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CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY – CAN IT BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED AND SUSTAINED?

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ABSTRACT

The publication of Canada's first National Security Policy (NSP) in April 2004 was a bold statement of intent that articulated the Government of Canada's resolve to enhance the protection and safety of Canada and its citizens. Focused on three core national security interests, and founded on core Canadian values, the NSP addresses matters of public health, natural disasters as well as man-made threats from both a domestic and international perspective. Ranging from traditional military threats through terrorist attacks, criminal activities and illegal immigration, the array of security concerns that the NSP includes is comprehensive and ambitious.[1] But is it realistic?

Although the Government of Canada (GOC) has undertaken a number of major initiatives since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and has committed significant resources to national security, it is unlikely that the broad mandate of the NSP will be achieved under current circumstances. Collaboration is recognized as a fundamental element for success, yet only limited improvements have been realized in this domain. Given the scope of the NSP's security concerns and the number of stakeholders involved across federal departments, government agencies as well as provincial and territorial jurisdictions, effective collaboration cannot be taken for granted. Rather, this paper will argue that the GOC must address the underlying impediments that have long detracted from an environment that is necessary to establish a culture of collaboration. Otherwise, the successful implementation of the NSP objectives will be challenging, while the long-term sustainment may be doubtful.

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[1] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 27 April 2004, p. vii.

PART 1 – SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW

There is no role more fundamental for government than the protection of its citizens.[2]

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 had a dramatic impact on security in North America. Canadians and Americans alike were horrified by the callousness and relative impunity with which a small group of Islamic extremists were able to execute their well-orchestrated attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Although the scale of the attack was horrendous in terms of death and destruction, the depth of the impact on peoples' sense of vulnerability was unprecedented. The governments on both sides of the border responded to this new imperative. But was the broader issue of domestic security really new? More importantly for Canada, how long will national security remain a national priority?

From a broader perspective, terrorism in different forms is as old as warfare itself. The advent of modern communications and improved media coverage, particularly with the introduction of television reporting in the 1950s, multiplied the psychological impact of terrorist activities immeasurably. While most modern-day terrorist activities have occurred abroad, Canadians and Americans alike had a taste of it well before 9/11. Canada's experiences were limited to such unrelated events as the FLQ "October Crisis" of 1970 and the Air India Flight 182 bombing of 1985. Conversely, the American experience had been more startling, with an increased prevalence in recent years. In fact, based on a string of events and foiled attempts the primary conclusion of the 9/11 Commission Report was that

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[2] Office of the PM, *Speech from the Throne*, 02 Feb 04, p. 22.

the terrorist events of 9/11 "…should not have come as a surprise."[3] So why then has the

GOC been seized with the importance of national security, particularly since Paul Martin

became Prime Minister (PM) in December 2003? Kim Richard Nossal has argued

convincingly that the sudden rise in interest in security matters by the GOC was more of a

reaction to the American response to 9/11 than a sudden, alarming concern about the state of

Canada's security.[4]

Not surprisingly, the GOC closely monitors public opinion as a guide to policy

development and the setting of national priorities. Despite the existence of numerous polling

agencies, the GOC has created its own public opinion research branch that conducts a regular

survey entitled *Listening to Canadians*, further underlining its acute interest in this domain.

Although a variety of pre-9/11 surveys had indicated that terrorism was one of several

security concerns held by Canadians, it spiked to the number one position in the days and

weeks following the attacks on the World Trade Center but then quickly faded away within a

few months.[5] Other telling perspectives of government priorities are the Speech from the

Throne and the federal Budget. The former emphasized national security and safety in

different forms up until the February 2004 Speech. However, national security was barely

mentioned in the October 2004 Speech other than in conjunction with its importance in

maintaining a strong trading relation with the US.[6]

Nossal postulates that the underlying fundamental compulsion for the GOC to

undertake such a robust interest in national security is economic prosperity, primarily that of

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[3] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report – Executive Summary*, 22 July 2004, pp. 2-3.
[4] Kim Richard Nossal, "Canadian Foreign Policy After 9/11: Realignment, reorientation, or Reinforcement?" *Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of* Terror, 2003, pp. 21-28.
[5] Public Works and Government Services Canada, *Communications Survey Fall 2001*, Communication Canada Research Branch.
[6] Office of the PM. *Speech from the Throne*, October 5, 2004, p.13.

preserving the vital trade relationship that has evolved with the US.[7] Certainly, from a long-term perspective the GOC's view on national security and national defence has hardly changed at all in the last few decades. While national defence is but one aspect of the broader national security portfolio, it is still a crucial element and a useful indicator. As stated by PM Martin, "…both the National Security Policy and the new defence policy will be closely linked."[8] However, having reviewed Canadian defence policy since the end of the Second World War, Bland and Maloney have concluded that since the early 1960's successive governments have consistently viewed defence and the CF as "…burdens on the Treasury and extraneous appendages to the government's policy agenda."[9] The results were unpredictable variations in defence spending priorities, and annual budget allocations that, other than by exception, repeatedly undercut the resources necessary to properly implement and adequately sustain the stated defence objectives. Could this be a forewarning of the approach taken for national security?

In considering official documents, it would seem that Nossal and Bland are correct in their interpretation of the GOC's views on defence, national security and the economy. In the opening remarks to the 1994 Defence White Paper, Minister Collenette stated that "The primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is to *protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security*."[10] Having been a cornerstone to Canadian defence policy for many decades, it should not have been surprising to note that the GOC's view on national security, from the perspective of protecting Canada and its citizens, changed very little despite the events of 9/11 and the sudden spike in public

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[7] Nossal, p. 31.
[8] Office of the PM of Canada, *Address by PM Paul Martin at CFB Gagetown, New Brunswick*, April 14, 2004.
[9] Douglas L. Bland and Sean Maloney, "Chapter 6 Defence Policy for the World Order Era: The First Steps – Reconstitution and Transformation," *Campaigns for International Security*, 2004, p. 192.
[10] Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, 1994, p. 2. Italics added for emphasis.

concern about terrorism. In fact, in its October 2002 response to security concerns raised by the Senate's Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD), the GOC emphasized that "…the principles of the 1994 Defence White Paper continue to be relevant in today's uncertain international security environment…".[11] Conversely, the same document also highlights the $7.7 billion dollars that had been committed to national security in the 2001 Federal Budget "…to keep Canada safe, terrorists out, and our borders open."[12]

So what does this all mean? Given the inextricable link between security and the economy, or more specifically, between Canada's trade relationship with the US and the latter's concerns about the security of their border with Canada as well as the shared air and sea approaches to North America, the GOC will have little choice but to improve its ongoing national security initiatives. Furthermore, despite the apparent drop in priority of national security in the Canadian public's consciousness, few would doubt the significant political consequences that would befall a government that failed to adequately prevent or respond to a terrorist attack on Canadian soil, regardless of the degree of improbability that such an attack might occur. Consequently, national security will remain an important responsibility that the current and future federal governments cannot afford to ignore. However, the associated budget support may experience the same shortcomings and unpredictable funding priorities that have been prevalent in national defence for the past many years.

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[11] GOC, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness – The Government's Response to the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence*, October 2002, pp. 11-12.
[12] Ibid, p. 2.

PART 2 – BROADENING THE SECURITY MANDATE

The Government of Canada has taken important steps to respond to this increasingly complex and dangerous threat environment…On my first day as PM, I announced important organizational changes that will further strengthen the capacity of the Government to deal with this new environment. But we need to do more.[13]

The role of the GOC in national security since 9/11 has evolved and grown, reflecting to a large degree the differing perspectives of two different PMs. Under PM Chretien, the approach was reactive yet cautious and limited. Conversely, PM Martin has been proactive, robust and expansive in his approach since taking over as PM in December 2003. Both cases demonstrate the tremendous influence and discretion of the PM in defining issues, shaping policy and directing resources.[14]

Chretien remained PM for more than two years after 9/11. Although significant bi-national measures were taken under the *Canada-US Smart Border Declaration*,[15] it is apparent that the Chretien government was primarily concerned with assuaging American security concerns so as to minimize the impact of US border initiatives on the trade.[16] Arguably, the introduction of the *Anti-Terrorism Act* was also a reaction to post-9/11 American concerns about Canada's seemingly lax approach to customs, immigration and refugees, as this issue had been on the agenda with US officials well before the attacks on the World Trade Center.[17] In any event, these initiatives have been successful in maintaining a relatively unrestricted flow of goods, commerce and people between Canada and the US as

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[13] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 27 April 2004, Introductory remarks by PM Martin.
[14] David L. Bashow, "Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Canada's Foreign and Defence Policy Linkage," *Canadian Military Journal*, Spring 2000, pp. 20-21.
[15] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *The Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration.*, 2003-02-07. Provides an overview of the 30 separate action items contained within the agreement.
[16] Nossal, pp.23-25.
[17] Ibid, p. 26.

recently underlined by the former US Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, who praised the "tremendous accomplishments" that had been achieved in border security.[18] The remainder of the Chretien government initiatives was limited in scope and priority. Although Deputy PM John Manley was assigned the role of chairing the swiftly created Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, he retained his other formidable responsibilities as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which served to signal the temporary nature of national security as a priority for the Chretien government.

Immediately upon becoming the new PM, Paul Martin undertook a proactive and robust approach to national security. Not only did he make it a key priority of his new government, but broadened the mandate to include "…a broad array of government activities, including military and police operations, …disease surveillance and response, agricultural inspection...".[19] In accordance with PM Martin's vision of a "…whole-of-government, whole-of-Canada approach to threats to our national security"[20], further measures were taken in swift succession.

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[18] Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *News Release – Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada: Year One*, December 12, 2004.
[19] PSEPC, *A National Security Committee of Parliamentarians*, 2004, Introduction. A lengthy but informative document regarding the new National Security Committee of Parliamentarians.
[20] Senate of Canada, *Proceedings of the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence: Issue 1 – Evidence*, February 23, 2004. Testimony by Mr. Rob Wright, National Security Advisor to the PM.

Figure 1 – Overview of threats and interests in the expanded national security mandate[21]

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC) was

established under the responsibility of the Deputy PM. This significant reorganization was

undertaken to amalgamate "…the core activities of the previous Department of the Solicitor

General, the Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness, and the National

Crime Prevention Centre."[22] The position of National Security Advisor (NSA) was created

with a mandate to report directly to the PM, reflective of the personal priority PM Martin

attached to the security agenda. The *ad hoc* approach to governance that was applied in the

Chretien government was quickly upgraded to a more comprehensive and permanent

governance framework beginning with the creation of a standing Cabinet Committee on

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[21] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 27 April 2004, p. 4.
[22] PSEPC, *News Release – Legislation to Establish Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Introduced*, October 8, 2004.

Security, Public Health and Emergencies under the direction of the new Deputy PM, Anne McLellan.[23]

In line with PM Martin's other focus on democratic reform, initiatives were set in place to strengthen the central governance framework through the application of greater transparency, inclusiveness and ultimately, improved decision-making on national security issues.[24] Accordingly, steps were quickly taken to initiate the creation of a permanent National Security Committee of Parliamentarians, an Advisory Council on National Security to seek additional security advice from outside of government, and a Cross-Cultural Roundtable and to maintain open channels of communication with ethnic, religious and cultural communities on security matters.[25] Finally, the first-ever National Security Policy (NSP) was tabled shortly thereafter along with an array of legislation tightening elements of national security in a variety of areas.[26]

Clearly, the Martin government has not only broadened the national security mandate, and articulated its intentions through the NSP, but has undertaken a comprehensive assortment of initiatives to enable its implementation. Certainly, the US has been impressed. In December 2004 President Bush made a point publicly of acknowledging that "…Canada has taken a series of critical steps to guard against the danger of terrorism…" and thanking the Canadian government "…for all those constructive and important decisions."[27] As stressed in the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, the US has a long-term view on national security. Given the deep-seated link between Canadian interest in cross-border trade

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[23] Ibid.
[24] PSEPC, *A National Security Committee of Parliamentarians*, 2004, Introduction.
[25] PSEPC, *News Release,* October 8, 2004, Backgrounder – National Security Coordinating Mechanisms.
[26] Office of the PM, *News Release – Government of Canada releases comprehensive National Security Policy*, April 27, 2004.
[27] PSEPC Press Release and backgrounders, October 8, 2004.

and the American interest in homeland security, it is likely that Canada's domestic national security commitments will continue to receive US scrutiny well into the future, long after Paul Martin's tenure as PM.[28]

Similarly, the expectations of the Canadian public have been elevated, not just in ensuring a safe environment but also, in an effective response to any man-made or natural disasters that might occur. As with national health care, once such expectations have been established, it is very costly politically to reduce them. Thus the enduring obligation for successive governments will be to undertake the necessary measures to achieve the required results. But how do the security interests of the PM become effectively implemented within the bureaucracy to produce tangible results for the taxpayers? More importantly, what is the impact of changes in a PM's short-term discretionary priorities, as reflected in the annual federal Budget, on the long-term sustainment of the expansive list of national security objectives?

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[28] Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, July 2002, p. 69.

PART 3 – PURSUING A "WHOLE OF CANADA" APPROACH

The problem of integrating policy considerations and operational considerations is made difficult by the isolation of the policy branch from the line functions…even the most brilliant policy ideas must be ultimately reformulated in such a way that they can be put into effect…to ensure that the means being developed are financially feasible and practically acceptable.[29]

Figure 2 – Schematic depicting the NSP Integrated Security System[31]

Clearly, the federal government has embraced its primary responsibility in leading the pursuit of this all-inclusive security strategy, and has acknowledged the magnitude of the associated task, both of which are implied in the following NSP definition:

> *National security deals with threats that have the potential to undermine the security of the state or society. These threats generally require a national response, as they are beyond the capacity of individuals, communities or provinces to address alone.[32]*

Also implied in this same definition is the lead role of the GOC in working with other countries, particularly with respect to collective security arrangements and international security missions. PM Martin reinforced this important point in a speech in which he explained how Canada's bi-national security efforts with the US, as well as her contributions

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[31] PCO, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 27 April 2004, p. 10.
[32] Ibid, p. 3.

to security and stability abroad, were integrated with the attainment of a safe and secure environment at home. He summarized by saying that the "…time has come to take strategic decisions and measures."[33] It would be hard to disagree. The "Smart Borders Agreement" is but one example, while the ongoing commitment of the Canadian Forces (CF), Foreign Affairs and other agencies to Afghanistan is another.

Recognizing the federal government's lead role in the implementation of the "whole of Canada" approach to national security, how can they possibly tie it all together? Providing central direction is clearly an important starting point. The GOC issued several security-related communiqués and news releases shortly after Martin became PM, which served to introduce his broadened security vision while explaining the rationale behind his associated security initiatives. This was soon followed by the publication of the NSP, which articulated the strategic objectives, key stakeholders, and initial implementation commitments. However, the NSP is new, complex and lacking in detail. Interpretation and understanding by everyone involved in implementing the NSP will be necessary. Beginning with the federal-level stakeholders, it is necessary to align priorities, responsibilities and objectives within a common focus of effort. This is no small challenge considering that most public servants are already overloaded with existing tasks and preoccupied with other issues. Coordination is essential, but the number of stakeholders involved is extensive.

Perhaps that explains why the Martin government turned to consolidation. The creation of PSEPC served to achieve this outcome by merging several key security portfolios under a single minister. In addition to the management of the personnel and functions of the

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[33] Office of the PM, *Address by PM Paul Martin*, April 14, 2004.

previously existing departments that were subsumed in the organizational merger, the Deputy

PM will also be responsible for six important agencies:[34]

- Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP);
- Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS);
- Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA);
- Canada Firearms Centre (CFC):
- Correctional Service of Canada (CSC); and
- National Parole Board (NPB).

The stated rationale for the creation of this super department is as follows: it

"…provides policy leadership, and delivers programs and services in the areas of national

security and emergency management, policing, law enforcement and borders…also ensures

policy cohesion...[35] In principle this should be more readily achievable under a single

minister since departmental resources can be aligned and apportioned internally in

accordance with the minister's direction without having to compete with other federal

departments. This may be so for this new department of over 50,000 people, but it will likely

pose some challenges given the many elements that must be reconciled internally as a result

of the merger. Furthermore, the creation of PSEPC may potentially degrade "policy

cohesion" for the larger team of stakeholders envisioned in the "whole of Canada" approach.

As forewarned by a Deputy Minister (DM) Task Force almost a decade ago, "…there is

concern that the new, larger departments are more inward looking and have thicker walls."[36]

However, consolidation has its limits, leaving other non-PSEPC stakeholders to

integrate into a larger coordination framework. Considering only the federal level of

government, other key departments with overlapping national security interests include the

Department of Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC), Department of International Trade Canada

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[34] PSEPC, *News Release,* October 8, 2004, Backgrounder – Public Security and Emergency Prepar

(ITC), Department of National Defence (DND), Transport Canada (TC), Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), Health Canada (HC), Environment Canada (EC), and the Privy Council Office (PCO).[37] Attempts at further consolidation of any of these different departments and their associated agencies would not only be unwieldy from a management perspective, it would also likely impede the other functional lines of operation provided by these entities. For instance, although Health Canada has an important role in "…protecting Canadians against many current and emerging [health] threats…"[38], this is but a portion of its broader health administration responsibilities. Similarly, while the CF may be called upon to assist first-responders to a natural disaster such as the 1998 Ice Storm, it has other commitments such as peace support operations in Afghanistan that are more focused on international affairs than domestic safety issues.

Finally, at the provincial-territorial levels of government, as well as in numerous municipalities across the country, the alignment of priorities, responsibilities and objectives within a common focus of effort becomes even more difficult. Most activities at these levels are more focused at the tactical level where specificity of intentions, arrangements and responsibilities are essential to mission success. This is natural given that they provide the majority of the "first responders" who will deal with the consequences of a man-made or natural disaster. Quite commonly, GOC bureaucrats refer to this as the "operationalization" of the policy. However, will those involved with the high-level governance of national security, as well as the development of the supporting policies be in touch with the perspective of those at the tactical level? According to C.E.S. Franks, there is risk that they

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[37] PCO, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 27 April 2004, pp. vii-xi.
[38] Ibid, p. 29.

won't be and a gap will be created between the stated intentions and the resulting outcomes.[39] Perhaps this explains the consistent reference to the need for effective coordination throughout the NSP and other GOC policy statements, as the means to overcome this potential disconnect.

Certainly the critical role of these lower-level organizations was not overlooked in the US Strategy for Homeland Security that underlined the fact that "Local units are the first to respond, and the last to leave the scene. All disasters are ultimately local events."[40] The federal government's approach to dealing with the provinces and territories will be particularly sensitive given the fact that Canada is a confederation with a constitutional division of powers between the federal government and that of the provinces. Consequently, although the federal government has the lead in responsibility for ensuring national security and controls a lot of the resources, they will clearly need to embrace a collaborative approach to "partner" with their counterparts within a "win-win" arrangement. Otherwise, the resultant coordination might not be too effective.

In summary, the "whole-of-Canada" approach to national security will be a monumental task, particularly from a long-term sustainment perspective. On the surface, the initiatives taken to date towards improving national security are quite impressive and reflect the personal engagement of PM Martin. Concrete measures have been taken to define the national security mandate, and outline its objectives and high-level implementation plan through the NSP. Reorganization and consolidation have been undertaken in an effort to achieve greater policy cohesion of key functional security domains. Legislative initiatives, security agreements, and centralized mechanisms have been established in order to build a

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[39] C.E.S. Franks, *The Parliament of Canada*, 1987, p. 206.
[40] Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, July 2002, p. viii.

framework to enable efficient coordination and functional integration. Finally, vital start-up resources have been approved through federal Budgets.

But what about the thousands of people involved in the integrated security system? The recent security initiatives undertaken are numerous, complex and comprehensive. People will be challenged at all levels to adapt themselves and their local teams to the implementation of their portion of the new security requirements. In all likelihood, very few people will have a holistic understanding of the larger system. Will coordination be enough or will greater emphasis need to be invested in building a collaborative environment in which people are aligned, focused and motivated to achieve the NSP objectives? As noted in past studies of inter-departmental efforts, "Policy cohesion across government is more likely to emerge in a collegial environment."[41]

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[41] PCO, *Deputy Minister Task Force - Strengthening our Policy Capacity*, December 1996, p. 19.

PART 4 – FROM COORDINATION TO COLLABORATION

...public servants have come under considerable and increasing pressure to work collaboratively in helping to resolve major policy issues...{but} there are questions about whether the federal government has in place the necessary structures, human resources and culture to deal with horizontal issues in an effective measure.[42]

As noted by Bland and Maloney a few months ago, the reliance on coordination reflects the reality that a "...comprehensive, established mechanism of national security planning and operations does not now exist in Canada."[43] In fact, they go on to assess the national security framework as being a patchwork of "...ad hoc arrangements by separate entities working under the direction of independent agencies and jurisdictions."[44] Other indicators that were provided during the SCONSAD hearings in February 2004 seem to reinforce this view. In responding to the fact that a number of earlier witnesses had referred to the situation as "...a 'spaghetti bowl' of bureaucratic difficulty" the National Security Advisor (NSA) acknowledged that despite the creation of PSEPC, there remains a "...significant amount of room for improvement."[45]

In fairness to the Martin government, it acknowledged the "...lack of integration in our current system..." when it published the NSP in April 2004, and committed itself to creating essential central coordination mechanisms.[46] Shortly thereafter, an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre was stood-up to provide a comprehensive and highly integrated intelligence warning and assessment capability, and steps were quickly taken to establish a new Federal-Provincial-Territorial Forum on Emergency Preparedness to coordinate actions

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[42] Herman Bakvis and Luc Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge*, 2004, p. 1.
[43] Bland and Maloney, "Chapter 6 Defence Policy for the World Order Era: The First Steps – Reconstitution and Transformation," 2004, p. 200.
[44] Ibid, p. 200.
[45] Senate of Canada, *Proceedings of the Standing Committee on National Security and Defence: Issue 1 – Evidence*, February 23, 2004. Query by Senator Banks and response by Mr. Wright.
[46] PCO, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 27 April 2004, pp. 9-14.

between these key domestic jurisdictions.[47] More recently, a 24/7 Government Operations

Centre was brought on line to provide the means to oversee and direct crisis response

operations to events impacting national safety or security,[48] and further efforts have been

taken to build working relationships between it and the provincial-territorial emergency ops

centers that were already in place. But is this sufficient to transform the "patchwork" into a

cohesive working environment?

      At a recent symposium in Ottawa on Network Enabled Operations, the Parliamentary

Secretary to the Minister of National Defence made a poignant comment that cuts to the heart

of the matter of what is necessary for success. As he noted, the systems and processes only

provide the integration tools while "…it is how people use networks to build effective

partnerships that matters most."[49] The Martin government has devoted tremendous effort to

building the network, but seems to have neglected the "people" part of the coordination

equation. Although, the term collaboration is formally identified as being an important

aspect of achieving successful coordination,[50] it begs the question as to whether any progress

has been made in this domain? Perhaps that was the underlying message subtle

recommendation in the report from the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) that the

members of PSEPC "…should work with its federal partners and the provinces and territories

to improve the co-ordination…"[51] Lannan's observations on the state of integrated counter-

terrorism efforts in Canada are more specific. He concludes his insightful analysis by noting

that despite the improvements in the integrated intelligence framework, "…cultural barriers

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Ward P.D. Elcock, Speaking Notes - Presentation at the Symposium on Network Enabled Operations, 1 December 2004.

[49] Keith Martin, Presentation at the Symposium on Network Enabled Operations, November 30, 2004.

[50] GOC, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, October 2002, p. 13.

[51] OAG, *Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons for April 2005 – Chapter 2 – National Security in Canada,* April 2005, p. 22.

and differences of operational bias within national security community" must still be

overcome "…to strengthen the trust and cohesive relationships between the partners."[52]

But what does the GOC mean by "coordination and collaboration" and why has it

received such emphasis as of late? Perhaps the implicit importance of addressing inter-

personal relations has failed to register in the use of the term "collaboration." Some baseline

definitions are necessary to clarify the meaning of these key terms:

> **Coordination**: *Low to moderate on the continuum of commitment,*
> *coordination…has as its purpose prevention of duplication of effort and*
> *assurance of provision of services.*[53]

> **Collaboration**: *A mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship which*
> *involves people from different agencies or sectors of the community joining*
> *together to achieve a common goal.*[54]

These definitions provide an insight into their appeal to the GOC – the primary focus

is on bureaucratic efficiency and harmonization of effort towards central objectives. Of note,

these terms are often used interchangeably with the terms "horizontal management" and

"horizontality", but they equate to the same intended results.[55] In reality, when considered

from an inter-personal teamwork perspective, the contrast between the two definitions is

striking: the former is transactional while the latter can be transformational as it pertains to

outcomes.

The need for coordination and collaboration across the federal government is not

new. During World War II it was necessary for the GOC to effectively respond to the war

effort.[56] However, once the war ended, government returned to its parochial approach to

business due in part to the high degree of independence each of the departments enjoyed in their respective domains of responsibility. This relatively clear delineation of federal responsibilities was also reflective of the comparatively simpler legislative and policy environment that existed at that time.[57] However, the situation changed during the 1950s. As the economy grew and lifestyles improved, Canadians came to demand more from government which responded in kind through the introduction of the numerous programs and services, such as national health care, social security and so on. Not surprisingly, the federal government quickly grew in size and complexity over the ensuing years, leading to an overlap between traditional departments as it pertained to policy interests and service delivery. The vertical "silo" framework of the federal government inevitably led to duplication of effort, inconsistencies in policies and competition for resources amongst the departments.

Upon becoming PM, Trudeau found this compartmentalized approach unacceptable as it failed to produce political options based on a broader governmental perspective. Consequently, he empowered the central agencies such as PCO to instill a competitive process of coordination so as to create a pluralistic environment.[58] While this created a centralized management framework that produced alternative considerations in policy development, the competitive nature of the new process led to an environment in which "Interdepartmental relations became too focused on transactions to the neglect of broader or longer-term policy."[59] The pursuit of efficiency and centralization undermined collaboration. In hindsight, the collaborative environment may have also been dampened by Trudeau's

[57] Donald J. Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*, 2003, pp. 62-69.
[58] Ibid, pp. 89-96.
[59] PCO, *Deputy Minister Task Force - Strengthening our Policy Capacity*, December 1996, p.1.

desire to create processes in which rational thought would overcome emotion thereby dehumanizing the interactions.[60]

Meanwhile, the growing overlap of departmental areas of responsibility and interdependence of policy development was becoming increasingly widespread. Furthermore, the legal obligations became increasingly complex, with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms raising individual expectations to a new level. Not only did inter-departmental teams have to give due consideration to existing service standards and program obligations, but great care had to be taken to ensure any new policy changes avoided unintended consequences elsewhere. The result was an inevitable growth of coordination committees, working groups and info briefings that consumed increasing time while producing little benefit.[61]

Unfortunately, the already poor environment of collaboration was weakened further by the cutbacks of Program Reviews of the mid-90s that led to even greater competitiveness for dwindling resources. The unfortunate outcome was that critical decisions were being taken within the "…crucible of the budget…"[62] and created a climate of "…departmental positioning and turf protection."[63] Cutbacks in personnel resulted in overworked bureaucrats who inevitably neglected long-term strategic matters to deal with the more urgent short-term issues.[64] To add yet another twist, Ministers began to engage academics, think tanks and consultants for policy advice due to a loss of confidence in the quality of work produced by the overloaded federal bureaucracy.[65]

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[60] C.E.S. Franks, *The Parliament of Canada*, 1987, pp. 204-210.
[61] Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics*, 1999, pp. 38-43.
[62] PCO, *Deputy Minister Task Force - Strengthening our Policy Capacity*, December 1996, p. 20.
[63] PCO, *Deputy Minister Task Force – Managing Horizontal Policy Issues*, December 1996, p. 25.
[64] PCO, *Deputy Minister Task Force - Strengthening our Policy Capacity*, December 1996, pp. 18-19.
[65] Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain,* pp.103-109.

Alarmed by these developments, the Clerk of the Privy Council of the day established nine task forces to undertake a comprehensive review of the situation. The ensuing recommendations converged on a few key problem areas. The primary recommendations clearly identified the need to improve horizontality:

> *Pressures from the Canadian and international environment require a much more integrated and corporate approach within the public sector, if it is to serve Canadians and elected officials effectively in the future. The need for integration applies equally to policy development, service delivery and the management of people.*[66]

Given the conviction of the senior bureaucrats, the identification of the problems' causes, and the detailed recommendations for improvement, one would think that many of these problems would have been overcome during the ensuing period. However, further examination points to a management bias, influenced in part by the New Public Management doctrine that had been introduced earlier in the 90s. The result was a focus on improving the transactional efficiency of the partnership arrangements, but it seemed to miss the importance of improving the cultural environment necessary to motivate synergistic "win-win" long-term solutions.[67] Unfortunately, given the enduring problems with achieving effective collaboration to this day, it is possible that this fundamental yet subtle difference in approach to inter-personal teamwork relations was hidden by the relative success achieved under certain circumstances.

Oddly enough, in the case of short-term missions or unexpected disaster responses, the results have been generally quite satisfactory, although the follow-on lessons reveal consistent challenges. Arguably, the difference between the objectives of the NSP and these isolated events is that the former requires long-term sustainment, while the latter succeed due

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[66] PCO, *Deputy Minister Task Force – From Studies to Action*, December 19, 1996, p. 8.
[67] Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge*, 2004, pp. 12-14.

to the temporary nature of the circumstances. More specifically, isolated events typically benefit from focused government support on a high priority, high visibility mission that has a clear end-state. Under these circumstances it seems that people become highly motivated to rise to the challenge, and embrace teamwork as the means to achieve the common objective.

The Kananaskis G8 Summit provides a well-documented case study in which Colonel Dave Barr assessed the overall results as being "…a highly successful operation from virtually every perspective, including that of interagency coordination."[68] Although there were numerous growing pains during the preparation and execution phases as the various stakeholders struggled to build plans, processes and an overall command structure, all the key players were clearly motivated to achieve the mission. Quite telling however, was the post-Summit observation by Mr. John Klassen, the individual who was assigned to run DFAIt is ad hoc Summit Management Office and had overall responsibility for the mission's success. The other key players involved echoed his view that "…good interpersonal relations can make-up for deficiencies or difficulties in the structure and organizations."[69] Other lessons identified included the vital importance of conducting an exercise to verify the readiness of the systems, plans and people, as well as the clear delineation of the command and control structure.[70] Thus it can be surmised that although a framework of governance, systems, plans and processes are all essential elements, the results are determined by people. In the case of the Kananaskis G8 Summit, the time and space of the circumstances were such that many of the people involved in the execution of the mission got to know one another by

[68] David Barr, *The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation*, NSSC 5 Research Paper, June 2003, p. 21.
[69] Ibid, p.21.
[70] Ibid, p. 14-19.

working directly together at the tactical "field" level during the planning and exercise preparatory phases.

Another useful example was Operation Assurance in late-1996, when Canada boldly attempted to lead a United Nations Multi-National Force (MNF) into central Africa. Although this was primarily a military operation, it is representative of the requirement for "3D" inter-departmental cooperation that is envisioned for the international security portion of the NSP.[71] Despite the fact that the mission was short-lived due to rapidly changing circumstances, it did receive the full backing of PM Chretien and was highly visible in the media. Thus the conditions were set for motivated teamwork. According to Appathurai and Lysyshyn who were both directly involved in the planning and coordination, they found that the ad hoc "…Interdepartmental Task Force worked well, and should be replicated in similar situation in the future."[72] However, Micheal Hennessy was more analytical in his detailed examination of the operation. One lesson of particular of note was the apparent need for "…closer DND-DFAIT cooperation and coordination than that provided by ad hoc structures, and prior practice would have proved fruitful."[73] The disturbing aspect about this observation is the fact that DFAIT and DND had a long-standing relationship pertaining to oversees operations involving the CF. Furthermore, in the short period of time between the end of the Cold War and Op Assurance, Canada had significantly increased its participation in a variety of overseas missions from combat in the first Gulf War, through volatile peace-keeping operations in the former Yugoslavia to humanitarian aid missions in Somalia and

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[71] PCO, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 27 April 2004, pp. 47-52.
[72] James Appathurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, "Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission, " *Canadian Forces Policy*, Winter 1998, p. 105.
[73] Michael A. Hennessy, "Operation 'Assurance': Planning a Multi-National Force for Rwanda/Zaïre," *Canadian Military Journal*, Spring 2001, p.18.

Haiti. It is quite remarkable that a highly functional, collaborative working relationship had not developed as a result of these shared experiences.

The third and final example of value is that related to the manner in which the GOC prepared for the Year 2000 (Y2K) issue. This case study is of interest given the longer timelines involved in the planning and preparation phase, as well as the breadth of the stakeholders involved. The Y2K problem and the potentially widespread consequences that could be triggered by a sudden failure of critical computer systems at the dawn of the new millennium was well documented long before the GOC finally took action. Despite a late start when the PM established an ad hoc cabinet-level committee on Y2K in 1998, it provided months of time to take action. Given the widespread nature of the problem, the breadth of concerned stakeholders was similar to that implicated in the NSP's vision of national security: it cut across international, federal, provincial and territorial jurisdictions, and implicated the private sector in a major way. Consequently, the GOC focused on "horizontality" as the key to success, "…to partner with critical stakeholders in win-win collaboration…critical working relationships that demanded good communications, regular meetings all to share information and to produce an agreed upon outcome."[74] Although it is difficult to judge how effective the preventative measures were in the final outcome wherein the Y2K problem had almost negligible consequences, the GOC deserves some credit for the approach taken, such as the emphasis on "collaboration", as well as the rigorous testing of plans and solutions. Additional factors for success that were highlighted in the lessons were the importance of strong political support (ie. from the PM), the need to provide the

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[74] Don Malpass, *The Federal Experience: Case Studies on Crisis and Emergency Management*, 2003.pp. 17-19.

necessary resources and the benefits of pursuing a win-win solution in which stakeholders "…see both the need and the benefit".[75]

All these examples reinforce the importance of people in the coordination equation, thereby reinforcing the importance of achieving an environment of collaboration that is focused on interpersonal relations. But what is the difference between these previous examples and the situation that necessitates sincere collaboration on an ongoing basis as envisioned within the NSP's integrated security system? It seems that one explanation for success in these case studies was determined by a research effort conducted back in 2000 that concluded, "Success often depends on how important a problem is perceived and on its sufficiently critical character."[76] Arguably, this is true from the perspectives of both politicians and public servants, with the engagement of the former reinforcing the commitment of the latter.

It would seem that the heightened focus on national security since 9/11 provides the necessary conditions to foster a collaborative environment in which PSEPC could effectively "work" with its other stakeholders. As a new super department with a clear security mandate in the NSP and the close personal attention of the PM, the issue of national security is clearly a critical priority for the Martin government. Furthermore, the fact that Osama Bin Laden has indicated that Canada is a potential target should add further credibility of the critical nature of national security for Canadians as a whole.

Yet despite meeting the stated criteria for successful collaboration, PSEPC is still found to encounter difficulties in working with its partners to reconcile details concerning basic plans and tactical responsibilities. Or perhaps the problem is that the partners are

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[75] Ibid, p. 19.
[76] Bourgault and Lapierre, *Horizontality and Public Management*, December 2000, p. 12.

reluctant to fully embrace PSEPC's leadership approach to national security. In her most

recent report, the OAG of Canada raised important concerns regarding the plans and

processes that would be applied within the proposed National Emergency Response System

(NERS), the key mechanism for integrating the stakeholders.[77] In particular and most

revealing were her observations regarding the vagueness and inconsistencies of the plans as

they pertain to integrating the various stakeholders across the different jurisdictions,

including the clear determination of who would take charge of an incident response.[78]

       Regardless, if problems exist in these early days of the NSP when political support is

high and the memories of 9/11 are still fresh, what are the underlying and seemingly

enduring impediments to achieving an effective environment of "win-win" collaboration?

What will be the impact on the long-term sustainment of the NSP?

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[77] OAG, *Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons for April 2005 – Chapter 2 – National Security in Canada,* April 2005, p. 20.
[78] Ibid, pp. 19-22.

PART 5 – ENDURING CHALLENGES

The predominant culture of the public service as well as the accountability framework in place does not provide an organizational environment that is conducive to extensive {sustainable} interdepartmental coordination and collaboration.[79]

Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the underlying impediments to effective e collaboration are deeply rooted in the structure of the federal government, the political process and human nature. Although many innovative initiatives have been undertaken to build the Integrated Security System, the inter-personal aspect necessary for long-term collaboration has been largely ignored. Perhaps the results of previous ad hoc Interdepartmental Task Forces have inadvertently hidden these problems. As a result of the nature of the circumstances, the participants bypassed the traditional impediments thereby enabling a temporary environment of effective collaboration. But the future of national security is unlikely to be temporary or simple. Consequently, unless deliberate efforts are made to reduce the erosive effects of the enduring impediments through greater effort on the people side of the equation, the successful implementation of the NSP objectives will be challenging, while the long-term sustainment may be doubtful.

Challenge #1: Divided Responsibilities – Primary Loyalties

People simply don't have a corporate view in the public service…The accountability frameworks do not create incentives to do this.[80]

The federal government is structured in such a way that it tends to undermine interdepartmental collaboration. While the GOC has come to rely increasingly on horizontal inter-departmental processes, it is still structured in vertical silos in which most people

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[79] Bakvis and Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge*, 2004, p. 52.
[80] Ibid, p. 56.

"…have a vertical mindset…"[81]. Most public servants spend the bulk of their career within a single department or agency, with the exception of the executives, who most likely had some experience in other departments and central agencies such as PCO. As a result, the majority of public servants in the federal government have limited understanding of the culture, responsibilities and capabilities of other federal partners. Furthermore, they will have a biased allegiance to the department or agency in which they've spent their careers, and where most of their work friends and networks reside. Finally, their future career progression will be largely determined by how they are assessed by others within their organization, even if they are currently assigned to an inter-departmental effort such as national security. Thus, it should not be surprising that their primary loyalty will be to their home department or agency, rather than to the collective efforts of a larger team of partners assigned to implement the NSP. The same dynamic is at play for the other participants from other levels of government and jurisdiction – it is simply a reflection of human nature.

For the politicians who become cabinet ministers, the challenge is different, but the result is similar. Ultimately, a cabinet minister must be loyal to the PM to retain his or her cabinet assignment, but they will be assessed by the PM in fundamentally different ways. The PM must take a "whole of Canada" view on how his government operates, particularly with respect to the impact on the voting public. A team approach is necessary to deal with most issues given the high degree of overlap and inter-dependence between federal departments and agencies. To avoid a "divide and conquer" situation form the opposition parties, the media or other critiques, the PM relies on cabinet solidarity and a legal firewall to accessing cabinet documents. As a result, cabinet deliberations and individual minister

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[81] Bourgault, *The Contemporary Role and Challenges of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada*, January 2003, p. 28.

inputs are completely opaque. Conversely, individual ministers remain accountable to Parliament for the performance of their individual departments. Not only must they respond to the relentless attacks from the opposition parties within full view of the media and public, they are subject to recurring examinations by the OAG as well as access to information requests. As a result, the minister's individual performance is highly transparent. Unfortunately, a problem within a given department reflects not only on the responsible minister, but also on the government as a whole. Thus, no matter how collegial or effective a minister is within the protected environment of cabinet, if they are unable to effectively handle the public scrutiny for their individual department they, become a liability to the PM.[82]

The result of this departmental accountability boils down to two counter-productive outcomes: risk aversion and short-term outlook. Although public servants at all level are presumed to be apolitical, the senior executive needs to be politically aware. If a department is to gain new resources or avoid further cuts, the minister must win cabinet support. However, if the same minister is struggling from attacks by the opposition or media, then they will loose credibility in cabinet given the negative impact on the government as a whole. But the opposition and media are constantly probing for issues to exploit and embellish, something they do through access to information requests in addition to other means such as testimonies to Parliamentary committees, leaks, or incidents that capture media attention. Consequently, the bureaucracy becomes risk averse in its actions and reactively issue-driven in its focus on priorities so as to avoid further embarrassment to the minister,[83] with subsequent reduction in cabinet support for ongoing and future departmental resource

[82] Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics*, 1999, pp. 47-59.
[83] Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain*, 2003, pp. 194-197.

requirements. The impact in inter-departmental situations is that participants will naturally

tend towards ensuring the welfare or their own organization before that of the team's

collective activity. They will shy away from taking "lead" responsibilities given the

possibility of their organization (and minister) bearing the scrutiny and blame for any failing

of the larger team. Once again, it is simply a reflection of human nature.

An interesting example of this mind-set was uncovered in a 1996 audit of DFAIT by

the OAG, with specific focus on peacekeeping operations, an inter-departmental effort

between the core partners of DFAIT and DND at the time. In trying to determine the

rationale for engaging in certain operations and comparing this with the actual results, the

OAG concluded that it would be quite useful to designate DFAIT as the lead department.[84]

Although this was only a notional recommendation, the idea was founded on an important

principle that is significant in a collaborative team endeavor. Regardless of the potential

benefits for an improved inter-departmental approach, DFAIT showed no interest stating that

they were "…concerned that by assuming the role of lead department for reporting, it would

be held accountable."[85] Apparently, the senior members of DFAIT completely dismissed the

idea without giving it any further thought, for in the follow-up audit two years later, the OAG

came to find that DFAIT had quietly ignored the lead role recommendation from the 1996

report without so much as even providing a reasoned explanation for this dismissal.[86]

Collective partnerships can indeed take a backseat to departmental requirements when the

interests of the latter may be in jeopardy.

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[84] OAG, Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons for May 1996 – Chapter 6 – Foreign Affairs and International Trade – Peacekeeping, May 1996, para. 6.122.
[85] Ibid, para. 6.41.
[86] OAG, *Volume 3 of 1998 Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons – Chapter 28 – Follow-up of Recommendations in Previous Reports: Peacekeeping*, December 1998, para 28.112.

In summary, the vertical structure of the federal government along with the accountability system in place will naturally result in impediments to an environment of inter-departmental/agency collaboration. Furthermore, a similar dynamic will be prevalent between participants from other levels of government and other jurisdictions – their primary loyalty will be to their "home" organization. While this can be bypassed in short-term situations as previously discussed, this phenomenon will be difficult to overcome for the NSP given the open-ended timeline and continuous change of participants that will occur. Consequently, given this enduring impediment it will be difficult to find a way to develop an environment of collaboration for the Integrated Security System over the long term, and as a result the NSP will fall short of achieving its full objectives.

> *...another inadequately appreciated general characteristic of systems lies in high resistance to policy changes. Perhaps as many as 98 percent of the policies in a system have little effect on its behavior because of the ability of the system to compensate for changes in most policies.[87]*

Challenge #2: From Reactive Governance to Long-Term Strategies

> *...central agencies tend to become an extension of the political leadership. This can only serve to shift their focus away from strategic policy and corporate management functions towards the partisan and personal interests of the political leadership which happens to be in office.[88]*

The remarkable discretionary power that has accrued to the position of PM in Canada has undermined the ability of the government bureaucracy to operate strategically. Savoie's in-depth analysis of the inner functioning of the Canadian government produced a convincing portrayal of the centralization of power in the central agencies over the last few decades, with

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[87] Jay W. Forrester, *System Dynamics and the Lessons of 35 Years*, April 29, 1991, p.27.
[88] Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics*, 1999, p. 336.

the PM's Office (PMO) being at the core of the control acting on behalf of the PM.[89]

However, this has not been the only change. As the "Centre" grew stronger, Parliament's

important role as the legislative authority diminished, due in part to party discipline, but also

to a lack of research staff and experience amongst Parliamentarians.[90] The end result has

been an imbalance in political power that has only served to provide the PM an incredibly

disproportionate amount of individual influence over government as a whole, particularly

when the PM's party controls a majority of the seats in the House of Commons.

Consequently, the priority interests of the PM outweigh all others in setting the government's

overall agenda. However, these interests can vary considerably from one PM to another,

particularly in the area of defence or foreign policy as highlighted by Legault in his *Report to*

the PM,[91] and detailed by Bashow in comparing the approaches taken by Prime Ministers

Trudeau, Mulroney and Chretien.[92]

For now, PM Martin is clearly committed to national security. Not only did he

broaden the security portfolio upon taking over as PM, he undertook a number of

comprehensive initiatives to pursue the vision put forth by his government in the NSP. His

"hands-on" approach to governance of this portfolio is reflected through the establishment of

the NSA, a position that serves to provide him with direct oversight and control. However,

there is no guarantee that such a prioritized focus on national security will last, leaving the

medium to long-term fate of the NSP in question. Other than the need to address US

concerns about the security of their border with Canada and the associated impact on trade,

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[89] Ibid, pp. 104-108.
[90] Douglas L. Bland, "Parliament's Duty to Defend Canada", *Canadian Military Journal,* Winter 2000-2001, pp. 41-42.
[91] Albert Legault, "Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces into the Twenty-First Century" in *Report to the PM*, 25 March 1997, p.5.
[92] Bashow, "Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Canada's Foreign and Defence Policy Linkage", *Canadian Military Journal*, Spring 2000, pp. 18-21.

the broad definition of national security allows for wide discretion in interpretation, priority and continued resource allocations through the federal budget. Past trends should serve as future indicators. As noted by Bashow in reviewing the actions of recent governments, "…a disturbing inconsistency – in concept and in application – appears to have developed."[93] The problem is that such uncertainty tends to undermine anything other than short-term commitments to collective efforts. As noted by Williams,

> *…the allocation of resources is through departments and not programs, and notwithstanding horizontal coordination, each department must stand accountable for its own performance.[94]*

As a result, the federal partners involved in implementing the NSP will be restrained in the resources and personnel they contribute to such inter-departmental activities, so as to ensure their primary mandates are not unduly affected. Given the lead role of the GOC in national security, it is quite likely that the provincial, territorial and municipal partners will follow suit. This then lends itself to the question as to whether the initiatives taken to date by the Martin government will be sufficient to ensure that the current emphasis on national security remains beyond a future change in PM? Certainly the publication of the NSP not only gives a written document to which the current government can be held to account, but provides a point of reference by which parliament, the media and the Canadian public at large can measure the commitment of future governments in this domain. In fact, a strategic policy was considered by SCONSAD as the key foundation upon which national security

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[93] Ibid, p.17.
[94] R. Williams, *A Measure of Realism: Why Canada does not need a National Security Council*, NSSC 3 Research Paper, 2001, pp. 12-13.

must be built as indicated by its criticism towards the government prior to the publication of the NSP in April 2004.[95]

However, the NSP as it stands is insufficient in detail to ensure sufficient long-term insulation from large variances in Prime-Ministerial discretion. Such continuity requires something more tangible by way of specific designation of lead responsibilities, objectives, timelines, and resource commitments. Furthermore, the NSP needs to be supported by a baseline glossary of key definitions to ensure a more coherent understanding amongst participants while restricting any attempts at creative interpretation in favor of parochial interests. As pointed out by Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald, the subjective interpretation of a DM, "…lacking in detailed analysis from first principles, but driven more by certain concepts…", can have an organizational-wide influence on the work done by the remainder of the line and staff public servants working within a given department.[96] Furthermore, they contend that such precision of language is necessary to permit a meaningful comparison with our allies on common security commitments, a particularly important point in light of Canada's increasingly integrated approach to continental security with our American allies.[97]

The other essential element to strengthening longer-term continuity of plans and the necessary participant commitments is an in-depth, transparent, and recurring review of the detailed NSP objectives by Parliament, in addition to the limited audit function currently provided by the OAG. This is nothing new, the idea having been suggested repeatedly by different committees, academics and think tanks since a Special Joint Committee proposed it

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[95] SCONSAD, *Canadian Security Guide Book 2005 Edition – An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions*, Ottawa, Dec 2004, p. 93.
[96] Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald, *A National Security Framework for Canada*, Oct 2002, p. 12.
[97] Ibid, pp. 11-13.

back in 1994.[98] In particular, Bland makes compelling arguments for an enhanced role of

Parliament in a transparent, recurring and detailed review of such policies so as to keep

governments on track with their resource commitments and stated objectives.[99] Comparative

examples substantiate the importance of such a tighter planning, interpretation and

assessment framework. A final case in point is Canada's defence policy, which has often

been too imprecise to provide clear direction for a rational budget commitment. In fact,

Bland and Maloney conclude with dismay that "…White Papers {for defence} were more

promissory notes than concrete undertakings."[100] Upon critical review of the current

Defence policy that was written over a decade ago, it is obvious that it provides more of a

description of the key elements than precise definitions. Perhaps the NSP is destined for the

same outcome unless corrective measures are taken quickly. Although there would be no

guarantee these measures would solve all the problems, there is little doubt that they would

enable major improvements.

In summary, the significant discretionary power of the PM undermines the ability of

the government to operate strategically – priorities are based on political imperatives, and can

be altered or eliminated as easily as they can be created unless they are somehow

"institutionalized" within an Act of Parliament, or within a more tangible, assessable

commitment. While national security is likely to remain a central requirement that future

PMs cannot unnecessarily neglect, particularly on the core issue of border security with the

US, the current NSP is inadequate to result in anything other than short-term, limited

resource and personnel commitments by participants at all levels. Unless further measures

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[98] Parliament of Canada, *Security in a Changing World – Final Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy*, 1994, p. 57.
[99] Bland, "Parliament's Duty to Defend Canada," *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2000-2001.
[100] Bland and Maloney, "Chapter 6 Defence Policy for the World Order Era: The First Steps – Reconstitution and Transformation," 2004, p. 193.

are taken to tighten the framework of planning, contributions, objectives and transparent

review, it is quite unlikely that the NSP will receive complete support from its participants in

the short-term, or avoid the discretionary whims of future PMs in the long-term.

> *Without a coherent road map, programs get muddled in their planning and execution. Without a policy, it is all but impossible to evaluate whether programs are meeting the government's goals.[101]*

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Although there are some who are in key positions of leadership and executive management (political governance, policy direction or supervision of implementation), the vast majority of the people supporting the broad mandate of the NSP have a more limited role. Most of those who are drawn into supporting the NSP are at the Assistant-Deputy Minister (ADM) level and below, and work primarily within their respective (vertical) organization with limited inter-departmental exposure, experience or understanding. Furthermore, most of these same people will be focused on either specific policy development or tactical line functions (ie. first responders). Finally, some of these people may work more in an integrated environment such as those assigned to functional roles within the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre at the strategic level, or the various operations centers (ie. Maritime Operations Centres on east and west coasts, along with provincial/territorial Emergency Operations Centres).

Thus, despite varying degrees of interaction with other partners in the "whole of Canada" security team, few of participants in the Integrated Security System have a comprehensive view of the entire system. Nor should this be expected; their focus is on their area of concern and their local environment. People working at the higher levels such as at the DM or Minsterial level, or those in charge of an integrated intelligence or operations center, will benefit from a much better understanding of the entire system, but will lack a detailed understanding of the particulars of the system, such as local procedures and arrangements. As previously discussed, people will be affected by their respective organizational cultures, and will have a biased perspective on matters. As a result, these vertical and horizontal misunderstandings will naturally lead to differences in opinion, friction and potentially a breakdown in cooperation.

Fortunately, unlike the previous enduring impediments, this problem can be overcome to a large degree through education, training and familiarization. As noted very recently by the OAG, "…the regular testing and exercising of response plan is critical to their effectiveness."[103] Although it would be useful if all participants could increase their level of understanding in the vertical and horizontal domains, the primary focus needs to be those folks working in key nodes that are involved in the decision loop. In particular, the people who are in positions of decision responsibility at all levels (ie. on-scene commander at tactical level or PM at the strategic level), as well as those working in integrated centers charged with analyzing, synthesizing and advising the decision-makers (ie. people working in a Provincial Emergency Operations Centre). The primary focus for these and other participants in the NSP is to undertake regular exercises that serve to test their readiness while also improving on their knowledge, confidence and effectiveness. Unfortunately, although this was the intent when the NSP was published,[104] it seems that exercises and evaluations have not been given a high priority to date. In particular, exercises at the strategic end of the spectrum have been less than stellar. While Canada did participate in the recent US-led TOPOFF III exercise (called "Triple Play" in Canada), it only undertook a limited role in the previous iterations of the exercise in the preceding years.

Another aspect of reducing the asymmetry of understanding would be derived from education and experience working in other departments, agencies and jurisdictions. While the focus needs to be on those at the operational and strategic levels of the decision loop, it would be a wise investment to provide some opportunities to others at lower levels of seniority. Courses could be given on the NSP and its implementation, either sponsored by

[103] OAG, *Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons for April 2005 – Chapter 2 – National Security in Canada,* April 2005, p. 34.
[104] PCO, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 27 April 2004, p. ix.

PSPEC through their new National Exercise Division, through the Canada School of Public Service or through other qualified organizations. This would give participants the dual benefit of not only increasing their understanding of the Integrated security system, but also the opportunity to network with other people who are involved from other organizations. The CF-sponsored National Strategic Studies Course (NSSC) would be an ideal venue to include junior executives from other departments and agencies to discuss national security in depth while undertaking exercises to put it in practice. Similarly, feedback lessons on recent exercises or real-life occurrences could serve to provide contemporary material to enrich the collective understanding of the NSP and fuel more in-depth discussions.

Finally, although secondments and exchange positions have long existed between departments, agencies and beyond, they have tended to be rather limited and underused. The exception is clearly that of the broadening that junior executives in the Public Service now receive, as a means to develop them for more senior responsibilities up to the DM level. The CF has been involved in this for years as well. Such secondments and exchanges have a dual use: they broaden the perspective of the individual working temporarily in a new organization, but these arrangements can also provide new perspectives to the organization receiving the individual. Along these lines, Lannan makes a good argument for creating a permanent cadre of liaison positions directly related to national security within key nodes. In his view, such a team would develop the necessary understanding and all-important working relationships that would serve to overcome the problems normally found in crisis response situations.[105]

In any event, the important point in all these suggestions is to raise the level of common understanding amongst participants in the national security processes. If

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[105] Lannan, p. 53.

supplemented by a baseline of common, well-defined terminology and a plan which provides greater specificity of objectives, responsibilities and so on, there is definite room for improvement over what is otherwise likely to occur for the NSP if nothing is done to develop an environment conducive to collaboration. Interestingly enough, these lessons are similar to those applicable to a collection of countries coming together as a multi-national force to undertake a given mission. As was explained elsewhere in a situation of military aircrew working together on a multinational operation, a baseline level of understanding is significant in enabling an effective working relationship. Common doctrine supplemented by collective training and other exchanges go a long way in raising the level of understanding, refining the procedures for working together and building a collaborative, team environment.[106]

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[106] G.C.P. Matte, *Improving Aircrew Interoperability in Coalition Warfare – Examining the Human Dimension of the Air Power Equation*, AMSC 7 Seminar Paper, November 2004, pp. 14-22.

PART 6 – CONCLUSION

…playing politics means pretending to take care of business while managing to reconcile the statement of the Government, your minister, the central agencies, and your departmental mission; you patch everything together so that it looks like it is all working…[107]

As stated at the outset of this discussion paper, the publication of Canada's first National Security Policy in April 2004 was a bold statement that articulated a commitment to a broad array of security concerns. Although the Government of Canada has undertaken a number of major initiatives within the framework of an integrated security system, it seems to be focused more on building structure than enabling effective working relations amongst the people involved. Collaboration is recognized as a fundamental element for success, yet only limited efforts have been made to develop an environment that would sustain it.

The NSP demands an interdependent effort amongst multiple partners across different jurisdictions and levels of government. To date, the success of key NSP initiatives have progressed well, but the honeymoon period of perceived political importance and critical vulnerability to threat may soon come to pass after which the true test of sustained collaboration will follow. This paper has argued that there remain enduring impediments in the federal government's structure and political process that will likely erode the existing collaborative environment, since "…[d]angers lurk where structural and jurisdictional weaknesses reside."[108]

However, the intent is not to end with a pessimistic outlook. Canada's interests in sustaining effective security measures through successive federal governments are not in

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[107] Bourgault, *The Contemporary Role and Challenges of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada*, January 2003, p. 112.
[108] Bland and Maloney, "Chapter 6 Defence Policy for the World Order Era: The First Steps – Reconstitution and Transformation," 2004, p. 200.

dispute. The primary elements of the NSP are good, and many valuable security initiatives

have been taken to help implement the integrated security system. If the analysis in this

paper is close to the truth, than solutions are within grasp. However, deliberate efforts must

be taken to reduce the subtle, but detrimental effects of these enduring impediments, and

focus much more on initiatives that will strengthen inter-personal relations, namely

developing greater common understanding amongst partners. The added support from a

more detailed planning framework, as well as a constructive assessment and adjustment

mechanism, would further reinforce an environment of effective collaboration. The outcome

would serve to assist in achieving the overall intent: a sustainable long-term "whole of

Canada" approach to national security and safety response.

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