CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

NSSC 8 - CESN 8

CANADA'S SILHOUETTE IS DISTINCT IN THE SHADOW OF THE EMPIRE

Canada's National Security Policy reflects distinct National Interests

Colonel D.A. Cooper

June 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract

In the post 9/11 security environment, Canada accepts it can no longer rest comfortably under the American security blanket. But, does a renewed national security focus as encapsulated in Canada's first-ever national security policy reveal that Canada is determined to protect its own national interests or is Canada's national security policy merely a response to the American homeland security imperative? More succinctly, does Canada's national security policy reflect its own, distinct national interests? The reality is Canada's geography, history, culture, economy and security are inextricably linked to the United States (U.S.). Moreover, the unilateral Presidential decision on 11 September 2001 to close the Border fused Canada's economic well-being to the American security imperative. Does Canada's national security policy bow to American pressure and fixation on homeland security? While some muse that Canada is the 51st state, this paper persuades the reader through a comparative, thematic analysis of Canada's first-ever 2004 National Security Policy (NSP) and the American 2006 National Security Strategy that Canada's NSP is a reflection of Canada's distinct national interests. Part 1 first establishes the context and comparative approach from which the distinctiveness of Canada's national interests is revealed. Following, a cursory review of Canada's and the U.S. national security apparatus with particular focus on decision-making in the aftermath of 9/11 is provided to illustrate the influences which shaped the respective strategies. Part 2 frames the central components of the Canada/U.S. relationship elucidating key distinctions. In part 3, a comparative analysis of the respective strategies from a thematic approach confirms that Canada's NSP is a reflection of the distinctiveness of Canada's national interests and values. The U.S. NSS is centered on protecting the American homeland through global intervention, while Canada's NSP reflects the criticality of the economic dimension of the relationship.

In this post 9/11 world, we all have to figure out what our roles are. Things are not as simple as they once were – for the U.S. and for other countries.

U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, April 17, 2003[1]

Introduction

Building on the 2002 strategy, the 2006 update document reasserts Bush's doctrine of preemption and preventative action against hostile agents with weapons of mass destruction.[4] With the sense of American vulnerability now engrained in the American psyche, the 2006 NSS central themes are firmly anchored to the primordial national interest of protecting the American homeland through proactive global intervention. Further, the 2006 NSS update provides a more tempered global view of American national interests, albeit wrapped in altruistic language and spearheaded by the promotion of American values.[5]

By contrast, prior to 11 September 2001, abbreviated hereafter to 9/11, Canada's national security reality could be aptly characterized by the clichéd label "world's longest undefended border" and described as a nation contently snuggled under the American security blanket. However, in the aftermath of 9/11 and after years of an extraordinary directed decline in military power, Canada announced a strong renewed commitment to national security including Defence. Prompt investment of over 7.7 billion dollars in national security initiatives growing to over $9.5 billion by 2005 reinforced Canada's renewed commitment.[6] Moreover, in April 2004, Canada released its first-ever national security policy "*Securing an Open Society*" confirming that the primary obligation and role of government is the protection and safety of its citizens.[7] The totality of these actions may be considered a tectonic shift for a nation previously unmoved by growing international criticism regarding its perceived lax security culture, overly moralistic foreign policy agenda and minimalist international security contributions.[8]

---

[4] United States National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 2006), 18.
[5] ibid., 18
[6] Canada, Auditor General, *2004 Report of the Auditor General of Canada* (Ottawa: 2004); available from http:www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html; Internet; accessed 29 January 2006.
[7] Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), Executive Summary, vii.
[8] Stephen Clarkson and Erick Lachappelle, "Jean Chrétien's Legacy in Managing Canadian-American Relations," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 12, no. 2 (Fall, 2005), 1, [journal online] available at http://proquest.umi.com; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006.

President Bush's ultimatum to the world challenged Canada, a 'soft power' with middle power potential, to pull its own weight.[9] In response, Canada contributed to the American homeland security imperative by aggressively bolstering its own domestic security posture. While tangible international security contributions centered on Canada's military contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom in South West Asia reflecting Canada's support for the war on terror, Canada did not support the war in Iraq. As the above quotation suggests, Canada may be defining its own role in the post 9/11 environment. It may further suggest Canada has awakened from its quiet, peaceful slumber under the American security blanket. But, does a renewed national security focus as encapsulated in Canada's capstone national security policy document reflect Canada's own national interests or is Canada merely bowing to the American ultimatum and American homeland security imperative? More succinctly, does Canada's National Security Policy reflect the distinctiveness of its own national interests?

The Thesis and Aim

Several scholars agree that at the highest level of abstraction, Canada and the U.S. as western democracies have great commonality of interests and shared values: protection of the homeland; economic prosperity; and the promotion of values and democracy abroad.[10] However, there is more than just some similarity between Canada and United States. The reality is Canada's geography, history, culture, economy and security is inextricably linked to the United States.

Joseph Roberts writes in his recent work, "*In the Shadow of Empire: Canada for Americans*" that "To Americans, and to much of the world as well, Canada seems almost

---

[9] The concept of 'soft power' comes from Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 32. Nye defines 'soft power' as "intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions" or those aspects of a dominant power that are attractive to people beyond its borders. 'Hard power' includes military and economic coercion capability. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, appropriated Nye's soft power concept in his pursuit of 'human security' through projects such as the land mines treaty as a primary goal of Canadian foreign policy.

[10] Richmond M. Lloyd and Naval War College and Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000), 677.

an extension of the United States".[11] Some muse that Canada is the 51st state. Renowned historian Jack Granatstein persuasively argues in "*The Border Papers*" that "Canada has no choice but to cooperate with the U.S. on hemispheric defense and the war on terrorism".[12] While Robert Cox posits, "Canada has become a functional part of the Empire" noting that Canada's "economic dependency on trade with the United States places deference to U.S. global interests at the top of any Canadian government concerns".[13]

Unilateral Presidential decision making in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 fused Canada's economic prosperity to the American homeland security imperative. Closing the border choked Canada's economic lifeline inciting a swift response and renewed security focus. This response is the foundation of Canada's first-ever National Security Policy. Considering this backdrop, does Canada's NSP reflect the distinctiveness of its own national interests and values or merely respond to the American ultimatum and homeland security imperative?

The author's thesis is that Canada's 2004 National Security Policy reflects its own distinct national interests and values. Although Canada is fully cognizant of the Presidential ultimatum, the consequence of unilateral decision making, the sense of American vulnerability and the reality of extensive interdependencies, the aim of this paper is to persuade the reader through a comparative, thematic analysis of Canada's National Security Policy and the 2006 United States National Security Strategy update that Canada's NSP reflects the distinctiveness of its own national interests.

---

[11] Joseph K. Roberts, "*In the Shadow of Empire: Canada for Americans*", (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 1.

[12] Jack L.Granatstein, "A Friendly Agreement in Advance: Canada-US Defense Relations Past, Present and Future", *The Border Papers, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary*, No. 166, (June 2002): Cover page, 1-19.

[13] Robert Cox, "Is there a Specifically Canadian Perspective on the World?" *Working Paper No 45 and Text of a Lecture by Robert W. Cox at the Liu Institute for Global Issues January 27, 2005, University of British Columbia*, 17; available from http://www.iir.ubc.ca/Papers/cox-wp45.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 April 2006.

The Map

Part 1 first introduces the comparative approach from which the distinctiveness of Canada's national interests will be revealed. A snapshot of Canada's and the U.S. national security apparatus highlighting decision-making in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 illustrates some of the influences that shape the respective strategies. The differences begin to illuminate the distinctiveness of Canada's national interests and values. Part 2 frames the central components of the Canada/U.S. relationship elucidating key distinctions. As a reflection of national interests, these distinctions are evident in Canada's NSP. In Part 3, a comparative analysis of the respective national security strategies from a thematic approach further illuminates the distinctiveness of Canada's national interests. While Canada is inextricably linked to U.S. and challenged by the American ultimatum, unilateral decision making and homeland security imperative, this paper concludes that Canada's 2004 National Security Policy reflects the distinctiveness of its own national interests.

What this paper doesn't do

The discussion in this paper is not centered on whether Canada's national security policy or for that matter the American strategy, provides consistent expressions of national interests and values. Rather, it should be understood that national security policy documents are communications of broad expressions of intent for diverse domestic and global audiences. As such, the outcomes are naturally contextual in basis reflecting both the complexity and competing nature among national interests and values.

Additionally, a more altruistic-values based tone and language tends to be used in national security documents to obscure or diminish the potential vulgarity of more definitive expressions of national interests. This is particularly true in the case of the United States. Anchoring national security objectives to overt expressions of national interests could, as the world's only superpower, give credence to a view that the American hegemony is advancing a unilateralist agenda beyond the governance of

multilateral institutions. As Stewart Patrick writes, "perceived unilateralism may undermine the legitimacy of U.S. global leadership and claims to be a benevolent hegemon".[14]

Part 1

Setting the Stage

National Interest Elasticity

Alvin Rubinstein advocates that the term national interest is subject to infinitely elastic interpretation.[15] As pluralist societies, varied interpretations of the national interest by Canada and the U.S. are inevitable. Further, clear, consistent interpretations of national interests may be undermined by ambiguous and inconsistent political decision-making and aggravated by the flagrant misuse of the concept by those who declare or define public matters "in the national interest". The numerous actors influencing the international system with widely differing interests and agendas also amplify the variances in interpretation. Considering Rubinstein's view that debate, ambiguity and confusion surrounds the term, it would be appropriate to introduce a definition of national interest in the hope of shortening national interest elasticity.

Joseph Nye writes, "In a democracy, the national interest is simply the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world". [16] Reviewing Nye's interpretation among the views of renowned interest scholars Hans J. Morgenthau, Peter Trubowitz, Martin van Creveld and others, P.H. Liotta suggests "interests are a starting point not an end state" linked to "a broad set of abstract guidelines to allow a nation to

---

[14] Patrick and Forman, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy : Ambivalent Engagement*, 23

[15] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *America's National Interest in a Post-Cold War World: Issues and Dilemmas* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 39, available from http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/mh022/93033417.html ; Internet; accessed 29 January 2006.

[16] Joseph S. Nye Jr, "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 1999), 22.

function" while answering the ultimate question "What are we willing to die for?".[17] In Liotta's view, "national interests reflect the identity of a people –their geography, culture, political sympathies, social consensus, as well as their levels of economic prosperity and demographic makeup".[18] Considering the insight of these respected scholars and to advance the broadest interpretation of national interests, for the purposes of this paper national interest may be interpreted as the way a sovereign state in its entirety would like to deal with its external environment.

Nuechterlein, Macnamara, and Liotta share the view that the broad categorization of national interests coupled with a corresponding assessment of relative importance to the survival of the nation provides a sound basis for comparative analysis. [19] [20] [21] This paper accepts Nuechterlein's National Interest Matrix model as a reasonable approach from which thematic analysis of Canada's NSP and the American NSS will be compared. While considering the model was first introduced in the seventies and that some may consider it outdated, it should be noted that Nuechterlein reasserts his national interest concept in his most recent 2001 book, "*America Recommitted – A Superpower assesses its Role in a Turbulent World"* demonstrating its modern day relevancy.[22]

In his seminal work "*National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities*" Nuechterlein concludes that throughout American history, four long-term enduring national interests have conditioned the U.S. government's view and role in the world. Emphasizing no particular priority, Nuechterlein summarized these enduring basic interests as:

---

[17] P.H. Liotta, "To Die For: National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties" from *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Richmond M. Lloyd and the Naval War College, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000), Chapter 9, 125-126.
[18] P. H. Liotta, "To Die for: National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties," *Strategy and Force*…, 125
[19] Donald Edwin Nuechterlein, *National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), 11.
[20] W. D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, "A National Security Framework for Canada," *Enjeux Publics* 3, no. 10 (2002), 1-27.
[21] P. H. Liotta, "To Die for: National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties," *Parameters* 30, no. 2 (Summer, 2000), 14.
[22] Donald Edwin Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses its Role in a Turbulent World*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 323.

(1) defense of the United States and its constitutional system;
(2) enhancement of the nation's economic well being;
(3) creating a favourable world order (international security environment); and
(4) promotion of U.S. democratic values abroad. [23]

Nuechterlein further notes that defending the United States would include defending Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Mexico and the Caribbean Basin.

Of particular note, Neuchterlein advocates that it is more important to accurately assess the intensity of the national interest at stake than it is to accurately determine or identify which enduring interest is involved in any given policy decision. Therefore, to assess the criticality of the interest Nuechterlein provides four intensity categories in his National Interest Matrix model, described as: survival; vital; major and peripheral.[24] These intensity categories are briefly amplified below.

First, a survival issue would be a rare occurrence. It would entail the very existence of a nation-state being placed in jeopardy from imminent attack on its own territory. Nuechterlein considered the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis from a United States perspective as a near survival interest.[25] In light of the 9/11 terror attacks coupled with the continuing threat of further attacks employing weapons of mass destruction, protecting the American homeland from terrorists could equally be considered a near survival interest. Figure 1 illustrates Neuchterlein's National Interest Matrix model in relation to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

---

[23] Donald Edwin Nuechterlein, *National Interests and Presidential Leadership,* 4
[24] ibid., 8
[25] ibid., 9

Country: U.S. **USSR**		**Issue: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962**		
Basis Interest at Stake		Intensity of the Interest		
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of Homeland		U.S.	USSR	
Economic Well-Being			U.S.	USSR
Favourable World Order		U.S.	USSR	
Ideological		USSR	U.S.	

Figure 1 – Neuchterlein's National Interest Matrix

Source: Neuchterlein, *National Interests and Presidential Leadership*, 13.

When serious harm to the nation is at stake inciting a military response to deter or counter the adverse action, in Nuechterlein's view a vital interest is at stake. The key difference between a survival and vital interest is the time available to negotiate, establish alliances and seek international support. Unlike survival interests, a vital issue may involve economic, international security or ideological interests. By way of example, Neuchterlein considered the 1991 Gulf War to counter Iraq's invasion of Kuwait a vital American interest.

Major issues are driven by events or trends in the international environment that adversely affect a nation's political, economic and ideological well-being. Most economic and ideological issues would fall in this category. The key difference between a major and a vital issue is what policymakers and political authorities believe is tolerable. For example, the 1973 oil embargo while serious was tolerable as it did not present a dangerous threat to the U.S. economy. This being said, some form of state action is required to prevent a vital issue from emerging.

When a state's enduring interests are not adversely affected the matter is considered a peripheral issue. For example, when the interests of private citizens or multinational corporations operating in another country are endangered, the matter while important may be viewed as a peripheral issue. Although a strong government response could be engaged, negotiation and a multilateral solution is generally the preferred option. However, as was demonstrated by military air strikes in Kosovo, peripheral issues may also result in a swift military response and may develop into a major issue.

Don Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald in their 2002 work, "*A National Security Framework for Canada*" adapt Nuechterlein's National Interest Matrix to Canadian conditions.[26] Their work maintains the view that Nuechterlein's matrix is not only a very useful analytical tool but also serves to clarify the interests at risk and assess the level of response contemplated.

This paper adopts Nuechterlein's, Macnamara and Fitz-gerald's comparative approach which promotes that enduring national interests may be broadly categorized as: (1) defence of the homeland encompassing sovereignty and territorial protection; (2) economic security and prosperity; (3) international security and stable world order; and (4) the ideological promotion of values. Additionally, it is noted that the major national interest categories are interrelated and not absolute. In other words, interest and values based policies may have both overlapping and competing consequences. By way of example, isolationist type policies creating a fortress America would contribute to homeland protection. On the other hand, these same policies could concurrently create economic barriers having a negative impact on quality of life, competitiveness and global influence.

Similarly, Canada's altruistic promotion of values to enhance global peace, order and good government may resonate well domestically. However, advancing a soft power agenda amid the rapid decline of substantive hard power contributions to international

---

[26] Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald, *A National Security Framework for Canada*, 25

security initiatives as was seen in the 90's, greatly diminished Canada's influence and prestige on the world stage.[27]

Inadequate hard power contributions and the perceived retrenchment from global security responsibilities incited international criticism towards Canada's perceived morally superior attitude and human security agenda. Moreover, Canada's decline in global influence was amplified when juxtaposed against an irritated American hyper-power and international expectation.[28] The expectation being that Canada, as a nation with middle power potential would bear its share of the global security burden through both soft and substantive hard power contributions.

While coordinated, cohesive national security policy-making balances competing interests and values, strategic context and decision making in crisis will naturally tip the balance. A brief look at the U.S. and Canada's national security apparatus highlighting decision-making on 9/11 begins to illuminate the distinct influences which shape the central themes in the respective strategies. As a reflection of Canada's distinct national interests and values, these differences depict a significant variance in the overall intensity and approach to national security matters.

United States – National Security Apparatus

The United States National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council (NSC) under the leadership of the President to facilitate interagency cooperation and give institutional stability to American national security policy making. The National Security Council's primary function is to advise the President on the integration of defence, domestic and foreign policy relating to national security. Since 1947, the

---

[27] Jennifer M. Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*, 1st ed. (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), 180-186.

[28] The hyper power label is attributed to French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine reflecting the unprecedented and simultaneous military, economic, monetary, technological and cultural dominance of the United States. See Patrick and Forman, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, 14.

National Security Council has evolved into the principal consensus building national security apparatus with the mandate to coordinate and develop the NSS.

According to section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the President must provide Congress a comprehensive annual report on the national security strategy of the United States. The report is to outline global interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to its national security.

The effectiveness of the NSC and the relevance of the strategy document, particularly during crisis situations, are significantly influenced by the strategic context, Presidential management style and the role and influence of the National Security Advisor (NSA) as a key immediate advisor. For example, Henry Kissinger as the NSA during the Nixon and Ford administrations dominated the foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, President Carter's open management style weakened the influence of the NSA and the NSC. [29] William Crotty characterizes the current Bush Administration as one noted for its extreme secrecy, with national security policy making being limited to a few selected advisors who form Bush's "war cabinet".[30] Bob Woodward shares William Crotty's view as exposed in his two recent books "*Bush at War*" and "*Plan of Attack*" dealing with the response to 9/11 and the war on Iraq. [31] [32]

The attacks on the World Trade Centre towers and the Pentagon presented an unequalled and immediate terrorist concern. When acting as Commander in Chief, the power and latitude of American Presidents to execute independent action over global events is significant. National security policy making following 9/11 is a reflection of both President Bush's crisis management approach and his executive authority. In "*Bush*

---

[29] President's Carter's preference for informality, openness and diversity of views complicated the decision- making process diminishing the influence of the National Security Advisor and the Council. See William Crotty's, "Presidential Policymaking in Crisis Situations: 9/11 and its Aftermath," *Policy Studies Journal* 31, no. 3 (August, 2003), 5.

[30] William Crotty, "Presidential Policymaking in Crisis Situations: 9/11 and its Aftermath," *Policy Studies Journal* 31, no. 3 (August, 2003), 5 available at http://www.csd.neu.edu/CrottyPresidentialPolicy.html.

[31] Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 376.

[32] Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 25.

at War" Bob Woodard writes, "As Bush told it, as soon as he heard about the attack on the World Trade Towers…I made up my mind at that moment we were going to war". [33]

President Bush advocated quick, decisive and lethal action against al-Qaeda. Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense was deliberate in setting military priorities, and a strategy for attack in Afghanistan and in due course Iraq. On the other hand, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell was intent on developing multi-national coalitions while emphasizing the need to work through the United Nations to establish a legal basis to support military operations.

The Congress gave the White House enormous discretion in national security matters in two new pieces of legislation. The first was the Patriot Act of 2001. The second created the mega department of Homeland Security. The 2001 Patriot Act passed in a matter of days following 9/11. It conferred extraordinary powers on the executive, legitimizing the infringement on citizen's rights through wiretaps, access to private records, and the power to detain suspected terrorists without recourse to judicial process. Despite considerable debate and some amendment, recent Congressional renewal of the Patriot Act confirms that significant authority still rests with the President to deal with national security issues. Moreover, renewal of the Patriot Act reflects a strong American security culture and the continued heightened sense of American vulnerability to future catastrophic terrorist attacks.

Creating the Department of Homeland Security to further protect the American homeland resulted in enormous influence and power being placed in a single cabinet level department. This monumental reorganization consolidated several key national security supporting agencies with domestic intelligence, enforcement and emergency response capabilities under one extremely important and influential Department Head, the Homeland Security Advisor and finally the Secretary of Homeland Security.

---

[33] Woodward, *Bush at War*, 15

Combined, the two pieces of legislation gives the Bush administration virtually every authority needed to do what is deemed best in the interests of national security. Thus, it can be concluded that policy making in the Bush Administration following 9/11 rested immediately and decisively with President Bush himself supported by a few, supremely influential advisors, a strong national security culture and a strongly unified Congress and Senate. Further, it can be asserted that the central themes in the 2006 NSS find their origins in immediate Presidential decision-making, and not in the long-standing consensus building machinery of the National Security Council. This being said, the 2006 version has since been "polished" by the National Security Council process.

Canada's Approach to National Security

In contrast to the United States, for a diverse set of reasons Canada perceives no direct external threat, has not developed a strong, cohesive security culture and responds to national security issues in an Ad hoc manner under the direction of the Prime Minister. Some of these reasons are examined below.

First, geography and history places Canada in a privileged position. As Jennifer Welsh writes, "for more than two hundred years, Canada and the United States, as "good neighbours" have shared the longest and most peaceful border on our planet – the 49th parallel, 8,891 kilometers long".[34] Secure in the fact the United States expresses no territorial ambitions; Canada accepts being sheltered by the American security umbrella. Supported by extensive, long-standing cooperative security arrangements, an open border and proximity has permitted inordinate economic interdependencies to develop resulting in the biggest bilateral trading relationship in the world.

Commonalities in language, culture, and social values further bond the relationship. Over several generations, the Canadian and U.S. populations have intermingled through everyday business, cross border travel, migration, immigration and the exchange of ideas. While there naturally have been some irritants, frictions and

[34] Welsh, *At home in the World: Canada's Global vision for the 21st Century*, 32

squabbling, primarily centered on economic issues as illustrated by the softwood lumber dispute, the relationship is viewed globally as one of remarkable, benign coexistence.

However, to the extent that Canada is linked to and lives in the shadow of the Empire there are clear differences. There is a ten-fold disparity in population, an even greater disproportion in wealth and simply no comparison in raw military power. In survey after survey, a strong majority of Canadians insist their identity is distinct from the American one. However, searching to define one's identity by making the comparison with one's neighbour does not suggest increasing commonality. As Michael Adam's fascinating study *Fire and Ice* has shown, economic cooperation with the United States has not lead to a convergence of social and cultural values. According to Adam's analysis, rather than coming together, the feeling and beliefs of Canadians and Americans are becoming more and more distinct. [35]

Shaped by different experiences, Canada emphasizes different values, sets different priorities and uses different means to achieve goals. First, Canada has never suffered a Pearl Harbour, a Cuban Missile Crisis or a 9/11. On the other hand, Canada is on the hit lists of al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, yet Canadians tend not to view themselves as direct targets. Though Canada tends not to view itself as a direct target, it is none the less vulnerable to terrorist attack. For example, Canada is the greatest exporter of energy to the United States and al-Qaeda has surely noticed that an attack on Canadian energy production and distribution systems would severely disrupt both U.S. and Canadian economic activity. According to the former Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci, terrorists will inevitably use Canada as a base to launch a terror attack on the United States. "Our shared geography alone makes it inevitable that the terrorists will consider Canada as a potential launching pad into the United States" said Cellucci, as reported by Mike Blanchfield.[36] Considering the depth of the energy relationship among other critical

---

[35] Michael Adams, Amy Langstaff and David Jamieson, *Fire and Ice: United States, Canada, and the Myth of Converging Values* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003), 224.

[36] Mike Blanchfield, "Inevitable' Terrorists Will Eye Canada as Launch Pad to US" *The Windsor Star,* 21 October 2004, available from, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=724709571&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

dependencies discussed further in this paper, it is reasonable to assert that a strategically aimed attack within Canada could have a dire effect on both economies. From this perspective, enhancing domestic security is of mutual interest.

From a threat perspective, Canadians identify health epidemics including pandemics, global warming and international terrorism (but not an attack on Canadian soil) as the top perceived threats.[37] The Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI) aptly captured and reinforced these distinctions through their analysis of Canadian interest in national security matters. The CDAI's March 2005 analysis of publicly available opinion poll research post 9/11 revealed that security and defence are low national priorities, while social programs top the agenda.[38] A 2004 EKOS poll conducted on federal priorities demonstrated that most Canadians cited social programs including health, education and child poverty as the most important. Moreover, defence was ranked 12th on the list of priorities.[39] In a CRIC poll released in 2005 spending more money on the military was ranked second to last the list. Protecting the environment ranked first followed closely by more spending on health care.[40] As a reflection of Canada's distinct national interests and values, it would appear that health, the environment and international security should bear some prominence in Canada's NSP and in fact, they do.[41]

While both nations acknowledge their overarching obligation is to protect its citizens and sovereign territory, the variance in which Canada perceives the threat and its own vulnerability results in different choices and priorities in national security matters. By way of example, at the end of World War II Canada had about the 4th strongest

---

[37] ibid.,np.

[38] Conference of Defence Associations Institute, *Understanding the Crisis in Canadian Security and Defence* (Defence Management Studies, Queen's University, 2005), 10, available from http://www.cda-cdai.ca; Internet; accessed 4 April 2006.

[39] EKOS, *Tracking Public Priorities*, (January 2004), available from http://www.ekos.com, Internet; accessed 4 April 2006.

[40] Conference of Defence Associations Institute, *Understanding the Crisis in Canadian Security and Defence*. 25, sourced from 2004 Portraits of Canada Annual Survey conducted by Environics, January 2005; available from http://www.cric.ca. Internet; accessed 4 April 2006.

[41] Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), 52, 59, xi.

military. However, by the end of the Cold War, Canada chose a soft power foreign agenda and chose to critically downsize its military capability to achieve massive deficit reduction goals. In the assessment of historian Richard Gwyn, "militarily, Canada is inconsequential" and as David Jones posits, Canada has "ceded its defence to the United States". [42] While these views may give rise to some debate, the bottom line remains clear. Since World War II, Canada has become increasingly content under the American security umbrella.

While Canadians may feel somewhat immune to external threats, national unity is an omnipresent internal threat that challenges both Canadian sovereignty and national security at its core. Canada's historical reality of two founding nations and constitutional recognition of the distinctiveness of the English and French peoples is aggravated by the modern day challenge of Quebec separation. National unity is considered a distinctly Canadian vital security interest which underscores all national security decision making.

The separatist agenda influences Canada's ability to develop and express a unified view of its national interests and values. For example, a recent independent parliamentary vote extending Canada's military role in Afghanistan was not supported by the members of the separatist Bloc Quebecois party for political reasons. As such, the close vote would not necessarily reflect the true strength of Canada's commitment to the war on terror. As illustrated, national unity issues not only underscores national security policy decision-making but may be viewed as the ultimate litmus test.[43] Canada's NSP would therefore, ultimately reflect the greater national unity interest.

While the Canadian and American political systems vary in form, there is commonality in substance. Both nations express a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, individual freedom and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Canada's constitutional

---

[42] David Jones, "Canada-U.S. Relations After September 11: Back to Basics", *Policy Options*, nd (March 2002), 25-26.

[43] Hector Mackenzie, "Defining and Defending a Place in the World: Canada's Vital Interests in International Affairs," *Canadian Issues* (Sep, 2002), 4, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=345523781&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

framework creates a strong centralized government with authority residing firmly with the Prime Minister. While both the President and the Prime Minister have significant authority to deal with crisis situations, there are significant differences in the way national security issues are managed.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Canada restructured its Public Safety institutions and reinforced the authority of the Public Safety Minister. The new Minister of Public Safety is the reciprocal agent to the American Secretary of Homeland Security, however does not exert the same scope of authority or national influence. Canada's National Security Advisor is embedded in the machinery of government within the Privy Council Office executing a policy coordination function. Serving no prominent, authoritative role in crisis and there being no established National Security Council apparatus, the role and influence of the Canadian NSA function is not comparable to the American National Security Advisor. In essence, the Prime Minister does not share his central authority to deal with national security matters. These distinctions reinforce the fact that in times of crisis the Prime Minister like the President is the unquestioned, sole national security policy decision-maker.

When it comes to national security issues, in the absence of an established national security apparatus, strong security culture and amid the national unity litmus test, the Prime Minister leads, the politicians react and the machinery of government responds by forming Ad hoc Cabinet Committee structures.[44] This was the state of affairs soon after 9/11. The following exposes Canada's response and decision-making in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 completing the foundation on which Canada's NSP is shaped.

Canada's 9/11 Response and Decision-making

Within hours of the attacks, North American airspace and the Canada, United States border were closed. While the events of 9/11 invoked an unprecedented

[44] Clarkson and Lachappelle, *Jean Chrétien's Legacy in Managing Canadian-American Relations*, 7

outpouring of concern, support and sympathy by Canadians, scholarly analysis support the now clichéd view that it wasn't until 9/12 that Canada felt the true impact of the terrorist's attacks.

There is relative agreement that when the airspace and borders closed, Canadians were crudely awakened to a new security paradigm and reality. Global terrorism was now on Canada's doorstep. While not intended to debate whether it was on 9/11 or 9/12 when the greatest impact was realized or when the wake up call was heard, Jennifer Welsh writes in her latest book, "*At Home in the World – Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*" that on 9/11 the "Canadian response was nothing short of heroic". [45]

On 9/11 swift actions by Margaret Bloodworth, the former Deputy Minister of Transport permitted 250 airplanes (with more than 40,000 passengers) to divert from U.S. destinations and land on Canadian soil. While air traffic controllers, first responders and local communities ruled the day, it should not be forgotten that Canadian officials faced the real possibility that terrorists remained on those flights. This being said, Canadian officials did not sense the possibility of an attack being directed on Canadian soil. Rather, first "unofficial" reactions by government officials centered more on determining whether the terrorist attacks originated from Canadian soil.[46] Such an eventuality would have brought resounding credence to the already growing American view that Canada's lax security attitude and dubious immigration and refugee screening system made Canada a safe haven for terrorists targeting American interests.

In spite of heroic individual and community level achievements, Jennifer Welsh criticizes that "in official and political terms Canada's response was underwhelming". [47] Referencing a report written by the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and

---

[45] Jennifer M. Welsh, *At Home in the World : Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*, 11

[46] Within hours of the terrorist attacks, the author attended a crisis meeting of the National Defence senior Joint Staff Steering Committee. As events were unfolding, establishing the origins of the attacks was a matter of discussion. Further, as the Departmental Security Officer and a member of the interdepartmental Associate Deputy Minister Public Safety Committee, early discussions with representatives from the Treasury Board Secretariat, Privy Council Office and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police reflected that initial government reactions centered on establishing the origins of the attacks and possible impact.

[47] ibid., 11

Emergency Planning as commented upon in the *Globe and Mail*, Welsh notes that Canadian authorities were "confused, slow and uncoordinated in their initial response".[48] Second, "no one had a picture of the national response within the government of Canada" demonstrating a lack of leadership and direction.[49] Third, Prime Minister Chrétien basically laid low in the first few days in comparison to British Prime Minister Tony Blair's inspirational leadership.[50] More importantly, Prime Minister Chrétien's inarticulate and measured response aggravated an already strained Canada/U.S. relationship.[51]

Canada's immediate response and decision making in the aftermath of 9/11 reflects the fact that Canada has neither experienced nor perceived an external security threat. In the absence of a well-established security apparatus or security culture, official decision-making was firmly in the hands of the Prime Minister and his interpretation of Canada's national interests within the atmosphere of an increasingly strained relationship.

The Canada/U.S. relationship provides the central context for understanding Canada's follow-on response to 9/11 and the strategic actions that are the key thrusts of Canada's first ever-national security policy. Part 2 examines the relationship to elucidate key distinctions and underscore not only its critical importance but also its prominent role in shaping the NSP.

---

[48] ibid., 11
[49] ibid., 11
[50] ibid., 13
[51] Clarkson and Lachappelle, *Jean Chrétien's Legacy in Managing Canadian-American Relations*, 7

Part 2

The Canada/U.S. Relationship

Must we be in love or will an arranged marriage do?
Thomas Axworthly [52]

To begin, much has been written to describe the relationship. Jack Granatstein, one of Canada's most eminent historians argues persuasively in several articles that Canada's most vital national interest is its relationship with the United States.[53] Charles F. Doran and John H. Sigler in their seminal work dealing with Canada/U.S. relations characterized the relationship as an "enduring friendship with persistent stress". [54] Jennifer Welsh posits that while Canada's relationship with the United States is vital to Canada's prosperity and security, it is a myth to promote "Canada as America's best friend". [55] While Thomas Axworthy, as highlighted in the above quotation, views the relationship like an arranged marriage, cordial but strained. These scholars among others agree that while there are irreversible interdependencies and common interests, there are distinctions that persistently challenge the relationship.

A Strained Defence and Security Relationship

First, there are distinct variances in how the relationship is viewed. On defence and security issues, Canada perceives a low threat and less vulnerability within its own territorial borders. A Canadian view would assert Canada jointly defends and protects the northern flank. More accurately, Canada assures its homeland defence through

---

[52] Thomas S. Axworthy, "An Independent Canada in a Shared North America: Must we be in Love Or Will an Arranged Marriage do?" *International Journal* 59, no. 4 (Fall, 2004), 761, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=782103341&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
[53] Jack L.Granatstein, "A Friendly Agreement in Advance: Canada-US Defense Relations Past, Present and Future", *The Border Papers, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary*, No. 166, (June 2002): Cover page, 1-19.
[54] Charles F. Doran and others, *Canada and the United States: Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 256.
[55] Welsh, *At Home in the World : Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*, 24

cooperative security agreements led by the flagship bi-national North American Aerospace Defence agreement, some 300 other bilateral arrangements and numerous other cooperative arrangements. Notwithstanding the extent of these agreements, Dan Dunsky suggests through his article, "Canada's Three Solitudes" that in the unpredictable world of post 9/11, the United States should be far more interested in Canada, to ensure it doesn't become a dangerously exposed northern flank.[56]

From an American perspective, Canada is seen to reap the benefit of living next door to a nation with unparalleled military power and no territorial ambition. In short, the United States bears the larger burden. For a nation with middle power potential Canada has not retained sufficient military capability to allow itself to contribute substantively to its own security, continental agreements and sudden global security events concurrently. Thus, cooperative security is not viewed as a balanced relationship. While the relationship is of vital interest to Canada, the U.S. view is at best peripheral, if it is viewed at all.

Canada's military contribution to the war on terror, although significant from a Canadian perspective was miniscule in the big picture. Deploying some ships, a few dispersed aircraft and one battalion for six months in Afghanistan cannot be deemed a substantial contribution considering the enormity of the terrorist attack on American soil, the urgency of the task at hand, the sense of American vulnerability or in comparison to the resolve demonstrated by the military contributions of other like sized allied nations.

Militarily, the two nations have a long positive history of working together. However, the relationship is currently strained. While not exhaustive, the following reveals some of the irritants and stress points. First, Canada's diminished military capability creates a notable burden-sharing imbalance. Second, Canada aggressively championed the anti-land mines treaty, notwithstanding that military powers like the United States, Russia, China and most Middle Eastern countries insisted land mines were much needed in their arsenals. In the American view, Canada's position demonstrated a

[56] Dunsky, *Canada's Three Solitudes*, 94

lack of support for and undermined the United States' self-appointed position as the global sheriff. Thirdly, former Prime Minister Chrétien's lackluster performance post 9/11 including his minimized response to redress offensive anti-American remarks made by direct staff brought credence to a growing view of Canada's lack of concern for American security interests. Fourth, while it is acknowledged that the lack of a United Nations mandate and limited military capability were both contributing factors to Canada's decision to not provide military support to the war in Iraq, the absence of any expressed moral support reinforced the view that Canada is not America's best friend.

Finally, Canada chose not to participate in the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) initiative. An agreement that Welsh, Bercuson and others scholars argue was in Canada's national interest. [57] [58] Compounded by the myriad of other irritants, Canada's most recent decision to not participate in BMD after first expressing strong support for the agreement was aggravated by the disrespectful manner such an important decision was communicated.[59] In addition to irritating an already strained relationship, reneging on this important cooperative security agreement in the post 9/11 environment clearly demonstrates that Canada can make national security policy decisions which reflect its own national interests, values and political reality. In short, the American ultimatum has not resulted in Canada bowing to the American homeland security imperative.

As exposed, historical and recent decision making affecting American national security interests aggravates, frustrates and strains Canada/U.S. relations. The choices made suggest that Canada's priorities and most vital national interests from a criticality perspective may not be aligned to protecting the homeland. The following examination of Canada's deep economic interdependencies and impact of 9/11 serves to illuminate both the distinctiveness and criticality of the economic dimension of the relationship.

---

[57] Jennifer M. Welsh, *At Home in the World: Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century,* 229

[58] Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Report for the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, *National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World* (Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003) p. 17, available from http://www.cdfai.org/currentpublications.html., Internet: accessed 1 May 2006.

[59] Having initially expressed support for BMD, the Prime Minister suddenly changed course. His decision was announced in a speech without any prior formal notification through official channels.

While the U.S. is focused on homeland security imperatives and global action, Canada's renewed focus and security enhancements appear anchored to its economic well-being.

Economic Interests First

Unilateral Presidential decision making post 9/11 linked Canada's economic well-being to American national security imperatives. Closing of the Border coupled with increasingly stringent security requirements is the central impetus for Canada's renewed focus in national security matters. The following captures the depth and importance of the economic relationship to illustrate Canada's supreme dependency on the U.S. economy.

To begin, the Canada, U.S. Border is viewed as one of the busiest international boundaries reflecting a comprehensive, contemporary, bilateral trading relationship. The scope and scale of the movement of goods, services, investment, people, and ideas while mutually important is unbalanced. For example, Canada is significantly more dependent on U.S. trade than vice versa.

The following data and comparisons informing the economic relationship are heavily sourced and extracted from Government of Canada online documents. Any variances between the data within the documents were due to rounding.

First, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in "*Canada-United States: The World's Largest Trading Relationship*" reports more than $1.9 billion in goods, 300,000 people and 37,000 trucks cross the border daily with 58% of the truck traffic funneling through five key border crossings: the Ambassador Bridge; Sarnia; Fort Erie; Lacolle; and the Pacific Highway.[60]

In 2004, bilateral trade was assessed at approximately $680 billion. In 2003, merchandise trade accounted for 86.7% of total U.S. exports to Canada and 92.3% of

[60] Foreign Affairs Canada, *Canada-United States, the World's Largest Trading Relationship*, (Canadian Embassy, Washington D.C.) available from http://www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/can-am/washington/trade_and_investments; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006.

total imports from Canada.[61] While Canada represents 23.5% of American exports and 17.4% of its imports. In short, the border and trade with the United States is central to Canada's economic lifeline. Moreover, Canada is critically dependant upon U.S. trade and sensitive to fluctuations in the U.S. economy.

Implementation of the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ignited a dramatic increase in trade and economic integration with the United States. Under NAFTA, two-way trade has more than doubled, averaging almost 6.0% annual growth over the last decade.[62]

The extent of economic interdependency is significant to both nations. Canada is considered the top foreign market for goods exports for 39 of 50 states and is in the top three for 8 other states. In 2003, twenty-three states sent more than one-quarter of their exports to Canada.[63] The United States absorbs more than 85% of Canadian exports and by way of comparison, Canada imports more U.S. goods than all 25 countries of the European Union combined which has more than 25 times the population of Canada.[64]

Foreign Affairs Canada notes that Canada's trade with the United States represents 52% of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Further, it is assessed that the Canada, United States economic partnership and trade relationship supports some two million jobs in each country.[65]

Over 40% of U.S. trade with Canada is intra-firm. For example, integration in the automotive industry demonstrates where trade is occurring between parts of the same firm operating in both countries. Notably, every North American vehicle contains about $1300 in Canadian made parts.[66]

---

[61] ibid., np
[62] ibid., np
[63] ibid., np
[64] ibid., np
[65] ibid., np
[66] ibid., np

The economic relationship between Canada and the U.S. is also distinguished by one of the world's largest investment relationships. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Canada and the most popular destination for Canadian investment. In 2004, U.S. direct investment in Canada was valued at more than $228 billion, while Canadian direct investment in the United States was close to $165 billion.[67] Nearly 98% of Canada's foreign direct investment is in the United States. While Canada ranks second only to the United Kingdom as a destination for U.S. investments, Canada is the 7th largest investor and accounts for 7.6% of all Foreign Direct Investment in the United States.[68] In short, Canada and the U.S. are major investors in each other's economies.

Canada is by far the single most important provider of energy to the United States. Canada supplies close to 100% of the U.S. electricity imports, 88% of its natural gas, and 17% of its oil.[69] Continuing fluctuation in world oil prices and the changing global security environment reinforces American vulnerability to disruptions in Middle East, Gulf Region, Latin America, and African oil and gas exports. Considering Canada holds the world's second largest proven reserves of oil, it is reasonable to suggest that the U.S. would seek a more secure source of energy through Canada. Should increased demand result, Canada has the potential in the long term to surpass Saudi Arabia as the next world oil giant. Canada is by far the U.S.'s largest, most reliable and most secure energy provider. Therefore, it is in both nations' interests to mitigate possible disruptions and to work collaboratively to strengthen North American energy security.

Exposing the economic impact of closing the Border in the aftermath of 9/11 further illustrates the depth, the complexity and the critical importance of the economic relationship to Canada. Moreover, the unilateral Presidential decision to close the border provided the impetus for Canada's renewed interest in national security. While the strategic actions articulated in Canada's NSP, notably enhanced Border Security, Transport Security, the reorganization of the Public Safety department and the new

[67] ibid., np
[68] ibid., np
[69] ibid., np

Intelligence capability supportcommon interests, Canada's resolve is underscored by its vulnerability to unilateral decision making and the nature of its economic relationship.

According to Government of Canada assessments, closing the border created shipping delays giving rise to increased costs in the manufacturing sector. The auto industry faced the possibility of closing down production lines. When the border did open, "enhanced security and closer scrutiny of goods created bottlenecks and chokepoints in supply chain management particularly those relying on just in time delivery systems".[70]

In both Canada and the United States, the airline and aviation industries suffered massive financial losses when all commercial traffic was grounded in North America. Once traffic resumed there was a severe reduction in passenger travel. Massive layoffs and bankruptcy plagued the industry and federal aid programs in both countries were needed to facilitate recovery. Tourism and related service industries were also seriously affected.[71]

The Government of Canada assessed that diminished consumer and investor confidence, large-scale layoffs and reduced consumer demand for goods and services created an uncertain economic climate. Canada's GDP for September 2001 was down 0.6% compared to the previous month and the unemployment rate rose. The catastrophic loss 8.025 09p6 aut/casualtys

and uslinesn intogrationwphi

overnight rates by 0.5 percentage points. The Bank of Canada continued to lower rates to restore consumer confidence well into 2002.[73]

President Bush's unilateral decision to close the border on 9/11 illuminated the interrelationship between Canada's economic prosperity and American national security interests. By 9/12 it became apparent that Canada's economic well-being is extremely vulnerable to unpredictable catastrophic events affecting American homeland security and to unilateral decision-making. Closing the North American airspace and the border on 9/11 followed by American resolve to implement stringent border security requirements reflects the intensity the U.S. views homeland security. Simply stated, American national security actions to protect the American homeland supersede economic interests. The 105th American Assembly writes in their recent report, *Renewing the US-Canada Relationship* that "the United States will place its physical security above the free flow of goods, services, capital and people across the border". [74] This reality is succinctly captured by the now often repeated phrase "Security Trumps Trade".[75]

The bottom line is that both countries have a critical stake in each other's economy. Assuring and improving the secure flow of goods and people at the border is a key national security priority for both nations. The 105th American Assembly further noted that border infrastructure, inspection and screening on both sides of the border are currently insufficient to meet the increasing flow of legitimate trade and new security requirements.[76] For example, the impending obligation for Canadians to have positive passport-type identification at the border has the potential to further disrupt cross-border movement. Considering these challenges, it is in both nations' interest to develop efficient, cooperative border management solutions.

As such, both nations signed the SMART Border Declaration, a 32-point plan which is founded on the principle that national security and economic security are not

---

[73] ibid.,1
[74] The 105th American Assembly Columbia University, *Renewing the US - Canada Relationship*, 2
[75] ibid.,2
[76] ibid.,2

competing objectives. Implementation of the plan will amalgamate separate border processes into a harmonized, integrated process akin to the NORAD agreement. Increased harmonization and entrenching the border processes through common technologies is intended to mitigate unilateral decision-making and keep the border open during high risk security events.[77]

The American overarching priority to protect the homeland is motivated by a continued sense of vulnerability and view of the global security environment. As a nation engaged in a war on terror, defending the homeland in the post 9/11 world is considered a near survival interest trumping the vital importance of its economic prosperity. While globalization and increasing economic integration exposes Canada's interests to global security threats, as revealed, Canada's economic well-being is highly vulnerable to unilateral decision making affecting the economic dimension of the Canada/U.S. relationship. It would therefore, be in Canada's own vital interests to take the necessary actions to mitigate the risk of becoming collateral damage to unilateral decision-making.

A comparison of the American 2006 NSS and Canada's 2004 NSP from a thematic approach clarifies the distinctiveness of Canada's national interests. Part 3 confirms that American vital national security interests are centered on protecting the American homeland through global intervention. By contrast, Canada's capstone national security policy responds to the economic impact of 9/11 incited by unilateral Presidential decision-making and increasingly stringent security requirements. Part 3 confirms that the NSP reflects the distinctiveness of Canada's own national interests highlighting the vital importance of its economic relationship.

---

[77] James D. Phillips, "Improving Border Management," *International Journal* 60, no. 2 (Spring, 2005), 7, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=870358611&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Part 3

The Strategies Compared Confirm Canada's Distinct National Interests

The 2006 United States National Security Strategy

President Bush in his opening letter to Congress introducing the 2006 strategy document categorically states, "America is at war".[78] Fueled by the threat of terrorism as revealed to Americans by the events of 9/11, the 2006 NSS is deemed a "wartime strategy" centered on the overarching obligation of protecting the American homeland. The 2006 NSS reflects that the United States, while in a global position of unparalleled power remains vulnerable.

The 2006 NSS cites two inseparable priorities: (1) fighting and winning the war on terror; and (2) championing the ideals of freedom, democracy and human dignity as the alternative to tyranny.[79] Joseph Nye has argued, "A democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a morality based and an interest based foreign policy". [80] Considering Nye's view, both priorities would contribute to American homeland security through global interventions.

Nine essential tasks are contained in the 2006 NSS mirroring the 2002 strategy. They are summarized as follows: (1) champion human dignity; (2) strengthen alliances; (3) defuse regional conflicts; (4) address Weapons of Mass Destruction; (5) promote global economic growth; (6) expand democracy; (7) build cooperation among the major global powers; (8) transform U.S. national security institutions to meet 21st century challenges; and (9) while introduced indirectly in the 2002 NSS, the 2006 NSS more prominently addresses as the ninth task "threats to public health, social order and the environment brought about by pandemics, transnational crime and destruction of the environment either through cataclysmic mega-disasters or human behaviour". [81] The

---

[78] United States National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2006, cover letter
[79] ibid., cover letter
[80] Nye, *Redefining the National Interest*, 22
[81] United States National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy…2006, 47*

newly defined ninth task is captured under the heading, "engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization".[82]

The 2006 NSS reaffirms three significant foreign policy shifts first promoted in the early days following 9/11 through Presidential addresses. First, the United States maintains a strategy of preemptive and preventive action to address both real and perceived threats. Second, those threats that present an imminent danger would be preempted while emerging threats would be subject to preventative action. Third, prior warning by soliciting international authority through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations may not necessarily be petitioned beforehand. The premise being, the national interest would not be served in giving prior warning to non-state actors who neither adhere nor respect international rules of conduct.[83]

Further, the 2006 NSS maintains the Presidential view that the deterrence doctrine derived from the cold war era is inadequate and ineffective against extremists and non-state actors. In the American view, pre-emptive and preventive action is essential to defending the homeland and national security interests. Awaiting clear indications of imminent attack could prove catastrophic; therefore, preventative action to disrupt emerging threats would in the American view be warranted.

However, globalization is blurring the boundary between foreign and domestic issues challenging the traditional conception of national interest. U.S. justifications for acting in the national interest may become increasingly contentious. Secondly, U.S. superiority and self appointed custodial role as the ultimate guarantor of world order is neither codified in international law nor recognized by all countries. Notably, there is no global consensus on what constitutes a threat to "world order" or any established criteria. As explained by David Scheffer, the chief U.S. negotiator on the International Criminal Court, given the United States' special global responsibilities it requires special

[82] ibid., 47
[83] ibid., 18

protections and exemptions from select international treaties.[84] In this context, the U.S. prevention strategy would appear to require international laws be redefined to legitimize the approach.

Alliances and multilateral institutions are essential to international order and thus important to the United States. However, the NSS maintains that the U.S. will not be constrained by the international community when defending its most vital interests. The U.S. believes inadequacies and shortcomings in institutions such as the United Nations cannot impede the fundamental right of the United States to protect its homeland through global intervention. As such, the United States asserts it will take unilateral action to protect its vital interests. As demonstrated by American actions in Iraq, when determined the U.S. will act without international consensus.

Acting in the absence of international consensus suggests that Presidential national security decisions will satisfy the expediency of an immediate response and implement its prevention strategy founded on the overarching homeland security imperative. American expediency could have dire consequences for Canada. As was seen on 9/11, Canada's vital economic interests could become collateral damage. Thus, it is in Canada's own national interest to mitigate its vulnerability to unilateral Presidential decision-making. The SMART Border Declaration, a concept which originated in Canada is specifically designed to achieve this result.

The NSS responds to early criticisms and dissenting views by Russia, China, Mexico, the Gulf States, South Africa, Turkey and Canada, among others, concerning the American war on Iraq. President Bush's "you're with us, or you're against us stance" or in the toned down version "either you are with us or you're irrelevant" have been replaced by a renewed commitment to work with liked minded nations.

Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman's detailed analysis of this issue in their recent work, "*Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy – Ambivalent Engagement*"

---

[84] Patrick and Forman, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy : Ambivalent Engagement*, 15

resolves that "going it alone" is not in American interests. [85] In the words of Stewart Patrick, "the unfamiliar and shifting international landscape shaped by transnational forces, new actors, and unfamiliar threats" suggests that "no single country, not even one as powerful as the United States, can manage alone".[86] As such, the NSS expresses a strong commitment to leading multinational efforts in order to tackle global challenges and ensure effective response.

The NSS acknowledges that a narrow, state focused solution defined by national interest alone is inadequate to address imprecise asymmetric threats. Hence, the strategy recognizes that a multilateral approach could contribute to greater civil-military cooperation by generating, for example, enhanced intelligence sharing. Canada's NSP supports this view as reflected by its investment in a new national integrated intelligence assessment capability. It should be noted that Canada's new capability known as the Integrated Threat Assessment Center, is not only highly dependent on effective multinational intelligence sharing agreements but that the United States is Canada's most vital intelligence partner. As such, enhancing Canada's intelligence capability would serve both nations' interests.

Both Canada and the United States are vulnerable to asymmetric threats and weapons of mass destruction introduced by low technology methods and non-state actors. To achieve the ultimate goal of protecting the American homeland from catastrophic attack, the U.S. solicits international cooperation. Thus, it is in American interests to be both unilateral and multilateral. However, John Dumbrell argues in his article to the "*Political Quarterly*" that the United States is advancing a new mixture of unilateralism and multilateralism; one which is pursued almost entirely on American terms and judged solely on America national interests.[87] On the other hand, while Canada promotes through its 2005 International Policy Statement a more active international security role with a willingness to lead and go it alone if necessary, Canada bears significantly less

---

[85] ibid., 2
[86] Ibid., 15
[87] John Dumbrell. 2002 "Unilateralism and "America First'? President George W. Bush's Foreign Policy, *Political Quarterly*, 73.3: 279-287

capacity to do so. As such, Canada's multilateral approach reflects a differing foundation and focus. Further, Canada's global interventions are more aligned to its stated desire to re-earn its global influence, contribute to human security and gain access to global markets by promoting its own national interests and values.[88]

From a thematic view, the 2006 NSS is a wartime strategy firmly anchored to defending the American homeland. While economic prosperity and the promotion of values are vital issues, they remain secondary to winning the war on terror. It is apparent that winning the war on terror, if at all achievable, requires a myriad of solutions and a global effort. This reality motivates the Unites States' renewed commitment towards multilateralism.

Finally, it is noted that Canada did not warrant any form of direct attention in the NSS update. While this is not unusual, it does reflect the benign nature of the relationship and the strength of the long standing cooperative security arrangements. This being said, if "security trumps trade" and with the U.S. holding the security umbrella, the relationship can quickly become irritated and strained in the national interest. As examined further, it is in Canada's interest to mitigate the impact of unilateral decision making; therefore, its NSP would naturally center on issues affecting the relationship.

Canada's National Security Policy

In contrast to the American NSS, Canada's National Security Policy "*Securing an Open Society*" begins by reaffirming the government's overarching and primary obligation to protect Canadians.[89] Three primary national security interests are identified: (1) protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad; (2) ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and (3) contributing to international security. Represented as a strategic framework and action plan, the key measures and actions are

[88] Canada. Privy Council Office, Canada's International Policy Statement, "*A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overview*", (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2005), Forward from the Prime Minister, np.
[89] Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004), vii.

identified under six strategic areas: (1) Intelligence; (2) Emergency Planning and Management (3) Public Health; (4) Transport Security (5) Border Security and (6) International Security.[90]

The NSP reflects the complexity and interconnectedness of a global society. It acknowledges the increase in acts of global terrorism, the threat from pandemics and the importance of providing a secure environment to assure Canada's quality of life.[91] Though, Canada's terrorist related experience is influenced by the Air India Bombing, the Quebec separatist activities under the FLQ banner and Canadian links to the London subway bombing, the NSP does not focus on homegrown terrorism. Canada's view of terrorism is not as broad as the American view. Though the NSP acknowledges Canada's vulnerability to asymmetric threats including WMD, its perception of the threat (not a direct target) and corresponding strategic actions are not comparable to the American global approach. Moreover, the NSP reflects Canada's limited sense of vulnerability and weak security culture.

The 2006 American NSS promotes homeland security through global intervention. By contrast, Canada's NSP highlights "intermestic" issues such as, health, intelligence, emergency preparedness, law enforcement, transport and border security; issues which are best managed through cooperative security arrangements. [92] However, the 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) does promote greater Canadian interaction in the world with the stated goal of re-earning Canada's reputation and influence in the world.

The NSP promotes an integrated, whole of government approach to national security issues, balancing the "protection of core Canadian values of openness, diversity and respect for civil liberties".[93] On the other hand, the American NSS reflects its global

---

[90] ibid., viii
[91] ibid., viii
[92] The term "intermestic" is becoming more commonly used to express the merging of foreign and domestic issues such as border security.
[93] Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* …, viii

superiority, unparalleled military power and "exceptionalism".[94] The NSS promotes an interventionist approach while Canada's NSP could be characterized as an isolationist view. This being said, the IPS promotes greater international intervention aligned to Canada's ideological soft power and values based human security agenda.

While extensively influenced by 9/11, Canada's National Security Policy is also shaped by two other significant national security events: the March 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Toronto and the August 2003, northeastern United States/southern Ontario power blackout.[95] The following briefly amplifies the significance of these two events as reported by the Government of Canada and assessed by the Conference Board of Canada.

The Toronto SARS event affected the epicenter of Canada's economic heartland. At end state, some 238 cases were confirmed nationwide with 32 related deaths and 15,000 residents being quarantined. In addition to the human cost, there was a significant economic impact aggravated by a World Health Organization (WHO) travel advisory.

The Conference Board of Canada's Canadian Tourism Research Institute assessed a potential loss in national economic activity in 2003 of $1.5 billion representing 0.15 percent of Canada's Real GDP with two thirds of the loss concentrated in City of Toronto and the travel, tourism, services sector.[96]

In the view of Robert J. Blendon, Professor of Health Policy and Political Analysis at the Harvard School of Public Health, "the implication of the SARS experience in Toronto for the United States is that if there were an epidemic of SARS in the U.S. that could not be contained quickly, it would have a significant economic impact

---

[94] Patrick and Forman, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, 5. Patrick writes American "exceptionalism" refers to a pervasive faith in the uniqueness, immutability, and superiority of the country's founding liberal principles, accompanied by a conviction that the United States has a special destiny among nations.

[95] Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* ibid., 21

[96] Paul Darby, *Special Briefing may 2003 - the Economic Impact of SARS* (Ottawa, Canada: The Conference Board of Canada, (2003), available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.asp?; or http://dfait-maeci.gc.ca; accessed 29 January 2006.

on any major city where cases occurred".[97] Addressing the threat from pandemics is a global concern. Both Canada and the United States recognize through their respective strategies that it is matter of major importance and mutual interest. Proximity, vulnerability, and spill-over effects suggests public safety, health and environmental concerns be addressed in a cooperative manner.

The 14 August 2003 Blackout left some 50 million people without power across the northeastern United States and southern Ontario. Nearly one half of Canada's economy (located in Ontario) was without power for 12-48 hours with rolling blackouts experienced for more than a week until full power was restored. New York and Toronto, among other financial and heavily industrialized centers were affected. Estimates on the likely total economic cost of the blackout ranges from $4.5 to $8.2 billion. The United States Department of Energy published a total cost estimate in the range $6 billion. The bottom line is the 2003 August Blackout cost billions of dollars in economic activity in both Canada and the United States. This event demonstrated both the vulnerability and interdependency of Canada, U.S. critical infrastructure.[98]

The impact of SARS and the Blackout had noticeable effect on Canada's economy. Moreover, the events identified to the Canadian public that the Federal government had not yet established the ability to respond effectively to intermestic emergency events. The NSP strategic actions addressing Public Health and Critical Infrastructure Protection under the Emergency Planning and Management pillar are in response to SARS and the August Blackout. Protecting Canadians from catastrophic events, as reflected in the NSP is in Canada's vital interests from both a human and economic perspective. Moreover, proximity and critical interdependencies dictate it's in both nations' interests to develop cooperative solutions.

---

[97] ibid., Harvard School of Public Health, Press Release available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/press/releases/press06162003.html ; Internet: assessed 4 April 2006

[98] Electricity Consumers Resource Council, "The Economic Impacts of the August 2003 Blackout" nd, 1, available at http://www.elcon.org/Documents/EconomicImpactsofAugust2003Blackout.pdf; Internet: accessed 8 April 2006.

The economic impact of 9/11, SARS and the Blackout gave rise to $7.7 billion dollars growing to over $9.5 billion by 2005 being allocated to national security related initiatives.[99] This significant allocation of funds coupled with a major reorganization of several government departments would be subject to scrutiny and review by the Auditor General. Considering the climate in Ottawa which demanded greater government accountability, some form of national security policy document would naturally be required. Thus, it is reasonable to assert the NSP would serve three keys proposes. First, the NSP would provide the overarching policy guidance needed to support the decisions and significant funds already committed. Secondly, with a Federal election on the horizon, the non-controversial document would communicate to Canadians the government's determination to protect its citizens from asymmetric threats such as pandemics. Third, the NSP would announce to the United States, Canada's renewed commitment to domestic and international security matters. Moreover, the stated core national interest of "ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies" would speak directly to U.S. concerns regarding Canada's perceived lax security culture, while possibility contributing to an improved Canada/U.S. relationship under the Paul Martin government.

The NSP identifies "ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies" and "contributing to international security" as two primary national security interests. [100] It is in Canada's self- interest to not only reinforce its own domestic security posture but in doing so contribute to the American homeland security imperative. As the recipient of strong criticisms by the United States for its lax security culture, any tangible actions contributing to American homeland security such as taking on a greater share of the international security burden would be well-received and are in Canada's national interests.

The six strategic areas cited in the NSP: (1) Intelligence; (2) Emergency Planning and Management (3) Public Health; (4) Transport Security (5) Border Security and (6)

---

[99] Canada, Auditor General, *2004 Report of the Auditor General of Canada,* np
[100] Canada. Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society : Canada's National Security Policy*, vii

International Security while more directly aligned to Canada's homeland security interests have an overlapping economic prosperity interest. While the NSP does not specifically express the economic dimension, the IPS does confirm the underlying economic perspective and relationship to national security interests. Moreover, the origins of the strategic actions and economic impact of 9/11, SARS and the Blackout confirm the intensity with which Canada would protect its economic interests. In short, Canada's response resulted in a concerted security focus and tangible international security action.

The immediate national security policy decisions were centered on keeping the border, ports and transportation hubs open and fluid. By taking swift aggressive action, Canada delivered innovative security solutions such as "SMART Borders" and introduced an out of country, point of departure air passenger screening program reflecting Canadian interests and values.[101] Notably, Canada did not create a comprehensive Air Marshals Program as strongly encouraged by the U.S. Rather, Canada chose to place Air Marshals on only those American and international flights needing such a measure. Further, Canada supported the war on terror through its military contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom, however, did not support the war in Iraq. These differences illustrate that while contributing to both American and Canadian security interests, Canada is making choices reflecting the distinctiveness of its own national interests and values.

Conclusion

This paper introduced the view that Canada and United States have great commonality of interests and shared values. The reality is Canada's geography, history, economy, culture and security is inextricability linked to the United States. To the extent some muse that Canada is the 51st state. In Robert Cox's view, Canada has become a functional part of the U.S. and considering the depth of Canada's economic interdependencies has no choice but to place American interests ahead of Canadian

[101] ibid., 3

concerns. Jack Granatstein asserts that Canada has no choice but cooperate with the U.S. on North American security matters. Their perspectives prompted this question: Does Canada's NSP reflect the distinctiveness of its own national interests and values or does it bow to the American ultimatum and homeland security imperative? Can Canada's silhouette be seen in the shadow of the Empire? Shaped by different experiences and influences the author's thesis is that Canada makes distinct choices in its own national interest. Through a comparative, thematic analysis of Canada's NSP and the 2006 NSS this paper persuades the reader that Canada's first-ever national security policy reflects the distinctiveness of its own national interests.

Considering that debate, ambiguity and confusion surrounds the term "national interest", Part 1 served to develop a common understanding of national interest while introducing the comparative approach from which the distinctiveness of Canada's national interests would be revealed. Building on Neuchterlein's Intensity Matrix model, it was determined that the distinctions which adjust the criticality of the interest involved would serve to illuminate the distinctiveness of Canada's national interests.

Examination of the respective national security apparatus, policy formulation and decision making in the aftermath of 9/11 revealed the first elements of distinction. The American national security strategy is supported by a well-established National Security Council and a strong security culture. Canada has no established national security apparatus, a perceived lax security culture and takes an Ad hoc approach toward national security issues. During crisis, both the Prime Minister and the President retain significant unilateral decision making authority. Their authority and management style are central elements to national security policy formulation. However, unilateral Presidential decision-making did intensify Canada's vulnerability and risk. Canada's economic interests were greatly affected by the closing of the North American airspace and the Border.

Making distinct choices reflecting differing interests, values and experiences Canada remains content to leave the lion's share of the continental security burden to the

Americans. Canada accepts the warmth the American security blanket provides, however, will in its own national interests kick at the covers. Canada has made choices which seriously irritate and strain the defence relationship. As revealed, Canada's diminished military capability, soft power agenda, response to 9/11 and the War on Iraq, promotion of the Anti-Land Mines Treaty, and sudden reversal to not join the BMD agreement confirmed Canada's distinct perception of the threat and its own vulnerability. These distinctions revealed that Canada may make decisions which may not contribute to the vital interest of maintaining a favourable Canada/U.S. relationship. Further, Canada's distinct national unity issues underscores national security decision making and is considered the ultimate litmus test.

By contrast, while the United States possesses unparalleled power it is vulnerable to further, catastrophic terrorist attacks. Supported by a strong security culture, the President was provided extraordinary authority under the 2001 Patriot Act highlighting the sense of American vulnerability. The experience of 9/11 coupled with the ongoing war on terror amid Iran's evolving nuclear enrichment program served to further engrain the sense of American vulnerability. Considering Neucherlein's model, the legitimate threat from further catastrophic attacks and the fact America is at War, protecting the American homeland is a vital, if not a near survival interest. The wide variance in which Canada perceives the threat and its own vulnerability is reflected in the NSP.

Examination of the Canada/US relationship focusing on cooperative security and economic interdependencies distinguished that Canada is highly dependant on the U.S. for its security and economic well-being. The expediency of unilateral Presidential decision-making to close North American airspace and the Border on 9/11 awoke Canada to a new security paradigm and stress point. American security interests would overtake Canada's economic prosperity and Canada's vital economic interests may become the victim of collateral damage.

Intelligence, Border and Transport Security strategic actions, as central pillars in the NSP, came into being during the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to manage the new

stress point in Canada/U.S. relations. The extent and nature of Canada's economic interdependencies revealed that Canada's economy is extremely dependent on the United States. Canada's perception of the threat results in a marginal interest in defence matters, while the criticality of Canada's economic dependency as reflected by the NSP strategic actions confirm Canada's NSP is underscored by the economic dimension of the relationship. By contrast, the 2006 NSS as a wartime strategy is firmly anchored to defending the American homeland through global influence and action.

Does Canada's national security policy reflect its own, distinct national interests? Considering the origins, distinctions and influences which shape Canada's NSP as evidenced by the strategic actions which frame the document, there should be no question. Canada is not the 51st state and its NSP does not bow to the American ultimatum and homeland security imperative. The economic dimension within its relationship with the United States underscores the NSP while the American NSS is unmistakably centered on defending the homeland through global intervention. In short, Canada's NSP reflects the distinctiveness of its own national interests and values. Canada's silhouette is distinct in the shadow of the Empire.

Bibliography

Books

Adams, Michael, Amy Langstaff, and David Jamieson. *Fire and Ice: United States, Canada, and the Myth of Converging Values*. Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2003.

Doran, Charles F., John H. Sigler, American Assembly, and Council on Foreign Relations. *Canada and the United States : Enduring Friendship, Persistent Stress*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985.

Lloyd, Richmond M., and Naval War College, Strategy and Force Planning Faculty. *Strategy and Force Planning*. 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000.

Nuechterlein, Donald Edwin. *America Recommitted : A Superpower Assesses its Role in a Turbulent World*. 2nd ed. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2001.

———. *National Interests and Presidential Leadership : The Setting of Priorities*. Westview Special Studies in International Relations. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.* New York: Basic Books, 1990.

Macnamara, W. D., and Ann Fitz-Gerald. *A National Security Framework for Canada*. *Enjeux Publics* 3, no. 10 (2002): 1-27.

Patrick, Stewart, and Shepard Forman. *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy : Ambivalent Engagement*. Center on International Cooperation Studies in Multilateralism. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

Roberts, Joseph K. *In the Shadow of Empire: Canada for Americans*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. *America's National Interest in a Post-Cold War World : Issues and Dilemmas*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994.

Welsh, Jennifer M. *At Home in the World : Canada's Global Vision for the 21st Century*. 1st ed. Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004.

Woodward, Bob. *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

———. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002.

Reports, Surveys and Public Documents

Canada. Privy Council Office. Canada's International Policy Statement. *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Overvie*w. Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2005.

Canada. Privy Council Office. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2004.

Canada, Auditor General, *2004 Report of the Auditor General of Canada.* Ottawa: 2004 available from, http:www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html.

Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. Report for the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, *National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World*. Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003. available from; http://www.cdfai.org/currentpublications.html.

Conference of Defence Associations Institute. *Understanding the Crisis in Canadian Security and Defence*. Queen's University, Chair of Defence Management Studies, 2005 available from http://www.cda-cdai.ca; Internet accessed 4 April 2006; Also available from http://www.cric.ca/en_re/portraits/index.html.

Electricity Consumers Resource Council, *The Economic Impacts of the August 2003 Blackout*, available from http://www.elcon.org/Documents/EconomicImpactsofAugust2003Blackout.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 April 2006.

EKOS Survey. *Tracking Public Priorities,* January 2004; available from http://www.ekos.com; Internet; accessed 4 April 2006.

Foreign Affairs Canada. *Canada-United States, the World's Largest Trading Relationship.* Canadian Embassy, Washington. Available from http://www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/can-am/washington/trade_and_investments; Internet: accessed 28 February 2006.

Foreign Affairs Canada. *Canada - United States Relations Web Sites; Border Cooperation Link*, available from http://www.dfait.gc.ca/can-am/main/border/default-en.asp; Internet; accessed 28 February 2006.

Government of Canada. *Key Economic Events: 2001 - the Events of September 11*; available from http://canadianeconomy.gc.ca/english/economy/2001September11.html; Internet; accessed 2 March 2006.

United States National Security Council. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2002, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html ; Internet accessed February 19, 2006.

United States Executive Office of the President of the United States. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006.

Articles

Axworthy, Thomas S. "An Independent Canada in a Shared North America: Must we be in Love or Will an Arranged Marriage do?" *International Journal* 59, no. 4 (Fall, 2004): Journal online; available from; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=782103341&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Blanchfield, Mike. "Inevitable' Terrorists Will Eye Canada as Launch Pad to US" *The Windsor Star,* 21 October 2004, available from; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=724709571&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD

Blendon, Robert J. et al, "The Public's Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in Toronto and the United States", Harvard School of Public Health, and John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Infectious Diseases Society of America, 2004. Internet; accessed 29 January 2006. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v38n7/31962/31962.text.html;

Clarkson, Stephen, and Erick Lachappelle. "Jean Chrétien's Legacy in Managing Canadian-American Relations." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 12, no. 2 (Fall, 2005): 65, Journal online, available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=984142881&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Cox, Robert. "Is there a Specifically Canadian Perspective on the World?" *Working Paper no 45. and Text of a Lecture by Robert W. Cox at the Liu Institute for Global Issues January 27, 2005, University of British Columbia*; available from; http://www.iir.ubc.ca/Papers/cox-wp45.pdf. Internet; accessed 3 April 2006.

Crotty, William. "Presidential Policymaking in Crisis Situations: 9/11 and its Aftermath." *Policy Studies Journal* 31, no. 3 (Aug, 2003): 451, Journal online; available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=424737841&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Darby, Paul. *Special Briefing May 2003 - the Economic Impact of SARS*. Ottawa, Canada: The Conference Board of Canada, 2003, available from http://dfait-maeci.gc.ca, Internet; accessed 29 January 2006.

Dumbrell, John. “Unilateralism and “America First: President George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy.” *Political Quarterly*, no.73 (Issue 3, 2002) 279-287.

Dunsky, Dan. "Canada's Three Solitudes" *The National Interest* no. 82 (Winter, 2005): 94, Journal online; available from; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=966413731&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Granatstein, Jack L. “A Friendly Agreement in Advance: Canada-US Defense Relations Past, Present and Future”, *The Border Papers, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary*, No. 166, (June 2002).

Jones, David. “Canada-U.S. Relations After September 11: Back to Basics”, *Policy Options*, nd (March 2002): 25,

Liotta, P. H. "To Die for: National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties." *Parameters* 30, no. 2 (Summer, 2000): 46,

Mackenzie, Hector. "Defining and Defending a Place in the World: Canada's Vital Interests in International Affairs." *Canadian Issues* (Sep, 2002): 31, Journal online; available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=345523781&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Nye, Joseph S.,Jr. "Redefining the National Interest." *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 1999): 22, Journal online, available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=42562119&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

Phillips, James D. "Improving Border Management." *International Journal* 60, no. 2 (Spring, 2005): 407, Journal online; available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=870358611&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD

Rice, Susan E.“Statement on the 2006 National Security Strategy”, *The Brookings Institution*, 16 March 2006 available from http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events; Internet accessed 17 March 2006.

The 105th American Assembly Columbia University. “Renewing the US - Canada Relationship." Harriman, New York, February 3-6, 2005, available from www.americanassembly.org; Internet; accessed 29 January 2006.