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**CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE/COLLEGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES**  
**NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAMME - 9**

**THE EXTERNAL AND DEFENSE POLICY OF BRAZIL**

By/par

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## **Abstract**

This paper critically examines the impact of the new world order on the formulation of Brazilian policies, the importance and the necessity for developing countries to have support from other nations active on the world stage that can guarantee their claims and other aspirations related to sovereignty. This research paper examines the status of the global politics, the new world order at the beginning of the 21th century, Brazil and United Nations system of international security, the outlook for Brazil's trading relations, the internal security and defense, and the policies and strategies. Although the strategic and institutional foundations of the atual Brazilian policy, Brazil has been to contribute to global security. Thus, the paper concludes with ten chapters the importance of the strong defence policy of Brazil to maintain the South America stability and to contribute to greater global security.

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## 2. INTRODUCTION

If to be viewed by other peoples as a neutral nation, a nation that intends to live within its own confines and to seek peaceful coexistence through dialogue and diplomatic activity with the rest of the world, were sufficient guarantee against threats by more powerful countries, then history would not have unfolded in the way we learn it. The Indians of Brazil would still be the owners of their lands. The North American Indians would not have been summarily exterminated. The Africans would not have seen their continent parceled out among the European powers.

The world beyond Brazil's borders presents a sombre picture. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and many other nations are becoming daily more powerful. Developing nations suffer difficulties in improving their quality of life. Their efforts are for the most part stymied, or shaped by the will of the more powerful and they face countless restrictions that prevent or impede their development in various sectors.

In the past, the great conquering powers attempted to embrace the world and turn it into their own fiefdom, at the cost of many lives and the destruction of what man had built. Never did they succeed permanently. All empires have in time come to ruin. They returned to the hands of their former lords or they became mutant kingdoms built on the rubble left by the destruction. In our history, all the great nations, without exception, have had their fall. Despite the lessons that he should have learned, 21st-century man, man at the beginning of the third millennium of our era, the knowledge era, is still forgetful of his real history and launches himself on physical and psychological conquests that will in due course lead to his downfall and the suffering of his people.

Developing nations are destined to remain vassals of the great powers, the backyard of their lords. Fortunately, with its natural wealth and the capacities and inventiveness of its people, Brazil finds itself in an intermediate position. But in a world where capital sets the rules of the game, where Wall Street decides which parts of the world must be destabilized in order simply to rebalance its own country's economy, a nation that seeks to develop and that lacks deterrent powers commensurate with its needs will not be able to go it alone. It will need stronger partners that can support it in its claims, that can give it backing during negotiations with the great powers - but without losing its sovereignty through such support.

Against this background, those countries that do not have a modicum of deterrent power that would give them an active voice on the world stage and allow them to achieve and sustain their national objectives have a fundamental and indispensable need for international cooperation, primarily in the areas of security and defence.

## 3. GLOBAL POLITICS

"In international politics the great powers do what they want, while the small countries do what they must" <sup>1</sup>

These words of that eminent French thinker in effect summarize current world politics. The great nations act in accordance with their will and take the steps necessary to their policies for achieving and maintaining their national objectives. Developing

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1 - Raymond Aron

nations must simply bow to the demands and restrictions imposed by the great powers, under the mantle of the so-called international agencies.

It is interesting to note that the countries that have nuclear technology, regardless of how they intend to use it, manage somehow to get around the concerns of the great powers, displaying to the world their capability and their dignity and insisting on their rights, without concerning themselves over any retaliation (which never occurs anyway) or sanctions of any kind.

The centres of power have alternated countless times in our history.

In the days of Rome and Carthage disputes led to the total destruction of Carthage, and its domains were transferred to the noble Romans. In ancient times and in the Middle Ages, the centres of power - Rome and Constantinople - were smashed to pieces. Portugal and Spain also suffered their setbacks, despite having divided the world in two parts during the great age of navigation. In the modern era the French and English centres succumbed in their competition for hegemony in Europe. There followed a succession of collapses for the centres of power, ending with Germany in the contemporary era, in the Second World War. With victory against Germany assured in February 1945, the three great powers (the USA, Great Britain and Russia) met in the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam and decided there on a new geopolitical division of the world. Among the matters they dealt with were the occupation of Germany, the establishment of United Nations (in which China and France took part as well) for maintaining world peace and security, solutions for the postwar economy of Europe, and the fate of Poland. As a result, Germany was divided, Bessarabia was annexed, Russia established hegemony in Europe, and various treaties and pacts arose in the rest of the world.

After the World War II, the United States isolated itself on the other side of the Atlantic, and became the great world centre of power. At the same time as the European nations lost sovereignty over their colonies in Asia and Africa, communism spread in Europe. France and Great Britain, once the great centres from which political, philosophical, social and industrial trends spread, gradually lost their status on the world stage, yielding to the great power of the United States, with the beginning of ideological confrontations with the Soviet Union.

During the Cold War, developing nations found themselves facing two global giants that were striving for power, and they were in a sense obliged to align themselves with one or the other, in observance of the principle of geopolitical alignment. However, the alternative of the "Non-Aligned Movement" existed as well.

During the Cold War, the system of international forces was driven by the contest between two great centres, with complete economic, geopolitical and military correspondence. Consequently, there was complete parity in all fields of national power. The two superpowers' power of attraction was complete unto itself. The other nations were confined to obeying the principle of necessary geopolitical alignment, i.e. they had to choose which of the two superpowers they would follow. In fact, this principle created a setting of great strategic predictability, in the sense that national manoeuvres were easily foreseeable because of the limited bargaining power of the peripheral nations. The only international action those smaller nations could take was to switch sides.

During this time there was great development in policies and strategies, especially when the Western power sought by all means to counter the advance of communism into parts of the world that were considered strategic. France, Germany

and Japan began to emerge as new centres of power, giving an "impression of dilution" of the East-West confrontation. So fierce was the nuclear arms race between the two powers, principally in the 1970s and 80, that a series of agreements had to be struck to ensure the survival of mankind.

#### 4. THE NEW WORLD ORDER AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

After the terrorist attacks of September 11 on the World Trade Center in New York City, it has become increasingly clear that the world is no longer the same. These attacks started the global reaction unleashed by the United States. That reaction marked a fundamental shift in the evolution of the world order at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, where the agenda is coming to be dominated by unilateral acts of force and coercion at the expense of the collective security system enshrined in the United Nations at the end of the Second World War. The result has been a dangerous escalation of violence and instability throughout the international system.

To appreciate the seriousness of the change now underway in world politics, we must go back a little in time and follow the shifts in the external agenda of the US government after the collapse of the socialist power. Washington's triumphalism translated at the time into the proposal for a "New World Order" to replace the old bipolar order of the Cold War. This concept was incorporated as the cornerstone of US foreign policy by President George Bush Senior on the eve of the Gulf War in 1990. The basic idea was that the different multilateral forums of the UN system should become a nucleus that would oversee a new and more stable world order, leaving behind the tensions and antagonisms that marked the Cold War. From this perspective, the UN Security Council would become the central forum for negotiation and resolution of problems relating to peace and security in the international system, while the economic agencies of the United Nations would play the role of "promoters" and "guardians" of open markets. This seemed to be the most appropriate format for the exercise of the United States' post-Cold War hegemony, synchronized with the move to reconfigure the exercise of that hegemony via the neoliberal agenda. From the economic viewpoint, that agenda reflected the structural need of the United States to conquer and consolidate new export markets for its products and capital, as a result of the abrupt cutbacks in real wage levels sparked in its economy by the technological innovations of the so-called "knowledge era".

Throughout the 1990s, the US foreign agenda diverged progressively, in both words and practice, from the governing principles of the "New World Order" announced at the beginning of the decade. The United States came increasingly to impose its interests in different regions of the world unilaterally and by force. This trend could already be felt during the Clinton administration, as embodied in the attacks on Iraq in 1998 and on Yugoslavia in 1999, which were conducted entirely outside the framework of the UN Security Council. This escalation in turned reflected the growing problems that the US government was facing in imposing its foreign agenda by consensus, by "indirect" use of the structural mechanisms of power that it wielded in the world economy. This manner of exerting its hegemonic power encountered increasing resistance, as much from other capitalist blocs and powers such as the European Union and Japan as from the new regional centres of power within the old socialist camp and among the developing countries, including China, Russia and India. In response, US

hegemony became increasingly and more openly coercive.

The September 11 attacks provided the pretext for President George W. Bush to notch up this "preferred option" for unilateralism and for resort to a policy of open force and coercion. Taking advantage of the climate of hysteria and panic that took hold of American society after the attacks (the result of its sudden and dramatic discovery that broad technological and military superiority is no guarantee of invulnerability), the new Bush administration made the search for "security" the supreme objective and value of US domestic policy and foreign policy alike. This meant placing new emphasis on the mechanisms and instruments for direct domination by force in the international system, at the expense of the formerly predominant option of exerting hegemony through the "indirect" means of structural power. On the basis of this new approach, the "global war on terrorism" was transformed into the centrepiece of US foreign policy. The war pursued against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan set the profile of the new interventionist agenda. To the extent that the threat to US territorial security was attributed to a transnational terrorist force operating globally, the targets of US military retaliation were completely "territorialized", seeking to disrupt the power structures that were feeding terrorist activities. In other words, geopolitical objectives of territorial control by force continue to dictate the US security agenda. But these objectives are being pursued unilaterally, completely outside the security system enshrined in the UN. Consistent with the intimidating stance that "those who are not with us are against us" <sup>1</sup>, the building of international "coalitions" around US geopolitical objectives is producing ad hoc and selective partnerships, put together through bilateral negotiations according to the shifting priorities of its foreign agenda, at the expense of a multilateral system of collective security. At the same time, the objectives of the "global war on terrorism" are defined in a deliberately open and vague manner to allow the continued selection of new targets in the territories of the 60 countries that allegedly harbour "terrorist cells". Not surprising, therefore, is President Bush's insistence that this is a war with no time limits and one that is likely to be very prolonged.

Placed in full operation following the September 11 attacks, the new US strategic doctrine has reinforced the unilateralist thrust of its foreign policy, which had already become prevalent during the 1990s. Beyond its opposition to ratifying the International Criminal Court, the United States refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol on environmental protection, and withdrew from the UN Conference on Racism held in South Africa. As to the international arms-control systems, the Bush administration refused to endorse the Verification Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Landmines Protocol, and it also broke with the Antiballistic Missiles Treaty, the backbone of the agreements for containing the arms race that were signed with the former Soviet Union in the 1970s.

The post-9/11 period thus saw unprecedented use of the force and interference by the US government to isolate personalities deemed "not aligned" with his interests. The most obvious case was the dismissal of the Director of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Brazilian diplomat José Mauricio Bustani, for having opened a channel of negotiation for the peaceful entry of Iraq into the agency: this ran counter to the US interest in fostering a climate of war with that country, using the argument that Iraq had not adhered to the international system for the control and eradication of chemical weapons. Another case was that of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, who was forced under US pressure

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1 – George W. Bush



not to stand for reappointment.

In the post-9/11 era, the US administration has engaged in many acts of force in various regions of the world, in the name of the "global war on terrorism". The principal initiative was no doubt the war unleashed in Afghanistan, which was conducted entirely outside the UN Security Council and resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban regime. US action is characterized by the increasing resort to force and intimidation for the simultaneous conquest of varied geopolitical objectives, including in particular the disruption of centres of power potentially hostile to American interests in different regions of the world.

On the domestic front, the new interventionist agenda of the United States has translated into an impressive series of measures to protect its economy and its businesses, in flagrant contradiction with the official line of defending "free trade". Beyond the usual resort to heavy non-tariff barriers, the US administration has imposed extremely restrictive quotas for imports of steel and other products, as well as a billion-dollar package of subsidies for agriculture that runs completely counter to the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the midst of the negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the conditions under which Congress granted Trade Promotion Authority to the executive branch virtually blocked the opening of the US market in sectors where US businesses do not have clear competitive advantages. Fed by the new surge of militarism, government orders to the weapons industry are back to the levels of the Cold War years. *Special economic packages have injected tens of billions of dollars into the sectors that suffered the greatest economic damage from the attacks, in particular air transport and tourism. In the case of the airline companies, the package was accompanied by an expansion of US government shareholding interests in those companies, signalling a curious return to the "producer state" after two decades of liberal preaching*<sup>1</sup>. Even in the financial sphere, the Bush administration decided to establish stricter controls over capital flows in the name of combating terrorism and money laundering, thereby reversing previous policies for the aggressive promotion of financial liberalization.

The antiliberal trend in the economy coincided with a move to restrict civil rights and freedoms in US society, to an extent unprecedented since the days of McCarthyism. In the wake of the terrorist attacks, the US government approved a "New National Security Plan" that authorized violation of the secrecy of private correspondence and communications, and the prolonged imprisonment of foreign citizens, who could be held incommunicado without any compelling evidence of guilt. We should also note the resort to military commissions to try foreigners accused of terrorism, and the refusal to apply the terms of the Geneva conventions to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda combatants captured in Afghanistan and transferred to the Guantanamo military base in Cuba.

This balance sheet shows that open recourse to force and violence for achieving geopolitical objectives has become the guiding principle of US foreign policy since the September 11 attacks. On the international front, this has vitiated the UN Security Council as the legitimate multilateral form for settling problems of world peace and security, in favour of a policy of building ad hoc alliances through bilateral contacts and negotiations, according to US interests in each region. For all effective purposes, that shift means the dismantling of the multilateral system of collective security enshrined in the United Nations at the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, the multilateral economic agencies of the United Nations system, in particular the

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1 - GUIMARÃES, Samuel Pinheiro (org.). *Alca e Mercosul*

International Monetary Fund - IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization - WTO, continue to be manipulated to impose on dependent countries a liberal agenda of open markets, despite the fact that US domestic economic policy is becoming increasingly protectionist and interventionist. The international system, with this dominant agenda, is increasingly characterized by the combination of militarization and dependency.

Although it is clearly on the offensive around the world, the new US agenda is facing increasing difficulties in harmonizing the international system politically around US objectives. In addition to its traditional adversaries, we may point to the growing divorce between the foreign policies of the United States and the European Union on various issues and in various regions of the world, particularly the Middle East, and also the consolidation of regional poles among developing countries that are critical of the US agenda, such as Brazil, China, Iran and Indonesia. Even the broadening of partnerships with Russia and India, as a function of their particular agendas in the "war on terrorism", is facing growing opposition from public opinion and political circles in those two countries, as the antagonism between their medium and long-term geopolitical interests and those of United States becomes evident.

Given the escalation of violence and instability generated by the interventionist and unilateralist agenda, it is fitting that Brazil should assume a higher profile of leadership in defending peace, democracy, development and multilateralism in the international system. These political attitudes have a strong support in the Brazilian Constitution, in the Brazilian peaceful tradition and in the volition of the folks.

## 5. BRAZIL AND THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Brazil's foreign policy holds it essential to integrate the country into the international system. That means integration into the United Nations system, into the inter-American system created at the end of the last century, and into various other organizations. The League of Nations was a "trial run" for the creation of the central policy of the UN and the specialized agencies, including those in the economic and financial areas, there were set up in particular at the end of World War II.

Brazil's participation in multilateral agencies has been an essential component of its foreign policy over the years, regardless of changes in government, ideology or political orientation. Those agencies offer two fundamental values for a country with the characteristics and dimensions of Brazil. They are being confirmed and, indeed, they have been enshrined in the Constitution.

The first is the fact that the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) guarantee respect for the basic rules of international law. Prohibitions on the use of force or the threat of force are essential principles. This seems obvious, but it isn't. In the terms of those two charters, disputes must be settled through recognized peaceful means.

Secondly, all states must be respected as sovereign units with equal rights, despite their economic, political or other differences. And there is the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the State, as well as in its foreign relations.

It is clear that, with the passage of time, a whole series of agreements concluded by states in exercise of their sovereignty has been redefined in the context of

international cooperation, to afford greater protection to certain rights. A classic case is that of human rights, which evolved from adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to what we have today, where there are specific and in many cases intrusive mechanisms for special rapporteurs of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, among others.

Brazil admitted no outside interference on these points of national sovereignty until the mid-1980s, a time when democracy was being restored. Since then, we have come to accept the jurisdiction of international bodies and we were recently one of the first countries to issue a so-called standing invitation to the human rights oversight bodies of the UN in cases such as torture, forced disappearance and child abuse. The special rapporteurs are invited to come to Brazil at any time.

Participation in the multilateral system was intended, on one hand, to offer guarantees for action by the UN, the OAS and other multilateral bodies. I am referring to all the states that have gained international prestige and have respected the basic rules of international law already enshrined in their constitutions. If they were to lose credibility, these bodies, which defend the basic rules of international comity, would also lose credibility.

A country of continental dimensions like Brazil has some special thinking to do. Our power of influence could have led us to treat our smaller neighbours with disregard, yet over the last century Brazil has scrupulously respected the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force.

This approach dates back, in the case of diplomacy, to Baron Rio Branco, who was Minister of Foreign Relations between 1902 and 1912. His extraordinary career was capped essentially by the consolidation of peaceful and reliable relations with ten neighbouring countries. None of them presented any real threat, but Rio Branco understood that if Brazil was to promote peace and establish credentials for playing an international role it would first have to consolidate its borders. In a prominent place in the city of Montevideo, Uruguay, there is a monument commemorating the agreements promoted by Baron Rio Branco that defined once for all the division of waters in the Mirim Lagoon and the Jaguarão River. It is curious to see a Brazilian diplomat honoured in a neighbouring country. A much smaller country, Uruguay never posed a military threat to Brazil, but the Baron realized that it was important to maintain a relationship of trust with that country, and that this outstanding issue would have to be resolved or it would remain a source of constant friction.

Coming back to today, Brazil respects the rules of international law as enshrined in Article 4 of the Brazilian Constitution, not in order to defend ethical values superior to those of other countries but because of the intrinsic conviction of our people.

The principles of the UN and OAS charters are also enshrined in the Brazilian Constitution. To the extent that Brazil is seen as a country respectful of international law, Brazil has greater credentials to demand the same treatment from other countries. In complying with the rules of international agencies, seeking to perfect existing mechanisms and promoting negotiations on issues of common interest, we feel that we have the right to demand the same respect.

Another important point is that international agencies serve as forums for deliberation, negotiation and adoption of agreements, treaties, conventions and rules that affect the most varied areas. These include disarmament, the core of present-day international politics, and other matters such as health, communications, international trade, finance, human rights, environmental protection, and the promotion of

sustainable development.

The regulatory role is also essential in the United Nations context, the main body of the international system. Brazil has always accorded great importance to the UN Security Council, which has as its main responsibility the preservation of international peace and security. Therefore, in adopting the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, the member states decided to give that body extraordinary powers.

The Security Council has successively redefined its role, taking binding decisions. From the legal viewpoint, it is curious that the UN Charter has carefully laid down the powers of the Security Council in Chapter VII and at the same time has given it unlimited decision-making power when it comes to defining what constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Over the last decade, the Security Council has intervened in internal conflicts in various countries, for example East Timor, Haiti, Sudan, Liberia, Congo, and others. The Charter makes it clear that the Council's power to use coercive measures is restricted to cases in which one country is threatened or attacked by another.

One of the most obvious examples was in Somalia, which was not threatened by any other country but was immersed in a horrendous internal conflict. Human rights abuses were flagrant and intolerable. The CNN television network showed daily images of children being killed and gangs butchering each other. The situation in the end became absolutely intolerable. But in technical or legal terms, it would be very difficult to argue that Somalia posed a threat to international peace and security.

Without invoking Chapter VII, there could have been no legitimate military intervention, with or without the UN flag. As the situation was clearly appalling and demanded action by the international community, there was an understanding that international action was really necessary, and that this would justify a flexible interpretation of the terms of the Charter.

The collapse of the former Yugoslavia marked a new redefinition of the powers of the United Nations, in that intervention occurred, initially, in a member state, as Yugoslavia itself began to disintegrate. Slovenia and the other former republics of Yugoslavia were going their own way or proclaiming their independence. Some countries recognized the independence of the former republics, beginning with Slovenia, which was promptly recognized by two or three states of Western Europe, and this sparked a series of efforts to try to cast all these events in terms of an international conflict. In other words, when the central government of Yugoslavia took military action to prevent Slovenia's secession, as other countries had already recognized that republic's independence, this was termed an international conflict that threatened international peace and security.

In the case of Kosovo, military action was taken not in the United Nations, through the Security Council, but by NATO. It is important to note that throughout the 1990s the North Atlantic Treaty Organization produced successive reinterpretations of its founding treaty, through summit meetings and gatherings of Foreign Ministers. It also expanded the grounds for action by NATO, which was essentially a defensive military alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc, clearly conceived as a mechanism to counter the Warsaw Pact.

With the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet threat, NATO redesigned itself as a military alliance but with other functions. For example, in the case of Kosovo, where once again there was no military threat to any member of that Organization, the decision was taken in accordance with the new reinterpretations of NATO, which

resulted in military actions that we all watched [on TV], including attacks on Belgrade. That is also a source of concern, in the sense that a sequence of events of this kind broadens the powers of the main body responsible for international peace and security.

In the cases of the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, Brazil voiced misgivings, because it is not the place of the Security Council to create tribunals, under the terms of the United Nations Charter. Brazil held that the idea of international jurisdiction for specific areas or for more general areas should come from a treaty or from a conventions in which states, freely abdicating a portion of their sovereignty, agree to create a new criminal court to judge the most abhorrent crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity, which in fact occurred. Hence the importance of what was done with the Rome Statute, in the sense of opening the way to the prosecution of these most detestable crimes.

One of the guiding principles of our foreign policy, of Brazil's international positioning, and of our view of ourselves in the world, has been and must continue to be, especially at this time, to insist on participating in the world's major intergovernmental bodies in which the great political, economic, financial and commercial issues of legitimate interest to us are debated. A country like Brazil must participate and must make itself heard. This points to the need to democratize international relations.

Many other countries have made great efforts, since Brazil's return to democracy in the 1980s, in the direction of consolidating their democratic institutions and guaranteeing the domestic rule of law. We feel ourselves entitled to demand the democratization of international relations and international respect for the rules of law.

The democratization of international relations, the opening of decision-making bodies to participation by countries like Brazil, is essential for us. This point relates to various bodies, starting with the financial area, in which we supported the creation of the new G-20 mechanism, which embraces not only the G-7, the seven richest countries in the world, but also a group of 13 developing countries, including Brazil, and which refers specifically to the international financial agenda, with topics of great importance. Brazil helped in this new creation, and we have taken an active part in it.

On the other hand, in the case of the United Nations Security Council, Brazil was one of the first to propose expanding the number of its permanent and non-permanent members for developed and developing countries alike. Brazil has indicated its willingness and its keen interest in becoming one of the new permanent members of the Security Council. All continents have a representative member in the Security Council, except South America, and Brazil have a natural leadership in this Continent.

We are under no illusions that the issue will be decided overnight, because there are major interests involved and very delicate regional situations in some parts of the world. Brazil believes that it meets the conditions and it is prepared to assume the responsibilities of a permanent member of the Security Council. Until that happens we [will continue to] participate actively in the work of the United Nations and the Security Council.

Brazil has been a non-permanent member [on several occasions], with two-year mandates in 1988 and 1989, then again from 1993 to 1994 and from 1998 to 1999. Brazil has participated in the work of the Security Council more than just about any other non-permanent member. I believe we are currently tied with Japan. Brazil and Japan are two countries that are often cited as possible new permanent members of the Security Council. Germany trails slightly behind us in the number of terms it has served

as a non-permanent member.

Brazil has taken part in United Nations peacekeeping operations from their inception and it has recently given priority to operations in Portuguese-speaking countries. We fielded major contingents in Angola, in Mozambique and most recently in East Timor.

There are budgetary constraints in virtually all areas of Brazilian government activity, but I believe that Brazil's international profile and our interest in playing a positive and constructive role in the world would justify a special effort to find solutions to the budgetary problems in this area.

The political will to participate certainly exists. Brazil's politics is that. There are no differences on this point between the government, Congress, the different areas of administration, or the Armed Forces.

Brazil is concerned, in the current context, with the need to strengthen multilateral bodies, with the importance of that dimension of international relations. There are negative signals as to multilateralism, which seem to indicate a trend to resort to unilateral solutions. This is of concern in the political and commercial areas, among others. The signals are not always very clear and they are sometimes contradictory.

For example, the Conference of the World Trade Organization in Doha, in November 2001, produced some highly positive results. They were not ideal outcomes, but Brazil and other developing countries had a strong presence and participation there. Brazil was able to reach agreements with the European countries, the United States, Canada and others, and we succeeded in adopting a series of decisions in Doha that will strengthen this process greatly. The same happened with the Monterrey conference on finance for development.

As I have mentioned, there have been some negative signs of unilateral tendencies or the rejection of multilateral solutions. The case of the International Criminal Court has already been fully discussed. That area affects basic power, military power, security issues. It is therefore an extremely sensitive issue and throughout the years Brazil has taken a positive stance, one that was completely coherent, serious and credible.

In the early 1960s, in 1962 or 1963, Brazil was one of the first countries to propose what ultimately became the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, the NPT. Together with a small group of non-aligned countries, Brazil originally proposed the guidelines of what we thought would become a non-discriminatory NPT, one that would create a balance of rights and obligations both for the nuclear powers and for the non-nuclear powers.

In the case of Tlatelolco, the outcome was positive. Brazil associated ourselves with Tlatelolco process, although it only came into force for Brazil in 1994.

In the case of the NPT, we lost out in the negotiations. In the end, in 1968 a solution was imposed by the two co-chairs, in the USA and the USSR, and the text was finally adopted after a process of deliberations. We were very active, and we were one of the countries responsible, for example, for Article 6 of the NPT, which counterbalances all the other obligations and creates the obligation to promote nuclear disarmament.

In 1998 Brazil adhered to the NPT, after a long and very interesting debate in the National Congress, in which different parties took different positions. This was not a simple process, but it was extremely important in the sense of establishing dialogue

with the political class, with all the different parties. The Brazilian Congress adopted very clear positions on this issue, including approval of the Non-proliferation Treaty, but with a reservation, not an amendment, in the sense that Article 6, which speaks of nuclear disarmament, must be respected and that Brazil must work toward such compliance.

Beyond that, let me conclude by mentioning some other bodies that have to do with disarmament, in which there have been signs of unilateral tendencies. One was the question of chemical and biological weapons.

As everybody knows, we created the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the 1990s. OPCW seems to us an excellent example of a non-discriminatory and democratic organization that creates obligations for all and that is effective and serious in its process for verifying compliance with the obligations contained in the Convention.

The same thing was tried in the field of biological weapons but at the end of the negotiating process, or when it was far advanced, the United States delegation objected to creating an organization similar to OPCW, on the grounds that chemical weapons were of a different nature.

I might also mention the case of the CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Following the Moscow treaty between Kennedy and Khrushchev, which prohibited nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, discussion began on prohibiting underground explosions. Finally, in the 1990s, a conclusion was reached on this Treaty. It was approved by the great majority of countries, including Brazil, but in the United States, which is the greatest nuclear power and a country essential for the viability of the system created by the CTBT, there was total opposition: the American Senate voted to reject the CTBT, and the new US administration decided to reiterate that position and not to attempt to reopen the question.

Finally, in the case of the OPCW, at the instigation of the United States and a few other countries Ambassador José Mauricio Bustani relieved of his duties as Director General of the organization. We reacted to that move, affirming and reaffirming our defence of Ambassador Bustani and his stewardship, because it seemed to us that the accusations and criticisms against him were absolutely groundless. We said that objectively, as a member state, and we knew that many countries shared our position.

At the same time, in this attempt to remove a Director General elected and re-elected by a multilateral organization with great responsibility in the area of disarmament, we saw a factor that could affect the very credibility of the multilateral system for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Then there came the news that a new director had been elected for the organization, the Argentine diplomat Rogelio Pfrter. On that occasion, Brazil made a brief declaration, leaving it clear that it was not supporting one candidate or another, given the dubious circumstances in which the previous Director General had been dismissed

## 6. THE OUTLOOK FOR BRAZIL'S TRADING RELATIONS

The outlook for Brazil's trading relations with United States and the NAFTA countries must be examined on the basis of a few basic premises. First, Brazil's relations with United States of America have been extremely important, especially since 1945,

and will continue to be so. There can be no doubt whatever about that.

Second, international trade is a key point in the strategy of any Brazilian government, whether it be capitalist-neoliberal, Keynesian, reformist, socialist or communist. And more than international trade itself, it will be essential to generate a significant trade surplus.

Beyond that, we must recognize that foreign investments in Brazil, as well as Brazilian investments and the efforts of labourers and workers in general, and state action were extremely important in transforming an agrarian economy that was archaic even in 1929 into one of the world's major economic powers, today ranked number eight

For those who may not have noticed, Brazil today produces more cars than Italy or England. It is one of the few countries that produce and export aircraft. At the same time, it is a major agricultural exporter. Its trade is diversified in terms of both customers and suppliers.

Foreign investments were, are and will continue to be extremely important for any Brazilian strategy for economic development. Taking these premises, we can analyze more closely the outlook for Brazil's relations with the United States and the NAFTA countries.

The outlook for Brazil's relations with the United States will depend, on one hand, on the American strategy on the international scene, of which the US strategy relating to Brazil is a part. The FTAA, for example, is not an isolated American initiative. It is part of a general foreign policy strategy of today's greatest economic, technological, military, scientific, ideological and political power.

Half of the patents registered every year are filed by American companies. American military capacity is greater than that of the next nine powers combined. Consequently, the United States is the dynamic economic, technological and scientific centre of the world.

On the other hand, we are in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and we have witnessed the end of utopias, or at least of those utopias that appeared after 1989. They held out the promise of indefinite progress on a footing of equality for all countries and all social classes; or extraordinary technological progress, the rule of law in international relations, the end of arbitrary actions, the end of violence, fraternal cooperation among states. Yet those Utopias never came to be and today they have disappeared in a whirlpool of violence, crisis and arbitrariness, increasing in the post-Soviet era.

Today's extraordinary international economical and political instability flows essentially from the marginalization of states on the periphery, that is to say the increasing gap in economic, technological, military and scientific power between states, and the attempt to preserve that situation. Powerful states are becoming increasingly powerful and more distant from the others. There is no indication that the per capita income gap is going to diminish; on the contrary, with rare exceptions the periphery is caught in an overwhelming spiral of impoverishment.

We cannot hardly characterize the situation in South America as being of no concern if we look at the situation in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, or Uruguay, countries that have been in crisis for four or five years; or Argentina, in a process of social, political and economic disintegration; or the serious situation in Brazil. But these situations of conflict, of disintegration, of social marginalization, of rising violence are repeated in other continents. In Europe itself, there has been a resurgence of right-wing movements, of xenophobia against immigrants and foreigners



and their descendents. In some countries there has even been a degree of rejection and discrimination against nationals, as we see in Western Germany against those from the East, and in Northern Italy against those from South.

This marginalization of countries and sectors within society flows in part from the characteristics of technological progress which, generally speaking, does not absorb labour, and even sheds it because of economic transformations in the productive process. The proof of this is the unemployment that exists both in highly developed countries and in countries of the periphery, where it is even more severe because of the growing labour force. And on the other hand, it flows from the adoption of aggressive and recession-inducing neoliberal policies.

In Brazil, the population is growing by 2.4 million people every year, and the total labour force is rising by 1.5 million. To keep the population employed we would have to generate 1.5 million new jobs every year and, in addition, we would have to employ those from the cohorts of previous years who are now unemployed or underemployed.

The informal economy, violence and the spread of slums around the cities are generating enormous instability. And no one can imagine how these circumstances are going to be reversed in the next three years. It is unlikely to happen in Brazil or in the other countries similarly affected, because to overcome this situation is an enormously difficult and complex task that involves a growing workforce and the characteristics of the new technologies, as well as the characteristics of transnational and financial capitalism.

Argentina offers a good example. Until about two years ago it was being held up to society, to business, to the Brazilian government and to the world as the example of a successful and well-run state and economy. That country's society was on the point of joining the first world, it was a favoured ally of NATO, and so on. Today, it is in a profound crisis, and transnational and financial capitalism and the international financial agencies are standing by while the Argentine situation deteriorates and they are even blaming the Argentines for their own misfortune.

As to arbitrariness in international relations, i.e. the flouting of the rules of international law or simply disdain on the part of the principal international power, this is unfortunately a fact: it is “no” to the International Criminal Court, “no” to ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and “yes” to the destabilizing missile shield program. This situation is extremely serious, given the premises of the international collective security system of the United Nations and the system of international law.

In the face of this international situation, what we also find is that, while economic, technological, military and political power at the centre of the system is growing, the population is declining in most of the countries that comprise that centre, such as Germany, Italy, and Spain, with the exception of United States, while around the periphery demographic growth continues.

How to maintain the rules of the international system that until now have clearly privileged the countries that are at its centre? That structure of international power was certainly not unfavourable to the countries that are at the centre of the system. That is obvious. It is enough to look at the increase in their per capita income, or their social and technological development. But we cannot say the same for the countries of the periphery.

There are two extremely important international trends. One is the strategy to consolidate the privileges of the centre of the system. What is that strategy? First, it

uses ideological persuasion to try to convince people that the system is the best in the world and the best of all systems or even, we are told, the only possible one. This then becomes the ideological conviction that prevails in various sectors of countries of the centre and of the periphery. Second, there is the use of intimidation, including force, against those who are critical and sceptical. This unleashes processes of intimidation at the ideological level, threats of the use of force, for example, and the actual use of military force

There is also the process of standardizing domestic policies and rules, something new that began with the Uruguay Round in the GATT, i.e. setting parameters for what is valid in terms of domestic policies, in general economic policies but political ones too.

Beyond that, there is in this process the question of disarming the periphery, while keeping the centre of the system armed, and increasingly so. The powerful states claim the legal right to develop new weapons or to perfect existing systems. These are highly sophisticated armaments that can be developed by countries that have this privilege, while the periphery is urged to renounce even conventional forces. Faced with countries that are steadily growing and are increasingly unstable, with ever more demanding populations, any strategist will see it as a wise move to disarm them as far as possible both in terms of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional weapons - and all of this, naturally, under the ideological pretext of defending the welfare of humanity.

Thus there are countries that, because they have "superior" civilizations, should have the right to keep certain weapons, because they are responsible countries, while the countries of the periphery, such as Brazil, do not have that right because we are an unworthy and irresponsible society, because we would threaten international stability with our rash initiatives, and because we are always threatening to use force. We would be a very dangerous country. So, we cannot have sophisticated weapons.

On the other hand, in this process of generating rules that define what countries can do internally, there is a growing tendency to have countries managed by international agencies. Those agencies set themselves up in countries and virtually run things, directly or perhaps through intermediaries, as has been suggested by a former chief economist of the IDB and others. In the recent past, teams of economists have moved into Argentina to determine how the economy should be run, since, as they say in their interviews, "those Argentines can't manage themselves". This means that technicians of a new "Colonial Service", today a real colonial service of the IMF and other entities, can manage those economies that are, according to them, failing or on the verge of collapse.

However, along with the consolidation of privilege there is a second international trend at work, towards a multipolar world. There are three great poles. The first is the United States, and the second is the European Union, which is becoming a mega-state that is expanding its territory and has a new international reserve currency, and wields growing influence in international agencies.

After the USA and Europe there is China, whose output has been growing by more than 10% a year in recent decades. China has become a great international exporter, a nuclear and military power, and it must certainly be considered as a new and powerful pole of world power.

These are the three great poles of the multipolar system that is now taking shape. There are other, lesser poles that are also important. Japan, the world's second-

largest economic power, could even get together with China and overcome the resentments left by the Second World War. There is nothing to make such a rapprochement a historical impossibility, and indeed it would form an extraordinary pole comprising not only those two countries but eventually other Asian countries that have a significant overseas Chinese population. India could be another power, and South America could become one too, if it were to organize itself economically under the non-hegemonic leadership of Brazil.

Within this future and probable multipolar context, the United States, the leading economic, political, technological and military power of the world, has changed its strategy. Whereas it formerly exercised its power through a "hegemonic condominium" that allowed for a degree of power-sharing with other states in the Security Council, in the International Monetary Fund, in NATO and in other bodies, it has switched to a strategy marked by unipolar and arbitrary ambitions, and one that is highly destabilizing for the world system.

In choosing a diffuse enemy, terrorism, to replace communism, the USA resolved that any strategy against that enemy would be valid, and it even reversed traditional American policies on civil rights, through new legislation that allows individuals to be kept in prison without access to a lawyer or without knowing the reason for their imprisonment or how long they will be held without trial.

Preventive war is in fact a novelty with extraordinary consequences. This strategy of preventive war is extremely serious from a political viewpoint and from that of international law and it is profoundly destabilizing to the world system, bringing instability to all borders and all societies.

The switch from multilateral management through an international system that is universally accepted, to a unilateral policy destabilizes and greatly upsets not only the countries and powers at the centre of the system, but also the countries that may find themselves the victims of political decisions taken unilaterally or by a small cohort: they will not be able to rely on the multilateral rules that were hitherto reasonably respected.

With the reorientation of American strategy, there is a pressing question of the "image" of the centre of the system. In this international system in which the great powers wield enormous power and which is characterized by concentration and asymmetry, these great powers depend for the system's preservation, in part, on projecting a highly positive "image" of the centre that will win the approval of the peripheral elites. What is the image of the centre traditionally disseminated in the periphery? In the first place, it is democratic. But the current state of politics at the system's centre has tarnished that image, primarily since the shenanigans in Florida, which are now surfacing again, and the growing restrictions on civil rights and freedoms reflecting the influence of conservative, fundamentalist Christian groups and reactionaries over the Republican Party and the government.

The democratic "image" of the system's centre has been profoundly shaken, and this has caused problems for the elites in all peripheral countries in defending their position of subordination in that system.

In the second place, there is the "image" of business efficiency and honesty in the centre. Recent years have witnessed a real ideological offensive to persuade countries of the periphery that their companies, unions and elites are inefficient and corrupt, while at the centre of the system there is a highly efficient and honest business class that should be imitated as a model. On a visit to Brazil, the chief US trade

negotiator - a senior government official - created quite a stir by making a public statement about systemic corruption in Brazil.

Suddenly, we discovered something extraordinary: a portion of the much-vaunted American progress of recent years was merely a speculative and fraudulent bubble. Hundreds of firms, including some of the biggest energy companies and the largest telecommunications company, had been cooking their books with the connivance of the world's greatest auditors and brokers. Millions of American investors had been cheated. The scheme used was the same as the one used in the speculative bubbles of the past, such as with the railways, the Mississippi and the tulip mania. There is a wave of technological innovations, which is being led now by information technology: new businesses are being created, amazing news stories circulate about their earning potential, and their balance sheets are falsified to increase their profits; share prices rise, imprudent individuals and investment funds buy up the shares; executives receive shares and sell them at the top of the market, they award themselves high salaries. All of which looks very much like what happened in England in 1690, when one of the first modern speculative bubbles burst. There is nothing new under the sun - it is just that the dimensions are unprecedented.

The fact is that many states have problems of every kind, including corruption. Citizens we have the duty to prevent, combat and denounce them, and demand severe punishment for the perpetrators. What we cannot accept is disrespect and the generalized international treatment of Brazil as a country that is corrupt or incapable of managing itself, for all countries have serious problems and each country needs to look to its own internal problems. Respect is a two-way street: to be respected one must show respect.

Brazil is facing a situation of great world instability, and arbitrariness, of economic stagnation and a broad strategic offensive of the United States in South America, which includes the FTAA and the military operation to combat the narco-terrorists in Colombia.

Latin America is of the greatest importance for US foreign policy, in particular because of the situation in the Caribbean and Central America in relation to the linkages between the two coasts of the United States through the Panama Canal and the vital need to maintain control of that region. This importance helps to explain the Americans' persistent irritation with Cuba, because it was there that long-established American hegemony was challenged for the first time.

The 23 states of Central America and the Caribbean, have less than 1% of the GDP of the Western Hemisphere. In other words they have no great economic significance. The importance of these countries is small from the economic or political viewpoint, and several of them are already associated with the United States through preferential treaties. The same is true with the Andean countries, where there are trading schemes to support the war on drugs. From the economic viewpoint, South America is the most important area.

The US strategy with respect to South America has an economic aspect, a military aspect, and a political-ideological aspect.

The American military strategy of recent years sought to disarm the region and establish military bases in one of the only continents of the world where there was no permanent American base. Now there is a US base in Ecuador, the Manta base, and there may soon be more in other locations. With this strategy, the USA intends to install personnel, equipment and supplies that will be ready and available whenever rapid

intervention is needed.

From the economic viewpoint, all the countries of South America have recently pursued similar economic policies, flowing from the renegotiation of debts, structural adjustment agreements, negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and so on. These policies assumed that inflation and economic stagnation were the result of the high degree of state intervention in the economy, and that to address the situation would require swift and radical privatization. Second, it assumed that excessive government regulation was preventing market forces from functioning properly. In the case of Brazil's new energy policy, deregulation led to the imposition of a special tax, the "*imposto do apagão*", to prevent likely future blackouts, and the Brazilian energy crisis persists. Finally, deregulation led to higher service charges, investment shortages, excessive profit remittances, and the harsh indexing of public utility rates to the dollar. The third assumption was that the national economies in South America were true "autarkies" and that they should therefore be brought promptly and without negotiations into the international economy in order to modernize them.

An ideological conviction took root in South American societies that allowed implementation of programs for accelerated unilateral trade liberalization, which was considered an outstanding success at the time, and for the liberalization, again unilateral, of capital movements, which favoured the adoption of schemes such as the CC-5 (a system for sending funds abroad) in Brazil, where fraudulent foreign-exchange transfers began to occur.

These neoliberal policies were applied in South American countries with only minor differences: privatization, deregulation, freer trade, tariff reduction, the transplanting of institutional models for regulatory agencies, the use of arbitration based on experience under Anglo-Saxon law. However, those policies failed spectacularly in nearly all countries of South America, as some economists, governments and institutions are beginning to recognize today. Whether in Uruguay or in Argentina, the very model of the policy, or that in Peru or in Bolivia as proof of success. Instead, there was a spectacular failure, and this led to an enormous concentration of incomes, the profound denationalization of economies, high unemployment, the reversion of those economies to previous stages of development, the disruption of productive chains and the collapse of social institutions.

Today, more and more politicians and economists in Brazil insist on the need for a proactive trade policy and the need to generate a substantial surplus. According to them, we must have competitive import substitution programs. If it were not necessary to make an effort at substitution, this would happen naturally, and production would be competitive; if it is necessary to pursue a substitution program it is because production is not competitive and that is natural enough in an underdeveloped country, or when there are oligopolistic markets. It is natural that companies and industries in an underdeveloped country will not be generally competitive with those of developed countries.

External assistance schemes for anchoring the currency and dealing with external strangulation are multiplying. So in the face of this failure, from the United States' viewpoint, it became essential to shore up those economic policies and to assure the opening of these economies to American firms, goods and capital.

When it is said that over a period of 10 years tariffs will be reduced to zero for most trade, i.e. for 85%, this means locking in a radical opening for trade in goods. The FTAA negotiations imply much greater liberalization, depending on the sectors that

would be excluded, in the services area. The United States, for example, is demanding the opening of certain strategic sectors such as financial services for the free establishment of banks, access to deposits from the public, and so on, which would mean reinforcing a policy of deregulation that is already in practice.

When the FTAA negotiations seek to establish rules that are even more favourable to foreign capital than those of the WTO at the very time when many are beginning to wonder how to reverse what was mistakenly negotiated the past, i.e. no discipline, total freedom for foreign capital, it means that they are trying to consolidate the present situation in which the Brazilian government has abdicated the right to discipline foreign capital so that it will contribute more effectively to sustained and stable industrial development. The FTAA seeks to consolidate those failed neoliberal programs, to guarantee US economic and political influence in the region, to form a single economic territory in the Americas. The FTAA negotiations will be possible if all states accept to finish all privileges and protections.

Yet instead of a broad regional agreement, there could be a multiplication of bilateral agreements between the United States, on one hand, and each South American country on the other: this would seem to be the preferred, although not the declared, strategy of United States. If sector-specific agreements are also going to be negotiated, this would consummate the initial objective of the US strategy in the FTAA. The United States is negotiating bilaterally for example with Chile, and it could go on to negotiate with other South American countries, and even with MERCOSUR. They would work out a structure of bilateral agreements, with the USA at the centre, and at the same time they would preserve the central objective of the American economic strategy, which is to open third markets while retaining the possibility of protecting those sectors of the US economy that will become less competitive, until they can recover their competitiveness. The Trade Promotion Authority provides significant funds for reorganizing the sectors that would be affected by tariff cuts, while Brazilian legislation and that of other countries does not provide any funding to compensate the sectors that would be dislocated by tariff reductions and by sharper competition from multinationals. The technological, organizational and financial capacity of the big US multinationals is much greater than that of Brazilian companies, even in those sectors where our companies can be competitive today, such as the steel industry. There is now an investment program for the recovery of US steel mills that were unable to cope with Brazilian competition in the past and that sought and won protection from their government. When current barriers are lifted in the future, perhaps those companies will have become competitive again, as happened in the US textile industry in the past. The capacity for industrial recovery and reorganization in the United States is very great, because of the huge investments in technology and the volumes of credit available to American firms.

In a single economic territory where the biggest companies of all time, the American mega-multinationals, are competing with Brazilian firms (and not foreign firms established in Brazil) what do you think will happen with companies that, on average, have such a different and lower degree of efficiency? Brazil has companies that are efficient, yet even those companies can be absorbed by mega-multinationals, as happened with the national steel company, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional. Being efficient is no guarantee of survival. If all Brazilian-owned businesses were taken over by foreign firms, we would have three problems. First, we would have to generate dollars to finance or remit the profits of the companies that would be denationalized.

Second, the growth of Brazilian exports would become dependent on the global planning of multinational firms. And third, the level of capital accumulation would decline.

In the international trade area, who is going to win out in the US market itself? Will it be the Brazilian companies? Will American subsidiaries in Brazil go head-to-head against their parent companies in the US market? This is extremely unlikely, and even absurd. In any case, the American expectation is that the United States will enjoy a significant surplus from the FTAA: that is its objective, and that is why it is insisting on the project. The FTAA is not intended to increase the US trade deficit, which is already gigantic, and this is certainly not the expectation of the US government and US mega-firms.

In any free trade area, investments tend to be concentrated in its most dynamic region.

The domestic dispute among the states to receive new factories in Brazil can be seen as an attempt to reverse this "natural" situation, through the incentives granted by various states to attract foreign firms that would normally head for the more developed areas of the country. Now the most developed areas of the American hemisphere, where 80% of the region's GDP is concentrated, is the United States. This means that foreign investors, including those from other countries, who want to set up in the single economic territory established by the FTAA will tend to locate in the United States. American investments already in Brazil could return home as a consequence of the FTAA, for one simple reason: investment in the more advanced technologies in Brazil is generally protected by tariff barriers. This is the case, for example, with the automobile industry, which has a 35% tariff. Once that tariff is eliminated, not only will imports increase, as has happened in the recent past, but those companies might decide to leave Brazil and return home. Similar repatriation movements could occur in other sectors, especially those where there are significant economies of scale and where transport costs for the final product are low.

Some analysts will argue, on the other hand, that firms could come to Brazil to take advantage of cheaper labour and to export from Brazil to the United States. However, they would seem to be forgetting that in order to take advantage of lower wages, companies in industries where labour is a significant portion of the final cost could set up in Mexico or in Central America, and export from there to the United States and to the rest of the hemisphere, with transport costs that are much lower than those from Brazil to the United States. Indeed this is already happening. Thus it is hard to imagine that a company would prefer to establish itself in Brazil to export to the US market.

But it is not the imbalance in investment and the imbalance in trade that are the most important questions in the FTAA. The main problem with this type of agreement, if the negotiations should ever be wrapped up (and they may not be: the partners may conclude that the drawbacks of the FTAA are too great) and if free trade is established between Brazil and the world's greatest economic power, is that Brazil's economic development needs demand activist government policies, i.e. policies to overcome social and regional disparities, inequalities of income and wealth, and unemployment, and to incorporate 50 million people into the country's society and market.

The challenge for Brazilian society is to incorporate this mass of people into the productive and political system, failing which we will face a gigantic and growing source of instability and insecurity. It is necessary to start a big educational program for

the poor people with a strong persuading policy to attend a natality control with a smart family planning.

Another very urgent challenge has to do with external vulnerabilities. Brazil's society and its economy must raise about \$50 million every year to cover foreign payments, in a world situation of crisis, of political and military instability, and of stagnating or slowing economic activity.

Some people have thought that worldwide economic expansion and the process of globalization would be permanent and postponing. But this idea runs counter to all our knowledge and historical experience of economic cycles. It assumes that there would be no more economic cycles and that we would now have permanent growth in the new international economy and enormous availability of capital, which would be ready to come to Brazil and modernize the country by transforming it into an export platform. Nothing like this has happened at the scale and in the time necessary.

In the face of this great international crisis and instability how can we resolve the problem of external vulnerability? Brazilian companies have great difficulties in rolling over their dollar debts, and the State has had to turn to the IMF to raise \$30 billion. These are certainly not indicators of success and external tranquility.

Recognizing that with the FTAA the State would no longer be able to pursue a proactive trade policy, what single account in Brazil's balance of payments could generate a healthy surplus in the short term? The current surplus is not healthy, because it results from a fall in both exports and imports, with the latter having declined further. A healthy surplus is one where exports and imports both rise, but the first more than the second. With the FTAA, how could we generate this type of surplus, at the scale and within the time necessary?

Brazil's vulnerability is not a problem that can be resolved in two, three or four years. And indeed it could get even worse. Reducing external vulnerability and eventually eliminating it is a long-term undertaking. It is a very complex task, given the situation of Brazil's physical and social infrastructure and its savings and credit.

It is essential, then, that the government be able to conduct policies to promote competitive substitution of imports, i.e. to maintain tariffs. Not huge tariffs, but adequate tariffs. Not the capital controls, but by these adequate tariffs to be able to discipline foreign capital, as they have done in China, which is the most successful country after the United States in attracting capital, a country with a communist regime, an adversary of the United States over Taiwan, but one that attracts multinational investments.

Therefore, to say that we must have a policy that is cooperative (and even submissive) vis-à-vis the United States in order to attract capital is profoundly mistaken. The idea that we must deregulate everything to attract investment does not make sense. China is ample proof that this is not a realistic interpretation of the interests and objectives of multinational firms.

The Brazilian government will need to have policies for employment, technological policies, policies for channelling investment and overcoming external vulnerabilities, and it will have to generate a significant trade surplus, or else disparities will worsen, and capital will become even more wary of Brazil.

In the end, the rules that the FTAA might lay down, eliminating all tariffs, liberalizing trade in services and capital movements etc., will make it impossible for the Brazilian government to design and implement the necessary policies for dealing effectively with these challenges. There would still be some room for action in the area



of credit, but then suppose that Chapter XI of NAFTA were reproduced in the FTAA, which is very likely: would the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) be able to articulate credit policies and pursue an industrial policy? I don't think so.

So the instruments of industrial and trade policy, and even technology policy, would cease to exist in practice, and would be deemed illegal under the FTAA. The State would no longer have them in its arsenal. Social disparities would tend to increase, if only because of the growth of population and the characteristics of technological processes left to the mercy of market forces; unemployment would rise, underemployment would persist, and social exclusion and political instability would swiftly worsen.

Brazilian society is not just any society. Brazil is not a small country. If we make a list of the 10 biggest countries in terms of territory, and another list of the 10 biggest countries in terms of population, and a third list of the 10 biggest countries in terms of GDP, only three countries figure on all three lists: those are the United States, China, and Brazil. This means that the possibility of Brazil's transforming itself within a reasonable period of time into a power as important as France or England is absolutely compatible with the dimensions of Brazilian society.

There is the need and the duty to develop this potential and to create an internal market that will absorb this enormous group of people now marginalized from production and public life. And this demands that the State be able to guarantee the infrastructure for the economic system, energy, communications, roads and ports, sanitation, in a supplementary and sure way, when private enterprise fails to make the needed investments. Is Brazil to find itself once again without energy because it was suddenly decided that there was no profit in investing in energy? Will Brazilians continue to live without basic sanitation? The State has the absolute and inescapable obligation to guarantee the expansion and functioning of physical and social infrastructure.

I think this is the key question: an FTAA treaty will eliminate the Brazilian State's possibility of wielding the economic policy instruments needed to address the challenges that characterize Brazilian society, and which if not addressed will worsen social disparities and external vulnerabilities, and frustrate the country's potential.

The FTAA will constrain and reduce sovereignty, society's capacity to define its future and to use economic and social policy instruments to construct that future. As to trade, the question of the FTAA is not only one of expanding exports, but the fact that the FTAA instruments make it impossible to address the challenges that we face in international trade, namely to expand and diversify products and markets, to add value, and to generate a surplus. Rejecting the FTAA does not mean that we should not continue to have close economic relations with the United States, with Canada, with Mexico, or with the European Union. But we cannot create a situation in which Brazil is unable to use the economic policy instruments needed to accelerate its economic and social development.

The big challenge today is how to broaden our relations with the United States, Canada, Mexico and the countries of South America without depriving the Brazilian State of the means necessary to pursue its strategy for economic, social and political development. It will be hard to construct a true and lasting democracy in Brazil with growing levels of social disparity and with the accentuated risks inherent in its current external vulnerability. Brazil can survive as a formal democracy, but it will not become a true democracy in which everyone participates, with a more prosperous and just

society, unless there is a national plan for sovereign development.

Politically, Brazil cannot agree to be incorporated into a larger economic territory under US hegemony, and to renounce the historic possibility of building a South American pole as part of the multipolar world system that is gradually emerging, and of contributing thereby to a fairer and more peaceful world system in which its government can better defend and promote the specific long-term interests of the Brazilian people as a whole, and not those of one or another given sector.

## 7. INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE

Security is a necessity, an aspiration, and an inalienable right of human beings.

“Among the obligations and responsibilities of the state is that of assuring security for all, and ensuring that everyone can and must fulfill the duties and functions necessary to maintain that condition. One of the most difficult problems facing the leaders of any nation is to strike a proper balance in the State's monopoly over the legitimate use of force, recognizing that the citizens have inalienable rights, on one hand, and are subordinate to the rule of law, on the other.

Security issues embrace both the so-called antagonistic universe, in which we find attitudes contrary to efforts to achieve and preserve national objectives, and the non-antagonistic universe.

Anything that can threaten the tranquility of individuals or society, obstruct or impede protection of people's rights, sow fear, or generate conflicts will constitute so-called "grounds for insecurity".

Such grounds can take various forms. Sometimes they result from the shortage of resources needed to satisfy basic human needs. They can also arise from the failure to accommodate the demands of social sectors seeking various incentives, and from political and psychosocial distortions that prevent segments of society from participating in the global political process and in cultural evolution. These grounds for insecurity can even result from threats to sovereignty, to the nation's economic or territorial integrity. They sometimes take fairly subtle forms, for example those arising from the unwarranted intrusion of external cultures that conflict with the national cultural identity.

Security is the feeling of guarantee that is necessary and indispensable to a society and to each of its members, against threats of any kind.

The nation's power can be strengthened through support established with other centres of power, in a relationship that seeks to eliminate points of friction and to achieve and preserve common objectives.”<sup>1</sup>

Currently, international pressures are flowing from the disappearance of economic frontiers, the establishment of military hegemony by a single power, the technological domination exercised by the more developed countries, and the domination of international telecommunications. Together with this "new world order", concepts such as limited sovereignty in areas of interest to the first world, "the duty of interference" and "the right of intervention", are frustrating the notion of sovereignty for less-developed countries. In this respect, the drug trafficking issue may be considered as a pretext for intervention, and consequently a threat to the sovereignty of countries of the Amazon basin.

The seriousness or value of the threat will depend on the importance (primarily

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1 - LAMAZIÈRE, Georges - Cooperação Político-Militar na América do Sul - Paris - França, 28/10/2000

economic) that the region has for the claimant nation. In this respect, Brazil has countless reasons that could be invoked for other states as pretexts for exercising the "duty of interference" and the "right of intervention". These include its immense Amazon forest with its deposits of rare minerals

## 8. HEMISPHERIC SECURITY AND DEFENSE

“War is an act of policy to use violence to impose one’s will upon another.”<sup>1</sup> It’s provoked by a desired or frustrated political ambition, which unleashes passions that are frequently uncontrolled.

At the beginning of the 1990s the world heaved a sigh of relief at the collapse of the Soviet Union, marking the end of the Cold War. The emergence of a single world power, calling itself democratic, seemed to herald a new era of peace, and humanity rejoiced in this. The dream was interrupted upon the arrival in office of the new US president, George W. Bush, and became instead a nightmare for many countries when the new boss decided to settle some old accounts (possibly dating from the time when his father was president) with Saddam Hussein. In reality, this was nothing more than a cynical pretext to establish control over Iraq's oil wealth to feed the great machine that the USA had become.

In order to carry out his personal ambition, he silenced the voice of an important international agency, the United Nations, which had taken a stance against the attack. It is interesting to note that the UN, of which the USA is the master orchestrator, was created to maintain peace and equilibrium in the world. Until then, it was the most important forum for dealing with issues among states.

The new challenges to hemispheric security are diverse in nature and multidimensional in scope. This declaration calls for a profound transformation of the issue: hemispheric security. For the first time, states have come to perceive the concepts of security and defence in terms of multidimensional threats to our societies, such as terrorism, drugs and related crimes, poverty, social exclusion, and human rights violations.

To understanding the context of hemispheric security requires a specific analysis, first of the national and/or subregional reality, and in particular the nature of existing challenges at those two levels. Next, to project them onto the hemispheric context so as to establish parameters to identify the possible effects, to make forecasts and to decide the measures that will be taken, before considering them as real threats.

On the other hand, so far there is no proposal on the agendas of the Human Rights Commission, the OAS Committee on Security and the Inter-American Defence Board calling for joint work with the countries involved for protecting human rights, or for preventing any strategies that their Armed Forces might adopt for dealing with the new concepts of hemispheric security. Brazil is determined to include these subjects in the agenda of the Organization of American States, and to include in the agenda discussions to increase the hemispheric security.

Brazil has made every effort to isolate our region from the main axes of world tensions and in this way to avoid possible pretexts for interference by powers from beyond the region; whether through the proposal to construct areas reserved for peace, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear devices; whether through the construction of political cooperation forums such as the “Contadora” or the Rio Group; or through repeated demonstrations of confidence and credibility to its neighbours. The region now faces unexpected vulnerabilities in light of the growing pre-eminence of problems of the so-called "New Security Agenda" after the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>.

The hypotheses capable of justifying international intervention, unilateral or

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1 – CLAUSEWITZ, Karl Von – On War - 1832

multilateral, such as human rights, ethnic minorities, sensitive technologies, democracy and the environment are superseded by one concrete issue in the region: the narcotics business, which has established a monopoly over violence and now controls territory in a country of the area, Colombia. Brazil in South America Continent have a responsibility to protect the Democracy, the Human Rights, the ethnic minorities, and others.

The hemispheric space can be divided into two subregions in both geo-economics and geo-strategic terms. The first, which is highly integrated economically and possesses high technology, is the more important from the viewpoint of global security. It comprises the USA, Canada, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and the northern tier of South America, including in particular Colombia. The second consists of the countries of the Southern Cone. Between these two there is a transition zone, consisting of some Andean countries that vacillate between the two groups. During the Fourth Conference of Ministers of Defence of the Americas held in Manaus, Brazil, in October 2000, Brazil stressed the difficulty of imagining a single, hemispheric vision of security for the entire American continent, noting that the geographic, political, economic, social and cultural realities of the three Americas are distinct, and that it is hard to take a single hemispheric view of security applicable to those three land masses.

In the Southern Cone, debate over defence and political-military cooperation has proceeded at a satisfactory pace. Brazil is concerned over initiatives to bind the countries of the hemisphere into extra-regional security mechanisms.

The viability of regional mechanisms in the area of defence seems to be jeopardized by some exemplary moves in the field of conflicts. The absence of weapons of mass destruction, the modest inventory of armaments, troops and military expenditures, as well as the low probability of conflicts between states and the lack of a common enemy for the region as a whole tend to impede efforts to accelerate dialogue for creating a new hemispheric defence system. Moreover, the security demands of countries of the area facing serious economic and social turmoil will become the most important and pressing nonconventional and non-military issues, as will the urgent need to deal with organized crime and drug trafficking.

In Brazil's view, any assistance to Colombia must respect the principles of non-intervention, self-determination of peoples, and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries. These are the principles that have traditionally guided Brazil's foreign policy.

On the external front, Brazil has been following closely the recent developments in the field of hemispheric defence. A number of important events have occurred in recent years, such as the creation in 1995 of the Committee on Hemispheric Security by the Organization of American States (OAS), which has devoted its attention exclusively to the security and defence of the Americas; the Meetings of Defence Ministers of the Americas, initiated in 1995 with a meeting at Williamsburg, the purpose of which is to establish dialogue between defence ministers of the hemisphere; and the creation in 1997 of the Centre for Hemispheric Defence Studies, with the purpose of promoting the exchange of ideas between the United States and the countries of the inter-American system on the issue of security.

On the external front, Brazil has been following closely the recent developments in the field of hemispheric defence. South America offers a setting of stability and peace, far removed from the main focal points of world tension.

With low military expenditure indices, the countries of South America are launched on a successful process of regional integration, propelled by MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, and they are seeking to consolidate democracy and economic and social development. Brazil start a new integration process of all countries of the South America with a strong interchange in the military, political, economical, and social areas. These aspects reduce to tolerable levels the possibility of conflict between states in the region, which is however exposed to clandestine actions of a transnational nature that generate additional needs for the protection of borders, surveillance of airspace, and the patrolling of rivers and coastal waters.

The recognition of Brazil as a regional power and the consequent intensification of our participation in mediating international conflicts demand that we maintain a force ready to join international peacekeeping missions. Brazil's participation in several such missions over time has demonstrated the valour of Brazilian soldiers and has enhanced the country's image as a regional and world power

## 9. POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

To increase bilateral relations with South American countries and with strategic partners;

To update and promote the trans-Atlantic dimension through relations with the countries of Africa, Europe and Asia;

To combat domestic petty politicking and resistance to change, replacing these with a can-do mentality as the expression of the Brazilian popular will, and to adopt a more proactive foreign policy, building on recent examples of success such as in breaking the blockade on soybean exports to China and dealing with the USA's protectionism for its farmers, where Brazil stood up to the Americans without any fear of reprisals.

To review trade agreements with other countries where Brazil is obliged to export unprocessed items with low value added, despite the fact that it has the needed processing capacity and the technology, as in the case of uranium exports to China.

Brazil will not find any support for exporting processed uranium, for this would signify a new competitor in the market - a hefty competitor - given the country's immense reserves and its leading-edge technology. Wall Street will obviously not accept this, unless our country adopts an energetic stance internationally, imposing its will as a sovereign nation and eliminating all barriers that have been unfairly imposed by those who are not complying with the promised disarmament. This is the moment, and our country must not flinch, as it has done in the past.

To strive at all costs to diversify its trading partners so that if some of them are not interested in a given negotiation there will be others that are - all of this, of course, within the dynamics of the laws of the market and diplomatic actions rooted essentially in love for Brazil.

To strengthen Brazil's presence in international organizations, seeking to participate actively in ways that will reflect our country's capabilities to handle any assignment, bearing in mind that the defence of our national interests demands that we participate in decision-making bodies, that we field Brazilian candidates of recognized capacity in world organizations, and that we engage in international actions that will have an impact so as to show the world that Brazil is ready to participate in decisions.

To review the stance of our current representatives from the foreign office (Itamaraty) with respect to their constant moves to pardon external debts of countries such as Argentina, which are costing us hundreds of millions of dollars, while restrictions on Brazilian exports are maintained. We have to negotiate at least a parcel that would be paid for in products that could be donated to our hospitals, shelters and other institutions that need them.

To coordinate the efforts of agencies of the Ministry of Economy with the work of our embassies, and to use our consulates to identify market opportunities and promote Brazilian firms and products.

There must be very effective interministerial coordination to prepare and support national positions, given the importance and the number of international markets.

It is essential to conduct effective forward planning so that we can foresee and respond to future crises, and keep our country always one step ahead in the negotiations.

The same forward-looking approach must be used to discern new threats, domestically and externally, that could arise as a result of recent international events that have demonstrated a weakening of state authority and have even trivialized violations of the Civil Code, reversing the roles of upright citizens and of outlaws. As an example, we may cite the questioning of government authority whenever its organs must take action to prevent or repress crimes.

The steady loss of confidence in the justice system and in our essential moral values.

We must define our priorities and take the steps necessary to develop a security strategy that is proactive and not reactive.

The adoption of an effective internal security policy for maintaining peace and public order, for preventing and combating all forms of crime and for safeguarding the rights, freedoms and guarantees of citizens, which will have a direct impact on the prestige and the authority of the State.

To meet this challenge we must bear in mind that public safety begins with full exercise of the rights of citizenship, respect for the law, and the transmission of fundamental values in areas such as education and the social integration of minorities.

Security is, first of all, a collective responsibility that the State must assume; on the other side of the coin, it is a right and a duty of every citizen.

When it comes to security, it is extremely important to develop social communication and to engage in re-education, with ethics as its basic principle, for the main opinion-forming media in the country.

We must give great priority to combating the impunity that now prevails, for this is becoming the basis for forming the outlook of those who will lead this country in the future and, like an octopus with its many tentacles, it is eroding all the ethical and moral values of our society - one of the first steps toward losing our people's identity and the will to defend our sovereignty - a very interesting objective for some nations of the world.

## 10. CONCLUSION

Military power is proportional to the scientific and technological development

associated with the military apparatus, and those who have this knowledge do not pass it on to third parties. Thus, there is a need to integrate the Armed Forces more thoroughly into the country's scientific, technological and industrial complex, in order to develop innovations for defence purposes. The solutions are quite feasible and they are right here in our country. They do not lie in external technology. The solutions are to be found in the tremendous capacity of Brazilians in all walks of life. Let us recall that Brazilian physicists, chemists and researchers in all areas are to be found at the pinnacle of the most highly renowned research centres in the world. Could this be the reason why some countries have tried so hard to bind Brazil's hands in all sectors? There are trade embargoes and data protection laws that make it extremely difficult to pay our external debt and this prevents us from taking more action on the social front and from improving our Human Development Index.

Despite all these forms of containment that do their best to obstruct our people's growth, Brazil has remained faithful to the decisions legitimated by the United Nations, a body that, until the Iraq war, was considered the highest organ of international relations.

In the current political scenario, we see a structure of world relationships with two dominant tendencies, leading to regionalization and globalization: the first is an intermediary step for achieving the second which, in reality, means greater interdependence among nations, and the socialization of problems.

Our country will be dependent to a large extent, over at least the next 20 years, on two programs that are deemed vital for the Armed Forces, as the only guarantee for maintaining the sovereignty, independence and positioning of the Brazilian nation. These are: to have our own capacity to launch a geostationary satellite, one that is genuinely national and reserved for exclusive use of the Armed Forces and other government agencies; and completion of construction work on the nuclear- powered submarines that will decisively establish our deterrent capacity vis-à-vis the world's centres of military power.

The existence and availability of a national satellite for exclusive use of the Armed Forces is a central factor for generating the autonomous capacity for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in various stages of warfare, thereby allowing integration of all elements of the forces, and synchronization and greater speed and agility in operations.

Completion of work on the nuclear-powered submarine will give us the capacity to be invisible to satellites; other sensors will be needed to detect it. It will represent the essential deterrent capacity that we do not yet have. Together with its greater independence and staying power, since it will not have to surface to recharge its batteries, the submarine can immobilize any naval task force that might be pursuing it and can strike fear into squadrons at sea. The submarine offers a low-cost solution and a powerful resource for middle ranking or weak nations.

The incorporation of these two projects, besides promoting great development in the areas of communication and nuclear medicine, would signal control over the most advanced and sensitive technologies of the contemporary world and would provide strong evidence of our nation's determination and credibility, and would therefore lead the great nations to think twice before turning their covetous gaze on Brazil.

Our country is facing some decisions that cannot be postponed. History shows us that it is only through unity and cooperation between peoples that world peace is possible. At this point what is needed is great determination on the part of the entire



nation and not only the military, for they are not responsible for formulating laws or for declaring war

Thus, more important than understanding why so many of our people have shed their feeling of patriotism and love for Brazil, which cost so dearly because of the way it took shape, is to seek all means possible to keep it safe from the threats that for the last few decades have broken the silence beyond the horizon.

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