. Considerable progress was made, but advances were eroded by failings in the judicial system. The Haitian example is instructive because it not only highlights the criticality of an independent entity for policing, but the vital importance of simultaneously pursuing other stated and implicit aims of the 3D approach. For example, no amount of international support and training for the Haitian National Police Force will balance a "judiciary [that] is susceptible to corruption and political interference."[51]

Given the importance of policing to the re-establishment of order in failed and failing states, it is surprising that there is no mention of this aspect in either the International Security Chapter of the NSP or the ISP. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) website indicates that "since 1989, the RCMP has managed the

[51] Thompson, 13.

deployment of over 2000 Canadian police officers to various missions around the world."[52] The same website explicitly acknowledges the role that police play in promoting "international peace and security by working with local police in countries experiencing or threatened by conflict."[53] In this regard, Canadian police are now playing a role in Afghanistan where "an RCMP six-man team [is] engaged in training Afghani [*sic*] police."[54] Yet, despite the fact that the RCMP has been participating in 3D interventions for "well over a decade and represents one of Canada's great contributions to world security,"[55] it seems to have been excluded from the 3D approach, or at the very least buried deeply within the development component of the concept.

Another important aspect of international security that was seemingly unqualified for mention in both the NSP and ISP is disarmament, often associated with demobilization and repatriation, and referred to as DDR. Short of nuclear war, the proliferation of small arms in unstable nations – epitomized by images of African youth armed with the ubiquitous AK-47 - has been one of the greatest threats to world peace since the end of the Second World War.[56] The UN has stated that "[s]mall arms and light

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[52] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "RCMP Fact Sheet, International Peacekeeping Branch," http://www.rcmp.ca/factsheets/fact_peacekeeping_e.htm; Internet; accessed 15 February 2005. The RCMP, in addition to providing the bulk of officers, also coordinate the participation of Canadian provincial and municipal police officers in international interventions.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] Eric Lerhe, "Is the 3-D Construct at Work in Kandahar or Are We Kidding Ourselves?" *The Dispatch: Newsletter of the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute,* Volume IV, Issue III (Fall 2006), 4. As of 3 April 2007, there were 12 RCMP and one Correctional Services Canada officer in Afghanistan, with another 12 RCMP promised by Stockwell Day, the Minister of Public Safety. See Jonathan Fowlie, "Day Announces Deployment of Police, " *Edmonton Journal*, Tuesday, April 3, 2007, A4.

[55] Wright, "Lost in Transition," 24.

[56] See Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, *Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business* (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), 54-55. Current estimates give the mean number of military small arms and light weapons in the world as 200 million. Of this figure, approximately 70% are AK-47 automatic rifles (or derivatives such as the AK-74) manufactured by the former Soviet Union, China or their allies. The number of AK-47s outside of state control is unknown, as is the number of deaths attributable to this type of automatic rifle.

weapons destabilize regions; spark, fuel and prolong conflicts; obstruct relief programmes; undermine peace initiatives; exacerbate human rights abuses; hamper development; and foster a 'culture of violence.'"[57]

Looking again at Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the number of small arms and light weapons outside of state control is staggering. In Haiti alone, where the population is estimated to be between eight and nine million, there are approximately 210,000 small arms and light weapons in circulation, most in the control of at least a dozen armed groups.[58] The ratio is even higher in Kosovo, where out of population of 2.4 million, 330,000 to 460,000 small arms and light weapons are still held by civilians, criminals and political factions.[59] With regard to Afghanistan, meaningful statistics are simply unavailable because it is not clear as to who falls under state control and who does not. Prior to the inauguration of the DDR program in Afghanistan, the final target of 100,000 combatants "was the product of political negotiations rather than actual evidence."[60]

While weapons outside of state control are generally a threat to stability, they simply will not disappear if a population does not trust the state to provide for its security. This is certainly the case in Haiti, where the threat often comes from the Haitian National Police.[61] It is also the case in Kosovo where the population has a negative perception of the effectiveness of both the Kosovo Police Service and the UN Civil

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[57] UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, "Small Arms and Light Weapons," http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw.html; Internet; accessed 17 February 2007.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] *Ibid.*
[60] Peter Dahl Thruelsen, "From Soldier to Civilian: Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration in Afghanistan," Danish Institute for International Studies Report 2006: 7, 46.
[61] Oxfam, "The Call for Tough Arms Controls: Voices from Haiti," Control Aims Campaign, January 2006, 8.

Police (UNCIVPOL).[62] Despite the fact that the DDR program in Afghanistan "can be characterized as a success in relation to the processes conducted elsewhere during the last decade,"[63] the nature of the conflict and history of the region would suggest that it would be prudent for the same demobilized soldiers to retain or obtain small arms for personal protection. The lesson to be learned is that disarmament contributes to stability in failed and failing states, but only if it proceeds in concert with the establishment of a viable judiciary and a police force to guarantee internal security.

Another 'D' that merits further discussion is democracy. The concept of democracy is ancient and is the very foundation of most Western nations, yet it was the 1960s and 1970s that bore witness to its widening global appeal.[64] Many so-called developing nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America were experimenting with democratic reform; at the same time, "growing civil society movements were giving expression to the global recognition of democratic values."[65] Democracy is sometimes welcome in failed and failing states, but this is not always true.[66] In cases, for example,

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[62] Anna Khakee and Nicolas Florquin, "Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo," United Nations Development Programme and the Small Arms Survey, June 2003, 2.

[63] *Ibid*., 43.

[64] See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). According to Huntingdon, democratization has occurred in waves: the first wave was 1828-1926, the second 1943-1962 and the third from 1974 on. Between each wave has been a 'reverse' wave where some newly democratic states reverted or regressed to non-democratic or less-democratic forms of government . Huntington suggests, at the time of publication, that the world was in a third reverse wave due, *inter alia*, to the growing economic disparity between rich (generally democratic) and poor (generally non-democratic states). Arguably, the demise of the Soviet Union and its hitherto communist satellites has brought about a fourth wave of democratization. Huntington's theory is also noteworthy in that it implies that there is a greater chance of bringing democracy to a failed or failing state if the time of transition corresponds to a wave and not a reverse wave.

[65] Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, "Democratization and Nation-building in 'Divided Societies'" in *Nation Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?* Ed. Jochen Hippler, 98-110 (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 28.

[66] While failed and failing states often do not welcome democracy, many covet the legitimacy that the term conveys. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the former German Democratic Republic are but two examples of decidedly non-democratic states that have exploited the gulf between democratic rhetoric and reality.

where democracy has never existed, such a system is meaningless if there is not a tangible and obvious connection to the improvement of one's basic needs. Democracy is a worthy long-term goal, but should not be viewed as the sole option. Indeed, modern interventions should create "democratic *potential* [author's italics], but not necessarily the door to actual democracy; on the contrary, power 'in the name' of the nation can be more repressive than feudalism or the doctrine of divine right."[67] Political scientist Denis Stairs has warned of the sometimes unrealistic expectations linked to democracy when he stated that "[a]s popular as it may be, the democratization of a hitherto undemocratic polity is probably…[something]…we cannot possibly accomplish."[68] While Stairs' view could be considered somewhat pessimistic, he does underscore that fact that democracy is neither a panacea nor instantaneous. It is complex, multi-layered and a vast field of study unto its own. Nevertheless, democracy should also be a consideration when discussing the 3D approach, if nothing more than as an idealistic and potentially long-term goal that has the potential to contribute to lasting peace and prosperity.

In summary, experiences in Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan offer sufficient evidence that the 3D approach does not fully describe all of the key components that are critical to success.[69] While one might argue that commerce/trade, policing, disarmament and potential democratic reforms are implicit to the 3D approach, the fact that they are not mentioned in the NSP or IPS, or mentioned only in passing, would suggest that this is not the case. Indeed, 4.5D + T/C + P[70] would be a better description, but even that may

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[67] Jochen Hippler, "Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building – Terminology and Political Concepts" in *Nation Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?* Ed. Jochen Hippler, pp 98-110 (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 11.
[68] Stairs, 23.
[69] Criteria for success will be discussed in the next (Doctrine) section of this paper.
[70] This equation is simply the combination of the 3Ds and the components discussed in this section: diplomacy, defence, development, disarmament and (sometimes) democracy + trade/commerce + police.

be limiting. Every international intervention is unique and will require its own recipe for success, a recipe that will undoubtedly be more elaborate than the plain vanilla flavour of 3D offered in the NSP and IPS.

Doctrine

One of the problems with understanding foreign policy is the breadth and depth of the subject. In attempting to define foreign policy, Kim Richard Nossal has determined that it cannot be described with any more specificity than "any aspect of governmental policy that extends beyond the geopolitical boundary [of the state]."[71] The 3D approach to foreign policy does not, unfortunately, escape the same problem of vagueness. Yet, if it is to be successful, there must be a clear road map to translate policy into action, reduce friction and deliver results. In this regard, some of the key strategic doctrinal aspects will be discussed to highlight where lack of detail and clarity are undermining, or have the potential to undermine, the policy. These aspects include ownership of the doctrinal space of development, criteria for success, clarification of what the 3D approach encompasses, and public communication.

Coming to terms with roles and responsibilities within the doctrinal space associated with development is the greatest single stumbling block to moving the 3D approach forward. The issue is one of ideology involving the classic tension between values and interests. While not necessarily mutually exclusive, values and interests do seem to diverge on this issue. On one hand, values-based proponents of development argue that foreign aid applied liberally throughout the world serves not only a

[71] Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1996), 5.

humanitarian purpose, but benefits Canada in the long term because a global enhancement of living standards reduces the propensity for conflict, ultimately promoting international security. On the other hand, those who approach the development aspect from the paradigm of national interests do so "not primarily in terms of ethical responsibility to peoples and countries in severe poverty, but rather in terms of putative importance to Canadian prosperity and security."[72] In this regard, Don MacNamara has stated that "[n]ational interests are inextricably linked to national security and a national security policy."[73] Thus, if development is undertaken to promote national interests, then it needs to be aligned with Canada's foreign policy objectives and not undertaken in an indiscriminate fashion.

The bureaucratic battle space for this conflict of ideology is within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the *de facto* custodian of the development portion of the 3D approach. Cited by a 1987 House Committee on Foreign Affairs as an organization "beset by a confusion of purpose,"[74] CIDA can quite rightly claim that since its inception, it has received mixed messages from its political masters. In fact, a policy statement on Canadian aid published the same year confirmed that CIDA's mandate was humanitarian based, not trade or security based.[75] Nevertheless, the IPS was a shift in direction to a more interests-based approach to development, an approach that the Conservative Government seems to be following in Afghanistan. Whether one

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[72] Cranford Pratt, "Competing Rationales for Canadian Development Assistance: Reducing Global Poverty, Enhancing Canadian Prosperity and Security, or Advancing Global Human Security," in *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha pp 368-378 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 390.
[73] W.D. MacNamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, "A National Security Framework for Canada," *IRPP Policy Matters*, Volume 3, Number 10 (October 2002), 11.
[74] Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs, *For Whose Benefit?* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1987), 7.
[75] Canadian International Development Agency, *Sharing Our Future: Canada's International Development Assistance* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1987), 2.

personally agrees with the shift or not, it is government policy. There remains within CIDA, however, a "line dividing those who…[champion]…a poverty focused aid programme and those who..[are]…willing to attach greater importance to commercial and political objectives."[76]

The IPS stated that there was a need to bring greater strategic focus[77] to international development and, in doing so, "at least two thirds of bilateral aid…[would be concentrated]…on 25 'Development Partner' countries by the year 2010."[78] Canada now provides aid to 155 countries – "a number that exceeds that of any other donor"[79]- so it was thought that by concentrating aid on fewer countries, Canada could achieve a more significant and lasting impact than chipping away at global poverty en masse. Even so, 25 major aid recipients is hardly focused and is analogous to ineffective personal investment strategies. In this regard, a recent article admonished investors that "[h]olding 29 funds is ridiculous…[,] there's no focus…[and] you're seriously over-diversified."[80] Even if 25 development partners seems like a lot, the truth is that the number may be considerably larger. Denis Stairs has persuasively argued that CIDA is nowhere near concentrating on the 25 developing countries outlined in the IPS. In fact, "[n]o one should assume that anything like a substantial change of policy has really

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[76] Pratt, 372. While it is acknowledged that there are differences between humanitarian aid and development, they are not mutually exclusive. For example, the provision of a deep well to provide potable water not only solves a real or potential humanitarian crisis, it also contributes to the longer term development of a community.
[77] Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA Canada's International Policy Statement," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ips-development, Message from the Minister; Internet: accessed 16 February 2007, 1.
[78] *Ibid*, 2.
[79] *Ibid.*
[80] Tom Bradley, "RRSP Nightmare: Too Many Funds in Your Basket," *Globe and Mail,* 9 February 2007, B12.

occurred…[because]…much of what is going on here is a form of 'Accountant's Musical Chairs.'"[81]

The resistance to change within CIDA may be explained, at least in part, by the vociferous opposition to the 3D approach voiced by the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who work independently and with CIDA in implementing aid. Comprised of professional humanitarians who are very much values-based, NGOs champion neutrality and independence as core principles. The position of CARE Canada, an organization that receives federal funding through CIDA,[82] very much typifies that of many NGOs. During testimony before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs (SCONDVA), Dr. A. John Watson, CARE Canada's President and Chief Executive Officer, stated that "[t]he IPS' diagnosis of the malady and prescription for how to deal with it are both woefully inadequate."[83] Later in the same testimony, Dr. Watson remarked that the IPS confuses "the hearts and minds element of an effective small wars strategy with professional humanitarianism."[84] In pulling out of Afghanistan in 2004, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) expressed a similar view, issuing a press release denouncing "the coalition's attempt to co-opt humanitarian aid and use it to 'win hearts and minds.'"[85] Thus, the issue becomes one of ownership of the humanitarian space and motives that underpin development and aid. Unfortunately, the debate over

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[81] Denis Stairs, *Confusing the Innocent with Numbers and Categories: The International Policy Statement and the Concentration of Development Assistance*, Report Prepared for the Canadian & Foreign Affairs Institute (Calgary: CDFAI, 2005), 18.
[82] Canadian International Development Agency, "Canada Helps Rebuild Afghanistan," News Release, 25 September 2002, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-331132630-PMP?OpenDocument, Internet; accessed 23 February 2007.
[83] Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, Number 056, 1st Session, 38th Parliament, Evidence, Thursday, 3 November 2005
[84] *Ibid.*
[85] Médecins Sans Frontières quoted in Raj Rana, "Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military Relationship: Complementarity or Incompatibility?" *International Review of the Red Cross*, Number 855 (September 2004), 565.

ownership runs the risk of overshadowing the needs of the very people both sides of the debate profess to help.

In reviewing CIDA's development portion of the IPS, one is struck by the dearth of references to the 3D approach, as well as the very limited use of the words diplomacy and defence. The term "whole of government," however, is used sporadically throughout the document to imply greater inter-departmental cooperation. The closest that the document comes to dealing with the interaction of diplomacy, defence and development is a short reference to disaster and crisis relief, and a statement that "the Government will ensure much stronger interaction – in both directions – between development goals and Canada's international agendas in trade, environment, health, justice, *and other relevant fields* [author's emphasis]."[86]

Unfortunately, this perceived hesitancy towards both the 3D approach and the allocation of developmental funds to 'hearts and minds' operations is manifest on the ground in Afghanistan. While $100 million per year is currently allocated to Afghanistan, only 10 per cent of this figure is allocated to Kandahar province where the vast majority of Canadian operations are conducted. The audit trail is faint and the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (formally the Standing Committee on Defence and Veterans' Affairs) has "from the outset, had difficulty…in finding out how much money is going into Kandahar, where we have assumed the primary responsibility, and how much is going elsewhere."[87] Even in Kandahar, the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) has had to wait for funding to

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[86] Canadian International Development Agency, "CIDA Canada's International Policy Statement," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ips-development, Message from the Minister, Internet; accessed 16 February 2007.

[87] Proceedings of the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 6, Evidence, 1st Session, 39th Parliament, Monday, 16 October 2006.

commence projects[88] to the point that USAID was reportedly ready to step in and fund so-called Canadian-conceived projects.[89]

The next doctrinal issue that poses concern is the need to have criteria for success that are not only achievable, but measurable. Given the complexity and the multi-faceted nature of modern interventions, this is no easy task. Nevertheless, a review of historical interventions can provide useful insight in this regard. A 2003 study published by Rand compared seven interventions, including Germany, Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan, to determine the level of progress made in democratic and economic reforms.[90] The study utilized inputs of military presence, police presence, and developmental assistance measured per capita and as a percentage of GDP. For outputs – or criteria for success – the study measured post-conflict combat deaths amongst the military forces and police of intervening nations, timing of elections, changes in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and changes in per capita GDP.

Not surprisingly, the study reinforced the notion "that economic rather than political democracy is often the top-of-mind concern of ordinary citizens in failed and failing states."[91] Those states that fared best, such as Germany, exhibited concomitant economic growth and democratic reform, with the former having a decidedly stronger influence on the creation of stability than the latter. Although not discussed in the Rand study, the correlation between this output and the others should not be overlooked. A constant increase in individual prosperity seems to lead to decreases in post-conflict

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[88] *Ibid*.
[89] Canadian Press, "RCMP and Aid Staff to Join Mission in Kandahar," http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/print/CTVNews/20050822/Kandahar_nextphase, Internet; accessed 9 January 2007.
[90] Dobbins, pp xiii-xxvi.
[91] Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, Number 056, 1st Session, 38th Parliament, Evidence, Thursday, 3 November 2005.

deaths, and to reductions in the number of refugees and IDPs. This suggests that an increase in per capita GDP over time is not only the most significant single measure of progress in a 3D construct, but an output that strongly influences other positive outcomes. As Figure 2 illustrates, there is an exponential relationship between the decrease in probability of conflict and the increase in per capita GDP.



Figure 2: The Impact of Per Capita GDP on Conflict Probability[92]

With regard to inputs that influenced success, the study revealed a strong correlation between time, manpower and money. Those interventions where the international community invested heavily, such as was the case in Germany, seemed to have fared best. At the opposite end of the spectrum was Haiti, where a short-term 'in and out' approach to the problem produced little progress and spawned a host of follow-on missions. In fact, Haiti offered conclusive proof that "while staying long does not

[92] University of British Columbia and The Liu Institute for Global Issues, "Human Security Report 2005," http://www.humansecurityreport.info/; Internet, accessed 23 March 2007.

guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure."[93] The study also reinforced the notion that expectations must be framed against the conditions under which the intervention commenced. As discussed earlier, ethnically homogeneous states that possessed a pre-conflict industrial base can be expected to fare better, and the nature of the conflict has an impact as well. If the surviving population is thoroughly defeated, weary of conflict and has suffered extensively, economic and political reform comes easier. This does not bode well for the application of the 3D approach in the 21st century. While there is a moral and legal obligation to avoid civilian casualties and to limit combatant casualties, "it seems that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult post-conflict stabilization can be."[94]

In comparison to all other missions less Haiti, the international community's intervention in Afghanistan reveals a strikingly meagre investment in the key inputs of military and police presence, and in developmental assistance. Statistics regarding the impact of this investment are not readily available, and the measure of post-conflict deaths is largely irrelevant as the conflict is ongoing. Regardless, measurable and widely-accepted criteria for success, and the influence that inputs have on these criteria, need to be developed not only for Afghanistan, but for future applications of the 3D approach. Failure to do so will not only contribute to an ongoing vagueness of the policy, but preclude feedback and adjustments that would make it more effective.

The third doctrinal issue that requires clarification is the policy itself. Even those who work in the international security arena are confused by terminology, by the time and spatial relationships between the components, and by the interface with allies in the

[93] Dobbins, 164.
[94] Dobbins, xxv.

conduct of interventions. The terminology associated with the 3D approach has gone through three and possibly four iterations since the concept was introduced. While the term '3D' appeared in the NSP, the ISP subtlety suggested – as noted earlier - that trade, or commerce as it is referred to in the ISP, was part of the equation. Even as the idea of tacking on 'T/C' was coming into vogue, an election and the need to create distance from a Liberal policy document[95] led to a yet another name change – the 'whole-of-government' approach which is, "more recently still (it is hard to keep up!)…[referred to as]… 'all-of-government' operations."[96] While 'whole-of-government' or 'all-of-government' are far less limiting terms that reflect the complexities of modern interventions and the need for inclusiveness discussed earlier in this paper, the ever-changing terminology is creating confusion.

The interrelationship between the components of the 3D approach is also unclear. The defence portion of the IPS states that "experience has shown…[that]…military power, diplomacy and development are intimately linked and complement one another,"[97] but there is no explanation as to how this occurs. Are the three components equal partners that should occur more or less simultaneously in every mission, or are they sequenced? If they are sequenced, do they overlap? If so, to what extent? Assuming that it is understood that any commitment to 3D is a long-term approach, could not 3D be viewed as a concept where Canada might be undertaking diplomacy, defence and development simultaneously, but in different missions? Experience in Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan shows that defence is generally front-end loaded and that development is

[95] While the current Conservative Government has not championed Liberal policy documents, it has certainly demonstrated a bipartisan commitment to further resource and develop the 3D approach.
[96] Stairs, "The Menace of General Ideas in the Making and Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy," 11.
[97] Department of National Defence, "Defence Policy Statement," 1.

sometimes difficult if not impossible during this phase.[98] A recent NGO report on Afghanistan tacitly acknowledged this fact, stating that "[u]nless and until…wider security is addressed, NGO staff will continue to be a target, making it difficult to reach all of those in need."[99] Even the former PM under whose watch the NSP was crafted believes that the interrelationship between the components is not well understood and the 3D approach is not being applied, in the manner he envisioned, in Afghanistan.[100]

Unilateral interventions, even by the world's only superpower, rarely if ever occur. If Canada is going to apply the 3D approach to coalition operations, then inter-allied doctrine development and coordination is essential. In multinational operations, selection and maintenance of the aim, as well as unity of effort, are extremely difficult to achieve when dealing with individual components of the 3Ds, let alone all three at once. Unless allies approach an intervention in a coordinated and like-minded way, success is exceedingly more elusive. Indeed, the achievement of coalition consensus regarding the 3D approach is a *sine qua non* for future operations. Perhaps the fact that the details underpinning the 3D approach are unclear is a blessing in disguise as the lack of clarity offers a window of opportunity to develop doctrine and concepts in concert with our allies.[101]

The final doctrinal issue that requires comment is communication. Any policy worthy of the name needs to be marketed not only to those who work with the policy, but

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[98] The problem of sequencing is circular in nature. While defence is usually key in the initial stages of a mission, the decision of some members of the indigenous population to support an insurgency is a rational choice in the absence of economic options that result from development. Thus, the elements of the 3D approach are not discreet and should be undertaken simultaneously *if conditions permit*. The issue then becomes one of the weighting of the components at a given time in a particular mission.
[99] Afghanistan NGO Safety Office and CARE, "NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan," May 2005, 8.
[100] Canadian Press Newswire, "Afghan Mission has Gone Off Track, says Paul Martin in *Toronto Star* Interview," 27 September 2006.

to the public in general. In introducing the NSP, PM Martin acknowledged this, stating that "[t]he fact that this is Canada's first-ever comprehensive statement of our NSP makes it particularly important that we engage Canadians on its content."[102] Yet, the 3D approach remains publicly obscure, shrouded in shifting nomenclature, a lack of clarity and wrangling over political ownership. If the approach is truly one of the cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy, it must be clarified, 'branded' and marketed so it is understood. Canadians can hardly be expected to rally around a policy they don't understand, and this lack of comprehension only opens the door to political opportunism. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that a former cabinet minister in the Martin government now prescribes an Afghan solution that is "a kind of Marshall Plan as we have done in Europe, in Japan, in Singapore…[and]…in Taiwan."[103] Federal New Democratic Party (NDP) leader Jack Layton has also seized on the ambiguity of the 3D policy, stating the Canada's approach in Afghanistan is "not balanced…[because]…it doesn't represent the equilibrium between humanitarian aid, reconstruction and [a] comprehensive peace process that Canadians would like to see."[104]

Communication is essential to building consensus and long-term support, both at home and abroad. The 3D approach – assuming it can be made to work – presents an opportunity to replace peacekeeping as a source of international pride and national

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[101]Canada's principal allies recognize that military solutions alone are inadequate and often counterproductive in dealing with 21st century interventions. To that end, many have developed or are in the process of developing '3D-like' approaches.

[102] Privy Council Office, iii.

[103] Stéphane Dion quoted in Campbell Clark and Brian Laghi, "Dion to Push for Afghan Marshall Plan," *Globe and Mai*l, 6 December 2006, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/Page/document/v5/content/subscribe?user_URL=http://www.theglobeandmail.com%2Fservlet%2Fstory%2FRTGAM.20061206.wdion06%2FBNStory%2FNational%2Fhome&ord=1171987521434&brand=theglobeandmail&force_login=true; Internet, accessed 20 February 2007.

[104] Jack Layton quoted in "Layton Again Calls for Afghan Pullout, in Wake of Deaths," CBC News, 3 September 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/09/03/afghan-layton.html; Internet, accessed 20 February 2007.

identity. Traditional peacekeeping "became a mission, a mantra, and a métier…[that Canada made]…the essence of its internationalism."[105] Nonetheless, it is now history and while justifiably venerated and celebrated, it is simply no longer relevant in the new world order.[106] Unfortunately, many Canadians cling to the outdated notion of Canada as peacekeeper. The 3D approach is, on the other hand, more relevant to the current world order, more inclusive of Canadians in general, and could produce more significant and far-reaching results. It clearly has the potential to replace peacekeeping as Canada's new 'brand' of internationalism, and should be marketed in a coherent and unified fashion.

In this regard, there is a distinct absence of the basic marketing tools that could be brought to bear on the issue. An enhanced and unified web presence, as opposed to 3D 'add-ons' to departmental web sites, is a belated and long-overdue start. Notwithstanding, there has not been a single whole-of-government press conference on the issue, nor has there been a strategic public relations campaign utilizing the media and official publications. DFAIT and DND research funding is available to a number of Canadian universities and think tanks to analyze traditional diplomatic and defence-related subjects.[107] To date, this funding has not translated into the level of academic debate, research and discussion that is needed to develop a wide-spread understanding of not only the concept of 3D, but its associated issues and concerns. Thus, a more targeted approach to funding should be explored. In terms of 'branding,' there are recent lessons to be learned from the Chrétien government's human security agenda. Regardless of the

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[105] Cohen, 60.
[106] Ironically, the best public marketing for peacekeeping – including the 2002 unveiling of the Peacekeepers' Monument in Ottawa and the depiction of the same monument on the ten dollar bill – occurred more than a decade after the need for classic peacekeeping evaporated.
[107] For example, DND sponsors The Security and Defence Forum that provides grants to selected centres of expertise in security and defence studies at 13 major universities across Canada.

perceived merits or deficiencies of the policy, it was effectively 'branded' as the cornerstone of Canada's new internationalism and reinforced with 'soft-power' successes like the Ottawa Treaty[108] and the Canadian sponsorship of *The Responsibility to Protect*.

In summary, lack of doctrinal clarity is hobbling the 3D approach. While there is a clear vision of where Canada wants to go, the strategy to get there is decidedly more opaque. Resolution of the doctrinal friction associated with the developmental aspects of the approach must be resolved. While the motives may differ, military hearts and minds campaigns, and professional humanitarian operations, are not necessarily mutually exclusive in the results they deliver. Should the two communities not be able to share the developmental doctrinal space, then clear boundaries – with associated government priorities and funding – will have to be delineated. In this regard, CIDA must play a crucial role. The 3D approach itself needs to be re-examined, clarified and deepened to develop concepts, doctrine, procedures and criteria for success that are compatible with our allies. Failings in policy articulation and lack of detail have the propensity to be translated into failings in application. Finally, 'branding' and marketing are potentially useful tools in developing public support and minimizing misconceptions about an aspect of foreign policy that, if successfully applied, has the potential to become a tenet of national identity.

Structure

The final aspect of the 3D approach to be examined is structure, in particular the organization and mechanisms of government that are needed at the strategic level to bring

[108] The Ottawa Treaty, also known as the Mine Ban Treaty, was ratified on 16 September 2007 and came into force on 1 March 1999. Formally known as the Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling,

about results at the operational and tactical levels. The 3D approach must, by necessity, involve "unprecedented levels of coordination among government departments and agencies."[109] For both the 3D approach and many other current policies, old ways of doing business are becoming less and less effective because issues frequently transcend departmental boundaries. As a result, a number of democracies are examining and experimenting with so-called joined-up government.[110] Through a new approach to governing, these countries hope to cut through bureaucratic structures and processes that impede timeliness and effectiveness. In this regard, this section will examine the problems associated with current governmental structure, historical and foreign examples upon which we may draw some lessons, and some suggestions for change that would serve to provide a more solid strategic foundation for the 3D approach.

Ownership and accountability are fundamental concerns when dealing with interdepartmental issues.

government."[111] While the witnesses were not intentionally evasive, it was clear to members of SCONSD that ownership and accountability amongst the three major players was not clear.

Such a finding should not be particularly surprising given that "[p]eople simply don't have a corporate view in the public service… [because]…accountability frameworks do not create incentives to do this."[112] While public servants may have pan-department responsibilities, loyalties tend to remain with their departments where the potential for career progression and personal developmental opportunities lie. Only a handful of executives, and those with executive potential, are employed at the Privy Council Office (PCO) or on secondment with other departments. Even here, most can expect to return to their respective departments and are thus focused on representing their departmental interests. The government has recently established the DFAIT-led Secretariat for the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START). A step in the right direction, START is nonetheless "fraught with extreme difficulty"[113] as it attempts to focus multiple departments not only on the situation in Afghanistan, but Haiti and the Sudan as well.

The problem is compounded yet again by the budgetary process which reinforces "a vertical mindset."[114] Funds are allocated on a departmental basis, and the departments

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[111]Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, 1st Session, 38th Parliament, Evidence, Monday, 11 December 2006. Senator Meighen, 11 December 06. During this session, Senator Meighen was attempting to trace how $100 million in federal funds earmarked for development were spent in Afghanistan.

[112] Herman Bakvis and Luc Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership* (Ottawa: Canadian School of Public Service, 2004), 52.

[113] Mr Donald C. Sinclair, Director General START, interview with author, 19 March 2007.

[114] Jacques Bourgault and René Lapierre, *Horizontality and Public Management – Final Report* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Public Management, December 2000), 12. A vertical mindset refers to the propensity to think only of issues that directly affect one's immediate organization. With regard to the federal government, this translates into a departmental-centric approach to business which serves to undermine and stifle inter-departmental collaboration.

must compete for their share of the budget. The idea of pooling resources for common goals is simply anathema to organizations that are used to an all-or-nothing approach to doing business. The current manner of budget allocation simply reinforces an "accountability framework…[that]…does not provide an organizational environment that is conducive to extensive (sustainable) interdepartmental coordination and collaboration."[115] In this regard, START is living proof that the federal budgeting process has not adapted to the realities of modern interventions. Allocated a working budget of $150 million, START is "tied to a bureaucracy that was created for different circumstances…[with the result that]…implementation drags due to authorities and accountabilities."[116]

Like accountability, culture is also decidedly departmentally centric.[117] Because coordination and collaboration is generally done in Canada at the PCO level or in infrequent and issue-specific working groups, there are distinct and sometimes conflicting public service cultures that further reinforce suspicion and mistrust. Akin to inter-service rivalry in the military context, these cultures serve to impede any move towards joined-up government. Political scientist Donald Savoie contends that in addition to the obvious departmental cultures, there are also two distinct cultures within each department: "those who prefer…to manage up and are preoccupied with the policy process, and those who…have to deal with program implementation and look down to the front-line workers providing services to Canadians."[118] Thus, the 3D approach faces not

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[115] Bakvis and Juillet, 52.
[116] Sinclair.
[117] Coming to a common understanding as to what culture is and what it incorporates is a challenge unto itself. For the purposes of this paper, organizational culture includes collective values, beliefs, expectations, interests and motivation.
[118] Donald J. Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers and Parliament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 155.

only different and sometimes opposing departmental cultures, but differing sub-cultures and lack of cohesion within individual ministries.

Yet another obstacle to enhanced inter-departmental cooperation and collaboration on the 3D approach is the short-term and political focus of many government departments. The Canadian political system is such that "central agencies tend to become an extension of the political leadership."[119] As a result, policies become associated with particular political parties and can become as transient as governments themselves. The 3D approach presents an interesting case study in this regard. Drafted and issued under a Liberal Government, the subsequent Conservative Government has directed, supported and financed a more comprehensive 3D approach in Afghanistan than the Liberal Government had ever envisioned. In fact, the current Conservative Government has made little or no mention of the NSP and ISP, the source documents of the approach. In this regard, portions of both documents have been relegated to the 'archived' sections of official government web sites,[120] presumably not because they are outdated, but because they are considered 'Liberal' vice governmental policy statements. The impact of political partisanship on policy in Canada is greater than in most Western states and is a reflection of the concentration of power at the PM level. In fact, "[w]ith the lack of checks and balances, the PM…is perhaps the most unchecked head of government among the democracies."[121]

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[119] Donald J. Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 336.
[120] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/about/position_papers-en.asp; Internet; accessed 9 March 2007. See footnote 7. When the IPS was first accessed online on 27 January 2007, it was not archived. By 9 March 2007, it had indeed been relegated to the 'Policy Archives' portion of the website.
[121] Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*, 282.

Human nature itself conspires against anything but slow and incremental change. Resistance to change is normal in bureaucracies and can be based on a number of real and perceived concerns. It is a particularly powerful phenomenon when it threatens jobs, power or organizational status. There is also a natural resistance to change when it is presented as a fait accompli without consultation with the stakeholders involved, and when such change runs counter to established organizational culture and practices.[122] This may at least partially explain the divided nature of support within CIDA for the 3D approach given that the use of aid as a targeted foreign-policy tool is a major departure from prior policies. Bureaucratic inertia takes considerable effort and time to overcome, and "[p]erhaps 98 percent of the policies in a system have little effect on its behaviour because of the ability of the system to compensate for changes in most policies."[123]

In spite of these obstacles, Canada has experimented with joined-up government in the past. Although there was no Canadian war cabinet during the First World War, Canada's PM, Sir Robert Borden, was invited to join the Imperial War Cabinet in order to streamline decision-making and increase the effectiveness with which the Empire collectively pursued the war effort. During the Second World War, Mackenzie King's creation of a War Cabinet[124] can rightly be considered the historical antecedent of Canadian joined-up government. Once again, for the sake of expediency and decisiveness on issues that transcended traditional departmental boundaries, the War

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[122] Timothy J. Galpin, *The Human Side of Change: A Practical Guide to Organization Redesign* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996), 43-45 and 118.
[123] Jay W. Forrester, *System Dynamics and the Lessons of 35 Years* (Boston: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991), 27.
[124] Brian Nolan, *King's War: Mackenzie King and the Politics of War 1939-1945* (Toronto: Random House, 1988), 34. The War Cabinet originated as the Emergency Council and was subsequently changed to the War Committee of the Cabinet.

Cabinet proved an extremely useful innovation in circumventing departmental bureaucracy and inertia.

More recently, both the short-lived 1996 humanitarian mission to Zaire and the preparations for the Year 2000 (Y2K) provided some key lessons in joined-up government. In the case of the former, Canada took on the role of lead nation of a coalition planning to deploy to Eastern Zaire under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) in 1996. A lead-nation role was unprecedented in Canadian history and required several government departments, in particular DFAIT and DND, to work closely together. In response to the requirement for enhanced collaboration, an ad hoc Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force was set up to provide strategic direction not only for Canadian consumption, but for that of potential coalition partners. While the mission was cancelled because the refugee crisis in Eastern Zaire dissipated, it is clear in hindsight that "closer DND-DFAIT cooperation and coordination than that provided by ad hoc structures…[as well as]…prior practice would have proved fruitful."[125]

Like the Zaire mission, Y2K proved to be a non-event. It is for this reason that it is also relatively difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of interdepartmental coordination. The consequences of a widespread failure of computer and communications systems was understood well before the dawn of the millennium and the Government of Canada had considerably more time to prepare for this eventuality than it did for the mission to Zaire. Nevertheless, an ad hoc cabinet-level committee was not established until 1998 and it was only several months later that preparations began. From the beginning, it was

[125] Michael A. Hennessy, "Operation Assurance: Planning a Multi-National Force for Rwanda/Zaire," *Canadian Military Journal*, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2001, 18.

stressed that success depended on partnering "with critical stakeholders…[and establishing]…critical working relationships that demanded good communications…[and]…regular meetings to share information and produce an agreed upon outcome."[126] While the dire predictions associated with Y2K were never realized, the benefits associated with the preparations, exercises and interdepartmental collaboration were ultimately of great utility in progressing the concept of joined-up government.

The most significant modern development with regard to joined-up government in Canada has been the creation of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), a so-called "super" department that oversees and coordinates the activities of six internal security related organizations.[127] Now known as Public Safety Canada (PSC), this organization's aim is to "build and implement national policies for emergency management and national security…[as well as]…federal policies for law enforcement and corrections."[128] This merger of related organizations has resulted in greater accountability and policy cohesion by virtue of the fact that one cabinet minister has overall responsibility. While larger organizations run the danger of becoming inward looking and difficult to penetrate in themselves, synergies are gradually being achieved with regard to internal security collaboration, thus reinforcing the efficacy of the concept.

Some of Canada's key allies have been moving towards joined-up government and are themselves using this form of government to underpin 3D approaches to international interventions. The British have enhanced collaboration significantly

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[126] Don Malpass, *The Federal Experience: Case Studies on Crisis and Emergency Management* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, 2003), 17-19.
[127] The six organizations are the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Canada Firearms Centre (CFC), the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) and the National Parole Board (NPB).
[128] Public Safety Canada Website, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/index-en.asp, Internet; accessed 9 March 2009.

between the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department for International Development through the establishment of interdepartmental funding arrangements called conflict prevention pools. The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool is designed to cover sub-Saharan Africa, while the Global Conflict Prevention Pool is dedicated to other potential hotspots around the world. Cabinet Committees have been established to oversee both pools; day-to-day operations, planning and budgeting are done by standing interdepartmental working groups. These working groups are established not only to cover particular countries or regions, but security and development themes such as disarmament and public infrastructure.[129] Although these innovations are relatively recent, "[t]he consensus seems to be that UK interventions have proven more effective when based on a shared analysis of a conflict and a joint response."[130]

The Dutch have developed a similar funding pool, which they have labelled the Stability Fund. This fund has fewer guidelines and restrictions placed on it than the British Conflict Prevention Pools, and is also different in that the Ministry of Defence does not participate. The potential for friction is significant, as bilateral interventions that require diplomacy and development often require security that is invariably provided by the military.[131]

In both countries, the move towards joined-up government has not been problem free. As with Canada, the issue of distinct departmental cultures continues to place

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[129] Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-up Government," *IRPP Policy Matters* Volume 5, Number 5 (July 2004), 13-14.
[130] Wolfgang Koerner, "Security Sector Reform: Defence Diplomacy" (Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Political and Social Affairs Division, 17 May 2006) 3. http://www.parl.gc.caInformation/library/PRBpubs/prb0612-e.htm. Internet; accessed 5 January 2007. The UK began reforming governmental structures to underpin interdepartmental approaches to international interventions in 2000.

obstacles in the path of the development of a common 'security' culture. The UK MOD continues to view security issues through the prism of defence diplomacy and, if necessary, armed interventions. Like CIDA, the Department for International Development tends to measure new initiatives against its mandate to eradicate global poverty.[132] In both the UK and the Netherlands, the greatest challenge in moving towards more effective joined-up government is "to overcome the tendency to evaluate joined-up activities against…single departmental aims and to view them against a new set of joined up policy criteria."[133]

What lessons can be learned from this review of structural problems, historical antecedents and emerging trends with some of our close allies? The first is that last-minute, ad hoc and transient coordination bodies are not particularly effective. The Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force and the preparations for Y2K are a case in point. The former was convened on an emergency basis and although effective when taking into account the limitations of time, it simply could not compensate for a lack of prior joint policy planning and interdepartmental experience. The latter, on the other hand, was perceived to be more effective because functional planning teams and interpersonal relationships were developed over a longer period of time. A comparison of the two examples suggests that more institutional restructuring will likely lead to greater cooperation and collaboration.

In the same vein, the second key lesson is that interpersonal relationships underpin cooperation and collaboration, and the depth of these relationships is directly proportional to their duration. Providing opportunities for civil servants and military

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[131] Fitz-Gerald, 15-16.
[132] *Ibid*., 16.
[133] *Ibid*.

officers to serve in PCO is laudable, but it does not address the root cause of the cultural and knowledge-based impediments to enhanced collaboration. This can only be achieved through more frequent inter-departmental secondments that occur at lower levels of seniority. Such secondments and experience would have to be encouraged and rewarded by the system. For example, a two-year secondment of a Canadian Forces captain or major to DFAIT or CIDA would need to be viewed as a career-enhancing move that is indicative of outstanding potential. Perhaps even more challenging would be the propensity of DFAIT and CIDA to view secondments to DND in the same fashion. From a DND point of view, the American example of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act could prove a useful model. This 1986 piece of legislation stipulated, *inter alia*, that no officer in the US military could be promoted to flag or general officer rank unless that officer had undertaken an approved joint[134] billet at some point in his or her career. There is merit in exploring a similar inter-agency approach with regard to future leaders within DFAIT, DND and CIDA. Finally, mandatory participation on interdepartmental courses and training would serve to further erode cultural biases and differences. The Canadian Forces' National Security Studies Programme is but one example of a number of government-sponsored educational opportunities where inter-agency cooperation could be enhanced. Unfortunately, there has not been a single DFAIT or CIDA student on the course since its inception nine years ago.

[134] Jointness in the military context refers to inter-service operations or assignments. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, joint billets in the US military are highly prized as a prerequisite for advancement.

Finally, the last lesson that one may derive is that "dangers lurk where structural and jurisdictional weaknesses reside."[135] Structures need to evolve and adapt to optimize the impact of new policies and ideas. This is no small undertaking in a Canadian context, for departmental structures, mandates and funding procedures are in fact law because they have been stipulated in acts of parliament.[136] Nevertheless, movement towards joined-up government in both the UK and the Netherlands is proceeding, with legislative changes being implemented to facilitate these changes. Unless there are clear lines of accountability, ownership and funding, results will be sub-optimal and parliamentary committees such as SCONSD will continue to have difficulty in determining who is responsible for what. Indeed, SCONSD and to a lesser degree SCEAIT have taken it upon themselves to provide parliamentary oversight of the 3D approach. This oversight is sporadic and incomplete. A parliamentary committee[137] dedicated exclusively to studying and reporting on the 3D approach would be an extremely useful tool in not only highlighting the importance of the policy, but in developing parliamentarians who have sufficient depth and expertise to make the legislative changes that are needed to optimize the efficacy of joined-up government.

Public Safety Canada provides an example of joined-up government from which further structural changes may be derived. As discussed previously, it encompasses those agencies and organizations that together have collective responsibility for internal

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[135] Douglas L. Bland and Sean Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 200.
[136] Sinclair. The recent creation of START is a step in the right direction, but is hobbled by outdated procedures and accountabilities conducive to individual departments.
[137] A Senate committee would be a better choose than a House of Commons committee for this purpose. Senate committees tend to be more effective in achieving multi-lateral consensus, thus presenting an enhanced opportunity to depoliticize issues. Senators also tend to serve longer on particular committees, ultimately creating a greater institutional knowledge of the issues.

security within Canada. As Figure 3 below illustrates, it is not outside the realm of the possible to suggest that a similar grouping of departments might be formed to concentrate and focus global security efforts.



Figure 3: Internal and External Security Groupings

Such a model recognizes that there has been and will continue to be overlap between the internal and external spheres. In this regard, DND is a perfect example. While domestic defence considerations are now the stated priority of the Canadian Forces, the reality is that the vast majority of training, planning and operations is, and most likely will be, of an expeditionary nature. In this model, other departments – such as Health Canada and Agriculture Canada – can and will play a significant role in both spheres from time to time. Nevertheless, the 'standing' groupings represented by the organizations in each sphere are more likely to be grouped under one 'super' department because they are focused predominantly on either domestic or international outcomes that

would benefit from clear direction, funding and policy that does not currently exist. In this regard, Canada would be wise to examine and learn from the experiences of our allies, in particular the UK. Just as it is desirable to work collectively on the doctrinal aspects of the 3D approach, so to is it desirable to share lessons learned and ideas on emerging governmental structures that underpin joined-up approaches to governance.

Recommendations

As is the case with virtually every government policy, the 3D approach has both its supporters and detractors. Political scientist Denis Stairs has argued that Canada has no business imposing our 'universal' model on others, and that "we need to remember that attempting to propagate our way of life abroad is an imperial enterprise."[138] He may well be correct, but the reasons why Canada has seized upon the 3D approach are not at issue here. What is at issue, however, is whether or not *after* deciding upon the policy, the Canadian government has provided the strategic and institutional foundations for its success. Michael Ignatieff previously stated in the same lectures series as Denis Stairs that "Canada improvises magnificently, but it may be time to stop improvising."[139] In this regard, any 3D successes achieved to date in Afghanistan can be attributed to the dedication and improvisation of diplomats, soldiers and CIDA officials on the ground, and *not* to interdepartmental collaboration and institutional change in Ottawa. To the extent that the 3D approach has succeeded, it would appear to be in spite of itself. If Canada is to sustain and develop this approach as a key tenet of foreign policy, then a

[138] Stairs, "The Menace of General Ideas in the Making and Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy," 24.
[139] Michael Ignatieff, *Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada*, O.D. Skelton Memorial Lecture (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs Canada, 12 March 2004), 16.

number of strategic-level changes will be required. Given the foregoing research and analysis, the following broad recommendations for change can be made:

Recommendation #1. Recognize the 3D approach for what it is. While the principal stakeholders in this approach are and will continue to be DFAIT, DND and CIDA, they are not the *exclusive* stakeholders. In fact, an international intervention will likely fail if there is an insistence on limiting dialogue to planning amongst this group alone. More often than not, interventions will also require sustained trade development, policing, disarmament of some form, and the achievement of measurable progress towards democratic institutions and governance based on the rule of law. Other departments and government agencies *must* also become involved. Whether it is Elections Canada, the Correctional Service or even Agriculture Canada, every situation will demand a different mix of mission-appropriate departments. As Wright has contended, "one could even extend 3-D's [*sic*] scope to include civil society, the private sector and policy actors." [140] While it may be argued that such inclusiveness is *implicit* to the 3D approach, this is not *widely understood*.

Recommendation #2. Resolve CIDA's mandate. CIDA has received considerable criticism and scrutiny for its alleged reticence to embrace the 3D approach. In some measure, this criticism has been unjust because the NSP and ISP did not bring about or recommend official changes to CIDA's mandate. Afghanistan has brought this disconnect to light, and thus "CIDA devotes itself…largely to handing over fat cheques to the government in Kabul, while delivering naught but dribs and drabs to the PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] in Kandahar."[141] The debate over funding and

[140] Wright, "Lost in Transition: Canada and the Search for a 3-D Solution in Kosovo," 18.
[141] Stairs, "The Menace of General Ideas in the Making and Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy," 28.

responsibility for short-term military hearts and minds operations and medium- to long-term humanitarian operations will not be resolved quickly, but by the same token it cannot be ignored. CIDA's role in this regard *must be clarified*. With respect to Afghanistan, there is simply no time to spare as Canada defines and implements this particularly difficult aspect of the 3D approach. Eric Lehr, a defence and foreign affairs analyst, has suggested that the Commander Task Force Afghanistan "should be immediately given the $30 million his US counterparts enjoy for local development projects and, most critically, the local authority to spend it rapidly."[142] Hopefully, this will not be necessary if CIDA's recently established Afghanistan Division is given the latitude and authority needed to make rapid changes to existing policy.

Recommendation #3. Add depth and clarity to the concept. One of the current concerns with regard to the 3D approach is that it has *not* matured much beyond an academic construct, a policy box devoid of the ability to be implemented to achieve concrete results. When one peels back the hype that was generated in documents like the NSP and IPS, it would seem that the 3D approach is little more than a "'big' label project […founded…] on the basis of loosely-formulated general ideas."[143] Unfortunately, Canada is now in the midst of translating a rather vague policy into action in Afghanistan, with all the inherent problems that accompany a project. Considerably more thought must be put into the approach to define measurable and effective criteria for success. Previous interventions should be mined to discern what these criteria are, and in this regard economic growth – measured in annual change in per capita GDP – is key. At the same time, doctrine should be developed in concert with our allies to determine not only

[142] Lerhe, 4.
[143] Stairs, "The Menace of General Ideas in the Making and Conduct of Canadian Foreign Policy," 13.

how the approach is applied in a multi-national environment, but *how the various elements are sequenced in their application*. Finally, terminology can be misleading and a more inclusive title than '3D' should be communicated in official documents. While 'whole-of-government' and 'all-of-government' both reflect inclusiveness and either may become the moniker of choice, they have crept into the lexicon and have not been formally introduced in subsequent policy statements. This simply adds to the confusion.

Recommendation #4. 'Brand' the policy and sell it. The 3D approach, not unlike the current mission in Afghanistan, is not widely understood by the public or by decision makers in Ottawa. Once the policy is clarified, it should be 'branded' and 'marketed' so that anyone with even a passing interest in the subject has ready access to facts and information. For example, as currently structured, departmental web sites serve to highlight the disjointed nature of both the policy and its level of acceptance. From frequent references in the DND website to virtually no reference in the CIDA website, communicating the policy is proving every bit as difficult as implementing it. Departmental mindsets are to blame and, as a result, "each of the 3Ds remains associated not so much with a fluid boundary-spanning approach, but with departmental 'proprietorship.'"[144] What is required is a model that can be *easily understood and communicated in a unified fashion*. DFAIT's recent 3D website - instead of perfunctory and belated additions to departmental websites – is a step in the right direction, but is only one of many initiatives that could be used to more effectively communicate the concept. Finally, there is potential to make 3D Canada's brand of internationalism for the 21st century. Just as peacekeeping became a source of national pride around which

[144] Andrew F. Cooper, "Adding 3Ns to the 3Ds: Lessons from the 1996 Zaire Mission for Humanitarian Interventions," The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) Working Paper Number 4 (Waterloo: CIGI, December 2004), 1.

Canadians rallied in the latter part of the 20th century, so to could 3D become a source of national pride in the new millennium.

Recommendation #5. Create the governmental structures and mechanisms to support the policy. Government structures that are rooted in the 20th and even 19th centuries may not be adequate to address current challenges and threats. Structures are evolving in both the UK and the Netherlands, and Canada's relatively recent creation of PSEPC (now PSC) is tacit acknowledgement that while difficult to overcome, traditional boundaries and barriers to change are not insurmountable. If inter-departmental, inter-agency and inter-state results are desired, then greater progress towards joined-up government must be made through the fostering of a common culture, inter-departmental funding arrangements, secondments and personnel exchanges with allies. While some progress is being made in this regard through coordination committees such as START, departments must move from cooperation to daily collaboration on a wide range of issues. A standing Senate committee dedicated exclusively to the 3D approach would be useful in identifying structural weaknesses and recommendations for change, and in the fullness of time this could well lead to greater integration between those departments – in particular DFAIT, DND and CIDA – that are externally focused.

Conclusion

Although there are a number of historical antecedents to the 3D approach, it is Afghanistan where this complex and all-encompassing policy is being implemented for the first time since enunciated in the NSP and ISP. Some progress is being made in the areas of quick-impact aid projects and the development of Afghan governmental institutions, but often only through the sheer determination, extraordinary effort and

tactical-level collaboration of DFAIT, CF, RCMP, CIDA and CSC personnel on the ground. Their efforts are being subverted by a very unstable strategic foundation to the policy, a foundation that is currently based on platitudes, generalities and an "optimism of means."[145] Indeed, in the rush to release the NSP and ISP, it would seem that the vision of what the 3D approach was to accomplish was clear, but the path to get there decidedly less so. It is too early to tell if the policy will succeed, but it most certainly will not if the strategic-level issues outlined in this paper are not addressed in a timely fashion. Indeed, the future of 3D will be sealed not in a far-off failed or failing state, but in the political and equally challenging environment of the nation's capital.

Why should Canada place so much effort and emphasis on underwriting this policy? First of all, we have *publicly* – and more importantly – *internationall*y committed to it. Failure to follow through on this policy will result not only in disappointing results in countries we wish to help, but in an erosion of credibility amongst our allies at a time when Canada is working very hard to achieve the opposite effect. Secondly, and more significantly, Canada must find its place in the current 'power earthquake' that characterizes the first decade of the 21st century. If we champion *The Responsibility to Protect* as a guide for intrastate behaviour and actions - that is to say that armed intervention, diplomacy and long-term development is justified and necessary to protect human rights when sovereign states cannot - then we must be prepared to contribute more than intellectual capital and soft power to the achievement of this aim.

Canada must bring to the table, in coordination with our allies and coalition partners, the right mix of diplomatic, defence, developmental *and other assets* to effect lasting and

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[145] Stairs, "The Menace of General Ideas in the Making and Conduct of Foreign Policy," 10.

meaningful change in failed and failing states. Such undertakings are ambitious, and demand a long-term commitment and a level of interdepartmental cooperation that Canada has not witnessed since the Second World War. An inability or unwillingness to resource and support these interventions will result in states where lawlessness and poverty will continue to exacerbate regional and global instability. Ultimately, Canada and her allies will have to intervene in these states at some point in the future. The repeated missions in Haiti not only illustrate this point, but raise questions about where Canada chooses to intervene en masse. Indeed, Don Macnamara has stated that "[i]f the '3-D' public policy of joined-up defence, diplomacy and development is to mean anything, it must mean something in our own hemisphere."[146]

There are many institutional obstacles to overcome on the path to a truly integrated and effective 3D approach, particularly in the areas of inclusiveness, doctrine and structure. Despite these obstacles, the risks associated with failure and the rewards associated with success more than justify the effort. The introduction to the IPS stated that "[n]ow is the time to rebuild for Canada an independent voice of pride and influence in the world."[147] The 3D approach is the cornerstone of this integrated, 21st century internationalism, and we simply cannot afford to get it wrong. As Homer so presciently implied almost 3,000 years ago, significant accomplishments of the magnitude represented by the 3D approach can be achieved only through trust, collaboration and teamwork.

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[146] W. Don Macnamara, "Haiti – An Opportunity for Canada to Apply the '3-D' Concept," *IRPP Policy Options*, February 2005, Volume 26, Number 2, 67.

[147] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World," PM's Introduction.

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