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Continental Defence Integration Divide:

Can It Be Bridged?

By/par Colonel N.E. Matern

ABSTRACT

The issues surrounding the prospect of enhanced continental defence integration are critically examined beginning with a brief overview of the continental security and defence framework inherent in the contemporary North American context. The paper then examines the main impediments to a strong bilateral relationship that inevitably serve to hamper any meaningful advancement in terms of continental defence integration. These impediments, in turn, conspire to maintain the Canadian and U.S. strategic partnership on security and defence in a perpetual state of "sub-optimisation".

The paper then examines the steps currently pursued by the Canadian government to progressively strengthen Canadian military capacity and in so doing demonstrates that continental defence enhancements are principally a function of a more actively engaged political leadership. Although these efforts contribute to strengthen the continental defence framework, they ultimately remain wanting.

Finally, the author explores opportunities for enhanced continental integration and active engagement between both partners. The paper concludes that defence structures in both countries will continue to evolve with the threat and that moving to an enhanced state of continental defence integration would likely require more political impetus if not another tragic event the likes of 9/11. In the interim, given the nature of the existing bilateral relationship, concrete advances in continental defence integration are likely to remain incremental at best.

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> Canada has long since given over responsibility for North American defence to the United States. This fact of Canada's foreign policy was in the background before September 11 but is now centre stage. Managing the U.S. relationship skilfully is therefore crucial. The first nine months of the Chrétien-Bush II era did not go smoothly and the Prime Minister, by playing his hand artlessly, lost a rare second opportunity to make a first impression following the terrorist bombings. The United States has set the markers for North American security and, given its strategic helplessness, Canada has little choice but to accept them.
>
> Mr David Jones,
> U.S. Political Minister Counsellor
> to Ottawa from 1992-1996[1]

Introduction

The close defence relationship between Canada and the United States (U.S.) is founded on the long-standing principle of indivisibility of North American security[2]. This relationship has come under strain since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. Weak Canada-U.S. bilateral relationships ultimately pose a direct threat to North American security and by extension Canadian national prosperity. Canadian promotion of a strong North American defence arrangement through active engagement would go a long way to appeasing the concerns of the United States, which has explicitly singled out

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[1] David Jones, "Canada-U.S Relations After September 11: Back to Basics". *Policy Options*, Vol 23, No 2 (March 2002): 25.

[2] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "The Fundamentals of Canada U.S. Defence Relations," http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/canada-U.S.-defence-relations-en.asp; Internet; accessed 7 April 2006.

security as their foremost issue of vital national interest. Canada's continued reluctance to apply coherence to its approach on the issue of continental defence has to date been interpreted by our American counterparts as a sign that this country is soft on homeland defence and a weak partner in the realm of continental security. While Canadians fret incessantly about the impact of continental defence issues on their sovereignty, the Americans are losing patience and moving ahead on protecting the continent without them. Their position is unlikely to change any time soon and it is therefore in the best long term interest of Canadians to find common ground on the issue of continental security and defence. The outcome of the recent federal election offers Canada a unique opportunity to renegotiate its position on continental defence in order to revitalize if not redefine a somewhat dysfunctional but no less critical strategy of mutual defence.

This paper will argue in favour of a better integrated continental defence arrangement, a key enabler to an enhanced security framework of mutual benefit to both partners. It will start by defining the continental security and defence framework inherent in the contemporary North American context. It will then examine the main impediments to a strong bilateral relationship that inevitably serve to hamper any meaningful advancement in terms of continental defence integration. It will then proceed to outline the steps taken by the Canadian government to progressively strengthen Canadian military capability and in so doing demonstrates that continental defence enhancements are principally a function of a more actively engaged political leadership. This paper will

finish by exploring opportunities for enhanced integration and active engagement between both partners, ultimately determining if our new prime minister may be the man to lead Canada down that path.

Continental Security and Defence Framework Defined

A nation outlines in broad terms, through its security strategy, how it intends to exploit all determinants of national power: economic; political; psychological; military and informational to achieve its national security and defence policy objectives[3]. By means of its security strategy, it will typically seek to pursue a comprehensive defence strategy, which is divisible into four distinct functional components, namely: deterrence, prevention, projection and protection[4]. Projection naturally concerns the conduct of operations abroad (usually offensive in nature) and deals directly with the threat at its source, thereby contributing indirectly to the defence of the homeland. While all four components are critical to homeland security, deterrence, prevention and protection are inherently defensive in nature and seek to protect the homeland directly from physical attack. Homeland defence and security are concepts which have gained significant visibility in the Western World since the events of 9/11. Although they typically apply to the strategy pursed by a

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[3] Department of National Defence, BGG005-004/AF-000 CH2 2004-11-05 *Canadian Forces Operations* http://www.dcds.forces.gc.ca/jointDoc/pages/j7doc_docdetails_e.asp?docid=15; Internet; accessed 5 April 2006: 4-1.

[4] Dossier de Recherches CEREMS, "La Homeland Defense" http://www.ihedn.fr/portail/cerems_dossiers.php; Internet; accessed 5 April 2006: 5.

nation they also extend to encompass the continent as a whole whereby a continental approach to defence and security in terms of Canada-U.S. relations refers specifically to the:

> security of the north half of the Western Hemisphere, and maintains an open invitation to participation by other countries. Hence, a continental approach does not violate the sovereignty or impair the national interest of any country, nor does it preclude bilateral agreements[5].

Interest in securing the North American continent dates back to the promulgation of Ogdensburg Agreement in 1940 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King who, as a result of serious troubles brewing in Europe, created the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) vested with the responsibility of exploiting opportunities for strategic cooperation in the land, sea, air and eventually space domain of the bi-lateral relationship[6]. This in time led, amongst other things, to the establishment of NORAD in 1957 which remains until this day the only fully integrated bi-national defence command on the continent. In March 2005, seeking to extend the benefits of North American security, prosperity and quality of life, the leaders of Canada, the United States and Mexico signed a "Security and Prosperity Partnership of North

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[5] United States, Department of Defense, *Bi-National Planning Group, 2006* (*Draft) Final Report of the Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation*, (Peterson Air force base, CO: (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006)), 39.

[6] Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder – The Permanent Joint Board on Defence" http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=298 ; Internet; accessed 6 April 2006.

America"[7] agreement which builds on the "Canada-U.S. Joint Statement on Common Security, Common Prosperity and a New Partnership in North America"[8] and the "Canada-Mexico Partnership", both agreed to in 2004. This abbreviated historical overview serves only to illustrate that the U.S.-Canada continental defence relationship is long standing, constantly evolving and for the most part quite successful. The events of 9-11 have nevertheless had three effects on this common defence partnership. First, they changed the dynamics of the traditional relationship and increased the challenges for Canada in satisfying the security and defence requirements of the U.S.. Secondly, they resulted over time in the inclusion of Mexico as an equal partner in the security domain of the continent and, lastly, they introduced the key dimension of civil security to the concept of continental defence. These circumstances present significant changes that inevitably call for new adaptive measures in pursuing strengthened continental defence arrangements.

The continental security and defence that we had become accustomed to in North America was traditionally based on the collaborative defence efforts of both Canada and the U.S.. Since 9/11, continental security and defence must be viewed through the wider lens of "continental security" where military and non-military means are used in tandem to defend the continent from external aggression, where non-military stakeholders exercise

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[7] The White House, "Fact Sheet Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America" http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050323-4.html; Internet; accessed 7 April 2006.

[8] Department of Foreign Affairs, "The Fundamentals of Canada U.S. Defence Relations".

the predominant role. In essence, continental defence in its purest form consists of the combined military measures applied by the U.S. and Canada across the land, sea, air and space domains which contribute directly to the defence of the North American continent but are subservient to the wider objectives of continental security and must therefore be integrated in an overarching continental security strategy. Thus defined, the nature of continental security and defence is also considered indivisible[9].

There are various ways by which continental defence can be pursued. One approach consists of either the U.S. or Canada practicing continental defence on behalf of both nations. Of the two, the United States is the only nation who could afford such a strategy but without Canada's explicit consent it would effectively compromise Canada's sovereignty in the process. The second approach is through bilateral understanding where both partners share in the burden of defence of the continent in a collaborative and cooperative manner through a range of agreements, understandings and arrangements. This has traditionally been the preferred approach to North American continental defence and consists of a halfway measure which ensures both partners are actively engaged in a cooperative manner but not integrated. The third option consist of a bi-national approach were both countries militaries are structurally integrated for defence of the continent as a whole. Ultimately, the better integrated the means of defence, the better postured defence

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[9] Department of National Defence*, 2005 Defence Policy Statement*, (Ottawa: Her Majesty In the Right Of Canada, 2005), 21.

forces will be to deter, prevent or protect the continent from external aggression, an approach strongly endorsed by the BPG when they argue that: "Canadians and Americans working side by side are much more effective at working toward common goals than geographically separated national staffs that meet twice a year or merely coordinate by the phone"[10]. Progress on this front remains nevertheless severely impeded by a host of other factors, not the least of which appears inherently related to the political imperatives of the day.

Impediments to a Strengthened Bilateral Relationship

If both partners are ever to be successful in pursuing an integrated and mutually effective continental security and defence strategy, the five determinants of national power alluded to earlier in this paper must be aggressively combined not only at the national level but also between Canada and the United States. As the BPG rightly suggests "synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power are required to ensure the successful execution of our defense and security missions. When the instruments are used in concert with each other and/or in cooperation with other nations, then the result is an exponentially stronger, faster and more effective means to address critical events"[11].

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[10] Department of Defense, *Bi-National Planning Group, 2006 (Draft) Final Report of the Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation*, 13.

[11] Ibid, 2.

Failing to integrate all determinants of power increases the risk of damaging the relationship, that may in turn inhibit both countries' ability to effectively defend their citizens from aggression, the claimed "fundamental responsibility" of both governments. Canadians most of all, and their political masters in particular, need to fully appreciate that the dynamics of the Canada-U.S. relationship have changed dramatically as a result of the 9-11 events. It is in Canada's best interest to discreetly but cleverly find better common ground with the U.S. on defence and security issues by concentrating first and foremost on the political-military interface of the relationship, an area Canada seems to have largely mismanaged since 9/11. Perhaps it is because Canadian leaders have failed to fully recognize that "the United Sates' more assertive role on the world stage and growing sense of vulnerability will have implications across the socio-economic, political, diplomatic and defence spectrum"[12] for Canada. An examination of the countries' diverging national security strategies combined with the strained relationship that developed between Canadian prime ministers and the U.S. president since 9/11 and the effects of traditional Canadian domestic politics on principles of self-determination provide some insight into both countries' mutual inability to advance continental defence interests in any meaningful way.

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[12] Department of National Defence*, 2005 Defence Policy Statement*, 21.

Pursuit of Different National Security Strategies

Notwithstanding its traditionally close ties with its southern neighbour, the events of 9/11 changed the global security dynamics and accentuated the differences between the two countries placing enormous strain on an otherwise overall healthy relationship. The U.S. has placed security squarely at the top of its national agenda and will not hesitate to resort to military force when it feels threatened. Although Canada is said to have responded in kind in terms of making security a priority, it has done so reluctantly and principally to preserve whatever level of prosperity it had worked so hard to acquire over the years. The increased rhetoric on security issues between both countries did not sit well with either partner and led to a deterioration of relationship from which Canada in particular is still reeling today.

In his introductory letter to the United States' 2002 National Security Strategy *(NSS)*, President Bush stated unequivocally that "Defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government"[13]. He again reinforces this notion in the 2006 NSS, stating: "this strategy reflects our most solemn

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[13] United States, Executive Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2002*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 2002), Executive Summary.

obligation: to protect the security of the American people"[14]. In other words, self-preservation is the overriding interest of the United States and one that will shape all government policy and characterize the nature of future relations with allies, partners and enemies. These tendencies, Robert Kagan suggests in his essay "Power and Weakness" are not the proclivities of the Bush administration but rather the product of a difference in power with others[15] and represent the root cause of the weakened relationship between Ottawa and Washington since 2001.

The origins of the bilateral rift can be traced to a profound shift in U.S. grand strategy. In the pre 9/11 period the U.S. pursued a grand strategy of Primacy. Such a strategy is "grounded in the unipolar perspective. The primary perspective of the hegemonic state is to preserve pre-eminent power. Security is achieved by maintaining a preponderance of power, principally through multilateral measures"[16]. Since 9/11 however, Elinor Sloan argues the United States has shifted its grand strategy to a "combination of primacy and imperialism" where the latter differs from the former in that it seeks to maintain power principally through unilateral measures[17]. The United States relies increasingly on military power while largely abandoning the soft power strategy that was

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[14] United States, Executive Office of the President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 2006), Executive Summary.

[15] Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness". *Policy Review*, No 113 (June /July 2002): 10.

[16] Elinor C. Sloan, "Beyond Primacy: American grand strategy in the post-September 11 era". *International Journal*, Vol 58, No 2 (Spring 2003): 304.

[17] Ibid: 317.

so globally effective in the post Second World War period [18]. The "benevolent eagle" has been wounded on its home turf and although it has functionally recovered, the psychological scars run deep resulting in a loss of innocence that has shaped and hardened its character while simultaneously making it prone to increased wariness.

This security paradigm shift has had a profound and enduring impact on the world. However, nowhere has the impact been more deeply felt than right here in Canada. The collective security dynamics to which Canada had been accustomed for decades changed overnight, concurrently raising the profile of continental security to an unprecedented, if not almost unmanageable level for Canada. For its part, Canada has always clearly favoured working through multilateral organizations. David Haglund argues that Canada pursued since the end of the Cold War a grand strategy of "cooperative security" defined by "its inclusiveness; its reliance upon an expanded understanding of security, which embraces such currently popular orientations as "peacebuilding"; its preference for gradual over rapid institutionalization; and, …its emphasis upon the value of building upon and

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[18] Robert Cox, "A Canadian Dilemma: The United States or the World". *International Journal*, Vol 60, Issue 3 (Summer 2005): 675. http://proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006.

transforming existing institutions inherited from the balance of power context"[19]. These characteristics are consistent with the notion of a values based liberal democratic society such as Canada. However, there is more to it than that. Canada ultimately favours support for multinational organizations, first and foremost among them the UN, recognizing the sovereignty it confers on nations as a "shield against the dominance inherent in a one on one unequal relationship"[20]. Canada was always hopeful that its "cooperative security" strategy would serve as a viable counterweight to help contain U.S. tendencies for unilateral action since Canada shares the European perspective that "American military power, and the strategic culture that has created it and sustained it, are outmoded and dangerous"[21]. As could be expected, this propensity for the promotion of a values based foreign policy does not sit well with the U.S. only because it feels it guarantees Canadian security in the process[22]. This sentiment naturally extends to the bilateral level where Canadians are considered "free-riders" on security matters[23].

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[19] David G Haglund, "Here comes M. Jourdain: A Canadian grand strategy out of Moliere", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol 27, Iss 3 (Spring 1998): 20. http://proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 25 February 06.

[20] Cox, "A Canadian Dilemma: The United States or the World": 678.

[21] Richard Price, "Hegemony and Multiculturalism", *International Journal*, Vol 60, Iss. 1 (Winter 2004/2005): 131. http://proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006.

[22] Jennifer Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*. (Toronto: Harper Collins PublishersLtd, 2004), 201.

[23] Joseph R. Nunez, "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power," *Parameters*, (Autumn 2004): 77.

Given the converging interests of the wider international community prior to 9-11, one could argue this Canadian strategy had merit. In the end however, the "cooperative security" strategy is clearly at odds with the one practiced by the U.S. in a post 9-11 environment and both are arguably in need of fine-tuning. The strategy as currently pursued and handled by Canada, serves merely to aggravate the divergence between U.S. and Canadian security and defence policies and interests. Better common ground must be found. Joseph R. Nunez correctly captures the conundrum when he writes:

> Canada generally worships at the United Nations altar, whereas the United States is skeptical about the United Nations' ability to provide timely and sound handling of global problems. In truth both positions are flawed, because one state is trying to use an international organization to magnify its modest power, while the other state is more eager to use its superpower status to disengage from slow UN deliberations to craft its own solutions to security threats.[24]

The divergence in the application of national strategies between both countries is inherently related to the different status Canada occupies in the world relative to the United

on its own, if need be"[25]. The underlying message is clear: the U.S. expects Canada to be no less than a willing, able and contributing partner in this effort of protecting its homeland or risk losing a measure of its autonomy in the process. It is necessarily in Canada's best interest to treat the terrorist threat seriously since Canada itself has been publicly "singled out" by Al Qaeda as a target[26]. A September 2002 Senate Report of the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence clearly makes the case when asserting that:

> Canada may not be the bull's eye in the sights of most extremist – The United States undoubtedly is. But Canada is clearly positioned as one of the inner rings on the target and if our country is perceived to be much easier to penetrate than the United States, we will move closer to the centre.[27]

Real Politik

A second and perhaps equally compelling explanation for the weakened relationship can be attributed to the personal relations which deteriorated between prime ministers and the U.S. president since 9/11. Given the power imbalance between both countries, managing relations with the Americans in terms of positive outcomes has always been a sensitive matter for Canada. At times, by virtue of its close proximity,

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[25] House of Commons. Standing Committee on National Security and Defence. *Report on the Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*. First Session, Thirty Seventh Parliament, September 2002, 20.

[26] Douglas A. Ross, "Foreign Policy Challenge for Paul Martin: Canada's International Security Policy in an Era of American Hyperpower and Continental Vulnerability" *International Journal*, Vol 58, No 4 (Autumn 2003): 553.

[27] Standing Committee on National Security and Defence. *Report on the Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, 23.

interdependence and similarities Canadians and Americans take their longstanding bilateral relationship for granted. Robert Thompson, national leader of the Social Credit Party from 1961-67 liked to remind Canadians "the Americans are our best friends, whether we like it or not"[28]. As with anything else, leadership in managing a relationship starts at the top. Although bilateral relationships should ideally be free of any personal biases, the tone of the cross border relationship matters and is to a large measure defined by the personal relationships which develop between presidents and prime ministers[29]. David S. Wright suggests "the quality of the personal relationship is a key factor in managing differences between both countries, especially at times of crisis when power in Washington tends to be heavily concentrated in the White House"[30].

Why are these relationships critical to Canadians in particular? Well, simply put, America is more important to Canada in terms of a bilateral relationship than the other way around and, consequently, Canadians must work harder and more thoughtfully at cultivating the relationship than their counterparts. Many countries around this globe compete for U.S. attention and thus Canada is but one in a long list of countries vying for influence in Washington "where access is the lifeblood of diplomacy and relevance is the

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[28] Derek Burney, "The Perennial Challenge: Managing the Canada U.S.-Relations" *Canada Among Nations 2005 - In Split Images*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, 47-61. (McGill- Queens University Press, 2005): 47.

[29] Jones, "Canada-U.S Relations After September 11: Back to Basics": 28.

[30] David S. Wright, *Managing Global Crises – and the U.S. Colossus,* - The Border Papers No 207, (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary , Renough Publishing Co. Ltd, December 2004), 10.

oxygen"[31]. Recognizing that circumstances and context differ from one country to the next, Prime Minister Blair, from Great Britain, and Prime Minister Howard, from Australia, managed to strengthen their countries' ties with the United States through the interrelationships they personally fashioned with President Bush, thereby advancing their national interests. Closer to home, Mexican President Fox, exploited his privileged relationship with the former governor of Texas when he became the first foreign leader to meet the newly elected president[32], a tradition steeped in symbolic meaning normally reserved for a Canadian head of state. Ultimately, Canada, as does Mexico, benefits from a certain degree of consideration over its rivals for U.S. attention by virtue of its North American connection; but this is not absolute and is contingent upon the fact that:

> When a prime minister and president enjoy ideological congruence, Ottawa Washington relations are generally positive, the policy agendas are compatible, and traditional norms of quiet diplomacy and non-linkage are likely to hold up. In contrast, when an American president's and Canadian prime minister's world views clash, Canada is less likely to be in a position to cooperate with the U.S. administration in the areas of its specific interest. Given the Bush antipathy for UN reform, strengthening international human rights and democracy, defence conversion, problem solving through multilateralism, and protecting the global environment, there were few points of convergence beyond the common anti-terrorist litany[33].

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[31] Derek Burney, "Canada U.S. Relations: Are We Getting it Right". Speaking notes prepared for the Ranchmen's Club, Calgary, Alberta, (November 17, 2005): 1. [Remarks on line]; available through the CDFAI.org/publications from http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Canada-U.S.%20Relations%20Are%20We%20Getting%20it%20Right.pdf; Internet; accessed 25 February 2006.

[32] Stephan Clarkson and Erick Lachapelle, "Jean Chrétien's Legacy in Managing Canadian-American Relations". *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol 12, Iss 2 (Fall 2005): 70. [Journal on-line]; available from http://proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 2 March 2006.

[33] Ibid: 78.

Traditionally, relationships between American presidents and Canadian prime ministers have been mixed, with some individuals developing very close personal bonds while other relationships could be characterized as "frosty" at best, if not downright contemptuous. Prime Minister Mulroney for instance worked assiduously on Canada U.S. relationships through his Washington network. He developed close personal ties with President Reagan which prompted "stronger efforts by the Administration to settle or at least contain, rather than complicate, disputes"[34]. The Clinton-Chrétien relationship, defined largely by a common understanding "for the logic of interdependence in a globalised world"[35], was less formal but could certainly be described as warm and helped maintain favourable Canada-U.S. relations. The Bush-Chrétien relation on the other hand was painfully dysfunctional "where dialogue seemed erratic, disputes festered in a very public fashion and attitudes on both sides of the border seemed to reflect more frustration or wariness than mutual respect"[36]. Much of this fallout was the product of poor communication between both partners and hinged on their inability to perceive or act commonly on security and defence issues in particular. Although Prime Minister Martin vowed to restore some lustre to the relationship he eventually failed in satisfying American expectations for Canadian participation in the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) initiative and ultimately succumbed to the temptation of publicly ridiculing the opposition for their

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[34] Burney, "Canada U.S. Relations: Are We Getting it Right", 1.

[35] Clarkson and Lachapelle, "Jean Chrétien's Legacy in Managing Canadian-American Relations": 67.

[36] Burney, "Canada U.S. Relations: Are We Getting it Right", 1.

electoral platform on Canada-U.S. relations when he considered his power base threatened during the run up to the 2006 elections.

The events of 9/11 certainly strained old relationships and created new rifts and disagreements at head of government level which only serve to exacerbate an already tenuous bilateral interaction. Indeed, important political differences emerged from the very different political viewpoints espoused by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and President Bush in particular[37]. The American perception is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future since with its uncompromising stance on the global security environment the current administration has in effect managed to shift the American psyche towards the right by breeding within the American people, rightly or wrongly, a sentiment bordering on security paranoia. The United States will nevertheless remain Canada's most important relationship although this condition will not be reciprocated[38].

Canada is perceived as a security and defence liability in the U.S.[39] and by virtue of its lopsided power relationship with the United States is struggling to regain the lost

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[37] Nunez, "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power": 1.

[38] Andrew Cohen, "Canadian American Relations: Does Canada Matter in Washington? Does it Matter if Canada Doesn't Matter?" *Canada Among Nations 2002 – A Fading Power*, ed. by Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molot, 34-48 (Don Mills; Oxford University Press. 2002), 47.

[39] Burney, "Canada U.S. Relations: Are We Getting it Right", 2.

political ground of the last few years. These circumstances are suited to be handled only by the most skilled Canadian diplomats and leaders. Given the current security paradigm, Canadian governments wishing to reinforce ties with the Americans will necessarily need to appear much more sensitive to their security and defence concerns, starting, in the Canadian context, at the continental level. Only then will the Canadian voice gain some measure of traction in Washington as have those of the British and Australian prime ministers, and only then are Canadians likely to encounter a more sympathetic ear to the challenge involving U.S. encroachment on Canadian domestic and foreign policies. Maintenance of the status quo in the strategic relationship with the U.S. is simply not an option as suggested by Davis Bercuson who in 2001 argued that:

> Unfortunately, the Canadian government continues to underplay the realities of that strategic partnership, preferring to overplay Canada's distinctiveness and autonomy with respect to security and defence priorities. The gap between the political rhetoric and strategic reality need to be addressed to ensure that Canadians truly understand the nature and importance of the relationship[40].

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[40] Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, *To Secure a Nation: The Case For A New Defence White Paper*: *Prepared for the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century*. (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2001), 4.

The Dynamics of Domestics

Those Prime Ministers who worked closely with their American counterparts have traditionally brought tangible benefits to their nation but in doing so have been said to have paid a domestic price[41]. This claim is important by virtue of the inherent link it draws between Canada U.S. relations and domestic politics. Domestic politics in this context concerns the degree of sovereignty that Canada is able to maintain in the face of a constantly evolving but inherently one-sided power imbalance relationship with the United States. Typically, it is claimed that when Canada is too closely aligned with the United States in terms of policies, either foreign or domestic, it is caving in to American diktat at the expense of its own sovereignty. One could arguably trace this sentiment back to the late 1700 when many British loyalists unfavourable to the American independence movement moved north to settle in what is present-day Canada and developed a distinct sense of identity largely independent of the American perspective. As our economies became increasingly integrated and mature that sentiment evolved in the sense that:

> Canadian business and political elite have concluded that "closer integration with the United States is either desirable or inevitable". Those Canadians more removed from the political and economic power generally do not share that perspective. Opposition in Canada to continental integration comes predominantly from civil society[42].

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[41] Burney, "Canada U.S. Relations: Are We Getting it Right", 1.

[42] Cox, "A Canadian Dilemma: The United States or the World": 670.

As head of a democratic society seeking re-election, prime ministers have typically been sensitive to the proclivities of the electorate at large while equally remaining mindful of the interdependence which exist between the Canada-U.S. economies and the necessity in fostering closer ties with the U.S. to advance Canadian prosperity. Thus, the circumstances now call for the Canadian prime minister to delicately balance the requirement of prosperity of the country with the cooperative security interests of the continent while maintaining a credible measure of sovereignty in the eyes of the electorate[43]. This is a tall order for any statesmen which will certainly prove challenging since, in the Canadian context, these interests are often considered competing interests.

Notwithstanding the noted aspiration of Canadian civil society for strong measures of sovereignty, there is evidence to suggest that this tendency may not be as deeply-rooted as otherwise claimed. According to a recent bilateral poll "on a wide range of issues from national security to energy policy, Canadians and Americans want more cooperation, not less"[44]. According to the poll dated August 05, "citizens of both countries advocate a more integrated system of military and emergency response"[45]. 65% of Canadians and 73% of American respondents wanted a "much closer" or "somewhat closer" relationships in terms

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[43] Burney, "Canada U.S. Relations: Are We Getting it Right", 3.

[44] Steve Maich, "Closer Than You Think", *Maclean's Magazine*, October 17, 2005, 16.

[45] Ibid.

of security[46]. Moreover, with regards to trade, in a November 2004 poll sponsored by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute / Dominion Institute 75% percent of respondents agreed "that given how important trade is to Canada's economy, protecting trade relationships should be Canada's top foreign policy priority"[47]. These results correlate findings dating back 24 years (1980) where during a country wide consultation on trade policy the persistent refrain from the responders amounted to "we don't really care what you do….but, first and foremost, you must get things right with the United States"[48]. On balance, the significance of such polls would seem to suggest that although sovereignty is near and dear to many Canadians it is not absolute and Canadians are generally seeking the societal benefits that a balanced measure of prosperity, security and sovereignty can offer[49].

With such information in hand, a clever prime minister could make the case that with over 80%[50] of Canadian exports destined for the United States it is clearly a matter of

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Miller, David A. "A Future North American Defence Arrangement – Applying a Canadian Defence Policy Process Model" in *North American Security –America's Response, Canada's Role (Martello Papers)* (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations), 79.

[48] Burney, "Canada U.S. Relations: Are We Getting it Right", 4.

[49] Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century,* 87.

[50] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Canada's International Policy Statement, A role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview*. (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen Right of Canada, 2005), 9.

vital national interest that our U.S. markets remain free from any major disruption. This notion of vital national interest extends well beyond the border into the heartland of the United States since Canadians must recognize that any significant incident or attack on the continental United States will likely have dire consequences for both countries. The prime minister could then argue that as a result, security and defence mechanisms in both countries need to be reinforced and more closely harmonized. Moreover, he could emphasize that the most efficient way of enhancing security is through the combined effects of cooperation, alignment and, where necessary and possible, full organizational integration both at the functional and structural levels. He could conclude that security, which is clearly a civilian led responsibility, would be better served by closer cooperation and alignment but, building on the NATO or NORAD models, argue that the military is ideally suited for integration and the contemporary security threat environment would be better served by integrated bi-national continental defence measures wherever possible.

In the end, the examination of the preceding factors relating to diverging national security strategies, poor political leader interaction and perceived proclivities of the electorate for absolute self-determination conspire to maintain the Canadian and U.S. security and defence relationship in a perpetual state of "sub-optimisation". The Canadian government's decision to not participate in the war in Iraq or to forego participation in BMD are perhaps legitimate and domestically popular but the way these decisions were conveyed to U.S. authorities created a fallout which remains unfavourable to the genuine

enhancement of any collaborative defence effort let alone any aspirations of further continental defence integration. Moreover, as previously noted, Canadian political leaders must better appreciate the linkages which exist between the instruments of national power and understand that by engaging positively rather than amateurishly in defence matters of vital significance to the United States, Canada is also advancing its national interests. We will never know what security, prosperity or sovereignty opportunities were lost as a result of the decision to forego BMD participation. That said, it is never too late to turn the page. The clear intent expressed by the former and current governments to strengthen Canadian military capability is being well received in the U.S. and is signalling that Canada genuinely shares U.S. security concerns and is perhaps finally willing to assume an increased share of the collaborative continental defence burden.

Progressive Strengthening of Canadian Military Capability

Policy Integration

Key security decisions have implications across the national and international geo-strategic spectrum. Early in his mandate, Prime Minister Paul Martin recognized this challenge and he published a series of policy documents aimed at filling a policy void, particularly in terms of security and defence, which had persisted in the government for years and remained unattended even after the 9/11 events. These documents were necessarily meant for public consumption at home in Canada but would also hopefully

serve to strengthen convictions in Washington that Canada was starting to act more responsibly in terms of security and defence.

The first document published by the prime minister in 2004 was the National Security Policy (NSP), roughly equivalent in conceptual terms to the U.S. NSS but clearly giving prominence to domestic rather than international security. "The NSP focuses on addressing three core national security interests: first, protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad; second, ensuring Canada is not a base for threat to our allies and third, contributing to international security"[51]. What is interesting to note is that in establishing his second priority, the prime minister is clearly signalling to our allies and, although not specifically named, the U.S. in particular, the importance he places on maintaining relationships with Canada's allies, acknowledging Canada has an important role to play in the security of their nation. Moreover, through this publication the prime minister also reinforces the crucial notion that "Canada is committed to strengthening North American security as an important means of enhancing Canadian security"[52]. The drawback however is that the document is light on specifics with regards to working with allies, relegating no more than two short paragraphs to the issues midway through chapter 3 and referring to the U.S. mainly when addressing border issues. Conversely, although a much more

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[51] Privy Council Office. *Securing an Open Society : Canada's National Security Policy.* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen Right of Canada, 2004), vii.

[52] Ibid, 5.

comprehensive document addressing security concerns principally abroad, the NSS does not make any mention of Canada in the context of NORAD. It is suggested "that as long as Canada is not perceived as a security weakness to the United States, it does not require specific mentioning in the NSS"[53]. Although perhaps a fair argument, both the Canadian and American documents nevertheless fail to underscore the importance of the Canada U.S. relationship and to outline how common security and defence measures might be mutually reinforced.

The second series of documents published in 2005 by the government is Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS) of which only the Overview was signed by the prime minister. The IPS is a series of three documents capped by the Overview. It is a comprehensive series of publications meant to underscore the government's 3 D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) approach to international policy. Five pages of the Overview are devoted to the subject of revitalizing our North American partnership. It claims amongst other things that "Our security, our prosperity, our quality of life - these are all dependent on the success with which we help to manage the North American continent"[54]. Interestingly, it goes on to suggest that "It is in Canada's national interest to continue to engage cooperatively with the U.S. …and to maintain our ability to influence

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[53] Jeffrey A. Turner "North American Security Cooperation – What Can America Need From its Neighbours? " in *North American Security –America's Response, Canada's Role (Martello Papers)* (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations), 30.

[54] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview,* Foreword.

how the North American continent is defended"[55] adding that "while maintaining a strong voice in continental affairs demands more concrete commitments, particularly in the realm of security, it will also protect our national sovereignty and build global influence"[56]. These are powerful policy statements which underscore the need and importance of pursuing collaborative security efforts in conjunction with the United States. They are explicit commitments to the importance of security in a continental setting and an acknowledgement by a government that it must do more in an area in which it has traditionally appeared reluctant to genuinely engage.

It took 11 years but Canada finally received the long awaited Defence Policy Statement (DPS) in April 05. This policy was critical of the orientation of the Canadian Forces (CF) and was published under Paul Martin who oddly enough "colluded in the structural disarmament of the Canadian Forces throughout the 90s"[57] largely through successive defence budget cuts. "The scope and scale of the DPS are decidedly ambitious"[58]. But the DPS is a refreshing document which clearly sets out the objectives in

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[55] Ibid, 8.

[56] Ibid, 6.

[57] Boivert, Nic. "Defence Policy Statement – Worth the Wait" *Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century*. (April, 27, 2005) [Article on-line]; available from http://www.ccs21.org/articles/boisvert/2005/documents/boisvert_dps_may05.pdf ; Internet; accessed 13 February 2006.

[58] Ibid.

terms of continental defence requirements, probably first and foremost with the introduction of a unified "Canada Command" (CANADACOM), a key enabler to enhanced North American defence collaboration. It singles out the U.S. as Canada's most important ally and underlines the indivisibility of North America's security while acknowledging that Canada has benefited immensely from its defence partnership. It also goes on to claim "we will continue to explore new and innovative ways to enhance relations with the United Sates to defend the continent"[59]. It commits to "exploring with the United States ways to enhance our bi-national defence cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security and military support to civilian authorities"[60] recognizing that "It is clearly in our sovereign interest to continue doing our part in defending the continent with the United States"[61]. In this document, the task of defending North America has priority over contributing to international peace and security which again should bode well with our American allies as it conveys the clear message that a greater emphasis must be placed on the Defence of Canada and North America. Notwithstanding these proclamations, actions are not always consistent with the DPS rhetoric. With so many CF resources heavily tied up in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future there is always the risk that our commitments to defence of the homeland languish.

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[59] Department of National Defence*, 2005 Defence Policy Statement*, 2.

[60] Ibid, 23.

[61] Ibid, 21.

Honest Attempts to Redress the Commitment to Capability Gap

Military capability in the CF was in decline for at least a decade if not more before the arrival of Prime Minister Paul Martin at the helm of the country in 2003. Capability is what a government needs from its armed forces to conduct operations domestically, continentally or internationally. Without the proper level of funding, capabilities become unsustainable over time and the force deteriorates under a regime of progressive "rust out" while capital moneys are transferred to personnel as well as operating and maintenance budgets to maintain prescribed levels of operations[62]. This situation illustrates precisely the predicament the CF faced under the leadership of Jean Chrétien from 1993 to 2003. Indeed, with the return of the Liberals to power in 93 and struggling with measures of fiscal necessity in government, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien promised to free Canada from the "clutches of the Cold war anchorage" and was fully intent on reaping the peace dividends at minimal cost and scaling back operations significantly[63]. Ultimately, the way in which the government pursued the application of the policy, by aggressively committing the CF to a myriad of operations while simultaneously slashing its personnel and budget, was

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[62] Phillipe Lagassé. "Matching Ends and Means in Canadian Defence" in *Canada Among Nations 2004 – Setting Priorities Straight*, ed. by David Carment, Fen Olser Hampson and Norman Hillmer, 73-92. (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 2004), 85.

[63] Dean F. Oliver, "How Much Was Never Enough? Canadian Defence and 11 September." *Canada Among Nations 2002 – A Fading Power*. ed. by Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel Molat. Don Mills, 122-141 (Oxford University Press, 2002), 125.

arguably the root cause of Canada's defence institutional demise and was politically irresponsible.

Academics, think tanks, and military officials publicly voiced their concerns regarding the beleaguered state of the CF, and the United States was equally openly displaying signs of concerns regarding an under funded Canadian military. Prime Minister Paul Martin came to power committed to restoring some measure of capacity to the CF after years of neglect and pledged $13B in additional funding over the next five years[64]. Although the outlook appears promising, given the advanced state of CF decay this amount is probably too little, too late. $13B worth of investment is certainly impressive but "it is unclear, however, whether these supplementary funds will be sufficient to afford the force structure envisaged in the DPS"[65]. Defence critique Phillipe Lagassé concedes that a conservative estimate of approximately between $14-15B is required in the next five years for the purchase of the platforms alone[66]. Moreover, a Standing Senate Committee examining the issue claimed, in the fall of 2005, that a yearly defence budget of the order

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[64] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Canada's International Policy Statement, A role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview*, 13.

[65] Phillipe Lagassé. "A Cautionary Perspective on the Defence Policy Statement " *Royal Canadian Military Institute –Commentary,* June 2005: 1. [Article on-line]; available from http://www.rcmi.org/eng/pub/5/page8.asp?t=5&p=8 ; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006

[66] Ibid.

of $25 to 35 billions is required for Canada to meet its defence obligations[67]. The newly elected Conservative Party has pledged additional funds over and above those promised by their predecessors but they also have more ambitious force expansion targets then their liberal counterparts[68] which will also predictably increase operating costs, possibly even offsetting any incremental increase to the budget in the process. Given current force levels deployed abroad, reapportionment of funds intended for domestic or continental use may also prove necessary.

Canadian Forces Transformation

The CF is currently undergoing the most profound transformation endeavour since Unification in 67. In an effort to make the CF operationally more effective, relevant and responsive to the contemporary operating environment, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) ordered the stand-up of four newly created operational-level headquarters as well as a Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) on 1 Feb 06[69]. These headquarters include Canada Command (CANADACOM), Canadian Forces Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM), Canada Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM) and Canada Operational Support Command

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[67] House of Commons. Standing Committee on National Security and Defence. *Interim Report: Wounded - Canada's Military and the Legacy of Neglect – Our Disappearing Options for Defending the Nation Abroad and at Home*, First Session, Thirty–Eighth Parliament, September 2005, 8.

[68] Conservative Party of Canada. "Stand Up for Canada – Federal Elections Platform 2006" http://media.conservative.ca/video/20060113-Platform.pdf; Internet; accessed 5 April 06.

[69] Gen Rick J. Hillier, *Chief of the Defence Staff Direction – Evolution of Operational Headquarters* National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa: 28 February 2005, 1.

(CANOSCOM)[70]. Transformation will require the CF to adopt a "fully integrated and unified approach to operations"[71] leading to a fundamental change in culture within the military. Current initiatives seek to enhance special operations capabilities as well as those related to the maritime, aerospace and land environments[72]. This transformation represents a leap forward in term of capabilities and its purpose is to provide increased leadership at home and abroad. Unfortunately, the full effects of the changes will not be optimized until all the ongoing "re-structural" dust has settled.

One of the main features of this transformation initiative is the stand up of a national operational command headquarters (CANADACOM) with the mandate to provide defence of the homeland. Its creation is "based on the new international security environment and a commitment to place greater emphasis on the defence of Canada and North America"[73]. It must be prepared to act in support to Canadian civilian agencies in case of emergencies or disasters and is the counterpart to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) on all matters pertaining to bilateral defence issues affecting the North American continent. NORTHCOM has generally responded favourably to the

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[70] Ibid.

[71] Department of National Defence*, 2005 Defence Policy Statement,* 4.

[72] Ibid, 13.

[73] Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder - Canada Command" dated June 28, 2005. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1692; Internet; accessed 3 April 2006.

establishment of CANADACOM and both organizations are already bilaterally engaged in collaborative efforts. It is worth noting however, that NORTHCOM has been in operation for three years and to date has benefited from the opportunity to exercise many of its operational processes, whereas CANADACOM capabilities' remain nascent at this stage and will fully mature only over the fullness of time, leaving Canada in the interim somewhat vulnerable to the course of events. That said, the realignment undertaken so far speaks very favorably in terms of potential for enhanced and coordinated bilateral defence planning and response. Unfortunately, it does nothing to further integrate our collective defence effort.

Canadian Contributions to the Mission in Afghanistan

The Canadian military has been fairly active in Afghanistan since Oct 2001. To date, Canada has deployed in excess of 20 ships and 14,000 military personnel of all ranks in the international campaign against terrorism[74]. Canadians have deployed on three independent operations in the course of the Afghanistan commitment. The first mission was entitled Operation APOLLO, and consisted of a U.S. led coalition involved in combat operations against Al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. The Canadian contribution consisted essentially of a Naval Task Force of four ships, some aircrafts and a Battle Group. The

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[74] Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder – Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan" dated February 28, 2006. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703; Internet; accessed 4 April 2006.

second mission, commonly referred to as Op ATHENA deployed in August 2003 in the context of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission which operated under NATO banner. Canadian participation in this mission amounted to five successive six month rotations[75]. Op ATHENA ended on 18 October 2005 with the repatriation of the Canadian reconnaissance squadron[76]. Finally, since February 2006 approximately 2300 Canadians are actively engaged in Operation ARCHER, in the province of Khandahar, where Canada assumed command of a multinational brigade, replacing an American brigade operating under the auspices of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

There are two reasons Canada's participation in Afghanistan is important to its overall defence strategy. First, as previously highlighted a contemporary national strategy for defence must necessarily combine elements of an offensive strategy with those of a defensive strategy, where "offence dominance" is characterized by addressing threats to a state by treating them at their source abroad, whereas "defence dominance" seeks to defend against these threats at home[77]. Thus by engaging in operations in Afghanistan, Canada is ultimately contributing indirectly to securing the homeland and by extension the continent. Secondly, Canada assumed leadership for a multinational force in replacement of an American brigade. This did not go unnoticed by the Americans who by virtue of their

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[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Elinor C. Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era.* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005): 9.

heavy commitment in Iraq in particular remain very appreciative of the Canadian military contribution and recognize the effect this commitment has on their own homeland security. Consequently, the Canadian operation in Afghanistan helps to counter popular home-grown perceptions in America that Canada is soft on matters of defence and serves to ease tensions with Washington where Ottawa has experienced difficulty reclaiming some measure of credibility.

Opportunities for Increased Collaboration and Active Engagement

NORAD Enhancements

On 11 September 01, the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) was the only bi-national defence command in existence on the continent and given the nature of the threat at that precise moment its utility proved instrumental in securing the skies over North America. Almost five years later, although security and defence structures in both countries have undergone profound changes, NORAD still remains the only bi-national continental defence mechanism in existence. With both countries constantly rethinking and reshaping their security structures to meet the evolving threat, assessment of NORAD's usefulness came into question.

NORAD is the primary means by which Canada and the U.S. conduct surveillance and control of their air approaches. It was stood up in 1957 in Colorado Springs on the basis of a ten year agreement establishing the "integrated operational control of the air defence forces of the two countries"[78]. It was established at the insistence of the U.S. that recognised that North American airspace needed to be treated as single theatre with a centralised command and control structure[79]. NORAD's missions evolved in accordance with the shifting threat environment[80]. Its purpose was originally to defend (air defence) the continent against Russian bombers armed with nuclear bombs and arriving over the Canadian horizon[81]. The threat of bombers was soon replaced by those of missiles and both countries erected tracking mechanisms (aerospace) to warn of impending attacks, thus adopting a ballistic missile warning function. Finally, NORAD was tasked in 91 with the surveillance and monitoring of aircraft suspected of drug trafficking[82]. The bi-national integrated structure of NORAD was always found to be most responsive to the ever increasing speed of air breathing threats[83].

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[78] Federation of American Scientists. "NORAD Selected Chronology" http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/airdef/norad-chron.htm ; Internet; accessed 17 March 06.

[79] Dwight N. Mason. "The Future of Canadian – U.S. Defence Relations" *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol 33, Issue 1 (Spring 2003): 65.

[80] Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era,* 85.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Dwight Masson, "The Future of NORAD" *Royal Canadian Military Institute –Commentary,* March 2005: 1. [Article on-line]; available from http://www.rcmi.org/eng/pub/5/page8.asp?t=5&p=8 ; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006.

Until the events of 9/11, NORAD was essentially an outwards looking organisation, addressing threats as they approached the continent. Since 9/11 NORAD has broadened its scope to also address threats arising from within the continent, mainly in the form of passenger airliners[84]. When considering NORAD's usefulness, it may be worth noting "that today in the post 9-11 era, fighter aircraft are more relevant to homeland defence than they have been since the bombers were displaced as the primary threat to North America in the early 1960s"[85]. Also, contrary to popular belief and despite Canada's refusal to participate in BMD, NORAD's role and Canada's involvement within it remains relevant. Indeed, the August 2004 amendment to the NORAD agreement allows it to use its Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITWAA) capabilities in missile defence operations[86]. In essence, by virtue of this amendment to the agreement NORAD is now closely linked to the "battle management" of BMD[87].

The debate on NORAD's future is however one of role expansion to include assessment and warning of seaborne threats. In the year leading up to 9/11 many Canadian and U.S. intelligence agencies as well as others expressed growing concern "about the

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[84] Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era,* 86.

[85] Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era,* 89.

[86] McDonough, David S. "Canada, Missile Defence and the Potential for Strategic Instability" *Royal Canadian Military Institute –Sitrep,* May-June 2005: 10. [Article on-line]; available from http://www.rcmi.org/eng/pub/5/page5.asp?t=5&p=5; Internet; accessed 27 February 2006.

[87] Joseph T. Jockel, "U.S. National Missile Defence, Canada, and the future of NORAD" *Canada Among Nations 2000 – Vanishing Borders*. ed. by Maureen Appel Molat and Fen Oster Hampson, 73-93 (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2000): 87.

prospect of terrorists using Weapons of Mass Destruction on North American soil"[88]. U.S.-Canada cooperation on the issue of addressing threats to land and sea approaches is increasing[89]. September 11 illustrated that, similarly to air based threats, compressed warning time equally applied to land and sea threats as there may be little or perhaps no warning against sudden attacks or disasters[90]. Concerned by a lack of an integrated maritime warning system the Bi-national Planning Group reinforced the value of NORAD's bi-national nature when it stated "Unlike the system that support NORAD's role in the aerospace domain, there is no single, bi-national centralized hub of information to Detect or Sense maritime military or civilian activities that may adversely affect our nations"[91]. The same applies for land based threats.

If Canada were to pull out of NORAD its influence in Washington would likely diminish[92]. It would necessarily spell disaster for the Canadian Defence Industry (CDI) since "one should not ignore the symbiotic linkage between the industrial and defence components"[93], especially in the aerospace industry. This could potentially affect the

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[88] Sloan, *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era,* 90.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Dwight Mason, "The Future of NORAD": 1.

[91] Bi-National Planning Group, 2006 (*Draft) Final Report of the Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation,* 37.

[92] Joseph T. Jockel, "U.S. National Missile Defence, Canada, and the future of NORAD", 89.

[93] Dr James Fergusson, "The U.S.-Canada Relationship in the War on Terrorism: The Aerospace Dimension" *The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute Conference Publication: Canadian Defence*

Defence Production Sharing Arrangements (DPSA); the Defence Development Sharing Arrangements (DDSA); and the North American Technology Industrial Base Organisation (NATIBO); while placing additional pressure on an already fragile Canadian privileged status regarding the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The situation is already tenuous and in 2003 prompted, Robert Cyr, with the Canadian Defence Industries Association, to voice very serious concern over the potential loss of $1 Billion in CDI sales per year because of a "Buy American" clause attached to the Pentagon's $400 Billion U.S. authorisation bill[94]. By virtue of its bi-national character NORAD is perhaps not a guarantee against trade restrictions for Canadian companies competing for U.S. contracts but, it is reasonable to assume it provides some measure of leverage other countries simply will never enjoy. This leverage would certainly increase if our defence integration was more extensive. Caution is in order however, since there is no evidence to suggest that Canada's participation in NORAD has ever exerted any measure of influence on the "U.S. defence posture"[95].

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and the Canada-U.S. Strategic Partnership (September 2002)*;* [paper online]; available from http://www.cdfai.org/currentpublications.htm; Internet; accessed 18 April 2006, 21.

[94] CBC News. "U.S. bill may hurt Canada's defence industry" http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2003/07/09/cda_military030709.html; Internet; accessed 17 March 2006.

[95] Joseph T. Jockel, "U.S. National Missile Defence, Canada, and the future of NORAD", 89.

In the final analysis, NORAD is a success story in terms of a bi-national model[96] whose form could arguably extend to accommodate other potential continental command and control structures. It is unquestionably "the cornerstone of the U.S.-Canadian security relationship"[97] and by virtue of its fully integrated nature "arguably the most integrated bi-national defence organization in the world"[98]. It certainly does not appear to have outlived its usefulness. The NORAD agreement was renewed in May 2006 and its role expanded to include maritime surveillance where "once ratified, the new treaty would allow for intelligence on shipping data and threats to the sea lanes to be piped directly into NORAD headquarters"[99]. In the process of organizational evolution, NORAD would be ideally suited to assume a greater role perhaps in the area of intelligence fusion. Given the anticipated short or even perhaps nonexistent warning timeframe typically associated with potential acts of terrorism directed against the continent, timely intelligence gathering and fusion remains the single most valuable functionality for the ongoing battle against terrorism[100]. Given NORAD's unique bi-national structure and capabilities for timely

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[96] Joseph T. Jockel, "U.S. National Missile Defence, Canada, and the future of NORAD", 87.

[97] Stephen Cundari, Jonah J. Czerwinski, James Kitfield, Dwight N. Mason and Christopher Sands, "The U.S.-Canada Relationship in the War on Terrorism" *The Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute Conference publication: Canadian Defence and the Canada-U.S. Strategic Partnership* (September 2002): 59. [paper online]; available from http://www.cdfai.org/currentpublications.htm or http://www.cspresidency.org/pubs/canada_final_report.pd; Internet; accessed 18 April 2006.

[98] Ibid: 60.

[99] Murray Brewster. "Treaty not a threat, minister says: new NORAD agreement will include maritime surveillance control over military won't be compromised, O'connor says"; [MET Edition]" *Toronto Star,* 21 February 2006, A.06. http:proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 4 April 06.

[100] Professor Harvey Rishikof, "U.S. Strategy and International Law." (Presentation given to students of National Security Studies Course No 8 (Canadian Forces Staff College) at U.S. National War College, Washington D.C., March 27, 2006).

processing of warnings and assessments it appears ideally suited for assuming the intelligence fusion role for all continental air and sea threats with the major outcome stemming from its ability to mitigate the risk of cross border information gaps.

Concepts for Enhanced Continental Defence Integration Revised

The creation of both NORTHCOM and CANADACOM, relative newcomers to the defence arena but no less key players on the homeland defence scene, have shifted the emphasis of continental defence to national organizations that typically respond to independent national authorities and collaborate in a bilateral vice bi-national fashion. As it stands the NORTHCOM commander, Admiral Keating, is double hated as both the NORAD and NORTHCOM commander. This creates awkward dynamics in a relationship of two distinct commands working towards one common purpose where for reasons of Canadian political sensitivity one of the commands (NORAD) cannot be perceived as subordinate to the other (NORTHCOM)[101]. In the interest of enhanced continental defence functionality there is a pressing requirement to find better ways of integrating key command structures recognizing however that they ultimately must remain politically palatable to both partners. Moreover, there is also an indisputable need to formally review

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[101] Lieutenant-General Eric A. Findley, "NORAD, NORTHCOM, Bilateral Planning Group." (Presentation given to students of National Security Studies Course No 8 (Canadian Forces Staff College) at Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., March 28, 2006).

the land and maritime portions of the longstanding continental "Basic Security Plan" which have been found to be outdated[102].

The CANUS BPG has studied this precise issue and provided options for consideration in their draft final report. In essence, what they propose are four future model concepts or structural models where the organizational constants in each model remain NORTHCOM, CANADACOM, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada ((PSEPC) now referred to as Public Safety (PS)). The organizational variants included in each model consist of either NORAD, a North American Defence Command (NADC), a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) or a Continental Joint Interagency Task Force (CJITF). Each option is further characterized by a subset of either bi-national, bilateral or unilateral alternative courses of action which either nation may exercise independently depending on the situation.

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[102] Joseph R. Inge and Eric A. Findley, "North American Defense and Security After 9/11" *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 40, (1st quarter 2006): 25.

FIGURE 1: MODEL 1: THREE COMMANDS – COMPLEMENTARY MISSIONS



Model 1 - The first conceptual model depicted in figure 1 above is a "Three Commands - Complementary Missions Model" where "missions would be clearly defined and delineated between all three commands" (NORTHCOM, CANADACOM and NORAD). "NORAD missions would be expanded to include all domain continental warning in addition to aerospace control". CANADACOM and NORTHCOM "would continue to plan and execute unilateral or bilateral missions for the defense of Canada and the United States respectively in the land and maritime domains". A Combined Joint Task Force is proposed for non-NORAD bi-national missions. This model has merit in that it builds upon the currently existing but expanded NORAD model where all intelligence

functions would be concentrated in one organization but for the benefit of both nations. This is an inherently flexible model since NORTHCOM and CANADACOM have the option of executing plans in the land and sea domain developed either uni-laterally, for response to a national event, or bi-laterally / bi-nationally based on previous mutually agreed to plans and procedures. Notwithstanding the BPG's insightful consideration of the issues, what the report fails to underline is that this option would require the least amount of restructuring as suggested commands all currently exist. This model also solves an important but ongoing command and control challenge by clearly establishing three distinct commands thereby eliminating the dual hated command role played by Commander NORTHCOM. Moreover, the report fails to indicate if the proposed CJTF (for non-NORAD bi-national missions) is intended to be a standing organization or not. Typically, CJTF's are mission tailored organizations but this is an important factor when considering operational response timelines and the complexities associated with standing up a bi-national ad-hoc organization at short notice.

FIGURE 2: MODEL 2 - SINGLE COMMAND FOR CONTINENTAL DEFENSE



Model 2 - The second model depicted in figure 2 above proposes a "Single Command for Continental Defense" where NADC is responsible for all bi-national defence issues". Essentially, it aims to transform NORAD into an all-domain bi-national warning and response North American Defence Command. NORTHCOM and CANADACOM retain responsibility for response to purely national events. This model has merit in that it provides the clearest and probably most functional planning and command and control structure of all options. It builds on the NORAD model which has enjoyed a significant measure of success to date in terms of continental defence and addresses the issue of CJTF "ad-hocness" referred to in model one by distributing both Canadians and Americans throughout a unified chain of command, ensuring the interests of both countries are continually represented in the formulation of plans and conduct of operations.

Notwithstanding, traditional Canadian sovereignty related apprehensions regarding continental issues, in the end "Canada has tended to embrace joint continental defence efforts with the United States"[103]. For their part, Americans have tended to prefer continental approaches to defence and continue to do so today [104]. Thus, if the structure is bi-nationally well balanced with key positions remaining American; if, Canadians and U.S. officials find common interest in this model and; if, provisions are made to ensure sovereignty over operations in one's nation is maintained (as is currently the case with NORAD) this option has the potential of being well received by Canadians by virtue of their experience with NORAD and, Americans because of their preference for continental over a perimeter based defence. Before summarily discarding the option because of political impracticality it is worth bearing in mind that in the event of an attack either partner will require the "cooperation to be close to automatic and developed to the point of contingency response plans that can be implemented immediately without political debate"[105]. Moreover, as Jack Granatstein reminds us, "Canada must cooperate as fully as possible with the U.S. [in the defence of North America] because the Americans are deadly serious about homeland security"[106]. Most importantly however, this model does not tie up standing forces, nor does it preclude any partner from acting independently with each operation approved on a case-by-case basis as is currently the case for NORAD and,

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[103] Phillipe Lagassé, "Northern Command and the Evolution of Canada – U.S. Defence Relations" *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 4, No 1 (Spring 2003): 16.

[104] Ibid: 20.

[105] Mason. "The Future of Canadian – U.S. Defence Relations": 82.

[106] Ibid: 84.

commercially, it would be conducive to enhanced industrial/technological cooperation between both partners. Success of this model is contingent upon a high degree of defence integration. The perception of NORTHCOM and CANADACOM marginalization could prove problematic as suggested in the BPG report.

FIGURE 3: MODEL 3 – PARALLEL COMMANDS WITH A STANDING COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE RESPONSIBLE TO NATIONAL COMMANDS



Model 3 - The third model depicted in figure 3 above proposes a Standing Combined Joint Task Force responsible to parallel national commands where the "CJTF performs bi-national missions as assigned by NORTHCOM and CANADACOM". In essence, this model has the CJTF (based on NORAD) acting in a supporting role to national commands. This model is similar in many ways to the previous model where the NADC structure is replaced by a standing CJTF. Essentially, distinction resides in that the CJTF is subordinate in authority to both national commands. The strength of this model lies in the dominance of national commands over the CJTF and therefore their ability to exercise influence over the process. While this concept could work reasonably well when the issue is of single national scope, events affecting both countries will run the risks of complicating command and control when operating in a cross border manner, potentially overwhelming the capacity of the CJTF to respond effectively to either national command. In my opinion this model is not well suited for a continental structure given the prerogatives each national command may exercise over the CJTF. The proficiency of a continental system is essentially tied to its ability to deal effectively with an incident which has cross border implications. This model does not appear optimized for that purpose, quite the contrary. The model would however, improve bi-national situational awareness regarding a developing crisis in either country leading to enhanced response readiness of the non-affected country in the event of a request for assistance. In the end however, contrary to what is suggested in the BPG report, I remain unconvinced this model would appeal to either Canadians or Americans for the reasons previously stated.

FIGURE 4: MODEL 4 - CONTINENTAL JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE



Model 4 - The fourth model in figure 4 above proposes a "Continental Joint Interagency Task Force" (CJITF) where defense and security functions are fully integrated and responsive to a CJITF. Each country would continue to maintain an ability to act uni-laterally within its own borders. It is argued the strength of this model relies on the combined effects of a fully integrated civil and military defence structure. While this may appear ideal in theory in a near perfect world, I unfortunately perceive this model as simply "a bridge too far". This model combines too many variables, not the least of which implies integrating not only two military cultures but also two very different public service cultures

where resistance to information sharing is common[107]. By its very nature and sheer gargantuan size, DHS for instance, is an unwieldy and cumbersome organization at best. It has been, since its inception, beset by problems of profligate spending and more recently was severely criticized for its ineffective response to hurricane Katrina, its first genuine organizational test[108]. I use this example simply to illustrate that there exist limits to what measure of efficiency can be achieved through full fledged integration.

The Harper Factor

As I pointed out earlier in this paper any progress Canada makes towards enhanced continental defence is first and foremost directly related to the political climate established by both national leaders. Consequently, it begs the question whether Prime Minister Harper is the man to lead Canada down the path of enhanced defence relationship with the U.S. or rather seek, as his most recent predecessors did, a path of relative disengagement bordering at times on outright resistance. The notion of establishing a fully integrated continental defence structure is certainly a hard sell to the Canadian public for any leader, especially one of a minority government. Moreover, Prime Minister Harper has not

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[107] Findley, "NORAD, NORTHCOM, Bilateral Planning Group."

[108] Fletcher, Michael A. "OMB Head to Replace Card as Top Bush Aid." *The Washington Post*, 29 November 2006, p.A4.

provided any indication of his position on the matter. However, there are always a number of indicators which serve to "define the cloth from which a man is cut".

Prime Minister Harper had always quietly expressed an interest in rebuilding the relationship with President Bush which had suffered multiple setbacks under the regimes of Prime Ministers Chrétien and Paul Martin. The first sign of his willingness in mending fences with President Bush was through his choice of Ambassador in Washington, Mr Michael Wilson, who was a shrewd choice since he came with very strong credentials as a former top government official in the Mulroney government and lots of charisma[109]. The new ambassador was personally entrusted by the prime minister with the very delicate task of rescuing the "bilateral relationship which had gone sour, without for a moment giving Canadians back home the impression that their new government is in any way kowtowing to the superpower"[110]. Prime Minister Harper reinforced this position publicly in Canada, sending a clear signal to that effect in the Throne Speech when (by way of the Governor General) he advocated building a "stronger multilateral and bilateral relationships, starting with Canada's relationship with the United States, our best friend and largest trading

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[109] The Economist, "The Americas: Ready for a Thaw: Canadian- American Relations" *The Economist Online,* February 25, 2006: 56. [Journal on-line]; available from http:proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 5 April 2006.

[110] Ibid.

partner"[111]. That said, it is worth noting that defence failed to make it into the select top five priorities on which the government has pledged to focus during their mandate.

The second critical ingredient which provides some measure of insight into the potential shape of future defence relationships is through interpretation of Mr Harper's personal position on defence matters. Before coming to power Prime Minister Harper was already an outspoken adherent of a strong defence policy. In his electoral platform he pledged to increase recruiting by 13,000 regular forces personnel and 10,000 additional reservists. Moreover, he committed to increase defence spending "by $5.3B over the next five years, beyond the currently projected levels of defence budget" already approved under the liberal government[112]. In terms of national commitments, he pledged to "increase the Canadian Force capacity to protect Canada's Artic sovereignty and security" and "restore the regular army in British Colombia" proclaiming he will adopt a "Canada First" vision for defence[113]. Nationally, Mr Harper's decision to make his first foreign trip as a newly elected prime minister a surprise visit to Canadian troops deployed in Afghanistan made a strong public statement in support of defence.

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[111] Canada. Office of the Prime Minister. "Speech From The Throne" April 4, 2006. [article on-line]; available from http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1087 ; Internet: accessed 5 April 2006.

[112] Conservative Party of Canada. "Stand Up for Canada – Federal Elections Platform 2006".

[113] Ibid.

Continentally, he vowed to continue cooperating with the U.S. military in the defence of North America[114]and at great political risk, offered to participate in negotiations on the controversial BMD file if invited to do so by the U.S.; a highly remote prospect at this stage[115]. The Minister of Defence confirmed however that Parliament would need to approve participation. Mr Harper was also committed to signing the NORAD agreement scheduled for renewal this May[116]. He supports expansion of NORAD's role into the maritime domain, an initiative spearheaded by the former liberal government. Although these commitments in no way suggest that Prime Minister Harper is an advocate of a fully integrated continental defence structure, they do provide a clear indication of his commitment to a strong and vibrant defence and healthy bilateral defence cooperation with the United States, one which under the right circumstances could possibly evolve towards a higher degree of defence integration.

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[114] Ibid.

[115] Mike Blanchfield, "Defence boss promises to boost military spending," [Final Edition]. *Calgary Herald.* 24 February 2006. [article on-line]: Available from http://proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 5 April, 2006.

[116] Mike Blanchfield. "NORAD treaty renewal could highlight Harper-Bush meeting," *Can News West.* 26 January 2006. [article on-line]: Available from http://proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 5 April, 2006.

Conclusion

The Canada U.S. defence relationship is a longstanding one. The pursuit by both countries, in recent years, of different national security strategies coupled with poor political leader interaction and the perceived proclivities of the Canadian electorate for absolute self-determination have conspired to maintain the Canadian U.S. relationship in a perpetual state of "sub-optimisation". The recent progressive strengthening of the Canadian military capacity is principally a function of a more engaged political leadership which is creating opportunities for increased collaboration and active engagement by both partners. Although these opportunities clearly contribute to a strengthened continental defence posture they ultimately fall short of optimising the continental defence posture such that the level of defence integration may move beyond the extremely successful NORAD arrangement. Notwithstanding the huge restructuring of defence and security structures in both countries following the events of 9/11, political sensitivities and realities are such that the defence structures in both countries will continue to evolve in step with the threat but independently. A move to integrate defences structures beyond the current NORAD arrangement requires political impetus and with U.S. frustrations over Canada's decision to forego participation in the U.S. BMD program, the inclination to move boldly in this direction will likely require another major catalyst, much as was the case when the U.S. was concerned by the Russian bomber threat back in the mid 1950s. In the intervening period, it falls primarily to Canada, through the prime minister in particular, to keep working hard at better managing the bilateral relationship. Especially important is Canada's continued effort to convince Washington it has turned the page by sending

continued strong signals that it is serious on matters of defence and security. For their part, military planners need to further refine the examination of options for enhanced continental defence integration so as to be prepared for the moment their political masters come looking for insightful recommendations with the previously proposed North American Defence Command (NADC) model appearing particularly worthy of added consideration. In the meantime, given the nature of the bilateral relationship, concrete advances in continental defence reform are likely to remain incremental at best.

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