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Can the Canadian Forces Reflect Canadian Society?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	3
VALUES.....	6
CANADIAN VALUES.....	6
CANADIAN FORCES/MILITARY VALUES.....	8
EMPLOYMENT EQUITY.....	12
LEGAL FRAMEWORK.....	12
STATISTICS.....	14
Census.....	14
Canadian Forces Demographics.....	16
Public Service.....	19
INTEREST AND PROPENSITY.....	19
PUBLIC SERVICE.....	19
CANADIAN FORCES.....	20
CF Workforce Analysis Methodology.....	22
U.S. ARMED FORCES.....	24
BRITISH ARMED FORCES.....	28
CANADIAN SOCIETY.....	33
VISIBLE MINORITY VALUES.....	34
ENCLAVES AND SOCIAL CAPITAL.....	38
CONCLUSION.....	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	50

ABSTRACT

The CF constitutes a unique cultural identity with a set of values and ethos with unlimited liability. Within this backdrop, there are demands or expectations that the CF reflect the Canadian society that it is meant to serve. For the Canadian Force to “reflect” the Canadian society at large, this would mean that the CF membership should share in the common Canadian values and reflect the demographic makeup or diversity that exists in Canada. The pattern of Canadian demographics indicates an ever growing sector of the Canadian population occupied by visible minorities. Further, much of the future growth of Canadian population is predicted to occur by immigration. However, the pluralistic Canadian society, with its varying demographic, social and cultural makeup presents a spectrum of diversity that by its very nature will be unlikely to produce representative cohorts, in both values and demographic profile that will equally gravitate to a military career. Thus, while the CF must protect Canadian values and principles, the CF is unlikely to reflect the Canadian mosaic.

INTRODUCTION

If an army does not reflect the values and composition of the larger society that nurtures it, it invariably loses the support and allegiance of that society.¹

The concept of diversity is not new to most liberal democracies. But with diversity, the demand to reflect the changing societal landscape becomes increasingly more challenging, especially for institutions such as the militaries. In a pluralistic society that is becoming more diverse both culturally and ethnically, can the Canadian Forcers (CF) continue to “reflect” the larger society given the unique nature or business of the CF? In a study of diversity in the UK armed forces, Dandeker and Mason suggest that proportional representation is not currently attainable and recommend adoption of delegative representation² - the point being that setting unrealistic quotas or goals will only lead to failures, thus further exacerbating the perception that the military is unable or unwilling to achieve “full” diversity.

The issue of diversity and the concept of equitable representation of various segments of the Canadian society became much more animated with the advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedom and the subsequent introduction of the Employment Equity (EE) Act. Prior to the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedom and the EE Act, there was an assumption that the CF was representative of the Canadian society, vis-à-vis the “white” majority. The issues of equal opportunity for women and the increasing immigration, particularly from the visible minorities, have highlighted the discrepancy in the colour palate of the CF in comparison to that of the Canadian society

¹ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996) in Franklin C. Pinch and others, *Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues* (Winnipeg: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Canadian Defence Academy, 2004), 198.

² Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, "Diversifying the Uniform? The Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services," *Armed Forces & Society* 29, no. 4 (2003), 481-507.

at large. To address this discrepancy and to comply with EE Act, military and other institutions are working hard to improve the representation of Designated Group Members (DGM).³

In “reflecting” Canadian society, one needs to look at two aspects, that of values and demographic diversity. This paper will argue that the nature of the CF has meant that CF, while exhorting values that are compatible with the society, has never truly reflected the values of the Canadian society. Further, it will be argued that CF, as professional and volunteer armed forces, has never truly reflected the Canadian society from the perspective of proportional representation; the increasing proportion of visible minorities in the Canadian society have caused this discrepancy to become more “visible”.

In support of the above hypotheses, this paper will first explore the issue of values of the general Canadian population followed by the values and ethos espoused by the Canadian Forces to enunciate the inherent differences between the two groups. The second and much more complicated part will address the issue of diversity in numbers as it relates to proportional representation of various ethnic and minority groups.

In trying to improve representation across the colour and gender spectrum, the EE programs have taken on various forms of statistical and proportional representation models. To explore the underlying rationale, this paper will explore the legal framework of EE and various statistical data as it relates to the concept of representation.

To explain the variances in representation of various minority groups, the matter of interest and propensity will be explored. As diversity is not unique to Canada, experiences in the U.S. and UK armed forces will be reviewed to gain additional

³ DGM for the CF comprise of women, aboriginals, and visible minorities. For bona fide occupational requirements, the CF does not actively recruit Persons with Disabilities. N. J. Holden, *The Canadian Forces Workforce Analysis Methodology* (Ottawa: Canada, Department of National Defence,[2004]).

perspectives on minority groups and diversity in their respective armed forces. From these reviews, the importance of interest and propensity will be highlighted as they relate to minority values and culture. The matter of minority values and culture will be further explored based on the theory of enclaves and social capital as a major influence for visible minorities which are sufficiently different than those immigrants from the European countries.

Thus, while the CF has incorporated the concept of interest and propensity⁴, it will be argued that not sufficient consideration is taken into account of the cultural differences of the various ethnic groups in influencing interest and propensity. While no goals, quotas or affirmative actions have been undertaken by the CF, the establishments of targets based on proportional representation, in compliance with EE Act and the Human Rights Commission, have meant that failure to achieve the target may be then perceived as demonstrating institutional inertia. This apparent failure, based on unrealistic target numbers can only further hamper the image of the CF as an equal opportunity employer and delay any constructive attempts at improving diversity.

Due to the scope of this paper, persuasive arguments and evidences will be presented focusing primarily on visible minorities and women. Further, as matters of racism and systemic barriers are well covered in literature, this paper will concentrate on issues of values and demographic diversity influencing one's interest and propensity to enroll in the CF.

⁴ *ibid.*

VALUES

CANADIAN VALUES

In order to be able to reflect Canadian values, it is important to first identify what these values are. But what are values? Lee states that people place great value on things that they are short of.⁵ For Heath, “a value specifies, not what we desire, but rather what we *should* [sic] desire. It states, on other words, what we think is good.” However, values as it pertains to National Values are those that should be widely shared, enduring and immutable.^{6 7} Hugh Segal identifies core Canadian values as democracy, freedom, tolerance and community.⁸ Granatstein and others state Canadians values as freedom, tolerance, mutual respect, environment, democracy and pluralism.^{9 10 11} In *Shared Values: The Canadian Identity*¹², Canadian values are explained in the following manner:

- Canada is a country that believes in freedom, dignity and respect, equality and fair treatment, and opportunity to participate. It is a country that cares for the disadvantaged at home and elsewhere, a country that prefers peaceful solutions to disputes.
- One of the core values is respect for others, an understanding that there are many ways to pursue the fundamentals of life.
- Those who created Canada shared a fundamental commitment to freedom, representative democracy and the rule of law.

⁵ Steve Lee, "Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 10, no. 1 (Fall, 2002), 1.

⁶ J. L. Granatstein, "The Importance of being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S." (Toronto, ON, C.D. Howe Institute, October 21, 2003).

⁷ Donald W. Macnamara, "National Values, National Interests and the Policy Process" (Canadian Forces College, January 12, 2006).

⁸ Hugh Segal, "A Grand Strategy for a Small Country," *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 3 (Autumn, 2003).

⁹ Macnamara, *National Values, National Interests and the Policy Process*

¹⁰ Granatstein, *The Importance of being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S.*, 1-35

¹¹ Lee, *Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 1

¹² Canada, *Shared Values: The Canadian Identity* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, [1991]).

While there are common themes, do Canadians truly share common values?

According to Joseph Heath, in his presentation to the 2003 John L. Manion lecture titled *The Myth of Shared Values in Canada*¹³, he argues that the concept of shared values in Canada is a myth. Heath further argues that,

The basic institutional structure of liberal democratic societies was designed with the specific intent of providing a framework within which citizens could engage in mutually beneficial co-operation *despite fundamental disagreements over questions of value* [sic].¹⁴

Given this revelation and the policy of multiculturalism and the burgeoning immigrant ethnic groups in Canada, it should then be evident that “our society is marked by an enormous pluralism of fundamental values”.¹⁵ Charles Gordon of *Maclean's* opines that new comers to Canada look for and wish to identify with their new country but that Canadian culture heritage is “so diluted, so weakened as to be almost invisible”.¹⁶ This then begs the question whether it will even possible for the CF to reflect the values of the Canadian society when the existence of such common values may be so elusive?

However, Heath claims that, while there may not be shared values, there are shared principles. Social order and a state can be achieved, not by the need for a set of common values, but upon the commitment to a set of shared principles. Further, by adhering to these set of shared principles, one can satisfy the requirements of citizenship.¹⁷ If this is the case, then it is very possible and plausible that ethnic groups, in particular visible minorities with different sets of cultural values, could participate as full citizens of

¹³ Joseph Heath, *The Myth of Shared Values in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, 2003), 37, 42, ii.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, 3

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 9

¹⁶ Charles Gordon, "In Search of Canadian Values," *Maclean's* 107, no. 43 (10/24/ 1994), 11.

¹⁷ Heath, *The Myth of Shared Values in Canada*, 37, 42, ii

Canada without having the need or desire to integrate into every facet of the society such as the CF.

CANADIAN FORCES/MILITARY VALUES

Discipline, authority, and conformity are central to the social integration of military units and organizations. They are key aspects of the notions of comradeship and esprit de corps that are core components of military self-image and organization. These characteristics tend, in principle, to give rise to problems when confronted with *differences* [sic] – a fact that may help to explain some of the difficulties they have encountered with the integration of female, gay, and related “others.”¹⁸

In Duty with Honour, military ethos is described as comprising of “values, beliefs and expectations that reflect core Canadian Values”.¹⁹ Some of the fundamental beliefs and expectations consist of accepting unlimited liability – service before self, fighting spirit, discipline and teamwork. The Canadian-the CF.

to respect and defer to authority. They are even willing to sacrifice their family life, to a certain extent, to accommodate other considerations including work. These traits express a loyalty to the organization and its leaders.²⁰

This unique ethos is also found very early in the values of officer cadets in military academies in various countries. In a study comparing value orientation in military academies in thirteen countries as compared to the business sector, officer cadets were found to express much greater respect for hierarchy, culture of collectivism rather than individualism and working attitudes that are much more institutional than occupational.²¹

In a review of military culture in the United States Armed Forces, and notwithstanding social changes in the military, the military is still seen as portraying a combat, masculine-warrior paradigm that espouses conservative and moralistic ideology in its customs.²² In an analysis carried out by the Population Reference Bureau, the U.S. Armed Forces are termed “greedy” institutions as it demands risk of injury or death of the serving member, separation from family, frequent geographic relocation, residence in foreign countries, long and often unpredictable duty hours and shift work, pressures to conform and by the masculine nature of the organization.²³ It should not come as surprise that these “greedy” demands are just as relevant in the CF.

²⁰ Mike Captstick Colonel and others, *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century: The Major Findings of the Army Climate & Culture Survey and the Army Socio-Cultural Survey* (Ottawa: Land Personnel Concepts and Policy, 2005), 9.

²¹ Joseph L. Soeters, "Value Orientations in Military Academies: A Thirteen Country Study," *Armed Forces & Society* 24, no. 1 (1997), 7.

²² Karen O. Dunivin, "Military Culture: Change and Continuity," *Armed Forces & Society* 20, no. 4 (1994), 531.

²³ David R. Segal and Mady W. Segal, "America's Military Population," *Population Bulletin* 59, no. 4 (December, 2004).

The concept of the armed forces being “greedy” is also reflected in the UK armed forces in that “the traditional view that services in the armed forces in some way entails a limiting of personal freedoms and a temporary cessation of certain fundamental human rights has held sway...”²⁴ This concept of members of the armed services being part of a second class of citizens with respect to protection under the rights and protection has routinely been accepted because of the unique culture and role of the armed services and the perceived need to maintain discipline. In Christopher Dandeker’s view, the armed forces often have this unique culture because “the Armed Forces need to be different from other organizations because of the functional imperative that underpins all of their actions, namely warfighting”.²⁵ As such, and according to General Sir Michael Rose, “soldiers are not merely civilians in uniform: they form a distinctive group within our society that needs a different set of moral values in order to succeed in circumstances which differ greatly from those in civilian life...”²⁶

In reflecting the similarities amongst the various militaries, Gen. Sir William Slim (Viscount Slim) is quoted as saying that:

I find I have liked all the soldiers of different race who have fought with me and most of those who have fought against me. This is not strange, for there is a freemasonry among fighting soldiers that helps them understand one another, even if they are enemies.

To summarize the fundamental difference between civilian life and the armed services, the former emphasizes individualism while the latter is foremost interested in collectivity. Thus “the British Armed Forces is a unique organization that is particularly

²⁴ Alex Alexandrou, Richard Bartle and Richard Holmes, eds., *New People Strategy for the British Armed Forces*, 2002), 15.

²⁵ *ibid.*, 25

²⁶ *ibid.*, 133

reliant upon a set of values that have been described as a total open-ended commitment, subordination of the self to the group and the idea of sacrifice of selfish interest, even a willingness to risk losing one's life"²⁷ – akin to the CF's concept of unlimited liability.

It seems clear then, that for those who have chosen the military as a career, they constitute a segment of the population who has voluntarily accepted to live by the military ethos which is not found, in its entirety, in any other sector of the Canadian society. Further, it can then be seen that militaries and soldiers, even from different cultures, share very similar experiences and perhaps values. Thus, while cultural gap may be wide between differing ethnicities, there may be more commonality of military ethos among the soldiers and the militaries. As such, it can be argued that the military, as a segment of the population, may not directly reflect the "values" of the society; however, the issue should not be a matter of direct reflection but rather whether this unique segment of the population holds views or values that are unacceptable or incompatible to the population it serves.

This distinction between reflecting societal values versus values that are compatible with society is essential. Given the reasons provided above, it is unlikely that CF can truly reflect Canadian values - assuming this shared values exists and can be identified. However, having compatible values is critical as this allows for the military to have somewhat differing set of values given its unique role, as long as these values are acceptable and compatible with the societal "core" values. Perhaps in recognition of this distinction, the following statement is provided in a publication by the Canadian Forces leadership Institute:

²⁷ *ibid.*, 144

In order to remain accountable and responsible to the nation that supports them, militaries in democratic societies, and in particular the Canadian Forces (CF), must foster values that are compatible with those of the greater society, while at the same time remaining effective in achieving military missions.²⁸

The preceding sections have dealt with diversity of values in general without specific correlation to minority groups. The rest of this paper will address the concept of proportional representation as it relates to minority groups and the influences of values and culture on interest and propensity for minority groups to enroll in the Canadian Forces.

EMPLOYMENT EQUITY

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Charter of Rights and Freedom under the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982 states that:

Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and , in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.²⁹

The Canadian Human Rights Act states that the purpose of the Act is to give effect to the principle that:

All individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented

²⁸ Pinch and others, *Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues*, 198

²⁹ *Canadian Constitution Act 1982*, (1982): 15(1) (accessed February 2, 2006).

from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability...³⁰

Under the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, it is the policy of the Government of Canada that all federal institutions shall “ensure that Canadians of all origin have an equal opportunity to obtain employment and advancement in those institutions”.³¹

The revised EE Act of October 1996 required employers to establish employment equity plans and sets out procedures for monitoring their progress in implementing them.

The purpose of the EE Act is:

To achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shall be denied employment opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to ability and, in the fulfillment of that goal, to correct the conditions of disadvantage in employment experienced by women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and members of visible minorities by giving effect to the principle that employment equity means more than treating people in the same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of differences.³²

Given the legislative context provided, the mission of Employment Equity Plan for the CF is “*to achieve employment equity in the Canadian Forces so that no person is denied employment or career opportunities for reasons unrelated to their ability to serve in the Canadian Forces* [sic].³³ To achieve this goal, three objectives are outlined, consisting of representative recruiting, equitable career development and supportive work environment. For the purpose of this paper, it is the representative recruiting which is of

³⁰ *Canadian Human Rights Act*, Public Law c. H6, (1985): .

³¹ *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*, (1988): 3(2)(a) (accessed February 2, 2006).

³² *Employment Equity Act*, Public Law C44, (1995): (accessed February 25).

³³ Department of National Defence, *Employment Equity Plan: Building Teamwork in a Diverse Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence,[1999]).

particular interest. In describing representative recruiting, this is defined as recruiting DGMs in “proportion to their availability in the workforce and their interest in the CF”.³⁴ The aspect of interest is crucial to EE plan as erroneous determination of interest will cause determination of recruiting targets that is either too low or too high. If the target is set too low, it will not satisfy the statutory requirement and provide a false sense of employment equity; but if set too high, it will lead to a situation where the target cannot be achieved, leading to labeling of the CF as an organization with inertia and reluctant to embrace diversity. This will have the potential to further impede recruitment as potential recruits will wish to avoid becoming part of an organization labeled unfriendly to diversity with insinuation of racism.

From an EE perspective, it is important to be clear on what objectives are to be achieved: equality of opportunity or equality of outcome.³⁵ Thus while EE focuses on equality of opportunity, there is then an expectation that with equality of opportunity, there will be equality of outcome in due time, vis-à-vis proportional representation at all levels.

STATISTICS

Census

Based on 2001 census³⁶, the Canadian population in 2001 was over 31M and it was estimated to be just over 32M by 2005. As of 2001, visible minorities in Canada constituted 13.4% of the population. Of this, about 73.4% are immigrants, meaning that

³⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵ Dandeker and Mason, *Diversifying the Uniform? the Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services*, 481-507

³⁶ Statistics Canada, "2001 Census of Canada," Statistics Canada, <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/home/index.cfm> (accessed February 25, 2006).

about three quarter of the visible minority population in Canada is first generation Canadian. Most of this migration occurred after 1971 with about 50% of the visible minorities coming to Canada between 1981 and 2001. Even more interesting, the influx of visible minorities during 1991-2001 was double that of 1981-1991.³⁷ What this suggests is that visible minorities, as a group, are relatively new to Canada.

Of the permanent immigrant residents in Canada, economic immigrants constitute the largest group with a high of 85.3% in 1995 to 56.4% in 2004. The family class immigrants make up the second largest group with a low of 8.5% in 1995 to the highest in 2004 at 29.3%. The third group consists of refugees with a low of 0% in 1995 to a high of 8.4% in 2003. The refugees consisted of 3.1% in 2004.³⁸

Given that the majority of visible minorities are first generation Canadians and the nature of immigration to Canada, it is very likely that these two factors will likely have significant bearing on the interest and propensity of visible minorities to join the CF – a major aspect that will be explored later in this paper. From a visible minority ethnic perspective, Chinese and East Indians constitute over 45% of the visible minority. Looking at the Chinese and South Asian immigrants, for those who are 15 years of age or older, about 85% are foreign born. Given this and the availability of literature related to these two groups, this paper will primarily focus on these two ethnicities to address the question of interest and propensity for visible minorities to join the CF.

³⁷ T. R. Balakrishnan and Stephen Gyimah, "Spatial Residential Patterns of Selected Ethnic Groups: Significance and Policy Implications," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 35, no. 1 (2003), 113.

³⁸ Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Facts and Figures 2004, Immigration Overview: Permanent Residents* (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, [2004]) (accessed February 27, 2006).

Canadian Forces Demographics

Table 1: Representation of EE Groups in the CF (March 1997)³⁹

	Regular	Primary Reserve	Total CF	Cdn Workforce
Non-designated	61,347 96.7%	30,322 96.3%	91,669 96.6%	88%
Aboriginal	969 1.5%	306 1.0%	1275 1.3%	3%
Visible Minorities ⁴⁰	1141 1.8%	863 2.7%	2004 2.1%	9%
Total	63,457 100%	31,491 100%	94948 100%	100%
Male	56,630 89.2%	25,634 81.4%	82,264 86.6%	54%
Female	6,827 10.8%	5,857 18.6%	12,684 13.4%	46%

It can clearly be seen that the EE groups are represented in numbers that are well below the workforce available. The representation would be even worse if we only looked at the larger Regular Force for both women and visible minorities. However, using the workforce availability and the level of interest shown in a public opinion survey conducted in 1997, the target for minimum representation was set at 9% for visible minorities and 28% for women.⁴¹ It is curious to note that for fairly self-evident reasons, women in the Canadian workforce do not, in proportion, wish to pursue a career in the

³⁹ Environics Research Group Limited, *A Survey of Visible Minorities, Aboriginals and Women to Assess their Level of Interest in Joining the Canadian Forces* Environics Research Group Limited, [1997].

⁴⁰ The actual number is likely higher as this number is based on self identification. Since the return rate for self identification forms was 67.8% in RegF and 49.8% in ResF, it is likely that the number presented is lower than actual since even those who returned the form may not have self identified as members of the DGM.

⁴¹ *ibid.*

CF; however, visible minorities are found to have the same level of interest in joining the CF as the non-designated (Caucasian) group. Since visible minority group is inclusive of women and the pluralistic nature of culture with majority being non-Canadian born, this apparent level of interest is questionable, particularly given that women in general have lower interest than men to join the CF. This issue will be explored in much greater detail later in this paper. From a purely proportional perspective, taking into consideration of interest immediately recognizes the fact that the CF cannot reflect the Canadian society in direct proportional terms.

Statistic Canada identifies Metropolitan area (MA) as “a very large urban area (known as the urban core) together with adjacent urban and rural areas that have a high degree of social and economic integration with the urban core. An MA has an urban core population of at least 100,000, based on the previous census”.⁴² The cities cited as MA are:

Table 2: Metropolitan Areas in Canada

- [Abbotsford](#) (B.C.)
- [Calgary](#) (Alta.)
- [Edmonton](#) (Alta.)
- [Greater Sudbury](#) (Ont.)
- [Halifax](#) (N.S.)
- [Hamilton](#) (Ont.)
- [Kingston](#) (Ont.)
- [Kitchener](#) (Ont.)
- [London](#) (Ont.)
- [Montréal](#) (Que.)
- [Oshawa](#) (Ont.)
- [Ottawa–Gatineau](#)(Ont.–Que.)
- [Québec](#) (Que.)
- [Regina](#) (Sask.)
- [Saguenay](#) (Que.)
- [Saint John](#) (N.B.)
- [Saskatoon](#) (Sask.)
- [Sherbrooke](#) (Que.)
- [St. Catharines–Niagara](#) (Ont.)
- [St. John's](#) (N.L.)
- [Thunder Bay](#) (Ont.)
- [Toronto](#) (Ont.)
- [Trois-Rivières](#) (Que.)
- [Vancouver](#) (B.C.)
- [Victoria](#) (B.C.)
- [Windsor](#) (Ont.)
- [Winnipeg](#) (Man.)

⁴² Statistics Canada, *2001 Census of Canada*

Based on the data available, the traditional recruitment pool for the CF has been fit young men between the ages of 17-24 from rural cities with population less than 100,000. The recruits are generally white males with previous CF ties with highschool education or less with little aspiration for more education.⁴³ Further, in 2003, francophones in the CF comprised of 27.4% while francophone representation was only 22.9% in the general population.⁴⁴

It is evident that based on these numbers alone, it is questionable whether CF was ever truly representative of Canada even if we were to leave the visible minority issue on the sidelines. Not only are there more francophones in proportion, but given the recruit base of most CF members, what does this say about value and demographic representation? Would it be fair to say that values of towns or cities with population of fewer than 100K are the same as large metropolitan cities like Toronto or Vancouver? Additionally, since the majority of MAs, which make up the bulk of the Canadian population, are not the recruit base for the CF, it cannot be said that the CF reflects Canada from the perspective of geographical diversity. Therefore, since it is highly unlikely that the demographics and perhaps the values of the CF ever truly represented Canada, the suggestion that somehow visible minorities should be recruited in a manner that represents the Canadian diversity is highly contentious. It is likely that the only time the Canadian Armed Forces was ever “representative” of Canada was when conscription was in force. Thus, in a professional and volunteer force like the CF, it is questionable if CF can truly be “representative” of Canada.

⁴³ Tracey Wait, *Canadian Demographic and Social Values at a Glance: Impact on Strategic HR Planning* (Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defence,[2002]).

⁴⁴ Pinch and others, *Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues*, 198

Public Service

Employment Equity in the Federal Public Service report 2003-2004⁴⁵ stated that women made up 53% of the public service, surpassing the workforce availability of 52%. For visible minorities, they constituted 8% of the public service under the target goal of 10.4%. Of these 5% of the executives in the public service were visible minority while in the scientists and professionals category, visible minorities made up nearly 12%. The report identified that visible minorities selected Administrative support (32%), Administration and Foreign Service categorie

participants. Visible minorities who completed at least a Bachelor's degree were at 71% while the other participants were at 56%. Additionally, visible minorities ranked competitive wages as the most important criteria in choosing a future career while other participants ranked interesting work as being most important. Further, the majority of visible minorities did not believe that competitive wages could be found within the Public Service. Given this thinking, it was also more likely that visible minorities would leave the Public Service when better opportunities became available. The survey thus recognized that the visible minorities are distinct and that there was "value in considering these distinctive preferences in designing effective recruitment strategies".⁴⁷ In a subset of visible minority students, a significant proportion agreed that the Public Service had relatively low wages, was too rules oriented, was resistant to change and limited independent thinking. This is ominous as one could easily translate this to the CF, perhaps even more so.

CANADIAN FORCES

In 1997, an Environics survey was carried out involving visible minorities, aboriginals and women to assess their level of interest in joining the CF.⁴⁸ The survey showed that men (30%) were almost twice as likely as women (16%) to be interested in joining the CF. Of interest, this survey determined that visible minorities (33%) were the second largest group to be interested in joining the CF after the aboriginals (35%). If so, then why is their representation in the CF so consistently low? This may be partially explained by perception of racism, harassment and lack of awareness of the opportunities

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁸ Environics Research Group Limited, *A Survey of Visible Minorities, Aboriginals and Women to Assess their Level of Interest in Joining the Canadian Forces*

in the CF, but how interest was gauged in the survey requires analysis to determine the veracity of the survey results.

Those visible minorities classified as being interested in joining the CF (33%) consisted of those who were very interested and other who were somewhat interested.⁴⁹ For the visible minorities, 12% were very interested and 21% were somewhat interested. Of those who were very interested, 35% were found to be very likely to visit a recruiting centre. This meant that only 4.2% out of the initial 33% were very interested in joining the CF and were very likely to visit a recruiting centre – a group that is truly motivated and would most likely enroll. However, even these numbers are deceiving. When Canadians are asked of their opinion of the CF, the results are routinely very positive. However, when the survey participants are asked to contextualize the importance of the military with all the other priorities such healthcare and education, military priority falls significantly lower. In the same vein, what is the likelihood that isolated questions about interest in joining the CF would carry the same outcome if the same survey population was asked to rank order their interest with other occupations?

On the positive side, visible minorities (48%) were the most likely to cite serving their country as the reason for joining the CF, indicating perhaps a citizenship factor.⁵⁰ On a less positive note, visible minorities (43%) were much more likely to cite other commitments for their lack of interest in joining the Regular Force. Additionally, only 37% of visible minorities strongly agreed that CF was an organization that made all people to feel welcome. In all, only 22% of visible minorities had a very positive

⁴⁹ A similar survey carried out in 2000 showed that 31% of visible minorities were at least somewhat interested in joining the CF. However, this study did not distinguish those who were very interested from those who were only somewhat interested.

⁵⁰ James Burk, "Citizenship Status and Military Service: The Quest for Inclusion by Minorities and Conscientious." *Armed Forces & Society* 21, no. 4 (1995), 503.

impression of the CF while visible minorities were the group least likely to agree that the CF would provide for the same opportunity for career advancement. Given these factors, the decision to include those who were somewhat interested in joining the CF, without the context of other priorities or commitments, into the calculus of interest and propensity is highly suspect. Lastly, for the visible minorities, joining the reserves (60%) was much more popular than joining the regular force. Using these survey results, the CF developed CF workforce analysis methodology to arrive at diversity targets – but is the methodology appropriate?

CF Workforce Analysis Methodology

The CF EE plan of 1999 set targets of 9% and 28% for visible minorities and women respectively.⁵¹ In 2004, based on a new workforce analysis methodology, workforce availability for visible minorities and women were adjusted to 7.8% and 19.4%.⁵² This new methodology incorporated the concept of interest/propensity into the workforce availability which should have led to a more accurate the targets for DGMs. However, in determining interest and propensity, those who were somewhat interested were included with those who were very interested – a strategy that is highly questionable.

An interesting variation was introduced in determining the target for clerical occupations for women in the methodology. This action was taken, in effect, to reduce the target for women in clerical occupations as the CF did not wish to “continue to create occupational groups where women tended to be clustered into stereotypically female

⁵¹ Department of National Defence, *Employment Equity Plan: Building Teamwork in a Diverse Canadian Forces*

⁵² Holden, *The Canadian Forces Workforce Analysis Methodology*

occupations”.⁵³ While not debating the merits of this change, this action appears inconsistent with the concept of “reflecting” society - what this action is trying to do is to change stereotypical societal behaviour rather than “reflecting” it.

When it comes to Combat Arms, the methodology tries to lump the reserve and regular force representation into one by setting the regular force representation as the low end and the reserve representation as the high end. In doing so, this methodology fails to recognize fundamental differences in Combat Arms between the regular force and the reserve force.⁵⁴ Given this difference on demand, one could logically conclude that that there would be differences in interest and propensity for women to choose Combat Arms between regular and reserves forces.

Due to some methodological weakness in the new methodology in arriving at workforce availability for determination of targets for DGMs, another revised methodology has been produced that has yet to receive approval from the Canadian Human Rights Commission. The results show a further decline in workforce availability for women to 17.7% while the workforce availability for the visible minorities move up to 8.1%. This revised methodology incorporates “military factor”, among others, into the equation to further moderate interest and propensity.⁵⁵ Regrettably, this new revised methodology increases the workforce availability for visible minorities which at first glance appear counterintuitive since one would expect the workforce availability to decline when military factor is included.⁵⁶ This notwithstanding, the real weakness, as

⁵³ *ibid.*

⁵⁴ The differences in Combat Arms can be viewed from readiness and commitment. It may be one thing to join the reserve for part time training and employment with no obligation to serve operationally versus a full time regular force commitment with unlimited liability.

⁵⁵ Irina Goldenberg, *A New Approach to Estimating Workforce Availability for the Canadian Forces*. (Ottawa: Canada, Department of National Defence, [2005]).

⁵⁶ This change is due to a combination of updated use of census data and changes to the methodology itself.

argued previously, is that the interest and propensity surveys continue to measure non contextualized interest based on “at least somewhat interested” to predict genuine propensity for joining the CF.

To delve further into what motivates minority groups to enroll in the military, it will be invaluable to compare the experiences of the U.S. and UK armed forces which have similar diversity issues affecting its social fabric.

U.S. ARMED FORCES

For the past several decades, in the belief that a force drawn proportionately from society is most likely to respect and advance society’s values and goals, the military has sought to achieve racial balance while still maintaining force effectiveness.⁵⁷

The U.S. Armed Forces provides a unique example of visible minority integration into the U.S. Armed Forces. In fact, it is recognized that “the integration of the army officer corps far surpasses that of the management ranks throughout corporate America as well as that of the faculty and administration at most traditionally White institutions”.⁵⁸

Historically, many groups who were not full fledged members of a society felt that they could improve their place in the society by performing military service.⁵⁹ This was particularly the cases with enslaved African Americans, who wished to prove themselves as worthy citizens, who were sometimes granted their freedom from slavery

⁵⁷ Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Margaret C. Harrell and Jennifer Sloan, "Why Don't Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?" *Armed Forces & Society* 26, no. 4 (2000), 523.

⁵⁸ Ronald Roach, "Doing what had to be done," *Black Issues in Higher Education* 14, no. 13 (08/21/, 1997), 18.

⁵⁹ Burk, *Citizenship Status and Military Service: The Quest for Inclusion by Minorities and Conscientious..*, 503

for their military service.⁶⁰ Regretfully, equality of opportunity did not come about with the abolition of slavery. It was only in 1948 that President Truman ordered the desegregation of the armed forces, and since then, “the American military has been at the forefront of official efforts to end the stigma attached to race that has denied African Americans their standing as full citizens in society”.⁶¹ It is interesting to note the views that desegregation was not carried out by the U.S. Armed Forces because of altruism, but rather it was the necessary thing to do so preserve the organization that had been plagued with racial tension and ineffectiveness.⁶²

While not free of racism, the desegregation helped to turn the military into a favoured option for many African Americans to improve their education and economic outlook.⁶³ In a study of military service and its impact on economic returns on black, Hispanics, and non- Hispanic White youths, it was found that all groups gained a significant in-service earning advantage. However, for blacks and Hispanics, this economic advantage did not translate into post-service labour market, suggesting impact of discrimination in civilian labour sector.⁶⁴ Since the military did not exercise hiring discrimination, the military was seen as an option, by all minorities and particularly the blacks, to escape unemployment, obtain education and training, and even an opportunity for a full career in the military. With the U.S. Armed Forces becoming an all volunteer professional force in 1973, “the U.S. military has been considered a pioneer of equal

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁶² Roach, *Doing what had to be done*, 18

⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Robert L. Phillips and others, "The Economic Returns to Military Service: Race-Ethnic Differences," *Social Science Quarterly (University of Texas Press)* 73, no. 2 (06//, 1992), 340-359.

opportunity among the nation's institutions, despite its being a unique internal labor market characterized by a hierarchical structure with little lateral entry".⁶⁵

By 2002, blacks made up 22% of the enlisted personnel while similar age group in the society consisted of 13%. For officers, blacks made up 9%, a number that is underrepresented as compared to the civilian labour market, but rising and comparable to black college graduates who made up 8% of civilian college graduates.⁶⁶ In the first Persian Gulf War, the blacks, who made up 12% of the population made up 25% of the military personnel in War. General Colin Powell has stated that "the military offers excellent opportunities for minorities, and that advancement opportunities in the military exceed those available in civilian life".⁶⁷ An attitudinal survey of American youths concerning military and civilian jobs showed that "blacks and Hispanics, but not Asian-Americans, had a more favourable attitude toward military service than did whites..."⁶⁸ Further, this study findings were consistent with the overrepresentation of minorities in the US Armed Forces.

For women in the U.S. Armed Forces, by 2002, their strength had risen to 15%. While not able to occupy all of the positions in the various services, the occupations open to women exceed 90% in all services with a high of 99% in the air force and a low of 91% in the army.⁶⁹ The record of equal opportunity in the U.S. Armed Forces is a unique one and perhaps unsurpassed among large organizations as it is "the only large organization in which large units (comprised mostly of men) are led by women, and large

⁶⁵ Aline O. Quester and Curtis L. Gilroy, "Women and Minorities in America's Volunteer Military," *Contemporary Economic Policy* 20, no. 2 (Apr, 2002), 111, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=113481841&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

⁶⁶ Segal and Segal, *America's Military Population*

⁶⁷ Carl A. Bartling and Russell Eisenman, "Attitudes of American Youth Concerning Military and Civilian Jobs," *Adolescence* 27, no. 106 (1992), 407.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

⁶⁹ Segal and Segal, *America's Military Population*

units (comprised mostly of whites) are led by minorities” – a model of integration and equal opportunity. However, Quester & Gilroy state that while the military should not be significantly different from the society it serves, the matter of proportional representation is a red herring because military has unique

opportunity and economic advantage as compared to civilian life. Further, the military's well defined merit based system is considered to have helped to provide better equal opportunity for progression than most large organizations. Therefore, "even though women and minorities had to start at the bottom and wait over 20 years to reach the top ranks, once they reached the top, they were competitive with their [white] male peers. They had been screened, vetted, and promoted by the same process".⁷⁴

BRITISH ARMED FORCES

Similar to Canada, there is an expectation by the UK government that "the armed services should 'reflect' society...to correspond more closely with that of the wider population in terms of gender, sexual orientation, social class, and ethnicity".⁷⁵ The term ethnic minority refers to the visible minority in the UK literature. In the UK, such ethnic minorities comprise about 7% of the population while in the armed forces, ethnic minorities make up only 1.7%.⁷⁶

In providing partial explanation for this under representation, literature is replete with issues of internal barriers which are often under the control of the organization and external factors which, by definition, are largely outside the control of the organization in question. Internal barriers address racism and the nature of the occupation while external factors relate to education, parental and cultural pressures.⁷⁷ The intent of this paper is to

⁷⁴ Quester and Gilroy, *Women and Minorities in America's Volunteer Military*, 116

⁷⁵ Dandeker and Mason, *Diversifying the Uniform? the Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services*, 481

⁷⁶ James Jupp, "Do Ethnic Minorities really Want to Sign Up? A Question of Imbalance," *Human Resource Management International Digest* 11, no. 5 (2003), 13, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=388121431&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

⁷⁷ Alex Alexandrou, Richard Bartle and Richard Holmes, *Human Resource Management in the British Armed Forces*, 2001), 175.

delve further into these external factors that may significantly impact on visible minorities' ability or willingness to integrate into these social institutions.

In an article by Dandeker and Mason, they argue that “the British armed services – a relatively small, all-volunteer force – cannot realistically be expected to successfully address the problem of increasing the participation of minority ethnic communities within their ranks” without first addressing the broader issue of identity by the government and the wider society.⁷⁸ In addressing the issue of identity, the question that needs resolving is whether ethnic or visible minorities have unique values and whether such values, culturally driven are retained over the long-term in a manner that is sufficiently distinct from the “majority” mainstream society to impact on their participation in the military institution. To recap, this is looking at external factors rather than the internal barriers to military service.

There are two well known considerations in analyzing visible/ethnic minority participation in armed services: the citizenship and business cases. The citizenship case can be seen from two perspectives: a disenfranchised group seeks to gain improved status as citizens by performing military service⁷⁹ while, on the other hand, the society may expect minority groups, on the basis of equity, to participate in core public institutions such as the military to demonstrate their loyalty and willingness to sacrifice for their citizenship.⁸⁰ By contrast, the business case looks at ethnic minorities as providing a larger potential recruit pool, especially given the current demographic trends.

⁷⁸ Dandeker and Mason, *Diversifying the Uniform? the Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services*, 482

⁷⁹ Burk, *Citizenship Status and Military Service: The Quest for Inclusion by Minorities and Conscientious...*, 503

⁸⁰ Dandeker and Mason, *Diversifying the Uniform? the Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services*, 481-507

Additionally, ethnic minorities provide diversity of views and talent pool, both culturally and linguistically, which can contribute to expeditionary military activities.⁸¹ However, for public institutions, like the military, the business case argument is less effective since there is no direct profit motive and thus must rely upon moral and ethical reasons.⁸²

A fundamentally different approach is taken to representation for women as compared to ethnic minorities by the British armed forces. For women, while they comprise 51% of the population, maximization of opportunity is emphasized with no suggestion that proportional representation is a goal. By contrast, for ethnic minorities, “the emphasis is on proportionality of representation and the implication is clear: its absence is itself evidence of continuing disadvantage or unfairness”.⁸³ Therefore, implicit in this difference is the notion of interest and propensity for women to enroll in the armed forces in general, while there is an assumption that ethnic minorities will have the same interest and propensity as the majority mainstream population and all things will be well if only internal barriers are removed. This is a major assumption that requires further examination. Since the main stream “white” population does not have a uniform propensity to serve in the armed forces⁸⁴, is it then logical to assume that various ethnic minority groups would have the same interest and propensity to join and serve in the armed forces?

The British armed forces approach to women and ethnic minorities, in designing different policies for the two groups invoke two types of representativeness: statistical

⁸¹ *ibid.*

⁸² Mohammed Ishaq and Asifa Hussain, "Race and Recruitment from a Uniformed Services' Perspective: The Scottish Dimension," *Policy Studies* 22, no. 3/4 (09//, 2001), 217-232.

⁸³ Dandeker and Mason, *Diversifying the Uniform? the Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services*, 486

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

and delegative.⁸⁵ Statistical representation is equivalent to proportional representation whereby members of a group in question is present in equal proportion to their presence in the larger population, whereas delegative representation simply requires presence of members of a group in question, but does not require proportional representation. A clear drawback to delegative representation is the risk of being branded as having token presence should the delegative representation fall far short of proportional representation.

There are several studies which have looked at reasons why ethnic minorities are so under represented in the British armed forces. While issues of internal barriers are well known, what appear to be less well emphasized or appreciated are the external factors of values and culture.

In a study of Hindu attitudes, Hussain has concluded that education was a stronger obstacle to recruitment than racism.⁸⁶ Additionally, since education is deemed extremely important to many such ethnic minorities, competition against armed forces for recruitment of this particular age group (17-22) was a serious obstacle. This is further exacerbated by perceptions that military career represented a low status profession.⁸⁷

Ishaq and Hussain determined that parental influence had a significant impact on career choices and that “there was significant difficulty in convincing parents that the services offered a viable career prospects”.⁸⁸ Thus, while interest in armed forces were higher in the younger recruit age groups, the fact that this is not translating into higher representation may be related to parental and older generational influences in using

⁸⁵ *ibid.*

⁸⁶ Asifa Hussain, "The British Armed Forces and the Hindu Perspective," *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 30, no. 1 (2002), 197-212.

⁸⁷ Asifa Hussain and Mohammed Ishaq, "British Pakistani Muslims' Perceptions of the Armed Forces," *Armed Forces & Society* 28, no. 4 (06//, 2002), 601.

⁸⁸ Ishaq and Hussain, *Race and Recruitment from a Uniformed Services' Perspective: The Scottish Dimension*, 222

education to achieve higher mainstream professional aspiration and success. This is not surprising as higher education is seen by many ethnic minorities as the means to overcome discrimination in the labour force.⁸⁹ As stated by Hussain, in “Asian families, parents have a tendency to exert a significant degree of influence on the career development of their offspring”.⁹⁰ In Hussain’s view, while parental influence was low as an isolated factor for not joining the armed forces, the parental impact is real, significant and present indirectly by having inculcated their values in their children who choose further education and civilian careers as the preferred reasons for not enrolling in the armed forces.

There are also issues of being posted away from home and the extended family that impact on career decisions. This was considered particularly important for those from the Indian sub-continent who receive considerable parental opposition since the “culture and tradition normally dictates that children stay with the family and married couples are not separated for long periods”.⁹¹

In fact, Hussain has determined that, based on his studies of various ethno-religious groups, there has been a lack of emphasis placed on “persuading parents or liaising with community and/or religious leaders as a strategy for recruiting ethnic minorities”.⁹² For those coming from the Muslim religious faith, matters of women’s role and the intermingling of the sexes at work place may be obstacles. Additionally, British

⁸⁹ Mohammed Ishaq and Asifa Hussain, "British Ethnic Minority Communities and the Armed Forces," *Personnel Review* 31, no. 5/6 (2002), 722, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=269034951&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

⁹⁰ Hussain, *The British Armed Forces and the Hindu Perspective*, 202

⁹¹ Ishaq and Hussain, *British Ethnic Minority Communities and the Armed Forces*, 726

⁹² Hussain, *The British Armed Forces and the Hindu Perspective*, 207

foreign policy and the war on terrorism and its focus on Islamic extremism may influence many to think twice about joining the British armed forces.⁹³

Hussain concludes that various ethnic minorities, particularly that of the Asian communities, have values and cultural expectations that are different than the mainstream which will influence interest and propensity for a career in the armed forces. Thus, progress toward greater representation may be harmed “unless unrealistic goals are revised to reflect the scale and reality of the task still facing the Forces”.⁹⁴ Even more strongly worded, Ishaq and Hussain state that by setting improper or unrealistic targets, the resultant “failure to meet targets may be construed as a failure by both those inside and outside the organization”.⁹⁵ In support of this idea, Dandeker and Mason suggest that the British armed forces, while supporting diversity, should utilize delegative representation in lieu of statistical or proportional representation.⁹⁶

CANADIAN SOCIETY

In looking at Canadian diversity, it may be helpful to first examine the term visible minority - clearly this is a relative term. Visible minority terminology is imprecise as there is an automatic assumption that “white” is the majority and are thus non-visible while all others are thus visible. However, in some of the largest cities in Canada, “whites” will soon become the minority, given current demographic trends, and

⁹³ Hussain and Ishaq, *British Pakistani Muslims' Perceptions of the Armed Forces*, 601

⁹⁴ Hussain, *The British Armed Forces and the Hindu Perspective*, 210

⁹⁵ Ishaq and Hussain, *Race and Recruitment from a Uniformed Services' Perspective: The Scottish Dimension*, 226

⁹⁶ Dandeker and Mason, *Diversifying the Uniform? the Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services*, 481-507

thus will become visible to “non-whites”.⁹⁷ However, for Canada as whole and for the purpose of this paper, the term remains valid and practical.

As has been stated previously, visible minorities constitute over 13% of the Canadian population of which about three quarter is first generation or 1.5 generation.⁹⁸ So what are the major categories of immigrants? The 2001 census showed that economic immigrants made up the largest pool followed by family class immigration and refugees as a distant third. The economic migrants immigrate to seek better opportunities either because economics are extremely bad in the home country or because the new country beckons them for even better opportunities. These are mostly business immigrants or skilled workers. For political migrants, most refugees leave their native country because to stay may/would mean threat to life, freedom or property.⁹⁹ The refugees in the 1990s came mostly from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Vietnam, Somalia, Iran and Ethiopia.

VISIBLE MINORITY VALUES

It is interesting to note that, especially among some visible minority immigrants, there is a strong focus placed on education. In a study by Frances Henry on Afro-Caribbean community in Toronto, it was found that “Caribbean parents place an inordinately high value on education. It is seen to be both important in its own right and the only avenue of social mobility for people from the lower social classes.”¹⁰⁰ This

⁹⁷ Wsevolod W. Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context* (Toronto: Thompson Educational Pub., 1999), 272.

⁹⁸ 1.5 generation describes those who were born outside of Canada but immigrated at a very young age. Madeline A. Kalbach and Warren E. Kalbach, *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader* (Toronto ; Fort Worth: Harcourt Canada, 2000), 350.

⁹⁹ Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context*, 272

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 123

sentiment is shared by the Chinese community where the respect for higher education has been entrenched for centuries. “Members of both the old and the newer Chinese communities in Ontario encourage their children toward careers in engineering, medicine and the law.”¹⁰¹

Some of these cultural values continue to be hindrances for full integration into some segments of Canadian society. For many visible minority immigrants, “policing, a civil service position, doesn’t hold the prestige, or the pay cheque, of a profession such as law, medicine or accounting”.¹⁰² This should hardly be surprising when one reviews the most common reasons for immigrating to Canada. It would make little sense for business and skilled immigrants to join the police, military or the civil service when the reasons for coming to Canada was for economic reasons, not to mention the language barrier for the first generation. If military, police or civil service was the goal, would it not make more sense to pursue this career option in their native country where they are not outsiders from the perspective of culture and language and where they are not considered part of a minority? Additionally, for refugees or political immigrants, “they look at police [and the military] as brutal and corrupt because that’s the way it is back home”.¹⁰³ For visible minority women in particular, their participation in uniformed services would be highly discouraged based on stereotypic cultural grounds.

For many of the visible minority immigrants, they are coming to a country with “North American version of individualism that emphasizes the desirability of thinking, planning, deciding and working for oneself, with as little constraint from others as

¹⁰¹ Brian K. Cryderman and Augie Fleras, *Police, Race and Ethnicity: A Guide for Police Services*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992), 201.

¹⁰² Darah Hansen, "RCMP no Longer Colour Blind," *RichmondNews Online Edition* March 10, 2004 (accessed February 1, 2006).

¹⁰³ *ibid.*

possible”.¹⁰⁴ This is often very different than the cultures that they are emigrating from with family and community-oriented values. One major difference in self-family member(s) connectedness between individualistic and collective cultures is found in major literatures comparing North American culture to that of South Asians and Orientals.¹⁰⁵ For example, South Asians place emphasis on the importance of family that “goes well beyond what most members of the majority culture...could conceive”.¹⁰⁶ This emphasis on family is further verified by Li¹⁰⁷ who has established that Chinese university students have significantly higher connectedness with immediate and extended family members than majority Canadians suggesting that family and cultural influence on recruit age groups cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, over consecutive generations, it has been found that North-American individualistic notion takes greater hold whereby “ethnic” cultural values become less prevalent.¹⁰⁸ “Over time, acculturation occurs alongside the integration of the (white) [sic] immigrant offspring into (white) [sic] mainstream economic and social life.”¹⁰⁹ For Canada, assimilation, meaning to be absorbed into the mainstream society such that ethnic differences disappear over time, has occurred most easily in “white” European ethnic groups, helped by various intermarriages and through generational dilution of ethnic identification.¹¹⁰ However, for some immigrants, segmental assimilation may occur, whereby “economic advancement [occurs] but with deliberate preservation of ethnic membership and values, and with

¹⁰⁴ Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context*, 174

¹⁰⁵ Han Z. Li, "Culture, Gender and self-close-Other(s) Connectedness in Canadian and Chinese Samples," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 32, no. 1 (01//, 2002), 93-104.

¹⁰⁶ Cryderman and Fleras, *Police, Race and Ethnicity: A Guide for Police Services*, 176

¹⁰⁷ Li, *Culture, Gender and self-close-Other(s) Connectedness in Canadian and Chinese Samples*, 93-104

¹⁰⁸ Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context*, 272

¹⁰⁹ Kalbach and Kalbach, *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader*, 139

¹¹⁰ Cryderman and Fleras, *Police, Race and Ethnicity: A Guide for Police Services*, 263

continuous economic attachment to ethnic communities”.¹¹¹ This emphasizes the potential role of enclaves in maintaining ethnic values and norms which may retard acculturation. An interesting phenomenon that has been observed is the ethnic rediscovery of third and subsequent generations rediscovering their roots.¹¹² However, a critical observation to be noted here is that these conclusions are based on ethnic identity retention over multi-generations of white and European ethnic groups that cannot be directly translated to visible minorities since most visible minorities are first generation Canadians with stronger cultural differences than European immigrants.

The importance of continued ethnic connectivity by ongoing participation with ethnic institutions such as churches cannot be underestimated as these groups show higher ethnic language retention and thus culture. These groups are thus found “to be more resistant to the process of acculturation or assimilation”.¹¹³ Given these differences and influences, it is not surprising that acculturation into a new and different society, from a sociological perspective, may take a lifetime, if not generations.¹¹⁴ The continued existence of ethnic connectivity and the official multiculturalism in Canada means “that immigrants will prefer to retain selected remnants of their cultural past while nonetheless making adjustments to Canadian society...in effect, partial assimilation along with the continued existence of a variety of cultures”.¹¹⁵

In looking at intermarriages to loosen cultural ties and hasten acculturation, it has been found that Europeans tend to intermarry mostly with British or French origin individuals whereas the intermarriages of visible minorities tend to occur with other

¹¹¹ Kalbach and Kalbach, *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader*, 139

¹¹² Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context*, 272

¹¹³ Kalbach and Kalbach, *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader*, 191

¹¹⁴ Isajiw, *Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context*, 272

¹¹⁵ Cryderman and Fleras, *Police, Race and Ethnicity: A Guide for Police Services*, 38,39

ethnic visible minorities.¹¹⁶ Therefore, while assimilation for Europeans is helped by intermarriages, such cannot be said to be true for visible minorities to the same extent.

It is clear that the pattern of acculturation into the Canadian society is sufficiently different between the Western European immigrants from that of the visible minorities and this has led to or is further exaggerated by the rising number of ethnic (to read visible minority) enclaves in Canada.

ENCLAVES AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

An interesting phenomenon that has transpired in Canadian pluralistic and multicultural society has been the rise of ethnic neighborhoods in Canada and its implication for acculturation and integration. “Recent immigrants are increasingly likely to settle in ethnic neighborhoods in Canada’s three biggest cities, raising concerns that they are becoming isolated from the rest of the community.”¹¹⁷ Keung, based on Statistics Canada numbers reported that the number of ethnic communities in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver rose from six in 1981 to a 254 in 2001. By 2001, 94% of the immigrants who arrived in Canada during the 1990s lived in large Census Metropolitan Areas. More specifically, 73% of the immigrants who arrived in 1990s settled in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.¹¹⁸

Statistics Canada reported that of 254 enclaves in 2001, 157 were Chinese, 83 South Asians with remaining 13 being black.¹¹⁹ The positive sides of ethnic enclaves

¹¹⁶ Kalbach and Kalbach, *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader*, 350

¹¹⁷ Nicholas Keung, "Ethnic Mini-Cities on Rise, StatsCan Study Finds; Immigrants Settle in Enclaves Concerns Raised about Isolation," *Toronto Star*, sec. A. 01, March 10, 2004.

¹¹⁸ Balakrishnan and Gyimah, *Spatial Residential Patterns of Selected Ethnic Groups: Significance and Policy Implications*, 113

¹¹⁹ Keung, *Ethnic Mini-Cities on Rise, StatsCan Study Finds; Immigrants Settle in Enclaves Concerns Raised about Isolation*

include the preservation of language and other aspects of culture that are promoted in Canadian multiculturalism. However, the flip side of ethnic enclaves is the potential to promote racism and the development of ghettos.¹²⁰ The existence of such enclaves can clearly lead to perceptions that enclaves are not conducive to early integration or cultural adaptation since it would tend to further social isolation from Canadian culture and thus impede societal integration such as the military. Keung quotes Usha George, director of Canada's Joint Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement as saying that "ethnic minorities congregate in enclaves for reasons that include family ties and community bonds".¹²¹ Further, it is not surprising that new immigrants would choose such enclaves as such communities will likely consist of previously arrived relatives and friends in addition to providing employment opportunities.¹²²

There are number of theories to explain why enclaves form. The social class hypothesis explain that enclaves form as new ethnicities tend to fall into distinct social classes and as time passes and conditions improve, members of the enclave disperse to move into more desirable neighbourhoods. This theory should then predict less residential segregation over time, and while this does do happen, it is too dependent on the economic factor and does not explain the growing number of enclaves in spite of socio-economic advancement of many ethnicities.

The second hypothesis has to do with social distancing. This hypothesis is significantly influenced by prejudice and discrimination and thus the natural desire for

¹²⁰ Balakrishnan and Gyimah, *Spatial Residential Patterns of Selected Ethnic Groups: Significance and Policy Implications*, 113

¹²¹ Keung, *Ethnic Mini-Cities on Rise, StatsCan Study Finds; Immigrants Settle in Enclaves Concerns Raised about Isolation*

¹²² Balakrishnan and Gyimah, *Spatial Residential Patterns of Selected Ethnic Groups: Significance and Policy Implications*, 113

groups of people to live among those who accept each other and have greater sense of community and commonness – a trait that is clearly found in enclaves.

Thus residential segregation may occur for two involuntary reasons. As new immigrants tend to occupy lower socio-economic class, they are only able to live in certain sectors of a city. Further, as these new immigrants may have greater cultural differences, the social distance and thus lower acceptance in the “main” society causes them to segregate into a localized setting.¹²³

The third hypothesis explaining ethnic segregation or enclaves can be called the ethnic identity hypothesis. This hypothesis theorizes a form of voluntary segregation based on ethnic-identity that maintains and flourishes a vibrant self-sustaining economy in which “persons of the same ethnic ancestry choose to live in proximity so that social interaction can be maximized, and group norms and values can be maintained”.¹²⁴ What is significant about this hypothesis is that it is relevant and can be generalized over multiple generations - and not just to the first generation.

While it is not possible to determine the one all encompassing hypothesis, it is clear then that all three would play some role in the evolution of enclaves. Further, both the size of the community and the concentration within an area provides some advantages for the development and advancement of such enclaves. It should then come as no surprise that ethnic enclaves have dramatically increased over the last two decades, with large influx of visible minority immigrants, who bring with them cultures and values more distinct than the immigrants from the Europe.

¹²³ Kalbach and Kalbach, *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader*, 350

¹²⁴ *ibid.*

For the British and Western European immigrants, it can be seen that enclaves or residential segregation diminish over successive generations. The assimilation of Europeans over successive generations is seen as the cost of economic mobility within the dominant culture as retainment of “ethnicity” may lead to economic and social costs.¹²⁵ Yet, for visible minorities, assimilation does not appear to confer economic or social mobility but rather on the basis of racial minority status alone, there is an across the board social and economic loss.¹²⁶ For some visible minority groups, such as the Chinese and South Asians, rather than assimilation over successive generation, the contrary appears to have happened whereby the second generation tends to have higher degree of segregation than the first generation.¹²⁷ This may be a reflection of the fact that such minority groups have more distinct cultures and are relatively “new” arrivals and it is through time and subsequent generation(s) that they were able to amass enough numbers to effectively create (new) enclaves. In fact, the classic assimilation pattern, as seen for European migrants over successive generations, is not evident for visible minorities. “Whereas immigrants of European origins are treated as ‘foreign’ on a culture-contingent basis, all racial minorities are treated as ‘foreign’ regardless of culture.”¹²⁸ What this seems to suggest is that for Europeans, adopting the dominant Canadian culture and thus assimilating will lead to economic and social mobility and equality. However, for the visible minorities, the racial factor alone will lead to some permanent penalty in economic and social mobility regardless of the level of assimilation

¹²⁵ Jeffrey G. Reitz and Sherrilyn M. Sklar, "Culture, Race, and the Economic Assimilation of Immigrants," *Sociological Forum* 12, no. 2 (06//, 1997), 233-277.

¹²⁶ *ibid.*

¹²⁷ Balakrishnan and Gyimah, *Spatial Residential Patterns of Selected Ethnic Groups: Significance and Policy Implications*, 113

¹²⁸ Reitz and Sklar, *Culture, Race, and the Economic Assimilation of Immigrants*, 233-277

and place of birth. This being the case, there would be no apparent advantage to assimilate – on the contrary, it would appear to encourage the formation and strengthening of enclaves to promote ethnic self-esteem.¹²⁹

Once enclaves are established, it is not too difficult to predict that subsequent visible minority immigrants will voluntarily choose to settle in these well established enclaves, whether for social class, social distance, ethnic identity or for all three reasons. Thus the formation of an “enclave... is likely to be economically dynamic and aspirant, allow cross-class relationships, thus enhancing information channels, job opportunities and models of academic and economic success, all of which reinforce the promise of upward mobility...”¹³⁰ This will have the tendency to reinforce enclaves with additional arrivals of immigrants.

While enclaves are important for the visible minorities, the relationship between occupational and residential segregation is lessening. This means that visible minorities are diversifying into various occupations and are becoming economically assimilated, but “the persistence of residential segregation among the various ethnic groups mean that, in spite of their occupational mobility, and hence the ability for a wider residential choice, many may prefer to live in close proximity to others of the same ethnic background to retain their ethnic identity and maintain ethnic connectedness”.¹³¹

To further examine the importance enclaves for visible minorities, it is important to understand the concept of human social capital. The decisions taken on whether to go to a college, to enter the job market or to join the military are thought of as investment

¹²⁹ *ibid.*

¹³⁰ Tariq Modood, "Capitals, Ethnic Identity and Educational Qualifications," *Cultural Trends* 13, no. 50 (06//, 2004), 101.

¹³¹ Kalbach and Kalbach, *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader*, 350

decisions affecting human capital.¹³² These decisions are made, much like many other investment decisions, using cost-benefit analysis of various scenarios over a set period of time. It is this human capital advantage that has been such a driver for black and Hispanic participation in the U.S. armed forces, as explained previously.

The importance of education in influencing the value of human capital is evident in many areas. In the UK, “all minority groups...have increased their share of admissions [where] ethnic minorities as a whole are about 50 per cent more successful in achieving university entry than their white peers”.¹³³ This is driven by the desire to improve economically, to not only better themselves, but also their children’s future prospects.

For some immigrant populations, children entering school do so where English, if spoken at home, is not the primary language. Thus when entering elementary school for the first time, these ethnic children are disadvantaged. However, this disadvantage is overcome for some ethnic groups whereby they eventually overtake the whites.¹³⁴ And, in spite of the potential bullying or racism, cultural adaptation and growing up in deprived neighborhoods, some ethnic groups have high educational drive and strong desire for qualifications. For Modood, this phenomenon has been particularly evident in South Asians and Chinese population in the UK. Modood speculates that this is the result of family and community influences using the following sequence of logic:

- parents, other significant relatives and community members share some general, but durable, ambitions to achieve upward mobility for themselves and especially for their children and

¹³² Phillips and others, *The Economic Returns to Military Service: Race-Ethnic Differences*, 340-359

¹³³ Modood, *Capitals, Ethnic Identity and Educational Qualifications*, 89

¹³⁴ *ibid.*

believe that (higher) education is important in achieving those ambitions, and so prioritize the acquisition of (higher) education; [in other words, human capital]

- they are successfully able to convey this view to the children who to a large degree internalize it and even where they may not fully share it they develop ambitions and priorities that are consistent with those of their parents;
- the parents have enough authority and power over their children, suitably reinforced by significant relatives and other community members, to ensure that the ambition is not ephemeral or fantastic but the children do whatever is necessary at a particular stage for its progressive realization.¹³⁵

For many visible minority communities, education is seen as a driver of human capital leading to future success. While human capital can be seen as an individual assessment, a confluence of such values within a community will lead to the development of social capital, whereby “...social capital, a...metaphorical construction, does not consist of resources that are held by individuals, or by groups but of processes of social interaction leading to constructive outcomes”.¹³⁶ In this sense, social capital can be seen as incorporating or becoming part of a culture:

Constituted from social interactions based on common ties, ethnic communities often provide social and economic resources to members. In such communities, the monitoring actions of members can reinforce parental efforts at communicating values, norms, and expectations to young children.¹³⁷

Thus while immigrant parents of ethnic communities may have little of direct economic human capital to pass on to their children, the social capital within the community may

¹³⁵ *ibid.*, 95

¹³⁶ Bankston and Zhou in *ibid.*, 99

¹³⁷ Kalbach and Kalbach, *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader*, 350

lead to active acquisition of human capital by their children through “transmission of norms-laden and goals-directing identities”.¹³⁸

But does the ability to pass on the (ethnic) societal norms and maintain such norms over generations require tight residential and business communities? According to Modood, the maintenance of (ethnic) societal norms or expectations is not necessarily dependent on dense or closed communities but rather the pervasiveness of the social capital. However, for this to occur without the ethnic community to be spatially grounded, the ethnic community must reach a certain critical size.¹³⁹

CONCLUSION

In a pluralistic and multicultural Canadian society, it can be difficult to identify those values which can be considered, by all, to represent Canada as a whole. By virtue of multiculturalism and diversity of groups or organizations in Canada, each with its own ethnic or organizational culture and subculture, no one group or organization can be considered to represent the whole. However, some of the so called core values such as freedom, democracy, rule of law, diversity and the respect for individual rights are principles which most, if not all, Canadians can ascribe to. It is the respect for these common sets of principles that allow such a pluralistic society such as Canada to function in a civilized and orderly manner in spite of varying individual or community values.¹⁴⁰

Within this context, the CF is an organization with a unique mission that exists nowhere else in the society. This unique mandate of the organization demands of its volunteer members to abide by the motto of “service before self” with unlimited liability

¹³⁸ Modood, *Capitals, Ethnic Identity and Educational Qualifications*, 101

¹³⁹ Kalbach and Kalbach, *Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader*, 350

¹⁴⁰ Heath, *The Myth of Shared Values in Canada*, 37, 42, ii

for its membership. Such a demanding mandate will draw from the population a certain segment that identifies itself with the mandate and sees itself as willing to meet the challenges. Therefore, not only will the unique institutional mandate create its own distinct culture, but those who voluntarily enroll into such an organization will be drawn to it by the very organizational culture in existence. Hence from values and culture perspective, the CF carries with it its own distinct set of characteristics that separate it from the rest of the society. Paradoxically, while the society often calls upon the military to reflect the society at large, when occasionally a member or a segment of the CF does exhibit the less than optimal side of the societal values or behaviour, the society is quick to criticize the CF for, in effect, reflecting the society at large!

While the very nature of the militaries often make it more similar between the militaries than with the civilian societies they serves, the issue of critical importance for the CF is to reflect, in its values and behaviours, those traits which are compatible with the Canadian society in defending those values and interests that are deemed to be of vital-interest to Canada.

From an EE perspective, can the CF mirror the civilian society? Inherent in this question is an assumption that the CF reflected the Canadian society before the rise in population of the visible minorities made the issue of proportional representation visible.

Based on the recruit patterns provided, it is clear that the majority of CF members come from small cities. Since the majority of the Canadian population lives in large cities, it is clear that there is little in the manner of proportional representation based on geographic distribution. Further, it is unlikely that, even among the white population, the ethnic makeup of the Europeans in these small cities would reflect the white ethnic make

up of the large cities. Since there are no statistics collected in this subject, this hypothesis cannot be tested, but what is more certain is that the values espoused in these small cities will not be the same as those espoused in more liberal and larger metropolitan cities.

From a linguistic perspective, it is clear that the CF does not represent Canada as francophones in the CF represent a larger group than that present in Canada.

One area that clearly stands out against the concept of full representation in the CF has to do with women in the military. While women represent about 50% of the population, there is no attempt to require that 50% of the CF be constituted by women. This is eminently logical as the interest and propensity for women to choose a career in the military in all of the available occupations will not be equal to men, at least for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the concept of proportional representation has been modified to take into consideration the level of interest and propensity for a given DGMs, and for women, the target set by the CF is at 19.4%. This target level is significantly lower than 50% and thus is in no way “reflective” of the society.

For visible minorities, the target set by the CF, in accordance with EE and the Human Rights Commission is at 7.8% while visible minorities make up 13.4% of the population. While 7.8% appears reasonable, it is based on surveys using interest and propensity questionnaires. A key and controversial feature of these surveys is the means to determine what constitutes interest. The strategy of combining those who are strongly and somewhat interested in joining the CF as the means to determine the target base is highly questionable. While those who are strongly interested in joining the CF should be considered in determining the target base for visible minorities, the positive predictive

value of those who were only somewhat interested in joining the CF should be highly suspect.

It has been demonstrated that human capital is seen as a major determinant, by visible minorities, for improved economic mobility. In specific, higher education is seen as the means to future success. This sentiment is strongly engraved and spans many generations. Many visible minority societies and cultures admire those who are well educated and hold professional occupations. For those immigrant parents who are first generation, the desire to educate their children and thus provide them the opportunities that brought them to Canada in the first place cannot be underestimated. This pervasiveness of the importance of human capital translates into ethnic social capital in determining cultural norms and maintaining these norms even through subsequent generations. The evident rise of enclaves in Canada supports the social capital concept and the continued value placed in education by the visible minorities. Additionally, the slowness of assimilation of visible minorities into the dominant Canadian society is reflected in and can be explained by the rise of enclaves. Further, these visible minority enclaves will affect the visible minorities in a manner different than those experienced by European immigrants who were relatively quick to assimilate into the dominant culture.

The importance of education, family and ethnic identity of the visible minorities, majority of whom are first or 1.5 generation, will all conspire to limit participation of this group in the uniformed services such as the CF. Additionally, the relatively low ranking that militaries enjoy as a career by visible minority cultures combined with the negative image experienced by many cultures perpetrated by their own native militaries conspire to limit a career in the CF as the primary interest for the majority of visible minorities in

Canada. This does not mean that military service is discarded. On the contrary, surveys have shown interest, but this interest is often higher in the reserves where primacy of family, higher education and professional (respectable) career can still be pursued in the civilian sector. Lastly, the bottom-up career progression in the military with no avenue for lateral entry into more senior ranks mean that it will take many years for there to be sufficient numbers of senior ranks of visible minorities to provide the necessary positive role models.

Given the totality of evidence present, it is doubtful that the CF can truly reflect the Canadian society. Since EE already accepts the concept of interest and propensity, any inclination toward proportional representation should be dropped in favour of delegative representation based on a more realistic interest and propensity. This is not simply a matter of philosophy, but one of great importance. Setting of unrealistically high targets for DGMs, based on faulty interest and propensity data, can only lead to a situation where the CF will be perennially be unable to meet its targets, no matter the effort. The consequence of this is plainly clear - this will inevitably lead to criticism of the CF which will only further entrench the perception of organizational inertia and systemic racism. Once this impression is reinforced, what reasonably minded visible minority will wish to become part of an organization that is seen to be unable and unwilling to be receptive to all Canadians to serve their Country!

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