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PLANNING FROM THE REAR:

CANADIAN FORCES PLANNING EXPERTISE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL DOMESTIC SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLANS

By/ par

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ASTRACT

After 11 September 2001, the Government of Canada reaffirmed its commitment to protecting its citizens by establishing the Department of Public Safety, Canada Command, and re-emphasizing a Canada first priority. This mandate infers a full spectrum, coordinated approach involving all levels of government and a multitude of agencies to provide a responsive and effective national domestic security and emergency preparedness capability.

This paper examines the contributions that the CF can make in generating these national plans with a particular focus on the military's planning expertise. The concept of CF core competencies in planning is analyzed from the context of career-long learning, operational experience, and military planning approaches. This assessment asserts that the CF as a national institution possesses the fullest range of requisite skill sets and capabilities necessary for the formulation of national interagency plans. The proposal that the CF apply this expertise and plan from the rear in assisting in the development in national security and emergency preparedness plans is also explored from potential organizational resistance to change and cultural perspectives.

The paper concludes that the core competencies resident in the CF are wholly relevant and highly applicable to today's security environment. Moreover, the CF should be viewed as a national asset greater than simply a "boots on the ground" response capability. Finally, CF knowledge-based competencies in the areas of exercises, logistics, communication, and command and control should be more fully exploited to realize nationally integrated domestic security measures.

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Sun Tzu[1]

INTRODUCTION

Domestic Security Imperative

Since the end of the Cold War, the global security environment has changed considerably with the emergence of new threats capable of affecting domestic interests from afar. Concerns over unstable or failed states that were once viewed as isolated concerns abroad can now become training grounds for sinister groups capable of carrying out destructive acts on any nation's home soil. Extremism, organized crime, and global warming have resulted in man-made tragedies and natural disasters that are increasingly the common concern of the international community.

It is within this context that Canada's domestic security and emergency management capacities have come to the fore as declared by the Minister of National Defence (MND) in ". . . establish[ing] the defence of Canada as our first priority."[2] This imperative is further accentuated in the 2004 publication of Canada's first official National Security Policy (NSP) focused on the security of Canadians.[3] The NSP states that the Government of Canada (GOC) has a priority goal of "protecting Canada and Canadians" through a series of key initiatives notably focused on enhancing domestic security and emergency management capabilities.

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[1] Sun Tzu, , Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, 142.
[2] Department of National Defence, 2 , (Ottawa: Canada's International Policy Statement, 2005), preface.
[3] Privy Council Office, - , (Ottawa: 2004), vii.

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In keeping with this mandate, references throughout the NSP emphasize the core theme of improved inter-government and interagency coordination in meeting the government's responsibility to ensure public safety and security. Of particular note is the added importance placed on the newly created Department of Public Safety Canada (PSC)[4] charged with the "testing and auditing of federal departments' security responsibilities and activities" and "round-the-clock co-ordination and support across government and to key national players in the event of national emergencies."[5]

PSC Mandate and Capability

A closer examination of PSC's mandate reveals overarching coordination and management responsibilities that include all levels of government and other regulatory agencies. The considerable number and jurisdictions of these departments, as seen just at the national level[6], demonstrates the scope and complexity of this task. Since September 11, PSC, and its predecessor organizations, have been at the forefront of projects such as the Public Safety and Security Interoperability in Canada initiative to better harmonize interactions between these diverse groups through improved inter-organizational processes. The goal of this initiative is to provide the capability of:

[4] PSC previously established as the department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) and before that the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP).
[5] Ibid, viii.
[6] In no particular order: Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Firearms Centre (CFC), Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), National Parole Board (NPB), Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's (CATSA), Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), Canadian Coast Guard's (CCG), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Department of National Defence (DND), Defence R&D Canada (DRDC), National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS), Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Centre for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control (CIDPC), Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), Transport Canada (TC). Privy Council Office, Public Safety and Security (PS&S) Community document, (Ottawa: Public Safety & Security Interoperability Committee, 2005), 1 - 6.

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> . . . working cooperatively in a seamless environment of shared responsibilities to help detect, prevent, and respond to threats (whether criminal, security or health-related) and national emergencies. Interoperability – the capacity for, and effective management of, information sharing among departments and agencies having public safety and security responsibilities – will be a critical measure of the success with which these organizations operate.[7]

From this brief analysis, then, it is readily apparent that there is a far-reaching mandate to coordinate and manage the development of national security and emergency preparedness plans in Canada. Indeed, the task requires extensive communication, networking, and planning expertise. As a more recently formed department, PSC has a vital mission to accomplish. Given the unpredictable and unrelenting nature of potential threats, there is also urgency to this undertaking. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that these efforts must be completed swiftly with as much competency and comprehensiveness as possible. In this regard, all governmental resources should be applied to this effort especially those with extensive planning expertise and experience. The assertion of this paper is that the Canadian military is an excellent resource in this regard. As such, the CF can "plan from the rear" by ***contributing*** to but not ***controlling*** the development of these national plans.

The discussion will explore the CF's role within the national security agenda followed by an assessment of Canadian military planning expertise as a national asset from institutional, core competency, and external perspectives. The value of the military approach to national plans development is examined from basic principles. Finally, the potential contribution of other areas of military expertise such as logistics, communications, and command and control, is considered in the development of national domestic security and emergency preparedness plans.

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[7] Privy Council Office, 2 , (Ottawa: Iteration 2.0, DRAFT Version 15, 12 August 2005), 1.

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THE CF AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA

CF Priorities: International Policy Statement and National Security Policy

The CF role in the National Security agenda has been articulated in the 2005 international policy statement. These documents have outlined a security continuum with the focus on national security at the centre flanked by personal and international security.

The concept here is one of interconnections and escalations wherein a threat can increase from a personal nature to a community level or possibly to become a provincial concern. There conceivably comes a point where a threat could increase beyond the response means of local forces and require national assistance. As discussed earlier, this interrelationship demands both accurate and timely coordination and planning across a wide array of government departments and associated organizations.

From this framework, the GOC has defined three core national security interests of which the first two are more domestically focused, namely:

1. Protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad;
2. Ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and
3. Contributing to international security.[8]

Looking at these first two domestically oriented mandates, the CF itself has been purposely directed to realign its organization to better respond to national events. In particular, the emphasis on domestic security has been reflected in a revitalized force structure such that by ". . . improving their ability to respond to domestic requirements, the Forces will view Canada as a single operational area."[9]

[8] Privy Council Office, - , 5.
[9] Department of National Defence, 2 , . . ., 18.

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To most effectively carry out these responsibilities, the CF has specifically been tasked to:

> enhance . . . [its] . . . relationships with civil authorities. This will include sharing information as well as developing and exercising plans, so that, in the event of a crisis, the Forces can make a timely, effective contribution to the Government's overriding objective to protect Canadians.[10]

Thus, the GOC has laid out a domestic security agenda that is ambitious in both scope and complexity. At the same time, the need for such a revitalization of the country's security, emergency preparedness, and interoperability capabilities is generally well understood and supported. However, the means of designing and building this new framework has not been fully defined. It is here in the development of Canada's new security framework the CF has the potential for a core contributory role. With its extensive skill sets and experience, the CF presents a rich resource for the development of this new security architecture. In particular, this contribution can be realized by exploiting the CF's national-level planning expertise to create an ". . . integrated security system . . . [in] a coordinated approach with other key partners – provinces, territories, communities, the private sector and allies . . . [with] co-ordinated plans to support the overall framework."[11]

CF PLANNING EXPERTISE AS A NATIONAL ASSET

CF Planning Expertise

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The CF, as with other militaries, is recognized domestically as a distinct organization representing the profession of arms. In placing service interests ahead of personal desires, Canadian Military personnel demonstrate their commitment to their

[10] Ibid.
[11] Privy Council Office, - , preface.

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country and subservience to political masters. While law enforcement officers commit to serve and protect, their unlimited liability is largely unknown in time and place. The CF commitment to unlimited liability differs in knowingly placing significant numbers of military personnel into harm's way as in the Afghanistan mission. Thus, the CF has acknowledged a priori and subsequently experienced multiple casualties in conflict areas over extended periods of time.

In this respect, the CF is distinctly different from any other government department and is vastly different than any private sector business. No other organization dispenses the controlled application of force on behalf of the government for national aims to the same degree with such potential loss of life. It is, therefore, within this context that the CF must train, educate, socialize, and develop its personnel. In other words, since there are no equivalent organizations from which to draw the full range of required expertise[12], the Canadian Military is charged with the development of its own.

And because key, full spectrum skill sets must be grown from within, the CF invests considerable effort and focused intent in producing the requisite talents necessary to successfully carrying out military tasks – tasks that are generally expected to have no-fail options. This requirement necessitates an emphasis on career-long development to produce the skill and knowledge to plan and conduct complex military missions.

The associated career stream of such an investment is considerable. From basic training to initial Military Occupations training, military officers are taught, tested, and promoted based on their abilities to not only lead but to plan and organize. This core trio of skills continues to develop with time, experience, and rank as responsibilities increase

[12] For example, related organizations like the RCMP, Provincial, Municipal Law enforcements agencies, Fire Fighters, Security and Intelligence agencies only represent a fraction of the requirement of full scope military expertise and capabilities and, therefore, do not represent adequate sources to meet all CF needs.

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and expectations rise. Advanced educational courses over years of service complement the experiential aspects of greater learning.

By the time an officer reaches the rank of Major and Lieutenant-Colonel, he or she is an accomplished leader and planner. In other words, the CF consistently invests extensive time, effort, and resources in developing its future leaders. Businesses can hire from the outside and there are regular inter-departmental moves in government. While this can provide for productive career and organizational changes at all levels including CEOs and Deputy Ministers, the CF provides for a career-long focus and continuity of skills development such as planning within each of its senior officers. Thus, the military by its nature provides for standardized and assured development of essential skill sets and talents. This, in turn, results in a large and eminently capable cadre of planning expertise.

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Core competency is another concept highlighting the extensive planning abilities resident in the CF. A core competency, defined as specialized, collective expertise that is the result of harmonizing complex streams of technology and work activity[13], can be easily related to a military organization. As discussed in the previous section, the mandate of the CF is central to Canada's security and the service the CF provides, the controlled application of force, unquestionably aligns with "an area of specialized expertise." Furthermore, the constantly increasing hi-tech aspects of modern conflict applied in ever shorter timelines ties in very closely with the concept of "complex streams of technology and work activity." Finally, the "harmonizing" component of this

[13] C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, "The Core Competence of the Corporation," 7 , May-June 1990, 82.

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definition can be readily associated with CF's advanced planning and co-ordination expertise.

But the higher level of Canadian Military planning expertise is far more than simply the sum of individual talents. As outlined earlier, the CF development approach for its personnel entails a career-long investment in fundamental military skills of which planning is one. The development and contributions of ever more capable planning talents warrant further examination from a core competency perspective.

Firstly, since the CF manages the development all of its personnel from recruit to retirement there is a common and known standard of training across military occupations. At the individual level, planning abilities are learned from existing planning practices and principles while practicing the associated skills to varying circumstances. This level of expertise could rightly be called an occupation or career field aggregate competency.[14]

Secondly, there is a collective competency encompassing professional expertise in CF planning. This component level of competency is represented by a higher level of planning knowledge and practices in a dynamic CF environment. Here competency is embodied in experiential, documentary, procedural, and practical expertise, which generates a deeper understanding of planning theory, philosophy, and doctrine as befits the recognition of planning as a "fundamental characteristic of the military profession."[15]

Thirdly, planning can be considered such a core military requirement that it necessitates consistently high performance at all levels and times together with the requisite developmental opportunities to do so. This institutional competency level is:

[14] MGen R. Dallaire, * (ADM(Per): file 1959-1 (A/DSHRA), 9 Feb 98), A-3.
[15] Ibid, in an adaptation of author's concept.

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> . . . often contained in codes of conduct, in statements of ethos or core values or in the oral history as well as in the socialization and professional development which occurs as one enters and progresses in the profession.[16]

Finally then, these three levels of competency - occupation, component, institutional - are mutually reinforcing and have become interwoven into the fabric of the military. This inter-relationship serves not only to strengthen CF planning expertise but to also ensure the continued excellence of this competency. Interestingly, however, the theory of a valid core competency holds that the associated excellence must be viewed as such "from both internal and external perspectives."[17] That is to say that both the CF itself and external organizations should recognize the intellectual skills and capabilities that these core competencies represent and more importantly, the contribution they can make, in this case, to a national planning effort. From a CF perspective, a more appropriate definition of core military competence might be, ". . . the unique skills and capabilities that allow the Canadian Forces to provide defence services to the Canadian Government and people."[18]

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Unfortunately, CF core competencies are not widely recognized or viewed as valuable intellectual assets in and of themselves. This is perhaps most striking to consider within the CF itself as a professional and proud body that should be quick to assess and promote its strengths to advantage. Indeed, one internal study concluded that, "Insufficient attention has been paid to core competencies and how these can be

[16] Ibid.
[17] Mark R. Gallon, Harold M. Stillman and David Coates, "Putting Core Competency Thinking into Practice," /, June 1995, 23.
[18] BGen Peter T. Gartenburg, * (NDHQ: file 1959 (DGMRS), 5 Jan 98), 1.

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leveraged to get better results."[19] The sweeping Military Occupational Structure (MOS) review sought to define an optimum force structure with CF downsizing and described the Minimum Operational Requirement (MOR) as the ". . . minimum number of uniformed personnel necessary to support the 1994 White Paper on Defence contingency operations . . . ."[20] This approach infers a strong quantitative vice qualitative or core competence methodology. More recently, the Minister of National Defence's Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency made the observation that "core competencies are not clearly identified . . . [and that] . . . defence has not been successful in identifying activities and functions which are core to the Defence mission . . . ."[21]

Thus, if CF core competencies and the valuable contributions they can make to the country are not collectively acknowledged within the Department of National Defence (DND), then there is an obvious hurdle to overcome in applying this knowledge-based capability outside of the military (and this is to say nothing of the missed opportunities to properly harness internal significance in terms of CF pride, self-worth, and morale). In other words, the lack of a collective recognition of CF planning expertise as a desirable resource is an impediment to the wider exploitation of this valuable asset.

Within this context, there is another element possibly conspiring against the ready incorporation of CF expertise into external organizational planning efforts, namely the perception of military culture. Even though the Canadian Military draws from the general Canadian population, the CF has been viewed as distinct by being ". . . inheritors

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[19] BGen Peter T. Gartenburg, "Department of National Defence – Corporate Strategy Assessment," Final Master's Paper, Queen's University, 1997, 12.
[20] LCol D. Guimont, 3 (NDHQ: file 5600-1 (DDA) 11 Dec 97), 1.
[21] Department of National Defence. Minister's Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency. $ "Executive Summary". From$
. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2003), iii.

of cherished historical legacies, traditions and a unique corporate sense of identity and purpose".[22] There are close parallels with US Forces where the military has been described as having ". . . organizational and participant cultures that are conservative, rooted in history and tradition, based on group loyalty and conformity, and oriented toward obedience to superiors."[23] These viewpoints suggest an inward-looking and, therefore, not well understood organization subject to misconception by outside agencies.

More visible distinctions of military culture include "discipline, professional ethos, ceremonial displays and etiquette, and cohesion and esprit de corps."[24] The manner in which military personnel conduct themselves, the adherence to the military culture, outward displays of respect and recognition, and the team building approach are all tangible attributes. Rightly or wrongly, these characteristics can lead to widely ranging interpretations of military intentions and actions both from an organizational perspective and certainly in the closer working environment of collective staff actions such as interagency planning initiatives. Questions of trust and motive could also figure prominently with those unfamiliar with military authority and approaches.

Finally, there is the issue of organizational behaviour and resistance to change aspects in particular. Relying on military staff as key contributors to national domestic security and emergency preparedness plans could well result in an ". . . attitude or

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[22] General G.C.E. Theriault (Ret'd), "Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian View," from * , ed. Jim Hansen, Susan McNish (Toronto, ON: the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), 9.

[23] Gail L. Zellman, Joanna Zorn Heilbrunn, Conrad Schmidt, and Carl Builder, "Implementing policy change in large organizations" in - 2 (Washington: Rand, National Defence Research Institute, MR-323-OSD, 1993), 370.

[24] Donald M. Snider, "An uniformed debate on military culture", , Vol. 43, Issue 1, (Winter 1999): 16-19.

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behaviour that shows unwillingness to make or support a change"[25] on the part of external agencies. In other words, having unknown military staff take a strong contributory role within an organization charged with producing the final product would most likely lead to conditions of uncertainty, hesitation, or mistrust. These feelings of doubt can be summarized as follows:

Resistance to CF Lead	Likely Cause
No reasons to change	Lack of recognition of benefit in using CF expertise
Fear of the unknown	Unfamiliarity with CF culture, capabilities
Lack of good information	Failure to focus on extensive national involvement for robust domestic preparedness plans
Fear for loss of power	Perceived CF agenda to take control
Bad Timing	Recent separation of PSC mandate from DND (2001)

Table 1 – Organizational Resistance to CF as Lead Planners[26]

Source: Schermerhorn, "Organizational Behaviour," 401.

As mentioned in the discussion of core competencies, if there is a collective lack of awareness and recognition of the significant national value and benefit resident in CF soft skills, i.e., planning expertise, then there is no ready impetus to change the existing approach and methodologies to produce security and emergency plans. The absence of recognition of a needed and ready asset necessarily leads to oversight and lost opportunity. In essence, then, this leads to the default logic of no reason to change. It does not infer that change and utilization of CF expertise could not occur with greater awareness and acknowledgement.

Fear of the unknown stemming from a lack of understanding and appreciation of CF culture as discussed previously naturally leads to hesitancy and uncertainty. An

[25] John R. Schermerhorn, James G. Hunt, and Richard N. Osborn, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 7th Edition, 2000), 400.
[26] Ibid, 401, adaptation.

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unfamiliarity of CF capability and lack of clarification of its contributory roles, could easily lead to reluctance to include the CF as a core developer of national plans. Again, however, this does not mean that CF involvement is without merit or highly desirable.

Another way of viewing these issues is that a lack of information could equate missed opportunities and potential gains. Taking a broader view, one could say that the imperative to produce national security and emergency plans could present a major undertaking with complexities that are only now becoming better understood. Within this framework, it is possible that a concerted assessment of the best resources, such as CF skill sets, to produce these deliverables may not have yet materialized or have been fully contemplated.

A more immediate cause for some hesitation or resistance towards direct CF involvement in national plans development is that of perceived threat to jurisdiction or mandate. PSC as the lead department charged with plans development would justifiably be concerned with the potential influence and effect of a large department such as DND taking on a key role in the production of core national plans. As a relatively new department, only recently separated from DND itself, PSC would be understandably cautious in associating itself closely with the CF for fear of diluting the PSC identity as the lead national security and emergency preparedness department.

From this somewhat cursory analysis, one can reasonably conclude that the ready acceptance and incorporation of CF expertise as a very notable and available planning capability is not a given. The counter issues are not insurmountable and could be effectively addressed through enhanced communication, coordination, cooperation, and mutual education. Of course, the discussion here has proceeded from an external CF

perspective alone. There are likely to be equally similar concerns and reactions extending from the military towards external agencies. However, given the CF ethos of service before self and allegiance to political direction, these considerations cannot be viewed as overly significant.

In sum, the purpose of this section is to highlight other factors, such as lack of recognition, cultural misinterpretations, and resistance to change, as influential determinants in employing military expertise in a major planning role. And while these issues are by no means insurmountable obstacles, their prolonged debate simply masks the true value that CF expertise represents as a knowledge-based asset. More to the point, these factors do not diminish the potential of military planning capabilities to contribute significantly to the national security and emergency management agenda. Finally, a level of expectation of just how effective an integrated multi-organizational effort can be must be kept in proper perspective given the imperative of national security. This view is summed up in the words of one US scholar writing on the American effort to coordinate national security work with a unity of effort, "Achieving unified action within the U.S. national security policymaking organizational framework is extremely difficult and perfection is impossible, but dampening the dissonance is not."[27]

Military Planning Expertise – A Valuable National Asset

Building on the assertion that CF core competencies are valuable intellectual assets, CF planning expertise has been repeatedly engaged in various multi-agency crises and scenarios. These real world events have not only demonstrated the worth of this

[27] Paul Michael Severance, "Characterizing the Construct of Organizational Unity of Effort In the Interagency National Security Policy Process," **(**Dissertation in partial fulfillment for the Doctor of Philosophy In Human Development, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Falls Church, Virginia April 25, 2005), 2.

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expertise, but they have also allowed for further refinement and adjustment to interagency planning approaches and methodologies. The following sections discuss examples of military planning expertise that have played a major contributory role in addressing multi-organization coordination and preparation requirements.

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Op ABACUS – At the end of the twentieth century, after the computer age had fully established itself into modern life, a serious deficiency in software programming became evident raising the specter of widespread computer crashes and loss of critical data and functions.[28] The unconstrained potential of this Year 2000 (Y2K) problem immediately created a collective multi-domain interest in dealing with this issue and preparing comprehensive contingency plans. In Ottawa, it is significant to not only note that the CF was promptly involved in the development of these plans, but to also note the leading role the military was given.

> The Government of Canada has developed a national contingency plan to respond to the Y2K threat and a National Contingency Planning Group (NCPG) has been formed with representatives from all federal departments. Should National Defence be required to assist civil authorities, they are developing an operational plan known as OP ABACUS. . . . [T]he three levels of government support in dealing with the Year 2000 problem (Y2K) as follows:
>
> - Departmental compliance to Y2K
> - National Contingency Planning Group (NCPG) - DND led
> - DND Response requirements for operations - OP ABACUS[29]

From this assignment of responsibilities, it is clear that in addition to its conventionally respected operational capabilities the CF's planning expertise was also

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[28] James D. Little, (As Chairman North Carolina Public Staff Year 2000 Committee, North Carolina), 17 September 1998, 2.
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[29] Workshop on the Year 2000 Problem (Y2K), / (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Geomatics, 1999), 1.

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quickly recognized as essential in developing national plans to deal with possible Y2K impacts. This recognition is further revealed in the comments of Mr. Paul Thibault (Federal Coordinator, Y2K National Contingency Planning, DND) on the proficiency of the CF in planning, "The Canadian Forces have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment and competence. They can plan missions and they can deliver. . . . Nor do I doubt their capacity to plan strategically."[30]

Although the Y2K bug did not manifest itself as a serious threat, it did raise the awareness of interagency coordination requirements and the contribution of the CF beyond simply the conduct of operations. Indeed, the Y2K scare exemplified the greater role and contribution, certainly in contingency planning, that the CF can make to safeguard national interests in the face of a threat. This opinion is reflected in the joint CDS and DM statement of congratulations to personnel on their role in Op ABACUS with emphasis on both the vital planning and coordination functions provided by the CF.

> From contingency planning to . . . the coordinating role of the National Contingency Planning Group . . . we played a leading role in meeting the Government's principal objective of maintaining public confidence. . . . One of the benefits has been to strengthen the rapport developed with the other Government departments, the provinces and territories, industry, and our allies. . . . The importance of these lessons and the role played by the Department and the Canadian Forces should not be under-estimated.[31]

From an Op ABACUS perspective, it is readily apparent that CF planning expertise was at the core of the planning and coordination effort necessary to prepare and protect the country. As a measure of the success and effectiveness of the CF contribution it is worth noting that Canada was considered to be ". . . ranked among the world leaders

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[30] 2 , Chair Ms. Susan Whelan, Essex, Lib., (Ottawa: Standing Committee On Industry, Standing Order 108(2), 1998), Transcripts of Evidence provided, 0915 Hours Thursday, November 19.

[31] General J.M.G. Baril and J. Judd, (NDHQ: CDS/DM Message), 1 January 2000.

in Y2K readiness."[32] Overall, then, the CF played a key supporting role in preparing for the potential Y2K crisis, a role that demonstrated the viability in "planning from the rear" to foster maximum interagency coordination and plans development.

Op GRIZZLY – In June 2001, shortly after Op ABACUS, the Prime Minister announced that Canada would host the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta. This event was similar to the Y2K scenario in that time and place were known, but the exact nature and extent of the possible threats were not. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that the lessons learned and success of Op ABACUS would naturally migrate into interagency planning for Op GRIZZLY, the CF operation for the Kananaskis G8 Summit. However, this did not occur as would have been anticipated given the Y2K experience.

> Lessons were learned during this operation, including the need to establish a special office under the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff to facilitate coordination with various other government departments and agencies involved in international domestic activities.[33]

To be fair, the type of summit threat changed remarkable from that originally envisioned. Nonetheless, the underlying challenge in planning for the G8 Summit appears to have stemmed from an expectation that concurrent planning could be readily integrated into the overall effort while fluidly accommodating and addressing changing requirements. This was most apparent between the RCMP and the CF where an anarchist security threat swiftly escalated to an immensely credible terrorist threat in the aftermath of September 11.[34] The resultant change of planning focus and priorities demanded an

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[32] 2 , Vice-Chairman Mr. Eugène Bellemare, Carleton—Gloucester, Lib., (Ottawa: Standing Committee On Industry, Standing Order 108(2), 1999), Transcripts of Evidence provided, 1545 Hours Monday, May 10.

[33] John McCallum, , Report to Parliament (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 31 March 2003), PART II: 2002-2003 Performance Highlights.

[34] Col David Barr, "The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College National Security Studies Course Paper, 2003), 3, 15.

integrated and aligned unity of effort that was not achievable by existing arrangements such as Liaison Officers.[35]

The point here is not to suggest blame or failings but rather to illustrate the need to provide collective interagency planning and coordination at the earliest opportunity. Ideally that point would emanate from prior scenario building and contingency planning. The valuable use of CF expertise to assist and guide this planning process was inferred in RCMP post operation discussions.[36] Here, it is interesting to note that CF Officers seconded to other government departments are often assigned to planning roles in the absence of specific terms of reference. Again, this speaks to the value assigned to CF planning expertise, but as the Op GRIZZLY experience demonstrates, one person alone cannot provide the full capacity and workforce necessary to plan larger, complex interagency missions.

Canadian domestic plans are irrevocably intertwined with those of the United States simply as a consequence of geography and living in the shadow of the superpower. For these reasons alone it is clear that Canada's domestic security agenda is also inextricably linked with that of the US. Therefore, there is a prevailing "intermestic"[37] element necessitating constant consideration in domestic planning particularly on Canada's part as the significantly smaller country. Fortunately, the two nations have a similar view of rights and freedoms with respect to their own population and the international community. Furthermore, there are parallels in the US approaches to

[35] Ibid, 16.
[36] Ibid.
[37] A term meant to denote overlapping aspects of international (as with the US) and domestic interests, i.e., inter-mestic.

domestic security with the establishment of its Northern Command (NorthCom) to the stand-up of Canada Command (Canada COM) north of the border. It follows, then, that an assessment of the US approach to National Security and Emergency Preparedness is a most relevant factor in Canadian national security and emergency preparedness planning.

A clear statement of US domestic policy in this regard is found in the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review Report. The document states that the Department of Defense (DoD) will enhance homeland defense and consequence management capabilities by,

> ". . . leveraging its comparative advantages in planning, training, command and control and exercising and by developing trust and confidence through shared training and exercises . . . [and working] with the Department of Homeland Security and with state and local governments to improve homeland security capabilities and cooperation . . . [and] interagency planning and scenario development . . . ."[38]

It is evident from this position that the US is well advanced in its thinking towards interagency interoperability and the lead role that DoD can play. American studies have increasingly reinforced the need for integration of multiple organizations for effective planning as the only viable means to ensure adequate national security.

> National security policy and strategy, to be both relevant and effective, must be focused, coordinated, approved, and implemented within the bureaucratic structure of the Federal government. . . . [T]he lines of distinction between the instruments of national power have become increasingly blurred and the numbers of agencies that have a role in providing for the nation's national security have increased. As a result, the development and execution of national security policy and strategy have become increasingly multi-agency or, in the current lexicon of national security, "interagency" in character.[39]

Bearing this in mind, it is only logical to consider this reasoning within the Canadian context, namely, exploiting military expertise beyond the traditional "boots on the ground" operational contributions to access the intellectual capabilities that rest

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[38] United States, Department of Defense, ? (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, February 6, 2006), 27.
[39] Paul Michael Severance, "Characterizing the Construct of Organizational Unity of Effort . . . ," 2.

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behind these successful operations. With the establishment of Canada COM and the clear mandate of PSC, Canada has taken the first steps towards a more integrated, interoperable whole of government approach to national security and emergency preparedness planning. And while these organizational structures bode well for a collective response to a crisis, the challenge remains tied to the effective inter-connection of the various agencies' competencies and capabilities. Here, the American concept of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is worth examining. JIACG is a developing concept under US Joint Force Command (USJFCOM) by ". . . conducting initial experiments with this interagency element on a combatant commander's staff."[40]

At its basic level, the JIACG is constructed to deal with a current "interagency void" and to be a Combatant Commander's (CCDR), such as NorthCom's, ". . . designated lead organization for the interagency community providing oversight, facilitation, coordination and synchronization of agencies' activities within the command."[41] More specifically, the JIACG:

> • Participates in the combatant commander's peacetime engagement, theater security cooperation, , and assessment.
> • Advises the combatant commander's staff on civilian agency +
> % and operations.
> • Provides perspective on and policy development.
> • Provides + during military contingencies and exercises.
> • Informs the combatant commander of civilian agency approaches, support requirements, capabilities, and limitations.
> • Arranges " and rehearsal exercises and other joint operation planning activities.
> • Facilitates communications to . and operators regarding interagency issues.[42]

[40] US Joint Forces Command, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)," http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_jiacg.htm; Internet; accessed 5 April 2006.
"The 2001/2002 Unified Command Plan gave USJFCOM a "laser focus" to become the incubator for new transformational concepts to build the military of the 21st century."
[41] The Joint Warfighting Center, "Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)," > , Pamphlet 6, 27 June 2004, 5.
[42] Ibid, 5, 6. Italicized emphasis added.

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Overall then, the JIACG ". . . provides a means to increase CCDR readiness by enhancing the pace and quality of operation planning, coordination, direction and assessment in both the combatant command and JTF headquarters."[43] This JIACG mission is similar to that of PSC in its coordination, management, and communication functions. However, the notable difference between the JIACG mandate and that of PSC are the recurring planning functions in the former's mission. PSC in its oversight and coordinating roles does not perform planning tasks on behalf of other departments and organizations. Rather, PSC presently links with these entities to coordinate their existing plans and capabilities into an integrated national government response.

As part of USJFCOM, the JIACG concept represents the US military coordination effort for integrated interagency contributions to national security. Remembering that CCDRs are both strategic and operational commands, the addition of JIACG on staff allows these commanders considerable insight and access to civilian agencies in the formulation of various types of plans at virtually all levels. In other words, the JIACG concept represents the evolving practice and policy definition of US military involvement in the planning formulation and development mandate designed to incorporate external agency concerns and requirements. Of course, the size of the CF precludes such a construct in Canada. Yet, an objective view says that the same basic outcome can be realized in Canada with the CF as a main contributor in the planning function for the GoC (Strategic Joint Staff in NDHQ in concert with Canada COM) and other agencies analogous to the role of the JIACG. As with the USJCOM mandate of building the US military for the 21st century, so too can the CF play a leading role in contributing its

[43] Ibid, 6.

planning expertise to the development of cohesive, responsive, and capable national security and emergency preparedness plans for the new millennium.

In contrast to the quickly developing US strategy of a DoD focus on integration for Military-civilian plans and operations in maintaining and strengthening its national security interests, the EU has only recently moved into the crisis management field.[44] Given that the EU is a political and economic union and not a military one, this new capacity has introduced numerous issues and concerns in establishing a military role for crisis operations and planning.

One of the more contentious areas has been that of military planning staff. Since NATO has long had robust military planners, the EU was faced with stiff opposition to establishing its own such capability. Indeed, the EU assessment was a familiar one in noting that any planning activity would have to address a myriad of concerns over numerous organizations, both military and civilian, and potentially involving many countries. The result of this analysis was the establishment of an EU Civil-Military Cell which would interalia provide a coordination and planning function to EU-led operations. The stand-up of this cell was agreed to with the caveat that it would be ". . . used only 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged' and only after no EU member state stepped forward to offer its national HQ for planning purposes."[45]

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[44] General Gustav Hägglund, "Seminar on Crisis Management and Information Technology," (Intervention Transcript as Chairman European Union Military Committee, Helsinki, 30 September 2002), 2. "At the European Council meeting in Helsinki in 1999, it was agreed that the EU would acquire the capacity to take independent decisions in the field of crisis management. Where NATO as a whole is not engaged, the EU will be able to launch and lead military crisis management operations."

[45] Defence Europe Organization, A World Security Institute Project, "NATO-EU Relations," http://defence-europe.org/; Internet; accessed 5 April 2006.

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Politics aside, the point raised here is again one of military planning expertise being used to further a greater collective response to a threat to national interests, collective interests in the EU case. The various demands such as deconflicting national and agency agendas, differences of culture, humanitarian focused Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) , etc. all invoked similarly focused solutions in the creation of a military presence in the plans development to coordinate the overall effort. This is nicely summarized in the Chairman of European Union Military Committee comments below, remarks that have validity in the Canadian domestic case,

> The EU civil-military co-ordination must ensure an effective response to a crisis by employing all necessary instruments from the full range of civilian and military instruments that are available within the EU [or Canada] in a comprehensive, coherent and co-ordinated manner.[46]

As a final observation, the incorporation of military planning expertise in the preparation and coordination of national level contingencies or crises is a recurring theme in more than one country and organization. The similarities of approach and employment of this military expertise highlights the increasing recognition of the value of including military planning experience in the preparation for collective interagency operations.

THE MILITARY APPROACH TO NATIONAL PLANS DEVELOPMENT

An Assessment of the Military Approach to National Contingency Plans

Military planners' training and experience bring with them the particularly relevant legacy of conflict preparation and analysis borne of centuries of evolution in the profession of arms. More specifically, the Canadian principles of war are relevant to planning and their value incorporates the skill of military planners and their knowledge of the "nature and theory of conflict and their successful integration into the planning

[46] General Gustav Hägglund, "Seminar on Crisis Management and Information Technology" . . ., 4.

process."[47] To illustrate this point, the most important principle of planning, selection and maintenance of the aim and the subset principle of continuity, will be used to highlight the appropriateness of the military approach to the domestic mission against unknown threats and disasters.

The principle of continuity holds that ". . . commanders must exploit an advantage by keeping the enemy under unrelenting pressure, thereby denying him respite or time to regain his equilibrium."[48] In the contemporary context of national security against asymmetric threats, this equates to a strategy of cohesive vigilance, decisive response, and tireless resolve. This posture also applies from an emergency preparedness perspective against natural disasters and inadvertent man-made calamities.

Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic works on war (interpreted here as conflict in the domestic security/emergency planning context), provided further modifications to the principle of continuity that postulate reasons for conflict involving ". . . as much inactivity, inaction, and interruption as it does action and continuity."[49] In considering asymmetric threats and natural disaster scenarios, there are varying periods of respite from conflict and emergency. The need for consistency of plans and application require all the elements of the strategy of cohesive vigilance, decisive response, and tireless resolve to adequately confront and overcome these threats and emergencies. These are, of course, very relevant factors to be considered in planning and permit a more detailed assessment of the principle in a contemporary setting. Therefore, two of the sub-divisions of the principle of continuity will be examined, albeit in cursory fashion, to

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[47] Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 * (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 1-6.
[48] Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 165.
[49] Ibid, 173 – 174.

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further explore a military approach to national domestic security and emergency preparedness planning.

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Another of Clausewitz's modifications deals with imperfect knowledge and postulates that ". . . even if the attacker has the advantage, the dearth of accurate intelligence will cause him to be either unaware of it or unsure that it is enough to defeat his enemy."[52] From a best defence perspective, integrating and coordinating a nation's security and emergency response capabilities, together as practicably with those of the US, represents as credible and able defence posture as is possible in an open, democratic society. While there is a classified aspect to this approach, there is also a deterrence effect in highlighting these capabilities. These capabilities could generate some uncertainty resulting in some delay or reconsideration of an attack in time, place, or method – time that could well result in successful counter-intelligence measures to uncover and neutralize the threat. This same mindset would also facilitate more capable responses to events such as destructive tornadoes or tsunamis (while there is clearly no deterrence aspect, here the benefit could be the coordinated "intelligence" of the meteorological/ oceanographic picture integrated with emergency first responders). Put simply, the concept here is one of military principles guiding, shaping, and fostering more comprehensive, inter-connected plans development.

Extending this concept further, the principle of continuity can ". . . be seen as the nexus for the three cases of interaction – (1) the maximum use of force [as befits the threat], (2) the objective of disarming the enemy [mitigating the effect], and (3) the maximum exertion of strength [in a best defence] . . . ."[53] In today's security environment, the relevancy of these overall concepts map well into the previously mentioned planning imperatives of cohesion, decisiveness, and resolve. In other words,

[52] Ibid,175.
[53] Ibid,171.

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applying the necessary level of force to destabilize threats without the slightest hesitation will result in the most effective security posture. These principles resonate in the words of General Richard Myers, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he said, "It is necessary to transform in order to be more agile, responsive, and capable to defeat global terrorism."[54] The thrust of this statement suggests that this transformation will provide for greater capability against any unknown threat or disaster. Therefore, given the incorporation of military planning principles such as continuity into the military approach to planning, the assertion is that CF expertise will produce well formulated, comprehensive plans to counter and/or mitigate unknown threats and disasters and/or their effects.

From this brief discussion, it is suggested that military principles of planning, in this case continuity, can have significant relevance and value against contemporary threats. The use of these principles, embedded in military planning practices, permit CF planners to rigorously consider all pertinent and critical factors in the development of plans. The conclusion, then, is that a military approach, inherently incorporating the fundamental principles of planning, will produce extremely effective and robust plans across a spectrum of threats and disasters. For these reasons, CF planning expertise is well qualified to play a central role in the development of national domestic security and emergency preparedness plans.

FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CF EXPERTISE

As this paper has argued, the CF consists of far more than operations and service personnel on the ground, at sea, or in the air. The Canadian Military's capabilities at

[54] Gen Richard B. Myers, "A Word from the Chairman," > , Issue Thirty-five, October 2004, 1.

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home and abroad extend from decades of successful missions conducted throughout national and global communities. The skill sets and expertise that have underwritten these complex, challenging, and dangerous operations are a true measure of CF excellence and expertise. It is these core competencies developed and refined over years and passed on to succeeding generations of military leaders that represent some of the most valuable CF assets. And while this paper has asserted that CF planning expertise would most effectively be employed in a contributory role assisting the formulation of national security and emergency preparedness plans, there are other CF areas of expertise warranting similarly close scrutiny and consideration. The following sections outline some of these possibilities but always with the premise that the utilization of CF expertise towards achievement of national objectives applies with the military participating "from the rear" in a contributing but not controlling role.

The establishment of Canada COM is in itself an opportunity to better engage CF expertise on the domestic front. As a command structure solely focused on national issues, Canada COM is designed to be an integrated, joint, high profile, and easily recognized and understood institution. From this basis, the CF has begun to take advantage of this recognition in dealing with other agencies. For instance, starting with planning once more, the CF Liaison Officer working the RCMP on the security plans of the 2010 Olympics is essentially an initial conduit to all the capabilities of the Canada COM. From this perspective, and in contrast to the previous Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff construct, the military structure involved is intuitively easier to

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comprehend and all involved agencies can, therefore, work that much more effectively in communicating their needs and concerns.

This small example highlights the potential of Canada COM to work more visibly and with greater mutual understanding with other departments and organizations at all levels in all jurisdictions. The Canada COM mandate of ". . . improving their ability to respond to domestic requirements . . . [by] view[ing] Canada as a single operational area"[55] brings with it the opportunity of working more closely with other agencies. Besides coordinating and co-developing plans, there are a myriad of other critical activities that can be more effectively conducted jointly to meet this mandate.

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Exercises can be organized and conducted from the small unit to regional and national levels as both verification and training measures. Exercising contingency plans with considerable rigor and investment has been a long standing feature of military readiness. Permitting smaller organizations access to CF expertise in the management of exercises, including the crucial post-exercise analysis and follow-up phases, could encourage and enhance capabilities and act as a domestic force multiplier certainly from the readiness perspective.

More specifically, events like small party responses or local cross-jurisdiction exercises could improve training standardization, regionally linkages, and national multi-organization integration through the established Canada Command Joint Task Force construct. Tapping into the CF's pre-existing regional familiarity, exercise experience, and communication links would permit local agencies to better evaluate their

[55] Department of National Defence, 2 , . . ., 18.

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performance, identify shortfalls, and address deficiencies – activities completely in keeping with the Canada COM mandate.

These readiness and validation exercises could in turn not only prompt contingency plan revisions and adjustments, but also lead to enhanced national training standards and resource/equipment assessments. While this is not a novel way of doing business in the CF, it is a new approach when applied to the support and interoperability of other departments and civilian organizations. Again, with the ready recognition that Canada COM is a professional and accessibly organization itself, the groundwork is laid for improved information flow, mutual understanding, interagency coordination, and overall enhanced response capabilities.

Leveraging these successes could, for example, lead to further advances in the areas of:

a) Logistics - National equipment stores, including type and location, to maintain and improve critical inventory lists and material access in the event of crisis (in contrast to the short notice canvassing of various agencies for aid response to Hurricane Katrina);

b) Communications, Command and Control – Critical information flow and decision making to ensure such elements as proper interoperability (radio compatible between agencies as was learned in the 1997 Winnipeg Red River Flood response) and jurisdictional statutes and mandates are factored into plans and operations (military defence versus constabulatory security); and

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c) Inter-Province, Province-to-State-to-Province Cooperation and Support – Standardize and implement response capabilities prior to crises (domestic and international cross border legalities, procedures as with NORAD).

All told, these concepts allow any agency or organization to realize significant readiness gains in accessing CF expertise beyond planning to the coordination and management of exercises, communications, command and control, and logistics.

CONCLUSION

Early in the new millennium, the world's security situation changed dramatically and from the tragedies of September 11 emerged a new focus and resolve for Canada, amongst many nations, to increase the protection of its people from terrorist acts. Subsequent natural disasters, such as the hurricane Katrina event in the US, have added to the impetus of providing for the basic safety of the citizenry. In this context, the Department of Public Safety was established to coordinate a whole of government response effectively and swiftly in the event of a crisis.

The Canadian Military was also transformed into joint command structures with Canada COM assuming the domestic mandate. This directive gave Canada COM the imperatives of protecting Canadians by ". . . detect[ing] threats, . . . quickly analy[zing] what they mean, . . . and . . . respond[ing] with the right mix of military and non-military resources."[56] This was further amplified in the Defence portion of the International Policy Statement wherein the CF was directed to:

> enhance their relationships with civil authorities. This will include sharing information as well as developing and exercising plans, so that, in the event of a crisis, the Forces can make a timely, effective contribution to the Government's overriding objective to protect Canadians.[57]

[56] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2 , (Ottawa: Canada's International Policy Statement, 2005), 8.
[57] Department of National Defence, 2 , . . ., 18.

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Against this backdrop, it is clear that the CF has a renewed and revitalized priority to "protect Canadians at home"[58] while working closely with a wider spectrum of departments and agencies to do so. It is here, in this multi-agency environment that the imperatives of national security must overcome the numerous mandates, jurisdictions, cultures, and agendas in the formulation of the most responsive and robust plans.

In objectively assessing all the various organization's strengths and capacities, the clear conclusion is that the CF has the expertise, breadth of experience, and international perspective to most competently assist in the development of these critical national domestic security and emergency preparedness plans. In dealing with similar challenges south of the border, the US has recognized that,

> response to challenges facing the Nation today most often requires a multi-agency, interdisciplinary approach that brings many diverse skills and resources of the Federal Government and other public and private organizations to bear,[59]

and assigned a prime directive to its military to participate in the development of necessary plans, coordination, and interagency interoperability.

And, so too, the logic holds for Canada. The depth of CF core competencies in having successfully planned and conducted numerous operations at home and abroad is too great to leave untapped in the realization of pressing national objectives. The difficulty in bring CF planning expertise to the fore rests in the notion that these military skills sets in and of themselves do not represent a tangible asset let alone a nationally recognized one. With a diverse number of organizations striving to meet their mandates while maintaining their stature and funding, the suggestion that the CF will assist in national planning could evoke criticism and resistance.

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[58] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2
, . . ., 8.

[59] The Joint Warfighting Center, "Doctrinal Implications$," Preamble.

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However, the overarching concept proposed is one of the CF "planning from the rear" in contributing its planning expertise to plans development. This integrates CF expertise in the efforts of other agencies and departments to facilitate and assist in the creation of credible and responsive national security and preparedness plans. The CF as a non-partisan, politically neutral entity is a desirable and able contributor to the realization of GoC goals.

Nonetheless, any such undertaking will always remain a work in progress as no collective of such varying institutions at all levels of government and civilian organizations will be perfect to all. Just the same, and to once again quote an American scholar on the subject of unity of effort, "Achieving unified action within the U.S. national security policymaking organizational framework is extremely difficult and perfection is impossible, but dampening the dissonance is not."[60]

Lastly, the potential benefit of a wider recognition and incorporation of the many core competencies residing in the CF applied towards the creation of a nation-wide security and emergency response framework fully networked, planned, exercised, linked, and coordinated through all levels, horizontally and vertically, is surely the highest goal. The unique CF experience and expertise in the areas of exercise design, training standardization, logistics management, communications networks, and command and control structures on a national scale against unpredictable events demonstrate the value of exploiting the full range of CF core competencies. The net benefit to all organizations involved with security and safety would be considerable as would the net benefit to the nation. As the US has surmised, ". . . interagency planning capability has shown great

[60] Paul Michael Severance, "Characterizing the Construct of Organizational Unity of Effort . . .", 2.

value in prosecuting the war on terrorism while offering numerous spin-off benefits to both military and civilian agencies."[61]

In the final analysis, then, the Canadian Forces need not always be a force of last resort. This is a limited operational, "boots on the ground" view. If personnel are indeed the most important asset, then the more prudent course of action is to free up ". . . bounded innovation . . . [and] . . . identify the people who embody critical competencies [such as planning expertise], and move them across organizational boundaries."[62] Consequently, from a larger perspective the CF should be employed as much for its knowledge-based assets as its operational capabilities to assist in the development, refinement, and maintenance of a national domestic security and emergency preparedness framework.

[61] The Joint Warfighting Center, , Preface.
[62] C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, "The Core Competence of the Corporation," . . ., 89.

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