The Media-Military Relationship

By

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ABSTRACT

There are many who contend that the relationship between the military and media collapsed during the Viet Nam War. Some veterans from this war still believe that this war was lost in the media. However, one only has to look back through history before and after Viet Nam to conclude that the there has always been some animosity between these two institutions. For example, even if we just look back as recent as the early 90's we can reflect on CNN providing its viewers with real time satellite footage coverage of military operations during the first Gulf War, and there was a perception that the military and media had worked out any past differences, however that was far from the truth, there were many concerns by the strategic leaders on the information being reported by the media. Some of these concerns will be addressed in this paper. The public has grown accustomed to real-time reporting on military operations and demand they receive this information in the future. This research will argue that the US media has a significant impact on conflict management at the strategic and tactical level regardless of whether it is a crisis, conflict, humanitarian assistance, or low intensity conflict. The aim of this paper is to explore the nature and the cause of the hostility between these two institutions, and address potential approaches to increase the likelihood of them operating together in future conflicts. In addressing these areas, the paper will first examine the link between war and people and then address the hostility between the military and the media. Secondly, this research will examine the following key areas: the "CNN Effect" on the public; public information and the media environment; historical military-media challenges; and embedding reporters during operations.

Introduction

The tension between the media and the military has been documented throughout history. Some have attributed this to the different cultures; others have concluded the two institutions are often at odds because of suspicion and distrust for one another. There is no argument that one needs the other to survive, it is a question of how both can co-exist while informing the public of accurate information, without comprising security for the military. Just looking back at a recent conflict, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it is clear that as part of the strategic planning the Department of Defense (DoD) developed an embedded media program that planned for large numbers of embedded reporters throughout military units. Unlike conflicts dating back to the Vietnam War, in OIF it was part of the initial plan to have journalists operating with units and reporting back to the United States (US) without censorship to feed the insatiable appetite for instantaneously minute by minute awareness of what was going on in Iraq. It has been argued by many journalists, politicians, analysts, and others that in some cases the media information made it on the air before the military could report it through its strategic command channels. [1] There is still a lot of debate on whether embedding the media in Iraq was successful or not, some opinions will be addressed later in this paper. This research will argue that the US media has a significant impact on conflict management at the strategic and tactical level regardless of whether it is a crisis, conflict, humanitarian assistance, or low intensity conflict. The aim of this paper is to explore the nature and the cause of the hostility between these two institutions, and address potential approaches

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[1] Dr. Michael Pasquarett, "Reporters on the Ground: The Military and the Media's Joint Experience During Operation Iraqi Freedom," *Center for Strategic Leadership* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, October 2003), 1-4.

to increase the likelihood of them operating together in future conflicts.   In addressing

these areas, the paper will first examine the link between war and people and then address

the hostility between the military and the media. Secondly, this research will examine the

following key areas: the "CNN Effect" (how the media presence influenced the actions

or behavior of US leadership); public information and the media environment (discuss

situations which may have caused the military not to embrace the media); historical

military-media challenges; and embedding reporters during operations.

War and People

The tools of war have grown over centuries, more sophisticated and complex, yet

there are core consistencies that are central to military-press relationships: the human

element, the government and the military. From a strategic perspective war and people

are intricately linked.

> Suddenly war became the business of the people – a people of thirty millions, all
> of who considered themselves to be citizens . . . The people became a participant
> in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the
> nation was thrown into the balance. The resources and efforts now available for
> use surpassed all conventional limits; nothing now impeded the vigor with which
> war could be waged. . .[2]

At the end of establishing his political framework for conducting war, Carl Von

Clausewitz, developed his famous trinity theory that consisted of: the people, the

military, and the government.   He believed that no victory could be won with the

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[2] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton
University, 1976), 592.

disproportion among any these three dimensions. [3]   This Trinitarian ideology endures.

Clausewitz contends:

> These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. One task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets. [4]

It can be argued that these conclusions drawn by Clausewitz were based on his

observation of the wars di/05 Ri071h Revoles betweFranceiondtetores

campaigns fought in 1806, Germany launched a campaign to make the war a concern of the people. She mobilized over a million men without money or credit to fight against France.

Sun Tzu also appreciated the importance of the three dimensions comprising Clausewitz's political framework. He considered the mobilization of the population to support the war as a perquisite to success.

> By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life unto death without fear of mortal peril. . . When one treats the people with benevolence, justice and righteousness and reposes confidence in them, the army will be united in mind and all will be happy to serve their leaders. [8]

Media-Military Relationships: A Look Back

> While there is---or should be---a natural convergence of interests in providing to the public accurate information about our armed forces and what they do, there is at the same time an inherent clash of interests (especially acute when men are fighting and dying) between military leaders responsible for success in battle and for the lives of their commands, and a media intensely competitive in providing readers and viewers with quick and vivid "news" and opinions. [9]

For the purpose of this research the term media refers to a wide range of different types of reporting. The term refers to anyone involved in the production of news, written, or oral, presented by anchors, reporters, crews, producers etc.

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[8] Sun Tzu . The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) 64.

[9] General Andrew J. Goodpaster, (USA Ret), "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?," *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly* (Autumn 2002): 2

"The origin of the war correspondent, like the origin of any species, is shrouded

by imperfect history. We know it happened, we just don't know when and how." [10]

There have been writers on wars as long as there have been wars. In American history,

George Kendall is given the credit for one of the first professional war correspondent,

which started his career covering the Mexican War of 1846-48. According to the records

of Kendall, he along with other journalist used horseback messengers across the plains,

telegraphed messages and even utilized steamboat going up the rivers to get their stories

to Washington DC for printing, in many cases before any army report reached the

government. [11]   A few years later, during the Crimean War, 1854-56, a small group of

journalists from the London Times, Thomas Chenery and William Russell and the New

York Evening Post, Richard McCormick were given the first credit of reporting the

realities on the battlefield. History records that Russell had a significant impact on both

the war and the government. He reported on deplorable conditions of the troops, poor

supply systems, bad leadership and an extreme shortage of medical supplies and

facilities. His writings targeted military incompetence and questioned why the taxpayers

were funding the war. Before the war ended the military realized that Russell's reporting

had a dramatic affect on public opinion and these type of reporting could unseat the

government.   However, this type of war reporting sold copies and sensationalized

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[10] Brayton Harris, "Blue and Gray in Blacks and White: Newspapers in the Civil War " (War Correspondent): 1.

[11] Ibid, 1

conflicts. [12] Russell was blamed for the downfall of the British government and for the death due to poor health of the British Commander, Lord Raglan.

The adversarial relationship between the media and the military was somewhat repaired during World War I when the US military embedded reporters in their forces. These reporters where given uniforms and were put on the front lines with the soldiers, where they had unlimited access to the battlefield. There was one caveat on their presence; all reports going back to newspapers were censored. Because of the events going on in the world and the patriotic feeling of journalist, they accepted this way of reporting to stay on the battlefield. [13] In World War II the military continued to embed reporters on the battlefield in an even more relaxed atmosphere than in World I. "Instead of attempting to stifle bad news, the services (especially the Army) succeeded in releasing enough information to keep the press reasonably satisfied." [14] By most accounts World War II represented a new point of reference in military-media relations. it was a war that covered such a vast part of the world and it was a war that relied on democracy to present a common front. Even though censorship measures were imposed the military and media worked together to paint the tapestry of the battlefield. Moreover, there are many who contend that World War II was the age of unlimited reporting.

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[12] Lieutenant Colonel J. R. D. Gervais, "The Media and the Conduct of War." The Changing Face of War: Learning from History, edited by Allan English, Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998: 255-271.

[13] Gregory M. Hannan, "The Military and the Media: An Historical and Cultural Examination" (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: *Air Force Institute of Technology*, 1998): 6.

[14] Ibid: 8.

This style of reporting ended when the Korean War began. Many journalists made no attempt to embed themselves with the services; they arranged their own ways to get into country and just started showing up on the battlefields with cameras. Initially, this was very effective for the military and the media during the first year of the war however, after the Chinese entered the war and the journalist started reporting negative articles about the US execution of the war, censorship was imposed by the leadership. This type of military-media hostile relationship continued on and off through the Viet Nam War as well.

The military established daily briefings to inform the journalist of the situations on the front lines in Viet Nam; however, after some journalist ventured out in the field they drew their own conclusions that generally did not coincide with what was being fed to them during the daily briefs. For example, the presiding Commander In Chief, President Johnson was frequently on the news telling the American public that the South Vietnamese people had control of their country and the US was basically there to support their efforts. The news media totally disagreed with the President's assessment and this difference led to a growing credibility gap between the media and the government (the military being apart of the government). [15] Because of technology and the lack of complete censorship, reporters were free to go all over the battlefield and report what they said they saw first hand. This information was reported in many cases as "live" information and the American public saw this as the "real truth", which had a tremendous effect on the public opinion of the war. The pressure put on the military leadership to take control of the flow of information coming out of Vietnam only exacerbated the

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[15] William N. Nagy, Department of Defense Combat Coverage Principles: Will They Serve Us in the Future? (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1995), p. 15.

strained relations between the two institutions. This experience has been categorized as one of the primary times in the 1900's that the news media and the military considered themselves as enemies of one another. There are many military personnel who participated in Vietnam who still regard the media as the source who lost the war for the US in Vietnam. What did the military learn from the Vietnam experience? They learned they needed the support of the American people to fight and win a war, however they did not learn that they could not tightly control the press.

During the 1983 invasion of Grenada, the Joint Task Force Commander, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf II, refused to allow any reporters on the ground in Grenada during the first several days of the operations. This infuriated some reporters who had been banished to a small island south of Barbados in the Caribbean. A few of them rented a small vessel and attempted to gain access to Grenada; however, they were intercepted by Navy vessels and not allowed on the island until Admiral Metcalf gave the approval. As a result of these differences between the media and the military, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey appointed a panel to study military-media relations. The recommendation from this panel was to establish what is known today as "press pools."   These pools were designed to furnish the media with early access to an operation.   [16] The first opportunity to test this paradigm was during the US invasion of Panama in 1989.

According to the media, their access in Panama was just as bad as Grenada. For fear of compromising the operations, the decisions were made by the government not to allow the press on the ground until operations were underway. This frustrated the

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[16] Brendan R. McLane. "Reporting from the Sandstorm: An Appraisal of Embedding." *PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly*, (Spring 2004): 3.

reporters because they missed the first hours of the operations and had to report to the American public information the military made available to them. Even with this delay this was the first time that CNN had the technology and capability to report a live crisis with real time information and action around the world. It was the beginning of the new military-media information age for the media. Former Joints Chief of Staff, General Colin Powell reflected on this moment and said, "This was a new, tough age for the military, fighting a war as it was being reported. We could not, in a country pledged to free expression, simply turn off the press. But we are going to have to find a way to live with this unprecedented situation." [17]

CNN Effect

The impact of the media and it effects has been named the "CNN effect", referring to the instantaneous availability of information, 24 hours a day all over the world. If there is access to satellite or cable in the area, you can be assured that someone is watching CNN news. Since its notoriety, the "CNN effect" has dominated debates across and around the globe. Journalists have the power to bring atrocities whether in the form of war or human suffering to the attention of an inquisive audience within hours of an occurrence.   Supporters of CNN images argue that the media drives conflict management by forcing western governments to intervene militarily in humanitarian crisis in some cases against their will. They support their argument by pointing out examples such as the decision former President George W. Bush made to send troops into

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[17] Colin Powell with Joseph E. Perisco, *My American Journey* (New York): Random House, 1995), 292.

Somalia in 1992. CNN was covering starving refugees and putting this in the heart and minds of the American public by broadcasting this over and over again. It is believed that this coverage across the screens of America gave the President the support he felt was necessary to send in the troops. Skeptics argue that the influence of the "CNN effect" is negligible; that a decision to launch a humanitarian intervention is ultimately decided by such factors as the government fear of seeing televised images of dead soldiers which may cause public support behind an intervention to collapse. [18] While continuing to look at Somalia during the Clinton administration in 1993, several soldiers were dragged through the street of Mogadishu, again continuous portrayal through the camera lens of CNN. There are many who believe that the impact of this media coverage caused the President to made the decision to pull the military out of Somalia.   However, Peter V. Jakobsen, author of Institute of Political Science, the University of Copenhagen argues through case studies analysis that "the American decision making process suggests that the televised pictures of the dead soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu merely affected the timing of the withdrawal." He contends the administration was already contemplating withdrawal when this incident occurred because of the 18 Rangers and Delta Force soldiers who were killed in the Battle of the Black Sea in the US Army's most intense close-quarters firefight since Vietnam. [19] In contrast, Colonel Margaret H. Belknap, an Academy Professor in the Department of Systems Engineering at the US Military Academy, a recognized scholar in the military community states, "The advent of real-time news coverage has led to immediate public

91   [18] Peter V. Jakobsen, "Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect," Journal ooCop3c87e an

awareness and scrutiny of strategic decisions and military operations as they unfold."

She contends this new military and media environment "has a profound effect on how

strategic leaders make their decisions and how warfighters direct their commands." [20]

To support her theory we only have to look at a US forces humanitarian relief effort such

as "Operation Provide Comfort" in northern Iraq. It was believed by many US officials

that the media created pressure on both military commanders and civilian officials to take

on new expanded missions once troops were on the ground. After the first Persian Gulf

War, the media remained in the region and started reporting the plight of the Kurds, and

wrongly or rightly – held the former President Bush responsible. "Several officials

identified incidents during humanitarian-relief operations in which they said inaccurate or

distorted media reports pressured them to shift attention and resources toward the "crisis"

portrayed by the media, away from more pressing problems."[21]   Accordingly to Andrew

Natsios an AID official, during the beginning of the operation, the media reported on a

meningitis epidemic in Kurdish camps and said the US disaster relief teams refused to

inoculate the population. Under great pressure from this report, the military started

inoculating everyone only to find out that the public health caretakers had recommended

only medicating children under five years of age. Because of the large-scale attention,

the real problem of cholera was not discovered in a timely manner. Changing the

direction of the effort and getting the media to support this through reporting took a

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[20] Margaret H. Belknap. "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?"
PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly (Autumn 2002): 100.

[21] Warren P. Strobel. Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace
Operations (Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 195

week. [22]   Similarly, in central Africa in 1994, media reports of cholera epidemic among Rwanda refugees in Goma, Zaire, meant, "efforts needed in the South and West were drawn away to the cameras. The lack of aid for locals while displaced refugees were fed and cared for increased the tensions and violence." [23]

History is replete with examples of the CNN factor even with US allies forces such as Great Britain. The deployment of British troops to Bosnia in 1992 represents a prime example of the media's role in influencing government policy. The media in the European theater bombarded the public with harrowing scenes of death and destruction in Bosnia ensuring that the headline read with such titles as: "Terror Reigns in Bosnia. Let no one claim he did not know." [24]   The operation in Bosnia was complex enough; it put an alliance overlay over a peacekeeping framework, which was carried out by a large number of contributing armed forces from a diverse group of countries. It is hard to determine who got it right, the media or the military or a combination of both. The media enthusiast have suggested that the media only had a little more than 30 seconds in some very highly complex and confused situations to unravel the threads and put it in a form that the public could digest. [25] They did not always get it right. Consequently, the British military Commanders deployed on operations found themselves more vulnerable to the pressures of the media, more than ever. Commanders felt that every action was

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[22] Natsios interview: "The Pentagon Chief's Fear: The Specter of Quagmire," US News & World Report (April 15, 1991): 31.

[23] Canadian Major D. M. Last and Done Vought, Interagency Cooperation in Peace Operations: A Conference Report (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, November 24, 1994)

[24] Paul Edwards, "The Military-Media Relationship – A Time to Redress the Balance?" Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (Oct 1998): 45.

[25] Ibid: 46

instantly screened back to millions of what they referred to as "armchair jurors", who judged them from a minute snapshot, depriving them of any real opportunity to defend their actions or decisions. [26]

Summing up, it can be argued the "CNN effect" has had some limited impact on Western interventions decisions, no doubt the Americans going into Central Africa, and the British going into Bosnia. However, in the American interventions such as Somalia, Rwanda and Northern Iraq during the early 90's were ultimately decided because the administrations expected few casualties and they had a clear exit strategy.

Public Information and the Media Environment

"By focusing the camera first on one crisis, then almost overnight on another, the media increasingly set the public agenda, and force politicians to deal with a constant flow of crisis and controversies." [27] One of the most important lessons of the Gulf War focused not on large tanks running all over the battlefield, or precision weapons being used, but on the impact of real time news coverage of military operations. [28] In an era of relentless, real time coverage, the media had an indelible impact on public opinion, arguably the critical center of gravity for any US military involvement whether it is a campaign, crisis or a humanitarian assistance mission. It is quite clear; the dynamics of media coverage had changed by the early 1990's. As a result, similar to the Vietnam era,

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[26] Ibid: 49

[27] Major Gary Pounder, USAF. "Opportunity Lost," AEROSPACE Power Journal, (Summer 2000): 61.

[28] Ibid: 61.

many military leaders strongly believed the power of instantaneous coverage and dramatic visual images threatened to undermine political and military efforts.

As the US conducted a build up for the war in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had to make an important decision on public policy. Knowing the war would be covered by radio, newspaper, magazines, and more prominently on the television, he was keenly aware how important it was to let America see what the soldiers, airmen, marines and sailors were doing in support of Iraqi Freedom. Secretary Rumsfeld in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Victoria Clarke, chose to again implement the embedded Media Program. (This program will be discussed further in this research). He understood that the media coverage of the war would shape public perception and have a tremendous effect on the future security environment of the US. Therefore the international media along with the many new American agencies had to have freedom of access to reporting. On 10 February 2003, he announced in a public affairs message that he wanted a factual story told about the forces in Iraq, whether good or bad. [29] The power of information cannot be over stated. Many can remember when the V Corps Commander during OIF, Lieutenant General William Wallace, was interviewed, he made a notable remark that "the enemy we're fighting is a bite different than the one we war-gamed against". This remark caused such a stir in the media, that the Whitehouse got personally involved, in defense of General Wallace. There was large fallout over what some have described as an innocuous comment

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[29] Secretary of Defense, "Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)," Washington, D. C. February 2003): 134.

expressing a General Officer frustration with events surrounding the beginning of the

war. [30] The US is not the only one who has experienced the power of information.

For example, with the start of "Operation Allied Force", during the Kosovo

crisis, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) realized early on that they had to

draw on their experience from the first Gulf War, and "Operations Desert Fox" against

Iraq in December 1998 in dealing with the media. To inform the public, they identified

some key requirements such as:

  * identifying a clear, simple and effective message

  * identifying/understand the target audiences

  * identifying the real needs of the media

  * having the right technology to get the information from the theatre of operation

  back to London

  * integrating media operations in the military campaign [31]

The media networks decided immediately after the collapse of the Rambouillet peace

talks that the operation would require wide spread international attention and it would

take all available resource to cover the crisis. This was in fact the first time that

European countries had taken part in a war since 1945. The consensus between the

media and the government was that "Milosevic could not defeat NATO in battle; his only

chance of success was in breaking Allied solidarity, and that could only come if Belgrade

won the media war." The goal of MOD's media operation was to grind away at

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[30] Dan Balz and Mike Allen, "CEO Bush Takes Over Management of Message, Media, and manipulation (New York: The Free Press, 2000), p. xv.

[31] Jonathan Eyal, "The Media and the Military: Continuing the Dialogue after Kosovo," Royal United Services Institute Journal, Vol. 145, Iss. 2 (April 2000): 37-44.

Milosevic's determination by persuading him that the British government, as part of the coalition would pursue the offensive until NATO objectives were met. [32]

There have been some reported experiences that did not occur during a conflict or crisis; however, undoubtedly they have had a chilling effect on the willingness of military personnel to engage the media candidly, incidents that some believe were not put in the proper context the first time. For example, in the spring of 1997, Lieutenant Kelly Flinn, United States Air Force (USAF) was court-martialed for adultery. This story to the surprise of the military leadership drew national media attention. The media portrayed this officer as a victim of what they referred to as an unfair military justice system. They further portrayed her as an officer serving her country being made an example of. The USAF initially ignored and disengaged themselves from having any dialogue with the media, thinking it would just blow over. It was several months after LT Flinn story was played-up in the media, an incident that seemed to never go away, and after Flinn appeared on numerous morning shows, several talk shows, etc before the USAF finally publicly addressed the issue. The former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald R. Fogleman finally came forward with a news announcement that the case against Flinn had not concentrated on adultery, it was because she had disobeyed a lawful order and lied to her superiors. [33] All of which the USAF and other services considered an act against good order and in violation of the uniformed code of military justice.

This historical insight provides a perspective on the public debate about the relationship between the government, the military and the media. This research will next

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[32] Ibid: 38.

[33] Lieutenant Colonel James K. Lovejoy, USA, Improving Media Relations," *Military Review* (January-February 2002): 50.

examine these two institutions from a cultural standpoint. The goal is to highlight both similarities and differences that strategic leaders might incorporate to improve their relations with the press.

Military-Media Challenges

The news media continues to be an un-popular with the military and politicians because the media has been send as groups that function without rules or regulations, unlike what is expected of political and military public servants. In all of the developed world, the media spans from magazines, national newspapers, TV networks, radio stations, newsletters, etc that have been used for centuries to gain public support while sometime exposing wrongs of both groups.   Journalists are notorious for highlighting a conflict or crisis in their story. Historically, conflict sells newspaper and the public likes to tune in to dramatic stories. The pressure to emphasize the drama, coupled with the constraints of the brief time or limited space available in which to tell the story, creates a challenge for the reporter. "In the first sentence or two, the story must tell, the who, what, where, when and how. Even this will be boiled down to the most newsworthy facts in order to hook the reader, listener or viewer into the rest of the story." It is easier to push conflict out in front in bad news than it is in good news, so reporters typically cover the negative side of an issue or event. [34] Newspapers, magazines, news broadcasting all look for the concept of conflict, seeking controversial documents and officials who can be urged into making meaty quotable statements. This is why they often react to techniques of aggressive questioning, pushing a microphone into a potential news makers

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[34]   United States Air Force Public Affairs Center of Excellence. "Meeting the Media" (2002): 7

face while asking loaded and leading questions…always looking for a sound bite. [35]

Conversely, the military looks at itself like a closed culture, which has been hostile to the media during many military operations, because the media is seen as an outsider. Military personnel at all grades pride themselves on working as a team and being very organized and deliberate while journalists are seen as independent and disorganized. The media want to tell their story and the military wants to fight and win battles, conflicts and wants to win the hearts and minds of those they are protecting, defending or liberating. History has clearly proven that there is an un-resolved division between the two professions. After the first Gulf War, Retired Marine Corp Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, succinctly said:

> ..a free press – one of the great virtues and elemental constituents of a democracy – is an institution wherein concentration of power is viewed as a danger. The press is a watchdog over institutions of power, be they military, political, economic, or social. Its job is to inform the people about the doings of their institutions. By its very nature, the press is skeptical and intrusive. As a result there will always be a divergence of interest between the media and the military. They are both essential to the well being of our nation is beyond question, but the problem of minimizing the natural friction between the two is a daunting one. [36]

Several examples follow from the past decade to illustrate why the military and media still remain on opposite ends of a continuum. During Desert Storm in the early 1990's, General Schwarzkopf stood in his command center and watched live news coverage of an artillery battle between the 82nd Airborne Division and the Iraqi troops. His amazement turned to shock when he heard the reporter name the unit for which he had selected to conduct this mission and feared that this information would divulge the unit's location to Iraq Intelligence. Additionally, he felt this information could expose

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[35] Ibid: 8

[36] Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor, "The Media and the Military – A Troubled Embrace," ed. Lloyd J. Mathews (Washington, D.C.: Brasseys, 1991), 122.

the coalition war plans, since the 82nd was already in a preassigned flanking position, just prior to the start of the ground war. [37] To the US forces good fortune, the Iraqis did not locate the division's position, but the incident illustrated the potential hazards of live battlefield coverage. This also supported the notion that the level of media attention can quickly shift from a strategic level down to a single tactical event. Similar conclusions were drawn after the Kosovo Campaign.

In April 1999, during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military campaign against Serbia, a USAF F-16 mistakenly attacked two civilian convoys near the Kosovo village of Djakovica, killing at least 12 refugees. NATO called a news conference in an attempt to provide the news media with an explanation of the mistake. This was an unsuccessful event, for a CNN reporter who was escorted by a Serbia official continued with his story and filed graphic reports from Djakovica, featuring gruesome images of burned and blooded corpses scattered among bombed-out vehicles. The vivid footages were flashed across every screen in America and seen around the world, particularly in Western Europe. [38]

Engaging the media early on to get out in front of a story involves some risk. Former 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division Commander Colonel Gregory Fontenot's conducted a mission brief to his soldier on the eve of his deployment to Bosnia. One of his embedded reporters from the Wall Street Journal attended this briefing and wrote a story the following day quoting Fontenot expressing his doubt that the mission would

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[37]   General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1997), 510.

[38]   Pounder: 57.

only last 12 months as declared by former President Clinton. Additionally, the reporter

said Fontenot warned his African American soldiers to be careful around Croatians

because they were racist. Within hours of this report the senior leadership was

admonishing Fontenot and he later received a letter of reprimand. [39]

During this same time frame, in a comment to the media Air Force Major General

Harold Campbell did not go un-noticed when he described former President Clinton as a

"dope smoking, skirt chasing . . .commander in chief." Also in 2002, while commanding

in Japan Navy Admiral Richard Macke also made a comment to the media after his

sailors were accused of raping a Japanese girl, that the sailors should have sought sex

from a prostitute. Needless to say, both of these General officers were forced to resign.

Again a few examples of how the media can influence strategic operations, and cause

political and/or disciplinary decisions.

Embedding Reporters – Is it Media Manipulation?

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military succeeded in leveraging the
media as part of its information Operations Campaign. The embedded Media
Program was both a propaganda tool for the strategic war effort and an
operational counter-propaganda asset. Propaganda is defined as any form of
communication to influence an intended audience via rational or emotional
arguments and personal opinion. [40]

The experimentation of embedding media support with the military dates back to

the Crimean War. In some of the earliest form of embedding, journalist wore uniforms

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[39] Lovejoy: 52.

[40] W.C. Garrison, "Information Operations and Counter-Propaganda: Making a Weapon of Public
Affairs," *Strategy Research Project* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 17 March 1999), 4-5.

and accompanied units with unlimited access to the battlefield. During World War I, countries like Great Britain, banned reporters completely in the war zone, where the US allowed them, however imposed mandatory censorship. As mentioned earlier, this proved not to be a problem through World II because the media basically had the same view of the war as the military, therefore the reporting tended to reflect the same ideas and the coverage lacked little or no criticism of the force. [41] The military enjoyed this age of war reporting, for this won the hearts and minds of the American public. However, by 1990-1991 during the first Gulf War the media was basically part of what was called large press pools. The media was very critical of this process and argued that the military restricted their access to direct reporting which they viewed was just another form of censorship. [42] The embedding process met the requirement of the government to keep the public informed; however, there are mixed reports from Desert Storm of the success of this initiative. Some argued that the media press pools and media embedment were forms of government and military manipulation. Robert E. Denton, Jr, a communications scholar, said in a book, he edited "The Media and the Persian Gulf War" "Orchestration requires coordination of efforts and actions designed to bolster public support. A campaign consists of multiple, coordinated events with a single focus. Vicarious audience participation is enhanced with carefully planned events as press conferences, panel discussions, and briefings that appear spontaneous." [43] Denton contends that the government effectively controlled the media during the Gulf War so they could project the messages they wanted to send around the world and used the

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[41] McLane: 79.

[42] Ibid: 80.

[43] Robert E. Denton, Jr., " The Media and the Persian Gulf War." Wesport, CT: Praeger, 1993: 53.

television as the medium for disinformation and propaganda. Many of the daily briefing

to journalists were believed to determine the priority and focus for the story of that day.

A survey of journalists who covered the war noted that the dramatic video of targeted

bombing became the lead story on the evening news rather than any informed battlefield

information or action. They went on to say that the Pentagon released so much trivial

information that the press could not keep up or digest the information in any useful way.

According to journalist interviewed, "such a tactic diverted attention from more sensitive

or media-initiated issues or stories." [44]   In the 1991 Television Quarterly, journalist

Patrick O'Heffernan said, that in the Gulf War, the form and content of the media

through the form of television became a " strategic tool of diplomacy, a determination of

troop and resource allocation, and an influence on national and international public

motivation. Thus, television became an essential weapon in the military's arsenal. [45]   A

report of the Gannett Foundation acknowledges and supports this idea that the military

was most successful in managing the media and the information they presented. An

editor, Everett Dennis said:

> The military supplied much of the news that came out of the gulf through
> briefings and videotapes, therefore what Americans saw on their screens (and
> television was the main source of gulf news for the vast majority of Americans)
> reflected the government's viewpoint . . . It is evident, not the least by its own
> admission, that the military used the press to promulgate its own policies as well
> as to spread disinformation to the Iraqis. [46]

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[44] John Pavlik, and Mark Thalhimer. "On Assignment: A Survey of Journalists Who Covered the War." In The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict, Everette Dennis et al., eds. (New York: Gannett Foundation Medical Center, 1991): 26-33.

[45] Patrick O'Heffernan. "Television and the Security of Nations: Learning from the Gulf War." *Television Quarterly* 25 (1991): 5-10.

[46] Everett, Dennis. "The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict." (New York: Gannett Foundation Media Center, 1991): 1-4.

Similarly, during the US intervention in Haiti in 1994, it was evident that the

media had the ability to change the course of a peace operation involving the military

even when it is under way.   In fact, in this operation the US officials took the most

proactive posture toward reporters, by opening military operations to coverage in an

unprecedented way. In Haiti, the cameras were directed toward military operations, and

the US news media descended on Haiti en masse. Compared to events that occurred in

Somalia the media interest in Haiti was centered on the political combat between former

President Clinton, and his powerful constituency. [47]   This was an operation for which

the media and the American public did not favor a military intervention. Initially, many

large newspapers such as the Washington Post and the New York Times actually

editorialized against Clinton sending troops into Haiti. [48]   Clinton and his senior aides

were keenly aware of the lack of deep public support for this operation, and turned their

efforts " to a time-honored tool to help explain what it was doing and built support ---the

news media."   As one official said a few days before U.S. troops landed: It's no secret

there's no great support for this mission coming from the American people, therefore the

keys to success is for the American people to understand the mission. He said this

cannot be done with smoke and mirrors, but only with full disclosure to the American

public. His interest and goal was to help reporters figure out how to tell the story. [49]

The news media was given unprecedented access to military plans and units, not just

during the invasion but many days to follow. This tactic was used by officials to get the

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[47] Strobel: 186.

[48] "Haiti: Concensus and Consent," Washington Post, September 14, 1994, A20; Congress Must Vote on Haiti," New York Times, September 13, 1994, A22.

[49] Senior State Department official quoted in Howard Kurtz, "Administration Acts to Soothe News Media," Washington Post, September 16, 1994, A30.

story in the living rooms of America, explain mission progress, and generate support for what the military was doing in Haiti. This strategy was helped immensely when ABS News chief national security correspondent John McWethy and his camera man was allowed to report and accompany a U. S. Army Special Operations unit on a mission. The correspondent was embedded with the unit that "landed outside the rural town of Miragoane, drove up to the local headquarters of the hated Haitian military, and took control of the town of 10,000, all the while attempting to keep the soldiers and people from exacting revenge on each other." According to McWethy, during the initial operation, "virtually every military unit had a reporter attached to it, outside the formal pool system." [50] However, this union did not have all positive outcomes.

There was an incident that occurred after the invasion in which the Haiti police viciously beat former Regime (Aristide) supporters. The US military witnessed this attack, but stood by and didn't get involved as several were beaten and one Haitian was killed. The media was present and covered not only the beatings, the death of a vendor, but U. S. soldiers who showed signs of frustration, because they had not yet received orders that would allow them to intervene in these types of situations. As this was aired on television, pressure from the media caused the administration to re-look the rules of engagement, and as a result, more troops were sent to Haiti. They were given orders to stop any further Haitian police brutality. [51] This seemed like a quick fix, but this did not end the tension between the administration's desire to avoid mission creep similar to what happen in Somalia, and the news media desire to report situations where they felt

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[50] Strobel: 87.

[51] Strobel: 190.

required more U. S. participation.   About ten days into the mission, several thousand Haitians marched in celebration of a military coup that ousted Aristide from power.   A group known as the Paramilitary force, attacked the crowd, and killed at least eight demonstrators. Again, the U. S. troops were in the vicinity but took no action. Needless to say this enraged the media and they demanded to know at a news conference held by the military and civilian spokesman, why the military didn't take any action on this attack. It was clear after this news conference that some action had to be taken. The civilian spokesman went on record saying the U. S. would not stand by and allow Haitians to be assaulted, killed or attacked.   As a result, three days later the U. S. forces "raided the headquarters of the main attaché organization, the front Revolutionnaire pour l'Avancement et le Progres d'Haiti (FRAPH), and carried out other searches for arms in a significantly more aggressive policy toward paramilitary groups." [52]   In sum, the news media pervasive presence in Haiti applied the necessary pressure on the Clinton administration to expand its operation and become more involved in the safety of the Haitian people.

Some critics characterized the United Kingdom cooperation between the media and government in Kosovo also as media manipulation. The media and the government, international agencies and Alliance governments collaborated early on to establish a rebuttal system in anticipation of Milosevic's media efforts, which was suspected to include allegations about massive loss of civilian life and property.   As a result of these agencies joint efforts, they set up "multi-layered media operation, which included a Media Planning Grid, and Overnight Media Summary, a daily Press Conference and

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[52] Strobel: 191.

Press Pack, and special web pages". There was no doubt that the government wanted to

address various audiences, including other nations of the Alliance, ethnic Albanians in

Kosovo, other Balkan nations and Milosevic regime in Belgrade. [53]   Again as mentioned

earlier this arrangement did not go over without some criticism, much like the US media,

some journalist felt that the government was trying to control the stories in the media

with a lot of formalized briefings with topics of their choosing.

What is known as the US modern form of embedding started in 1995 during the

peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. This system became prominent during Iraqi Freedom,

in which over 600 journalists initially participated in this program. In November 2002,

the military established an "Embed boot Camp", where the media was taught such things

as safety techniques, they were familiarized with direct fire, nuclear-biological-chemical

attacks, minefields, combat first aid, tactical marches, taught exercises in what to do if

caught captive, and a course in understanding the military language. The aim of this

training was to help the media understand the military and teach them some combat

survival skills. Andrew Jacobs of the New York Times after his training with the military

described it as "alternately enlightening, entertaining, horrifying, and physically

exhausting".   [54]   In making their initial postwar assessment, many high profile

journalists agreed embedding reporters was a success. NBC's Tim Russert thought it had

"worked extremely well" and said, when you looked at all the various slices together, you

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[53] Jonathan Eyal, "The media and the Military: Continuing the dialogue after Kosovo," Royal United Services Institute Journal, Vol. 145, Iss. 2 (April 2000): 37-44.

[54] Dennis: 81.

had a pretty close to complete picture." [55] Wolf Blitzer, who had headed CNN's war desk from Kuwait, called it a win for the public, the media, and the military. [56]

Presenting a particular different view of the media, in the book "Manufacturing Consent" Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman contend the US media actively frames issues and endorse news stories that serve the need and concerns of the elite [57] Both authors promote their theory through what is know as a "propaganda model". Even though the model does not necessarily address embedding the media it is important to understand the model as it relates to using the media as a means of propaganda. Chomsky and Herman argue that all strong stories in support of the elite are presented in the media through one of five filters. The first filter they believe that influence media is corporate ownership. The media is typically owned by large conglomerates, which are tied to the stock markets, therefore what is reported in the media is what the corporation wants the public to know. The second filter is advertisement. All forms of the media are tied to advertising in order to cover the costs of production. This purports that advertisement revenue comes from large corporations that ultimately influence what is in the publication. The third filter is sourcing of mass media news. Mass media are drawn into relationships with powerful sources of information because of economic necessity and reciprocity of interest. The media can cover everything so they tend to place their reporters where they expect major stories, in places such as, the Whitehouse, the Pentagon, on Wall Street, etc. The fourth filter is known as "flak", which described by

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[55] "Assessing the Media's Battle Plan for Coverage," Buffalo News, 18 April 2003.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Robert W. McChesney interview: "The Political Economy of the Mass Media," *Monthly Review* (January 1989): 1.

Chomsky and Herman as negative responses to media statements of TV or radio program. Large businesses frequently unite and form groups to counter negative media outputs, which is another form of control. The fifth and finally filter that Herman and Chomsky identified was anti-communism. This is a means to identify an enemy and promote his or her demise through the media. [58]

In summary, the criticisms of embedding reporters with military units during "Iraqi Freedom" centered around two themes. The first being what was called the "Stockholm Syndrome" (where it has been suggested that reporters work was influenced by their close relationship with their units). Reporters shared many physical hardships with their units and in many cases they were apart of the group. However, most of them have concluded this bond did not prevent them from being objective, or caused them to lose their impartiality. [59] The second significant criticism was that embeds failed to give a good accounting of the war. As argued earlier, this could have been a result of the government providing a daily brief which some felt was a mechanism to direct their focus. Both of these criticisms have merged into a greater question of whether the war made "good TV". Some media critics have argued that the quick action sequences from correspondents made viewers "too fascinated by the level of detail" and encouraged them to become "passive, follow-along tacticians." [60] Conversely, others have complained that within a week of the war the stories were overwhelming and confusing, causing

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[58] David Cromwell, "The Propaganda Model: An Overview," Excerpted from *Private Planet* (2002): 1-4.

[59] Two instances of reporters assisting gunners in targeting enemy Iraqis or fulfilling military tasks to help their units were recounted in David Zucchino, "After the War," Los Angeles Times, 3 May 2003, sec A, p. 1, and Scott Bernard Nelson, "Embedding Reporter Comes Away from the Front Lines Torn," *Boston Globe*, 22 April 2003.

[60] Nancy Franklin, "TV Goes to War," *The New Yorker*, 31 March 2003: 33.

many to avoid hearing the constant accounting of the war. [61] This research has revealed there is a need for future historical work that will focus on understanding and evaluating the embedded media system.

Recommendations:

After the invasion of Grenada Casper Weinberger appointed a commission to study and recommend solutions to improve the military-media relationship. He recognized that something had to be done to enable these two entities to work together on the battlefield, why? Because the administration was acutely aware that the media had a powerful effect on public opinion and what is viewed in the media has a tremendous effect on strategic decisions and policy making. In 1984, the panel reaffirmed the need for cooperation between the military and media and recommended the following outstanding measures:

* Incorporate public affairs planning in military operational planning;

* During military operational planning, when it is determined that the solution for media coverage is media pooling, then establish a large pool, minimize their time in this role before going to full coverage.

* The military should provide personnel and equipment, to include escort and transportation support for media personnel.

* Develop a program where the public affairs representatives meet news organizations' leadership on a reasonably regular basis to discuss mutual problems, including relationships with the media during military operations and exercises. [62]

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[61] Charles McGrath, "Bomb," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, 14 April 2003: 15.

Any Commander today that does not recognize that the media is absolutely

critical during the planning of any operation requires training. For example, before 1st

Armored Division deployed to Bosnia, former Commander Major General William (Bill)

Nash ensured his Division developed a plan to strategically work with the media. His

objective was to maintain the American's public's support, to influence the warring

factions to comply with the Dayton Accords, and to make the soldiers feel good about the

work they were about to do. To facilitate this media military cooperation he ensured his

public affairs officers were part of the planning process and they were very interactive

with the media. [63]

Frank Aukofer and retired US Navy, Vice Admiral, William P. Lawrence

conducted a joint study in 1994 for the military that focused on the military-media

relationship in conflict situations. The study was conducted under two fundamental

premises: one is that the First Amendment guarantees unfettered freedom of press for

Americans, and this applies to the military operations and all government institution:

second is that the military is dedicated to civilian authority and the forces are essential to

the preservation of freedom, security, and preservation of the Constitution. They also had

some great recommendations to alleviate differences between the military and the media

such as:

- The Department of Defense adopt an overall policy of "security at the

    source".   This would mean an end to field censorship of the media.

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[62] Major General Winant Sidle, " Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Media-Military Relations Panel."
(August 1984): 4-6.

[63] Lovejoy: 56.

- News media representatives recognize that only under extraordinary circumstances would the civilian or military leadership exercise some temporary censorship in the interest of security.

- Media and Military conduct a joint study to look at how rapid new technology affects security issues on the battlefield.

- Assign a flag or General Officer in the combat theater to coordinate the news media aspects of the operation under the commander of US military forces.

- Establish a joint office of Military-Media relations. This office would facilitate discussions of real-time battlefield reporting, and developing education and training programs for journalists and military men and women.

- News organizations start covering military operations at the local level such as with the National Guard, Reserves and ROTC units to get a better understanding of the military.

- Provide news media education as part of the Professional Military Education System, and allow news media personnel to attend courses at the National War College. [64]

Given the experience in Bosnia, Afghanistan, the Gulf War and, Iraq, pooling the media in its current format seems inappropriate for future low intensity conflicts, peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. As mentioned earlier, it doesn't matter where these operations occur in the future because the media has the technology to display whatever is happening on the ground to the world within minutes of its occurrence. The

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[64] Frank Aukofer and Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence, Ret, "American's Team: The Odd Couple – A report on the Relationship Between the media and the Military." (Nashville, Tennessee: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), 6-7.

military must therefore seize opportunities, however small they may be to projects its own view of the situation. To do this, commanders and the leadership at all levels must take a proactive media stance and have the right people with the right training in place to make this a success. There has to be cooperation rather than exclusion or coercion. Research leads to the inevitable conclusion that some form of education has to occur with the military and the media to expect any professional working relations in the future. Military professionals must educate themselves and their subordinates on the role of the media, and recognize their own strengths and weaknesses. One of the military's more apparent weaknesses includes its members' negative attitude toward the media. Conversely, a military strength includes high-quality personnel, its existing public affairs program, public interest, and most important, public respect. [65] One of the first military objectives should be to reverse the hostile attitude many military members have toward the media. This new attitude has to start at the highest level with the senior leader. They must not only engage the media themselves but also encourage their subordinates to do so. [66]

It can be argued that the military must re-examine both its doctrine and how they are operating now and reflect changes for the future. A relationship bridge with the media could mean providing transportation, security, food, accommodations, and privileged access to the military above and beyond what has been demonstrated in media embedding in Iraq. It appears that this technique was beneficial when the war first started in 2003; however there are commanders who argued that there appears to be a lack of interest with the media now that the conflicts is in its second year. Presently, in the daily

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[65] Public Opinion Survey. "The American Enterprise" (July/August 1999): 90.

[66] Lovejoy, USA,: 52.

US news, the war in Iraq is covered for approximately three to five minutes on the late evening television news, versus the beginning of the war when there was constant reporting.

Commanders must get to know the reporters covering their unit. The goal is to encourage a sense of professionalism and approach them in a manner that says there is a mutual expectation. They should not be afraid to let reporters know they do not expect favoritism, but fair treatment. When you do this, as a commander, you have to make yourself available so your side of the story can be told, even if it is a negative story. [67] Commanders and leaders should recognize just as they have to deal with unpleasant challenges in their operations, the reporters also have to deal with difficult situations of reporting the facts without emotions. General Collin Powell, (Retired), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, once noted: "the interviewee is the only one at risk in this duel. The media report only stupid or careless answers, not stupid or unfair questions." [68] Additionally, commanders and leaders must be aggressive in correcting a story that is portrayed incorrectly or out of context. If there is an established relationship between the two institutions the likelihood of the reporter correcting the story is much higher. If the media outlet refuses to reverse the story commanders or the unit public affairs officer should elevate the issue up through the media's chain of command. While this sounds easy in a garrison environment, this could prove quite challenging on the battlefield, which is why it is so important to have trained professional public affairs officer on site to work with the media. This will send a clear message to the reporters in an area that the

[67] "Meeting The Media," ed by the United States Air Force Public Affairs Center of Excellence. (College of Aerospace, Doctrine, Research and Education, 2002): 9.

[68] Ibid: 19.

leaders will take measures to correct a story, and hopefully this will foster a positive relationship for the future. The good reporters pride themselves on the accuracy of their stories.

There also has to be a relationship redesign with the military and the media. If the military is held to high standards, then the media should have standards imposed as well. Media should be accountable for those stories reported incorrectly, or in violation of unit security. Reporters should not just be embedded with a unit without some form of training on military operations and culture.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Despite the percolated disputes between the media and the military, leaders of each institution understand the importance of the other. Military and civilian leadership at the strategic level understand fully the first amendment rights of the people; however, the delivery of this information is where some form of mutual support and cooperation needs some work. Given the environment the media has created over the past four or five decades, military organizations must prepare how to deal with reporters. In today's world of events, anyone can be selected to be a military spokesman with very little warning, and the person selected should not be thrust before the camera unprepared. They must be aware of reporters' style and techniques, and they must understand how to react in situations in which they are confronted by the media. There are those who espouse turning the clock back in history and impose censorship as was often written about after World War I, and II and even in Grenada when the media was not allowed to come ashore in Grenada until three days after the invasion. With today's technology,

sophisticated communication systems and the capacity to report from anywhere in the world, the political and military leadership knows that censorship will never be imposed again. The strategic and tactical commanders have a duty to inform the public on what the military forces is doing, some of it will be positive and some will be negative actions, and the fact has to be accepted that the negative will get most of the press time. Having said that, a solution is accepting the fact that the military and the media will always be at odds, and what has to happen is to learn new ways to live harmoniously. In the age of fast information and instant coverage, secrecy has become increasingly difficult to sustain. If the military denies correspondents access to operational planning and execution, reporters will draw their own and possibly erroneous conclusions.

There are strong parallels between the opening weeks of the operation in Haiti and the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War. In both cases, a U. S. administration had, by its actions during the crisis accepted responsibility for the fate of civilians. Additionally, both incidents show cased the pressure the media could put on policymakers to take stronger action on behalf of civilians. This research has also revealed that whether the US is involved in a crisis, peacekeeping, or support of human rights, the media has a large effect on public opinion, and this will not change.

There is room for partnership development so the media will respect and work together with the military while not divulging information that will endanger the forces during an operation. On the other hand, the military has to reestablish a trust with the media that they will not try to withhold information and will address the good with the bad, because there will always be mistakes made by both institutions. It is apparent by this study that the news media has the ability to alter plans and complicate policy. It was

also pointed out that, the "CNN effect" does not result in a total loss of political control; however, it will influence the minds and will of the people, if the civilian and military leaders do not get out ahead of operations and missions and develop an information strategy. If the officials will not do this they can count on the media to do it for them. Secondly, there is also no doubt that a culture change is necessary and should be apart of the end state of this relationship between the military, government and the media.

As mentioned in the recommendations, this has to start with training. Military training has to start at the lowest level up through the ranks of enlisted and officers. The media is critical and should be apart of planning for major military operations, humanitarian assistance, crisis and operations other than war. While training alone will not alleviate all hostility, it is a start to understanding one another.

Over the past 20 years, the US has engaged independent organizations, individual panels; "gray beards" study groups, academic reviews, etc, to combat this adversarial relationship between these two institutions. They have discovered that there is no one or right answer, it is a combination of things that has to be on a continuum. A key factor of success would be to go back and start with the recommendations from the Sidle study and the Frank Aukofer and William Lawrence report. Both institutions must recognize there will be some frustrations along the way, but doesn't this exist in any part of our lives? The media must continue embedding operations with the military and they should also train together when practical. Again, come to terms with the fact that the tensions between the media and military are natural. Training and education will go a long way in easing some of the tension, but will never eliminate them. Nor should they be eliminated. The media are the eyes and ears of the American public and the military has a

responsibility to protect its nation while exercising sufficient security to protect the troops in harm's way, and strategic leaders are responsible for the security environment of the nation. Lastly, the secret to successful military-media relations is cooperation and using all the resources available. To ensure proper coverage of military operations, leaders must ensure they have the right military personnel who are professional and competent and they will not hesitate to utilize the public affairs branch community to interact and engage the media. The public affairs should be advising commanders and teaching soldiers alike what it takes to work with the media. Conversely, the media has to put their very best on the battlefield and work alongside the military in operations other that war. They can't be the reporter of the day who doesn't understand how the military operates and has no sense of the importance of security. The media should attempt to train with the military whenever possible and seize the opportunity to train and attend military institutions such as the War College or the Command and General Staff College, etc. Both institutions should be held to a higher standard.

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