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**ROMANIA'S DOUBLE ACCESSION: JOINING NATO AND THE EU**

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**Introduction:**

The European Union (EU) has experienced significant changes over the last few years. The EU has enlarged from 15 to 25 members and has been working to implement a new constitutional treaty to institute internal reforms and further political integration.<sup>1</sup>

The EU has also taken steps toward developing a common foreign policy and defense arm.

Romania's accession to the European Union represents the first strategic priority of Romanian Policy<sup>2</sup>, following full NATO membership in 2004. To achieve this strategic objective a concentrated effort on behalf of governmental institutions, civil society, and each Romanian citizen is needed. For Romanians this means more prosperity and more security. After the European Council in Nice, the European Union has created the institutional premises for its enlargement. Although this objective indicates a high level of ambition of the Romanian government, the Romania's accession to the EU in year 2007 is achievable.

**EU Perspectives**

The European Union (EU) is a treaty-based, institutional framework that defines and manages political and economic cooperation among its 25

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<sup>1</sup> Kristin Archick, "The European Union in 2005 and Beyond". *Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress. The Library of Congress*, October 19, 2005. CRS Web. Pg ,2

<sup>2</sup> Romanian Governmental Program

member states (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). In June 2004, EU leaders concluded work on a constitutional treaty that contains changes to the EU's governing institutions and decision-making processes. Commonly referred to as the "constitution," this new treaty aimed to enable a larger EU to operate effectively and prevent gridlock, boost the EU's visibility on the world stage, and enhance the Union's democratic legitimacy.<sup>3</sup> It grew out of the 2002-2003 Convention on the Future of Europe and previous EU efforts to institute internal reforms.

Major innovations in the over 300-page constitution included<sup>4</sup> abolishing the EU's rotating presidency in favor of a single individual with longer tenure; creating a new EU foreign minister position that will combine the roles of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the External Relations Commissioner; increasing the European Parliament's powers by extending its decision-making rights to additional policy areas; and decreasing the size of the Commission in 2014. EU leaders also agreed

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<sup>3</sup> Archick Kristin. "The European Union in 2005 and beyond". *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library for Congress*. October 19, 2005. CRS Web. Pg 3

<sup>4</sup> The European Union Constitutional Treaty; [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c\\_310/c\\_31020041216en04200464.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c_310/c_31020041216en04200464.pdf)

to simplify the EU's current, complex system of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV); beginning in 2009, QMV decisions will require 55% of member states (compromising at least 15 of them) representing at least 65% of the EU's population.

In the defense field, EU leaders approved: a "mutual assistance clause" that has been likened to NATO's Article 5 defense guarantee; "structured cooperation" to permit a smaller group of members to cooperate more closely on military issues; and a European armaments agency to promote procurement harmonization and improve European defense equipment interoperability.<sup>5</sup> EU officials insist that none of these defense provisions seeks to weaken NATO or the transatlantic link.<sup>6</sup>

EU leaders officially signed the constitution in October 2004 and set November 2006 as the target date for the treaty's entrance into force. In order to come into effect, the constitution must be ratified by all member states through either parliamentary approval or public referenda. Twelve states have completed ratification, but the constitution's future has been thrown into doubt following its rejection by French and Dutch voters in separate referenda in May and June 2005.

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<sup>5</sup> Solana, Javier. "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World", December 2003, ISSEU, Paris at: <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>

<sup>6</sup>Dr. Payne, Kenneth. "The European Security and Defence Policy and the future of NATO", BBC News Analysis Research, [www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf](http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf), 2003

Arguments against the constitution varied; in both countries, some voters claimed it could undermine traditional social protections, while other voters sought to register dissatisfaction with unpopular national governments, the EU bureaucracy, and Turkey's prospective EU membership.<sup>7</sup>

Other reasons for rejecting the constitution differed. As Kristin Archick points out, in France, some feared that it could ultimately weaken Paris' dominant role in the EU, while Dutch voters complained that certain provisions of the constitution unduly favored the EU's bigger countries. In the wake of the French and Dutch "no" votes, it became unclear whether other EU member states would proceed with their ratification plans.

Proponents of moving forward hoped that if most members approved the constitution, such approval would help force a second vote in those states that rejected it. The U.K., however, announced that there is "no point" in continuing to plan for a British referendum in light of the French and Dutch rejections.<sup>8</sup> At their June 16-17, 2005 summit, EU leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the constitution but announced that decisions about the timing of ratification were for each member state to determine. They acknowledged that the initial ratification deadline of November 2006 was no longer tenable and did not set a new target date.

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<sup>7</sup> Archick Kristin. "The European Union in 2005 and beyond". Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library for Congress. October 19, 2005. CRS Web. Pg 4

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem

Experts say this decision effectively puts the constitution on hold until at least mid-2007, or longer.

Some predict that the EU may be facing a period of stagnation, at least in the short term, as members grapple with internal reforms and the EU's future shape and identity. They also suggest that the rejection of the constitution could impede the EU membership aspirations of Turkey and possibly the Balkans, given that considerable opposition is tied to concerns about further EU enlargement.<sup>9</sup>

### **EU Enlargement**

Enlargement is one of the EU's most powerful policy tools. The pull of the EU has helped to transform the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into becoming modern, well-functioning democracies. More recently, it has inspired far-reaching reforms in Turkey, Croatia and the Western Balkans. All European citizens benefit from having neighbours that are stable democracies and prosperous market economies. Enlargement is a carefully managed process which helps the transformation of the countries involved, extending peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights and the rule of law across Europe.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Archick Kristin. "The European Union in 2005 and beyond". Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library for Congress. October 19, 2005. CRS Web. Pg 3

<sup>10</sup> Europe Enlargement,  
[http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/understand\\_enlargement/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/understand_enlargement/index_en.htm)

With the end of the Cold War, the European Union has sought to extend the political and economic benefits of membership to central and eastern Europe. Ten states — Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia — joined the EU on May 1, 2004.

Publicly, most EU officials are enthusiastic about enlargement.

They view it as solidifying a Europe “whole and free,” claim it will further open markets in the east, and hope that ongoing growth in eastern Europe will help jumpstart economic growth in the west. Others note that the enlarged EU still faces several challenges as it seeks to integrate the 10 new members, whose combined economic weight remains relatively small.

Many new members need to complete reforms in areas ranging from food safety to public administration.

Based on a realistic analysis of the funds’ flow for the last few years, Kristin Archich comes to a conclusion that enlargement will necessitate a redirection of structural funds for development projects within the EU from older members, such as Spain and Italy, to newer and more needy countries like Poland. It will also be several years before most new EU members are deemed ready to join the EU’s open borders system or the EU’s single currency, the euro.



Bulgaria and Romania concluded accession negotiations in December 2004 and hope to be able to join the EU in 2007; some caution, however, that their accession could be delayed for one year if they fail to implement remaining reforms. Also in December 2004, the EU announced it would begin accession talks with Turkey in October 2005, provided that Turkey continues to make progress on democratic and human rights reforms and extends its customs union to the EU's 10 new members, including Cyprus. After some contentious debate among member states, accession negotiations with Turkey began on October 3, 2005. They are expected to take at least a decade to complete. The EU asserts that the "shared objective of the negotiations is accession" but has cautioned that it is an "open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed."<sup>11</sup> Some observers suggest that the difficulties with ratifying the EU constitution may cause the negotiations with Turkey to take even longer than initially predicted, and that they may be less likely to result in full membership. All of the western Balkan states also harbor EU aspirations in the longer term. In June 2004, the EU named Croatia as another candidate and opened accession talks on October 3, 2005, following a determination that Croatia was fully cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

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<sup>11</sup> The European Union Constitutional Treaty; [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c\\_310/c\\_31020041216en04200464.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c_310/c_31020041216en04200464.pdf)

Yugoslavia. Macedonia submitted its membership application in March 2004.

A New European Parliament and European Commission Elections for a new European Parliament (EP) with 732 members were held on June 10-13, 2004. The EP has seven political groups, which are based on ideology rather than nationality or political party, plus some “non-attached” members. The center-right European People’s Party retained its position as the largest political group in the EP.

Voter turnout, however, was very low throughout the newly enlarged EU (just over 45%), and euro-skeptic parties made significant gains, especially in the U.K. In July 2004, the EP elected a Spanish socialist, Josep Borrell, as EP President for the next 30 months. A new European Commission also took office in 2004 amid considerable controversy.

After a contentious debate, member states in June 2004 named former Portuguese Prime Minister José Manuel Barroso as the successor to outgoing Commission president Romano Prodi. The other Commissioners were nominated by the member states; all of them, including Barroso, were subject to approval of the European Parliament, which has the power to accept or reject a newly-proposed Commission as a whole. In October 2004,

some Members of the EP threatened to veto the new Commission because they objected to its proposed composition. Barroso was forced to revamp his team in order to ensure parliamentary approval. The new Commission took office on November 22, three weeks after it was originally scheduled to have started work; it has one Commissioner from each of the EU's 25 member states.

## **2. Romanian Government Program**

### **Political Guidance for Romania's Integration in EU**

In the general context of EU enlargement in order to join this international organization the Romanian Government has established its Accession Program which consists of the objectives to be achieved in the short and long term.

Based on development strategies and the Romanian political and economic interests, the Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry and European Integration Ministry will coordinate external and internal efforts aimed at the acceleration of the accession process.

In this respect an Economic Strategy in the Medium Term and a National Plan for Romania's Accession to the EU have been issued.

In the meantime, Romania must solve all the problems related to the current stage of the negotiations with the EU and the economic figures (achievements), which, unfortunately, are not to Romania's benefit (advantage), and situated it on an inconvenient and unrealistic position.

Therefore to acknowledge and take into consideration the experience of the newly EU member states, as well as the experience of the "old" EU integrated nations will be a good way to be followed. At the same time the experience that Romania will gain on the integration way will be an asset for the other states which have chosen to ask for joining the EU.

In the nearby future the Government will pay great attention to a visa regime for Romanian citizens so that they would be able to travel to EU countries without a visa. To achieve this objective a Governmental Action Plan has been issued which will enable the Government to take the necessary measures for better resource allocations, for the elimination of the difficulties in the area of border control, illegal immigration etc. In this respect the Romanian Government will closely cooperate with the EU member countries. Romania is also very committed to actively participating in the process of reshaping the EU. As a future EU member, Romania is interested in the finalization of the European integration process which will hopefully assure its place within the organization in accordance with

Romanian demographic, geographic and economic potential. Romania will take all consultation opportunities offered by the European Security and Defense Policy to candidate states in order to assure a wide Romanian participation in all European crisis management actions.

### **3. Romania's Strategy for Integration in EU**

As part of the former communist market and Warsaw Pact, Romania was the first country that set up a legal framework designated to deal with the EU and has established good relations with the EU since 1970. It is worth noticing that in the seventies, the former Soviet Union refused to recognize the existence of the EU, while in 1980 Romania *de facto* recognized EU as an economic association and signed the agreement for creation of the Romanian-EU Commission. Today the EU is the main trade - partner for Romania. It should be taken into consideration that Romanian integration into European structures is taking place both as the result of abolition of the communist regime and the creation of a viable market economy.

At the same time the EU “suffers” a very complex transformation process of “widening”<sup>12</sup> and “deepening”<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> Widening = enlargement with the new member states that meet the EU economic and political requirements ;

<sup>13</sup> Deepening = enhancing the institutional reforms in order that the EU to transform itself into a real economic, political and military organization.

The Amsterdam Treaty has laid down a set of conditions that are mandatory to be met by the candidates to the EU – mainly central and east-European countries. Through « Agenda 2000 » all the structural adjustments that must be implemented by the candidate states have been identified in order to ensure a good functioning of the EU when the new members will be joining. A European Commission agreement is needed to assess the level of preparedness of each candidate state for reaching the full member status. The European Council in Luxemburg has approved the “candidate status” for the 10+1 European states which have associate relations with the EU.

### **Principles and criteria for accession to the EU**

By signing the Association to the EU Agreement, Romania has irreversibly engaged in the European integration process.

The National Strategy for preparing the Romania’s Accession to the EU signed in 1995 was the first action plan for achieving the necessary stages in order for Romania to obtain the EU member status.

During the screening process that took place up to 1999 the European Commission did not agree upon the progress made by Romania in its effort

for integration within the organization. Consequently during this period of time all the European Commission Reports were not in Romania's favor.<sup>14</sup> However since 1999 European Commission Reports have radically changed the Romanian position to the top of the candidates enabling a favorable decision of the Helsinki European Council (2000) to start the pre-accession program for Romania.

In order to obtain the full member status Romania must assume the complete implementation of a set of principles (common for all the candidate states) as follows:

- the rule-of-law principle that requires to set up a new law system; the state should be able to ensure the protection of the rights derived from the rules adopted at the community level;
- the human rights and fundamental freedoms principle; it is considered to be a judicial norm having universal value;
- the social state principle;
- the cultural pluralism principle;
- the subsidiary principle;

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<sup>14</sup> Screening process = periodical examination of the candidates' performances.

For a better understanding of the context of Romanian integration to the EU it is worth noting that political factors are of the same importance as the economic factors are, at least from the requirements' of that must be met. In this respect the European Council in Copenhagen (1993) set up the political objective that has to be met by any EU candidate states such as:

- the stability of the institutions that guarantee democracy, rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities;
- the existence of a functional market economy;
- the capacity of assuming the obligations derived from the EU membership, including the adherence to creation of political, economic and monetary union;

Romania's accession to the EU represents an objective of maximum importance for Romanian foreign policy. The accession decision is based on economic, historic and geographic reasons.

From the economic point of view the EU represents the second world economic pole. In the context of ongoing transition to the market economy on one hand and the existence of the need for achieving a sustainable level of economic development on the other hand Romania's accession to the EU may direct important communitarian funds in order to eliminate the actual discrepancies.



This aspect should be taken into consideration when analyzing the position of various member states with regard to the EU enlargement process: some states situated in the southern part of the EU – especially those who have a modest level of economic development in comparison with the northern ones – will request for delays of EU enlargement for the simple reason that they would not any longer be beneficiaries of the EU restructuring and regional development funds. States like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland and to some extent Spain and Italy would likely become donors, rather than beneficiaries and this could have an impact on how they view accession and the allocation of communitarian funds.

From the historic and geographic point of view it should be noted that Romania has been always part of Europe. Moreover taking into consideration its Latin origin we can argue that Romania has much more in common with the western culture than the other eastern states.<sup>15</sup>

However it should be mentioned that during the ages the eastern European part has had a significantly different development than the western part. It is more than evident that from both geographic and cultural points of view Romania is a European country. When it comes to Romania's accession to the EU one for example can not make use of the same set of arguments as in

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<sup>15</sup> Is not only a matter of language is about many similarities and affinities and many shared values such as: European political system and culture, common history and traditions, European culture, common religion and most importantly the same European spirit and aspirations.

the case of Turkey's accession which is a partial European country and which has a dissimilar culture/religion to the rest of the European world.

### **Romania's objectives and priorities in the context of EU accession**

To join the EU the Government set up a number of major objectives as follows:

- the consolidation of the political system and democratic institutions;
- the creation of an economic and social climate able to ensure maximum benefits and satisfaction to Romanian citizens;
- the enhancement of the market economy mechanisms ;
- the consolidation of the political, economic and cultural cooperation with the EU member states and the candidate states;
- the consolidation of the Romania's status on the European and international arena in terms of stability and security.

To adapt the Romanian internal realities to those of the EU both from economic and foreign policy points of view, the Government identified a series of priorities which must be taken into consideration when issuing the social and economic policies such as:

- a. Structural adjustments of the economy able to meet the requirements of the EU unique market and of EU common policies:
- the consolidation of the macroeconomic stability in order to create the proper conditions for sustainable economic development;
  - the acceleration of the structural adjustments of the economy that would permit to eliminate the delays in the social – economic transformation areas;
  - the implementation of a monetary policy and a fiscal policy able to correct the budgetary deficit and to enhance the economic activity which will be mainly oriented to export;
  - the local and regional development, the enhancement of the social-economic solidarity and cohesion;
  - the attenuation of the non- favorable social consequences of the economic reforms;
  - the re-launching of the social dialogue; the consolidation of the civil society;
  - the implementation of the “*acquis communautaire*”;

- the gradual fulfilling of the convergent criteria necessity to participate in Economic and Monetary Union;
- b. Adherence to the norms and principles of the Common Security and Defense Policy;
- c. Institutional and operational adjustments and the consolidation of cooperation with member and candidate states in justice and internal affairs areas;
- d. Structural and functional reform of the public administration in order to ensure the growth of the administrative efficiency and coherency, to reduce bureaucracy, to eliminate the discrepancies and overlapping and to ensure the compatibility with member states' administrations;
- e. A better information of the public opinion with regard to EU structures and mechanisms and as well as to costs and benefits of the integration.

### **Costs and benefits of the European integration**

The new Romania's status as a EU member will have a major impact on all aspects of economic, political and social life.

From the political point of view there will be a need for reconfiguration of the decision-making mechanisms in the sense that part of competencies will

be transferred to the communitarian institutions. However Romania will have the opportunity to be part of the collective decision-making process, so that it will be able to better promote its interests and values.<sup>16</sup>

The main benefits for Romania as the result of its integration to EU would be as follows:

- a stable political and economic climate which enables a durable development;
- a stable economic environment;
- a high competitiveness of internal market which will lead to a normal motivation and stimulation of the autochthonous economic agents in the sense of growing of the productivity and the efficiency through the development of new products and services and through the implementation of modern technologies;
- a growth in trade which will play a very important role in national economy and on labor market and will have a direct impact on the unemployment level;
- a free access to European capital and investment markets, to latest generation information systems and equipments, to “know-how” and to organizational techniques from developed countries;

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<sup>16</sup> Romanian Governmental Program pg 4

- the presence of Romanian economic agents on the unique European market;
- the facilities offered by Economic and Monetary Union;
- the consolidation of the national security through Romania's inclusion into ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) system;
- the opportunity to participate in the decision making process at the European level, including decisions with regard to the future European configuration;
- a growing prestige for Romania and the consolidation of its status vis-à-vis of the other actor-states both from politic and economic point of view;
- the rights and privileges for the Romanian citizens in accordance with their new status of "European citizens";
- free access for Romanian citizens to European labor market and good perspectives for professional enhancements;

There are also some other advantages which can be added here such as the costs, known as "lost opportunities". But these are taken into consideration just in case Romania fails to joint the EU. It should be mentioned here the following:

- international isolationism and the exclusion from the decision making process on European issues and not only; this includes the non-integration in ESDP which means additional expenditure for maintaining an autonomous position;
- economic isolationism of Romania even though about 60% out of its trade is made with EU;
- limitation of the opportunities to access communitarian market with Romanian products;
- growing vulnerability of Romanian firms and products in confrontation with trade defense measures and ethnic protectionism used by EU in relation with tertiary partners;
- growing discrepancy of economic development between Romania and neighbor countries who will joint EU;
- diminution of the chances to align to *acquis communautaire*;
- difficulties in obtaining the consensus at the EU level regarding the admission to EU of other candidate states;
- diminution of Romanian possibilities to develop a competitive agriculture as a result of non-integration in Common Agriculture Policy;

With regard to the costs needed to bring the Romanian economy and society in line with EU standards it is worth acknowledging that even though they are very high, they are necessary for gaining a durable economic growth and they have to be supported by Romanian people.

### **EU financial assistance to Romania**

One of the biggest advantages Romania can get as a result of its integration in EU is given by the possibility to take part in the decision making process at the European level. Even though there are many voices that criticize the fact that Romania after the integration will lose some of its prerogatives in the favor of supranational institutions, a realistic analysis will show that as a full EU member Romania will have the possibility to be part of, and moreover, to influence, the European decision making process.

When it decided “to go east” the EU started its assistance program for Romania, mainly through supporting the efforts made by Romania in order to transform its economic and social life from the structural point of view. Therefore the EU went through a number of financial programs – the most representative being PHARE Program, initially designated for Poland and Hungary well known as “Poland and Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of Europe”.



As a result of the European Council meeting in Helsinki (1999), a decision has been made with regard to opening the negotiations with all candidate states to EU integration in the sense that, starting with 2000, the EU financial programs have been significantly modified both from the importance of financial support and from the internal structure of the programs point of view.

During the period 1990 – 1999 Romania has benefited by a non-reimbursable financial assistance of 1167.56 million euro. The main sectors which benefited from Phare program assistance were as follows:

- privatization, restructuration, small and medium enterprises = 267 m euro;
- education = 140 m euro;
- transportation = 151 m euro;
- agriculture = 86 m euro;
- health = 32 m euro.

Romania has also implemented the provision of the other two EU financial programs with direct application in environment, transportation system and agriculture.

The absorption costing<sup>17</sup> of the non-reimbursable financial assistance given to Romania was for that period of time of 98%, one of the highest amongst the candidate states. That suggested once again the reliability of investments in Romanian economy.

#### **4. Romania's Military Integration in EU**

The analysis of the security system in which Romania is included for the time being should take into consideration the specific conditions which characterized its political and economic development in the last century. These conditions might be analyzed on one hand at the individual level, specific to Romania only and on the other hand at the larger level specific to Europe as a whole, knowing that Romania took part in diverse political/military alliances during the centuries.

The current conditions - economic, political, geo-strategic – under which Romania exists are influenced both by internal and external factors.

Taking into account the geographic features of Romania and its geographic position in immediate vicinity of the former USSR is easily understood the strong influence this country exercised upon the Romanian internal and external evolution. As a former socialist country Romania was part of the

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<sup>17</sup> Absorption costing = an economic coefficient, which takes into consideration factors such as: the level of bureaucracy, the degree of fund utilization, the degree of coordination, the negotiation capacity etc.

communist military alliance - Warsaw Pact - till 1990 and the consequences of this fact upon the security conditions of the country are still manifest.

Romanian military system has been designed to face an eventual aggression from the west, therefore the fix-armament systems were mainly set up in the western part of the country. Moreover all military products and weaponry were conceived in accordance with Warsaw Pact standards. All these strategic and technical aspects created a series of problems for Romania's integration to NATO who had to rethink its strategy, tactics, logistics, communication etc. in order to be compatible with the new standards of the North Atlantic Organization.

Today's security threats are different from those of Cold War period and come mainly from failed states, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crime syndicates and competition for natural resources. These new threats are global in nature and could arise anywhere – but their implications affect us all. Because the threats are different the response must be different. Sitting back with huge number of forces dedicated to territorial defense and working in isolation have definitely lost relevance in this new threat environment.

Taking into consideration the major changes in the strategic environment since 1990 Romania has understood and adopted as well a new vision, a new

meaning of social reform and modernization strategy. In this regard the Romanian Armed Forces have taken into account the geo-political and geo-strategic changes in the international security environment, and as a result, the Armed Forces' reorganization and modernization process has been consistently developed with political and diplomatic actions that have aimed at supporting Romania's accession to NATO. At that moment the reform represented both a requirement to accomplish interoperability with NATO and an internal need too.

The Romanian Armed Forces re-shaping process started at the end of the 1990's at the same time as the major political changes in the Romanian society and has passed through an ample process of conceptual and procedural clarifications. The reform and restructuring process contained three phases each of them had as objectives the achievement of several specific criteria. At the beginning of 2000 the restructuring process continued based on the "Reorganization and Modernization Program" which was to be accomplished in two phases: the first one (up to 2003) initiated at the same time with the beginning of third PARP cycle, and the second one till 2007. During this complex process of restructuring and modernization it appeared that reorganization does not mean just structural changes, adjustments of doctrines, new rules, new documents, but especially a deep

change of mentality. To Romanian military authorities, the Prague Summit meant one of the most significant landmarks in the way to reshape the Romanian Armed Forces in accordance with new demands. NATO needed at that time a more operational structure, improved capability to manage crisis situations, new and enhanced partnership relation with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The Prague Summit confirmed, once more, NATO's commitment to continue the enlargement process, which has a special significance to Romania as one of the seven invitees to accession. Romania had already been going through an intense reviewing and adapting process of the Armed Forces at the time it was receiving the invitation to join NATO. Based on NATO Ministerial Directive and Prague Capabilities Commitments Romanian General Staff decided to start a fundamental review of the Objective Force 2007 which is performed on the basis of missions and specific requirements of the Romanian Armed Forces as follows: contribute to the Romania's peacetime security; defend Romania and its allies; promote regional and global stability and security; provide support to local and national authorities in civil emergencies.

The first objective of transformation was to adapt the whole structure of the armed forces, so that to ensure interoperability with the Alliance at all levels.

The fundamental review of the Objective force 2007 was approved by

Homeland Supreme Defense Council in 2004, when the first phase of force restructuring started. The second phase of the restructuring process will continue with the “2015 Armed Forces Structure”. The aim of the reform is both to modernize and integrate the Armed Forces into the new democratic Romanian society. From the very beginning the model was inspired from NATO countries, NATO integration process itself being a strong catalyst for the internal reform of the Romanian military system.

Transformation, fulfillment of Romania’s commitment to NATO and EU, and participation in security initiatives and missions abroad are the most relevant processes for Romanian Forces nowadays.

Romania plays a significant role in security and stability at the crossroad of four European geostrategic areas: Central Europe, Southern Europe, the Black Sea Area and Caspian energy corridor, which connect Romania further to Caucasus and Central Asia. Romanian security efforts are focused on the contribution to both regional and global security based on democratic principles and values, meaning that Romania is evolved in the development of cooperative security networks which are based on interlocking initiatives in South – East Europe, as well as multilateral cooperation initiatives, in order to participate in building confidence, security and countermeasures against the risks and challenges in the region. As NATO member and,

hopefully starting with January 2007 an EU member, Romania has gained and plays its role in the regional peace and stability.

It is worth noting that Romania has already become involved in EU initiatives undertaken in the realm of defense and security and has augmented its force offer to the EU, in correlation with its force offer to NATO. As Lord Robertson outlined in his speech given at the European Parliament's Foreign Committee "the two forces complement each other" and they are not in a competition.<sup>18</sup>

Romania's participation in the EU operations includes: the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUMP), the Concordia Operation in FYROM and, at present, the ALTHEA Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the prospect of its accession on Jan 2007 Romania intends to increase its participation in the European Security and Defense Policy by joining specific projects, including the process of generating rapid reaction capabilities – battle groups (BGs). Romania is committed to the EU Battle Groups initiative participating in two BGs: in the Italian one and in the multinational one led by Greece.

Coming to our daily awareness and concerns in the transformation area it should be noted that the Romanian military fundamental objective is to

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<sup>18</sup> NATO has created its "Response Force" (NRF), whilst EU has its "Rapid Reaction Force"(RRF).

shape the force structure in order to be able to successfully face the current and future threats against Romania, NATO and the EU. To reach this objective it is necessary to obtain the ability and flexibility to rapidly project and sustain forces in any operational theatre in order to respond to the full spectrum of the Alliance and EU missions. The Romanian Armed Forces will gradually transform in order to defend Romania and comply with all the assumed commitments such as NATO and EU. Following the streamlining previously described the Romanian Ministry of Defense initiated at the beginning of the year 2005 a set of thirteen projects dedicated to the transformation of the Armed Forces until 2015. The general objective of the series of projects is to reshape a structure numerically reduced, but completely professional and modern, mobile, efficient, flexible, deployable with a high degree of usability and sustainability in any theatre of operations, in line with the Alliance's similar transformation process. The first project envisages the Strategy of the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation, a document meant to coordinate the internal transformation with the NATO transformation process. The strategy has been approved by the Homeland Supreme Defense Council and will be followed by an implementation plan. It has also considered being of great priority the two projects that aim at providing compliance with the commitments assumed to



NATO and EU, as well as a firm revision of the Command and Control System.

Romania has shown its capacity to bring a significant contribution to endorse the security efforts made by international organizations. By signing the treaty to join the European Union, a more extensive approach to EU security issues will be possible as Romania could become part of more committees and working groups, and it can become more closely connected to the processes underway within the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In this regard, Romania needs to develop a clear strategy to enable a gradual and dynamic integration in these processes, especially if these turn out to be disappointed. The country's participation in EU operations is a proof of the contribution in support the ESDP. A priority for the near future is to engage more in the EU rapid reaction capabilities, as well as in the European defense industry development. Cooperation in the defense industry at EU level is vital for the operationalization of the European Security and Defense Policy, resulting in better capabilities of crisis management in Europe. As it concerns the European Agency for Development of Defense, Research, Acquisition and Weapons Capabilities, Romania is interested in participating in cooperation and development programs of the EU defense industry.

Accordingly, Romania believes that European integration opens new opportunities to relate to the complex institutional mechanisms of the continent.

## **5. EU Foreign and Defense Policies**

### **The EU Security Strategy**

Over the past decade, the EU has sought to forge a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to help boost its weight in world affairs and to match its growing economic clout.<sup>19</sup> As part of this process, EU foreign ministers in May 2003 tasked the EU's High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, with developing an EU security strategy to identify common security interests and joint policy responses.

Some member states had resisted setting out a common EU strategy for years, fearing it could constrain or fail their national policies; but observers suggest that the internal EU rift over Iraq gave impetus to this project as a way to help avoid similar internecine disputes in the future. In December 2003, the EU approved the final version of its first-ever security strategy, "A

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<sup>19</sup> CFSP = The Treaty on the European Union (the Treaty of Maastricht) underlined the international and distinct identity of the EU by the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The CFSP was defined as the second pillar of the EU. ESDP has been rooted into the CFSP of the EU as described in the TUE. Member states should support CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. Member states should refrain from any actions which would be contrary to the interests of Union and likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The CFSP refers to security issues, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, but without settling a timetable. The Treaty contains a Protocol on the Petersburg task and a Protocol on the WEU which was defined as the institution responsible with applying EU's decisions having defence implications.

Secure Europe in a Better World.”<sup>20</sup> It outlines five key global threats confronting the EU — terrorism, weapons proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime — and a range of tools, primarily diplomatic and economic, for tackling them.<sup>21</sup> In particular, it emphasizes the importance of conflict prevention and multilateral solutions.

The security strategy also calls on the EU to promote stability in the European “neighborhood,” which includes the Balkans and the EU’s new eastern border after enlargement, as well as the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Some commentators have criticized the EU’s security strategy as being too vague and lacking in detail. EU officials counter that it merely represents the first step in developing a more comprehensive security strategy and that work will now begin on specific policies for implementation.<sup>22</sup> Others contend that the new security strategy is weak because it does not clearly identify the possible use of force as an option for confronting threats posed by terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). EU leaders dismiss this criticism, however, pointing out that the security strategy acknowledges that military means may be needed to deal with certain threats.

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<sup>20</sup> Solana, Javier. “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World”, December 2003, ISSEU, Paris at: <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> Archick Kristin. “The European Union in 2005 and beyond”. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library for Congress. October 19, 2005. CRS Web. Pg 11

<sup>22</sup> *ibidem* Pg 12

Following the war with Iraq, the EU adopted a common policy on WMD in June 2003. The EU's "Declaration on Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" recognizes WMD proliferation as a growing international threat, and the risk that terrorists may acquire WMD. The Declaration sets out a range of diplomatic tools for tackling WMD proliferation, including strengthening multilateral forums such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and improving export controls. However, this WMD policy also sanctions the use of "coercive measures" as a last resort. In December 2003, the EU approved a "Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" that further elaborates on the June Declaration. These WMD documents are separate from the EU's overarching security strategy, but are viewed as implementing mechanisms for the portions of the security strategy related to WMD.<sup>23</sup>

### **European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and EU-NATO Relations.**

Since 1999, the EU has sought to develop a defense identity outside of NATO to provide a military backbone for CFSP and to give itself more options for dealing with international crises. This project, known as ESDP,

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<sup>23</sup> Archick Kristin. "The European Union in 2005 and beyond". Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library for Congress. October 19, 2005. CRS Web. Pg 13

has led to the creation of a 60,000- strong rapid reaction force <sup>24</sup>, three defense decision-making bodies, and ties to NATO intended to ensure close links between the two organizations and prevent a wasteful duplication of NATO resources or structures. The EU insists that ESDP is not aimed at usurping NATO's collective defense role and most EU NATO allies, say that EU efforts to enhance military capabilities should complement those of the Alliance.

As part of ongoing efforts to further develop ESDP, the EU adopted in December 2003 a new agreement on enhancing the EU's military planning capabilities.

This agreement represents a compromise negotiated by the U.K., France, and Germany, and stems from the desire of France and some other countries to forge a more autonomous European defense arm.<sup>25</sup> The compromise entails:

- Establishing a British-proposed EU planning cell at NATO headquarters (SHAPE) to help coordinate "Berlin Plus" missions, or those EU missions conducted using NATO assets.
- Adding a new, small cell with the capacity for operational planning to the existing EU Military Staff — which currently provides early warning and

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<sup>24</sup> For and Against; *Debating Euro-Atlantic Security Options*, Bruxelles, 2004

<sup>25</sup> Archick Kristin. "The European Union in 2005 and beyond". Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library for Congress. October 19, 2005. CRS Web. Pg 14

strategic planning — to conduct possible EU missions without recourse to NATO assets.

- Inviting NATO to appoint liaison officers at the EU Military Staff to help ensure transparency and close coordination between NATO and the EU.

Some observers criticize the British for agreeing to this deal, accusing U.K. Prime Minister Blair of bowing to French demands for a more independent ESDP to help burnish his European credentials following the rift with Paris and Berlin over Iraq.<sup>26</sup> U.K. officials are keen to point out that the deal considerably scales back the original April 2003 proposal by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg to create a European military headquarters, planning staff, and armaments agency.

They claim that language in the agreement reaffirms NATO as Europe's preeminent security organization, and stress that the EU cell will "not be a standing headquarters." Although Washington approved this compromise, some U.S. officials still fear that the new EU planning cell of 20 to 30 officers may be the first step in driving the transatlantic alliance apart.<sup>27</sup> They believe this small cell will grow over time into a larger staff, which could duplicate NATO structures. The EU is working to implement

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<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, pg 14

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem

its new planning cell and is collaborating with NATO to establish the EU cell at SHAPE and to finalize the NATO liaison arrangements.

In 2004, the EU also agreed to enhance its rapid reaction capabilities by creating 13 battle groups, of 1,500 troops each, able to deploy to trouble spots, especially in Africa, within 15 days. The EU has set 2007 as the deadline for these battle groups to be fully operational. They will likely be employed mostly as spearhead forces that would seek to “prepare the ground” for larger, follow-on peacekeeping operations.

### **U.S.-EU Relations**

Since the end of major combat operations in Iraq, many European officials have sought to mend fences with the United States. EU leaders have continually stressed the fundamental importance of close U.S.-European ties and sought to portray the EU as a reliable partner.

The Bush Administration has asserted that improving transatlantic relations — in both the EU and NATO — is a priority for its second term. Europeans have welcomed these efforts, and many believe that the Administration has succeeded in improving the atmospherics of the relationship.<sup>28</sup> At the U.S.-EU summit on June 20, 2005, the two sides pledged to continue working

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<sup>28</sup> Ibidem pg 15

together on a range of challenges, including the promotion of transatlantic economic growth and integration, the Middle East, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, and U.N. reform.

Nevertheless, transatlantic tensions have not disappeared and resolving differences will require a sustained political commitment from both sides. Over the next several months, EU officials will likely continue to engage with the United States on all of these issues. The greater Middle East and various “homeland security” issues — such as passenger pre-screening, data transfers, and U.S. visa waivers for citizens of new EU member states — will remain key concerns on the U.S.-EU agenda.<sup>29</sup>

NATO and EU officials will continue working together in the Balkans, and NATO-EU cooperation in providing assistance to the African Union-led peacekeeping mission in Sudan will be closely watched as a test of the evolving NATO-EU relationship.

The United States and the EU are committed to pursuing a strategic dialogue on East Asia, but Washington remains concerned about a potential lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. Several trade disputes also persist. These include aircraft subsidies, beef hormones, genetically modified foods, U.S.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibidem



anti-dumping practices and exemptions in U.S. export tax legislation that leave tax breaks in place for contracts already signed on certain heavy goods.

As the EU continues to evolve, some U.S. analysts worry that a larger, potentially more confident EU may seek to rival the United States and could weaken the transatlantic link.<sup>30</sup> They also contend that a more unified EU would likely lessen Washington's leverage on individual members and could complicate U.S. efforts to rally support for its initiatives in institutions such as the United Nations or NATO.

Others suggest that an EU able to “speak with one voice” — especially on foreign policy and defense matters — would be a more credible, capable partner for the United States in managing global challenges and could shoulder a greater degree of the security burden, both within and outside of Europe. During President Bush's February 2005 visit to the EU's institutions in Brussels, he asserted that “the United States wants the European project to succeed” and that a strong Europe is in U.S. interests.

### **CA –EU Relations**

Canada is one of the European Union's oldest and closest partners. What started out in the 1950s as a purely economic relationship has evolved over

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<sup>30</sup> Ibidem pg 16

the years to become a close strategic alliance.<sup>31</sup> The EU and Canada now work together on a great range of diverse issues ranging from research into alternative energy sources to providing police officers for Bosnia. European and Canadian leaders meet regularly at bilateral summits to exchange views on a wide range of issues.

At the Ottawa Summit on 18 March 2004 the EU and Canada adopted a Partnership Agenda which identifies ways of working together to move forward on issues of mutual interest,<sup>32</sup> especially where joint action can achieve more than both sides acting alone:

- in foreign and security policy, the EU and Canada draw on a shared commitment to effective multilateral institutions and effective global governance to project their common values on the world stage, for example by working together for the full establishment of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.

- in the field of justice and home affairs both sides work to assure the security and protect the rights of their citizens. For example, both sides work to make air travel more secure by exchanging information to identify potential threats, while safeguarding the privacy of their citizens.

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<sup>31</sup> EU – Canada Relations; [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/canada/intro/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/canada/intro/index.htm)

<sup>32</sup> *ibidem*

-the EU and Canada are both committed to reinvigorating global economic growth through a successful round of multilateral trade talks. They also embark on a new type of trade agreement, a Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement, to eliminate regulatory obstacles and to make it easier to trade and invest in each other's markets.

-together, the EU and Canada will tackle global challenges including climate change, and poverty in developing countries. For example, the EU and Canada work together to give people in the world's poorest countries access to affordable medicines and to help alleviate the suffering caused by infectious diseases including the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

The Partnership Agenda acknowledges the great changes that have taken place in EU-Canada relations as a result of developments in the EU. With the creation of the European Single Currency, the establishment of an EU Foreign and Security Policy, and an increasingly active role in the field of Justice and Home affairs, the EU has grown far beyond the economic organisation it was when the relationship with Canada was first formalised in 1976. Canada recognises that the EU is now a major global actor, not least in global institutions such as the United Nations and the G8.<sup>33</sup> With its

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<sup>33</sup> EU – Canada Relations; [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/canada/intro/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/canada/intro/index.htm)

enlargement to ten new members on 1 May 2004, and its new Constitutional Treaty, the EU continues to evolve rapidly.

The political relationship between the EU and Canada is characterised by a high degree of consensus on many of the issues facing the international community. This is demonstrated by the remarkably similar voting patterns enjoyed by the EU and Canada in the United Nations (voting together more than 95% of the time during the 57th session of the UN General Assembly). The EU and Canada work closely together in confronting challenges to regional stability, either in Afghanistan and Haiti.

There are some analysts who suggest that the EU- Canada relations, especially in the ESDP domain, should be far more enhanced. Julian Lindley-French, for example, pointed out that Canada should join Europe on its security journey under the famous “3 D”.<sup>34</sup> He argued that it is in Canada’s interests to engage more effectively with European defence, while NATO will remain the centre of gravity of Canada’s and Europe’s defence for the foreseeable future. He also proposed that Canada should offer a Battle Group to the EU, based on the assertion that such a proposal would not only demonstrate Canada’s interest in ESDP but also open up further options for Canada’s security engagement.

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<sup>34</sup> Julian Lindley-French. *Presentation at a Joint Roundtable, with the Atlantic Council of Canada*. March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2005.

## **6. Conclusions**

Romanian integration strategy to EU should be seen in the larger context of Romania's orientation to the implementation of a democratic political system and a viable market economy.

The reasons why Romania has chosen to join the EU are diverse, including historic factors e.g. cultural affinities, geographic position as well as economic and political factors.

Even though the EU realizes a much higher economic development level than the Romanian one, Romania's integration to the organization could create many durable economic effects in its favor.

From the political point of view Romania's integration to European structures will assure a greater stability of governance and democratic system in this country and will contribute to the European stability as well.

In the same time as a future EU member Romania will have the opportunity to take the benefits, advantages and disadvantages of the common European Security and Defence Policy not just as a consumer but as a provider of security too.

The future evolution of the EU to an economic, political and military union can effectively guarantee the Romania's security through integration it

within a reciprocal European security system. And last but not least Romania's accession process could suggest general lessons for countries in similar situations, no matter they are candidate, such as Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, or potential candidates, such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro.

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