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SUPERPOWER EUROPEAN UNION –

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE
POLICY AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP**

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**SUPERPOWER EUROPEAN UNION –
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP**

“What we are doing is historic. We are building a new superpower. The European Union is about the projection of collective power, wealth, and influence. This collective strength when we work together means the European Union can stand on par as a superpower along with the United States”

Tony Blair

Introduction

American ambivalence towards ‘Europe as a power’ has remained consistent throughout the entire history of NATO. The United States still recognises the need for the Alliance, but resents the cost and occasionally even the commitment. Washington demanded American leadership of the Alliance but constantly called for greater burden-sharing¹ and occasionally pondered renewed isolationism.²

That the European Union (EU) has to concentrate and increase its efforts to take over more responsibility for European and global security according to its economic power is a matter of great debate between the US and the European NATO members – and not only since former

¹ Gavin Kennedy, *Burden Sharing in NATO*, London, Duckworth, 1979, on the more recent debates: Nicole Gnesotto, *Les Notes de l’IFRI 11: Burdensharing in NATO*, Paris, IFRI 1999, nos. 11-13

² Jolyon Howorth, “European Integration and defence: the ultimate challenge”, *Institute for Studies Western European Union*, Paris, November 2000, p. 11. On arguments in favour of isolationism, see also Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come home America. The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation”, *International Security*, Vol. 21, issue 4, spring 1997, pp. 5-48.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger³ asked about whom to call in Europe if the world caught fire. “Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, various proposals for the European allies to play a greater part in NATO’s activities by creating a discrete European Pillar, were floated periodically. On the US side, these tended to emerge out of disputes over finances and burden sharing; on the European side, the projects concentrated on generating greater balance and influence and leadership. All of them failed to materialise, largely because of the peculiar circumstances of the Cold War.”⁴

Throughout the Cold War period, the US has played a critical role in European integration and security, in particular through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Alliance still is the bond between Europe and North America. Meanwhile the uniting effect of the Cold War threat has gone and the end of this period has left the United States of America in a dominant position as a military power and an unchallenged, and virtually unchecked, global dominant actor.⁵

The second Iraq War, where disagreements between the US and former close allies over how to ‘do’ security broke the surface in a spectacular and damaging manner, led to the situation that the European Union is developing more autonomy. While the fear in the EU is that the US is driving its own worldwide agenda without consideration of any European interests, the United States fear that the Europeans have continued to back away from the US and NATO and that the Alliance is no longer needed and while US influence might diminish Russian influence on the EU

³ A frustrated Secretary of State Henry Kissinger famously asked in 1977, “What telephone number do you dial to reach Europe?”

⁴ Jolyon Howorth, “European Integration and defence: the ultimate challenge”, Institute for Studies Western European Union, Paris, November 2000, p. 3

⁵ Javier Solana, “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a better World”, Brussels 12 December 2003, p. 1

might increase. Although the official statements are very moderate, the tone and vocabulary from across the Atlantic is still very critical.

Many efforts, especially the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the development of military and crisis management capabilities within the EU are seen as a possible rival of US dominance, and as a threat to NATO which might have unforeseeable, negative implications and consequences on the transatlantic relationship.⁶ These fears seem to be validated with the recent, however, still unsuccessful attempt of some of the EU member states to lift the arms embargo against China in spring 2005. Based on these features it is argued that the EU is not only on its way to become the rising challenger of the US because of its emerging polity that is in the process of marshalling the impressive resources and historical ambitions of Europe's separate nation-states, but also that the EU pursues its own political agenda with little consideration of US security interests.

With the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)⁷ and ESDP as well as the nomination of the former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to continue in his role as CFSP co-coordinator,⁸ the EU has moved a good step closer to a clear answer on Henry Kissinger's question. The newly developed and agreed European Security Strategy (ESS)⁹

⁶ Alyson Bailes, "US, NATO and Europe – Is there still a Common Agenda?", Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Paris, 12 December 2002, p. 1

⁷ The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the 1992 Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht. A number of important changes were introduced in the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty spells out five fundamental objectives of the CFSP: (1) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the EU in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter; (2) to strengthen the security of the EU in all ways; (3) to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter; (4) to promote international co-operation; and (5) to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. http://europa.eu.int/comm/index_en.htm

⁸ EU News, Policy Positions & EU Actors online, "Solana to answer that 'call from Kissinger'", & Defence, 30 June 2004, p. 1, www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-118090-16&type=News

⁹ In June 2003, barely three months after one of the worst-ever crises of the European Union (EU) generated by the United States-led invasion of Iraq, Europe's leaders meeting in the Council of the European Union were able to unite

clearly defines the role for the European Union in the coming decades: “As a union of 25 states and more than 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s GNP and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the EU is inevitably a global player.”¹⁰ The question where the EU is off to and what will be the result of CFSP is – not at least because of the cultural and political diversity of the European Nations as well as the different visions within the European Union as to what form ESDP should take – not easy to answer. The current dynamic clearly shows that the “European journey” is not over; on the contrary, it has just started and it contains the political potential not even to strengthen the transatlantic ties by sharing responsibility for global security but also the danger for further estrangement between the European Union and North America.

The challenges of the European security environment – with its long and partially fragile borders to (potential) crisis regions and its inevitably special relationship with Russia, which is and remains vital for European security, as well as the globally evident and upcoming, unresolved social, political, economical and environmental problems – might only successfully be solved when the European Union and the United States of America are cooperating politically and militarily. This changing security environment and the increasing global demands, which require the improvement and development of European capabilities in times of shrinking defence

in welcoming a first draft of a new Security Strategy for the EU. The document, finally adopted by the European Council of 12–13 December 2003 under the title ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, was a bid to reassert the EU’s common strategic vision and to strengthen its common will for action in the realm of security. The Strategy underlines the importance of conflict prevention and civil, but also – wherever necessary – military intervention in weak or failing states. Alyson J. K. Bailes, “The European Security Strategy – An Evolutionary History”, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 10, Stockholm, February 2005, p. 4. Jörg Faust und Dirk Messner, “Europe’s New Security Strategy – Challenges for Development Policy”, Discussion Paper 3/2004, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, p. 6

¹⁰ Javier Solana, “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a better World”, Brussels 12 December 2003, p. 1

budgets on the European side and steadily increasing procurement costs, will inevitably lead to a closer and more integrated European political and defence cooperation.¹¹

Transatlantic relations have not been easy at all. During the Cold War the US dominated the Alliance, which was very much in the interest of the West European countries, because the United States of America was essential for European liberty and survival. Thus, many simmering conflicts with the US and within NATO were covered by the necessity to present a strong and powerful Alliance and to demonstrate cohesion and strength. This unity changed significantly after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and even more before and during the second Iraq War. The rift between the European Union and the US was more than obvious and tensions increased on both sides of the Atlantic.

The aim of this essay is to show that the Europeans have embarked on the greatest and probably most important journey in their long and during many periods belligerent history and that this development is going to have decisive influence not only on the unification of Europe but also on the transatlantic relationship. Although the direction and destination of this historically unique journey seems to be predictable, the way which it will really take and where it might end is yet unknown. This essay reviews the recent achievements of the European Union with a special focus on the European Security and Defence Policy. It examines how the

¹¹ The EU capabilities list is long and would be very considerable, with highlights on strategic lift, C4 and satellite-based intelligence, as well as appropriate strengths in the field of precision guided munitions, air supremacy and offensive electronic warfare. For the moment, very little of this figured in the actual planning of any EU member state other than France and the United Kingdom. The estimate for additional capabilities and capabilities improvement is based on the planned acquisition pace of key enabling military assets. Significant deliveries of the A400 airlift aircraft are planned for 2009-12; see S. Coniglio, "A400M, An-70, C-130J, C-17: How Do They Stand?" *Military Technology*, vol. XXVII, no 7, 2003, p. 58. Skynet 5, a sophisticated European military satellite communications system that will mainly serve the UK is expected to be fully operational by 2008; see C. Hoyle, "UK Concludes Skynet 5 deal", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 40, no. 17, 2003, p. 3. The first test models of the Galileo navigation satellite will be in orbit by early 2006; see D. A. Divis, "Military role for Galileo emerges", *GPS World*, vol. 13, no. 5, 2002, p. 10, www.global.org. Several European satellite reconnaissance programs should yield usable assets over the next few years; see "The New Challenges Facing European Intelligence – reply to the annual report of the Council", Document A/1775, Assembly of the WEU, 4 June 2002, paragraphs 81-4, 104

development of the ESDP has influenced the transatlantic relationship and how it might impact future relations between Europe and the United States. The paper suggests a road map for the future development of the EU so that it may adequately address the changing security environment and increasing global responsibilities.

The European Union

After a disastrous era in the first half of the 20th century, "...the nations of Europe searched for a political mechanism that could bring them together and move them beyond their ancient rivalries."¹² The EU is the "...very first mega-governing institution in all of history to be born out of the ashes of defeat. Rather than commemorate a noble past, it sought to ensure that the past would never be repeated. After a thousand of years of unremitting conflict, war, and bloodshed, the nations of Europe emerged in the span of less than half a century, decimated. Their population maimed and killed, their ancient monuments and infrastructure lying in ruins, their worldly treasures depleted, and their way of life destroyed..."¹³

After WW II, a group of visionaries decided they had better do something or the European nations would do it again. Many of these people were driven by a moral imperative to end war, because one could look at Europe, with the Iron Curtain coming down, the countries were rebuilding their military before they rebuilt their cities, and one could see another brutal, lethal war coming to Europe. It became clear that Europe had to reorganize and to find some new

¹² Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream*, Penguin Group (USA), New York 2004, p. 200

¹³ Ibid

way.¹⁴ One of the leaders of this movement was Winston Churchill. In 1946 he gave two famous speeches about the state of Europe. One was in Fulton, Missouri: “An iron curtain has fallen across the continent.” But the speech that the Europeans know better is one he gave in Zurich three months later in which he said, “I want to speak to you today about the tragedy of Europe. ... We have had these three brutal wars and we are going to do it again. Anybody can look and see we are going to do it again unless we reorganize our ancient continent, and the model is going to be the great republic across the shining sea. ... We have to build a sort of United States of Europe.”¹⁵ Two years later, at the Congress of Europe, he pondered the future of a continent wracked by centuries of war and offered his own vision for Europe, “We hope to see a Europe where men of every country will think of being a European as of belonging to their native land, and ... wherever they go in this wide domain ... will truly feel, ‘Here I am at home.’”¹⁶

Jean Monnet, a French statesman and one of the great visionaries for a united Europe, declared in 1943 during a conference in Algiers that “... there will be no peace in Europe if the states are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty. ... The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development. The European states must constitute themselves into a federation.”¹⁷ Monnet, who more than any other single individual was responsible for creating the idea of a European community composed of formerly

¹⁴ T. R. Reid, *The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy*, Edited transcript of remarks, 12 August 2004, Carnegie Council Books for Breakfast, Merrill House, New York, p. 1

¹⁵ T. R. Reid, *The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy*, Edited transcript of remarks, 12 August 2004, Carnegie Council Books for Breakfast, Merrill House, New York, p. 4

¹⁶ A. S. Byatt, “What is a European?”, *The New York Times Magazine*, 31 October 2002

¹⁷ In 1943, Monnet became a member of the National Liberation Committee, the French government in exile in Algiers. During a meeting on August 5, 1943, Monnet declared to the Committee: "There will be no peace in Europe, if the states are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty... The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development. The European states must constitute themselves into a federation. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JeanMonnet>

divided peoples and countries, understood how difficult it would be to fulfill this dream. The problem, noted Monnet, is that “Europe has never existed; one has genuinely to create Europe.”¹⁸

The creation of a united Europe began with the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.¹⁹ “Many European intellectuals and political leaders argued that the long-standing economic rivalry between Germany and France was at the heart of the lingering conflict in Europe, and a major cause of war that periodically engulfed the continent. Jean Monnet proposed the idea of merging the coal and steel production of Germany and France, especially along the long-contested industrial corridor that bordered the French province of Lothringen and the Ruhr and Saar rivers”.²⁰ He realized that the friction between Germany and France for control of the Ruhr, was rising dangerous levels, presaging a possible return to hostilities as had happened after WW I. Monnet believed that the cooperation that would result from the integration of these German and French industries would serve to build an element of trust between the former rivals that would continue to grow with time.²¹

Six years later the preamble to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC),²² states unequivocally that the aim is “...to lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”²³ The grand hope was “... to substitute for

¹⁸ Elaine Sciolino, “Visions of a Union: Europe Gropes for an Identity.” The New York Times. 15 December 2002

¹⁹ The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC): first treaty organization of what has become the European Union; established by the Treaty of Paris (1952). It is also known as the ‘Schuman Plan’, after the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, who proposed it in 1950. Member nations of ECSC pledged to pool their coal and steel resources by providing a unified market for their coal and steel products, lifting restrictions on imports and exports, and creating a unified labour market. The executive machinery of the ECSC provided an important precedent for the future growth of a united Europe. The Columbia Encyclopaedia, <http://www.bartleby.com/65/eu/EuropnCNSC.html>

²⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Monnet

²¹ Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream*, Penguin Group (USA), New York 2004, pp. 201-202

²² The EEC Treaty created four basic rights: the right of citizens to move between the states; the right to establish residence in another state; the right to work in another state; and the right to move capital between countries

²³ “Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome)”, 25 March 1957, www.europa.eu.int

age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis of broader and deeper community among people long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared.”²⁴ Here was the first European political entity in history whose very reason for existence was to build peace.²⁵

In the 1970s and 1980s, the EEC expanded, adding the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Greece and Portugal as member states. “While the economic devastation of WW II provided an impetus to create a European community, the oil shock of 1973 added new urgency to efforts aimed at integration.”²⁶

In 1992, European governments signed the Maastricht Treaty, which created a single European market and changed the name of the former European Community to the new “European Union”. At the same time, the Europeans committed themselves to a new single continental currency, the Euro (€),²⁷ and to the free movement of labour from one European country to another. Furthermore, member states agreed also to extend intergovernmental cooperation to include a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

²⁴ Commission of the European Communities (CEC). *Treaties Establishing the European Communities*, Luxembourg: Official Publications of the European Communities (OOPEC), 1983

²⁵ Chris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration*, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 15

²⁶ Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream*, Penguin Group (USA), New York 2004, p. 205

²⁷ The Euro (€; ISO 4217 code EUR) is the currency of twelve European Union member states: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City which formerly used the French Franc or the Italian Lira as their currency, mint their own Euro coins in small amounts. The Euro is also the currency of Montenegro and Kosovo and is used in Andorra as well. The Euro is the result of the most significant monetary reform in Europe since the Roman Empire. Though the Euro can be seen simply as a mechanism for perfecting the Single European Market, facilitating free trade between the members of the Eurozone, the Euro is also a key part of the European project of political integration.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro>

When the EU expanded its membership on 01 May 2004, it was an epochal event in European history. For what began as a former coal and steel trading arrangement, had grown from a common market into a globally powerful international community and with the EU's draft constitution,²⁸ which is currently being considered for ratification by its member states, it becomes clear that a new transnational political institution is being born that is designed to function like a state. And even after the French and Dutch "No" which might lead to a rejection of the EU constitution in its current form, "... the Union itself is already so far along toward integration that no one really believes it will ever dissolve back into separate nation-state governments, each going it alone in the global era. Rather, most political observers believe that if this particular constitution runs into serious trouble, the member states will merely resurrect its various particulars in other treaties and directives until the substance of the covenant becomes binding on the community."²⁹

"A united Europe has emerged as the embodiment of an approach to world affairs that stands in contrast to that of the United States. It is one based on pooled sovereignty, the primacy of international institutions and law, the exaltation of peace, (...) a shared currency, and a value system equating the death penalty with barbarism and free health care with civilization. Europe is at a point in its history where making aggressive war is considered passé, an outdated relic along the lines of burning at the stake or a medieval joust."³⁰ The EU is the first transnational government whose regulatory powers supersede the territorial powers of its member states. This fact alone opens a new chapter in the nature of governance. Its legitimacy "...lies in a code of

²⁸ The constitution brings together for the first time the many treaties and agreements on which the EU is based. It defines the powers of the EU, stating where it can act and where the member states retain the right of veto. It also defines the role of the EU institutions.

²⁹ Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream*, Penguin Group (USA), New York 2004, pp. 208-209

³⁰ Roger Cohen, "Will the European Union Achieve SUPERPOWER Status? – Wake up and smell the brioche", New York Times, 2003

conduct, conditioned by universal human rights and operationalized through statutes, regulations, and directives, and most important, by a continuous process of engagement, discourse, and negotiation with multiple players operating at the local, regional, national, transnational, and global levels.”³¹

Europe has had internal civil wars, it had some problems with terrorism, but in sixty years, there has not been a war between European nations, and at this stage of European integration it is hardly to presume that there might be another war. Europe is now too organized, too unified and its economies are too strongly interwoven. So far it has really worked.³² However, security for Europe does not mean security for the world. Although Europe has become a more and more stable region where wealth and prosperity is spread, the overall global picture and situation looks differently.

With its commitment to human rights, the primacy of international institutions and law and a value system which is based on modern humanism³³ and with its not always fortunate experience as colonial powers the Europeans feel committed to take over responsibility for a more secure and better world. It seems that they are willing to shoulder their responsibilities and part of the overall global burden. To lay a sound basis for the upcoming challenges, the EU is on

³¹ Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream*, Penguin Group (USA), New York 2004, p. 209

³² T. R. Reid, *The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy*, Edited transcript of remarks, 12 August 2004, Carnegie Council Books for Breakfast, Merrill House, New York, p. 5

³³ So, with modern humanism one finds a philosophy or religion that is in tune with modern knowledge; is inspiring, socially conscious, and personally meaningful. It is not only the thinking person's outlook, but that of the feeling person as well, for it has inspired the arts as much as it has the sciences, philanthropy as much as critique. And even in critique it is tolerant, defending the rights of all people to choose other ways, to speak and to write freely, to live their lives according to their own lights. Frederick Edwards, “What is humanism?”, Common Dreams News Centre, 1989, <http://www.jcn.com/humanism.html>

its way to develop besides the CFSP and ESDP, institutions and procedures at its disposal, which are necessary for successful coping with the future tasks.

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

The members of the EU have embarked on an historic journey that is intended to create a European Security and Defence Policy. They have already backed up this policy with institutions, a European Security Strategy and they will back it up with capabilities designed to permit them to act on behalf of shared security interests, independently of the US and NATO when necessary. This initiative would fulfil a commitment made by NATO's founding European members in the late 1940s when they pledged to combine defence efforts to make a substantial European contribution to the Alliance as a counterpart to the efforts of their North American allies.³⁴

With the Treaties of Dunkirk (1947) and especially Brussels (1948),³⁵ which were focusing on defence and the establishment of a security community, the European integration and

³⁴ Stanley R. Sloan, "The United States and European Defence", Chaillot Paper 39, Paris, April 2000, ISSN 1017-7566, p. 4

³⁵ Immediately after WW II, the Western European nations felt threatened by the military power of the Soviet Union because she had emerged from the war stronger than she had been before it. She had an annexed population of about 23 millions and an annexed area of over 180,000 square miles. Moreover, she had more than 3 million men under arms. Undoubtedly, Russia became the strongest military power in Europe. In response to this military threat, Britain concluded a military alliance with France, known as the 'Treaty of Dunkirk'. The chief purpose was to prevent future German aggression. It also provided for economic assistance and military co-operation against the political threat of the other aggressors, such as Russia. The Prague Coup of February 1948 gave new fear of the Russian threat. The United Kingdom immediately called for greater economic and military co-operation among the western European countries. The 'Treaty of Dunkirk' was broadened to include the Benelux and they signed the 'Treaty of Brussels'. The 'Treaty of Brussels' was not only a military alliance but also an ideological alliance. It provided for collective self-defence, economic and social collaboration in Western Europe. Cold War 1945-1960, <http://www.thecorner.org/hists/europe/coldwar.htm>

the first real step towards Europe's development into a zone of peace and stability began.³⁶

However, even with the signatures freshly on the Brussels Treaty in 1948, the European security context was radically changed by the onset of the Cold War. The new complexity of European Security problems, including the early German rearmament, the need for a transatlantic alliance, and the demands for sovereignty, and the failure to obtain a majority in the French Parliament, the European Defence Community (EDC) was never ratified and the initiative collapsed in August 1954.³⁷

Although the Europeans have been interested in foreign and security policy early after WW II it was no topic during the Cold War period. For nearly half a century defence was not an active subject matter within the European community because of the changed circumstances. While France considered that a European Security and Defence Policy would consolidate and enhance a more balanced and stronger Atlantic Alliance, the UK feared that if the European Union would develop a capacity to be able to manage its own security affairs, the US would retreat into isolationism and NATO would collapse which could have unforeseeable consequences for a free and democratic Europe.³⁸ Consequently, for almost fifty years, the United Kingdom exercised an effective veto on any initiative – usually French ones – on European defence issues. By the mid 1990s, after a phase of relative stagnation and re-

³⁶ Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and defence: the ultimate challenge", Institute for Studies Western European Union, Paris, November 2000, p. 9

³⁷ Ibid, p. 1. The European Defence Community (EDC) was a treaty signed in May 1952 by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries in response to the American call for the rearmament of West Germany. However, because of the failure to obtain a majority in the French Parliament, the EDC was never ratified and the initiative collapsed in August 1954. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Defence_Community

³⁸ Ibid, p. 2. See also John W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), Chapter V, 'The Making of the Treaty of Dunkirk'. General de Gaulle always insisted that the strongest alliances were those between partners of relatively equal standing, and what NATO needed above all was balance between the two sides of the ocean: Daniel Colard and Gérard Daille, 'Le général de Gaulle et les Alliances', in (Institut Charles de Gaulle, ed.), *De Gaulle en son Siècle, Tome 4: La sécurité et l'impérialisme de la France* (Paris: Plon, 1992): See also, on this, Nicole Gnesotto, *La Puissance e l'Europe* (Paris: Presses des Sciences Po, 1998)

orientation within the Alliance, it seemed that the time had come for a rebalancing of the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic and for concrete steps to be taken by the European NATO members to assume greater responsibility for their common security and defence.

European countries signed up for a process designed to provide a genuine European military capability without unnecessary duplication of command structures, planning staffs and military assets and capabilities already available within NATO, while simultaneously strengthening their contribution to the Alliance's missions and activities. Such an approach was seen as responding to the European wish to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and to the need for a more balanced partnership between the North American and European member countries of the Alliance.³⁹ The idea to improve European military capabilities was a fundamental aspect of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and originated at meetings of NATO Defence Ministers in Berlin and Brussels in summer 1996. Consequently, the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI)⁴⁰ was launched in Washington 1999 to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of NATO missions.

³⁹ NATO Handbook: Evolution of the ESDI, chapter 4, updated 10 October 2002, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm>

⁴⁰ NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was a step to ensure that the Alliance could meet the security challenges of the 21st century and was prepared to deal effectively with crises like that in Kosovo, as well as maintaining the ability to fulfil its fundamental responsibilities for the defence of its member countries. The Initiative has covered almost all areas of military capability, including the mobility of forces; their logistical support; their ability to protect themselves and engage an enemy; and the command and control and information systems. The focus of DCI has been on Alliance capabilities in the following five, overlapping areas: (1) "mobility and deployability": i.e. the ability to deploy forces quickly to where they are needed, including areas outside Alliance territory; (2) "sustainability": i.e. the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations; (3) "effective engagement": i.e. the ability to successfully engage an adversary in all types of operations, from high to low intensity; (4) "survivability": i.e. the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats; and (5) "interoperable communications": i.e. command, control and information systems which are compatible with each other, to enable forces from different countries to work effectively together.

Unfortunately, in spite of much rhetoric, this initiative has not yet produced too many tangible results.

In spring 2003, following nearly three years of discussion between NATO and the EU, the European Security and Defence Initiative resulted in the “Berlin Plus agreement”⁴¹ which serves as the foundation for practical work between NATO and the EU. Although this arrangement was an important step in the further development of the relationship and future cooperation between NATO and the EU, the latter remains dependent on the decision of all NATO member states, even non-EU NATO members, for the use of NATO assets and capabilities. For a transitional period, as long as the EU will not be engaged in major EU-led operations, this arrangement might be sufficient and acceptable because it gives the EU the chance to develop its own assets and capabilities as laid down in the “EU’s Headline Goal 2010”.⁴² However, if a situation developed where the EU wanted to play a greater military role according to its economic power, this agreement might prove to be insufficient because of its dependency on the agreement of all NATO members. In particular, non-EU NATO members including the US might have different

⁴¹ The “Berlin Plus agreement” is a short title for a comprehensive package of agreements between NATO and the EU, based on conclusions of the NATO Washington Summit. It is comprised of the following major parts: (1) NATO - EU Agreement; (2) Assured Access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO); (3) Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO; (4) Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilities; (5) Terms Of Reference for DSACEUR and European Command Options for NATO; (6) EU - NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities; (7) Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements. All parts are tied together through the so called "Framework Agreement", which consists essentially of an exchange of Letters between SG/HR and SG NATO, dated 17 Mar 03. Since that day, the "Berlin plus" package has been in effect and serves as the foundation for practical work between EU and NATO. In that, the view of EU-led CMO makes use of NATO planning support or NATO capabilities and assets for the execution of any operations. SHAPE Headquarters, www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm

⁴² With the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003, EU member states decided to set a new ‘Headline Goal’ for the EU that reflects the evolution of the strategic environment and technology. In May 2004, the EU defence ministers adopted a new plan known as the ‘Headline Goal 2010’. Building on the Headline Goal 2003, it envisions that member states “be able by 2010 to respond with rapid decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union”. The Headline Goal 2010 plan was endorsed by the June 2004 European Council summit meeting held in Brussels. Gustav Lindstrom, “The Headline Goal”, Institute for Studies, Paris, Updated April 2005, pp. 4-5

agendas, and views on certain political events and crisis developments that are not shared by EU countries. In the long run, this dependency on the 'good will' of all NATO members and the embedded indirect control of the US and non-EU NATO members on EU decision making processes may not be acceptable for the EU and it seems only a matter of time when this situation will lead to differences and even conflicts between both organizations. One solution for this foreseeable dilemma might be to guarantee an assured access by the EU to NATO assets and capabilities under all circumstances. However, such a strong commitment from NATO is not very likely and therefore the EU will in all likelihood need to develop autonomous capacities. This will foster a deeper integration of the military forces and defences of EU member states.

Concerning ESDP, most substantive progress within the EU has taken place since late 1998. Deriving from the worse experiences from the Balkan Wars in the Nineties and the second Iraq War it became clear, that the EU needs to act in a more coherent and coordinated manner. So far only the 'soft means' of diplomacy, economic measures and financial actions were developed in the EU and have been priority number one on the agenda. It became evident that the EU needs to have all the means available to act in order to counter also military threats adequately if the Alliance or US are not willing to take over responsibility.

The breakthrough came with the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998 where the European Council was given the responsibility for framing an ESDP under the European Union's CFSP. What Saint-Malo did was to consign the UK's view to history. Born after the Cold War period in the 1990s, where any deviation from NATO was still seen as an act to endanger the transatlantic ties, initially the EU denied itself the ability to command its forces independently and agreed to depend mainly on NATO for the necessary resources both to plan

and to command any serious stabilisation operations. After much controversy about these self created restrictions a decision was made both to formalise and to strengthen an EU military planning capability at NATO and to augment the EU Military Staff rather than to set up a new command organisation.⁴³

The causes and timing of European Security and Defence Policy's birth suggest that it was a reaction of the EU to US dominance. Although it is not quite a balancing project, it is certainly an effort by EU member states to develop an alternative security resource and to gain more independence from US influence and domination. There are at least four major reasons responsible for the development of ESDP within the last decade:

Firstly, as outlined in the European Security Strategy ESDP is a logical development of the European Union's CFSP, which arose from the recognition that an economic bloc and independent political entity of the size and kind of the EU would inevitably be a global power.⁴⁴ As a consequence, the EU needs a foreign policy, which is only complete with a defence policy.

Secondly, the UK needs an EU role that plays to its strengths. Although Britain's political class and people remain somewhat sceptical of the EU, the country has made the choice that it is safer to be in the EU than outside of it. The UK is still not ready to introduce the Euro and accept the constraints that would accompany that move. The other three greatest powers,

⁴³ Barry P. Posen, "ESDP and the Structure of World Power", *Instituto Affari Internazionli*, 2004, Vol. XXXIX, p. 10-11

⁴⁴ Rick Steves, "A United Europe in the 21st Century: Eclipsing the American Dream?", http://www.ricksteves.com/about/pressroom/activism/eurodream_text.htm: "Twenty-five nations have pooled their resources and made a common commitment to a common destiny. The European Union — with 450 million people — makes up seven percent of the world's population. (The United States has 300 million, or five percent.) Europe now has the world's largest economy, with a GDP of \$11 trillion (slightly larger than the U.S.'s). Now the third-largest government on earth (after China and India), the EU is unique in that it has no claim to territory."

Germany, France and Italy are in the Euro, so those Britons who wished to play a significant role in the EU were looking for another mechanism to improve British influence, prestige and autonomy.⁴⁵ As one of the two biggest defence spenders in the Union, Britain hit upon ESDP as an issue where it could lead, pursuing both prestige and power in the EU.

Thirdly, ESDP was and is a sales tool for NATO's force goals.⁴⁶ Britain and France were looking for arguments that would produce more serious attention to defence issues in Europe than emerged in the early 1990s. While Britain is interested in more European military capability, France is strongly interested in building Europe's power positions.⁴⁷

Finally, ESDP aims to give the European Union the capability to deal with the 'Petersberg Tasks'.⁴⁸ These were the tasks that the US did not want NATO to take up at the outset of the Balkan wars and which the European Union could not then address. The EU tried to wield its

⁴⁵ According to a several dozens of interviews executed by Barry P. Posen in 2002/2003, British leaders believe that the US will take Europeans more seriously if they deliver some usable capabilities to NATO. Furthermore, if Britain is seen as the agent of these improvements, its standing with the US will rise. Finally, British planners discovered during their first major post-Cold War defence review that they simply cannot afford all the capabilities they want Britain to have for its own reasons.

⁴⁶ NATO force goals are set through a process involving each country, the other Allies, and the NATO International Staff, in order to ensure that the Alliance has necessary capabilities to carry out the missions envisioned in the NATO Strategic Concept. Each country agrees with its Allies to provide certain of those capabilities. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Archives, Committee Reports, "Interim Report NATO's Role in Defence Reform", <http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/2001/au-199-e.asp>

⁴⁷ France has had the longest standing interest in an independent European defence capacity. When queried about French interests, a former British official, Sir Rodric Braithwaite, capture French reasoning perfectly: "A junior partner who is taken for granted is a junior partner with no influence. In dealing with the Americans we need to follow the basic principle of negotiation: you must always make it clear that you will, if necessary, walk away from the table." R. Braithwaite, "End of the Affair", Prospect, May 2003, www.prospect.magazine.co.uk/ArticleView.asp?P_Article=11914

⁴⁸ The missions assigned to the EU military forces are currently described in Article 17.2 of the Treaty of the European Union: "Questions referred to in this article shall include (1) humanitarian and rescue tasks, (2) peacekeeping tasks and (3) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." The words from 'humanitarian' to peacemaking' are taken from the WEU Petersberg declaration of June 1992. When the 15 EU members negotiated the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, they chose to retain the language adopted by the nine WEU states at Petersberg rather than work out a new description, as there was consensus on a text that allowed for various interpretations. Martin Ortega, "Petersberg tasks, and missions for the EU military forces", Institute for International Studies, updated February 2005, p. 1

economic influence early in the Balkan crisis but it proved inadequate to the tasks. At least two lessons were drawn from the Balkan crisis: first, for some crises, only military force will be appropriate; second, the US will not always be interested in problems on Europe's periphery.⁴⁹

The establishment of the ESDP suggests that EU member states want to take over their part of responsibility and they also want the option to act where deemed necessary even if NATO is not willing to take action. The proclaimed European goal is to ensure that this is a positive change, giving the EU more responsibility in the transatlantic defence relationship and relieving the US of some of its current defence burdens. Consequently as a second phase of the ESDP, the European Security Strategy was developed in 2003. It was the prerequisite for a credible and efficient security-political appearance of the EU and a direct response to the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002⁵⁰ offering support to America's aims and yet implicitly questioning the American security method.

The European Security Strategy (ESS)

The adoption of the ESS in December 2003 gave start to the next phase in ESDP development. With this strategy, the EU member states agreed on a common interpretation of the changes in international politics after 9/11 as well as on the development of a common threat perception. The ESS is intended to serve as the basis for an EU Strategic Concept to enable the EU's effective adaptation to the changing security environment. The strategy is a broad

⁴⁹ The results are largely based on several dozen interview conducted by Barry P. Posen in Fall 2002-Spring 2003 among European officials currently or previously involved in NATO or ESDP and exchanges of view with scholars

⁵⁰ US National Security Strategy, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>

document and is based on the ambition of turning the EU into a more powerful international player, capable of acting, and who takes responsibility for international security and peace. The ESS is holistic, reasonably intellectually coherent and sufficiently flexible to allow the EU to meet new challenges in a time of rapid change. It provides a framework within which traditional EU priorities such as conflict prevention, increase of prosperity and good governance within regional dialogue are balanced with the new member states' priorities of responding to WMD proliferation and international terrorism.

The ESS states that the EU and its member states will deal with their security priorities in a framework that emphasises multilateral institutions, especially the UN and regional organisations as well as the rule of law and the strategic relationship with the US and other global partners, especially Russia. It has no illusions regarding the weakness of the EU as a military power and consequently the Union's lack of military capability is highlighted as a major deficiency in the EU crisis management toolbox. The strategy stresses that priority security objectives need to be addressed through 'effective multilateralism', in other words, by supporting the UN system, strengthening national responses through EU synergies and by addressing root causes such as poverty and weak governance through community instruments and regional dialogue.⁵¹

The existence of the ESS is itself an important step towards the development of a European strategic culture. It is also a signal that the EU is exiting the creative-conceptual phase and entering international politics. The strategy calls for a more muscular, more coherent Union

⁵¹ Gerrard Quille, "Making multilateralism matter: the EU Security Strategy", ISIS Europe, European Security Review, No. 18, July 2003, p. 1

that uses its instruments in a more coordinated manner. In this sense, the ESS can be seen as an appeal for a realistic assessment of the EU's foreign policy. The strategy's credibility was increased by the placing of terrorism as the number one threat facing Europe as was morbidly validated by the terrorist strikes in Madrid on 11 March 2004. Admittedly, the strategy is ambitious, listing almost every conceivable threat, and placing terrorism at the top of the list alongside failed states and WMD proliferation.⁵²

In light of the new threats, which the EU and its allies, friends as well as other strategic partners, are facing, the ESS must be rapidly consolidated into a European Strategic Concept that will formalise when, why, where and how the EU will act. This is of utmost importance not only to provide the EU with the necessary terms of reference for action but also to set the frame for future action. The security and defence missions implied in the ESS call for the development of an ESDP that carries out a far broader range of missions than currently envisaged, over far greater distance, at potentially higher levels of conflict intensity and for longer periods.⁵³

The ESS is not only the EU's answer to the American debate about appropriate reactions to the new threats in a globalized world. It is also an attempt to answer the future challenges for the EU. Thus, it also addresses the top priorities for the US, such as international terrorism and WMD, and it proposes concrete steps within a broad framework. The endorsement of the strategy represents a significant basis for the ESDP and is an important moment in the evolution of the EU-US strategic partnership. It remains to be seen whether this will deliver 'effective

⁵² In the "key threats" section terrorism, WMD proliferation and failed states are singled out while stressing regional conflicts and criminal networks as enablers for WMD terrorism, Javier Solana, "European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World", Brussels 12 December 2003, pp. 5-6.

⁵³ Julian Lindley French and Franco Algieri, (Advised by Thomas Bauer, Yves Boyer, Janis Emmanouilidis, Tuomas Forsberg, Stefani Wiess, and Rob de Wijk), "A European Defence Strategy", Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh 2004, p. 9

multilateralism', an institutionalised and equitable dialogue with the US and NATO, and the capabilities required for decisive and rapid responses to international crises.⁵⁴

From a purely military perspective, it seems to be important for the Europeans to maintain the cooperation with Washington because neither the European Union nor the US is able to cope with the new threats exclusively alone. However, the EU initiative contains the seeds of the most important strategic shift in the Alliance since the end of the Cold War, and perhaps even since the foundation of NATO and it is the attempt to cope with the US as an equal partner who is willing to take over his responsibility for global security. This development has the potential to strengthen the Alliance and the EU-US partnership if managed successfully, and the potential to drive a wedge between the US and Europe and to destroy NATO if it is not which cannot be in the interest of the European nations.⁵⁵

Role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Although NATO still is the dominant institution for collective European defence, its importance has diminished since the end of the Cold War. Since the 1990s, the risks to Europe and the United States have changed essentially.⁵⁶ NATO has come a long way in a relatively short time. However, the Alliance, as James Goldgeier reflects, has not “engaged in any real

⁵⁴ Erich Reiter and Johann Frank, „The European Security Strategy – Austrian Perspective”, www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/02_ees_frank.pdf

⁵⁵ Stanley R. Sloan, “The United States and European Defence”, Chaillot Paper 39, Paris, April 2000, ISSN 1017-7566, p. 4

⁵⁶ Dr. Kenneth Payne, “The European and Defence Policy and the future of NATO”, BBC News Analysis Research, www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf, 2003, p. 7

soul-searching about what role members expect NATO to play in coming years as an alliance in responding to existing and future threats.”⁵⁷

No doubt, NATO has played a constructive role in the Balkans, but the Kosovo campaign demonstrated the limits of the formal Alliance. Its complex decision-making process and procedures for political consultation made it more difficult for NATO forces to take the initiative and maintain the tempo of attacks.⁵⁸ For the US, the difficulties of ‘war fighting by committee’, demonstrated that NATO’s role in an operation is likely to be constrained.⁵⁹ Thus, the Kosovo campaign led to an unavoidable division of military labour, reflecting not only the divergent perceptions of risk but also the actual institutional and military limitations of the Alliance. Consequently, the creation of a ‘coalition of the willing’ for the Iraq campaign was contained not only by the unwillingness of many NATO members to participate in a war without a UN mandate, but also by the reluctance of the US to use NATO in any war-fighting role in the future.⁶⁰

The US concept of ‘coalitions of the willing’ might bear some attraction for the United States because on the one hand she is able to bypass complicated, long lasting and constraining processes and on the other hand her leadership role will not be questioned at all. However, as the Iraq example shows, this approach comprises the potential to damage or even to destroy the cohesion and credibility of the Alliance because it deliberately neglects the role of NATO. To

⁵⁷ James M. Goldgeier, Not When but Who,’ NATO Review, Spring 2002, Issue 1, www.nato.int

⁵⁸ James P. Thomas, ‘The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions,’ Adelphi Paper 333, IISS, 2000, pp. 59-92, see pp. 59 and 65

⁵⁹ Dr. Kenneth Payne, “The European and Defence Policy and the future of NATO”, BBC News Analysis Research, www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf, 2003, p. 10

⁶⁰ Charles Grant, “Can NATO remain an effective military and political alliance if it keeps growing?” Debate with Ronald D. Asmus, Centre For European Reform and NATO Review, Spring 2002, Issue 1, www.nato.int

assure NATO's relevance, and to maintain a dialogue with the EU and the European NATO members, the US needs to follow the organization's rules, otherwise it could precipitate the end of NATO as an organization.

Today different transatlantic perspectives on global security issues are influencing the development of NATO. While the EU still is focussing more regionally, for the reasons already described, the US is focussing globally.⁶¹ After 9/11, the existential issue remains "...whether an Alliance established to provide for the collective defence of member states can recast itself as an instrument of global security?"⁶²

The political dimension of NATO is still a source of a longstanding tension in US attitudes towards the Alliance. The US wants to see European countries develop additional military capabilities, so that they are not as reliant on US protection, but also wants to preserve US political leadership. Although the US has greater priorities elsewhere, NATO is still a useful institution. It gives the US the chance to stay fully engaged in European policy debates and it provides the US with the political and military instrument to control and even to contain Russian ambitions in Europe with the support of her European allies. Additionally it offers the US the possibility to use NATO as a political forum and to influence or even control EU decision making and policy as it did through the "Berlin Plus Agreement".⁶³

⁶¹ Colin Powell, Remarks with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, Washington, DC, May 5, 2003

⁶² Ivo H. Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism," *Survival*, vol. 45 #2 (Summer 2003), pp. 147-166, p. 149

⁶³ Dr. Kenneth Payne, "The European and Defence Policy and the future of NATO", BBC News Analysis Research, www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf, 2003, p. 8

How might the future relations between NATO and the EU develop? There is an almost equal membership between the EU and NATO, the more so after EU enlargement. The European empathy for multilateral institutionalism and the promotion of international law makes it clear that this tendency will drive the agendas not only of the EU but also of NATO.⁶⁴

The relationship and co-operation between NATO and the EU continues to improve. In March 2003, the EU and NATO had figured out the details of the “Berlin Plus Agreement” allowing for assured EU access to NATO assets and capabilities. However, this decision will continue to be taken on a case-by-case basis.⁶⁵ With the decision on the “Berlin Plus Agreement” the mechanism is available, through which to co-ordinate policy and military operations according to the degree of interest among both organisations. The transformation of the NATO-led SFOR mission to the EUFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that NATO and the EU can and need to operate together.⁶⁶ Terrorism, failing states and the threat of WMD proliferation suggest that for the foreseeable future, both NATO and the EU will have an important role to play in regional and global security. But equally, both organisations will continue to evolve, reflecting the underlying dynamic of the transatlantic relationship, as well as the ongoing development of the EU.

NATO’s original role is more likely to be threatened by the absence of any pressing requirement for an extensive formal alliance to undertake asymmetric collective defence than it is by the emergence of the EU as a competing organisation. However, as long as the United States have vital interests in Europe they value NATO as the most important forum in which the US and

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 15

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 13

⁶⁶ Ibid, pp. 27-28

European member states both have a seat at the table. Nevertheless, NATO will remain politically significant, even if its military importance has diminished and might diminish further.⁶⁷

The United States of America and the European Security and Defence Policy

“Strong powers naturally view the world differently than weaker powers. They measure risks and threats differently, they define security differently, and they have different levels of tolerance for insecurity.”⁶⁸ Although the US is still the dominant global power, the EU has emerged as an increasingly unified player on the world stage during the last decade. Consequently, the US and the EU have clashed publicly on such seemingly trivial trade issues as beef and bananas, but also on larger questions of global governance, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court.⁶⁹ However, the more headway the Europeans make in the setting up of a true European defence capability, the more voices are heard in the US that analyse, question, challenge or even fear this new European ambition.

Whatever its ambitions regarding political and military credibility, the European members of NATO seem to be a worry for the US, either because of the inadequacy of its military expenditures, which could make it useless for America, or, conversely, because its desire for political autonomy could put the Atlantic Alliance in jeopardy. From those who reproach the

⁶⁷ Charles Grant, ‘Can NATO remain an effective military and political alliance if it keeps growing?’ Debate with Ronald D. Asmus, Centre For European Reform and NATO Review, Spring 2002, Issue 1, www.nato.int

⁶⁸ Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the New World Order*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 27

⁶⁹ Stephen Kull, “WORLDVIEWS 2002, Comparing American and European Public Opinion on Foreign Policy”, Transatlantic Key Findings, Topline Data, Research at the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), p. 2

Europeans for going too far politically to those who reproach them for doing too little militarily, US commentary on the ESDP is always voiced in a plaintive mode, rarely that of praise or enthusiasm.⁷⁰ Transatlantic policy differences have a much longer history than the recent invasion of Iraq, even longer than the end of the Cold War. However, the differences have certainly become more profound and significant in the absence of an existential territorial threat. The last few years have seen a proliferation of comment to the effect that the perspectives of Washington and the European NATO members and the EU are diverging.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the talk of divergent perspectives ignores a degree of commonality of interest, on both sides of the Atlantic.⁷²

The EU member states appear ready to make a substantive response to this call: to engage in a concerted effort both on a CFSP and more specifically on an ESDP. It seems that both sides want the same thing: greater European responsibility and self-reliance in defence and security matters. The backdrop against which this re-balancing act takes place is a new spirit of self-confidence and self-assertion in the EU and a mixture of self-centeredness and unilateral self-reliance in the US where European emancipation is seen as a very favourable development as long as it serves and supports US national interests.⁷³ The members of the EU are attempting to create a substantial, autonomous, collaborative European military capability, including forces and decision-making processes and institutions.

⁷⁰ Stanley R. Sloan, "The United States and European Defence", Chaillot Paper 39, Paris, April 2000, ISSN 1017-7566, p. 2

⁷¹ Gwyn Prins, "Thinking about intervention: An essay reflecting upon the state of the policy debate in early 2001", RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 4, August 2001, pp. 12-17, p. 16

⁷² Dr. Kenneth Payne, "The European Security and Defence Policy and the future of NATO", BBC News Analysis Research, www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf, 2003, p. 27

⁷³ Michaela Hönicke, "Intentions and Ambivalences in U.S. Policies towards Europe", Reinhard C. Meier-Walser/Susanne Luther (Hg.): Die euro-atlantischen Beziehungen im Spannungsfeld von Regionalisierung und Globalisierung. München 2001, p. 2

The question remains, does America really want a strong Europe? One of the most important lessons of the transatlantic relations since 9/11 is that while Europeans and Americans can easily agree that Europe should be ‘strong’, they do not so easily agree on what they mean by ‘Europe’ or by ‘strength’. To Europeans, ‘strengthening Europe’ means vesting more powers to the European Union. To Americans, ‘strengthening Europe’ means increasing the wealth, security and thus military capabilities of the countries that make up the European continent.⁷⁴

The dominant perceptions in the US regarding ESDP are first a policy in which there nearly always coexists the sacrosanct nature of NATO, second a historical suspicion of France,⁷⁵ and third a deep seated aversion to the very term European ‘autonomy’ and a certain uneasiness – which is new – regarding recent British and German policies,⁷⁶ where UK and Germany, once the most reliable and closest partners of the US, are striving for a more autonomous and more capable Europe.

A review of the timing and the reasons for the development of ESDP suggests that they can largely be traced back to the problem of unipolarity. France has provided constant pressure for a more autonomous Europe, which is able to act independently of NATO and the US. For other EU member states, the strategic rationale centres on the creation of options. The UK joined

⁷⁴ David Frum, “Up with Europe. Down with the EU”, National Post, dfum@aei.org, 28 Feb 2005

⁷⁵ Michael White, “France backs Blair on EU force”, The Guardian, 10 February 2001: “In February 2001, President Jacques Chirac pledged that the European Union’s efforts would be ‘in complete harmony with NATO’.”

Jacques Chirac, Comments to the press following the Anglo French Summit of 24 November 2003: In November 2003, he repeated the message at a London press conference with Prime Minister Blair. France, declared Chirac does not have a problem with NATO. ... We are totally involved in all the changes, which have occurred recently. When it was a question of creating the NATO Response Force, we asked to be involved and we were involved. We were the leading contributor to that force. ... Our view of European Defence is a view, which is in no way contradictory to NATO. Let that be very clear. Neither the Germans, nor the French, wish in the slightest way to take any initiative, which would be in contradiction with NATO.

⁷⁶ Stanley R. Sloan, “The United States and European Defence”, Chaillot Paper 39, Paris, April 2000, ISSN 1017-7566, p. 2-3

this effort out of dissatisfaction with dependency on the US, the implications of which were manifested in the Balkan wars. Other European states joined largely for the same reason.⁷⁷

The US policy on Iraq, another manifestation of the unipolar moment, has succeeded in weakening Germany's once nearly instinctive allegiance to NATO and produced a much stronger inclination toward an EU security project.⁷⁸ Germany cannot entirely replace the UK as an ESDP leader, but its growing support for the project is another factor making it difficult for the EU to reverse its course on defence. The US hegemony is likely to result in similar US policy initiatives in the future, with similar results.⁷⁹

The US approach towards a more autonomous Europe could be termed a 'yes, but' policy, supporting the European effort but warning of its potential negative consequences. Many American observers support the EU's goal of developing an ESDP, in the hope that such cooperation will relieve the US of security burdens. As the EU enlarges and strives towards

⁷⁷ Dr. Kenneth Payne, "The European and Defence Policy and the future of NATO", BBC News Analysis Research, www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf, 2003

⁷⁸ This inference, derived from a number of interviews, is supported by both anecdotes and public opinion polling. For example, an unnamed German editor reports that his editorials arguing that the EU should not be built against the Americans produced a torrent of e-mails to the contrary. See W. Pfaff, "US Message: Who Needs Allies?" *The Boston Globe*, 27 April 2003, p. E11. A recent poll reports that "Germany, the long-time American ally, now expresses an unambiguous preference for Europe over the United States". In 2002, 55% of Germans polled said that the EU was more important than the US to Germany's vital interests; by 2003, 81% of Germans polled said the EU was more important. See, German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, "Key Findings", pp. 3, 9

⁷⁹ Those who attribute the US-led invasion of Iraq and overthrow of the Baath regime solely to the Bush administration's peculiar approach to the war on terror ignore the depth and breadth of suspicion and hostility to the Iraqi Baath regime in the US since the first Gulf War. During the 2000 campaign, Vice-President and Democratic Party Presidential candidate Al Gore alluded to the need for a stronger policy to overthrow Saddam Hussein than that pursued by his then boss, President Bill Clinton. "It is our policy to see Saddam Hussein gone," he averred in a public speech. See J. Lancaster, "In Saddam's Future, A Harder US Line", *The Washington Post*, 3 June 2000

greater integration, NATO becomes more important for Washington in that sense.⁸⁰ As already discussed, official US policy will likely continue to put top priority on ensuring NATO's continued vitality. Support for developments on the European level will be conditioned by this reality. Future US policy towards ESDP remains stressed. American concerns about the potential negative consequences of ESDP might increase in direct proportion to the emphasis EU governments put on 'autonomy' in describing ESDP goals. The word itself is neutral, however, some in the US will read it as a direct challenge to US policy goals and leadership roles.⁸¹

Although the US is currently the strongest nation in the world, still she will not get what she wants without cooperation.⁸² Therefore, the United States of America and the European Union need to cooperate closely and as the EU, the US must show sensitivity and try to fashion goals that are consistent with the interests of others. On more and more issues, from infectious diseases, drug trafficking, transnational crime, human trafficking and financial flows to environmental degradation, an arrogant, unilateralist approach employing the military and economics will not work, neither for the EU nor for the US.⁸³ The transnational and transatlantic agenda is growing and none of these problems is confined to Europe or the US. None of these problems can the EU or the US hope to defeat alone. Contemporary security means that the only choice Europeans and Americans have is to seek active security together.⁸⁴ To shoulder its part of regional and global responsibility the EU must have the means and capabilities to act

⁸⁰ Helle Dale, "EU Army to the Rescue? Heaven Help US From Our Friends", The Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org, 29 October 2003, p. 2

⁸¹ Stanley R. Sloan, "The United States and European Defence", Chaillot Paper 39, Paris, April 2000, ISSN 1017-7566, p. 3

⁸² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., lecture on "The Paradox of American Power", Princeton University, 08 May 2002, p. 3-4

⁸³ Stan Crock, "America Can't Keep Playing Lone Ranger", book review: Joseph S. Nye Jr. "The Paradox of American Power – Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone", Oxford University; in Business Week online, 08 April 2002, p. 1

⁸⁴ Richard N. Haas, "Creating a New Course in the Transatlantic Relationship", Remarks to the Centre for European Reform, London, 10 June 2002, p. 2

appropriately. This leads to the question how far EU member states are willing to go to commit national forces for an integrated defence?

A European Army and European Defence Integration

Due to the drastically changed political environment, for the first time the EU has found itself in a situation that is characterized by the obligation to act independently. Not only have new dangers become evident for the security of the EU but the most important and reliable ally, the US, backed away from common ground and shaped the rules for cooperation more and more to its national interests. The United States seemed to say good-bye to the principle of solidarity with its European allies. As the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, she strives for ad-hoc coalitions, which on the one hand demands only little obligations from the US and does not question her leadership role, and on the other hand gives international legitimacy to operations. The Iraq crisis demonstrated that the US was prepared to deal with likeminded EU states individually, rather than to attempt to deal with the EU as a unified whole. The reported statement of Condoleezza Rice underlined this perception: “US post-Iraq policy towards Europe was to ‘Punish the French, ignore the Germans, forgive the Russians’ and presumably reward the Spanish and the British?”⁸⁵ Such a behaviour isolates opponents and undermines the European project, and this may further undermine the reanimation of the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore it undermines any attempts to generate ‘credibility, cohesion, convergence, commitment and candour’, the prerequisites for transatlantic re-coupling.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Dr. Graeme P. Herd, “Variable Geometry & Dual Enlargement: From The Baltic to the Black Sea”, Conflict Studies Research Centre, October 2003, p. 4

⁸⁶ *ibid*

Consequently, the Europeans have to think about their international, economic and civilisatory role as well as its military role in the world. In politico-military regard, this means the Europeans have to be politically unified and this means also militarily credible if they want to deal not only with the ‘Petersberg Tasks’⁸⁷ and the fight against international terrorism,⁸⁸ but also with future tasks as well as common European defence.⁸⁹

It is obvious the EU lacks military muscles which limit Europe’s ability to project power as part of an overall security concept as described in the ESS. With the intent to play a more influential role in the world, the EU has besides additional efforts in foreign policy and development co-operation also to undertake a fundamental revision of its politico-military architecture.⁹⁰ Therefore, the EU needs to transform and reform not only its decision making structures but also its predominantly nationally structured and conceived armed forces with the aim of an adequate and rapid decision making process and of European wide politico-military integration.

The decision on the new “Headline Goal 2010”, which envisions that member states should be able by 2010 to respond with rapid decisive action applying a fully coherent approach

⁸⁷ For some time the EU member states debated about whether to focus on the ‘lower’ or the ‘higher spectrum’ of the ‘Petersberg missions’, but the Helsinki Headline Goal made it clear that the capabilities that the EU was expected to acquire would be the ‘appropriate capabilities’.... to be able to undertake the full range of ‘Petersberg tasks’. On the other hand, it was obvious to everyone that territorial defence was excluded from those tasks. Martin Ortega, “Petersberg tasks, and missions for the EU military forces”, Institute for International Studies, Paris, updated February 2005, p. 1

⁸⁸ See “The European Council declaration on the contribution of CFSP, including ESDP, in the fight against terrorism” (Seville, June 2002)

⁸⁹ In the final text of the Draft European Constitution, four major issues are relevant to the definition of the EU military missions: (a) a general description of ESDP; (b) a collective defence clause; (c) a solidarity clause in case of terrorist attacks; and (d) the listing of the CFSP’s objectives and principles.

⁹⁰ Ulrich vom Hagen, “Militärische Multinationalität in Europa angesichts divergierender globaler Ordnungsvorstellungen“, 2003, pp. 181-182

to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union, was made in spring 2004. With the formulation of this goal and the decision to implement in 2006 the so-called civil-military planning cell, which can be seen as the forerunner of a future operational planning capability or even an operational headquarters, the pre-requisites towards a more autonomous and decisive EU and a further defence integration are set.

European countries differ considerably in manpower, in defence budgets and in capabilities, first and foremost to mention the nuclear capabilities of France and the UK. While theoretically, each nation of the EU has an equal say in the development of a common European defence policy, the reality offers a different picture. In military affairs, only very few member states have the capabilities to plan and execute military operations on the strategic and operational level. Most of them have so few resources that they can, at best, act at the upper level of tactical engagement but certainly not above. This situation leaves most of the burden on a very limited number of countries to develop the EU's potency on the whole spectrum of military activities.⁹¹

This leads to the conclusion to concentrate and bundle national capacities and scarce resources and to risk the step not only for the

sign of an ESDP.⁹² However, the question is not so much, if the EU will have an integrated European Army but when and in which way the European Union needs to integrate its defence and its military.

The first serious signs of the aim to develop a real EU military capability emerged at the conclusion of the Anglo-French Summit at St Malo in December 1998. The momentum was maintained by a number of bi- and multi-lateral meetings and summits throughout 1999 that resulted in a detailed framework being outlined at the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999. This culminated in the ‘Headline Goal 2003’ (‘HG 2003’) of 60,000 troops plus appropriate aerial and naval support, to be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for a year, to be in place by 2003.⁹³

In 2003, the ‘HG 2003’ was only quantitatively met, which means the EU is still missing critical capabilities such as strategic lift, C4 ISR and satellite based intelligence. This situation led to the decision to provide the EU member states and the EU an adequate period of time for the development of required capabilities. The result was the adoption of an advanced ‘EU Headline Goal 2010’ (‘HG 2010’), which implies also a ‘Civilian Headline Goal 2008’.⁹⁴ It

⁹² Patrick Fitschen, Michael Stehr, “Eine gemeinsame Armee für Europa”, Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik Nr. 11, Juni 2003, p. 1

⁹³ Annex I to Annex IV, ‘Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence’, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council (10-11 December 1999), <http://ue.eu.int>

⁹⁴ Gerrard Quille, “Implementing the defence aspect of the European Security Strategy: the Headline Goal 2010”, European Security Review, No. 23, July 2004, p. 3
Gustav Lindstrom, “The Headline Goal” (updated April 2005), Institute for Security Studies, page 6.; Concerning civilian ESDP capabilities, a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was endorsed at the December 2004 European Council. Civilian missions are foreseen to handle various types of monitoring missions as well as providing support to Special Representatives of the EU. The civilian ESDP capabilities should be deployable within thirty days of the decision to launch a mission. Such undertakings could be deployed autonomously, jointly or in close collaboration with military operations. The next steps towards the establishment of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 are: (1) elaborating key planning assumptions and illustrative scenarios (to be completed by April 2005); (2) creating a Capabilities

outlines the process for achieving the objectives already laid down in ‘HG2003’ with some specific milestones including, inter alia, the establishment during the second half of 2004 of the civil-military cell⁹⁵ within the EU Military Staff (EUMS); the European Defence Agency (EDA) during 2004;⁹⁶ the Battle groups by 2007;⁹⁷ and acquiring the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008.

Principally the ‘HG 2010’ lays the basis for a European contingent army, which follows very closely the NATO approach, is easy to compose and where nations still have the say on any commitment. This might be an adequate model for the immediate future, although NATO proved its ponderousness and inadequacy during recent crises, especially during the Balkan wars, and with its ongoing Force Generation problems e.g. in the build-up of the NATO Response Forces (NRF),⁹⁸ however, the future needs to look different. In the long run, the changing security

Requirement List (by July 2005); (3) assessing national contributions to the Civilian Capabilities Requirements List and the identification of capability shortfalls (to be completed by the end of 2005); (4) ensuring a Civilian Headline follow up process.

⁹⁵ In order to enhance the capacity of the EUMS in the field of early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning, the EU will set up a cell with civil/military components. This cell has five functions, to: (1) link work across the EU states on anticipating crises, including opportunities for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation; (2) assist in planning and co-ordinating civilian operations; (3) develop expertise in managing the civilian/military interface; (4) conduct strategic advance planning for joint civil/military operations; (5) reinforce the national HQ designated for an EU autonomous operation. Gerrard Quille, “What does the EU agreement on Operational Planning mean for NATO?”, NATO Notes, Vol. 5 no. 8 December 2003, p. 2-3

⁹⁶ The European Defence Agency (EDA) received the final backing of the Foreign Affairs Council on 17 May 2004 after its establishment had been originally agreed in November 2003. Since the end of 2004 it works in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments. The overall idea of the EDA is to promote coherence in place of fragmentation in European defence procurement. The creation of the EDA is a central component in the further development of a true European foreign and defence policy. The future annual budget is expected to be 25 million €, including ten million euro in set-up costs.

⁹⁷ The EU Battlegroups is a project done in the context of the ESDP, its aim being the creation of 13 rapidly deployable units for international intervention and tasks reaching up to full combat situations. The EU Battlegroups are to be deployable more rapidly and for shorter periods than the long-planned European Rapid Reaction Force. A Battlegroup is considered to be the smallest self-sufficient military unit that can be deployed and sustained in a theatre of operation. Each Battlegroup will be composed of 1500 combat soldiers plus support. It is desired that each Battlegroup should be ready for launch in 10 days from command, and be in the theatre of operations in 15 days. It must be sustainable for at least 30 days, which could be extended to 120 days rotation. Encyclopaedia Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_battle_groups

⁹⁸ The NATO Response Force (NRF) was proposed during the NATO summit held in late November 2002. The 19 existing members of NATO voted unanimously to modernise the alliance so it can confront threats from international

environment and other environmental factors will force the EU member states to re-think their principally national contingent approach towards further deepened integration especially in the light of rapid response to crisis situations. The reasons for such a development are more than obvious:

For the EU with its long and partially fragile borders to (potential) crisis regions such as Eastern Europe, especially to the Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus, North Africa and the Middle East, national security policies and national defence, make only little sense. Security for Europe and a sound contribution to global security can only be guaranteed by a strong and integrated credible European defence, which is able to act rapidly and adequately and that is based on a strategic partnership with the US and other global partners, especially Russia, which is vital for European security because of its proximity to the EU, its geopolitical environment and its enormous resources.⁹⁹

Unnecessary duplication of equipment, spending and structures as well as the duplication of institutions have a deleterious impact on capabilities and on the EU's decision-making process.

terrorism, hostile dictatorial regimes and rogue states. NATO's main mission of protecting the nations that comprise the Alliance will remain, but focused against these new threats rather than the old enemy of the Cold War, Russia. The NATO Response Force should be operational by 2006 and is intended to fulfil a key role in the US-led war on terror, and to meet and respond to threats from weapons of mass destruction.

Composition: NRF will consist of air, maritime and ground forces which will be rotated on assignment over a period of six months. The size of the force applied will be dependant on the mission that is to be carried out, but rough estimates indicate the following as a guideline: (1) NATO Land forces up to Brigade size.(2) Maritime forces up to the size of a NATO Standing Naval Force. (3) Command and Control capabilities and Air assets capable of carrying out and supporting up to 200 combat sorties daily. It is expected that such a force will number roughly 21,000 personnel. Units that will be assigned as part of the NRF will undergo specialised training to ensure they are capable of fighting together effectively on short notice under the command of a Combined Joint Task Force HQ. It is expected that the NRF will be able to be deployed within 7-30 days to international trouble spots and remain operational for up to three months if required. NATO, "Army Technology - NATO Response Force Information", <http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/missiles/nato.html>

⁹⁹ Javier Solana, "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a better World", Brussels 12 December 2003, p. 15

A report in 2001 by the Centre for European Reform (CER)¹⁰⁰ argued that "... Europe's problem lies much more in the way its armed forces are structured and specialised, than in its overall level of defence spending – which is, on the whole, not unreasonable."¹⁰¹ European defence spending amounts to some forty percent of the US' defence budget, but the Europeans reach between ten and twenty percent of the American expeditionary capabilities and less than thirty percent capital output in comparison with the US.¹⁰²

Although permanently noted as an important theme, the Europeans paid mainly lip service to the subject matters interoperability and standardisation. These topics never reached the necessary priority in the agenda of the EU members and European NATO members. In the longer-run, procurement will need to become more like that of a single state in which the only debate that matters is between strategy and the needs of Europe's land, sea and air forces together with its new security sector. Through harmonisation of equipment requirements and standardisation the EU via the EDA could enjoy many of the advantages of US procurement policy, i.e. larger research and development budgets, longer production runs and centralised project management. Indeed, only through such economies of scale can European governments overcome the ever-increasing unit cost of equipment, research and development costs.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ The Centre for European Reform (CER), which is located in London, is a think-tank devoted to improving the quality of the debate on the future of the European Union. The CER aims to promote new ideas and policies for reforming the EU. As an independent organisation, the CER has published work by contributors from all the main political parties. Those involved in its activities are well placed to ensure that its ideas are fed into the policy-making process. The CER also provides advice to governments in several European countries, as well as to EU institutions. <http://www.cer.org.uk/>

¹⁰¹ Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, "Europe's Military Revolution", London, Centre for European Reform, March 2001, p. 54

¹⁰² EU defence spending is only around 45-50 per cent of the US's annual defence budget. Based on 2001-2002 defence budget figures, EU defence spending amounts up to €170 billion annually, compared to the US's annual defence budget of €350 billion. Only France and the UK have made any recent substantial increases to defence spending. European Union, Homepage. European Defence, <http://www.european-defence.co.uk/directory/eu04.html>

¹⁰³ Dr. Kenneth Payne, "The European Security and Defence Policy and the future of NATO", BBC News Analysis Research, www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf, 2003, p. 23

The EU member states remain far behind the US in terms of capabilities – and this gap is certain to widen as the US defence budget increases more rapidly than that of European countries.¹⁰⁴ So far, the Europeans duplicate a great deal of their research and procurement efforts because defence budgets are divided between twenty-five countries. For the same reason, they cannot fully exploit economies of scale. Further inefficiencies occur because some procurement is undertaken for national political reasons, rather than on grounds of efficiency or performance. With the establishment of the European Defence Agency in 2004, a first decisive step in the right direction was done towards integrated European defence procurement and a common European defence market as well as the development of a true ESDP and deepened integration.

The continuous technical improvement of military arsenals, especially on the US side, the so called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),¹⁰⁵ with its steadily rising development and procurement costs for highly sophisticated assets and capabilities, lead to the situation that all European nations, even France and the United Kingdom, can no longer afford the forces and equipment which might be necessary to line up with the US to the necessary extent. If the European Union wants to keep pace with the US in the technical arena and if EU member states want to keep their technological and scientific position in the world, a common, synchronized

¹⁰⁴ Dr. Kenneth Payne, “The European and Defence Policy and the future of NATO”, BBC News Analysis Research, www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf, 2003, pp. 16-18

¹⁰⁵ According to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defence: “A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.” Jeffrey McKittrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlep., Georges Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill, “The Battlefield of the Future” – 21st Century Warfare Issues”, Air University, <http://www.cdsar.af.mil/battle.bfoc.html>, chapter 3, p. 1

effort within the Union is necessary. The foundation of EDA and the development of the 'GALILEO' navigation satellite system¹⁰⁶ are initial promising steps towards a closer cooperation and technical innovation in Europe.

In order to build a "... strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention ...", the EU's military and crisis management credentials need to be strengthened. However, the Union should avoid having NATO thinking rub off on its own strategic culture. One of the greatest strengths of the ESDP is that it is a post-Cold War initiative centred on post-Cold War threats. Although a collective defence article needs to be adopted to correspond with the goals of integration, it is not urgent in the short run. Leaving territorial defence to NATO for the time being will also help to avoid the ESDP becoming overburdened at this early phase of the initiative.¹⁰⁷

The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy

A European Union that comprises the wealthiest and most influential European nations lays the basis for Europe's future role. Deeper integration will inevitably lead to institutional, security and defence reforms. The security of the EU requires a holistic approach and a realistic

¹⁰⁶ GALILEO: Europe's Navigation Satellite System. The European Union is building its own global navigation satellite system called Galileo, currently projected to be operational in 2008. Galileo is slated to be a civil system that will be operated by a commercial Galileo Concessionaire. The European Union intends to launch a full constellation of satellites that will be independent from GPS. Current plans call for Galileo to offer five services including: (1) an Open Service for mass market and recreational users; (2) a Commercial Service for specialized applications, with guaranteed service; (3) a Safety of Life Service providing higher reliability and additional integrity data; (4) a Public Regulated Service for government-approved users. (5) a Search and Rescue Service; <http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcaturi=tcm:29-117496-16&type=LinksDossier>

¹⁰⁷ Stephen Blackwell, "Ill timed and Ill Advised? The European Defence Union Summit", April 2003', RUSI Newsbrief, Vol. 23, No. 6, June 2003

strategic civil-military concept that combines achievable means and ends. Military defence is an important part of this effort and if the EU wants to be a legitimate and effective security actor, it must possess a credible military defence component.¹⁰⁸ What does it imply and which consequences will it have for the transformation of the EU into a global actor?

The European Security Strategy needs to be rapidly transformed into a mechanism that defines when, where, why and how the European Union will act. The Iraq War showed again that in times of crisis, EU unity crumbles under the conflicting short-term interests of its member states. This is why the EU member states need to develop a practicable decision making process, which meets the requirements of a considerably changing security environment. This cannot be done without acknowledging power relations. The time has come to establish an EU Security Council, which guarantees a rapid and balanced decision-making and where the balance of power within the EU is taken into account adequately, without offending any democratic principles. The council must be responsible for both military and civilian security and in time the defence of the Union. Such a concept can generate the consensus that will in turn weld all the EU's security into the single institutional framework that contemporary security demands.¹⁰⁹

The European Security Strategy needs to be transformed into a Strategic Concept for the EU. Such a concept would represent a new overall approach in transnational security thinking and organisation, because it contains national, civil and military, as well as offensive and defensive security and defence efforts. To develop a European Strategic Concept the ESS must

¹⁰⁸ Julian Lindley French and Franco Algeri, (Advised by Thomas Bauer, Yves Boyer, Janis Emmanouilidis, Tuomas Forsberg, Stefani Wiess, and Rob de Wijk), "A European Defence Strategy", Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh 2004, p. 58

¹⁰⁹ Asle Toje, "A Security Strategy for Europe – The Solana Strategy in the Wake of Madrid", The Oxford Journal on Good Governance, panel discussion, p. 2

be translated into security and defence missions with a detailed military task list that would form the basis for a strategic ESDP. The strategic ESDP military task list will provide the framework for European force transformation, deepened integration of European armed forces, planning for future missions, equipment programmes and defence financing requirements.¹¹⁰

European defence spending has always been one of the most embarrassing items that confronts the EU. European governments do not spend enough on defence. However, it is clear that a direct correlation exists between defence expenditure and an effective strategic ESDP that no clever re-allocation of existing resources can resolve. A strategic ESDP will cost money and EU member states need to decide which financial requirements are necessary to meet the future challenges. A new approach to defence financing is required. Traditionally, defence expenditure has been based upon a narrow national calculation of interest, threat and affordability and it is clear that this will continue for some time. Given other pressures on national budgets, a balance between affordability and capability will be unavoidable. This calls for a common funding especially for such items, which would overstretch national defence budgets.¹¹¹ The € 60 million EU security budget will have to be substantially increased. Ideally, this increase should come directly as a percentage from the € 160 billion defence budgets of the member states. However, even the EU budget of 2005, of which some eighty percent will be allocated to ‘agricultural and rural development, as well as ‘structural operations’, should not be off limits when it comes to defence spending for European security. So far, only some four percent of the overall budget are

¹¹⁰ Julian Lindley French and Franco Algeri, (Advised by Thomas Bauer, Yves Boyer, Janis Emmanouilidis, Tuomas Forsberg, Stefani Wiess, and Rob de Wijk), “A European Defence Strategy”, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh 2004, p. 5

¹¹¹ In addition to limited strategic intelligence satellites and other air-breathing systems (such as global reach unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)), advanced communications and effective ground surveillance (C4ISR), EU forces need effective suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), offensive electronic warfare (OEW) capabilities, fast strategic lift (air and sea), force protection capabilities, and precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

planned for ‘external action’.¹¹² Ultimately, it is up to political leaders to convince public opinion that security investment is vital.¹¹³

The European common defence market, supported by a common Research & Technology budget and co-ordinated through a strong European Defence Agency would undoubtedly improve cost-effectiveness for European armed forces undergoing transformation. The need for a single European defence market is self-evident. If the US follows a ‘Buy American First’ strategy, the EU must adopt a ‘Buy European First’ strategy to safeguard procurement for European armed forces. Securing Europe’s autonomous supply of advanced military technology and equipment is a pre-requisite for a strategic ESDP.¹¹⁴ However, transatlantic cooperation in the technical and armaments sector that is based on an equal partnership should be in the interest of the European Union and the United States.

Intelligence is still a national topic. The EU needs the means, procedures and mechanisms to not only generate and exchange intelligence among Member States and partners but also to assess this information in order to come to an integrated threat assessment, which is essential for successful common action.¹¹⁵

Looking into the future means that it is necessary to look beyond the immediate challenges faced by the European Union. A European Security and Defence Union (ESDU), a

¹¹² <http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/budget/syntchif2005/en.pdf>

¹¹³ Asle Toje, “A Security Strategy for Europe – The Solana Strategy in the Wake of Madrid”, *The Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, panel discussion, p. 3

¹¹⁴ Julian Lindley French and Franco Algeri, (Advised by Thomas Bauer, Yves Boyer, Janis Emmanouilidis, Tuomas Forsberg, Stefani Wiess, and Rob de Wijk), “A European Defence Strategy”, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh 2004, p. 7

¹¹⁵ See also: Javier Solana, “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a better World”, Brussels 12 December 2003, p. 14

European Army, the role of Nuclear Forces in a common defence, the role of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty,¹¹⁶ the future support to the United Nations and the relationship with other strategic partners, in particular the US, are all items on the future agenda of European defence.

The implications of ever closer co-operation over security and defence between EU member states and the integration of the security and defence effort as well as the pressure that derives from shrinking national defence budgets and the dawn of future challenges does suggest that in due course the EU might be confronted with the issue of an ESDU.

Military missions implied by the ESS suggest the need for European armed forces to operate progressively higher up the conflict intensity scale from defence diplomacy at one end through to robust preventive missions, possibly anywhere in the world. An integrated European Army might have some attraction for smaller EU member-states as a cost-effective contribution to Europe's security and defence. Nevertheless, it is difficult to identify when the major EU member states would be willing to submerge completely their military identities in such an entity.¹¹⁷ However, an integrated European Army should be the goal, which is legitimised by the European Parliament and financed by the EU member states, an army with joint structures that go beyond the ones already in place. Therefore, there is a need for a joint defence system, common

¹¹⁶ Modified Brussels Treaty. Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence Signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as Amended by the "Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty", Signed at Paris on October 23, 1954 (...) ARTICLE V: "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." <http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/3e-f.html>

¹¹⁷ Asle Toje, "A Security Strategy for Europe – The Solana Strategy in the Wake of Madrid", The Oxford Journal on Good Governance, panel discussion, p. 2

legislation and standardisation. The European Parliament should have a say on committing forces: Assuming that a fully-fledged EU government would have been set up within the foreseeable future, the army would report to the EU government and to the EU Parliament. Through a deployment law, Parliament should decide if deploying troops is an option or not.¹¹⁸

The nuclear forces of the UK and France have no formal ESDP role but they afford an extended deterrence to all EU and NATO partners. In time, the role of these forces needs to be formalised within an EU framework as they are within the NATO framework. Again, given the current strategic environment, it will clearly not be for some time yet, but it is an issue that is unlikely to be avoided indefinitely.¹¹⁹

The ESS rightly states that the EU should enhance its support for the United Nations to uphold international peace and security. With the forthcoming reform of the UN in 2005 and in years to follow, it seems clear that Europe will increase its influence and importance within the organisation and the UN Security Council (UNSC).¹²⁰ However, a merger of the seats of the

¹¹⁸ Toby Helm and George Jones, "German plans for Euro-army 'show Blair is deceiving Britain'", Daily Telegraph, 24 October 2003

¹¹⁹ Julian Lindley French and Franco Algieri, (Advised by Thomas Bauer, Yves Boyer, Janis Emmanouilidis, Tuomas Forsberg, Stefani Wiess, and Rob de Wijk), "A European Defence Strategy", Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh 2004, Venusberg Group Reports, p. 4-5, www.cap.uni-muenchen.de

¹²⁰ The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the most powerful organ of the United Nations. It is charged with maintaining peace and security between nations. While other organs of the UN only make recommendations to member governments, the Security Council has the power to make decisions, which member governments must carry out under the United Nations Charter. The Council has five "permanent" members: People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States. The permanent members were originally based on the victorious powers after World War II. In 1971, the People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China, while in 1991, Russia succeeded to the seat originally held by the Soviet Union. Currently the five members are the only nations permitted to possess nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which lacks universal validity, as not all nuclear nations have signed the treaty. Ten other members are elected by the General Assembly for 2-year terms starting on January 1, with five replaced each year. The members are chosen by regional groups and confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly. The African, Latin American, and Western European blocs choose two members each, and the Arab, Asian, and Eastern European blocs choose one member each. The final seat alternates between Asian and African selections. Wikipedia Encyclopaedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org>

European members of the UNSC into a shared EU seat would provide a clear demonstration of European resolve about “effective multilateralism”.

Amongst the other major powers that are involved in a strategic ESDP, Russia is vital. Security for Europe without Russia is impossible. At the very least, it is clear that Russia must be convinced of the value of a strategic ESDP and encouraged to deepen its relationship with the EU. The development of a strategic ESDP also represents a new structure within the broad European security architecture that must be compatible with and acceptable to new partners. The Cold War is over and the ESS implies new partnerships, not only with Russia but also with others, such as Canada, China, India, Japan and Ukraine.¹²¹ Moreover, strong partnerships will be essential. Indeed, a strategic ESDP will have significant influence in regions as widely separated as the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Africa. A strategic ESDP will also require a direct EU diplomatic presence around the world.¹²² A system has to be developed that combines the resources of the Member States with those of the EU.¹²³

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale, not only because of its economical and political weight but also of its support to the UN and international organizations as well as its attitude, which is based on modern humanism. In

¹²¹ See also: Javier Solana, “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a better World”, Brussels 12 December 2003, p. 15

¹²² Julian Lindley French and Franco Algeri, (Advised by Thomas Bauer, Yves Boyer, Janis Emmanouilidis, Tuomas Forsberg, Stefani Wiess, and Rob de Wijk), “A European Defence Strategy”, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh 2004, Venusberg Group Reports, pp. 4-5, www.cap.uni-muenchen.de

¹²³ See also: Javier Solana, “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a better World”, Brussels 12 December 2003, p. 14

doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world. A visionary ESDP needs a visionary European Security Strategy and a visionary European Defence Strategy with all its necessary implications. The logical implication of ever more intensive security co-operation is that one day there will be a common defence.

CONCLUSION

As Europe faces up to its unique vision of security so will the responsibilities that will inevitably accrue to a rich and stable Europe in a poor and unstable world. For more than half a century Europeans have witnessed non-Europeans answering Europe's security questions on Europe's behalf. The days when Europeans could be spectators of security are at an end. As 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks also on European soil so tragically demonstrated, a Europe that stands aside will be no less secure. Renewed conflict in the Balkans has also reminded Europeans that an inability to guarantee a stable Europe undermines any pretensions the EU might have to stabilise the world beyond. Thus, the only questions to which Europeans must find an answer concern the nature and scope of Europe's re-engagement in global security and the role the EU eventually plays within it.

The EU has taken over responsibility for securing the peace in Bosnia, and it seems likely that it will shortly thereafter, take over the responsibility for Kosovo. If ESDP missions are successful, the project may attract more public and elite support. If so, the resources devoted to Europe's security project may also increase and Europe's autonomous military capabilities will grow. If this comes to pass, ESDP is likely to complicate US-EU relations in three ways.

First, because of its peculiar relations with NATO, ESDP gives Europeans a way to encourage the US to be more interested in Europe's special security concerns than would otherwise be the case. Europeans have strong interests in peace and order on Europe's periphery, including the suppression of civil conflict. NATO has taken on these missions, but it has also taken on missions farther afield to satisfy the US. For the discussed reasons it seems clear that the US has a strong political interest in preserving NATO's primacy on the continent.

Second, the maturation of the ESDP will produce Europeans who are increasingly convinced that they could provide for their own security if they have to do so. This is not a prediction of an EU ready to compete with the US, it is a prediction of an EU ready to look after itself. This will not happen soon, but given the planned pace of EU capabilities improvements, a more militarily autonomous European Union will appear viable in a bit less than a decade. As consciousness of this fact grows, Europeans are likely to speak to the US inside and outside NATO with greater expectation that their views will be taken seriously. The US will have decisions to make about how it wants to conduct its foreign policy and in particular, about how much it cares about Europe relative to its other international projects.

Finally, insofar as US officials already recognise that ESDP is and will be a complicating factor for them, they will have to decide on the US attitude toward the project. US officials have supported the project, but with the understanding that it will provide the European Union with no truly autonomous capabilities. When it appears otherwise, they

become about the ultimate rewards of cooperation with the US in the context of NATO. Overt US opposition may produce the very capacities that the US opposes. Given US power and consciousness of its power, it is not obvious that the US will find a subtle way to deal with the EU's defence efforts. This might add more friction to the transatlantic relationship.

To answer Henry Kissinger's question, today and even more in the future, the EU is the right address if one wants to speak to Europe. It is time that Washington realises that bilateral relationships and NATO are no longer sufficient to manage the West. However, a European Security and Defence Policy in opposition to the United States might have no future and contradicts the European Union's long-term security interests in an increasing globalized world. At the same time the US administration should recognise that a European Union with a functioning Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy does not contradict US national security interests. Against this background, both sides of the Atlantic need to change their present policies and unilateral strategies vis-à-vis the other transatlantic partner. Only when the EU is acknowledged as a player can the Europeans become what the US needs, namely strong and able partners.

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