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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE –
COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
National Security Studies Course 6

**Influencing Transformation: Military Leadership at the
Strategic Level**

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Abstract

The world is dynamic and ever changing. Advancing technology, diminishing natural resources, evolving state relationships and dissatisfaction with the status quo, mark the 21st Century as a time of increased complexity, and heightened ambiguity. The attack of 9/11, more than any other event in the 21st Century, signals a renewed emphasis on low-intensity, asymmetric warfare. Canada and the Canadian Forces (CF) must be able to adapt and respond. Effective strategic military leadership is vital to influencing the transformations the CF will likely need to make in the 21st Century. This paper argues that effective military strategic level leadership is more important than ever if the CF is to be successful in achieving transformations in a rapidly changing world. The focus of this paper is on military leadership within the CF; however, military/civilian interaction at the highest levels of DND is not ignored. In addition, the paper is primarily concerned with the transformation of combat capability during peacetime.

The challenges to transformation are numerous and many are deep rooted within DND. The human dynamic in transformation is key and, far too often, overlooked. The current practices are insufficient to overcome some of these challenges and there is a mistaken belief that change occurs automatically once announced. This paper demonstrates that current CF senior leaders need to transform their strategic approach to embrace the need for effective leadership. Beyond direct leadership skills and a strong suite of personal competencies, effective strategic level leadership emphasizes knowledge, vision, influence, commitment, and outcome. Without effective strategic leadership to guide the transformations that will inevitably be required, the CF risks not being relevant to Canadians in the future.

Influencing Transformation: Military Leadership at the Strategic Level

Nothing is more difficult to carry out than initiating a new order of things.

Machiavelli.

This paper discusses the importance of military strategic level leadership to successful transformation. Canadian Forces (CF) leaders must be prepared to undertake transformations to adapt to 21st Century challenges. Even though such an idea may sound straight forward, a Department of National Defence (DND) advisory committee report on efficiency, recently provided to the Minister, points to a very poor track record of strategic level change, including transformation, in the CF.¹ This should be cause for concern. Strategic leaders, and their supporting staff, who fail to understand their role in transformation are doomed to repeat the failures of their predecessors. Arguably, the CF will fail if it is incapable of providing Canadians with a military instrument that is prepared and, if necessary, transformed to meet the needs of the 21st Century.

The end of the Cold War brought the promise of greater world stability. Some idealists predicted that nations might enjoy the dividends of peace through harmonious and profitable global interaction. Undeniably, the threat of major world war receded. However, the world is far from harmonious – in fact, it is volatile, unpredictable and rapidly changing.² Extremism, dwindling natural resources, explosive population growth, advancing technology and asymmetric challenges to US military superiority, are but a handful of the many challenges that face the nations of the world, including Canada.

Against this backdrop Canada has foreign and domestic policy objectives requiring a meaningful military capacity to safeguard peace and security.

The CF must be poised to transform to meet future challenges. This is not to deny that certain aspects of the CF should be changed gradually or, indeed, left alone. But in the case where transformation is warranted, effective strategic level leadership will be pivotal. Last organized and armed to operate in the Cold War, the CF must now complete its transformation into a 21st Century military force. In this regard, one example is the decision to retire the Leopard tank. What is the point of having tanks if there is neither the political will, nor the ability to deploy and sustain them outside of Canada? Tanks served the CF well, positioned forward in Germany during the Cold War. However, they are unlikely to be the optimal weapon for tomorrow if they are never permitted to leave the Wainwright training area in Canada. The bold step of retiring the Leopards, and introducing a less capable and heavily armoured direct fire system will significantly alter Army doctrine. Directing adaptation, such as the one noted above, is a key task for strategic military leaders. In this case, both the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) and the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) made a difficult decision about the Army future direct fire requirement. Influencing others to accept such a significant shift has been no small feat. Are there other transformations that the CF might undertake to maximize its usefulness?

This paper argues that effective military strategic level leadership is more important than ever if the CF is to be successful in achieving transformations in a rapidly changing world. The focus of this paper is on military leadership within the CF; however, military/civilian interaction at the h

peacetime. Divided into four major sections, the paper begins with a background section to define and characterize both transformation and strategic level leadership. The second section reveals the increasing potential for transformation as the CF enters the 21st Century. By examining current global trends, the future security environment and their impact on Canada, it is clear that adaptability will need to be the hallmark of the CF. The third section highlights the challenges associated with military transformation. In doing so the vital role of the effective strategic level leader will become evident. In general, the current approach by CF strategic leaders is insufficient. A more effective approach is essential. In this vein, the last section will show how effective leadership can address the highlighted challenges.

Background

What is Transformation?

Transformation describes a change in concept, organization, process, technology application and/or equipment through which significant gains in operational effectiveness, operating efficiencies and/or cost reductions are achieved.³ Innovation, like transformation, also describes change that results in a significant gain. Stephen Rosen in *Winning the Next War* believes that innovation must include the creation of a new combat arm, or a change to the way a primary combat arm fights. It is his view that change to the formal doctrine of a military organization, which leaves the essential workings of the organization unaltered, does not represent innovation.⁴ Jeffrey Isaacson and his co-authors in *Predicting Military Innovation* define military innovation as “new war fighting concepts and / or new means of integrating technology ... [where the] new

means of integrating technology might include revised doctrine, tactics, training, or support.”⁵ In short, transformation is change that results in significant gain.

These definitions mesh well with the views of senior military leaders in both Canada and the US. General Ray Henault, the CDS, in articulating his vision of the future firmly states that, “We cannot and will not pursue a transformation agenda by “tinkering” at the margins in new capabilities without reducing or eliminating those that are no longer relevant in the current and future strategic environment.”⁶ Besides being significant, transformation, in a CF context, includes the elimination of a current capability and/or function to realize the gain. From a US perspective, both General (retired) G.R. Sullivan, Chief Of Staff (COS) US Army at the conclusion of the Cold War, and Major General D Deptula, United States Air Force (USAF), view transformation as the introduction of significant, or fundamental change that creates a different organization.⁷

Significant change is nothing new to armed forces. History is replete with numerous examples that help characterize the momentous nature of transformation. For example, the French Revolution witnessed the sudden growth of armies from thousands to hundreds of thousands. The accompanying tactical innovations meant that swarms of highly trained skirmishers - deployed in small assault columns-in-line reinforced by powerful bombardment - replaced cumbersome and massive columns.⁸ Such an incredible transformation forced France’s foes to either adapt, or prepare for defeat. One such foe, the Prussian Army, was thoroughly defeated. Gordon Craig in *Politics in the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*, chastises the Prussians for displaying, “an inflexible conservatism that worked against efficiency and effectiveness, and a stubborn reluctance

to admit that the practices of warfare may have changed.”⁹ Surely no modern leader wants to be subsumed by similar complacency.

World War II provides another startling example of military transformation where military planners, with the assistance of industrial authorities, transformed war to include large segments of the civilian population. By introducing aircraft delivered bombs, and self propelled rockets, “... [with] the proper mix of ordnance-high explosives to blast open doors and windows and break up buildings into kindling, [and] incendiaries to set the wreckage alight ... the result was a firestorm, a raging inferno that might level ten or fifteen square miles of city, and kill fifty or a hundred thousand people.”¹⁰ War was no longer limited to remote battlefields and the distinction between combatant and non-combatant became blurred.

Both these examples endeavor to demonstrate how sweeping transformation can be. History bears testament to the fact that armed forces have always had to adapt to the challenges of their era. As Williamson Murray, a noted US military historian points out, “Like their human masters, organizations that don’t change die.”¹¹ Without effective leadership, the potential to repeat the mistake of the 17th Century Prussian Army remains a possibility.

What is Strategic Level Leadership?

The assertion that all military leaders - from the tactical up to the strategic level - face many of the same challenges is undeniable. From the CDS, his key staff such as the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS), and the environmental chiefs at the strategic level, to unit Commanding Officers (COs), and below, all leaders are responsible for

accomplishing assigned missions using our best resource - people! There are, however, some unique differences.

Firstly, the responsibility, authority, and complexity facing a strategic level leader, like the CDS, are different from those facing a CO. One leads over 60,000 personnel while the other has a few hundred subordinates. The CDS has significant input into a multi-billion dollar portfolio whereas a CO is normally responsible for a budget of less than \$100M. Interaction with other government departments, politicians, and ultimately the head of state is more pronounced at the strategic level. Additionally, strategic leadership involves the collaboration of several senior executives. For example, the CDS must work closely with the Deputy Minister (DM), several Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADMs) and his direct military reports, to establish coherent direction for the CF as well as various policy options for political consideration. The CDS and his key staff establish goals and broad direction that will impact the CF in the decades ahead, while the operational and tactical leaders have a more immediate focus. Beyond reacting to the problems of today, the CDS must make difficult decisions about future capabilities required, and the resulting force structure and resource allocations. Even though the strategic level leader has the most power, the greatest access to information and the most latitude for action of any level,¹² his job is more complex and, ultimately, more difficult than at lower levels.

A second notable difference is the indirect nature of leadership at higher levels. For example, at the formation level, such as a Land Force Area Headquarters (LFA HQ), 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) HQ, or Maritime Atlantic (MARLANT) HQ, we depend on leaders for, “the indirect facilitation of task accomplishment at the direct level,

through policies, procedures, resource tailoring, and uncertainty reduction.”¹³ This level translates the direction and plans from the strategic level by issuing coherent plans for implementation at the lowest levels. The operational level can have direct contact with the tactical level on a routine, but not necessarily a continuous basis. Contrast this with a CO who maintains constant and direct contact with the majority of his subordinates. Technical competence and interpersonal-communicative skills are of paramount importance to the tactical level leader.¹⁴

In the main, a strategic level leader can’t directly lead the entire force. It is inconceivable that the CDS could have direct contact with over 60,000 people on a regular basis. He must, therefore, lead through other individuals and groups. In addition, he must formulate his plans collaboratively with the DM and other senior government officials. The CDS will have constant contact with his key subordinates and close colleagues, so his direct leadership skills must be sharp. However, his indirect leadership skills must be even sharper. Internal to the CF, he must be able to influence the tactical level through his key staff and operational level commanders. This is tremendously important in terms of transformation. Generally speaking, subordinates prefer to receive information about major change from their supervisor, and not directly from the top leaders, or some glossy pamphlet.¹⁵ Presumably, this is because individuals want to gauge their direct supervisors’ impression of the proposed transformation before committing to it. In order for a military force to share a common vision of future, be willing to initiate transformation, and to “... overcome the subtle forces of risk aversion, desire for predictability, and comfort with simplicity,”¹⁶ the strategic level leader must account for this indirect manner of his influence.

How does a leader effectively address these unique challenges at the strategic level? Unfortunately, there are no definitive prescriptions on what constitutes effective leadership. While the allure of a simple flowchart to guide leaders may appeal to any scientific mind, the truth is that politics, war, and human nature are not conducive to rational analysis. Leadership is an art, and not a science of hard and fast rules. Even using current leadership models may be a bit of a stretch. Some question their applicability for the 21st Century. The nub of their argument, against current models, is that they fail to account for the significantly increasing level of complexity military leaders must face.¹⁷ The models are insufficient because they can't account for leaders who must now function in an environment characterized by internal tensions, contradictory demands, and multifaceted responsibilities on a scale never before seen. For example, leaders are now bombarded with too much information. Advancing technology has provided the means to overwhelm leaders with many conflicting and often competing details. Also, it is now possible for military forces to conduct operations across the full spectrum of conflict, all in the one day. Against this backdrop, how does the strategic leader cope with such complexity? Even though the current models are perhaps deficient, we do not need to throw up our arms in surrender! If a detailed strategic level leadership model is “a bridge to far,” some sense of what makes leadership effective, at this level, should still be possible.

When asked to define leadership one might respond by saying, “leadership is the art of influencing others to accomplish the mission in accordance with the intent of the leader.” The emphasis on influence seems critical. In accomplishing the mission, influence is perhaps best thought of as a connection that raises the level of motivation and

morality in both a leader and a follower.¹⁸ While the above definition serves us well at the lower levels in the CF, is there a little more to leadership at the strategic level? What about management? Does management take on a more pronounced role at the strategic level? How are management and leadership linked?

Some might be inclined to use the terms manager and leader interchangeably. Is there really a significant difference between the two? For some there is. John Kotter, an accomplished professor of leadership at the Harvard Business School, suggests that leadership is about coping with change, while managing is about coping with complexity. It is his contention that leadership complements management; it doesn't replace it.¹⁹ Management is a critical feature of any organization including the military.²⁰ Figure 1 demonstrates, in a simple manner, the distinction between leadership and management.




Figure 1. Management vs. Leadership²¹

The management process of planning (goals and means to achieve them), controlling (monitoring and correcting ongoing activities to facilitate goal achievement), organizing (how best to group activities and resources) and motivating, seeks to focus the effort of an organization towards a common goal.²² Motivating followers to accept organizational goals is where management and leadership meet. Dr Robert Murphy, a professor of management at the US Army War College Leavenworth (USAWC), explains that the fundamental difference between a strategic manager and leader is that the leader must do everything a strategic manager does, but “will also find ways to influence people to internalize plans, policies, and procedures.”²³ Influencing individuals, and groups gets to the core of the strategic leadership challenge. It certainly complements the emphasis on influence from our simple leadership definition presented earlier. But is it enough?

Karol Wenek, in research work for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI), argues that our simple definition, tied exclusively to influence and outcome, is insufficient. It fails to account for the responsibility leaders have to ensure that their actions are ethical, and account for follower well being. Wenek proposes that effective CF leadership be defined as “directing, motivating, and enabling others to accomplish the mission ethically and professionally, while working to improve the CF as an organization.”²⁴ This definition is helpful as it reminds us, explicitly, that leadership is not about achieving the mission at any cost. That said, Wenek’s definition includes an emphasis on influence and outcome.

From the US Army War College comes a well thought out definition of strategic leadership – “the process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources,

directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats.”²⁵ This definition characterizes the indirect nature of strategic level leadership. It is particularly useful because it builds upon outcome and influence. It introduces the ideas of vision, commitment and consensus. Commitment, or buy-in from others is derived, in part, from influencing and, if necessary, changing the organizational culture.

Implicit, in this definition is the fact that knowledge is a critical element of successful strategic leadership. Coping with the global environment and the extant uncertainties, demands an educated mind that can sift through a large number of competing factors. The definition also highlights that strategic level leadership must contend with complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. In short, all of these ideas get to the heart of strategic leadership and help to frame what might be required to make it effective.

Not to be overlooked is a strategic level leader’s personal competencies. Edgar Puryear, author of *American Generalship: Character is Everything*, has interviewed and studied over a thousand US General and Flag Officers. He concludes that professional knowledge, decision, humanity, equity, courage, consideration, loyalty, selflessness and most importantly, as the title of his book suggests, character are essential characteristics of strategic level leaders.²⁶ In a similar vein, Canadian behavioural scientists Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau have conducted extensive research into the competencies required by commanders. The four competencies they identify are physical (strength, sensory motor skills, health, agility and endurance), intellectual (planning, monitoring,

reasoning, making inferences, visualizing, assessing risks, judgment, flexibility, willingness to learn and creativity), emotional (resilience, hardiness, balance, perspective, ability to cope under stress, emotional toughness to deal with risk and a sense of humour), and interpersonal (leadership, trust, respect and empathy that promotes effective teamwork).²⁷ Arguably, many of these competencies apply as well to strategic level leaders. For example, the complexity of the strategic environment makes the elimination of uncertainty virtually impossible – as these leaders must also be able to cope with uncertainty.²⁸ Personal competencies are obviously important and must be accounted for in any discussion of strategic leadership. However this paper will look beyond most of these personal competencies, given that they are well documented and will, instead, focus on the strategic level leader, using the USAWC definition, emphasizing the knowledge, vision, influence, commitment and outcome necessary to be effective. Before we examine each one of these in further detail, it would be better to understand the potential for transformation in the future CF, and some of the likely challenges. In doing so, our examination of effective strategic leadership will be broader and more complete.

Transformation and the 21st Century CF

The world is dynamic and ever changing. Advancing technology, diminishing natural resources, evolving state relationships and dissatisfaction with the status quo, mark the 21st Century as a time of increased complexity, and heightened ambiguity. VUCA, in the US military vernacular, defines an environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity.²⁹ The attack of 9/11, more than any other event

in the 21st Century, signals a renewed emphasis on low-intensity, asymmetric warfare. Canada, and the CF must be able to adapt and respond.

Global Trends

Even though there is a plethora of global trends, let us consider just three – global environmental stress, interconnectedness, and technological advancement – to underscore the VUCA environment.

Thomas Homer-Dixon, in his book *The Ingenuity Gap*, predicts that by 2050 the total demand for energy, resources and the accompanying waste will triple. Given the world's finite resources, some of which take hundreds of years to regenerate, it is understandable how this growth is unsustainable. Troubling is the thought that we, humanity at large, do not have the ingenuity to adjust our course.³⁰ If we can't find a way to solve this predicament then the battle for resources amongst states could become violent. For example, John Peet in a special edition of *The Economist – The World in 2004*, suggests that war in the future may be fought over water and not oil, as water shortages become more acute.³¹ The impact on Canada could be profound. Unlike the 20th century, we can no longer take a stable global environment for granted.

Second is the growing interconnectedness amongst all nation states and influential non-state actors. Transnational threats such as crime, disease, migration, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism are diminishing the significance of national borders.³² For example, efficient and modern transportation networks facilitate the spread of infectious diseases, drugs, and WMD. Countries can no longer hunker down in the hope of avoiding problems several time zones away. The impact of overpopulation, resource depletion, or the pandemic spread of disease can no longer be contained to just

one continent. Greater interconnectedness also means that developing nations are no longer willing to blindly accept the status quo. They better appreciate the wealth, and higher standard of living in developed nations. They are no longer content to adhere to regimes that disadvantage them. For example, international trade negotiations could collapse as developing countries demand, from the World Trade Organization, a roll back in the agricultural subsidies that protect developed nations.³³ Perhaps greater interconnectedness will destabilize world order. Anarchy caused by the collapse of governments unable to cope could increase the number of protracted low intensity conflicts.³⁴ Ignoring trouble in distant lands is probably no longer possible. If Canada expects to play a greater role in preventing calamities before they occur, rather than attempting to triage the problem after the fact, then what sort of CF capabilities will be needed to undertake a surge in conflict prevention? For example, will greater strategic mobility become the imperative? What might the CF give up to improve strategic mobility?

The third trend is the rapid advancement of technology. Communications technology has enabled an information society where, for example, the media can often report and assimilate knowledge faster than governments. Technology can overwhelm us with a plethora of micro details on any particular problem without necessarily providing an answer on how to solve it. The number of sources of information for any executive has dramatically increased.³⁵ Does too much data increase the complexity of military decision-making?³⁶ Deciding what is important and what is not, in a sea of information, is only one side of the problem. The acceleration of the technological advance demands that military equipment be upgraded more frequently. How can strategic military leaders

maintain effective fighting forces requiring, for example, continuous computer upgrades, in a resource constrained environment? Additionally, the pace of technological innovation is causing us problems our predecessors did not have to cope with – namely increasing complexity, the requirement for rapid doctrine revision and the inability to test weapons thoroughly before use.³⁷ Can the CF transform quickly enough to adjust to this new reality?

How will Canada adapt to other technological advances? Consider the potential of direct energy weapons in war. At the very minimum, we must be able to protect ourselves against such a weapon. What about micro-machines? Can we take advantage of lighter devices to reduce our strategic lift requirements? These are but two examples of new technologies that are on the near horizon.

Future Security Environment

All three trends noted above underscore the idea of VUCA. In reality, however, the direction of the overall world security situation remains anyone's guess. The threat of large interstate war has receded with the emergence of one superpower that can overwhelm any conventional opponent. Therefore, potential enemies will look to asymmetric options, such as WMD, to achieve their goals.³⁸ Is it any wonder that the US is incredibly concerned with WMD proliferation? Growing tension between developed and developing nations over trade, natural resources and infectious diseases has been addressed above. The potential for increased extremism, political instability and conflict is irrefutable. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the US, and of March 11, 2004 on Spain, provide stark examples of this potential. What will become of Iraq and the US attempts to democratize it? Will Islamic fundamentalists continue to pursue a regime of terror? Even

though Al Qaeda has been weakened, it has splintered into a network of regional terror groups that might be even more dangerous.³⁹

Lieutenant-Colonel (LCol) David Last suggests that the unlikelihood of large interstate war means that, “the spectrum of peace, conflict and war is no longer clearly divided by identifiable markers”⁴⁰ Canada must be ready to respond to new, and emerging threats that aren’t necessarily framed in the same way they have been in the past. Last properly points out that Canada must be prepared to find new ways to most effectively use our limited military assets.⁴¹ Could it be that our current approach to combat, find – fix – destroy, will be replaced by find – form (necessary team) – fix – eliminate – learn – disband?⁴² It may be too early to tell but it is one of the many critical aspects we need to be thinking about. In short, the potential for more rapid transformations is boundless, and our willingness and ability to undertake them essential.

Canada

Despite our relatively secure place in the world, based primarily on geography, and our friendship with the United States, Canada continues to pursue interests worldwide. The Canadian government is committed to playing a distinctive and independent role in making the world more secure, peaceful, co-operative, and open.⁴³ The dilemma for defence planners is that Canadian national interests are numerous and broadly focused. Debatably, they range from the promotion of economic stability, international peace and security, through to the advancement of strong social programs, and cultural diversity. Canada wants to be many things to many people! Determining the necessary capabilities the CF should have and, perhaps more importantly, should not have, is challenging when the priority of interests remains vague. For example, should Canada

focus its limited defence spending on North American continental security, or is the priority to have a responsive expeditionary capability?

From a North American perspective, the longest undefended border in the world can no longer be taken for granted. If our top national interest is economic well-being, then relations with our largest trading partner demand primacy. By way of contrast, homeland security continues to be the US priority. Indeed, the Canadian government is transforming in order to deal with this priorities dichotomy. Led by the Deputy Prime Minister, Canada is adapting to US demands for greater security cooperation along the northern border, through the creation of the Department of Public Security and Emergency Preparedness. The establishment of the Northern Command and the NMD initiative are but two examples of US efforts to transform their North American defence strategy.

Globally, the US is challenged by the same 21st Century trends. Their reaction has been very pronounced. The US is now much less concerned about diplomacy, alliance practices, arms control agreements or international legal norms in a multilateral setting.⁴⁴ While the US has adapted to the world in many ways, President Bush's view, in military terms, is straightforward, "We have to think differently ... the world has new priorities ... the first is to speed the transformation of the US military to confront the threats of the 21st Century."⁴⁵ The US Department Of Defence (DOD) has embraced this view. In establishing priorities General Richard Myers, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has three: winning the global war on terrorism, improving joint war fighting capabilities, and transforming the Armed Forces.⁴⁶ The war on terrorism has challenged the US military to adapt. For example, an Army based primarily on heavy divisions of tanks,

armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and howitzers, was not the Army we saw on horse back in Afghanistan calling in B-52 air strikes against the Taliban. Transformation is a key feature of US military thinking. The same can be said of another close Canadian ally. The UK Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, is pursuing transformation by having the military “... shift from the current mix of light and heavy forces representing two extremes of deployability [sic] and combat power to a more graduated and balanced structure of light, medium and heavy forces.”⁴⁷

All of this leaves Canada to struggle as to how best to pursue foreign and defence policies traditionally oriented on multi-lateral cooperation. To date, these partnerships have demanded flexible and timely responses to political direction from most government departments. There is no reason to expect this will be any different in the future. Canada must have a military instrument that is flexible and adaptable to respond to the threats of the future.

The Canadian Forces

The CF mission is to defend Canada while contributing to international peace and security. The key roles include defence of Canada, defence of North America, in co-operation with the United States and contribution to international peace and security initiatives. This is an extremely wide avenue of responsibility. Limited by the fiscal resources that Canadians are willing to provide, the last decade has been, arguably, much more challenging and taxing for the CF than the last decade of the Cold War.

The recent operational tempo has been extreme. In 2002-2003, the CF deployed nearly 10,000 personnel on 14 different missions covering the full spectrum of conflict. In support of the campaign against terrorism, the CF deployed ships, aircraft and ground

forces to Southeast Asia. The commitment to the NATO IFOR in Bosnia (principally ground forces and helicopters), and to many other peace support and peace keeping missions, continued unabated. Domestically, the pace was no less hectic. Support to civilian authorities included several thousand search and rescue sorties, cooperation in law and fisheries enforcement and a significant contribution of personnel to fight fires in Alberta and Quebec. The CF has been stretched to fulfill its mandate.

The CF can't dwell on past successes and simply hope that its current operational forces will meet the needs of the future. The CF senior leadership knows that transformation is essential.⁴⁸ For example, Lieutenant-General (retired) Mike Jeffery, as CLS, made army transformation his top priority. His conviction was that Canada had too little army for the number of tasks assigned, and too much army for its budget. This conundrum meant the status quo was unsustainable forcing the realization that "... the Army must evolve if it is to remain relevant."⁴⁹

At the CDS level the diagnosis is just as clear. "Our op tempo was high given our commitments to the campaign against terrorism. We faced a significant sustainability gap between the cost of the defence program and our resource base."⁵⁰ Our emphasis over the last few decades on manpower and operations and maintenance, has come at the expense of our capital expenditures.⁵¹ In other words, we have been neglecting our future capability development by focusing our resources on the problems of today. General Henault is attempting to re-focus on the future. His priority of developing people, modernizing the force structure and enhancing relationships to "enable and capably support transformation"⁵² aims to overcome this sustainability gap. In November 2003, during a short speech to the Base and Wing Commanders, the CDS referred to

transformation no less than six times. He urged them to communicate his transformational agenda because “your influence with the troops plays a direct role in how successful we are in implementing change.”⁵³ It is this last quote that gets to the heart of the matter at hand – all leaders, but especially those at the strategic level, have an essential role to play in transformation. What is it about transformation that makes leadership so critically important?

Challenges

This section aims to reveal, in general, how individuals and groups confront change, and how military bureaucracies try to prosecute transformation. It will also identify some of the specific challenges facing a CF strategic level leader. All of this will permit the reader to examine in the last section of the paper how effective strategic leadership might be focused to overcome some of these challenges.

Individual and Group

In general, individuals tend to be more comfortable with the status quo than with change. They normally have their own self-interest at heart and, thus, look at change by asking what they stand to lose.⁵⁴ It is human nature. In his monograph, “Central Problems in the Management of Innovation,” Andrew H. Van de Ven maintains that humans are efficient processors of routine tasks who shy away from complexity and risk.⁵⁵ He uses an analogy of a frog in water to describe the natural human reaction to change. If one throws a frog into a pot of boiling water, the frog is likely to try and jump out. If, however, the frog is placed into a pot of cold water, and heat is applied gradually then the frog is unlikely to react until, unfortunately, it is too late. In other words, individuals are not predisposed to embrace change that arrives swiftly, or that alters the

steady state significantly. In the main, we are all happier with gradual change. Something as drastic as transformation poses a personal challenge for many. Plans that ask individuals to embrace several significant changes at once are therefore unrealistic!

Pressure to conform, and the preference to minimize disagreement and turmoil serve to challenge innovation at the group level.⁵⁶ Even if individuals in a group see the merit of a particular transformation, their support might be muted. Pressures to be a team player may serve to dislocate support for transformation.

Military Bureaucracy

Transformation is an extremely complex process that, in some instances, can be agonizingly slow. To emphasize its slow nature Robert O’Connell, in his book *Of Arms and Men*, points to simple introduction of the stirrup, as the one link needed to turn an armoured horseman into an effective lancer, as having completely eluded thought until the Middle Ages. His example illustrates the degree to which transformation is a captive not only to time and place, but also to knowledge itself.⁵⁷ The challenge of devising a new method, that counts on a technology not yet developed, is immense. Nevertheless, transformation is possible in cases where the need is great. For example, the USMC innovation in amphibious warfare – designed to extend reach and striking power against the Japanese in the Pacific during World War II – suggests that innovation can be achieved by military institutions and states whose vital interests are at stake.⁵⁸

Harold Winton in his book, *The Challenge of Change*, lists five steps in the process of innovation.⁵⁹ These steps are followed by many NATO armed forces, and provide a generic top-down framework. By quickly reviewing these five steps some of the challenges to transformation become readily apparent. First and foremost, the process

must begin with determining what the nature of future operations is likely to be.

Predicting the future threat, and the likely security environment requires creativity, a comprehensive intelligence picture, and good judgment on the part of the visionary.

Martin Van Creveld argues that predicting the nature of future war, after the Industrial Revolution, diminished the value of devising solutions to past problems – the true requirement was, and still is, the ability to envision the future accurately.

most bureaucracies tend to achieve their results based on process and through consensus. In the extreme, this can paralyze transformation if the process becomes more important than result, or if consensus slips and becomes “total agreement by all.” Stephen Rosen, in *Winning the Next War*, truly believes, “the absence of innovation is the rule [and is] the natural state [of bureaucracies].”⁶³ Martin Van Creveld takes it even further by suggesting that we get others, outside of the organization, to do the inventing!⁶⁴ He points to the 20th Century to make the case that none of the most important devices that have transformed war – from the airplane and the tank all the way to the electronic computer – came from a military doctrinal requirement.⁶⁵ In sum, the aim of this paper is not to convince the reader that concept development is impossible, but rather to point out that military bureaucracies must be determined and focused if they hope to develop operational concepts. Transformation will not occur by itself.

The third step in the process is to translate the operational concept into doctrine. Initially, the doctrine is a draft framework, which defines how the new capability is likely to be organized, and/or equipped. It will also articulate how the new capability is likely to be used. Doctrine writing requires creativity and great flexibility.

At this point the new capability, as defined by doctrine, is given to the tactical level to allow for sensible input before finalizing equipment, and tactical details. The final two steps are very much iterative, and point to the evolutionary nature of transformation.⁶⁶ That said, and as discussed earlier, the rapid advancement of technology might serve to shorten or eliminate the time devoted to these final two steps. The fourth step is to trial the new method at the tactical level. In order to implement the new capability the tactical level must receive it, or a prototype, to facilitate an iterative

process of experimentation and user trial. It may be that conservatism, and resistance to change will also occur at this stage. This is not a criticism of the tactical level but simply a statement of fact. Byron Greenwald explains it this way; “ The military is reluctant to disregard historically reliable equipment and doctrine before battlefield advantages of innovations have received a full, complete and objective test.”⁶⁷ The final step is to adjust the doctrine as necessary and then trial it again.

General Gordon Sullivan suggests that most of us have an aversion to personal risk, and look to address future problems with yesterday’s solutions.⁶⁸ Transformation forces us outside of our comfort zone by demanding that we assume some personal and organizational risk. We are unlikely to easily give up what works, especially if a new method appears lacking in any way. Why would we trade a weapon or a doctrine that has served us well for something that is unfamiliar, and likely unproven in operations? An example, from the Interwar Canadian Army, makes the point. Attempts in 1930 to replace the horse with a motor vehicle to tow guns, met strong resistance from many in the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. The thrill of galloping into action was, in their opinion, too much to give up and led some of the more seasoned warriors to leave the service rather than face such a drastic change.⁶⁹

Admiral (retired) Bill Owen, a recent US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), points to the professionalism of an all-voluntary military as one of the impediments to change. Perhaps counter intuitive, he maintains that military professionalism serves to create a conservatism that works against change.⁷⁰ Military professionals who serve for lengthy periods, and who are improperly oriented towards the

maintenance of traditions and unreasoned commitment to the status quo, can seriously impede change.

What should be apparent at this point is the degree to which leaders must influence others to accept transformation and change in general. Transformation, and effectively leading it, is a key job for any strategic leader. Unless one can convince individuals and groups otherwise, the tendency will be to embrace the status quo. One of the major missteps in leading change comes from a lack of communication resulting in little chance for buy-in.⁷¹ Influence is a critical aspect of transformation.

Do the challenges discussed above apply to the CF bureaucracy? The short answer is “most definitely.” Effective CF strategic leaders must appreciate these challenges. For example, not only do the CDS and his key staff have to influence the CF, they must also influence the DM, the MND, the government and, ultimately, the Canadian public that their vision for any particular transformation is right! However, there are other unique Canadian issues that accent the challenges discussed above.

Let us start with a simple but startling observation by Brigadier-Genera (retired) Joe Sharpe and his colleague Doctor Allan English. In a very recent examination of CF command and control they conclude, “... ranks below colonel have lost confidence in their superiors ... [and there is a] lack of trust in senior leaders and higher headquarters today.”⁷² This damning indictment, although painted with a “mile wide paintbrush,” should be of concern to any CF strategic leader trying to advance a transformation. How can the strategic level possibly influence members of the CF if there exists a lack of trust? Considerable effort will be required to create commitment if this analysis is correct.

Lieutenant-General (LGen) Michel Maisonneuve frames the challenge for a CF strategic leader by writing, "... senior CF executives serving at NDHQ serve within a network where their freedom to take action is severely limited. Spending authority is constrained, procurement is effected within strict guidelines, organisational manoeuvre room is greatly restricted and accountabilities are complex."⁷³ The idealist portrayal of transformation discussed above does not account for the reality that strategic leaders have a greater number of complex constraints with which they must deal.

The list of unique Canadian challenges is perhaps endless. The MND's Advisory Committee, charged with identifying administrative efficiencies that could be made within NDHQ, best sums it all up when it states that DND has an inconsistent track record of implementing strategic change.⁷⁴ The committee cites organizational culture, management structures and processes that are resistant to strategic-level transformational change, the short duration of management tenure and extant lack of strategic change experience as well as bottom up planning as the fundamental reasons for the inconsistency. The committee concludes that success in overcoming these challenges will require committed, active leadership and clear accountabilities.⁷⁵ In recommending that a greater focus be placed on strategic leadership development the committee suggests that improved opportunities for promising Colonels and Brigadier Generals to acquire experience in strategic-level leadership be considered essential. Unfortunately, the committee received a lukewarm response from DND. By countering with the position that the current practices of senior leader development and exposure were adequately addressed by the Officer General Specifications,⁷⁶ the departmental response begs the question, "Did DND miss the point?"

In sum, strategic leadership has a key role to play in transformation. Overcoming resistance to change and creating a commitment to a new vision - within the CF, DND and the government, as a whole, is critical. As John Kotter points out, “ Too many people have been trained only to manage the current system, or to make incremental shifts. They have not been shown how to provide the leadership necessary to make bigger leaps.”⁷⁷ The current CF senior leadership may need to transform their strategic approach to embrace the need for effective leadership. It should be evident to the reader that current methods are insufficient. The next section will highlight the important aspects of effective strategic level leadership.

Effective Strategic Level Leadership

The cited failure to prepare employees for change as the most frequent reason that fewer than 30 percent of US business change initiatives actually succeed emphasizes the need for leadership.⁷⁸ Granted, one must be cautious when applying civilian business ideas to military organizations given that combat is not a business activity.⁷⁹ However, as the reader will see, there is a fair degree of consensus amongst military practitioners, academics and the business community when it comes to the important role of high level leadership when undertaking transformation. Against this backdrop, let us now return to knowledge, vision, influence, commitment, and outcome as vital components to effective strategic level leadership. By doing so, it becomes apparent why effective military leadership is more important than ever.

Knowledge

Knowledge is essential. With the ever-accelerating pace of change, it is paramount that strategic level leaders have a good grasp of the world that surrounds

them, the governmental decision-making process they must influence and transformation fundamentals. Unfortunately, some leaders believe change, once announced, occurs automatically.⁸⁰ Is it any wonder, then, that transformation can be so difficult?

provide enough formal education and practical experience in change leadership and management to colonel and flag/general officers?

John Kotter points out that education permits an organization to deal with resistance.⁸⁵ Not only do the leaders need to know the challenges associated with change, individuals within the changing organization need to know what is going on. They need to know where the organization is heading and how it intends to get there. This supports the military and academic view that professional military education in the CF should be structured to support: commanders and staff, maximizing their influence, cognitive complexity, creativity, intellectual flexibility, tolerance of ambiguity, self awareness, initiative, risk and trust.⁸⁶

In sum, knowledge is an essential component of effective strategic level leadership.

Vision

The primary task of strategic leaders is to create a vision for their organizations.⁸⁷ Organizations contemplating transformation need their strategic leaders to agree on, and provide a vision, that followers can understand, and ultimately accept. Vision articulates provides a description of what the future orientation must be. Indeed, a vision can only be useful if it describes the end-state, thus allowing followers to better grasp the new idea in definitive terms.

An entity as large as the CF needs a vision that endures longer than the tenure of any particular leader. If each newly appointed leader changes the vision significantly without careful analysis, there is some risk that long range planning will become muddled and tentative. When LGen Hillier replaced LGen Jeffery as CLS, in June 2003, he was

adamant that the Army follow the vision prescribed by his predecessor. This has permitted a stable, and consistent approach towards building an information age, medium weight army.

The importance of vision is acknowledged in the business world. John Kotter maintains that leaders set a direction that creates a vision for the future. Leaders who create vision are “broad based strategic thinkers who are willing to take risks.”⁸⁸ As noted earlier in this essay, the tendency of individuals and groups is to cling to the status quo and to remain, intellectually, within their comfort zone. A vision makes the case for change, and provides the necessary structure and constraints around which the planning process can derive a workable plan.⁸⁹ This depiction should resonate well with those in uniform.

Creativity is essential for an effective strategic level leader trying to derive a sensible vision. General Myers suggests that, “Creativity is the fuel that will power innovation and improvements in joint war fighting and military transformation in the 21st Century.”⁹⁰ McCann and Pigeau arrive at a similar conclusion. In examining the conditions necessary for command effectiveness, they consider creativity as the most important requirement.⁹¹ Even though this assertion is applied to commanders, it is equally applicable to the strategic leaders whose analytical, and conceptual skills must be just as finely honed.

All in all, effective strategic level leaders must create a vision that is understandable and believable.

Influence and Commitment

Transformation needs commitment. Commitment must come from CF personnel, the civilian members of DND starting with the DM and a number of external stakeholders, including the Canadian population at large. Arguably influence, with a view to achieving commitment, competes with vision as the most important task of the strategic leader.⁹² Let us first consider commitment from within the CF itself.

As we established earlier, influence connects the leader with followers. In reality, leaders use power, both position and personal, to influence others.⁹³ Karol Wenek describes position power as the legitimate power any leader derives from their position in the hierarchy to do such things as reward and coerce others. Reward can be a powerful tool to motivate subordinates to follow the direction of a leader. At the strategic level, the CDS has the power to build commitment from his immediate subordinates by bestowing praise recognition. Perhaps more to the point he can, in extreme cases, simply remove those who will not commit to his new vision.

Personal power establishes a leader's credibility so that the follower accepts, and approves of the leader's view willingly. For a strategic leader communicating a clear, concise and believable vision aims to influence key subordinates within the organization that the vision is correct and viable.⁹⁴ In turn, these key subordinates must influence those below them to accept the vision. While nothing prevents the strategic leader from directly communicating to the lowest levels, the sheer number of formations and units will preclude him from communicating directly to all. He will have to quarterback the effort and count on the skill of his key subordinates to deliver the vision.

Influencing others to accept a transformational vision requires a determined effort. Issuing written edicts, and expecting an organization to simply get on with it is, to

put it mildly, naïve. If the vision is provided piece-meal to subordinates, or is in some way altered, either intentionally or through the interpretation of others, then it may not result in commitment. Barry McLoughlin, a communications specialist, cautions that information from above can be “drained of its contents” before it is delivered to the lower levels.⁹⁵ The strategic leader must ensure that his message arrives intact. For example, the creation of a viable Canadian Army strategy, one that proposes to build an information age medium weight army to replace the one designed to fight the Warsaw Pact in Germany, has taken over ten years to develop. Much time has been spent by the CLS trying to influence not only the Army, but also the CDS and the Minister to accept this new vision. Repeated interaction with the army general officers, and colonels, at numerous strategic planning sessions conducted by the CLS, demonstrates the effort that is required.

The strategic leader must also achieve commitment from his senior civilian colleagues within DND, and with external stakeholders – namely other government departments, cabinet and the PM. The Canadian population, through its elected representatives, must be willing to support a particular transformation for it to succeed. Identifying the key stakeholders and addressing their key concerns will be an essential influence activity. The strategic leader must make the case for transformationp4ted uut. A(ae ter m)Tj 12

Although comprehensive knowledge, effective vision and absolute commitment are all critical aspects of effective strategic leadership, they amount to little if the desired transformation is not achieved. Effective leaders must be determined and should concern themselves with the plan to achieve their vision. Great leadership does not end once the vision and the corresponding commitment are achieved – follow through is essential to ensure successful execution.

Leaders must avoid the trap of being enamoured by process. Process is a means to an end – process does represent an end in itself. Major General (retired) Keith Penney, writing in spring 2003 as Chief of Review Services, reflected that in the early 1990s the CF began to break away from process to put more emphasis on outcomes.⁹⁶ To be sure, focus on outcome in no way diminishes the responsibility to account for follower well being, nor to act ethically, as Karol Wenek suggests earlier in this paper. In directing the transformation of the US Army to the information age, General Sullivan made the point that, “It is not good enough to be the good idea guy who works only for positive action. You have to personally work all the people dimensions, both good and bad.”⁹⁷ How you get to the outcome counts.

An effective leader needs to be determined to see a transformation through to completion. With the resistance that naturally comes with transformation, leader determination/will power is required. Of course, it must be a smart determination. His determination must be flexible, to cater for new circumstances as they present themselves and must be calculated so as not alienate the audience(s) the leader is trying to influence into accepting the transformation. LGen (retired) Ray Crabbe, a recent Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS), puts it this way, “If there is one characteristic of command

that I believe must be ever present, it is the will to get the job done, to see an action through to its successful conclusion ... the ability to overcome obstacles and impediments and to get to the objective ... this is true whether in combat or in a peacetime headquarters setting.”⁹⁸

Focus on outcome must also be tempered with the understanding that transformation includes the risk that things won't necessarily turn out as predicted. If subordinates are expected to achieve the strategic leader's vision then they must be empowered to do so. By empowering them, there must be a tolerance for failure and a corresponding commitment to keep trying. The old adage, “nothing ventured, nothing gained” underlines this idea. Getting individuals to let go of the status quo means that they are willing to accept risk with something new. They can't be “hammered” for the failure of something new or they will be unlikely to try again in the future.

There must also be an effective feedback mechanism. The leader must be willing to listen and consider reasoned input from the lower levels. There is no bigger turn-off for subordinates than the thought that their opinion doesn't count. Sometimes just listening will be enough - the leader needs simply to absorb venting from subordinates thus allowing them to move ahead.

Finally, comes some sensible advice from Larry Bossidy, an accomplished CEO of Allied Signal, in his book *Execution*. He laments how the absence of execution is the biggest obstacle to success in the business world today. “Leaders placed too much emphasis on what some call high-level strategy, on intellectualizing and philosophizing, and not enough on implementation.”⁹⁹ It is not enough to develop a vision and secure the commitment of the organization. An effective leader seeking to achieve

transformation must focus to ensure that the outcome sought is actually realized.

Leadership without the discipline of execution is ineffective.¹⁰⁰

Conclusion

In a rapidly changing world, characterized by VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity), and the potential for low intensity conflict, effective strategic level leadership is more important than ever if the CF is to be successful in achieving transformation. Global trends, including increased environmental stress, interconnectedness and technological advancement, signify the increasing pace of change to which we must be prepared to adapt. A new government, led by Paul Martin, looks to play a more distinctive and independent role in making the world secure, and peaceful.¹⁰¹ This will require the CF to be adaptable and responsive in support of government objectives. Unquestionably, the high operational tempo of the CF over the last decade lends credence to the intention of the Canadian government to use its military power in a variety of roles. Transformation, change through which significant gains in operational effectiveness, operating efficiencies and/or cost reductions are achieved, will be required if the CF is to remain relevant and useful to the government.

Effective military strategic level leadership is essential in addressing many of the challenges associated with transformation. The human dynamic in transformation is key and, far too often, overlooked. After all, the CF derives its ultimate strength from its personnel. They need to be at the front of the minds of all CF leaders. The natural human tendency to embrace the status quo and to avoid too much risk is not so much a criticism as it is a simple reflection of the truth. We are somewhat reluctant, for good reasons, to let go of things that have served us well in the past. The complex and non-linear nature of

war, across its full spectrum, demands creativity, determination and focus to push beyond the status quo. The strategic leader will need to push a military bureaucracy that is anchored in process and consensus management. The conclusions of the MND's recent advisory committee on administration efficiencies illuminate DND's poor weak record of effecting meaningful strategic change. It recommends, among many things, that a greater focus be placed on leadership at the strategic level to effect transformation. In other words, the current CF senior leaders need to adapt to the needs of transformation, and embrace effective strategic level leadership. The current leadership approach is not working.

Effective strategic leadership must build upon direct leadership skills and a strong suite of personal competencies. Beyond the physical, intellectual, emotional and interpersonal competencies, as defined by Carol McCann and Dr Ross Pigeau, knowledge, vision, influence, commitment, and outcome highlight the important components of strategic leadership. As well, understanding the global setting, federal government aspirations, procedures and methods of transformation will enable leaders. Military leaders will also need to gain consensus with their civilian colleagues and will need the highest level of political support to undertake transformations with the CF.

To initiate transformation the leader must be able to develop a vision that is compelling. Influencing CF personnel to accept the vision will require patience, persistence, continuity and endurance. Vision must be continuously communicated and every effort must be made to help all let go of the old ways, and commit to the transformation. A strategic leader's involvement with transformation can't end once the vision is issued in a glossy pamphlet. There must be a determination to see the

transformation through to completion. Execution matters! Subordinates concerns and unforeseen difficulties must be addressed and modifications to the original vision may be necessary.

Effective strategic leadership is vital to influencing the transformations the CF will likely need to make in the 21st Century. Without it, the CF risks not being relevant to Canadians.

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⁷⁷ Kotter, 10.

⁷⁸ The skills, qualities, and attitudes of change leaders include: commitment to absolute excellence, comfort with change, clarity of direction and a manifest commitment to a higher purpose for the

organization, persuasiveness, persistence and patience, thorough preparation for the struggles ahead, participative management styles, commitment to multidisciplinary teaming, global perspective using world wide assets, and understanding of knowledge networking. Donald M. Bradshaw, "Creating a Change Receptive Organizational Culture," in *Building and Maintaining Healthy Organizations: The Key To Future Success*. ed. Lloyd J Mathews; available from <http://www.Carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/pdf/AntonMyrerBook.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2004; 33-34.

⁷⁹ The authors argue that attempting to apply "the business style of management" to government organizations is counterproductive because it creates the wrong priorities, and assumes that most decisions are made rationally. The capability to engage in combat is not a business activity, and in many ways requires measures of effectiveness fundamentally different from "efficiency" as defined by the marketplace. Sharpe, xii-xiii

⁸⁰ There are three phases to change: ending, losing, letting go; the neutral zone; and the new beginning. A method to manage the change is to: describe the change, make sure the details are planned carefully, understand who has to let go of what, make sure that steps are taken to help people respectfully let go of the past, help people through the neutral zone with communication, create temporary solutions to the temporary problems and the high levels of uncertainty found in the neutral zone, help people launch the new beginning. William Bridges and Susan Mitchell, "Leading Transition," in *On Leading Change: A Leader to Leader Guide*, eds. Frances Hesselbein and Rob Johnson (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 34-35 and 40-43.

⁸¹ Last, 9.

⁸² Iain L. Densten and Judy H. Gray, "Leadership Applications – Organizational Effectiveness;" available from <http://cda-acd.mil.ca/cfli/engraph/research/pdf/50.pdf>; Defence Information Network Canada; accessed 28 January 2004, 10.

⁸³ Jacobs, 443.

⁸⁴ Jody L. Bradshaw, "Motivating Future Leaders," In *Building and Maintaining Healthy Organizations: The Key To Future Success*. ed. Lloyd J. Matthews; available from <http://www.Carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/pdf/AntonMyrerBook.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 15 January 2004, 53.

⁸⁵ Kotter, 37-41

⁸⁶ Sharpe, xviii and 88.

⁸⁷ Magee, 39.

⁸⁸ Kotter, 54-55.

⁸⁹ Kotter, 57.

⁹⁰ Myers, 7.

⁹¹ Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau, "Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control." *Canadian Military Journal* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2002), 55.

⁹² Stephanie Paquet, Laura Hambley, and Theresa Kline, "Strategic Leadership Competencies in the Canadian Forces" (Study prepared for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Kingston, March 2003), 34.

⁹³ Wenek, 49-51.

⁹⁴ Magee, 21

⁹⁵ Ibid., Tab 4: 7.

⁹⁶ Department of National Defence, *Bravo Defence* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 5.

⁹⁷ Sullivan, 164.

⁹⁸ Lieutenant General Ray Crabbe, "Nature of Command," in *The Human In Command: Exploring The Modern Military Experience*, eds. Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau (New York: Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers, 2000), 13.

⁹⁹ Larry Bossidy and Ram Charin, *Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done* (New York: Crown Business, 2002), 6

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 34.

¹⁰¹ At the time of writing, an election call is imminent which depending on the results might impact on this priority.

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