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VALUES AND INTERESTS IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY:

A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Canada's domestic and foreign policy is an important expression of what matters to Canadians and their government. The debate over whether domestic and foreign policy should be driven by a pursuit of *values* or *interests* is longstanding, perpetuated by impassioned advocates on both sides of the issue. Arguments of the interest-based policy supporters, self-titled *pragmatists*, are characterized by a particularly narrow characterization of values and interests. This somewhat constrained view tends to force the debate into an either-or outcome; that is, it's either all interests or all values. This paper adopts a social psychological perspective on the interest vs. values debate, demonstrating that a more encompassing consideration of the complexity of value content and relationships results in a more balanced equation. A social psychological point of view reveals that values have been, and should continue to be, integral components of Canada's domestic and foreign policy. Our values define us and unite us, and they should be up front and center in Canada's foreign policy to let the world know who we are and how we will interact with the international community.

Introduction

Canada's domestic and foreign policy is an important articulation of what matters to Canadians and their government. It establishes Canada's identity on the world stage and lays out how Canada interacts with other nations. On the domestic front it fosters a sense of unity among the citizenry and provides a standard against which the people of Canada can evaluate their government's behaviour. The debate over whether domestic and foreign policy should be driven by a pursuit of *values* or *interests* has challenged political leaders, occupied academics, intrigued the media and occasionally captured the curiosity of the Canadian public since its first incarnation by Louis St. Laurent in 1947.[1] Much like the nature-nurture controversy, which revolves around the relative contributions of genetic predisposition and the environment on an individual's development, there is a wide spectrum of opinion over the role played by values and interests in the formulation and execution of Canadian foreign policy. At one extreme are the so-called *pragmatists*, personified by the likes of Jack Granatstein, Kim Richard Nossal and Denis Stairs, who argue that ". . . values or principles are for individuals, while nations have *interests* above all."[2] At the opposite end of the spectrum are those characterized by the pragmatists as *idealists*, whose vision for Canada's foreign policy is epitomized in the words of former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham, who spoke these stirring words during his keynote address at the 2002 International Press Freedom Awards:

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[1] For the remainder of this paper domestic and foreign policy will be expressed simply as foreign policy, as in many respects, one flows from the other. This view is consistent with *Foreign Policy for Canadians,* published in 1970, which describes foreign policy as an extension abroad of national policy.

[2] J.L. Granatstein, "The Importance of being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S.. (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2003), 7.

> The world we want is much like the Canada we want: a sustainable future of shared security and prosperity; of tolerance and respect for diversity; of democracy and the realization of human rights; of opportunity and equal justice for all.[3]

It is interesting to note that, while the pragmatists would undoubtedly portray Graham as an idealist, this short excerpt from his address makes reference to security and prosperity, which the pragmatists typically refer to as interests.[4] While each of the pragmatists holds their own distinctive views on foreign policy, they appear to be unified by a particularly narrow interpretation of values which permeates each of their arguments. This paper will first provide a social psychological perspective on values that will expose the limitations imposed by the pragmatists' point of view. Next, it will reveal a clear values-based thread in Canadian foreign policy since its inception. Finally, this paper will show that a social psychological perspective leads to a more informed foreign policy debate and demonstrate that values continue to warrant an important place in Canadian foreign policy.

[3] Bill Graham, "The Honorable Bill Graham Speech on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression International Press Freedom Awards" (Toronto: Wednesday, November 13, 2002); http://www.cjfe.org/eng/awards/graham.html; Internet; accessed 17 February 2007.

[4] Further references to "pragmatists" in this paper relates specifically to the shared conceptualization of values and interests of Jack Granatstein, Kim Richard Nossal and Denis Stairs. Simply stated, what these authors characterize as *interests*, social psychologists would typically describe as *materialist* values. These authors limit their characterization of *values* to those in the *postmaterialist* domain. The significance of this view of values and interests to Canadian foreign policy will become clear later in this paper. Interested readers are directed to the Bibliography for specific works by Granatstein, Nossal and Stairs.

Values Background

Any examination of the relationship of values and interests to Canadian foreign policy must be anchored in a common understanding of the meanings of these two terms. In his seminal work, *The Nature of Human Values*, Milton Rokeach, a social psychologist and founding father of empirical values research, defines a value as:

> . . . a single belief of a very specific kind. It concerns a desirable mode of behavior or end-state that has a transcendental quality to it, guiding actions, attitudes, judgments, and comparisons across specific objects and situations and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate goals.[5]

Rokeach differentiates two main subtypes of values; those that are *instrumental*, related to desirable *modes of conduct*, and *terminal*, related to *end-states*.[6] Within the terminal values subgroup are social values, which encompass such notions as national security and world at peace. Instrumental values include those with a moral character, which incorporate the essential attribute of *oughtness*. Some common examples of moral instrumental values are honesty, courage and responsibility.[7]

In light of the fact that every human being is a unique individual, one might be inclined to expect that there would necessarily be an infinite number of values. Rokeach counters this assumption with the argument that although human beings are all individuals, the number of problems that confront humans over time is relatively limited. Rokeach argues, consequently, that there should be relatively few values. He goes on to explain that although the number of values is relatively limited, they are organized in

[5] M. Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 18.
[6] *Ibid.*, 7.
[7] *Ibid*., 8.

countless ways into distinct *value systems*. This vast array of value systems accounts for cultural, societal and institutional diversity. Rokeach envisages a value as a standard that guides behaviour, while a value system is a general plan utilized to resolve conflicts between competing values and make decisions. According to Rokeach, a particular situation activates a number of values and whereas any action will be compatible with one or more of them, it is unlikely that any action will be compatible with all of them.[8]

Rokeach refers to an interest as basically one of the many manifestations of a value. He goes on to explain that an interest is a narrower concept than a value, lacking a value's essential function as a *standard* as well as a value's fundamental characteristic of oughtness.[9] Rokeach's concept is reinforced by the following Oxford Dictionary definition, which relates interests to behaviours undertaken in the pursuit of end-states:

> A central concept in liberal political and economic explanations of the actions of unconstrained actors – whether individuals or groups. Individuals (or groups) are identified with a set of *interests,* which correspond to needs, wants, or, more generally, forms of power.[10]

What is apparent in these descriptions of interests and values is that rather than viewing them as orthogonal, as the pragmatists tend to do, social psychologists recognize the close relationship between them; interests have a home within the values family. While the pragmatists' linear perspective leads to a tendency to see interests and values as opposing forces in perpetual conflict, the social psychologists' view of one as a subset of the other suggests more congruence, particularly regarding their relationship to behaviour.

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[8] *Ibid*., 9.
[9] *Ibid*., 11.
[10] *Oxford Dictionary Online Premium*, http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?entry=t104.e846&srn=13&ssid=155551845#FIRSTHIT; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.

Building on Rokeach's influential research, Bardi and Schwartz examined the important connection between values and behaviour.[11] While Bardi and Schwartz's research supports Rokeach's determination of a clear linkage between values and behaviour, they caution that it is overly simplistic to assume a direct causal relationship. Bardi and Schwartz maintain that while individuals act in ways that express or promote the attainment of their values, *situational pressure* moderates the impact of these values as determinants of behaviour. Elaborating further on this issue, the authors emphasize that the stronger the situational pressure, the weaker will be the influence of values on a particular behaviour. Bardi and Schwartz's findings illustrate how normative pressures moderate the motivational influence of values on behaviour.[12]

Bardi and Schwartz opine that:

> . . . individuals experience little external pressure to perform behaviours that express values that are unimportant to the group. In the absence of external pressure, the personal importance of values may influence behaviour more, leading to stronger correlations with their corresponding behaviours.[13]

What is immediately apparent in this observation is that, while individuals acting on their own may be more inclined to be true to their personal values, group pressure may motivate them to compromise. It is also important to recognize that any individual is a member of many different groups. Politicians' freedom to pursue their personal values is limited by the pressure to represent the interests of their constituents, their party and their country.

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[11] A. Bardi and S. H. Schwartz, "Values and Behavior: Strength and Structure of Relations," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 29, no. 10 (Oct, 2003).
[12] *Ibid*., 1217.
[13] *Ibid.*, 1217.

There is widespread agreement in the social psychological literature that Rokeach's work clearly established the essential aspects and number of values that form the basis for cross-cultural research, a fundamental requirement for the comparison of values in different countries.[14] Seeking to bring additional clarity to the complex interplay between values and their relationship to behaviour, Shalom Schwartz conducted extensive research aimed at identifying commonalities in the structure and content of human values. Schwartz conceptualizes values as:

> . . . desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity. Implicit in this definition of values as goals is that (1) they serve the interests of some social entity, (2) they can motivate action—giving it direction and emotional intensity, (3) they function as standards for judging and justifying action, and (4) they are acquired both through socialization to dominant group values and through the unique learning experiences of individuals.[15]

Schwartz's key contribution to the social psychology literature is his concept of the universality of value structure and content. As illustrated in the following passage from his work, goals and needs are core elements of value content:

> Specifically, values represent, in the form of conscious goals, responses to three universal requirements with which all individuals and societies must cope: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and requirements for the smooth functioning and survival of groups.[16]

Schwartz reasons that the universal content of values provides individuals and groups with a common language so that they can communicate with one another about ". . .

[14] S.H. Schwartz, "Are there Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?" *Journal of Social Issues* 50, no. 4 (1994): 19-45.
[15] *Ibid.*, 21
[16] *Ibid.*, 21.

necessities inherent in human existence".[17] In other words, values are the medium through which needs and goals are transmitted between the members of the group.

Schwartz developed the view that values do not function in isolation. To Schwartz, the critical element that distinguishes one value from another is the type of *motivational goal* expressed. He reasoned that actions taken in the pursuit of each type of value have ". . . psychological, practical, and social consequences that may conflict or may be compatible with the pursuit of other value types."[18] Through an analysis of the conflicts and compatibilities that may occur when different value types are pursued simultaneously, Schwartz developed the theoretical model of value relations depicted in Figure 1.

[17] *Ibid*., 21.
[18] *Ibid.*, 23.



Figure 1. Theoretical model of relations among motivational types of values, higher order value types, and bipolar value dimensions.
Source: Schwartz, S. H. "Are there Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?" *Journal of Social Issues* 50, no. 4 (1994): 24.

Schwartz's ten motivational value types are represented as slices in the pie-shaped model displayed above. What is most important about Schwartz's model is that while it distinguishes distinct value types, rather than treating the many different dimensions of values as independent, or interacting randomly, it brings clarity by representing the motivational relationship among value types as a continuum. The model locates more compatible value types in close proximity to one another; competing value types are

opposite each other across the circle. Visualizing value types in this manner emphasizes the dynamic interplay between the many different motivational forces that determine behaviour. The overly simplistic one-on-one value and behaviour cause and effect notion apparently adopted by the pragmatists is replaced by a more realistic conception of how a given behaviour may be compatible with pursuit of a number of distinct values. For example, because of their locations in the model, one would expect that pursuit of *Power* value types would likely conflict with pursuit of *Benevolence* value types to a far greater extent than it would conflict with *Security* value types. Likewise, pursuit of *Benevolence* values would be expected to be more compatible with pursuit of *Universalism* values than it would with pursuit of *Achievement* values.

Based on data from wide-ranging values research in many countries, Schwartz mapped individual values onto each of the ten motivational value types. His findings are illustrated graphically in Figure 2 below.



Figure 2. Value structure prototype averaged across 19 Nations (36 samples)
Source: Schwartz, S. H. "Are there Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?" *Journal of Social Issues* 50, no. 4 (1994): 31.

Referring to Figure 2, as one might expect, values such as *national security* and *social order* are located together within the *SECURITY* value type and they are situated in close proximity to the *POWER* value type. It should come as no surprise that *wealth*, located within the *POWER* value type, is at the opposite side of the continuum from *protect environment* and *world at peace*, situated together in the *UNIVERSALISM* value type. This model does not imply that action taken in pursuit of the *national security* value cannot also be compatible with the *protect environment* value; however, it does suggest that such action is more likely to be compatible with the *social order* value. The

model would also suggest that conflict is more likely between actions taken in pursuit of *social order* and *freedom* values than between actions taken in pursuit of *social order* and *wealth*.

In contrast to the pragmatists' apparent conviction that interests and values operate independently, conceptualizing the relations among values as Schwartz sees them, interacting simultaneously in predictable ways to shape behaviour, offers the potential for a less polarized result in the interests vs. values debate. By way of example, consider the behaviour of making a charitable contribution. The act of giving to charity might represent pursuit of social justice (i.e. caring for the weak), a Universalism value. This being said, when one gives to charity it does not imply that one does not value wealth, one of the Power value types; however, the location of the two values opposite one another in Schwartz's model illustrates graphically that there is competition between the two. While wealth and charity may be pursued simultaneously, emphasis on one is likely to result in less emphasis on the other. It is not, however, as the pragmatists might lead one to conclude, all of one to the complete exclusion of the other. In other words, being charitable does not mean that you must give away your entire salary and live in poverty, and valuing wealth does not mean that you never give to charity.

Values are a useful tool for analysing social processes and bringing meaning to political phenomena.[19] Central to this analysis is the premise that values are deeply held constructs that remain stable over time and transcend specific events, objects and

[19] Valerie Braithwaite and Russell Blamey, "Consensus, Stability and Meaning in Abstract Social Values." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 3 (November 1998): 363.

institutions. When values are viewed as *non-negotiable*, *universal ends* or *universal oughts*, they evoke a sense of *absoluteness* and, as such, they are much more likely to coexist than to conflict.[20] When the majority of the population agrees on the social values they would like their society to pursue there is value consensus, leading to value stability. The basic abstract nature of values also contributes to their durability. To illustrate how this feature contributes to value resiliency, Brathwaite and Blamey opine that *despite* a shared understanding of the core meaning of specific values, individuals and groups will differ in *how* the value is pursued. As the researchers explain,

> [Although] widespread consensus might exist for the social value of a world at peace . . . individuals will diverge in the degree to which they see peace as achievable through economic sanctions, military retaliation, negotiation, compromise, or turning the other cheek in a particular situation.[21]

The evolution of the right to vote in Canada is a home-grown example of how a value, like democracy, may be interpreted and pursued in different ways. While today Canadians take it for granted that everyone over the age of 18 has the right to vote, it was not always so for women, Aboriginals, Asians and prisoners, who only gained the right to participate in elections in the past century.[22] Democracy in Canada in 2007 is certainly not the same as it was in 1907; however, the transformation did not happen overnight.

This discussion of values illustrates a number of key issues and concepts that will be taken up later in this author's consideration of Canadian foreign policy formulation

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[20] Valerie Braithwaite, "The Value Balance Model of Political Evaluations." *British Journal of Psychology* 89, no. 2 (May 1998): 226.
[21] Valerie Braithwaite and Russell Blamey, "Consensus, Stability and Meaning in Abstract Social Values.". . ., 366.
[22] CBC Archives, "Voting in Canada: How a Privilege Became a Right," http://archives.cbc.ca/IDD-1-73-1450/politics_economy/voting_rights/; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

and application. Firstly, values may be desired end-states or goals, or desirable modes of conduct or principles. Secondly, the distinguishing element of a moral value is the concept of *oughtness*. Thirdly, there are a relatively limited number of values, they are stable over time and they interact in somewhat predictable ways. Fourthly, a specific action may be compatible with simultaneous pursuit of a number of distinct values. Fifthly, the relationship between values and behaviour is not one of direct cause and effect; many other situational and personal variables interact in complex ways to determine how humans act. Next, although there is general agreement on the definition of a particular value, how a value is pursued differs between individuals and across situations. Finally, from the point of view of the social psychologist, interests and values are not orthogonal. An interest is nothing more than a specific kind, or subset, of value types, lacking the fullness of the concept of a value's essential function as a *standard* as well as a value's fundamental characteristic of *oughtness*.

The next section will take a historical look at Canada's foreign policy through a social psychological lens and identify its core enduring values. The 56 values most typically used in survey research are provided for reference at Annex A.

Canadian Domestic and Foreign Policy through the Years

Perhaps the earliest articulation of Canadian foreign policy, as distinct from that of Great Britain, was delivered by Louis St. Laurent, Secretary of State for External Affairs under Prime Minister Mackenzie King, during the inaugural Gray lecture at the

University of Toronto in 1947. In his speech, St. Laurent established that Canada's foreign policy ". . . must have its foundations laid upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups of the population."[23] St. Laurent was acutely aware of the historical, deep-seated animosity between the English and French speaking communities in Canada and the challenges inherent in attempting to unite two disparate cultures sparsely dispersed across a large country. He was also cognizant of the political realities of Canada's geography, climate and abundance of natural resources and their relationship to the country's economic prosperity.

St. Laurent spoke of foreign policy in terms of five general *principles*. His first principle, ". . . that external policies shall not destroy our unity," set the stage for a Canadian foreign policy that would cautiously seek a compromise to offset the centrifugal forces constantly pulling the country apart.[24] St. Laurent knew instinctively that ". . . a disunited Canada will be a powerless one," in a world dominated by the great powers.[25] This first principle is very much in keeping with Schwartz's social order value, a vital component of national stability, one of the security value types.

St. Laurent's second principle, political liberty, was a clear message to the world that in spite of its small population and ties to the commonwealth, Canada would stand on its own two feet and determine its own direction. This principle could certainly be

[23] Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs: The 1947 Gray Lecture at the University of Toronto," http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/2496/future/stlaurent.html; Internet; accessed 12 February 2007.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid*.

viewed in terms of the pursuit of authority and social recognition, elements of the Schwartz power value type. These values are concerned with control of resources and pursuit of respect and status in the international community. Although early on in his address St. Laurent stresses Canada's independence from the commonwealth, his frequent references to the United Kingdom later on in his discourse revealed that Canada was still unsure about its ability to cut the umbilical cord to the mother land.

When he speaks of respect for the rule of law, his third principle, St. Laurent refers not only to the importance of social order to security and stability within Canada, but also of the need for social justice from a global perspective and its pivotal role in maintaining world peace. This principle illustrates how some foreign policy objectives touch a number values, representing several potentially conflicting value types in Schwartz's inventory.[26] The important message here is that seemingly disparate values can be pursued simultaneously.

St. Laurent's fourth principle addresses the significance of human values. Elaborating on this principle, St. Laurent speaks of moral principles, of traditions and of standards and ideals that guide foreign relations.[27] These notions fit easily with the concept of values as standards and as desirable modes of conduct that serve as moral sign posts to guide behaviour. St. Laurent's concept of human values lends itself well to an

[26] S.H. Schwartz, "Are there Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?" *Journal of Social Issues* 50, no. 4 (1994); Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs: The 1947 Gray Lecture . . .

[27] St. Laurent, Louis. "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs: The 1947 Gray Lecture. . .

interpretation as being representative of Schwartz's benevolence and universalism value types, concerned with enhancing people's welfare, tolerance and understanding.

In conveying his fourth principle, St. Laurent also makes mention of transcending material well-being. This expression of the pursuit of values that look beyond national security and power is consistent with the postmaterialist values included in Schwartz's benevolence and universalism dimensions.[28] Commenting on the political relevance of materialist and post-materialist values, Schwartz writes:

> Materialist values, presumably grounded in experiences of insecurity, emphasize social order and stability and the political and economic arrangements believed to ensure them. They correspond to the adjacent value types of security and power, types with similar psychodynamic underpinnings. . . Postmaterialist values emphasize individual freedoms, citizen involvement, equality, and environmental concerns, corresponding to the adjacent universalism and self-direction value types.[29]

Referring back to Figures 1 and 2, materialist values are predictably located opposite post-materialist values on Schwartz's model, suggesting that action in pursuit of one type would be taken at the expense of action in pursuit of the other type.

Lastly, St. Laurent's notion of a ". . . willingness to accept international responsibilities," incorporates elements of Schwartz's security, influence on the world stage and responsibility for ensuring social order values.[30] Although St. Laurent's vision for Canadian foreign policy was expressed in terms of principles, which shaped and

[28] S.H. Schwartz, "Are there Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?" . . ., 31.
[29] *Ibid.,* 37
[30] S.H. Schwartz, "Are there Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?" . . .; Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs: The 1947 Gray Lecture. . .

guided Canada's relations with the world, it is safe to say that it could have very well been described as a set of core Schwartzian values.

Some of St. Laurent's other remarks are also worth noting. St. Laurent makes no mention of the United States within the foreign policy principles, however, later in his speech he does nonetheless convey an appreciation for the requirement for Canada to contribute to North American defence and an understanding of the influence of the economic and military power imbalance between the two nations on the Canada-U.S. relationship. St. Laurent also recognized that while Canada needed to pay careful attention to its relationship with the U.S., that this should not be undertaken to the complete exclusion of participation in international institutions, most notably the United Nations.[31] St. Laurent understood that for Canada, multilateralism was not optional; it was necessary as a counterbalance to the mighty U.S. and it was vital to global security. Table 1 summarizes the comparison of St. Laurent's Principles with Schwartz's values.

[31] Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs: The 1947 Gray Lecture. . .

St. Laurent's Principles	Schwartz's Values	Schwartz's Value Type
National unity	**Social order**	**Security**
Political liberty	**Authority, social recognition**	**Power**
Rule of law – social order	**Social order**	**Security**
Rule of law - social justice, world peace	**Social justice, world at peace**	**Universalism**
Human values	**Equality, broad-minded, meaning in life**	**Benevolence, Universalism**
Accept international responsibilities - responsibility	**Responsible**	**Benevolence**
Accept international responsibilities - influence	**Influential**	**Achievement**
Accept international responsibilities – social order	**Social order**	**Security**

Table 1. Comparison of St. Laurent's Principles with Schwartz's Values

In 1970 Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau mandated his Liberal government to undertake a wide-ranging foreign policy review. The outcome of the review was the publication of *Foreign Policy for Canadians,* a white paper issued in six booklets.[32] *Foreign Policy for Canadians* established six main *themes* of national policy seeking to:

- Foster economic growth;
- Safeguard sovereignty and independence;
- Work for peace and security;
- Promote social justice;
- Enhance quality of life; and,
- Ensure a harmonious natural environment.[33]

[32] Department of External Affairs, *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1970).
[33] *Ibid*., 4.

Foreign Policy for Canadians identified national policy as the broad framework for foreign policy, the latter described as an extension abroad of national policy. A look at these six themes from a social psychological perspective reveals that each of them easily finds a place within the Schwartz values survey. Economic growth could otherwise be represented as wealth, one of the power value types. Sovereignty and independence are clearly expressions of the authority value, another of Schwartz's power value types. Social justice, described in *Foreign Policy for Canadians* in terms of international law, standards and codes of conduct and alleviating racism, lines up well with a number Schwartz's universalism values. In *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, quality of life is depicted as a blend between economic prosperity, or wealth, and social reform, or social justice. Peace and security and a harmonious natural environment might well have been phrased as Schwartz's world at peace and protect environment, both universalism value types.[34]

Foreign Policy for Canadians established a direction for Canada that would see a movement away from the U.S. in favour of Europe and an increased focus on the developing world. There would be less attention paid to national security and more emphasis placed on strengthening the Canadian economy. When viewed as themes, as they were originally articulated, the components of *Foreign Policy for Canadians* appear to establish a new course for the country, distinctly different from the vision espoused by Louis St. Laurent in 1947; however, restated as values, it is readily apparent that there is more similarity than divergence. St. Laurent's political liberty shares much in common with Trudeau's sovereignty and independence, both expressions of authority and social

[34] S.H. Schwartz, "Are there Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values. . .

recognition values. Trudeau's social justice and peace and security are both consistent with St. Laurent's respect for the rule of law. Finally, St. Laurent's human values go hand-in-hand with Trudeau's quality of life. As one would expect, given the stable geopolitical arena during the Cold War, the values underpinning Canada's foreign policy remained essentially unchanged for over thirty years. Table 2 summarizes the comparison of *Foreign Policy for Canadians'* themes with Schwartz's values.

Foreign Policy for Canadians **Themes**	**Schwartz's Values**	**Schwartz's Value Type**
Economic growth	**Wealth**	**Power**
Sovereignty and independence	**Authority**	**Power**

1. National unity = social order;
2. sovereignty and independence = authority;
3. justice and democracy = social justice;
4. peace and security = world at peace;
5. economic prosperity = wealth; and,
6. integrity of the natural environment = protecting the environment

What is most striking about this list of priorities is that, compared to previous iterations of foreign policy, there is absolutely nothing new. The first priority, a reflection of growing concerns over Quebec separatists' secessionist ambitions, re-emphasises St. Laurent's concern with the divisions between French and English Canada and is aligned with Schwartz's social order value. Priorities two through six, restated in terms of Schwartz's values, are essentially a repackaging of the Trudeau government's national themes. Restated in terms of core values, Canada's foreign policy had once again withstood the test of time and another policy review. Table 3 summarizes the comparison of *Competitiveness and security: directions for Canada's international relations* policy priorities with Schwartz's values.

Competitiveness and security Policy Priorities	Schwartz's Values	Schwartz's Value Type
National unity	**Social order**	**Security**
Sovereignty and independence	**Authority**	**Power**
Justice and democracy	**Social justice**	**Universalism**
Peace and security	**World at peace**	**Universalism**
Economic prosperity	**Wealth**	**Power**
Integrity of the natural environment	**Protecting the environment**	**Universalism**

Table 3. Comparison of *Competitiveness and security: directions for Canada's international relations* policy priorities with Schwartz's values

In 1995, the Chrétien Liberal government issued *Canada in the World – Canadian Foreign Policy Review (1995)*. Its stated purpose was to establish the context within which Canada would act internationally and to identify the major objectives the Government intended to pursue in the world. The review was based on the report of a Special Joint Parliamentary Committee made up of members of the Senate and of the House of Commons that traveled the country and gathered the views of Canadian citizens, the business community, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academics. 70 meetings later, having received over 550 briefs and listened to 500 witnesses speak their minds; the committee submitted its comprehensive report.[36] Following its extensive consultations the government established *three key objectives* as the core of Canadian foreign policy and as a guide for setting priorities:

1. the promotion of prosperity and employment;
2. the protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and,

[36] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada in the World - Canadian Foreign Policy Review (1995)," http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp; Internet; accessed 2 March 2007.

3. the projection of Canadian values (respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the environment) and culture.

Although the government identified only three objectives, the third, projection of Canadian values, actually makes mention of four specific values. Restated as Schwartz's values, the objectives are:

1. the promotion of prosperity and employment = wealth
2. the protection of our security, within a stable global framework = national security, social order, world at peace
3. the projection of Canadian values = security, influential, social order, responsible
4. respect for democracy = social justice
5. the rule of law = social order, social justice
6. human rights = equality, broad-minded, social justice
7. the environment = protecting the environment

Following its wide-ranging consultation with a broad representation of the Canadian citizenry, one might have expected that this foreign policy offering would introduce something unique, but it was not to be. *Canada in the World* illustrated once again that the foreign policy principles first laid out by Louis St. Laurent nearly 50 years earlier had withstood the scrutiny of a coast-to-coast review; Canadian values at the core of foreign policy remained intact. Table 4 summarizes the comparison of *Canada in the World*'s policy objectives with Schwartz's values.

Canada in the World Objectives	Schwartz's Values	Schwartz's Value Type
Prosperity and employment	**Wealth**	**Power**
Protection of security	**National security, social order**	**Security**
Protection of security	**World at peace**	**Universalism**
Projection of Cdn values	**Security, social order**	**Security**
Projection of Cdn values	**Influential**	**Achievement**
Projection of Cdn values	**Responsible**	**Benevolence**
Respect for democracy	**Social justice**	**Universalism**
Rule of law	**Social order**	**Security**
Rule of law	**Social justice**	**Universalism**
Human rights	**Equality, broad-minded, social justice**	**Universalism**
The environment	**Protecting the environment**	**Universalism**

Table 4. Comparison of *Canada in the World*'s policy objectives with Schwartz's values.

Paul Martin, during his brief stint as Prime Minister, signed off on *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, Canada's current official international policy statement.[37] In light of the following passage from the document, it should be no surprise that *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* would not significantly alter the course of Canadian foreign policy:

> Our fundamental interests—ensuring continued prosperity and security for Canadians—remain the same as they were in 1995 when we last set a strategic course for our international policy.[38]

The security component of this equation is best represented in *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy,* issued in 2004. The document articulates three core national security interests:

[37] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT - A Role of Pride and Influence in the World," http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/overview-en.asp; Internet; accessed 2 March 2007. Although there has been a change in government since the publication of this document the current Conservative government has not yet issued a new foreign policy statement.
[38] *Ibid*.

1. protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad;
2. ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and,
3. contributing to international security.[39]

Sprinkled throughout *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* are references to core national interests, including pursuit of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Values are discussed in terms of a commitment to peace, order and good government, and advancing the concerns of people who seek freedom, stability and democracy. There is also mention of Canada's responsibilities:

1. to protect the people of the world from humanitarian catastrophes;
2. to deny those with intent to harm from acquiring weapons of mass destruction;
3. to respect fundamental human rights;
4. to build lives through provision of economic assistance; and
5. to the future, through sustainable development.

Restated as Schwartz's values, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* and *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* espouse the following key pursuits:

1. prosperity = wealth
2. security = national security
3. democracy, human rights = social justice, equality

[39] Privy Council Office, "Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy," http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/natsecurnat_e.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 March 2007.

4. rule of law; peace, order and good government = social order, social justice
5. responsibility for security and human rights = responsibility
6. responsibility for sustainable development = protecting the environment

A look at this list of values suggests that not even the terrifying events of 9/11 would significantly alter the course for Canada's international policy, which remains fundamentally unchanged 50 years after its first inception by Louis St. Laurent. Table 5 summarizes the comparison of a *Role of Pride and Influence (2005)* Interests and Values and *Securing an Open Society (2004)* Security Interests with Schwartz's values.

***Role of Pride and Influence (2005)* Interests and Values and *Securing an Open Society (2004)* Security Interests**	**Schwartz's Values**	**Schwartz's Value Type**
Protecting Canada and Canadians	**National security**	**Security**
Contributing to international security	**Security**	**Security**
prosperity	**Wealth**	**Power**
Democracy, human rights, peace	**Social justice, equality, world at peace**	**Universalism**
Rule of law, order and good governance	**Social order**	**Security**
Responsibility to protect, economic assistance	**Responsible**	**Benevolence**
Sustainable development	**Protecting the environment**	**Universalism**

Table 5. Comparison of a *Role of Pride and Influence (2005)* Interests and Values and *Securing an Open Society (2004)* Security Interests with Schwartz's values.

No examination of Canadian foreign policy would be complete if it did not include a mention of human security, a concept most often associated with one of its most

fervent proponents, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy. Human security, as defined by Axworthy, goes beyond the mere absence of military threat to include liberation from economic privation, a suitable quality of life, and an assurance of basic human rights. In the words of Lloyd Axworthy:

> . . . human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament. It recognizes the links between environmental degradation, population growth, ethnic conflicts, and migration. Finally, it concludes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until human security is guaranteed.[40]

An example of the human security agenda in action is the Mine Ban, or Ottawa Treaty; a landmark international treaty on the ". . . Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.[41]

Although Axworthy proposes a shift of focus from the state to the individual, was his human security approach to foreign policy a radically different path for Canada? Jennifer Ross is certainly not convinced.[42] In her 2001 article in *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Ross argues that the human security concept was introduced into Canadian foreign policy long before Lloyd Axworthy began talking about it. Ross contends that human security is essentially

> . . . a multi-dimensional approach to security (tackling military, political, economic, societal and environmental threats) that focuses on ensuring the security of the individual through such means as treaties, conventions and

[40] Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership," *International Journal* 52, no. 2 (Spring, 1997): 184.
[41] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," http://www.icbl.org/content/download/7050/165094/file/treatyenglish.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.
[42] Jennifer Ross, "Is Canada's Human Security Policy really the "Axworthy" Doctrine?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 8, no. 2 (Winter, 2001): 75.

peacebuilding. It also places this security above considerations for state sovereignty.[43]

Ross traces the origins of human security back to at least the late 1980s, when Joe Clark was SSEA in the Mulroney Conservative government. Ross contends that even though the term had not yet been coined back in the 1980s, the concept of human security originated with the Canadian government's interventions related to the Central American wars. For example, to ensure that Canadian aid would be used to enhance the socio-economic security of the people who needed it the most rather than to bolster Central American government coffers, it was channelled increasingly through NGOs. Canada also sent human rights observers and peacekeepers to the region in 1989 and 1991 to safeguard the security of individuals, not to support any Central American government.[44] With its emphasis on the individual instead of the state, these Government of Canada (GoC) initiatives are clearly consistent with what Lloyd Axworthy would consider human security.

Axworthy's human security aligns with Schwartz's values as follows:

1. economic development and absence of economic privation = wealth
2. human rights and social equity = social justice, equality
3. rule of law and good governance = social order
4. sustainable development and prevention of environmental degradation = protecting the environment
5. underlying theme of responsibility = responsibility

[43] *Ibid*., 77.
[44] *Ibid*., 89, 90.

A comparison of Axworthy's human security agenda with other Canadian foreign policy offerings reveals that Ross was on to something. Not only is there evidence that the concept of human security has been around since at least the 1980s, looking back at Louis St. Laurent's address in 1947 with a social psychological eye reveals that many of the values represented in the human security doctrine were present from the very beginnings of Canadian foreign policy. Axworthy's human security agenda represents an evolution in *how* the values articulated in Canadian foreign policy could be pursued, a trend which appears to predate him, rather than fundamentally different values. Table 6 summarizes the comparison of Lloyd Axworthy's *Human Security* tenets with Schwartz's values.

Axworthy's Human Security Tenets	Schwartz's Values	Schwartz's Value Type
Economic development and absence of economic privation	**Wealth**	**Power**
Human rights and social equity	**Social justice, equality**	**Universalism**
Rule of law and good governance	**Social order**	**Security**
Sustainable development and prevention of environmental degradation	**Protecting the environment**	**Universalism**
Overarching theme of responsibility	**Responsible**	**Benevolence**

Table 6. Comparison of Lloyd Axworthy's *Human Security* tenets with Schwartz's values.

Putting it all Together - Canada's Core Enduring Values

Tracing the course of Canadian foreign policy through the years reveals, as the social psychologist would predict, a core set of enduring values. *How* these values are pursued has clearly evolved over the years; however, the basic values underpinning Canadian foreign policy have weathered well. Although some, like economic prosperity and security, are typically characterized by the pragmatists as interests and set apart from universal and benevolence value types in the interests vs. values debate, all are values nonetheless. These, along with the corresponding Schwartz value and value type are summarized below in table 7.

Core Enduring Values in Canadian Foreign Policy	Schwartz's Values	Value Type
National unity, (stability of society)	**Social order**	**Security**
Sovereignty and independence, political liberty	**Authority**	**Power**
Protecting Canada and Canadians	**National security**	**Security**
Economic prosperity	**Wealth**	**Power**
Accept international responsibilities (contributing to international security, economic assistance (ODA)	**Security, Responsibility**	**Security, Benevolence, Achievement**
Projection of Canadian values	**Influence**	**Achievement**
Rule of law, good governance	**Social order, social justice**	**Security, Universalism**
Democracy, human rights, social equality, peace	**Social justice, equality, world at peace**	**Universalism**
Integrity of the natural environment, sustainable development, prevention of environmental degradation	**Protecting the environment**	**Universalism**

Table 7. Core Enduring Values in Canadian foreign policy along with the corresponding Schwartz value and value type.

National Unity (stability of society)

In a Canadian context, the prevailing concern for social stability, or Schwartz's social order value, is national unity. Although Canada's two major linguistic communities share much in common, Canada's foreign policy initiatives have always been constrained by the persistent threat of Quebec separation and, to a lesser extent, by other regional agendas. This concern with Quebecois nationalism is in no small way responsible for what historian Adam Chapnick describes as a history of conservatism in

Canadian foreign policy.[45] The primacy of national unity was appropriately recognized by Louis St. Laurent in 1947 when he placed it at the top of his list of five principles in the very first articulation of Canadian foreign policy distinct from that of Great Britain. At a 2003 C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture, Jack Granatstein argued that national unity may have been the major determinant of Canada's decision to not support the U.S. war in Iraq. Although the Prime Minister of the day, Jean Chrétien, publicly justified Canada's decision to stay home on the basis of a lack of a UN mandate, Granatstein argues that the true motivation may have been significant opposition to the war among Quebecers in the midst of a provincial election campaign.[46] National unity was important then and, as the federal government's manoeuvring around transfer payments leading up to the most recent Quebec provincial elections demonstrated once again, it continues to be a powerful policy shaping force today.

Sovereignty and independence, political liberty

Although the state serves society, it nonetheless has an independent character. Steven Holloway defines the state as ". . . a generally unified and relatively autonomous institution that claims sovereignty over a given territory and people . . ."[47] For Canada, living in the shadow of the world's only remaining superpower, maintaining its autonomy and projecting its image as distinct from the U.S. is a constant preoccupation, particularly in view of the fact that the two countries share so much in common. Although Canada

[45] Adam Chapnick, "Peace, Order, and Good Government: The "Conservative" Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 60, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 635.
[46] J.L. Granatstein, "The Importance of being Less Earnest. . ., 17.
[47] Steven Kendall Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest* (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006), 8.

enjoys an excellent rapport with its neighbour to the south, Granatstein cautions that some restraint is in order to ensure that demonstrations of its autonomy from the U.S. do not take the form of anti-Americanism and jeopardize this critically important relationship.[48] As will be explored later in this paper, with much of its economic prosperity and security tied to its North American partner, while pursuing its sovereignty and independence, or Schwartz's authority value, Canada would be well advised to heed Granatstein's advice.

Protecting Canada and Canadians

At the present time there are approximately 35 conflicts ongoing in the world as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.[49] As there is no "world government," there is no guarantee that one state will not undertake aggressive action against another. As Steven Holloway argues, peace may depend on a ". . . negative golden rule: I won't hit you, if you don't hit me."[50] Since a nation's citizenry look upon defence as an insurance policy that only the government can provide, it must be one of every nation's top priorities. A look at Canadian defence spending trends since the end of WWII might cause one to give pause about whether Canada is according the attention to protecting its citizens that they deserve. Canadian defence spending dropped precipitously following WWII and today represents approximately 1.2% of Canada's Gross Domestic Product

[48] J.L. Granatstein, "The Importance of being Less Earnest. . ., 22.
[49] Uppsala Universitet - Department of Peace and Conflict Research, "Uppsala Conflict Data Program," http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/; Internet; accessed 31 March 2007.
[50] Steven Kendall Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest*. . ., 14.

(GDP), one of the lowest rates among NATO countries.[51] It would appear that given Canada's relative safety from any direct threat of invasion by a hostile state because of its geographic isolation from potential invaders and a strong, friendly neighbour, successive governments have historically relegated it to the back seat in favour of the pursuit of economic prosperity. This being said, as the 2006 arrest of members of a purported terrorist group in Toronto accused of plotting attacks on Canadian targets demonstrates, in a post 9/11 world, the threat of acts of aggression against Canada by non-state actors is very real.[52] The adoption of a Canada first defence policy underscores the importance of insuring the safety of Canadians at home. Defending a large landmass and vast coastline with a relatively small, sparsely distributed population would be a daunting task for any nation. Canada is fortunate indeed to be supported in this endeavour by its powerful neighbour to the south and close cooperation with the U.S. on security matters is and will continue to be a fact of life for Canada for years to come. With Canada on Osama Bin Laden's hit list, it would appear that Schwartz's national security value will continue to be an important consideration for policymakers for the foreseeable future.[53] The government's recent investments in security suggest that they are willing to give a little on the prosperity side to better protect the Canadian public.

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[51] Conference of Defence Associations, "Reinvestment in Defence: Charts Showing the Situation of Canadian Defence Funding," http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/Fincomsubcharts.htm#Chart%204; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

[52] Stewart Bell and Kelly Patrick, "Alleged Canadian terror plot has worldwide links," *National Post*, 4 June 2006. http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=de3f8e90-982a-47af-8e5e-a1366fd5d6cc; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

[53] CTVglobemedia, "Canada is potential terrorist target: Hillier," http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20050711/questionperiod_terrorism_050710?s_name=&no_ads=.; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, aimed at stabilizing potential terrorist sanctuaries and quelling potential hostile intent by state actors, emphasize the connection between national and global security in today's environment. Canada's contribution to establishing security, developing a sustainable economy and rebuilding a democratic government in Afghanistan is a clear expression of its pursuit of rule of law and good governance values, or in Schwartz's terms, social order. Having committed $1 billion CAD to aid and development and having lost 55 soldiers to fighting in Afghanistan, Canada has demonstrated without a doubt that it recognizes its responsibility to contribute to global security. In social psychological terms, Canada's activities in Afghanistan demonstrate the compatibility between and simultaneous pursuit of Schwartz's social order, security and responsibility values.

Economic prosperity

Canada is one of the world's wealthiest countries; ranking 8th in GDP and 20th in Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. Wealth provides a nation with the means to pursue security for its citizens and, as the findings of the World Values Survey (WVS) demonstrate, happiness and life satisfaction are strongly correlated with economic development.[54] As this passage from the British government's Department for International Development (DFID) 2005 publication, *Fighting poverty to build a safer world: A strategy for security and development*, illustrates, there is also a strong correlation between conflict and poverty:

[54] Ronald Inglehart, "Globalization and Postmodern Values." *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 215.

> All other things being equal, a country at $250 GDP per capita has an average 15% risk of experiencing a civil war in the next five years. At a GDP per capita of $5,000, the risk of civil war is less than 1%.[55]

Although some may view it as a great evil, wealth is understandably an important precondition for national security and social stability, or in Schwartz's terms, social order, and like it or not, the WVS shows that money does indeed appear to buy happiness.

As the world's fifth largest exporter and importer, Canada's economic prosperity is inextricably linked to trade, which makes up 70% of the country's GDP. Exports alone represent nearly 40% of the economy and account for 25% of Canadian jobs.[56] The majority of Canada's trade is with the U.S., and the two countries exchange some $1.8 billion in goods and services every day of the year, well over $1 million a minute. In 2005 almost 85% of Canada's merchandise exports went to the U.S. In the same year, the U.S. accounted for nearly 60% of Canada's merchandise imports.[57] When it comes to Canada's wealth, the U.S. undoubtedly matters a great deal.

With so much of Canada's prosperity and security riding on its relationship with the United States, one might be inclined to conclude that because of a considerable power imbalance between the two countries, Canadians would be under considerable pressure to sacrifice their values to appease the Americans. This concern is perhaps unjustified for at least three reasons. First, in spite of numerous departures between Canadian and

[55] Department for International Development, "Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development," United Kingdom: Department for International Development, 2005, 8. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/securityforall.pdf ; Internet; accessed 31 March 2007.
[56] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY STATEMENT - A Role of Pride and Influence in the World," Canada. . .
[57] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Seventh Annual Report on Canada's State of Trade: Trade Update June 2006," http://www.international.gc.ca/eet/trade/sot_2006/sot-2006-en.asp#aiv1; Internet; accessed 2 March 2007.

American foreign policy over the years, Canada remains intact and continues to prosper. For example, when Prime Minister Jean Chrétien decided not to back the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 Canadian business leaders rushed to Washington to pre-empt anticipated economic reprisals. As the following excerpt from a Sinclair Stewart Globe and Mail article quoting Richard Perle, a prominent U.S. defence advisor, suggests, their fears were perhaps unwarranted:

> Our economies are intertwined, and even if people wanted to be punitive -- and I don't know anyone who does -- when you have an economic relationship like that existing between us, it's like setting off a munition within your own lethal radius . . . It could damage us as well.[58]

A review of data from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) monthly trade reports confirms Perle's assertion. Figures for the 12 months preceding Prime Minister Chrétien's March 2003 announcement to 12 months after the announcement reveals that trade between Canada and the U.S. remained stable, with exports to the U.S. accounting for over 80% of total Canadian merchandise trade and imports from the U.S. hovering at approximately 70% of the total.[59]

Secondly, marching lock-step with the Americans will not guarantee preferential treatment on money matters. The vast majority of financial transactions between Canada and the U.S. are through private industry and governments have little power over today's large trans-national corporations. Jennifer Welsh argues that Canada's contribution to the U.S. led coalition in Afghanistan did not bring about a favourable resolution to thorny

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[58] Sinclair Stewart, "Rift Over Iraq Expected to Heal," *The Globe and Mail*, 7 April 2003, sec. B http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=1059817411&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1178652659&clientId=1711; Internet; accessed 31 March 2007.

[59] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Monthly Trade Report," http://www.international.gc.ca/eet/tradeneg/monthly_mer-en.asp; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

issues like the softwood lumber dispute. As Welsh states, ". . . endorsing U.S. foreign policy will not necessarily translate into significant economic benefits."[60]

The third reason Canadians need not fear the subordination of their values to those of the Americans is that, as revealed in the graph below from the WVS, ". . . designed to provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human concern," when it comes to values the two countries share a good deal in common.[61] In many ways Canadian values are American values and vice versa.

[60] Jennifer M. Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), 166.
[61] World Values Survey, "World Values Survey," http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/; Internet; accessed 15 February 2007.



Figure 3. World Values Survey Cultural Map
Source: World Values Survey at www.worldvaluessurvey.org/

Responsibility and influence

There is considerable evidence in the social psychological literature that Canada, along with other wealthy industrialized democracies, is undergoing a gradual cultural transformation toward post-materialist values with a ". . . shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security above all, towards increasing emphasis on self-

expression, subjective well-being, and quality of life concerns."[62] Steve Lee, Executive Director, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD) at DFAIT, articulates Canadian post-materialist quality of life values as:

> . . . respect for the environment; commitment to democracy; defence of human rights; a desire to encourage fairness in developing societies (fair, labour, business, legal and governance arrangements); a recognition of the importance of tolerance and diversity in our own society; a desire to promote that to others; and a strong attachment to the idea of an engaged civil society both at home and abroad.[63]

Referring back to Table 7, many of Lee's quality of life values are found among the core enduring values in Canadian foreign policy, reflecting Canada's recognition of its international responsibilities and its desire to influence world affairs. A number of Lee's values are situated among Schwartz's universalism and benevolence value types. Assuming that Canadians are adopting increasingly post-materialist values, what does this mean for Canadian foreign policy? As illustrated by his assertion that foreign policy principles must be based upon ". . . broad support of large groups of the population," it is clear that Louis St. Laurent recognized the importance of congruence between foreign

[62] Ronald Inglehart, "Mapping Global Values," *Comparative Sociology* 5, no. 2/3 (2006): 120. Inglehart's post-materialism theory of pursuit of values builds upon Maslow's hierarchy of human needs. Inglehart's observation of political culture in Europe during the 1960s caused him to suspect that younger individuals socialized under conditions of relatively high and stable affluence would develop values fundamentally different from those of their parents, who were raised during a period of economic hardship and insecurity. Inglehart postulated that individuals raised in an environment of scarcity would pursue economic security as a means to guarantee access to the *material* things that ensure their survival. Individuals socialized during the post World War II era, characterized by unprecedented affluence and security, would take their basic survival for granted and focus more on individual freedoms, humanitarian considerations and political involvement, (i.e. *postmaterialist* values) and place less emphasis on material concerns. In other words, as with Malsow's hierarchy of human needs, pursuit of postmaterialist values is predicated upon the assurance of economic and physical security. Inglehart has continued to study values for four decades. For a more complete discussion of materialist and postmaterialist values interested readers are encouraged to consult the Bibliography, which includes several of Inglehart's papers.

[63] Steve Lee, "Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 10, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 1.

policy principles and the values of Canadians.[64] Kim Richard Nossal has written that, ". . . a country's foreign policy will always reflect a community's particular values,"[65] lending further support that post-materialist notions deserve their place on the Canadian foreign policy agenda. Nossal introduces an important caveat with the statement that, while values should *"determine"* foreign policy objectives, values should not be *"turned into"* foreign policy objectives. Instead, foreign policy objectives should be articulated, according to Nossal, in terms of Canadian interests. Nossal's point of view gains support from Jack Granatstein, who writes, ". . . our values are important to us, but they must be subordinated to interests."[66]

While Nossal and Granatstein speak of interests, in social psychological terms what they seem to be saying is that Canadian foreign policy should be limited to clearly-stated end-state or goal-oriented *materialist* values like security, sovereignty and economic prosperity. Moreover, they appear to argue that Canadian foreign policy should avoid reference to any of the *moralistic* values that refer to standards of conduct or principles; social equality, human rights, peace or democracy, representative of *post-materialist* values. In other words, Nossal would appear to want policymakers to think about post-materialist values but not to write about them.

Nossal contends that a values-based approach to foreign policy, or inclusion of post-materialist values in foreign policy, is overly ambitious and therefore, unachievable,

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[64] Louis St. Laurent, "The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs: The 1947 Gray Lecture. . .
[65] Kim R. Nossal, "The World we Want"?: The Purposeful Confusion of Values, Goals, and Interests in Canadian Foreign Policy," http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20World%20We%20Want.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007.
[66] J.L. Granatstein, "The Importance of being Less Earnest. . ., 8.

too expensive for Canadian taxpayers and therefore unaffordable, and not adequately resourced and therefore hypocritical. His harsh assessment of Canada's foreign policy suggests that Nossal fails to appreciate the normative aspect of values. He seems to imply that unless Canada is willing to single-handedly solve the world's problems, that it is dishonest to even mention moralistic values in its foreign policy. Writing about fairness in the global community, Jennifer Welsh explains that the aim is ". . . not redistributing wealth at the levels we see domestically, but alleviating the crippling poverty that grips so many societies around the globe."[67] Welsh's comments offer a more encompassing view of Canada's foreign policy objectives, illustrating the normative dimension of its post-materialist values. Her perspective is consistent with the previously mentioned DFID publication, demonstrating the relationship between conflict and poverty, which suggests that modest rises in GDP per capita may go a long way to preventing conflict and contributing to global stability.[68]

Another of Nossal's criticisms of Canada's foreign policy is his belief that projecting Canadian values abroad is illiberal and therefore, un-Canadian. His view is supported by Denis Stairs, who believes that Canadian foreign policy is too preachy and is irritating the international community.[69] What Nossal and Stairs are concerned about are not the materialist values that they consider to be Canada's interests; they are again referring to the moralistic post-materialist values in Canadian foreign policy. Although

[67] Jennifer M. Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*. . ., 218, 219.
[68] Department for International Development, "Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development," United Kingdom: Department for International Development, 2005, 8. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/securityforall.pdf ; Internet; accessed 31 March 2007.
[69] Denis Stairs, "Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy," *International Journal* 58, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 252, 253.

the two fear that inclusion of these types of values in Canadian foreign policy is damaging Canada's image abroad, the results of a recent Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll examining countries' influence in the world, ranking Canada 1st out of 12 countries as a positive influence, would suggest otherwise.[70]

Economic Assistance and Other Universalism and Benevolence Values

Denis Stairs, firmly entrenched in the pragmatists' camp, poses the following question about Canada's foreign policy:

> It may be timely, in short, for Canadians to ask themselves, in sober spirit, whether they really want to rationalize their foreign policy policies on the basis of what they and their leaders assert are their values, as opposed to what they *know* (to the extent that anyone is capable of knowing such things at all) are their interests.[71]

Stairs suggests that democracy, individual freedom, human rights, the rule of law, respect for minorities, empathy, tolerance, respect for diversity, willingness to compromise, and even multiculturalism are common in liberal democracies.[72] He opines that Canadians are deluded in thinking that they possess an unusually virtuous distinctive set of values, which prevents them from understanding the true motivations for their behaviour. As the WVS shows, Stairs appears to be correct that Canadian values are closely aligned with those of other industrialized democracies; however, there is nothing in the social psychology literature to suggest that Canadians are less aware of what motivates their behaviour than other nationalities.

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[70] British Broadcasting Corporation, "BBC World Service Poll March 2007," http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/06_03_07_perceptions.pdf; Internet; accessed 6 March 2007.
[71] Denis Stairs, "Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy. . ., 251.
[72] *Ibid.,* 246.

Stairs argues that what Canadians really want, or value, is essentially what the rest of humanity wants. That is:

> ". . . safety and security first, prosperity (and the rewards it brings) second, and perhaps in third place (if they can manage it), the comfort that comes from the belief that their behaviour is sufficiently 'moral' to allow them to feel free of guilt."[73]

Referring back to Table 7 once again, these comments, representative of the point of view of proponents of an interest-based foreign policy, suggest that the only values that really matter to Canadians, and according to Stairs, to the entire human race, are security and wealth, both in the materialist domain. Nossal describes pursuit of wealth and security as universal goals in foreign policy, dating back 2500 years.[74] The pragmatists back up their claims that Canadian foreign policy is all about security and wealth by pointing out that Canada's spending on official development assistance (ODA) is well below the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) average of 0.46% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2006, placing Canada 9th among 21 countries in dollar amount and 15th as a percentage of GNI. Interestingly, with respect to development assistance as a percentage of GNI, Canada is on par with Australia and nearly double the United States, whose ODA is at 0.17% of their GNI[75], suggesting that Australians and Americans look after their own prosperity before assisting the world's poor as well.

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[73] *Ibid*., 246.
[74] Kim R. Nossal, "The World we Want"?: The Purposeful Confusion of Values . . .
[75]Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Development Aid from OECD Countries Fell 5.1% in 2006," http://www.oecd.org/document/17/0,2340,en_2649_201185_38341265_1_1_1_1,00.html; Internet; accessed 4 April 2007.

The Center for Global Development (CGD), a not-for-profit think tank that works toward reduction of global poverty and inequality, has developed a more comprehensive evaluation of how effectively the world's wealthiest nations are assisting less fortunate countries. The CGD's Commitment to Development Index (CDI) measures gross aid as a share of GNI, deducting points for "tied" aid; trade barriers against exports from developing countries; investment in developing countries; migration, or immigration policies and practice, particularly with respect to unskilled workers; initiatives to protect the environment and preserve scarce natural resources; security, in the form of contributions to internationally sanctioned peacekeeping operations and forcible humanitarian interventions; and, sharing of new technologies with poor countries. In 2006, Canada ranked 10th of 21 countries on the CDI. Canada received high marks for its strong support of technological innovation and dissemination, its low barriers against developing country exports, and its policies promoting productive investment in poor countries. Canada lost points because of a relatively high proportion of tied foreign aid, its arms exports to undemocratic governments, and its poor performance on the environment.[76] A visit to the CGD's website reveals that, although it is not a stellar performer, Canada's contribution to assisting the world's poor is in the same league as many European countries and Australia, and is slightly ahead of the United Kingdom and the United States.

The pragmatists opine that the only true Canadian values are wealth and security and that the government should just go ahead and tell it like it is to awaken Canadian

[76] Center for Global Development, "Commitment to Development Index 2006," http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi; Internet; accessed 4 April 2007.

citizens and politicians from their delusions of grandeur. Given Canada's average performance with respect to measures of how effectively the world's richest nations are assisting underdeveloped countries, it would appear that Canadians' peers are not performing up to the pragmatists' standards either. Rather than adopting this all-or-nothing view of interests or values, anchored in an orthogonal conceptualization of their relationship, the social psychologist would be inclined to see security and wealth values coexisting with universalism and benevolence values. Pursuit of one value would not necessarily preclude pursuit of others simultaneously and any action might be consistent with the pursuit of a number of different values. By way of example, consider Canada's refugee and immigration policy, characterized by Welsh as a reflection of ". . . our nation's commitment to generosity, openness, and diversity."[77] While these comments are indicative of universality and benevolence values, in the same text Welsh points out the important contribution of new Canadians to supporting a growing economy and an aging population, revealing their role in assuring another of Canada's core values, economic prosperity.

As Welsh's comments illustrate, actions may be taken in pursuit of many values concurrently, however the emphasis placed upon pursuit of one value or another would depend on a number of influencing factors that fluctuate over time. Are Canadian politicians deluded when they point to how Canada's activity in Afghanistan is contributing to global security and assisting the world's poor, reflecting pursuit of *Universalism* and *Benevolence* value types, or are they simply blind to the reality that it is really entirely about enhancing national security by preventing terrorists from reaching

[77] Jennifer M. Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century* . . ., 130.

Canadian soil, and securing new markets for Canadian exports? The pragmatists would certainly argue the latter.

Denis Stairs suggests that, "The political behaviour of Canadians may be due in part to their values, but it is due far more to the circumstances in which they find themselves."[78] Stairs goes on to say that:

> . . . it is precisely because Canada's security and wealth are in such fortunate estate that Canadians sometimes have the freedom to indulge their desire to be good. But they should recognize that this is a freedom denied to many other polities precisely because the hard realities they face leave them with little choice but to concentrate on their own essentials.[79]

Ronald Inglehart, Director of the WVS, would agree with Stairs that the "circumstances in which they find themselves" are important determinants of people's worldviews, but he would likely disagree with Stairs' negative characterization of this phenomenon. Through decades of survey work representing 85 % of the world's population Inglehart has demonstrated that, "Economic development is associated with predictable changes away from absolute norms and values, toward a syndrome of increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting and post-industrial values."[80] While economic prosperity is a *necessary* precondition for the shift towards post-materialist values, by itself it is not *sufficient*; the other essential element is security. As illustrated by their position along the horizontal axis on the graph below, although the former Soviet States enjoy much greater economic prosperity than India, their positions on the postmodern dimension are quite similar. Inglehart explains that the collapse of communism and the struggle to establish democracy has created, ". . . a sense of unpredictability and insecurity that leads them to

[78] Denis Stairs, "Myths, Morals, and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy . . ., 255.
[79] *Ibid*., 256.
[80] Ronald Inglehart, "Mapping Global Values . . ., 117.

emphasize *Survival* values even more heavily than those who are accustomed to an even lower standard of living."[81] Canada is positioned much further to the right along the horizontal, postmodern axis, than countries like Russia not because it is far more wealthy; it is instead because Canada's stable democratic institutions, well-developed governance, strong social programs, tolerance of diversity and respect for human rights and individual freedoms, provides Canadians with a sense that their future is secure. The combination of economic prosperity and the security of a stable democracy is the impetus behind Canada's movement toward the adoption of increasingly postmaterialist values. It is not as Stairs would suggest, simply a matter of money; institutional values count just as much.

[81] *Ibid.,* 124.



Figure 4. Where given societies fall on two key cultural dimensions
Source: Inglehart, R. "Changing values, economic development and political change", 394.

Inglehart's work suggests that as nations become more prosperous and their security becomes more certain, there will be a predictable move towards adoption of postmaterialist values. In much the same way, Schwartz's model of relations among motivational types of values situates postmaterialist values in the Universalism and Benevolence domains, opposite the materialist values, located in the Power and Security

domains. These models of value relations help make sense out of Canadian foreign policy. For example, just as the concern over a growing deficit caused the Canadian government to shift their focus throughout much of the latter part of the twentieth century to materialist values, the social psychologists would predict that now that Canada's fiscal house is in order, more attention will be paid to development assistance, protecting the environment, and fostering democracy, human rights and social equality, the very types of values that Nossal maintains should not be "*turned into"* foreign policy objectives. Although Nossal disapproves of inclusion of postmaterialist values in Canadian foreign policy, Inglehart would insist that it is precisely the adoption of postmaterialist values like self-expression and a diminished support for political institutions and policies that motivates him to criticize his government. Furthermore, it is freedom of expression, another of Canada's postmaterialist values, that underpins the laws that provide Nossal with the right to openly condemn his government's policies. As this example with freedom of expression demonstrates, postmaterialist values are a genuine part of Canadian culture; as such, they should be included in Canada's foreign policy.

In summary, the pragmatists distil Canadian foreign policy down to two fundamental materialist values, economic prosperity and national security. While they acknowledge that Canada's foreign policy should reflect the values of its citizens and they appear to recognize that in addition to wealth and security, Canadians also value human rights, social equality, social justice, peace and environmental protection, they argue that these postmaterialist values are too preachy, vague and unachievable to be included in foreign policy statements. To satisfy the pragmatists and earn the right to

include these values in its foreign policy, it would appear that Canada would have to give away all its economic resources to the world's poor, defend the rights of all the world's oppressed and with a mighty military force, rid the planet of all evil dictators. With the bar set this high it is obvious that no matter what Canada does, it will never be enough for the pragmatists. If Canadians are really as greedy and shallow as the pragmatists would seem to believe, it is odd that global opinion polls, like the PIPA Poll mentioned earlier in this paper, rank Canada as among the most favourable countries in the world.[82] Canada also ranks consistently among the top countries in the world on the United Nations Development Index.[83] Either the Canadian government's propaganda machine is nothing short of miraculous, or the pragmatists have got it wrong. I, for one, prefer the latter.

Conclusion

One of the most longstanding debates about Canadian foreign policy revolves around the question of whether it should be interest-based or values-based. On one side are the so-called pragmatists, who argue that values have no place in foreign policy. The pragmatists refer to proponents of a values-based foreign policy as idealists, and insist that they must open their eyes to the stark reality that Canada's foreign policy is entirely about pursuit of interests. Adopting a social psychological perspective to understanding Canadian foreign policy, this paper has demonstrated that the pragmatists' portrayal of values, seemingly based on three inaccurate characterizations, stifles the debate. The first

[82] British Broadcasting Corporation, "BBC World Service Poll March 2007 . . .
[83] United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Indicators," http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_CAN.html; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

of the pragmatists' assumptions is that interests and values are as different as apples and oranges. Examining foreign policy from a social psychological point of view illustrates that a more appropriate metaphor would characterize values as apples and interests as perhaps, a Macintosh. Just as the Macintosh is a *kind* of apple, interests are, in reality, a particular *kind* of value. The second assumption is that interests and values are like the two paths in Robert Frost's celebrated poem, *The Road Not Taken*. The traveler in Frost's poem recognizes, when he comes upon a fork in the road, that he cannot pursue both paths simultaneously. On this point, the social psychologist would insist that different values can indeed be pursued simultaneously and any given action may be consistent with a number of different values. Finally, to the third assumption, that as in a coin toss, wherein each outcome is independent of all others, different values influence behaviour independently, the social psychologist would reply that values interact in predictable ways to shape behaviour.

A review of Canadian foreign policy since its origins with Louis St. Laurent revealed, as the social psychological empirical literature would predict, that the enduring values that underpin Canada's relationship with the rest of the world, have remained essentially unchanged even following the upheaval caused by 9/11. The social psychological perspective demonstrated that actions are motivated by any of a number of values that, at first glance, might appear incompatible. Contrary to the pragmatists' view that foreign policy objectives should only include end-state or materialist values, the social psychological view identified how the normative values, particularly of the postmaterialist domain, are representative of the values of Canadians and deserve a place

in Canada's foreign policy. Values do not change overnight, but there is evidence in the social psychology literature pointing to a gradual shift towards tolerance, human rights and protection of the environment. These changes toward postmaterialism will undoubtedly have a significant impact on Canada's future foreign policy deliberations.

Canada is perhaps not destined for greatness in world affairs, however, as Jennifer Welsh puts it, "A crucial aspect of Canadian foreign policy is simply *being what we are*: a particular, and highly successful, model of liberal democracy."[84] Welsh goes on to say,

> All these aspects of the Canadian model are exceedingly attractive. And what is attractive creates a magnetic effect. It induces others to emulate what we do, and to forge better and closer relationships with us. This magnetism, whether we recognize it or not, is a form of foreign policy.[85]

While all the military might in NATO could not frighten the former Soviet Union into submission during the Cold War, it was slowly drowned by the trickle of ideas through tiny cracks in the Berlin wall, nurturing an opposition movement from within that gradually overcame the oppressive forces of communism. As Barbara Falk opines in her work about the impact of dissidence in East-Central Europe, ". . . "ideas matter" to political change, ". . . human creativity and resourcefulness can topple the most intransigent of regimes. . ."[86] Canadians should be proud that some of those regime-toppling ideas might have been made right here in Canada.

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[84] Jennifer M. Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century . . .*, 189.
[85] *Ibid.,* 189.
[86] Barbara J. Falk, *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe: Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings* (Budapest New York: Central European University Press, 2003), 7, 9.

Annex A

Items from Shalom Schwartz's Value Survey	
1. Equality (equal opportunity for all) 2. Inner harmony (at peace with myself) 3. Social power (control over others, dominance) 4. Pleasure (gratification of desires) 5. Freedom (freedom of action and thought) 6. A spiritual life (emphasis on spiritual not material matters) 7. Sense of belonging (feeling that others care about me) 8. Social order (stability of society) 9. An exciting life (stimulating experiences) 10. Meaning in life (a purpose in life) 11. Politeness (courtesy, good manners) 12. Wealth (material possessions, money) 13. National security (protection of my nation from enemies) 14. Self-respect (belief in one's own worth) 15. Reciprocation of favors (avoidance of indebtedness) 16. Creativity (uniqueness, imagination) 17. A world at peace (free of war and conflict) 18. Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honored customs) 19. Mature love (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy) 20. Self-discipline (self-restraint, resistance to temptation) 21. Detachment (from worldly concerns) 22. Family security (safety for loved ones) 23. Social recognition (respect, approval by others) 24. Unity with nature (fitting into nature) 25. A varied life (filled with challenge, novelty, and change) 26. Wisdom (a mature understanding of life) 27. Authority (the right to lead or command)	28. True friendship (close, supportive friends) 29. A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts) 30. Social justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak) 31. Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient) 32. Moderate (avoiding extremes of feeling and action) 33. Loyal (faithful to my friends, group) 34. Ambitious (hard-working, aspiring) 35. Broadminded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs) 36. Humble (modest, self-effacing) 37. Daring (seeking adventure, risk) 38. Protecting the environment (preserving nature) 39. Influential (having an impact on people and events) 40. Honoring of parents and elders (showing respect) 41. Choosing own goals (selecting own purposes) 42. Healthy (not being sick physically or mentally) 43. Capable (competent, effective, efficient) 44. Accepting my portion in life (submitting to life's circumstances) 45. Honest (genuine, sincere) 46. Preserving my public image (protecting my "face") 47. Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations) 48. Intelligent (logical, thinking) 49. Helpful (working for the welfare of others) 50. Enjoying life (enjoying food, sex, leisure) 51. Devout (holding to religious faith and belief) 52. Responsible (dependable, reliable) 53. Curious (interested in everything, exploring) 54. Forgiving (willing to pardon others) 55. Successful (achieving goals) 56. Clean (neat, tidy)

Source: Dietz, Thomas, Amy Fitzgerald, and Rachael Shwom. "Environmental Values." *Annual Review of Environment & Resources* 30, no. 1 (2005), 348, 349.

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