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**The Integration of Defence Civilians within the Defence Team:
How Far Can we Go?**

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Abstract

The integration of the Department of National Defence public servants with the Canadian Forces military workforces into a single Defence Team has been the desire of senior leadership for several decades. This paper argues that, despite the department's clear intentions, cultural tensions still exist and the current level of integration is such that the most effective use of human resources is not being achieved at this important time for the defence institution. The lack of presence of defence civilians in deployed operations such as in Afghanistan is only one factor which not only indicates the lack of Defence Team integration, but also sets Canada apart from its closest allies. This paper proposes enablers of integration ranging from the integration of military and defence civilian leadership doctrine to the implementation of a National Security Professional concept. In addition, hard integration targets are suggested in order to achieve concrete results and to succeed in changing cultures.

The Integration of Defence Civilians within the Defence Team: How Far Can We Go?

*“In simple terms, what the individual can do
is more important than where he or she came from
or what uniform, if any, they wear.”*

General R.J. Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff

and the civilians working in the diplomacy and development disciplines are the 23,000 civilian public servants working in the Department of National Defence (DND).

It has been recognized for a long time that the integration of the civilian public servants in DND, now referred to as “defence civilians,” is essential for the achievement of the Canadian Forces (CF) mission. In communicating his vision for the CF in 2004, General Rick Hillier, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), stated that the CF must move towards viewing the regular and reserve components, including the public service, as a “single solution.”² In *Human Resource Strategy Horizon One 2003-2005*, the Deputy Minister (DM) of National Defence and the CDS stated that “our military and civilian personnel form a Defence Team which is a solid and thriving reality... not at all an abstract concept.”³

In fact, one can argue that maximizing the contributions of the DND civilian team is a force multiplier that allows for a more significant operational effect for a given number of uniformed military personnel. A workforce of more than 23,000 employees is an important strategic asset that must be fully engaged in the institution’s mission. But yet, the military and defence civilian workforces continue to work alongside each other in an “environment of conflicting cultures”⁴ where the military community sees the defence civilian team as risk-adverse, process-oriented bureaucrats, and where defence civilians perceive the military community as rigid and difficult to penetrate. The result is that the level of integration of the two communities remains low and opportunities are missed to maximize the Canadian Forces mission effect.

² CF Transformation: From Vision to Mission: CDS Seminar Presentation, 20 June 2004.

³ Department of National Defence, *HR strategy Horizon One 2003-2005: Facing the People Challenges of the Future for the Civilian Workforce*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence 2002), 1.

⁴ Lieutenant General (Ret’d) M.K. Jeffery, “In Command: Authorities, Accountabilities and Responsibilities.” (lecture, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, ON, 2 May 2007), with permission.

This paper shows that, despite clear statements of intent regarding the integration of the civilian workforce within the overall Defence Team, significant cultural differences remain between the military and civilian groups in the DND/CF. This paper also demonstrates that the current level of integration is insufficient and that there is a strong case for action. Finally, in an attempt to force change and increase the level of integration, enablers and concrete integration targets are proposed.

2. A Clash of Cultures

The corporate culture in the CF and DND has generally been characterized as being twofold: “the civilian corporate culture as bureaucratic, inflexible, disinterested (or at least uninformed) in defence issues, consensus-dependent and reactive,” and the military culture as “reliant on tradition, tactically and operationally innovative but strategically lacking, and resistant to change.”⁵

These cultural differences have, over the years, affected relations between the civilian and military workforces at all levels. Strong undercurrents caused by numerous DND, CF and public service transformation activities, particularly those that have occurred in the CF/DND headquarters since the early sixties, have strongly reinforced existing differences and perceptions. It is absolutely essential to understand this evolution and legacy in order to look forward to the future of the integrated Defence Team and before entertaining any discussion on further integration.

⁵ S.A. Hill, (2007), *Corporate Culture in the CF and DND: Descriptive Themes and Emergent Models*, Defence Research and Development Corporation Center for Operational Research and Analysis Technical Report. Manuscript under review, 1.

The 1960s

The 1960s marked the beginning of a new era focused on management efficiency in the CF and DND.⁶ Not until the current CF transformation was initiated in 2004 has there been such a large-scale change initiative focused primarily on strengthening command, with a strong emphasis on operational effectiveness rather than efficiency.

The Royal Commission on Government Organisation (The Glassco Commission), initiated in 1960, served as the catalyst for a series of events focused on increasing efficiency that would eventually result in the unification of the three existing services, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force into a single service called the Canadian Forces in 1968 and, in 1972, the amalgamation of the CF and department headquarters into the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). In its final report, the Glassco Commission highlighted the risk of relying on the Chiefs of Staff Committee for military advice and advised that the Minister needed a “strong staff group which is essentially civilian in character, outside the framework of management of the Armed Forces.”⁷ The report also noted that the DM should provide this advice through a strengthening of his role.⁸ It should be noted that at that point, the Armed Forces employed approximately 125,000 regular force members and 50,000 civilians.⁹ Most of the civilians were employed within the three Services - the Army, Navy and Air Force -

⁶ Michael A. Rostek, *Peacetime Efficiency to Wartime Effectiveness: Defence Management in the 1990s* (Ottawa, Ontario: Library and Archives Canada, 2004), 44.

⁷ *Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organisation Volume 4: Special Areas of Administration*, J. Grant Glassco, Chairman (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 21 January 1963), 76.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

and very few of them held positions of influence.¹⁰ The DM relied on a very small staff of approximately 100, with limited real powers.¹¹

While the Glassco Commission's primary objective was to increase efficiency within the government at large, its recommendations were far-reaching for the DND. The 1964 White Paper on Defence issued by Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence (MND) (1963-67) endorsed many of the commission's recommendations, also pointing out that the present headquarters organization was far too large and created duplication, and that a 25 percent savings could be achieved through unification.¹² With the integration of the Services headquarters under a single CDS, the White Paper also pointed to the need for the DM to be given greater responsibility in order to better assist the MND "in the discharge of his responsibility for the control and management of the Armed Forces."¹³ While efficiency was a common theme, the principle function of the headquarters was also seen by many as "one of support rather than operational command."¹⁴

The 1964 White Paper did result in the Hellyer-led integration of the Services under the single Command of the CDS and the formation of the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) in 1968.¹⁵ Hellyer wanted "greater efficiency and more civilian participation in the unified CFHQ under the CDS and the departmental headquarters

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 78.

¹¹Peter C. Kasurak, "Civilianization and the Military Ethos: Civil-Military Relations in Canada," *Canadian Public Administration* Volume no. 2 (Spring 1982): p120.

¹²Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), 19.

¹³*Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁴*Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organisation Volume 4: Special Areas of Administration*, J. Grant Glassco, Chairman (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 21 January 1963), 66.

¹⁵ An interesting fact outside the scope of this paper is that the new CF organizational structure with the operational commands, a strategic joint staff, centralized force development and centralized military personnel management has some elements of a CFHQ. This would be an interesting area to research given the evolution of the headquarters since 1968 and the on-going debate since then about whether the "de-integration" NDHQ would be in the best interest of the Department.

under the Deputy Minister, but he had no intention of amalgamating the two separate [headquarters].”¹⁶

The 1970s

Donald MacDonald (MND 1970-72), dissatisfied with the separation between the two headquarters, felt that the DM should play an even greater role in policy matters and in the administration of the CF, and established a Management Review Group (MRG) to evaluate the current organization and to make recommendations. The MRG’s recommendations were the basis for the 1972 amalgamation of CFHQ with the department’s headquarters into the newly formed NDHQ.¹⁷ The unified headquarters provided the DM with a civilian staff outside the chain of command with the power of the last word with the civil authority.¹⁸

One important feature of the newly formed NDHQ was that civilian and military officers were considered to be interchangeable, and as such, could be assigned to any appropriate position. The notion of the “Defence Team” was therefore born in 1972, although not made official until the 1980s.¹⁹

The tumultuous period from the time of the Glassco Commission to the creation of NDHQ in 1972 generated a heated debate that would last for decades about the civil administration of the department and the roles of public servants. The formation of

¹⁶Douglas L. Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision*. A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Department of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), 39.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁸Peter C. Kasurak, “Civilianization and the Military Ethos: Civil-Military Relations in Canada,” *Canadian Public Administration* Volume no. 2 (Spring 1982): p117.

¹⁹Douglas L. Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision*. A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Department of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), 57.

NDHQ was seen as having blurred the relationship between the CDS and the DM in favour of the DM's increased control, resulting in a power struggle.²⁰ Commanders soon began to complain that defence policy and the administration of the CF had been *civilianized*.²¹

The arguments against civilianization of the department were deeply rooted among the military community and were probably a way to express their resistance to the drastic changes that they had faced in the late '60s and early '70s. These changes resulted in a significant reduction in the latitude they had enjoyed under the three independent services. Some argued that this civilianization resulted in a decline of the traditional military values in favour of a more bureaucratic military community working alongside public servants in NDHQ.²² Others expressed significant dissatisfaction with the quality of civilians as well as allegations of political patronage.²³ General J.A. Dextraze (CDS 1972-77) stated that:

... the military see civilians promoted a number of times without their ever experiencing the vicissitudes of life outside the headquarters; and civilians see the serviceman as a transient, likely to be posted at a critical time in the work program... Both groups fear the other taking over all the important challenging positions in NDHQ."²⁴

²⁰G.K. Corbould, "No Moral Right," (Kingston: National Defence College of Canada, 1984), 12.

²¹Douglas L. Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision*. A Study Prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Department of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), 41.

²²Peter C. Kasurak, "Civilianization and the Military Ethos: Civil-Military Relations in Canada," *Canadian Public Administration* Volume no. 2 (Spring 1982): 110.

²³Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 64.

²⁴J.A. Dextraze, "From the Chief of the Defence Staff to all Members of the Canadian Forces" (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarter, 1974), 23.

In fact, General Dextraze admitted years later that the organizational structure of NDHQ was his worst decision as CDS.²⁵

In the opinion of D.L. Bland, it became clear that “the integration of the NDHQ civilian and military staff has heightened, not lessened, the conflict between the two workforces in headquarters and it created institutional ambiguity where none need exist.”²⁶ Civilians were viewed as being “self-serving, ready to jump to a better job (in any department at the first opportunity) and never being subjected to the vagaries of the posting system – while retaining all the few remaining ‘perks’ left to the military.”²⁷ The military community also expressed significant concern with the establishment of parity between military and civilian pay and other benefits. The removal of official military privileges such as mess subsidization and staff car privileges, combined with a more bureaucratic role in NDHQ, was perceived as having significantly eroded the military profession.²⁸

Finally, exacerbating the divide, opportunities for advancement for high-potential defence civilians did not always materialize in this environment highly influenced by current and former members of the military:

*... a large number of positions at all levels are filled by ex-servicemen who, on retirement or resignation from the service, take up civilian positions with almost no break in service. This serves to make a bad civilian establishment even less attractive to civilians both in and outside the department. ...the fact that so many of the positions are already occupied by ex-military persons reinforces the tendency not to merely appoint ex-military members to civilian positions but then to keep promoting them.*²⁹

²⁵Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 99.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 161.

²⁷G.K. Corbould, “No Moral Right,” (Kingston: National Defence College of Canada, 1984), 19.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 18.

²⁹Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 64.

This particular situation was compounded by the ability of military members to directly apply for internal position openings within the public service – a policy which has been reinstated in 2006 as a result of the Public Service Modernization Act.

The 1980s and 1990s

The malaise between the military and civilian components of the defence team continued throughout the 1980s. In a controversial speech given by C.R. Nixon (DM, 1975-82) to members of the Staff College in 1981, he described military officers as “neophytes” who were posted to positions within NDHQ, where they did not have the knowledge, expertise, awareness and contacts within the government to make the judgments required in managing this multi-billion dollar strategic organization.³⁰ According to Nixon, military officers were also ignorant of civilian employee rights within the military community and the problems surrounding the civilian personnel in DND had reached “explosive proportions”.³¹

While the heated debates would quickly be overshadowed by re-capitalization in the 1980s, followed by the turbulent downsizing of the 1990s, the military-civilian cultural issues and the focus on efficiency rather than operational effectiveness in the CF/DND were never completely resolved. If anything, the Management, Command and Control Re-Engineering Team (MCCRT), which was established in January 1995 as a result of the 1994 White Paper and with the mandate to reduce personnel employed in

³⁰C.R. Nixon, *Notes for Presentation by C.R. Nixon Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence at the Canadian Forces Staff College, Toronto, 9 September 1981: "Role of the Deputy Minister in the Department of National Defence"*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1981), 22.

³¹C.R. Nixon, *Role of the Deputy Minister in the Department of National Defence*. Presentation to the Canadian Forces Staff College. Toronto: 9 September 1982. Quoted in Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 162.

headquarters by approximately 50 percent, reinforced the emphasis on management efficiency over operational effectiveness. Primary guidance to MCCRT also included that “NDHQ would continue to function as an integrated civilian/military headquarters”.³² In fact, in a report to the Prime Minister in 1997, M.D. Young (MND) underlined the notion that the integrated NDHQ would continue to be the model for the foreseeable future, acknowledging that no organizational structure was perfect:

*Civilians must have a significant role in the national defence structures of every democracy. There are, of course, many ways of structuring complementary civilian and military work relationships. No one model is perfect. Everywhere, however, the effectiveness of the system rests on cooperation and consultation at all levels – not on totally separate structures working on the same things at the same time often at cross purposes and in ignorance of one another.*³³

During the 1990s the Canadian public service also undertook major transformation initiatives with an emphasis on decentralization of authority, reliance on private sector management techniques, and the assumption that generic leadership competencies for managers and executives would be sufficient to allow free movement of generalists across organizations and departments.³⁴ Significant commonalities in core job requirements across departments were the fundamental assumption behind “the model of a single generalist career path leading to becoming a PS Executive.”³⁵

This new approach to professional development renewed the source of the grievance of the military community. Defence civilians were, from then on, encouraged to treat DND as a mere milestone within their career development bringing more generic

³²Department of National Defence, *Management, Command and Control Re-engineering Team: Historical Report* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997), 1.

³³M. Douglas Young, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and management of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997), 29.

³⁴The Government of Canada, *The Renewal of the Public Service of Canada*. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, c1990), 69-76.

³⁵A.C. Okros, “Defence Human Resource Management” (draft paper, Canadian Defence Academy, 2007), 18.

skill sets rather than specific in-depth defence-related competencies obtained through a career in defence.

Today

This divergence of cultures continues to be an important factor to consider through transformation initiatives. In a recent survey conducted among senior DND/CF military and civilian leaders, the military was perceived as a “strong, impermeable culture” with some clear differences from the civilian culture. The study concluded that alignment of the cultures will be enhanced “if senior decision-makers... maintain an awareness of the cultural differences and consciously refrain from making assumptions that are not tenable outside any of the... groups.”³⁶ The study also demonstrated a consensus among civilian and military leaders about the benefits of an integrated (military/civilian) corporate culture.³⁷

While today’s context and transformation initiatives clearly reflect a strong will towards harmonization of the civilian and military cultures in DND, it is important to remember and understand the history and clashes that have occurred during the past decades. Issues such as civilian control of the CF and cultural differences between the military profession and defence civilians will always exist, and a certain amount of tension is always inherent and can be *healthy* in the relationships of these groups.³⁸ If

³⁶S.A. Hill, (2007), *Corporate Culture in the CF and DND: Descriptive Themes and Emergent Models*, Defence Research and Development Corporation Center for Operational Research and Analysis Technical Report. Manuscript under review, 29.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 25.

³⁸ Department of National Defence. *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Ottawa: Published under the Auspices of the Chief of the Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, c2003), 73.

kept unchecked, this tension can also result in a harmful amount of protectionism and competition.

3. Current Level of Integration

Before undertaking a discussion of the current level of integration of the civilian and military workforces in the Defence Team, it is important to define from which angle the concept of integration will be investigated. On the one hand, greater integration can be treated as a means to increase civilian control of the management of the CF, as it was done in 1972 when NDHQ was formed. In essence, civilian control comes primarily from “having a Minister of National Defence elected by the people and responsible to Parliament: it also derives from a permanent public service involved in the management of defence.”³⁹ Therefore, from this perspective, integration requires not only a certain number of civilians in organizations within NDHQ, but also strong representation in key management positions. As a case in point, Table 1 shows that prior to 1968, 29 percent of the Defence Team consisted of defence civilians, as compared to approximately 28 percent in 1999. Yet, based on the discussion above, civilian control is much greater today than it was in the early sixties, owing to the significant involvement of civilians in the management of defence.

On the other hand, assuming that the level of civilian control of the CF is adequate, integration can be looked at as a means to better use the available workforce to achieve the CF mission. Given that the CDS’s sixth guiding principle for the current CF transformation focuses on the fact that “what the individual can do is more important than

³⁹J.L. Granatstein, *For Efficient and Effective Military Forces*. A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence (Ottawa: Canadian Institute of International Affairs 1997), 7.

where he or she came from or what uniform, if any, they wear,”⁴⁰ it is on this premise of better use of the Defence Team that the topic of integration will be measured.

Additionally, using an “Operational Focus”⁴¹ as a backdrop, the CDS’s fourth guiding principle, the current level of integration of the civilian workforce will also be measured in terms of contributions to operations.

Based on these premises, four areas are considered in this paper in order to evaluate the current level of integration: the overall civilian and military workforce proportions, the current representation of civilians at the executive level, the overall employment patterns for civilians with a more detailed look at one specific functional area, and finally, the level of integration of civilians in operations.

Defence Civilian and Military Workforce Proportions

In simple numerical facts, the size of the military and civilian workforces has fluctuated significantly during the past decades due to various downsizing initiatives, hiring restrictions, caps on the number of military positions and other such factors. Table 1 shows that the civilian proportion of the DND/CF permanent workforce has remained relatively stable over the years, with the civilian proportion of the overall permanent workforce remaining at approximately 28 to 29 percent. MCCRT targets of 1995 were aimed at a reduction of military positions by 32 percent and civilian positions

⁴⁰General R.J. Hillier, *CDS Transformation SITREP 02/05* (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarter, 7 September 2005), Annex A.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

by 45 percent, which explains the target reduction of the proportional civilian representation to approximately 25 percent of the permanent workforce for 1999.⁴²

Table 1 - Permanent Defence Civilian and Military Workforce Proportions – Canada

	1960 ⁴³	1989 ⁴⁴	MCCRT Target for 1999 ⁴⁵	2005
Regular Force	125,000	88,800	60,000	61,630 ⁴⁶
Defence Civilians	50,000	36,600	20,000	23,571 ⁴⁷
Total	175,000	125,400	80,000	85,201
Proportion of Defence Civilians	29%	29%	25%	28%

Table 2 demonstrates that both the United Kingdom (U.K.) Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the United States (U.S.) Department of Defence (DoD) have a greater proportion of their workforces represented by defence civilians. This is particularly true for the U.S. DoD, with 35 percent of its overall workforce being civilian in 1999. As explained later in this paper, this may be a reflection that the U.S. DoD has long been talking about integration, has harmonized the defence civilian employee culture with the military culture, and has also recognized the lower cost, greater continuity and the significant capability offered by defence civilians.

⁴²M. Douglas Young, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997), 32.

⁴³*Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organisation Volume 4: Special Areas of Administration*, J. Grant Glassco, Chairman (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 21 January 1963), 61.

⁴⁴M. Douglas Young, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997), 32.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 32.

⁴⁶Department of National Defence, *Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2004-2005* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005), Tables C.9a and C.9b.

⁴⁷Public Service Human Resource Management Agency Canada, "Statistics Tables," <http://be2020.publiservice.hrma-agrh.gc.ca/tableviewer/tableview.aspx>; Internet; accessed 3 May 2007.

Table 2 - Permanent Defence Civilian and Military Workforce Proportions – United Kingdom and United States

	U.K. MoD (2004)⁴⁸	U.S. DoD (1999)⁴⁹
Regular Force	207,020	1,453,000
Defence Civilians	89,440	794,000
Total	296,460	2,247,000
Proportion of Defence Civilians	30%	35%

Representation at the Executive Level

Representation at the executive level provides a coarse measure of involvement in the DND/CF decision-making and a sense of the number of advancement opportunities for high-potential defence civilians who are aspiring to a career in the department. As a starting point, Table 3 provides a comparison of the number of public servants in the Executive (EX) Group positions in DND, in the Public Service of Canada, and the number of Colonels (Col), Navy Captains (Capt(N)), generals and flag officers in the CF.

Table 3 demonstrates that in broad terms, the number of defence civilian executives is proportionally much lower than in the rest of the public service – by a factor of four. To a lesser extent, the proportion is also lower than in the CF, even though the CF proportion of executives is likely to be very conservative (low).⁵⁰ This further reemphasises the marginal defence civilian representation at the executive level.

⁴⁸United Kingdom, Defence Analytical Services Agency, *UK Defence Personnel in Figures*, (2004) [Report on-line]; available from <http://www.dasa.mod.uk/publications/pdfs/entente/ententeenglish.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 February 2007, B-6.

⁴⁹United States. General Accounting Office. *DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles could Provide Significant Benefits* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1994), 11.

⁵⁰ It should be noted that the Director of the Civilian Classification Office (DCCO) benchmarks the EX01 level with the Colonel rank. However, experience has showed that many Colonel positions would be classified at the EX02 level if subjected to the civilian classification process and, as a result, many Lieutenant Colonel (LCol)/Commander (Cmdr) positions would be classified at the EX01 level if the classification process was also applied. By including a portion of the over one thousand LCol and Cmdrs

While these proportions may hide some important influencing factors, such as the nature of the functions performed by defence civilians in DND versus the functions performed by public servants in other departments, the gap is significant enough to illustrate a disparity and clearly represents a much reduced number of opportunities for high-potential defence civilians, as compared to their counterparts in other departments and in the CF.

Since the implementation of the Public Service Modernisation Act in 2006, military members are allowed to compete directly with defence civilians on any position, including executive positions. This only compounds the opportunity problem for defence civilians. As was recognized following the formation of NDHQ, this can lead to an unattractive establishment to civilians both in and outside the department, and may cause high-potential individuals to either leave for other departments or merely use the DND/CF as a stepping stone for their career.⁵¹

Recent discussions about potential reductions in Col, Capt(N) general and flag officer positions have reopened the debate about the perceived excessive number of EX Group defence civilians in DND. It would be important to keep in mind that based on the above, any further reductions in EX Group positions would further isolate the defence civilian population in terms of career progression opportunities and would further compound executive cadre problems in the Defence Team - particularly if military executive positions were to be reduced as well. Two wrongs do not make a right.

in the CF executive count, the proportion of CF executives would likely approach two percent which is comparable to the proportion in the Public Service at large. Therefore, the CF proportion of 0.63 percent in Table 3 is probably very conservative (low).

⁵¹Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973), 64.

Table 3 - Defence Civilian and Military Workforce Proportions at the Executive Level.

	Defence Civilians (2007) ^{52,53}	Public Service of Canada (2007) ⁵⁴	CF Regular Force ⁵⁵ (2005)
Total	23,571	187,838	61,630
EX Group	128	4 684	
Col/Capt(N)/Generals Flag Officers			391
Percentage Executives	0.54%	2.4%	0.63%

Employment Patterns

Employment patterns are extremely important since they can allow for increased mission effect for a given total workforce. This has been recognized not only here in Canada, but also among our allies. The MCCRT did recognize the importance of this point, stating that “if a headquarters’ job does not require specific military knowledge or experience, it should be staffed by a civilian in order to free a uniformed member for more operational duties.”⁵⁶ Similarly, the U.S. General Accounting Office also recognized the importance of employment patterns in the U.S. DoD, stating that “replacing... military personnel with civilian employees would reduce peacetime

⁵² Public Service Human Resource Management Agency Canada, “Statistics Tables,” <http://be2020.publiservice.hrma-agrh.gc.ca/tableviewer/tableview.aspx>; Internet; accessed 3 May 2007.

⁵³ D.M. deGravina, Director Civilian Executive Services, e-mail to author, 25 April 2007.

⁵⁴ Public Service Human Resource Management Agency Canada, “Statistics Tables,” <http://be2020.publiservice.hrma-agrh.gc.ca/tableviewer/tableview.aspx>; Internet; accessed 3 May 2007.

⁵⁵ Department of National Defence, *Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 2004-2005* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005), Table C.9a and C.9b.

⁵⁶ Department of National Defence, Management, Command and Control Re-engineering Team: Background Information for Senior CF/DND Managers on Reengineering and Change (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996), 8.

personnel costs and could release military members for use in more combat-specific duties.”⁵⁷

It is interesting to note that the motivations for the U.S. DoD to employ defence civilians include both the ability to free military positions for combat-related duties and economic reasons. It should also be noted that given that more than five thousand U.S. DoD defence civilians were voluntarily deployed to the Gulf War and other operations, “deployability has not been the basis for excluding civilians”⁵⁸ from most support types of employment.

The Glassco Commission report made specific comments about the financial, flexibility and military issues associated with the high number of military positions in supporting or non-combatant activities, concluding by questioning whether it was in the national interest to employ such a large number of uniformed personnel in such positions.⁵⁹ The report also highlighted employment pattern inconsistencies among the three Services in the early 1960s. For example, in the report, the Commissioner asks the following question: “What circumstances dictate that 54 per cent of the Air Materiel Command should be in uniform, when the Navy can manage the similar function with approximately 5 per cent?”⁶⁰

Forty years later, looking at the defence material procurement function as a point of reference, the question would still be valid. In the DND Material Group, the air material equipment program management division still employs a majority of military

⁵⁷United States. General Accounting Office. *DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles could Provide Significant Benefits* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1994), 2.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁹*Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organisation Volume 4: Special Areas of Administration*, J. Grant Glassco, Chairman (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 21 January 1963), 82.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 84.

personnel with only 37 percent defence civilian staff, while the maritime division, employs a almost twice that proportion of defence civilians at 67 percent of the total workforce.⁶¹

When compared to our principal allies, the low proportion of civilian positions in the DND's material procurement functions stands out, with only 62 percent of the employees being defence civilians (2,316 defence civilians, 1,379 military).⁶² The U.S. DoD central logistics function has a defence civilian workforce representing 94.1 percent of the total.⁶³ The Australian Defence Force (ADF) shows a similar trend with the Capability Development and Acquisition function employing 6,250 defence civilians in a total workforce of 8,000, for a proportion of 78 percent.⁶⁴ The U.K. MoD Defence Procurement Agency employs 4,714 defence civilians for a total of 5,418 employees, giving a proportion of 87 percent defence civilian staff.⁶⁵ Finally, the *Délégation générale pour l'armement* (DGA) of the French *Ministère de la défense* employs 15,700

⁶¹L. Cloutier, Director Material Group Human Resources, e-mail to author, 4 April 2007.

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³Central logistics covers program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, and centralized procurement offices. It also includes centralized repair, modification, maintenance and overhaul of equipment, and activities such as industrial preparedness. Support activities include operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, and training and administrative commands. United States. General Accounting Office. *DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles could Provide Significant Benefits* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1994), 42.

⁶⁴*Capability Development & Acquisition*. Capability development and acquisition personnel are those required to develop policy and practical options for the Government on new and replacement capability. Acquisition of capability to bring it into service is included in this function. The options cover strategic policy, international relations, research and development, materiel, systems, workforce and finance aspects of capability. Australia, Department of Defence, *Strategic Workforce Planning Review – Final Report* (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003), 125.

⁶⁵United Kingdom, Defence Procurement Agency, *Annual Report and Accounts 2005/2006* (London: The Stationary Office, 2006), 22.

defence civilians for a total workforce of 18,500 employees, giving a proportion of 85 percent defence civilian staff.⁶⁶

The same argument could be used for the equipment maintenance function area. In the DND/CF, the debate regarding how support will be provided to a piece of equipment, such as first- and second-line equipment maintenance, rarely includes the use of defence civilians. The options considered usually are limited to uniformed military maintainers or contractors. The use of defence civilians could allow for maintaining control of such support activities while potentially reducing costs without using valuable military human resources.

While the figures presented above cannot be interpreted literally due to the different organizational structures and mandates among the various defence forces, they do suggest inconsistencies within the DND as well as an overall conservative approach in the decision to allow defence civilians to play a more substantial role in certain functional areas.

Defence Civilians in Operations

Arguably, the ultimate test to measure the level of integration of defence civilians within the Defence Team should be the level of involvement in operations. The current CF operations in Afghanistan provide a significant insight from this perspective. As a starting point and in agreement with the CDS sixth principle for transformation, senior CF chain of command have recognized that they would accept support from any source,

⁶⁶France, Ministère de la Défense, “Délégation Générale pour l’Armement,” http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga/decouverte/la_delegation_generale_pour_l_armement/presentation_et_missions/presentation_de_la_delegation_generale_pour_l_armement_dga; Internet; accessed 3 March 2007.

including contractor and public service personnel, in order to maximize mission effect with the limited number of military personnel deployed in-theatre.⁶⁷

So far, civilians play a key role in Afghanistan with the employment of over 140 contractors and employees contracted through the Canadian Forces Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA); however, only two Defence Scientists and a few term defence civilians with specific language and cultural skills have joined the team in Afghanistan to date.⁶⁸ With a workforce of more than 23,000 employees, it is worthwhile trying to understand the reasons why such a valuable resource would be the absolute last resort for supporting the institution's most critical mission.

Looking at the U.S. DoD during the 1991 Gulf War, five thousand DoD defence civilians voluntarily deployed to the Persian Gulf area to support the military forces.⁶⁹ Today, the U.S. continues to rely on defence civilians to support operations world-wide, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. DoD process for requesting additional resources in operations, the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS), clearly specifies upfront that the process applies to military and defence civilian personnel.⁷⁰ U.S. DoD Defence civilians, when asked, are usually willing to deploy since this type of duty is specified and understood within their terms of employment – it is expected and part of their culture.⁷¹

⁶⁷This point was made on several occasions by the Commanders of the CF operational commands during breakfast and lunch discussions when NSSP 9 visited Ottawa, 19-23 March 2007.

⁶⁸Major G. Penner, J1 Ops 3, CEFCON, e-mail to author, 11 April 07

⁶⁹United States. General Accounting Office. *DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles could Provide Significant Benefits* (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1994), 5.

⁷⁰The Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS) is the primary method for requesting military and civilian augmentation for contingency operations, recurring operations and exercises. United States, Department of Defence, "Worldwide Individual Augmentation System," http://cpol.army.mil/library/mobil/mob_090402.html; Internet; accessed 13 March 2007.

⁷¹Mr James Feagin, WIAS Point of Contact, telephone conversation with author, 15 March 2007.

Specifically, the U.S. Army's policy, consistent with the U.S. DoD "Mission-Ready Workforce"⁷² objective, is "that civilians will be used to support the military in carrying out their missions."⁷³ The U.S. Army has also designated Emergency Essential (EE) positions, and individuals filling these positions are expected to deploy when requested.⁷⁴ Similarly, the U.S. Air Force Personnel Center has institutionalized the objective to "develop a tactically sound and operationally savvy civilian workforce to meet its mission" and to integrate "seamless operations with transparency between military and civilian personnel."⁷⁵

Therefore significant differences between the U.S. and Canada exist not only in policy and processes for employment of defence civilians in support of military operations, but also in the cultures and the expectations of the institution, starting when an individual is first hired.

In an attempt to resolve some of the legal and administrative issues surrounding the deployment of DND employees in support of CF international operations, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Human Resources - Civilian (ADM (HR Civ)) has recently drafted policies and procedures dealing with the decision process, screening, risk assessments, exclusions and limitations.⁷⁶ The draft document also deals with medical care, laws of armed conflict, discipline and Status of Forces Agreements.

⁷²United States, Department of Defense, *Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan 2006-2010* [Publication on-line]; available from http://www.dod.mil/prhome/docs/civilianstrat_plan7_9.pdf; Internet; accessed 25 April 2007, 8.

⁷³United States, United States Army, "Civilian Deployment/Mobilization," <http://cpol.army.mil/library/mobil/civ-mobil.html>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2007, Section 1.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, Section 1.

⁷⁵United States Air Force Personnel Center, "Directorate of Civilian Force Integration – Mission Statement," <http://ask.afpc.randolph.af.mil/cfo/>; Internet; accessed 28 February 2007.

⁷⁶Department of National Defence. *Draft Civilian Resources Management: Deployment of DND Employees in Support of CF Controlled International Operations*, (July 2006). [Report on-line]; available

While a lot of work has been done to institutionalize the process, the reality is that defence civilians for deployed operational support are still a last resort. This is far from the intent of the CDS sixth principle for transformation.

Conclusions on the Current Level of Integration

In summary, a few conclusions can be reached looking at the level of integration of the defence civilian workforce in the DND from the perspective of most suitable employment of defence civilians and military personnel and maximisation of mission effect.

First, the DND/CF employs proportionally fewer defence civilians than do its main allies. Increasing this proportion could lower costs and/or free military positions for operational positions. Second, the percentage of defence civilian executives is four times lower than in other departments and also less than in the military. Given that military officers have recently been given the privilege to compete for defence civilian executive positions, career prospects for aspiring high-potential leaders in the DND public service workforce appear to be marginal.

Third, inconsistencies of employment patterns for defence civilians exist within the department and, in addition, when compared to our allies using the material procurement function as a case study, a high proportion of military personnel remain in what could be considered non-combatant positions.

Finally, defence civilian support of operations is still a last resort. This sets the DND/CF apart from its U.S. ally, who applies the “Total Force”⁷⁷ concept at home, and abroad in both peace time and contingency operations.

It can therefore be concluded that the DND/CF is not making maximum use of its defence civilian workforce and that further integration is clearly possible.

4. Case for Action

The nature of military conflicts has changed significantly during the past ten years, and the current Canadian contribution to Afghanistan is a reflection of this new reality. Fourth generation warfare, three-block warfare, whole-of-government approach and the “3D” or nation-building concepts are at the forefront of the new discussion about strategy and doctrine. Fundamentally, all of these concepts have in common the need to integrate simultaneously the political, economical, social, diplomatic, military and information domains, while maintaining partnerships with affected governments and the international community. This new and challenging environment also requires the highest level of integration at the national strategic level in order to maximize overall mission success.

The competencies required to succeed in this new reality cannot be developed in either military or defence civilian silos alone. Cross-functional and multi-departmental knowledge, experience and skills are absolutely essential. Similarly, multi-disciplinary teams are necessary to better understand mission requirements and achieve maximum effect and success. For example, an army officer who brings only war-fighting expertise

⁷⁷United States, Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 6 February 2006), 75.

to an operation at the strategic or operational level is of limited value to the team in the new security context. On the other hand, the same army officer who has taken part in humanitarian, peacekeeping and military operations and who has experience in dealing with the diplomatic and development agencies of the government as well as Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) both abroad and in the National Capital Region is a significant asset.

The capacity to develop sufficient numbers of such individuals is limited within the CF and therefore, the role of defence civilians in forming multi-disciplinary teams has gained significant importance. These individuals must not only understand the defence environment, but also bring their knowledge and experience from other departments. Given that deployability of defence civilians in operations should be common practice and that defence civilian movement to and from Other Government Departments (OGD) is routine and encouraged within the public service, it becomes evident that further integration across CF/DND organizations, including within the operational commands, could help the CF meet the challenges of the new security environment.

In conclusion, further integration is not only clearly possible, as demonstrated in the previous section of this paper, but is also key to achieving CF mission success in today's context.

5. Enablers and Challenges

Having established that further integration of defence civilians is possible and desirable, it is worth looking at the enablers that would assist in overcoming some of the current obstacles to full achievement of the CF transformation guiding principles and

objectives. It is understood that some of these enablers are already being considered for implementation; however, taking a step back may reveal some gaps among the current initiatives.

Creating an Identity

The current CF transformation has focused on the creation of a single entity for the CF. In his first transformation guiding principle, the CDS states that “all service personnel must look past environment, component or unit affiliations to most closely identify with the CF.”⁷⁸ While the sixth guiding principle is meant to form one cohesive, integrated defence civilian and military team, the issue of defence civilian identity has remained “conspicuously absent.”⁷⁹ It is therefore worthwhile to look at the potential need for means to create an identity and sense of belonging for defence civilians. This could also serve the purpose of reducing cultural differences between the military and defence civilian groups.

The U.S. Army, for example, includes in its leadership doctrine its defence civilian corps and qualifies its defence civilian component as “experienced personnel committed to serving the Nation.”⁸⁰ The doctrine also states that that Army defence civilians provide “mission-essential capability” and are “committed to selfless service in the performance of their duties.”⁸¹ The Army Civilian Corps Creed is also defined within the Army leadership doctrine and reinforces the Army team through statements such as “I

⁷⁸General R.J. Hillier, *CDS Transformation SITREP 02/05* (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarter, 7 September 2005), Annex A.

⁷⁹S.A. Hill, (2007), *Corporate Culture in the CF and DND: Descriptive Themes and Emergent Models*, Defence Research and Development Corporation Center for Operational Research and Analysis Technical Report. Manuscript under review, 18.

⁸⁰United States, Department of Defense, FM 6-22 *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), Chapter 3, 4.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, Chapter 3, 4.

am an army civilian – a member of the Army team... I will always support the mission... I live the Army Values...”⁸²

The sharing of values and commitment, combined with a total approach to leadership training that reinforces leadership values by U.S. Army military and defence civilian members, has been recognized as a means to prevent separation of cultures.⁸³ In Canada, the focus on belonging to the public service first, while at the same being part of an institution such as the DND/CF, creates an environment that is fertile for cultural differences.

To bring the DND/CF military and defence civilian groups to share similar values and commitment to the mission, CF leadership doctrine needs to be expanded to better define the relationship among all members of the Defence Team. In a manner similar to the U.S. Army, the civilian leadership doctrine should be included in *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*,⁸⁴ as previously proposed by L.W. Bentley.⁸⁵ Public service values focused on democracy, professionalism, ethics and people would be clearly enunciated and supplemented with the statement of defence ethics principles: respect the dignity of all persons, serve Canada before self and obey and support lawful authority.^{86,87} The complementary nature of these values should be highlighted as a necessary ingredient of an effective Defence Team.

⁸²*Ibid.*, Chapter 3, 4.

⁸³Colonel W.S. Skinner, “*Total Army Culture – The Civilian Connection.*” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States War College Paper, 1993), abstract

⁸⁴Department of National Defence. *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Ottawa: Published under the Auspices of the Chief of the Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, c2003).

⁸⁵Lorne W. Bentley, *Canadian Forces Transformation and the Civilian Public Service Defence Professional*, (Kingston Ontario: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, February 2007), 52.

⁸⁶Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service,” http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/hrpubs/TB_851/vec-cve1_e.asp#_Toc46202803; Internet; accessed 3 May 2007.

This would be a first step in the recognition of differences among civilians of the public service in the Defence Team and those in other departments. Being upfront about the expectations and values of members of the Defence Team would likely turn off certain potential civilian employees; however, this may be a positive outcome that would result in a team of individuals able and willing to contribute to the success of the CF mission, whatever and wherever it might be. Such an approach would certainly go a long way toward recognizing the uniqueness of the defence environment and in reducing cultural differences. This approach would still be consistent with professional development programs such as the Defence Learning Curriculum and the national security professional concept discussed later.

Service and civilian officers, especially of intermediate and senior rank, between the headquarters staffs of the Armed Forces and the organization of the Deputy Minister.”⁸⁹

Today, the case for a greater interchange is still valid. The CDS Action Team (CAT) 4 report, which is focused on the defence institutional alignment with the current CF transformation, states that “cross-employment” of non-“military-imperative” positions, including positions in a military operational context, should be pursued as a means to increase flexibility and backfill for military personnel on deployment.⁹⁰ The MCCRT also had recommended the designation of many more positions in NDHQ as “optional (either military or civilian)” as a means to foster the Defence Team concept.⁹¹

Interchanges within the department do occur today to a certain extent; however many constraints continue to prevent the free movement of defence civilian and military personnel among non-military imperative positions. First, the classification of positions as civilian makes it difficult to fill a vacancy with a military officer without disturbing the salary wage envelope. Similarly, many non-military essential positions are designated as military and have a certain occupation and rank associated with them, and no funding to employ a defence civilian to fill the position. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, sub-cultures at the military occupation level also play a significant role in protecting certain key positions in certain organizations. The bottom line is that both the military and defence civilian workforces are denied key developmental opportunities.

There clearly is a need to remove these real and perceived obstacles and silos in order to best manage the defence workforce as a whole rather than in communities. This

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 79.

⁹⁰Chief of the Defence Staff, *CDS Action Team 4 Report - Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Alignment* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2005), B-4.

⁹¹Department of National Defence, *Management, Command and Control Re-engineering Team: Historical Report* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997), 5.

would provide better professional development of defence civilian and military personnel, would help reduce existing cultural differences, and would allow for further integration of the defence civilian workforce within the defence team.

Defence Professional Concept and the Defence Leadership Curriculum

One of the department's corporate priorities has been to initiate the development of a Defence Professional concept in order to refocus the Leadership Competency Development Program as well as to match recent changes in legislation and central agency requirements.⁹² The mere existence of a Defence Professional concept is a recognition that defence civilians are in an environment like no other in the rest of the public service. Immersed in the military culture and its ethos, defence civilians must not only understand their own role and influence, but also possess unique competencies, such as knowledge of the profession of arms and of the military human resource management processes in an integrated civilian/military structure.

In essence, the Defence Professional concept arose from the CDS sixth guiding principle and is aimed at creating defence civilians that have an "acute sense of their responsibilities to directly support operations" through a better understanding of today's war and conflicts at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.⁹³ Defence Professionals would distinguish themselves from the rest of members of the public service because of their integration within the defence team, their unique professional development, and

⁹²Treasury Board Secretariat. *Departmental Performance Report 2005-2006: National Defence*. (Report on-line); available from http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/0506/ND-DN/nd-dn04_e.asp; Internet accessed 13 February 2007, Section 4, 22.

⁹³Lorne W. Bentley, *Canadian Forces Transformation and the Civilian Public Service Defence Professional*, (Kingston Ontario: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, February 2007), 12.

their professional identity. They would be expected to be employed and deployed into theatres of operations.⁹⁴

The Defence Professional concept, although requiring further definition, was endorsed in principle at the October 2006 DND Civilian Human Resource Committee (CHRC).⁹⁵ The concept gained general support among defence civilian and military senior management, who endorse the idea as a means of developing defence civilians who are highly informed and could have a significant impact on the corporate culture.⁹⁶

Since October 2006, however, further examination of the concept and its feasibility has resulted in it being replaced with the Defence Leadership Curriculum (DLC).⁹⁷ The DLC is a defence civilian professional development program covering areas such as diversity, work-life balance, and career development, and which is based on the creation of a compendium of leadership resources.⁹⁸ The DLC is divided into leadership and defence clusters that include courses related to defence ethics, the CF, military human resource management and legislated requirements such as financial administration.⁹⁹

The decision to reduce the scope of the Defence Professional initiative to what essentially consists of an orientation, training and development program for new DND employees has been based on issues such as the need to keep the program simple and

⁹⁴Ibid., 1.

⁹⁵Department of National Defence, Civilian Human Resources Committee, *Record of Decision*, (Ottawa: 16 October 2006).

⁹⁶S.A. Hill, (2007), *Corporate Culture in the CF and DND: Descriptive Themes and Emergent Models*, Defence Research and Development Corporation Center for Operational Research and Analysis Technical Report. Manuscript under review, 16.

⁹⁷Stephanie Poliquin, Director General for Leadership and Professional Development, telephone conversation with author, 21 February 2007.

⁹⁸Department of National Defence, *HR strategy Horizon One 2003-2005: Facing the People Challenges of the Future for the Civilian Workforce*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence 2002), 12.

⁹⁹Department of National Defence, "Defence Leadership Curriculum," http://hr.ottawa-hull.mil.ca/hrciv/dglpd/dodlri/dlc/fr/home_f.asp?reference=120880001; accessed 3 May 2007.

accessible to all defence civilian employees rather than the selected few.¹⁰⁰ The creation of a new *profession* would indeed bring new dimensions, such as a selection process, the requirement for extensive training, an ethical code and a process of certification. Perhaps more importantly, public servants do not as a general rule treat defence as a career commitment but rather as one of several departments where they will be called to serve during their career. The Defence Professional concept implies that they would specialize in defence which goes against the preferred professional development model adopted by the Public Service of Canada as discussed previously in this paper.

Looking at the situation from a different angle, perhaps there is more than one set of needs to be filled and thus both programs have their own merit. The DLC as an orientation and training package for all defence civilian employees would fill an important gap but does not necessarily eliminate the need for higher education in the defence field. And given that there would be generic defence-related training as part of the DLC, perhaps the concept of Defence Professional could be expanded in scope to incorporate the main elements of national security.

The National Security Professional

The idea of expanding the scope of the Defence Professional concept to the level of national security is not new. It has the advantage of capturing the professional development needs of public servants in other departments and agencies involved in national security, particularly in the defence, development and diplomacy (3D) fields, such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Foreign Affairs, Public

¹⁰⁰Stephanie Poliquin, Director General for Leadership and Professional Development, telephone conversation with author, 21 February 2007.

Safety and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). This idea of a cadre of purposefully developed specialists has recently been qualified as a “logical extension” to the Defence Professional concept by CF/DND senior executives.¹⁰¹

In the U.S., a similar initiative has been under consideration for some time. In 1997, the National Defense Panel (NDP) issued a report on defence transformation and national security in the twenty-first century, proposing the concept of an “interagency cadre of professionals, including defence civilian and military officers, whose purpose would be to staff key positions in the national security structures.”¹⁰² The panel suggested “the identification of interagency positions within the national security community, including domestic agencies with foreign affairs responsibilities (e.g. Justice, Commerce, Energy), and staffed by the interagency cadre.”¹⁰³ Other suggestions included the reciprocal assignment of foreign nationals to such positions as well as the establishment of a national security curriculum for training and education in strategic affairs, building upon the course work at the National Defense University and National Foreign Affairs Training Center.¹⁰⁴

The NDP recommendation resulted in a proposal from the United States Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security/21st Century in 2001, to develop a National Security Service Corps (NSSC). The NSSC concept includes professional education programs emphasizing interagency-specific areas, mandatory job rotations to other departments and the designation of Corps positions in the DoD, State, Treasury,

¹⁰¹S.A. Hill, (2007), *Corporate Culture in the CF and DND: Descriptive Themes and Emergent Models*, Defence Research and Development Corporation Center for Operational Research and Analysis Technical Report. Manuscript under review, 17.

¹⁰²*Report of the National Defense Panel – Transforming Defence: National Security in the 21st Century*, Philip A. Odeen, Chairman, (December 1997) [Report on-line]; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2007. 66.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 66.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, 66.

Commerce, Justice, Energy, the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and the National Homeland Security Agency, which includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).¹⁰⁵ Guidelines, such as the establishment of comparable promotion rates within the NSSC and rotational assignments, are also recommended. The Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act of 2003 is aimed at institutionalizing the NSSC under the oversight of the National Security Service Board.¹⁰⁶

A Canadian national security professional program, similar to the U.S. NSSC concept, with participation from military and civilian personnel of the DND/CF and other government departments such as Foreign Affairs, the Privy Council Office, CIDA, the Public Safety Agency and the RCMP, may indeed be the best enabler for the integration of the civilian workforce, not only within the Defence Team, but within the greater Canadian national security team composed of “national security professionals.”¹⁰⁷ In this context, professional development opportunities such as the National Security Studies Program at the Canadian Forces College could become one of the pillars of a professional development curriculum. National security professionals could be selected at the middle-management level from essentially anywhere within the participating departments and would be developed through formal training and employment rotations in designated

¹⁰⁵*The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century – Road Map for Security: Imperative for Change*, Garry Hart and Warren B. Rudman, Co-Chairs, (15 February 2001) [Report on-line]; available from <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIIFR.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007, 101-102.

¹⁰⁶The Bill passed the Senate in 2003 but was referred by the House to various committees and sub-committees for review after 2004. The Library of Congress. “A bill to strengthen and improve the management of national security, encourage Government service in areas of critical national security, and to assist government agencies in addressing deficiencies in personnel possessing specialized skills important to national security and incorporating the goals and strategies for recruitment and retention for such skilled personnel into the strategic and performance management systems of Federal agencies.” [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d108&querybd=@FIELD\(FLD003+@4\(\(@1\(Sen+Akaka++Daniel+K.\)\)+00007\)\)](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d108&querybd=@FIELD(FLD003+@4((@1(Sen+Akaka++Daniel+K.))+00007))); Internet; accessed 10 March 2007.

¹⁰⁷Lorne W. Bentley, *Canadian Forces Transformation and the Civilian Public Service Defence Professional*, (Kingston Ontario: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, February 2007), 54.

positions. As proposed in the U.S. Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act, the program would be overseen by a national security service board that would likely be chaired by the National Security Advisor.

As discussed above, it would make sense to pursue both the DLC and a broader scope of professional concepts covering national security. These two programs could co-exist and would complement each other. The DLC could reinforce the CF/DND values and introduce the uniqueness of the DND/CF, including its peculiar dual culture to all defence civilians of the department. The national security professional program would apply to those who choose to participate and are selected. It would prepare the future leaders of the government departments involved in the national security arena.

This type of concept can only gain momentum if it is initially championed by a department and, given that the DND/CF already leads other departments in terms of national security professional development, it would make sense for the DND/CF to nurture and advocate the concept across the departments.

Challenges

Obstacles to further integration are numerous and can easily stand in the way to achieving any progress. For example, increasing the proportion of defence civilians for a given number of CF members would require the hiring of a large number of additional defence civilians. Some fear that such an increase would cause problems if the department was subject to personnel reductions a few years from now. However, the demographic profile of the public service is such that the projected high rate of retirements in a few years from now could be mitigated by hiring and training permanent

personnel today. Additionally, there is a strong case for additional human resources in the DND/CF at this particular time given the operational tempo, the significant procurement activities and the on-going transformation.

Another issue that comes to mind is the effort needed to change a culture from a workforce putting the public service first to one that puts the CF mission first. There is no doubt that such a change would not occur overnight. In fact, it may take several years and could only succeed if championed by a key DND figure who has the vision and mandate to implement change and who has the support of the DND/CF senior management.

Lastly, there can be a risk in going too far in terms of shared professional orientation which would occur at the expense of a *healthy* civilian military tension. There is a need for balanced operational focus, risk taking and effectiveness versus a need for transparency, probity, risk avoidance and efficiency. While this factor is important and must be considered, there is still much room for further integration based on the arguments brought forward in this paper.

6. How Far Can We Go?

It would be difficult to set an upper limit on the integration of civilians within the defence team that is quantifiable; however, given that there is room to manoeuvre and that there is a case for action, some notional targets may be established.

For example, given that there are approximately 140 contractors and CFPSA employees supporting the CF in Afghanistan, it is reasonable to assume that an equivalent number of DND public servants could be providing support. This would represent

approximately 0.6 percent of the workforce, which is comparable to the U.S. DoD during the 1991 Gulf War where the 5,000 defence civilians represented 0.75 percent of their defence civilian workforce. In fact, for the reasons discussed above, defence civilians should become the first option followed by contractors and CFPSA personnel. These individuals would provide significant support in areas such as contracting, logistics and maintenance, and would free up military resources for combatant functions. Most importantly, deployed defence civilians would obtain first-hand experience in operations, which would make them significantly more valuable to the organization as they return and continue their careers within the department. A similar logic may be used to establish defence civilian contributions for all CF missions.

To maximize CF mission effect given a fixed number of military personnel, the fewest reasonable number of non-combatant positions should be filled with uniformed personnel. While criteria can be used to make the determination of positions as defence civilian or military, concrete targets may also be used to prevent protectionism. These targets could be established based on current proportions within certain functional areas as compared to defence organizations such as those of the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. Raising the overall proportion of defence civilians from 27 to 30 percent - which is comparable to other defence institutions as shown in Table 2 – could potentially free up nearly 3,000 military members for operational duties.

In order to retain high-potential defence civilians who want to serve as part of the Defence Team, the number of opportunities for progression needs to be comparable to that of other departments. While more analysis would be required to set targets, it is

apparent that the number of executive positions should be increased to reflect that of other departments and the military community.

The notional targets discussed above would need to be validated and other ones could be developed. These hard targets are meant to demonstrate an approach to the integration of defence civilians within the defence team that would force change, as opposed to soft targets such as the establishment of professional development programs which, if implemented alone, may or may not lead to organizational or culture change - the two go hand in hand.

7. Conclusion

Despite the DND/CF clear intentions of integrating the defence civilian and military workforces, the dichotomy between the military community and defence civilian workforce continues to exist and there is still much work to be done to maximize the CF mission effect of the current Defence Team.

Today, the DND/CF employs a smaller proportion of defence civilians than its allies, provides fewer advancement opportunities for them than anywhere else in the public service, and does not maximize their contribution in non-combatant support roles. In addition, the culture gaps between defence civilians and the military communities continue to exist. The ultimate case study for integration lies in the current operations in Afghanistan – a defining mission for the future of the Canadian Forces – where uniformed members, contractor personnel and CFPSA employees form a cohesive team while defence civilians are marginalized on the sidelines. Strategically, this is a significant failure of integration.

While most defence civilians may associate themselves as members of the public service first, the reality in defence is that the mission and culture of the institution is clearly atypical. The military profession possesses a culture which needs to be understood and accepted by all since the achievement of the military mission is the reason for the organization's existence. As a result, much more needs to be done to indoctrinate defence civilians into the DND/CF environment in an attempt to minimize cultural gaps and align the defence civilian workforce with the military mandate of the department. This has been done in other military forces, such as in the U.S. Army with success and needs to be pursued in Canada.

The issue of integration must also be resolved at a larger scale than the Defence Team. The nature of today's wars and conflicts requires that a more holistic *whole-of-government* approach to human resource management. The concept of a National Security Professional program may be a solution, and the DND/CF can play a leadership role in further nurturing and advocating the concept to OGDs involved in the national security domain. In the end, however, development programs alone, such as the DLC or the National Security Professional, will not change cultures; hard integration targets also need to be established and implemented.

Any company or government organization having the privilege of employing over 23,000 highly educated and dedicated employees would see this strategic resource as being vital to meeting its mission. Unfortunately, much work remains to be done in the DND/CF to shift towards viewing the Regular and Reserve components, including the public service, as a single solution. Fundamentally, it is a matter of maximizing CF

mission effect in a complex national and international security environment through the most effective use of limited public resources.

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