CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

NSSP 9 / PSEM 9

Cultural Awareness
An essential policy tool
In the emerging strategic environment

By / par Colonel J. Gendron

May / mai 2007

CONTENTS

Abstract

Cultural Awareness
An essential policy tool
In the emerging strategic environment

> **"Even today, knowledge of one's enemy and his culture and society may be more important than knowledge of his order of battle."** [1]
>
> **VAdm Arthur Cebrowski.**

Society has been tormented for some time searching for explanations over the occurrence of the World Trade Centre tragedy. Unanswered questions about the events of the 11 September 2001 compounded with what more and more appears to be a hopeless conflict in Iraq are alarming.[2] The fact that these military and societal failures are no isolated incidents is even more painful. These failures come in a series of major historical geo-political upsets such as the French defeat in Indochina, the US withdrawal from Vietnam and the Russian pull out from Afghanistan. The world has come to realize that great powers often fail to defeat weaker powers despite overwhelming conventional forces. In this geo-strategic environment, VAdm Cebrowski, former Director of the US Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation and the father of the network centric warfare, comes to the conclusion that "US joint transformation efforts, need to pay more attention to understanding enemies and their cultures".[3]

---

[1] Keith J. Costa, "Cebrowski: DOD Planners Need To Focus On Understanding The Enemy," *Inside the Pentagon* (October 28, 2004). http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_419_Inside%20The%20Pentagon.doc; Internet; Accessed 29 April 2007. 1

[2] On 9 April 2007, le réseau de l'information de Radio Canada (RDI) reported that 200,000 persons had died since the start of the conflict of which 30,000 died in the last year. Gilbert Burnham in "The Lancet.com" published on line, estimates this number to be 601,000. http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf; Internet ; accessed on 29 April 2007

[3] Keith J. Costa, "Cebrowski… 1.

In the mean time, there is a growing sentiment of disappointment in society about great powers failing to heed the fundamental rule that some strategic level conflicts, such as those involving counter-insurgency, can rarely be resolved by the employment of military means alone.[4] Quite often, the appropriate employment of other means such as diplomacy, nation building and trust building measures informed by the understanding of culture, are indispensable to bringing these conflicts to resolution. In this context it is particularly relevant to ask the question: Could cultural awareness be a piece of this strategic level puzzle and if so what consideration is it given by great powers?

This essay will demonstrate that cultural awareness can be an important piece in the prevention and resolution of some conflicts likely to arise in the emerging strategic environment. It will also conclude that a number of Great Powers would benefit from giving more consideration to cultural awareness in policy and strategy development. This situation has resulted in a growing number of unsuccessful prevention of ideological conflicts often followed by painful defeats despite overwhelming economic, financial, technological and conventional military power. This deficiency can be verified by reviewing practical cases. It can also be verified by reviewing national strategies and policies of great powers. It is clear that unless great powers develop the ability to better understand foreign cultures, societies are likely to continue being tormented in search for

---

[4] Thomas X. Hammes, "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation." *Strategic Forum,* Fort McNair Washington DC, Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, No 214, (January 2005). Available from: http://www.ndu.edu/inss; Internet; accessed 15 January 2007.

explanations for great powers' failures to defeat militarily weaker enemies. [5]   This essay

will be developed along the lines of a qualitative and empirical demonstration. It will

review strategic level conflicts from theoretical, practical and policy perspectives. The

theoretical portion will be conducted on the foundation of a fourfold conception of the

nature of power developed into a specific hypothesis for the purpose of this essay.

This demonstration is composed of three parts. Part One is a theoretical review of

the role of cultural awareness at the strategic level. It examines the existence of conflicts

for which cultural awareness could be a determining feature in the pursuit of resolution.

This portion gives due consideration to conflicts where great powers were defeated by

weaker powers. Part Two is a practical review of the role of cultural awareness in modern

conflicts. This review is conducted through a case study of the Afghan conflict and

through an assessment of major Canadian policy documents. Due consideration is given

to the relevance of ideological causes and asymmetric warfare. It also draws conclusion

on the significance of cultural awareness to the Afghan conflict and whether or not

cultural awareness is receiving sufficient consideration at the strategic level portion of

conflict resolution. The case study is followed by an examination of Canadian policy

documents evaluating to what extent cultural awareness is provided adequate

consideration in Canadian policy development. Finally, Part Three provides strategic

level recommendations to make best possible use of cultural awareness in the resolution

of the Afghan conflict and in the development of Canadian policy development.

---

[5] Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New-Haven & London: Yale University Press. 2006), 1.

It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperilled in every single battle [6]
Sun Tzu.

Part One. A theoretical review of the role of cultural awareness at the strategic level

This theoretical review studies the role of cultural awareness in relation to ideological conflicts and in relation to the conduct of asymmetric warfare in the resolution of conflicts. Part One is divided in two sections. Section One uses the fourfold conception of the nature of power to analyze the responsibility of cultural awareness in various type of conflicts. It will draw conclusion on the likely hood of cultural awareness being an overriding factor in some conflicts' outcome. Section Two analyses recent geo-strategic developments with a view to making predictions on the likely role of cultural awareness in influencing conflict resolutions in the emerging geo-strategic environment. The next segment introduces the fourfold conception of the nature of power.

Part One Section One

1.1 The Fourfold Conception of the Nature of Power

In the sixth century BC, Sun Tzu established the undeniable importance of knowing your enemy and knowing yourself in the conduct of battles. This essay analyzes

---

[6] Sun Tzu, quoted in Wikipedia, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Sun_Tzu ; Internet; accessed 6 April 2007.

4

whether at the strategic level, cultural awareness plays a role in developing the right level of understanding of the enemy and of yourself and if it does, to what extent can cultural awareness be an overriding feature in bringing a conflict to resolution.

Using a fourfold conception of the nature of power as the theoretical foundation, this section analyzes the potential role of cultural awareness in conflict resolution. The first step consists of analyzing Napoléon Bonaparte, Heinz von Foerster and Sun Tzu to establish the conception of the fourfold nature of power. This conception is further developed into the hypothesis of the fourfold nature of power. The resulting hypothesis is used in analyzing the1987 liberation of Afghanistan and the 1991 liberation of Kuwait. These analyses aim at familiarizing the readers with the application of the hypothesis to a given conflict and at the same time establishing the level of relevance of cultural awareness in the resolution of each of these two conflicts. Using the same hypothesis, three additional conflicts characterized by the defeat of US forces against a weaker enemy are studied. These three case-studies aim at developing a better understanding of the likely role of cultural awareness in conflict resolution. Due consideration is given to the relationship between cultural awareness, ideological conflicts and the conduct of asymmetric warfare. The second section of Part One provides an analysis of the emerging geo-strategic environment and studies the evolving role of culture in the context of the continuation of the "war against terror", the lasting unipolarity of the world and the accelerating globalization of trade and information. It gives due consideration to the options available to weaker powers, sometime affected by extremism, sometime affected by ideological conflicts, in the pursuit of their culturally perceived legitimate aspirations.

As a natural path toward the hypothesis of fourfold conception of power, the next segment provides a summary of the historic thinking behind the fourfold conception of the nature of power.

1.1.1 Development of the fourfold conception of the nature of power.

Napoléon Bonaparte, "widely regarded as one of the greatest commanders ever to have lived"[7], stated that: "Il n'y a que deux puissances au monde, le sabre et l'esprit : à la longue, le sabre est toujours vaincu par l'esprit."[8] This twofold approach to power was well accepted during the second generation warfare period in which Napoléon fought. However, if power was that simple, one could conclude that great powers failure to defeat weaker enemies is simply caused by their lacking in spirit. Jeffrey Record, a writer and professor in the Department of Strategy and International Security at the US Air War College, re-enforced Napoléon's theory by stating that: "Fighting power is a mélange of measurables (e.g. troop strengths, weapon counts) and intangibles (e.g. generalship, organization quality, morale)."[9] While Napoléon and Record both agree that power depends on more than physical strength alone, Heinz von Foerster, a renowned physicist and also the father of the cybernetics of the second order, advanced the understanding of war through his intellectual work in the field of modeling "living beings" as physical

---

[7] Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleon; Internet; accessed 20 Feb 2007

[8] Napoléon Bonaparte was quoted by Louis de Fontanes (1757-1821) in a note written in Saint-Cloud, Monday 19 Septembre 1808. Wikisource "Poètes et critiques littéraires de la France : M. de Fontanes, Revue des Deux Mondes, tome 16, 1838" http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Po%C3%A8tes_et_critiques_litt%C3%A9raires_de_la_France.-_M._de_Fontanes; Internet ; accessed 7 April 2007.

[9] Jeffrey Record, "Why the Strong Lose," *Parameters.* (Winter 2005-06).

systems.[10] Heinz von Foerster introduced the fourfold conception of the nature of power in stating that: "War is an intimate combination of the physical and the psychological, allied with the science of knowledge and the wisdom of morality". [11] The revolutionary outcome of this important finding is the acceptance that the exercise of power is not only the result of measurables and intangibles, but also the intimate integration of a number of well defined fields rooted in science and social studies.

Sun Tzu brings additional context to Heinz von Foerster intellectual work by emphasizing the possibility for a multitude of types of conflicts through the following analogy: "The musical notes are only five in number, but their melodies are so numerous that one can not hear them all. Similarly, there is only a handset of parameters constituting the essence of war, but the combinations are, so to speak, countless."[12] Inspired by Sun Tzu's wisdom and building on Heinz von Foerster genius, this essay is proposing the hypothesis of the Fourfold Nature of Power. The next segment will define this hypothesis in more details.

---

[10] Nouveau Petit Robert 2007, p. 605. La cybernétique est la science des systèmes constituée par l'ensemble des théories relatives au contrôle, à la régulation et à la communication dans l'être vivant et la machine.

[11] Heinz von Foerster, quoted by P. Pahlavi, "The nature of war and its theories," *CFC National Security Study Programme*, 9 February 2007.

[12] Obviously Sun Tzu knew about music. Some may argue that melodies are composed with seven musical notes (augmented by five half tone). However, most melodies are composed using a scale. For example, the **pentatonic scale** is comprised of five notes per octave. Pentatonic scales are very common and are found all over the world. **The Chinese scale**, less common in North America, but potentially the one referred to by Sun Tzu, is also made up of five notes. See Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentatonic_scale; accessed 7 February 2007.

1.1.2 Hypothesis of the Fourfold Nature of Power

According to this hypothesis, the real power of an international actor[13] is more accurately represented by integrating the sum of four distinct sources of strength. These strengths combined differently depending on the historic and cultural context. Just like the combinations of notes leads, so to speak, to an endless number of melodies, this hypothesis suggests that different conflicts would rarely have identical powers at play.

The first obvious source of strength is the Physical Power which is best depicted as the material and physical capability available to a group to impose its will. Military organizations, state of technology, effectiveness of techniques, finance, logistical infrastructures fall within that category. The second source of strength is the level of Psychological Will existing to use a group's Physical Power in pursuit of a particular objective or a particular outcome. A group will not necessarily be ready to use a particular source of Physical Power simply because it is available. The use of Physical Power comes at a cost (politically, morally, militarily, diplomatically, financially…) therefore, because there are consequences to using Physical Power, groups' readiness and willingness to use the means at their disposal will be affected.[14] The third source of strength is the Cultural Beliefs which defines the reasons to fight, the level of legitimacy of a particular behaviour, the level of tolerance for suffering in pursuit of a cause, the

---

[13] An international actor could be a nation, a religious group, an ideological group, a terrorist group or simply a group of interest defending a particular cause.

[14] Richard D. Johnson, *Seeds of VictoryPsychological Warfare and Propaganda*. (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military/Aviation), 1997.

8

level of commitment to a particular group and the moral values enhancing the rightness of a cause or the wrongness of a behaviour. Hence Cultural Beliefs exercise significant influence on what to fight for, how to fight and how long to fight.[15] Finally, Cognitive Knowledge is the level of awareness and understanding of one group's own status with regard to the four sources of strength "in comparison" with the awareness of the opposing group status of the same four sources of strength. The Cognitive Knowledge contributes to predicting the opposing forces most likely behaviour, level of commitment, will to fight, level of tolerance for suffering in pursuit of a particular cause.[16] It also defines one's own strategic level options for fighting the opposing force, understanding what is legitimate, understanding what is not and understanding the level of commitment of one group to oppose the other group's will in pursuit of a particular outcome. Depending on the historical, cultural and geo-strategic context, these defining parameters combine differently, potentially creating the illusion that the nature of war is changing. The reality is that there is no concrete evidence that the true nature of war has meaningfully changed since the sixth century BC.

In summary, the hypothesis assumes that Power is the combination of what we can accomplish (Physical power), what we want to accomplish (Psychological Will), what we know of the adversary and of ourselves (Cognitive Knowledge) and what we have come to believe (Cultural Beliefs). Despite the fact that this hypothesis is intuitive

---

[15] Henri Boré, "Cultural Awareness and Irregular Warfare: French Army Experience in Africa." *Military Review* Fort LeavenworthVol. 86, (July/August 2006).

[16] David C. Gompert, *Head we win: the cognitive side of counterinsurgency(COIN),*(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007).

in nature, it leads to the conclusion that it would be illusory to think that we can properly

evaluate one's power without taking into consideration all of the above mentioned

features including the Cultural Beliefs component. Dr Jacob Klipp, Director of the

Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, asserts that: "In the current climate,

there is broad agreement among operators and researchers that many, if not most, of the

challenges we face in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted from our failure early on to

understand the cultures in which coalition forces were working."[17] This statement

exemplifies the potential consequences of overlooking cultural awareness.

Graphically, when all factors are equal (which is rarely the case), the theory of the

Fourfold Nature of Power generically describes one's nation strength as in figure one.

Physical Power

Cognitive Knowledge

Cultural Beliefs

Psychological Will

---

[17] Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow and Capt Don Smith, "The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century." *Military Review,* (September-October 2006): 11.

Figure 1

This figure shows that each of the four features do not act in isolation. Each

influences and is influenced by the other three features. So how does cultural awareness

play out in this context? Simply put, cultural awareness is the ability of one group's

Cognitive Knowledge function to accurately understand the extent of the Cultural

Beliefs' strength of the participants to a conflict to the point of being able to predict the

effect of various Cultural Belief factors on the conduct and on the outcome of a conflict.

The understanding must not confine itself to the opposing group but must also extend to

the local population affected by the conduct of the conflict.[18] It must also extend to the

friendly forces' constituents including one's one own force, one's own government, and

one's own population. The effectiveness of the understanding will be proportional to the

depth of the understanding. Addressing limited visible surface stereotype characteristics

such as language, dress and traditional will lead to poor understanding and low usefulness

of the resulting knowledge. A returning commander from US Third Infantry Division

employed in Afghanistan declared: "I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked

was cultural awareness. Great technical intelligence… wrong enemy."[19] Developing the

ability to go beyond the stereotype surface issues will provide a group the ability to

usefully predict the opposing group's behaviour, level of commitment and strategic

courses of action in a particular geo-political context.

---

[18] Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow and Capt Don Smith, "The Human Terrain…

[19] Robert H. Scales Jr, "Culture Centric Warfare," *United State Naval Institute Proceedings,* (October 2004: 130-4), 1.

11

Understanding one's own cultural background will allow one group to develop sound strategic level options respectful of its population culture and likely to prevail through times of crisis, difficulty and uncertainty. Cultural awareness will guide what behaviour to adopt at what time, in what strategic circumstances, in what manner, for how long in order to achieve the desired strategic effect. This will lead Robert Scales to say "… intimate knowledge of the enemy's motivation, intent, will, tactical method, and cultural environment has proved to be far more important for success than the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned aircraft, and expansive bandwidth."[20] Thus, in summary, cultural awareness contributes to the strength of a group by bringing understanding of Cultural Beliefs' effect and understanding of culturally acceptable strategic courses of action available to achieve the desired outcome.

To develop a better understanding of this concept, the next section will consist of the application of the hypothesis of the Fourfold Nature of Power to conduct a qualitative analysis of two well known conflicts. These two analyses will demonstrate one example of each case where cultural awareness did and did not play an overriding influence. The first conflict will be the Liberation of Afghanistan from Russian occupation (1979-1988). The second conflict will be Liberation of Kuwait by a US led coalition in 1991. The methodology guiding this analysis is described next.

1.1.3 Analytical methodology

In this process, we will evaluate the qualitative strength of each opponent in the conflict in relation to the four features of Physical Power, Psychological Will, Cognitive

---

[20] Ibid. 1.

12

Knowledge and Cultural Belief. Strength will be qualitatively assessed on a scale of very limited, limited, moderate, good, strong and very strong. The resulting strength of a nation will be evaluated by consolidating graphically the sum of the individual features for both opponents. We will start with the Afghan Russian conflict.

1.1.4 Liberation of Afghanistan from Russian occupation 1979-1988

In this segment the Russian Afghan conflict is examined to demonstrate the level of relevance of cultural awareness in the outcome of a conflict. Separate qualitatively analysis of the strength the Russia and the strength of Afghan resistance are conducted in each of the four features of the Fourfold Nature of Power. These qualitative evaluations are consolidated graphically with a view to provide insight on the level of relevance of cultural awareness on the Afghan Russian conflict. First we will look at Russian aspect of the conflict.

Russia enjoyed large conventional forces under the form of significant fire power, powerful attack helicopters, relatively large ground forces and air power. Without a doubt, Russia enjoyed **overwhelming Physical Power**. The risk associated with an unstable Afghanistan provided some limited justification for invading a foreign territory.[21] Although Russian leadership felt reasonably justified to invade Afghan territory, the existence of Russia as a state did not depend on the outcome of the conflict in Afghanistan. The importance of Afghanistan for the general Russian citizen is limited

---

[21] Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, *The Soviet-Afghan War -How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, Translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas 2002); **http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu/grasovpreface.html**; Internet accessed 30 April 2007.

at best. Thus Russia **enjoyed limited Cultural Belief** which in turn contributed largely to **limit the Psychological Will to use forces.** The Soviet leadership assumed erroneously, that they would rapidly manage the Mujahideen opposition by joining force with the Afghan Army. However, things unfolded differently: Sarin and Dvoretwky assert that: "All antigovernment factions joined the struggle, not only contrary to the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan regime, but especially against the invading strangers."[22] Russian leadership demonstrated very limited understanding of the resolve of the Afghan people depicting a **very limited Cognitive Awareness** of Afghan determination to fight for their existence.[23]

From the Afghan perspective things were very different. Afghans possessed fairly limited **Physical Power**. Nevertheless they were supported financially, logistically and technically by the US. Thus **we will evaluate their Physical Power as limited to moderate.** Undeniably, the Afghan military forces were fighting for the very existence of Afghanistan as a nation. "Unlike the Communist guerrilla movements in China and Vietnam, the Mujahideen guerrillas were not trying to force a new ideology and government on their land. Rather, they were fighting to defend their families, their Qawm, and their religion against a hostile, atheistic ideology, an alien value system, an

---

[22] Oleg Sarin and Lev Dvoretsky, *The Afghan Syndrome - The Soviet Union's Vietnam, (*Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 44.

[23] The National Security Archive, "Afghanistan Lessons Learned from the last War - The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs" Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya, October 9, 2001. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs; Internet, accessed 15 April 2007.

oppressive central government, and a foreign invader."[24] "This conflict became a holy war against the unfaithful"[25] The Russian-Afghan conflict was perceived as the confrontation of Islam against an invasion of un-believers **re-enforcing an already strong sense of Cultural Beliefs into a stronger one.** "Pakistan and Iran nervously considered the increased presence of the Soviet military on their borders and began providing training and material support to the Mujahideen. The United States, Peoples Republic of China, Britain, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates began funneling aid to the Mujahideen through Pakistan."[26] Afghans enjoyed high support from the civilian population and from the multinational community leading to a **strong Psychological Will** to use all Physical Power at their disposal. It is safe to state that the Afghan forces had **strong Cognitive Knowledge** of the importance of this conflict for the Afghan people and the relatively limited importance for Russia as a nation. The graphical representation of the hypothesis of the Fourfold Nature of Power for the Russian Afghan conflict is depicted in figure 4.

---

[24] Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, *The Soviet-Afghan War -*

[25] Dr Oleg Sarin and Dr Lev Dvoretsky, *The Afghan Syndrome…* 44.

[26] Ibid

15

Graphical representation – Fourfold Nature of Power

Russian – Afghan Conflict

Physical Power

Psychological Will

Cultural Beliefs

Cognitive Knowledge

Russia

Cognitive Knowledge

Physical Power

Psychological Will

Cultural Beliefs

Afghanistan

Figure 4

In this case, the hypothesis of the Fourfold Nature of Power demonstrates that the intimate combination of Physical Power, Cognitive Knowledge, Psychological Will and Cultural Beliefs favoured the Afghan forces. More importantly, it serves to demonstrate the overwhelming role played of Cultural Beliefs in determining the outcome of the conflict. The logic behind this conclusion comes from analyzing the figure resulting from removing the Cultural Beliefs, Cognitive Knowledge and Psychological Will aspects from the graphics with a view to creating a graphical representation of a single fold concept of power base on Physical Power alone. The logic for removing these three source of strength is that in this case they were all very much affected by the Cultural Awareness of their enemies and of their own forces. **Thus we will remove the Psychological Will along with Cultural Beliefs and Cognitive Knowledge from the graphic.** The resulting depiction is in figure 5.

16

Graphical representation – Uniforld Nature of Power

Russian – Afghan Conflict

Physical
Power

Physical
Power

Afghanistan

Russia

Figure 5

This graphic demonstrates that without the influence of cultural awareness, depicted by the Cognitive Knowledge of all affected Cultural Beliefs and without the influence of Cultural Beliefs on the Psychological Will feature, Russia would have relatively easily defeated the Afghan forces. Had Russia been aware of this strategic balance of forces, it is reasonable to assume that Russian leaders would have developed a different strategy. This conflict shows how a modern mechanized force with overwhelming technological superiority became embroiled in someone else's civil war on rugged terrain and how war was fought to a military draw and a political defeat.[27] **This case highlights the important potential role of cultural awareness in strategy development and in determining the outcome of some conflicts.**

---

[27]Ibid.

17

When Victory Brings a Glow of Righteousness[28]

Otto Friedrich Editors of the Time Magazine

1.1.5 Liberation of Kuwait (1991)

The US led liberation of Kuwait will be reviewed to provide an additional concrete example of the above mentioned theory. The US led coalition enjoyed impressive superiority in the area of stealth technology and surveillance technology. They also possessed overwhelming air and maritime power, gigantic fire power under the form of massive employment of both cruise missiles and precision bombing.[29] Overall the US led coalition employed **overwhelming Physical Power**.

The coalition including Kuwait was well supported by world public opinion. "Immediately following Saddam's one day, August 2nd invasion of Kuwait, world community opinion was decisive and resolute in the issuance of an overwhelming denunciation of that action thru the almost unprecedented unanimity of the United Nations."[30] Most great nations including most Arab nations strongly acknowledged the legitimacy of liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation through the use of conventional forces. It was the right thing to do. The survival of Kuwait as a state depended on the military action to repel the Iraqi Army**.** The US led coalition owned the moral high

---

[28] Otto Friedrich, *Desert Storm – The War in the Persian Gulf,* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1991), 1.

[29] Ibid.

[30]Richard D. Johnson, *Seeds of Victory- Psychological Warfare and Propaganda,* (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd, 1997), 17.

18

ground featuring **strong Cultural Beliefs** which played a large role in generating **solid Psychological Will** to employ available conventional forces**.** Both the US and Kuwait forces had a good understanding of Saddam Hussein's motivation and resolve to stay in Kuwait.[31] They also had a good understanding of the Iraqi population "relative" low interest in Kuwaiti territory. To assist in developing and exploiting this understanding, 4th Psychological Operations Group deployed to the headquarters of US Central Comd to plan the PSYOP support for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As the strategic-propaganda development capability, for the Middle East region, its mission included "to demonstrate US resolve and improve the image of US forces in-theatre…"[32] Consequently, the US and Kuwait understood that possessing Kuwaiti territory was not essential to the general Iraqi population. Thus the US and Kuwait possessed **good Cognitive Knowledge** of the adversaries military means, determination and political motive. This concludes our assessment of the US led coalition. We will now turn our attention to Iraq.

From the Iraq perspective, Saddam's **Physical Power was significant but limited** compared to the formidable arsenal of the US led coalition. Historical claims on Kuwaiti territory provided limited justification for the Iraqi cause. Iraq existence did not depend on possessing the Kuwaiti territory nor did it depend on the outcome of this conflict. Thus, Iraq possessed only **limited strength in Cultural Belief.** Saddam Hussein had limited understanding of the US led coalition resolve to free Kuwait and even more limited awareness of the US coalition political resolve to take military action. Some will

---

[31] Ibid.

[32] Maj Jack N. Summe, "PSYOP Support to Operation Desert Storm," *Special Warfare,* Vol. 5, No. 2, (October 1992): 6.

say that Saddam Hussein conducted a well orchestrated international media campaign and in doing so he exercised an outstanding control of foreign reporters located in Iraq. Everybody remember CNN's Peter Arnett coverage of coalition blunders including the bombing of the alleged baby milk plant and bombing of the alleged Public Air Raid Shelter no 25. While the western world, were affected by the resulting images of death and despair, the impact was mitigated by the recognized sincere coalition efforts in limiting collateral damages, by allegations that Saddam Hussein was using his own population as human shield for legitimate military targets and by questionable Saddam Hussein's transparency in exercising excessive control over media coverage of these events.[33] Thus the conclusion is that Iraq demonstrated **relatively limited strength in Cognitive Knowledge** and in **cultural awareness of the US led coalition**.

On the Arab public opinion front, Saddam Hussein was much more successful. "Despite all his efforts to portray the conflict as the 'whole world against Saddam,' Bush was dismayed to find out how much support Saddam's emotional appeals seemed to have in the Arab world."[34] Saddam Hussein's willingness to use all conventional forces at its disposal was relatively strong. In this context Saddam Hussein enjoyed a **strong Psychological Will.** So, how is the Fourfold Nature of Power graphically represented in such a case? The graphical representation of the hypothesis of the Fourfold Nature of Power is depicted in figure 2.

---

[33] Richard D. Johnson, *Seeds of VictoryPsychological Warfare and Propaganda…*

[34] Otto Friedrich, *Desert Storm – The War in the Persian Gulf…27*

Graphical representation – Fourfold Nature of Power

Kuwait Liberation 1991

Physical Power

Cognitive Knowledge

Cultural Beliefs

Cognitive Knowledge

Cultural Beliefs

Physical Power

Psychological Will

Psychological Will

US Led Coalition

Iraq

Figure 2

In this example, the hypothesis of the Fourfold Nature of Power shows that the intimate combination of Physical Power, Cognitive Knowledge, Psychological Will and Cultural Beliefs largely favoured the US led coalition and would explain the US coalition relatively rapid victory. **Although Cognitive Knowledge of Cultural Belief did play an important role as an enabler, we can "not" conclude that it had an overriding impact on the outcome of the conflict.** The logic behind this conclusion comes from removing the Cultural Beliefs, Cognitive Knowledge and Psychological Will aspects from the graphic with a view to creating a graphic depicting a single fold concept of power graphic. The Psychological Will component is also removed because in this

example, the Psychological Will was significantly amplified by the Cultural Beliefs feature.[35] **The resulting graphics in figure 3 still largely favour the US led coalition.**

Graphical representation – Twofold concept of Power

Kuwait Liberation 1991

Physical Power

Physical Power

Iraq

US Led Coalition

Figure 3

The conclusion in this case is that Cultural Awareness amplified the already dominating consolidated effect of the US led coalition Physical Power. However, Cultural Awareness did not come out as an overriding factor because it did not change the outcome of the conflict. On the other hand, the previous Afghan Russian case study demonstrated that sometime, cultural awareness can be and overriding factor in conflict resolution. This situation begs the question: What kind of conflict can bring a great power to be defeated by a weaker power and what is the role of cultural awareness in such a

---

[35] Even when leaving the Psychological Will in the equation, the resulting graphic still favors the US led coalition.

22

conflict? The next segment addresses this important question by analyzing three conflicts where the US forces were defeated by a weaker power.

1.1.6 US defeats against weaker powers

Having just demonstrated the potential influence of cultural awareness in some type of conflicts, this subsection analyses recent US defeats against weaker powers. Jeffrey Records points out that all major failed use of military force by the US since 1945, notably the three conflicts of Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia, have been against nations with much inferior Physical Power.[36] These three conflicts will be reviewed with a view to determining major factors leading to the US defeat and the potential role of cultural awareness in conflict resolution. The next segment will cover the Vietnam War.

> **"There is a saying which goes, "If you know the enemy and you know yourself, you would win every single battle." However, the Americans fought the Vietnamese, but they did not know much about Vietnam or anything at all about the Vietnamese people. Vietnam is an old nation founded in a long history before the birth of Christ. ... The Americans knew nothing about our nation and her people…They didn't understand our will to maintain independence and equality between nations even though these are stated in President Jefferson's manifestation... No matter how powerful you are there are certain limits, and they did not understand it well."[37]**
>
> **Võ Nguyên Giáp**

1.1.6.1 Vietnam

Some describe the Vietnam War as a conflict between communism and capitalism. Others like Võ Nguyên Giáp describe it as a war of independence largely

---

[36] Ibid.

[37] Võ Nguyên Giáp, General Vietminh Supreme Command, CNN Cold War Interviews, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/about.series/interviews/; Internet accessed 30 April 2007.

23

affected by US cultural ignorance. In both cases, the Vietnam conflict was a classic case

of ideological political confrontation. The late American strategist, John R. Boyd

affirmed that "during the Vietnam War, we [the US] committed every mistake in the

grand strategic book. Instead of attracting the uncommitted, we repelled them by a

perception of indiscriminate use of firepower (more tons of bombs than in all of WW II),

we failed to negate Ho Chi Minh's claim that he was fighting a straightforward war for

independence, we did not respect the ideals and culture of our allies ("gooks"), and our

population came to believe that their government was not telling the truth about either the

goals or the progress of the war (which is why our tactical victory in the 1968 Tet

offensive resulted in a grand strategic defeat.) As a result, achievements on the

battlefield were offset by our government's isolation first from its allies and then from its

own people." [38]   In this example we see that the Vietnamese adversary was fighting for

existential reasons. Thus the US had clearly less at stake than their adversary. Boyd

claims that the US was basically ignorant of the Vietnamese political belief and resolve.

Võ Nguyên Giáp will add : "La guerre se déroulait sur plusieurs fronts, le plus important

étant celui de l'opinion publique américaine." It is reasonable to conclude that the

Vietnam conflict was much affected by ideological differences. It was resolved by the

Vietnamese insurgents demonstrating a much better cultural awareness of the US than the

US did of its opponent. In this context, the Vietnamese insurgents' focused their main

effort against the US political will rather than the US conventional forces on the ground.

From Indochina, this essay will now move-on to the Middle-East to conduct a similar

review of the 1982 intervention in Lebanon.

---

[38] John R. Boyd, quoted by Dr Chet Richards Editor *Defense and the National Interest*,
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/boyd_grand_strategy.htm; Internet; accessed 22 February 2007;

24

Hezbollah, Arabic: حزب الله *ḥizbu-llāh*

Meaning "party of God"[39]

1.1.6.2 Lebanon

In Lebanon, we witnessed a conflict between Islamic extremists' beliefs and western nations' values. US military forces were deployed to Lebanon in September 1982 as part of a Multinational Force including French, Italian and British Forces. The mission of the US forces was "to establish an environment that would facilitate the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in establishing sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area."[40] Initially, the US forces were welcomed by the local population. However, the destruction of the US embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983 marked a deterioration of the situation. Between August 1983 and 23 October 1983, the US received quantities of intelligence reports warning of terrorist attacks. "On 23 October 1983, a large truck laden with the explosive equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed through the perimeter of the USMNF compound at Beirut International Airport penetrated the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters building and detonated. The force of the explosion destroyed the building, resulting in the deaths of 241 U.S. military personnel."[41] This act

---

[39] Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah; Internet; accessed 6 April 2007.

[40] US Department of Defense, *Report of the Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983.* (20 December 1983), 2-3. Available from: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/index.html ; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.

[41] Ibid.

of terrorism, often credited to Hezbollah, achieved its aim and resulted in the rapid withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon.

It is interesting to note that Hezbollah is recognized as a resistance movement by Syria and Iran. It is positively regarded by a considerable portion of the Arabic and Islamic communities. The US, UK and Canada clearly recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The Hezbollah Crest includes the following quote: « car ceux qui suivent le parti de Dieu seront victorieux. » There is general acceptance that the terrorist act of the 23 October 1983 is the result of an ideological conflict between an extremist Islamic group's cultural beliefs, Hezbollah, and western nations' values. It is easy to draw parallels between the 1983 explosion and the 11 September 2001 tragedy. The terrorist group, alleged to be Hezbollah, certainly demonstrated a good cultural awareness of his opposing force in the context of an ideological conflict opposing Islamic extremists and western values. This concludes our review of the Lebanon conflict. From the Middle-East we will go to the horn of Africa to analyze the Somalia conflict.

**"The American command believed the Somalis to be
intellectually primitive, culturally shallow, and militarily
craven. All three beliefs proved expensively incorrect."[42]
Jonathan Stevenson.**

1.1.6.3 Somalia

In 1992, Somalia was a failed state opposing corrupt dictatorship ideology against democratic and humanitarian values. Corrupt dictatorial tribal leaders (often referred to as war lords) will create security conditions preventing the delivery of food and supplies to the starving Somalis. Pressured by the UN, President Bush accepts to send troops and accepts the US taking leadership of a multinational force to establish a climate of security necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid. First groups of marines land in Somalia on 9 December 1992.[43]

The multinational force strength will reach more than 38,000 troops. This will not be enough to disarm Somalia's irregular armies. War lords, such as General Muhammad Farrah Aideed, fearing erosion of their authority will revert to insurgency tactic to inflict a steady stream of casualties to US forces. These casualties along with the lack of progress in disarming the irregular armies will be systemically reported back home on US

---

[42] Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogasihu – Testing US Policy in Somalia, (*Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 115.

[43] Richard Stewart, *The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994,* (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002).

media. On 7 October 1993, President Clinton will surrender to US public opinion and to Congress pressure and will order the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia.[44] Again, the war lords' community demonstrated a good cultural awareness of the opposing forces in the context of an ideological conflict opposing corrupt dictatorships ideology against democratic and western nations' humanitarian values.

1.1.6.4 US defeats against weaker powers

In Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia the weaker power had a lot more at stake than the US. The underlying theme in each of these conflicts is the existence of an ideological cause which was successful in defeating the US political will. Not just any ideologies can provide the ground for a weaker power to defeat a greater power. Among several factors, it takes a cause rooted in cultural belief to generate sufficient strength of commitment to compensate for military inferiority and attacking the greater powers' political will.[45] In all cases, the weaker power attacked the US political will rather than pursue the exhaustion of the US conventional military power.[46] The lesson to retain for great nations is definitely that ideological conflicts can in some cases provide conditions where cultural beliefs generate the necessary commitment to compensate military inferiority. In this context William Lind predicts that the future warfare will undeniably be marked by a return to a world of cultures.[47]

---

[44] Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu – Testing US Policy in Somalia…*

[45] Jeffrey Record, "Why the Strong Lose"…..

[46] Thomas X. Hammes, "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves in to a Fourth Generation," *Strategic Forum,* No 214. (January 2005).

[47] William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," *Military Review,* Vol 84, (Sep/Oct 2004).

We have just quickly reviewed three conflicts where the United-States were defeated. Thomas Hammes argues that these were not exceptions and that the same form of ideological warfare defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria and the USSR in Afghanistan.[48] But practically, how can a militarily inferior power defeat a greater power's political will? We will see in the next section how successful weak powers revert to Asymmetric Warfare against super powers.

1.1.7 Asymmetric Warfare

Having pointed out the presence of ideological causes in conflicts where the US was politically defeated against weaker enemies, it can also be established that in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia, the weaker group engaged against the US had no choice but to revert to some kind of asymmetric warfare such as insurgency, guerrilla, terrorism, information warfare or any combination of the above. What else could they do in the face of an overwhelming conventional force such as the US military machine? The weak nations and communities revert more and more to the same strategy. The next segment will address this strategy.

The conflicts that we have reviewed demonstrate that the strategy of the weak starts when asymmetry shows up between the conventional military forces at play. When affected by significant military capability inferiority and when the cause justifies the means, the weak power will attempt to neutralize the superior conventional military

---

[48] Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*: on war in the 21st century (St-Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 3.

29

forces of its opponent by creating another form of asymmetry in an unconventional portion of the battle sphere. In this sphere the weak power becomes an unconventional superpower exploiting the weakness of its opponents in this new environment. In conventional asymmetric confrontation, the weak party showing sufficient "Psychological Will" will logically turn to the unconventional sphere to attack the conventional superpower Achilles heel. In most cases the unconventional superpower will attack the Psychological Will and moral of the unconventional weak power which is very much influenced by the cultural history and cultural beliefs of the affected communities.

Thomas Hammes summarized the issue as follows: "The message is clear… only unconventional war works against established powers".[49] Hammes pushes further by asserting that: "As the only Goliath left in the world, the US should be worried that the world's Davids have found a sling and stone that work."[50] Thus ideological fighters have found in asymmetric warfare the sling they can afford and has proven effective against the colossal Goliath that the US represents. Is the US the only victim to asymmetric warfare? The next segment uses the recent Lebanon Israeli conflict, as one example among many, demonstrating that the US are not alone.

In summer 2007 in Lebanon, the Shiite militia carried the fight against the Israel Defense Force (IDF) in the human sphere of public opinion. In this human battle sphere,

---

[49] Thomas X Hammes, *The Sling and the Strone…* 3.

[50] Ibid. 5.

30

in less than a month, the IDF had been transformed from a conventional great power to a weak unconventional force. In this new battle sphere, the small Shiite militia came out as a "Goliath" armed with a psychological weapon that forced the IDF to retreat without accomplishing their national strategic objectives. A new form of asymmetry was born where the IDF became a "David" in search of an Achilles heel. While the asymmetric warfare theory is generally well accepted, some detractors exist on the importance it plays in defeating greater power. The next segment will address some of their allegations.

1.18 Asymmetric Warfare Detractors

Some detractors will blame the defeat of super powers and great powers on their inability to deal with extremism generated by poverty and societal clashes. It is reasonable to admit that extremism is often the result of hopelessness when one comes to the belief that his idealistic expectations are unachievable in any other ways.[51] However, the review of conflicts support the thesis that extremism contribution to defeating super powers is only successful when using asymmetric warfare. Extremism becomes only one of the various discontent community likely to revert to asymmetric warfare as the only logical choice of desperate and weak powers against conventional superpowers. Freedom fighters, resistance movement and legitimate political parties are also potential users of asymmetric warfare and have also been successful in defeating stronger nations through the use of asymmetric warfare rather than extremism.

---

[51] Discussion with Mr Victor Carvell, Counsellor Humanitarian issues, Geneva, 27 February 2007

1.19 Part One Section One - Conclusive Summary.

The hypothesis of the Fourfold Nature of Power was used in a reasonable qualitative approach to evaluating the role and the relevance of cultural awareness in the conduct of warfare and in the exercise of power. The hypothesis provides qualitative evidence that cognitive awareness of cultural beliefs can play a determining role in the outcome of some conflicts.

Reviewing the conflicts of Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia, we have concluded that ideological conflicts are the most likely to create the conditions for culture to have an overwhelming impact on their outcome. We agreed that these are no isolated cases as the French met the same result in Indochina; the Russian met the same outcome in Afghanistan; and Israel met the same result in Lebanon. In all cases, the weaker opponent reverted to asymmetric warfare to attack the political will of the greater power. Ideological fighters have found in asymmetric warfare an affordable and effective sling to tackle the colossal Goliath that the US represents. Ideological conflicts are likely to generate the resolve to revert to asymmetric warfare as the only logical and rational choice for desperate weak powers engaged in a conflict of survival against a superpower. Ideological conflicts are the most likely to create the conditions of cultural awareness to be an overriding feature in conflict resolution. This situation begs the question as whether we are likely to see more or less ideological conflicts in the developing global geo-strategic environment. Section Two will cover this very issue.

Part One Section Two.

1.2 New Strategic Environment

In the previous section we have provided a theoretical foundation demonstrating that it is normal for cultural awareness to be an overriding factor in the resolution of some conflicts. In this section we will conduct an analysis of the recent world strategic developments to demonstrate whether the emerging environment will be more or less conducive to the occurrence ideological conflicts. First the recent manifestation of hard power in the form of the World Trade Centre tragedy, the War against Terror and the emergence of the US as the world super power are examined. Then it will be followed by a study of the emerging Globalization of Trade and Information. Finally, the conclusion will aim at determining whether the emerging strategic environment will be more or less conducive to the emergence of ideological conflicts. The next segment covers an analysis of the World Trade Centre tragedy from a cultural perspective.

1.2.1 World Trade Centre Tragedy

Undeniably, culture is a very complex phenomenon and its relevance to strategic studies will continue to grow as society evolves. Mary Habeck, an esteemed associate professor of history at Yale University, brilliantly captures the profoundness and relevance of culture in the emerging strategic geopolitical environment: "Immediately after September 11, 2001, Americans agonized over the reason why nineteen men hated the United States enough to kill three thousand civilians in an unprovoked assault."[52] Only by understanding the elaborate ideology of the faction behind a particular cause, can a nation determine how to contain and eventually end the threat posed to peace and

---

[52] Mary R Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror…* 1.

security.[53] According to Mary Habeck, the American agony can only be resolved through detailed and in-depth study of the adversaries' culture with a view to reaching below the surface and developing proper understanding of underlying aspects of culture from religious belief to emotional bounds. Surface issues such as language, dress and physical appearance are clearly insufficient to address the important question haunting American peoples. Many like Mary Habeck believe that going below surface is essential to understanding how to win the hearts and minds and to prevent such issues from re-occurring. Soon after the attack on the World Trace Centre, the US launched a global war against terror. Having just uncovered the cultural awareness aspect of the World Trade Centre Tragedy, the next piece provides a similar analysis for the US War against Terror.

1.2.2 War against Terror

With exceptional efficiency and iron strong determination, the US revved up a humongous and impressive war machine and unleashed a fantastic conventional military force culminating into the Shock and Awe campaign against Iraq . The military campaign was well supported by exceptional financial, economic and diplomatic strategic level actions. A flawless execution of US conventional warfare doctrine, the coalition of the willing established rapid dominance of the theatre using overwhelming decisive force, outstanding battlefield awareness, dominant maneuvers, and spectacular displays of power paralyzing Iraqi Forces' perception of the battlefield and destroying its will to fight.[54] The downfall of Saddam Hussein, the defeat and dislocation of the Iraqi Army

---

[53] Ibid.
[54] Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shock_and_awe#Doctrine_of_rapid_dominance; Internet; accessed 17 Feb 2007.

and the stand-up of a pro-American government is the result of an overwhelming successful conventional war effort.

Despite this success, tenacious uprising exploded in post Saddam and pro American government era, leading to an insurgency now in its fourth year with no end in sight.[55] The US Secretary of State, Mr Donald Rumsfeld accurately summarized the US predicament as follows: "To win the war against terrorism, we must also win the war of ideas: the battle for the souls of those recruited by the terrorist networks around the world."[56] Again, winning the war of ideas and the battle of the souls necessitates understanding the unseen cultural fabric which determine behaviours, develop tolerance for suffering and strength of mind to resist greater powers.[57]

The war against terror is not a new type of conflict nor is it an exceptional or isolated case. Throughout history, greater powers have consistently faced weaker enemy with overwhelming military force without achieving the desired result. The French retreated from Indochina, the US retreated from Vietnam, the Russian retreated from Afghanistan, Israel continue struggling against Palestinians and the list goes on. Nevertheless a number of respected writers such as William Lind, an American expert on military affairs and Col Thomas Hammes (retd), who served in Iraq in 2004, predict a new trend in warfare characterized by an increased number of ideological conflicts. This

---

[55] Jeffrey Record, "Why the Strong Lose"…

[56] AFP-Le Mondce, "Rumsfeld veut désormais lutter contre le terrorisme avec les idees », Le Monde, October, 2003

[57] Mary R Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy* …

trend would be the result of normal societal and geopolitical strategic evolution. We will

review some of the key elements of this societal and geopolitical evolution leading to an

increased number of ideological conflicts and at the same time to the greater importance

of cultural awareness in strategy development.

After having discussed the cultural awareness aspect of the World Trade Centre

tragedy, we have discovered in the War against Terror the continuation of a trend

characterized by the occurrence of ideological conflicts. We have earlier determined that

cultural awareness is key to resolving ideological conflicts. We will now continue on the

next step of the analysis of emerging strategic environment by analyzing the

consequences of the emergence of the US as the only world super power.

1.2.3 Unipolarity of the World

The US has become the world sole super power through supremacy in military

capabilities, conventional doctrine and ability to project combat power on relatively short

notice. Many had predicted the emerging technological and military dominance secured

through inordinate military spending. [58] However, fewer had predicted that the imposing

US arsenal would be accompanied with an impressive tolerance for "quasi" unilateral

action depicting an unprecedented "National Will" to use overwhelming conventional

forces in pursuit of US national interests. The combination of inordinate physical power

with strong national will to use this physical power results in the rapid resolution of

conventional conflicts. Only ideological causes properly resourced and properly

---

[58] Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemonhy"*International Secrutiy,* Vol 28, No1 (Summer 2003).

organized will be strong enough to motivate opponents toward unconventional

asymmetric warfare to oppose the US military might. Intelligent committed persevering

opponents motivated by ideological causes will have no choice but to revert to some kind

of unconventional and asymmetric warfare to survive to the US conventional warfare

arsenal.[59] This situation is likely to generate limited wars characterized by rapid

transition to asymmetric an unconventional warfare. The World Trade Centre tragedy, the

War against Terror and the lasting unipolarity of the world complete a US centric and

hard power related view of the geopolitical environment. These three phenomena point

toward an emerging geopolitical environment characterized by ideological causes and

asymmetric warfare. The next two pieces will cover the softer but just as important factor

of the globalization of the economies followed by the globalization of information.

1.2.4 Globalization of Economies

The pursuit of globalization will cause a growing interconnectivity between

nations. The world economy is likely to continue growing remarkably. Trading nations'

wealth is likely to grow proportionally. National economies will depend more and more

on reliable and consistent access to trade markets. This emerging trend will contribute

significantly to reducing armed conflicts between trading nations since nations will need

a stable predictable geo-political environment to pursue trading objectives and economic

growth. Among several serious strategic assessments, this trend is acknowledged in the

European Union Security Strategy: "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor

so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th century has given way to a period of

---

[59] Jeffret Record, "Why the Strong lose"…

37

peace and stability unprecedented in Europe history."[60] Europe, at the fore front of globalization, is a case in point. Nations embracing globalization are likely to experience similar developments.

We conclude that globalization of economies will reduce the likelihood of conventional conflicts involving super powers. As a consequence, the influence of remaining type of conflicts, notably ideological conflicts conducted through asymmetric warfare, will increase proportionally. As demonstrated earlier, cultural awareness is likely to play a critical role in developing effective strategies to deal with ideological conflicts. It is normal to assume that cultural awareness relevance to conflict resolution will grow at a rate comparable with the rate of advance of the globalization of trade and economies. The next segment will proceed with analyzing the second emerging soft power feature: the globalization of information.

1.2.5 Globalization of Information

The information revolution enabled by the globalization phenomenon is probably the most important force shaping communities today. "While some of the key forces behind the information revolution are universal, the impacts on any given community will be unique, depending on its individual makeup, economic structure, attributes, and responses."[61] This observable fact will be studied under three aspects: The strengthening

---

[60] European Security Strategy. *A secure Europe in a better World.* (Brussels: European Union, 12 December 2003) 1.

[61] Pamela Blais**,** *"How the Information Revolution Is Shaping Our Community"*, Planning Commissioners Journal, Issue 24, (Fall 1996): 16. Available from: http://www.plannersweb.com/articles/bla118.html; Internet accessed 17 April 2007.

of Communities of Interest, the emergence of bloggers and finally the conduct of Information Warfare. The next segment analyzes the impact of Globalization on Community of Interest in the emerging strategic environment.

1.2.5.1 Community of Interest.

Globalization will bring much greater unrestricted flow of information and flow of people which will create a much superior transparency. "Globalization has changed the nature of psychological warfare, making it easier to transmit information and build linkages, but harder to sustain perceptions or themes that do not closely match existing predispositions."[62] People and societies of developed nations have almost unrestricted access to the communities and ideas of other cultures. Nowadays it is easy for most citizens of most states to develop strong interests and common bonds with those of other states using emails, web sites, and inexpensive long distance. In such an environment, people may share interest and communicate with members of other states more often than they normally communicate with their next-door neighbours. The globalization of information facilitates the development and maintenance of Extremist networks and the proliferation of ideological causes.[63] This element has been picked up by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) in particular with regard to the proliferation of blogs. The next piece analyzes the potential impact of the emergence of blogs.

---

[62] Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, "Insurgency In Iraq And Afghanistan: Change And Continuity," *Strategic Studies Institute* (25 May 2004), Available from: http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_2004_05_25_intro.html ; Internet; accessed 9 February 2007

[63] Thomas X Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*….

1.2.5.2 Bloggers.

The GCSP has dedicated significant effort to the analysis of blogs and the security threat emerging from the globalization of information network. After all, bloggers enjoy a near total freedom of expression in a borderless worldwide audience. Dr Nayef R. F. Al-Rodhan, Director of the Program on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalization and Transnational Security at the GCSP wrote: "One of the most important threats emanating from the Internet and Web-based application is the possibility of them being used by terrorists in promoting, planning and carrying out their activities."[64] The globalization of information through the emergence of blogs as a means of spontaneous and borderless sharing of ideas increases the emerging environment fertility for ideological conflicts. Cultural beliefs will be more easily shared, compared and confronted. Cultural awareness relevance to resolving these emerging conflicts will grow proportionally to the ability of sharing information and to the resulting propagation of limitless sharing of cultural beliefs. This environment is likely to favour the conduct of information operation and information warfare. Our attention will not turn to information warfare.

1.2.5.3 Information Warfare.

Blogs allow relatively large portion of targeted communities to engage into political debates and issues affecting national interests. This is evident by the large number of blogs criticizing the US intervention in Iraq, criticizing US policy on the war on terror and criticizing the actions of particular US politicians. This information warfare tool will be exploited as part of any asymmetric warfare effort to attack the soft

---

[64] Nayef R. F. Al-Rodhan, *The Emergence of Blogs as a Fifth Estate And Their Security Implication* (Genève : Edition Slakine, 2007) 56.

underbelly of US political will. The effectiveness and attractiveness of asymmetric warfare will continue to increase supported by the availability of cheap, simple and effective information operation tools exploiting US citizens' cultural beliefs and promoting opponents cultural beliefs. On this note, it is now time to conclude on the effect of the globalization of Information.

1.2.5.4 Conclusive Summary Globalization of Information

This segment on the globalization of information suggests that the emergence of bloggers will generate more communities of interest and will facilitate the conduct of information operation and information warfare. This environment will be conducive to the emergence of ideological conflicts. The relevance of cultural awareness is likely to naturally expand with the phenomenon of globalization of information and the emergence of more ideological issues.

1.2.6 Conclusive summary on:

Part One Section Two - The Emerging Geo-Strategic Environment

An analysis of the recent world strategic developments demonstrates that the emerging environment will be more conducive to the occurrence of ideological conflicts. The manifestation of hard power phenomena through such forms as the War against Terror and the lasting US military supremacy, provides indication that ideological conflicts may well be on the rise. Secondly the emergence of softer power phenomena such as the globalization of economies and information contributes to developing an environment rich in opportunities for ideological conflicts to flourish. The compounded

41

effect of hard and softer power features at play further indicates that the world is likely to witness an increase number of ideological conflicts. It is logical and reasonable to assume that in such circumstances the importance and relevance of cultural awareness in bringing conflicts to resolution is likely to rise at a comparable rate as the occurrence of ideological conflicts. On that note, it is now time to conclude on Part One of this essay.

1.2.7 Conclusive Summary Part One

The fourfold conception of the nature of power was used to establish that it is normal for cultural awareness to be an overriding factor in some types of conflict. Following this finding, ideological conflicts were determined to be the most likely to create conditions for cultural awareness to be an overriding factor in conflict resolution. Finally, a study of the emerging geo-strategic developments determined that conditions are conspiring to develop an environment characterized by a growing number of conflicts conducted through asymmetric warfare and motivated by ideological causes. Most often these causes will tap into the wellspring of culture, media and ideology. In fact the study highlights the rise of Asymmetric warfare as the logical and rational choice for desperate weak powers engaged in a conflict of survival against a superpower. Such environment will be conducive not only to re-enforcing cultural awareness as an important factor but also as an overriding factor in the resolution of a growing number of ideological conflicts. It is now time to transition towards conducting a practical review of a recent conflict to evaluate to what extent these findings apply to recent conflicts and to what extent are great powers and Canada adapting to this reality.

42

Part Two. A practical review of the role of cultural awareness at the strategic level

Part two of this essay will provide a practical review of the role of cultural awareness in two ways. First, in Section One we will conduct a practical review of the Afghan conflict with a view to validating the relevance of cultural awareness in a modern conflict. Section Two will provide a review of Canadian national level strategies through existing policy documents to show how policy documents assist or fail to assist in the effective exploitation of cultural awareness.

> **We do not understand our adversary well at all. We may be shouting: "Liberty, liberty… liberty", not knowing that all he hears is: "Christianity, Christianity…Christianity."[65]**
> **Dr Jim Keagle**
>
> **"Liberty is just another name for freedom, the profane idea used to impose the disease of secularism world wide."[66]**
> **Anjem Choudary**

Part Two Section One.

2.1 A case study of the Afghanistan conflict

The previous section led to the conclusion that lengthy conventional conflicts involving great powers are less and less likely. On the other hand, weak powers and groups of interest engaging into asymmetric warfare against great nations in conflicts motivated by ideological causes are more and more likely. A review of the Afghan

---

[65] Dr Jim Keagle, Lecture on "US Government/American Political Culture" (Canadian Embassy in Washington, 16 April 2007).

[66] Anjem Choudary is a British Islamist and follower of Omar Bakri Mohammed. Quoted by Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy…79*

conflict will now be conducted to validate the relevance and role of ideologies along with cultural beliefs and cultural awareness in conflict resolution. The evolution of the Afghan conflict toward asymmetric warfare will be analyzed from the perspective of three specific groups in Afghan society: extremists, fundamentalists and the average citizen. The study will conclude with commenting on the level of relevance of cultural awareness to the resolution of the Afghan conflict. With that in mind, the next section will provide a review of the events leading to the Afghan conflict.

2.1.1 Review of the events leading to Afghan conflict

Steven Metz and Raymond Millen are convinced that the 2001 terrorist act aimed precisely at enticing a US Attack on Afghanistan with a view to inflicting the US a painful and humiliating defeat. Metz and Millen will go as far as to claim that "the goal of bin Laden and the radical Islamists is to recreate Islam's historical caliphate and expunge it of outside influence. Because the US represents the greatest obstacle to achieving this objective, bin Laden has sought to challenge, humiliate, and psychologically dominate the US, at least in the eyes of the Islamic world.…"[67] Following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US by Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban regime received an ultimatum from the US to cease providing protection to Bin Laden and to his Al Qaeda terrorist network. Because of the Taliban refusal to adhere to the US ultimatum, Afghanistan was invaded by a US led coalition.[68] From this we can retain that Bin Laden intended to achieve a symbolic victory over the US on the psychological and cultural

---

[67] Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, … 14.

[68] Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy…*

perspective. The US reaction was swift. With inordinate power, iron strong will, quasi worldwide political support and with strong US popular support, the US led a multinational force in the invasion of Afghanistan and rapidly defeated the Taliban regime. Unfortunately, the conflict in Afghanistan did not get resolved with the defeat of the Taliban regime. It simply led to a different kind of conflict: insurgency.[69] The Afghan conflict became a classic case of a weaker enemy reverting to asymmetric warfare upon having lost the conventional battle. The asymmetric portion of the Afghan conflict will be examined with a view to validating the role and influence of cultural awareness in this phase of the conflict. The next segments will analyze some aspect of the Afghan cultures relevant to this conflict.

2.1.2 Afghan cultures.

The various cultures and social groups in play will be analyzed with a view to determining the their potential relation with the insurgency. While there are evident general Afghan cultural characteristics, there are also several groups within the Afghan society with important different beliefs and cultural make-up. Among the general cultural traits comes the Islam heritage. Afghans are largely Muslims. The Afghan Muslim society comes in a variety of flavours covering a relatively wide spectrum of behaviours and beliefs. For the purpose of this essay, the three following categories will be covered: Extremists, Fundamentalists and the average Afghan citizen. The next segment will address Extremism.

---

[69] Senlis Report, "Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies," (February 2007), Available from: http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/018_publication ; Internet; accessed 16 February 2007

45

Through these misguided policies, the international community has turned southern Afghanistan into a recruitment camp for the Taliban.[70]   **Senlis Council**

2.1.2.1 Extremism

A very small but important segment of Afghan society is composed of Islamic extremists embracing terrorism and violence as a mean to achieve distinct self-imposed religious and political objectives.[71] These members are often motivated by the spiritual fulfillment of living by the "narrow and inaccurate" interpretation of their religious text, potentially augmented with financial reward and the promise of a better life for their loved one. One important difference characterizing extremism is their interpretation and understanding of the notion of Jihad. Extremists claim that Muslims lost their dignity through the conscious and premeditated assault of the "unbelievers" on Islam. After the Christian crusaders invasion of Muslim land, extremists allege that the US and Europe are engaged in a modern colonizing of their land and in humiliating them in front of the world. This leads Extremists to proclaim that these unbelievers must be opposed with violence and determination.[72] The Senlis Council reports that the coalition has been particularly ineffective at mounting a campaign for winning the hearts and mind of

---

[70] Senlis Council, quoted by Richard Foot, "Think-tank claims lack of trust behind Afghan mission's failure", CanWest News Service, (15 February 2007), Available from: http//www.canada.com; accessed 15 February 2007.

[71] Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy*

[72] Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy*…. 67.

Afghans.[73] It seems reasonable to assume that cultural awareness would be a key enabler in developing such campaign and in aligning international efforts in pursuit of legitimate cultural respect, religious, social and economic stability in line with tribal traditions and local customs. Dr Keagle asserts that understanding the adversary's culture is essential to shaping attitudes, beliefs and behaviours.[74] There is no evidence that the international community has understood this strategic cultural reality and that a proper strategic response has been developed. The coalition handling of Extremism contributes to the belief that the international community would benefit from giving more consideration to cultural awareness in policy and strategy development. On that note, the next segment examines how the international community is dealing with Fundamentalism.

2.1.2.2 Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism resembles extremism with one major important difference. Fundamentalist's interpretation of the religious text on Jihad is markedly different. Ordinary fundamentalists will not accept reverting to violence to pursue the expansion of Islam or to simply pursue the expulsion of peaceful capitalists from Islam territory. Their interpretation of the religious text makes Jihad a relevant tool to counter military aggression or concrete physical aggression on Islam territory. The mere presence of groups of foreigners with different peaceful spiritual values does not justify for them the use of violence. [75]

---

[73] Richard Foot, "Think-tank claims lack of trust behind Afghan mission's failure"…

[74] Dr Jim Keagle, Lecture on "US Government/American Political Culture"…

[75] Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy*…

In this context, there is no evidence that the international community has understood the strategic relevance of culturally isolating terrorists and insurgents from fundamentalists and from the rest of the Afghan society. There is no sign of policies and strategies aimed at winning the hearts and minds of fundamentalists and elevating them as heroes fighting terrorism and insurgencies side by side with the international community. The coalition handling of the Fundamentalists further contributes to developing the understanding that the international community would benefit from giving more consideration to cultural awareness in policy and strategy development. The next piece studies the handling of the average Afghan citizen cultural aspect by the international coalition.

2.1.2.3 Average Afghan citizen

The average Afghan citizen is first and foremost a member of a tribal society. The four largest tribes are: the Pashtun with a strong link to Pakistan, Tajiks with a strong link to Tajikistan, the Hezara with a strong link to Iran and the Uzbeks with a strong link to Uzbekistan. The balance of the population is made up of very small tribes. Thus the situation in Afghanistan is culturally, historically and geopolitically very complex. Hammes wisely states: "the struggle in Afghanistan is not a simple two-sided fight between the Taliban and the US. There are numerous players. The vast majority are opposed to an effective central government, which would impinge on their interests."[76] Many citizens believe that the US and the international community interests in Afghanistan are very temporary and motivated by self-interest. Once the US and the rest

---

[76] Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*… 168.

of the international community leave, Afghans will be left to deal with war lords' militia, Taliban tyrant regime and extremism in the form of Al Qaeda or whatever other forms it may take in the future. In this context, why are members of the average Afghan society joining the insurgency? This will be addressed in the next segment.

The Senlis report establishes the existence of two large categories of insurgencies in which the average Afghan citizen is caught up: national and liberation. "[The] 'National' insurgency opposes insurgents against the national government due to perceived differences of ideology, ethnicity, economic class and other political issues traditionally addressed within the national political realm. [The] 'Liberation' insurgency, on the other hand, targets those perceived as occupiers."[77] In the case of Afghanistan we have both cases at the same time and they are culturally and mutually supporting one another. National dissatisfaction fuels spiritual and religious extremism. Spiritual and religious extremism exploits poverty and economic hopelessness turning Afghans against the central government and national authority. From this analysis, several indicators point toward the average Afghan cultural beliefs, cultural traits and multi-ethnic heritage to underlying features of both insurgencies.[78]

In this context there is no sign of policies and strategies aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the average citizen and elevating them as heroes fighting terrorism and insurgencies side by side with the international community. The coalition handling

---

[77] Ibid. 4.

[78] Ibid.

of the average Afghan citizen further demonstrate that the international community would benefit from giving more consideration to cultural awareness in policy and strategy development. Does every body agree with this conclusion? Not surprisingly there are some detractors and it is important to give their views due consideration.

2.1. 3 Detractors on the relevance of cultural awareness

Some will say that reconstructing a nation has nothing to do with the local culture. It simply requires massive funds and international guidance on how to stand-up national institution. To the contrary, Mary Habeck argues that the western community must encourage the creation of governments that are more responsive to the need and beliefs of its citizen. On that, speaking on the democratization of the Middle-East she says "…a higher tolerance for the integration of religion and government, will lead to the creation of states that reflect the religious, cultural and historical tradition of that area of the world" [79] In this situation, cultural awareness is essential to promote the right kind of governance suited to the aspirations, traditions and ethnicity make up of the country. Cultural awareness is essential to identify does elements of society that can only be contained through armed action and policing and those elements of society looking for an opportunity to get out of perpetual poverty and misery.

Others will disagree claiming that the international community is already providing Provincial Reconstruction Teams under the protection of NATO troops.[80]

---

[79] Mary R Habeck… 177

[80] NATO Handbook, Public Diplomacy Division. (Belgium: NATO, 2006).

International and national industrial developments agency are pouring millions of dollars in projects in the areas. The US is investing billions of dollars in nation building funds to support the central government of Afghanistan. The reality is that all of that is simply not enough.[81] It is small in comparison to the Defense budget increase required in western nations due to the increase terrorism threat exported to the heart of their homeland. It is pale in comparison with the thousands of soldiers who died in Afghanistan in the service of their country. It is insignificant in comparison with tens of thousands of innocent civilian Afghans who died either exploited by Al Qaeda and the Taliban or as "collateral damage" to the coalition strikes.[82] The international community is simply not doing enough! It is now time to summarize. On that note it is time to summarize our findings on the Afghan conflict case study.

Part 2 Section One. Conclusive Summary.

In summary, there is no evidence that the international community has understood the cultural preoccupation of the Afghan society and the strategic relevance of dealing with them in a manner that contributes to winning the hearts and mind of Afghan society. There are little signs of policies and strategies aimed at demonstrating the international communities respect of tribal communities legitimate cultural aspiration, cultural beliefs and multi-ethic heritage spanning artificial borders and facing continual threat from local warlords militia. The international community has yet to reach out to the Afghan people

---

[81] Senlis Report, "Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies…

[82] While the official civilian body count conducted by the coalition is approx 63,000, it is accepted that the real count is between 200,000 and 600,000 because not all bodies are accessible or available to the coalition.

51

in supporting their effort for cultural, religious and economic autonomy from warlords, criminal organizations and insurgents.[83] This study generally indicates the international community would benefit from giving more consideration to cultural awareness in policy and strategy development in the pursuit of winning the hearts and mind of the average Afghan citizen.

In conclusion, the Senlis report very wisely state that "options for a peaceful settlement of the current conflict are within its grasp, but the international community has yet to reach out to the Afghan people." [84] Current reconstruction efforts are clearly insufficient. Good governance is an important strategic enabler for resolving the Afghan crisis. This good governance is unachievable without adhering to Afghan culture and understanding their aspiration as a nation and as a society. This conflict can only be resolved in the mind of Afghan citizen. What we think is not as relevant as what the Afghans see and think. As of now, we have given them no reasons to think that we will be with them until a stable and effective government respecting their cultural beliefs, religion and traditions will be in place.

---

[83] Ibid.

[84] Senlis Report, "Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies… i.

> **To achieve success, we must be prepared to fight across the spectrum of political, economic, social and military spheres. [85]**   **Thomas X. Hammes.**

Part Two Section Two.

2.2 Canadian National Policy Review

A review of the Afghan conflict was completed as a case study validating the relevance of cultural awareness in the winning the hearts and minds campaign. The next theme will consist of reviewing existing national strategies which is best expressed through policy documents. The intent is to analyze how policy documents assist countries in developing and exploiting effective cultural awareness in the pursuit of national objectives. Canada's National Security Policy and three International Policy Statements (IPS): the Overview, Diplomacy and Defence documents will be reviewed. The next segment will address National Security Policy.

2.2.1 National Security Policy

From a cultural awareness perspective, the National Security Policy is innovating in a significant manner. With a view to contribute to building a more integrated security system, the policy dictates the creation of an advisory Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, composed of members of Canada's ethno-cultural and religious communities. The round table is meant to work with the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Justice. More specifically the policy states that: "It… will provide advice to promote the protection of civil-order, mutual respect and common

---

[85] Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone...* 231.

53

understanding."[86] The intent is to engage in lasting and continuous dialogue to improve understanding on how to manage security interests in a diverse society.

Bruce Doern reports that the creation of this roundtable is a good effort to reach out to Canada's cultural and religious communities that may feel caught in the front line of defence against terrorism. More specifically the new round table is perceived to be reaching out to Muslims and Arab communities. Doern also reports that this initiative is a break from the US practice. The roundtable initiative would have caught the attention of at least one American group of think thank which believes that the US should look at emulating this policy.[87] The roundtable has already met eight times. A list of their activities, participants, theme and outcome are published the internet under a government of Canada Webpage. [88]

While we must recognize that the creation of this advisory group is a step in the right direction, it does not give any direction to other Departments such as Foreign Affairs (CIDA), RCMP, DND, Customs, Emigration, Education, Health Canada to develop any level of cultural awareness within their respective departments. It does not either encourage capitalizing on cultural awareness and Canada's rich multicultural heritage in the conduct of foreign policy, in the resolution of strategic level conflicts or in

---

[86] Privy Council Office, *Securing an open society: Canada's national security policy*. (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), 2.

[87] Bruce G. Doern, *How Ottawa Spends, 2005-2006: Managing the Minority,* (Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGuill-Queens University Press, 2005). Available from: http://books.google.ca ; Internet: accessed on 12 March 2007.

[88] Government of Canada. *Keeping Canadian Safe.* Available from: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ccrs/meetings-en.asp#3 ; Internet; accessed on 12 March 2007.

conduct of relevant departmental businesses. The National Security Policy shows encouraging signs of progress in the recognition and exploitation of cultural awareness. It nevertheless shows several important deficiencies suggesting that this aspect of Canadian policy would benefit from giving more consideration to the place and role of cultural awareness.. The next segment covers the IPS – Overview.

2.2.2 IPS - Overview

This policy promulgated in 2005, contains several reference to Canada's multi-cultural heritage. A key element of the policy is the formulation Canada's desire to make a difference in the world. To facilitate achieving this objective, Canada is adopting a 3D (Diplomacy, Development and Defence) approach. Despite the wisdom and vision demonstrated by the 3D approach to nation building and industrial development, the policy fails manifestly to even mention the creation of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security. It also fails to give any direction on using Canada's multi-cultural community to inform foreign policy. It fails to encourage interdepartmental cooperation in developing and applying the proper level of cultural awareness in the development of departmental policies. The IPS Overview shows significant cultural awareness deficiencies suggesting that this aspect of Canadian policy would benefit from giving more consideration to the place and role of cultural awareness.

2.2.3 IPS – Diplomacy

In the message from the minister, the Honourable Pierre Pettigrew states: "Our experience of building one voice from many cultures… defines us as a country".[89] The document also give due consideration to the importance of public diplomacy and the projection of Canadian cultural values such as "the ultimate firewall against the recruitment of terrorist".[90] However the creation of Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security is not mentioned. The policy omits to acknowledge the important role that Canada's proud multi-cultural heritage can contribute to foreign policy notably in the area of pursuing a 3D approach to promoting security in failed and fragile state, in fighting terrorism and in planning the reconstruction efforts for international crisis. In conclusion, the IPS on Diplomacy shows encouraging signs of progress in the recognition the importance of cultural awareness. It nevertheless shows that significant work remains to be done to effectively exploit Canada's rich cultural heritage and in applying cultural awareness in areas other than public diplomacy.

2.2.4 IPS - Defence

This policy promulgated in 2005 emphasizes the importance for the CF to transform to be effective in the 21st century. It recognizes the Government of Canada intent to make a difference in the world and to implement a 3D approach to complex

---

[89] Department of Foreign Affairs, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Diplomacy*, (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs, 2005) Message from the Minister.

[90] Pierre Pahlavi, "La diplomatie publique du Canada : virage ou figure de style", *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* (2007: 13:3, forthcoming)

conflict and post-conflict situations. Nonetheless it manifestly fails to even mention the creation for the Cross Cultural Roundtable on security let alone stating how this body can play a key role in assisting the CF promoting domestic security, fighting terrorism and contributing to the 3D approach to complex conflict and post-conflicts situations. Although the transformation initiative talks to the importance of developing a CF culture, it does not mention the importance of developing a greater understanding of Canada's multi-ethnic heritage and how it can contribute to greater efficiency of the CF. The CF much advertised transformation appears to be much about equipment acquisition leaving the cultural awareness aspect for a later day. In conclusion the IPS on Defense demonstrates that Canada would benefit from giving more consideration to cultural awareness in policy and strategy development.

2.2.5 Conclusion on review of Canadian policies.

Canada's national security policy makes a noble attempt at promoting cultural awareness with the creation of the Cross Cultural Roundtable on Security. However, much work remains to be done. Other national policy documents such as IPS Overview and Defense largely omit the exploitation and promotion of cultural awareness. We must conclude that some encouraging progress has been made with regard to exploiting cultural awareness as part of the National Security Policy and to some extent with the IPS Diplomacy. Nevertheless this initial progress has not yet trickled down to other policy documents. Thus this study suggests that Canada would benefit from giving more consideration to cultural awareness in policy development.

Part Three: Recommendations

Recommendations will be offered in two parts. The first part will deal with the conflict in Afghanistan. The second part will deal with national policy in general.

Part Three Section One.

3.1 Afghan conflict

Consideration should be given to developing the strategy to settle the Afghan conflict on a two prong approach, each prong informed by the cultural beliefs, traditions and aspirations of the Afghan people. One prong should deal directly with the small groups of extremist who for ideological reasons are not interested in dialogue or in compromising. Prong two should focus on winning the hearts and mind of the Afghan people.

3.1.1 Prong One - Extremism

A relatively small group of Afghans are hard-core extremists. "For ideological reasons, they have chosen to use violence rather than peaceful means to resolve their problems and achieve their objectives."[91] Military and policing action supported by a comprehensive containment strategy and by the rest of the Afghan community will be essential to neutralizing such group. However, this approach should be supported by a second prong to deal with winning the hearts and minds of the rest of the Afghan society. The next segment will address winning hearts and mind part of the Strategy.

---

[91] Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy*…. 170.

58

3.1.2 Prong Two - Winning the hearts and mind

To win the hearts and minds of the Afghan population, the international

community should give due consideration to making a long term commitment to

Afghanis. This commitment should take the form of a comprehensive counter-insurgency

strategy building on all elements of the power including diplomacy, information

operations, economic, financial, education, health, policing and military. Good

governance respecting Afghan culture, traditions and aspirations is a key strategic enabler

for resolving the Afghan crisis. In this context, the Senlis report makes important

recommendations: "Responding to Afghan legitimate grievance" and "Creating a shared

long vision of Afghanistan". We will cover both in the next two segments.

3.1.2.1 Senlis Report - Respond to Afghan legitimate grievances

The Senlis reports argues that it is morally and effectively important to respond to

the Afghan legitimate grievances: "The international community must rapidly respond to

legitimate grievances such as the lack of economic development, infrastructure,

humanitarian aid and healthcare. Currently, many Afghans are being lost to the

insurgency be cause of the lack of these very basic provisions."[92] In particular it is

important to create economic stability to separate the grassroots insurgents from the hard

core extremist. Otherwise national dissatisfaction will fuel spiritual and religious

extremism. Spiritual and religious extremism will exploit poverty and economic

---

[92] Senlis Report, "Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making
Enemies…Conclusions and recommendations iv.

59

hopelessness turning Afghans against the central government and national authority. The second recommendation deals with creating a shared long term vision of Afghanistan.

3.1.2.2 Senlis Report - Creating a shared long term vision of Afghanistan

The Senlis report emphasizes that the international community should stop alienating the Afghan population by imposing "Western" ideals, approaches and concepts." Creating a shared long term vision of Afghanistan is central to gaining the support of Afghans. In particular the report argues: "We must help Afghans shape their own form of democracy which takes in to account the Afghan values and culture". [93] Without a shared long term vision in line with Afghan values and culture, the country is likely to fall back under the leadership of regimes protecting extremism and showing little respects for human rights.

Part Three Section Two.

3.2 Canadian Policy

Having demonstrated the relevance and logic for increasing the cultural dimension of Canada's policy, we will now move to providing recommendations to assist in developing such policy. We will first provide recommendations on National level policy such as the International Policy Statements and the National Security policy. Secondly, we will be addressing policies internal to the Defense Department.

---

[93] Ibid. Conclusions and Recommendation v.

3.21 National Level Policy

The government of Canada's effectiveness in exploiting cultural awareness in the development and implementation of national strategies could improve significantly by implementing a number of fairly simple measures. First, the role of the current advisory Cross Cultural Roundtable could be increased to include the mandate of informing the development of foreign policies in the field of reconstruction and stabilization of failed and fragile state. It could also inform the development of anti terrorism strategy. It could inform the development of foreign policy in general. Secondly, national direction could be given to departments to take full advantage of Canada's Cultural heritage in the formulation of their respective departmental policy. Solicitor General, DND, Education, Health Canada, Customs, Emigration comes to mind. Departmental policy should take full advantage of Canada ethnic groups in communicating and influencing the population in their respective country of origin, religious group or community of interest. Relevant departments should formalize their development of the cultural dimension of their policy through the creation of a departmental cultural awareness program.

It is also recommended to complement the cultural awareness program of relevant departments with a national centre of excellence in Cultural Awareness to provide surge cultural awareness capacity to support national activity on a priority basis. Along the same line, Canada should recommend to the United Nation the development of an international Cultural Awareness program to assist in exchanging expertise and information amongst nations.

61

3.2.2 Department of National Defense internal policy.

Adhering to national policy, DND should develop a Cultural Awareness program for Warrant Officers and Officers. The program could offer a list of cultures of national interest such as: Middle East (Israeli, Palestinian, Arabian), Asia (Afghani, Pakistani, Iranian, India, Chinese), Africa (Sudan, Congo, Uganda), Western Hemisphere (US, Haiti, Mexico). Members could be required to pick one area out of five and to achieve different level of competence at different time in their career.

At the Basic Officer Qualification level and at the WO level, members could be required to achieve a basic level knowledge of the cultures in the chosen area. For promotion to the rank of Master Warrant Officer and to the rank of Major, members could be required to achieve an intermediate level qualification that would be integrated in career courses either in formal teaching or through remote training.

Advance qualifications should be available for members with outstanding potential for career advancement to formation Chief Warrant Officer and for those aspiring to become General Officers. Advance qualification could be delivered partly through remote learning, partly through formal teaching on Advanced Military Strategies Course (AMSC) and the National Security Studies Program (NSSP) and partly on contact training. Deserving members and those selected for a particular appointment requiring more in-depth knowledge could be provided the opportunity to augment military attaché staff in a relevant country to improve their skills through contact training.

Conclusion

Several great nations have build-up impressive military force. However, unless great nations establish a complementary capability in the field of "cultural awareness", they are likely to continue failing in preventing ideological conflicts with the too often consequences of retreating in the face of a weaker adversary. This complementary capability must be driven by national strategy and policies to achieve the level of completeness, coherence and efficiency necessary to influence foreign policy and the conduct of war as an extension to the conduct of politic.

It is clear that we have reached a geopolitical environment conducive to ideological conflicts. Cultural awareness is likely to play a key role in bringing these conflicts to resolution. Properly developing Grand Strategy and national policies is an important tool to developing the necessary cultural knowledge and foundation to either prevent or resolve these conflicts appropriately. A quick review of Canada policy documents demonstrates that Canada has made some progress in giving some level of consideration to the development and employment of cultural awareness. The reality is that the current state of the policy falls short from developing and exploiting the important potential of cultural awareness in the conduct of foreign policy and in the resolution of international and intercommunity conflicts.

It is clear that Canadians are proud of their multi-cultural heritage and that the intent of the Canadian policy is to protect this heritage. The creation of the Cross Cultural Round Table on Security is an undeniable demonstration of Canada's attachment to this

heritage and desire to promote dialogue and understanding between ethnic communities and the government of Canada. The roundtable has a very domestic flavour leaving aside the opportunity to capitalize on Canada's multi-cultural heritage in the formulation of foreign policy, reconstruction initiatives, and the implementation of 3D approach to stabilizing failed and fragile states. Such deficiencies are likely to result in a growing number of unsuccessful prevention of ideological conflicts too often followed by painful defeats despite overwhelming economic, financial, technological and conventional military power. This deficiency shows that Canada along with the international community would benefit from giving more consideration to cultural awareness in policy and strategy development.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Canada. Privy Council Office. *Securing an open society: Canada's national security policy.* Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004.

Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World - Overview.* Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005.

Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Diplomacy.* Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005.

Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*: *Defence.* Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005.

Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operations* Change 2, Ottawa: DND Canada, 15 August 2005.

Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-355-001/FP-001 *Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.* Ottawa: : DND Canada, 2006.

Canada. *Keeping Canadian Safe.* http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/ccrs/meetings-en.asp#3; Internet; accessed on 12 March 2007.

European Union. *European Security Strategy. A secure Europe in a better World.* Brussels: European Union, 12 December 2003.

United States. Department of Defense. *Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983,* 20 December 1983. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/index.html; Internet; accessed 3 March 2007.

AFP-Le Mondce, "Rumsfeld veut désormais lutter contre le terrorisme avec les idées », Le Monde, October, 2003.

Blais, Pamela. "How the Information Revolution Is Shaping Our Community,*" Planning Commissioners Journal,* Issue 24, Fall 1996; http://www.plannersweb.com/articles/bla118.html; Internet; accessed 17 April 2007.

Boase, Roger. *Islam and Global Dialogue – Religious Pluralism and the Pursuit of Peace.* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005.

Boré, Henri. "Cultural Awareness and Irregular Warfare: French Army Experience in Africa," *Military Review,* Vol. 86, (July/August 2006).

Boyd Curtis D. "A Unique Organization: The 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group." *Special Warfare*. Vol. 16, (Aug 2003).

Boyd. John R. Quoted by Dr Chet Richards, Editor, Defense and the National Interest. http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/boyd_grand_strategy.htm; Internet; accessed 22 February 2007.

Bryjak, George J. "Fourth Generation Warfare." *Peace Magazine*. Vol. 22, (Apr-Jun 2006) Available form: http://www.ndu.edu/inss; Internet; accessed 15 January 2007.

Costa, Keith J. "Cebrowski: DOD Planners Need To Focus On Understanding The Enemy", *Inside the Pentagon,* Washington DC: October 28, 2004, Available from: . http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_419_Inside%20The%20Pentagon.doc; Internet; Accessed 29 April 2007.

Doern Bruce G. *How Ottawa Spends, 2005-2006: Managing the Minority*. Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGuill-Queens University Press, 2005.

Dueck Colin. *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy*. Princetown, NJ: Princetown University Press, 2006.

Dunlap, Charles J. Jr. "The Limits of Fourth-Generation Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette.* Quantico. Vol. 89, Jul 2005.

Foerster, Heinz von. quoted by P. Pahlavi, "The nature of war and its theories", *CFC National Security Study Programme 9*, February 2007.

Friedrich, Otto. *Desert Storm – The War in the Persian Gulf,* Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1991.

Fukuyama, Francis. *Nation-building: beyond Afghanistan and Iraq.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.

Echevarria II, Antulio J. "Fourth-Generation War & Other Myths." *International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center*, 11/1/2005; http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=20001995&site=ehost-live; Internet; accessed 15 Jan 2007.

Giáp, Võ Nguyên. "General Vietminh Supreme Command," *CNN Cold War Interviews*, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/about.series/interviews/; Internet accessed 30 April 2007

Gordon, Michael R. "General Says New Strategy In Iraq Can Work Over Time." *New York Times*.: 24 January 2007.

Grau, Lester Michael A. Gress. *The Soviet-Afghan War -How a Superpower Fought and Lost*. Translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, Kansas: University Press of Kansas 2002; Available from: http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu/grasovpreface.html; Internet accessed 15 April 2007.

Gray, Colin S. *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.: 2005.

Griffin, Sean D. "Critical Thinking: A Weapon for All Wars," *Marine Corps Gazette.* Quantico, Vol. 89: Jun 2005.

Habeck, Mary R. *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror.* New Heaven & London: Yale University Press, 2006.

Hammes, Thomas X. "Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks," *Military Review.* Fort Leavenworth. Oct 2006.

Hammes, Thomas X. "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation," *Strategic Forum,* Fort McNair Washington DC: Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, No 214, January 2005. Available from: http://www.ndu.edu/inss; Internet; accessed 15 January 2007.

Hammes, Thomas X. *The Sling and The Stone: On war in the 21st Century*. St-Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004.

Hedges, Stephen J. *"*Fourth Generation Warfare." *Edmonton Journal*. Jun 26, 2005.

Histoire de France. "Citations Historiques Célèbres." http://francehistoire.free.fr/annexes/citations.html; Internet ; accessed 7 April 2007.

Ignatieff, Michael. *Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*. Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003.

Johnson, Richard D. *Seeds of Victory - Psychological Warfare and Propaganda*. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military/Aviation, 1997.

Kipp, Jacob, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow and Capt Don Smith. "The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century." *Military Review,* September-October 2006.

Lind, William S. and John F. Schmitt, Gary I. Wilson. "Fourth generation warfare: Another look," *Marine Corps Gazette***.** Quantico. Vol. 85, Nov 2001.

Lind, William S. and Daniel Smith. *"*Symposium: Q: Is multiculturalism a threat to the national security of the United States*?" Insight on the News.* Washington:. Vol. 17, 31 December 2001.

Lind, William S. Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson. **"**The changing face of war: Into the fourth generation." *Marine Corps Gazette***.** Quantico. Vol. 85, : Nov 2001.

Lind, William S. "Understanding Fourth Generation War." *Military Review***.** Fort Leavenworth. Vol. 84, Sep/Oct 2004.

Maley, William. *Fundamentalism reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*. New York: New York University Press, 2001.

Maximus, Fabius. "The Myth of Grand Strategy." Part one in a series of articles about grand strategy in a 4GW Era, January 31, 2006. http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_myth_of_grand_strategy.htm; Internet; accessed 22 February 2007.

McLean, Va. "Americans' impatience shows lack of understanding of Iraq conflict." *USA Today*. 16 June 2005.

Metz, Steven and Raymond Millen. "Insurgency In Iraq And Afghanistan: Change And Continuity." Strategic Studies Institute. 25 May 2004. National Intelligence Council; http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_2004_05_25_intro.html; Internet; accessed 9 February 2007

Owens, Mackubin Thomas. Review of *A Brutal Constant Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, by Colin S. Gray. National Review. New York: Vol. 58, 10 April 2006.

Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemonhy," *International Security,* Vol. 28, No 1 (Summer 2003).

Ranstorp, Magnus. *"*Al-Qa'ida - An Expanded Global Network of Terror," RUSI Journal**.** London: Vol. 150, Jun 2005.

Record, Jeffrey. "Why the Strong Lose," *Parameters,* Winter 2005-06.

Sarin, Oleg and Lev Dvoretsky. *The Afghan Syndrome - The Soviet Union's Vietnam.* Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993.

Scales, H, Robert Jr. "Culture-Centric WARFARE," *United States Naval Institute. Proceedings,* Annapolis, Vol.130, Oct 2004.

Senlis Report, "Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies," February 2007, http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/018_publication; Internet; accessed 16 February 2007.

Stevenson, Jonathan. *Losing Mogasihu – Testing US Policy in Somalia,* , Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

Stewart, Richard. *The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2002.

Summe, Maj Jack N, "PSYOP Support to Operation Desert Storm," *Special Warfare,*Vol. 5, No. 2, October 1992.

Stewart, Del. "De Constructing the Theory of 4th Generation Warfare," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin,* Ft. Huachuca:. Vol. 30, Oct-Dec 2004

Terrino, John. "'Human centric warfare' needed to beat militant Islam: General." *Aerospace Daily & Defense Report*. Washington, Vol.213, 7 February 2005.

The National Security Archive. "Afghanistan Lessons Learned from the last War - The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Russian Documents and Memoirs" Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya, October 9, 2001. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html#docs; Internet; accessed 15 April 2007.

Vest, Jason. "Radical Reformer," *Government Executive,* Washington, Vol. 38, Feb 2006.

Wikipedia. http://www.wikipedia.org. Internet: accessed several times.