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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES COURSE 6

**PRAGMATIC PARTNERSHIP:
SOME REASONED APPROACHES TO CONTINENTAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY**

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**PRAGMATIC PARTNERSHIP:
SOME REASONED APPROACHES TO CONTINENTAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY**

The superior man, when resting in safety, does not forget that danger may come. When in a state of security he does not forget the possibility of ruin. When all is orderly, he does not forget that disorder may come. Thus his person is not endangered, and his States and all their clans are preserved. Confucius (551 BC - 479 BC)

Abstract

Despite rapidly changing global events taking place within the post-Cold War security environment, including those following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Government of Canada remains either unwilling or unable to adequately address the nation's fundamental defence and security requirements, as demonstrated by its general adherence to the established precepts of the 1994 Defence White Paper and continued failure to invest sufficiently in maintaining viable armed forces. Despite some recent favourable developments, including modest increases to defence spending, a recently released national security policy, and impending foreign and defence policy reviews, there exists little to suggest that the Government of Canada is prepared to effect sufficient changes to its defence and security policies and practices that would result in sufficient qualitative or quantitative improvements in integral military capability needed to resolve longstanding deficiencies.

Accordingly, the Government of Canada must consider more pragmatic courses of action, within established limits (self-imposed and otherwise), that will better secure its defence and security interests. The realities of "middle power" constraints, combined with continued capability and force structure shortfalls of the Canadian Forces, provide key imperatives to

embracing new approaches that will better meet Canada's national defence and security in a continental context with our neighbour to the south. In these approaches, the "singularity" of North America is accepted and embraced in such a manner as to ensure that *all* national defence and security efforts, military and political, are oriented and harmonized to the extent possible within a common Canada-United States framework.

Specific courses of action needed to achieve this aim include the government's rededication to honouring established Canada-United States defence and security treaties, agreements and arrangements, as well as reinvigorating established bi-national defence mechanisms, with a view to significantly increasing military integration. This includes key force structure modifications that would better align the Canadian Forces with North American defence requirements, thereby improving effectiveness and economy as part of a greater collective, despite prevalent resource constraints. The expansion of the North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement to establish a single integrated military command structure for Canada and the United States is recommended as a key enabler. Concurrently, the Government of Canada must act quickly to render itself more useful to continental defence in the broader political context, through declared and specified political support of United States Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) initiatives, along with offers to employ Canadian territory, infrastructure and resources to improve capabilities in BMD and associated areas. Finally, the Government of Canada must continue to investigate other potential avenues of increased and/or improved bi-national defence and security collaboration with the United States.

Thesis

There is little likelihood that sufficient improvements in Canadian defence capability will be attained within the foreseeable future that would enable this country to significantly improve its defence and security requirements on its own. Accordingly, action must be taken immediately to optimize limited Canadian defence capabilities to the extent possible within existing resource limits by more closely aligning them within Canada-United States continental defence arrangements, while concurrently seeking innovative new approaches through which to facilitate the efforts of the United States in securing our common continental defence perimeter. To achieve this, a much higher degree of military integration between the two countries will be necessary, along with granting the United States far greater accessibility to Canadian territory, national infrastructure and resources. While such approaches would undoubtedly result in some loss of Canadian autonomy, they would ultimately serve to preserve this nation's sovereignty through negotiated collaboration and active participation in common defence and security, as opposed to the United States unilaterally imposing its measures upon Canada. In the current geo-strategic context, Canadian national and continental defence requirements are indistinguishable and we must act now to secure our interests on our own terms, else risk having the United States do it for us.

Introduction

The years following the collapse of the Soviet Union have borne witness to a marked increase in "turning points" and "defining moments" in the evolution of Canadian defence and security policy. We have witnessed, indeed endured, a seemingly incessant array of laboured

pronouncements, refinements and clarifications concerning the Canadian Government's position (or lack thereof) on not only key developments on the international stage, but also those associated with the most fundamental aspects of national defence and security. More often than not, these statements have lent themselves towards some form of rationalization with respect to the Canadian Government's growing list of shortfalls in meeting its formally established defence and security policies and objectives. More recently, the Government's efforts to adapt several longstanding arguments made within the relative constancy of Cold War bipolarity have fallen increasingly out of context, given the elevated volatility associated with global balance of power shifts. Notwithstanding that many difficult defence and security challenges faced by the Government of Canada throughout the Cold War era continue today, the current geo-strategic situation has added to the dilemma, by virtue of the unprecedented regional instability and conflict, terrorism, arms proliferation, failed states, humanitarian crises, diminishing resources, and myriad other calamities that have emerged. While the Government of Canada has attempted to keep pace in reacting and adapting to global events (arguably with some modest successes in select areas in human security, UN and NATO interventions), it remains largely unwilling or unable to adequately address fundamental defence and security requirements, in favour of self-imposed defence spending constraints and other national (political, social and economic) priorities. Indeed, the 1994 Defence White Paper dedicates much of its rationale upon the foundation of "an effective, realistic and affordable policy", as well as taking into consideration "the very important domestic influences on Canada's defence posture and, in particular, to current fiscal circumstances".¹

¹ Department of National Defence. 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 2, 9.

Regardless of the Government's 14 April 2004 announcement of a much welcome major infusion of capital funding,² given the government's record, it would appear unlikely that this development, along with a recently released Canadian national security policy and impending foreign policy and defence reviews, will lead to a significant alteration of course with respect to defence spending over the long term. The evident inclination to adhere to Canadian defence policy rudiments has been indicated through various channels, including comments made during a 2000 Defence Policy Group Forum. The associated report affirmed, even with early knowledge that a defence policy review was under consideration, that "the fundamental premise of the 1994 Defence White Paper remains valid today, noting that, in the short term at least, there is no urgent need for a review of Canadian defence policy."³ Indeed, even within the Canadian social mainstream, attitudes concerning defence and security preparedness appear to have returned to characteristic norms, despite the significant impact of the attacks of 11 September 2001, as indicated by Steven Staples:

Six months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a Compas poll found that only 7 per cent thought that more money should go to defence against terrorism, while 72 per cent of Canadians wanted the government to focus spending on health care or education.⁴

Old tendencies, New Circumstances

Despite the dichotomy of views concerning the priority assigned by the Government of Canada to defence and security in the face of not only fiscal constraint, but also national

² Kevin Cox, "Martin Boosts Defence Spending," *Globe and Mail*, 14 April 2004, 1.

³ Department of National Defence. *Defence Forum Report* (Montreal, QC, 2000), n.p.

⁴ Steven Staples, "But Who Wants More Military Spending?" *Canadian Dimension*; available from <http://www.canadiandimension.mb.ca/extra/d1122ss.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 May 2004, n.p..

precedence, longstanding propensities reinforce the belief that no substantive increases in overall defence capability will be realized within the foreseeable future. While some very modest gains in defence spending have been attained over the past few years (keeping defence spending just above the one percent of GDP waterline), and the aforementioned major cash infusion appears reasonably assured, the political will and investment needed to reacquire and sustain a truly viable operational capability and force structure will likely remain out of reach. Indeed, despite considerable continuing pressure from allies and a wide range of interest groups, Canada does not appear to be postured in any way to significantly change its current ranking in defence and security investment, which in per-capita spending terms remains only slightly higher than half that of the non-US NATO average.⁵ David R. Jones, in addressing a 1990 Canadian Ethics and Defence Policy conference touched upon what remains today a chronic lack of resolve to tackle broad defence and security capability issues head on:

...it seems likely that past reticence in this respect is in part due to the confusion surrounding Canada's defence policies in recent decades, as well as to the sectarianism which has engulfed many protagonists in what debates have emerged. Nevertheless, this same reticence undoubtedly is one major reason why Canada still wanders perplexed and uncertain as to the role of its armed forces in any future international order or, indeed, as to whether or not it even needs any armed forces.⁶

This, of course, has resulted in consequences for Canada as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and, closer to home, as the “other” partner in continental defence and security with the United States. Fred R. Fowlow, in his review of Canadian defence policy, notes that while the

⁵ Canadian Senate. Standing Senate Committee on Security and National Defence. *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, February 2002, 83.

⁶Acadia University. *Ethics and Canadian Defence Policy Conference Proceedings*, (Wolfville, NS, 1990), n.p.

Government seems prepared to endure continued criticism of its shortcomings in defence policy, spending and commitment, its ability to actually sustain this approach may be short lived:

Blatantly, the Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff, continued to deny virtually every critical observation made by the media, retired military, defence analysts, academics, the US Ambassador to Canada and the Secretary General of NATO. Not to overlook the last two Auditor-General reports which criticized the way the government has handled defence matters, is it reasonable to assume that so many people could be wrong?⁷

This paper will examine and consider some potential options that could conceivably be exercised by the Government of Canada to better safeguard its defence and security interests across the broader defence and security spectrum, particularly in the context of strategic cooperation with the United States, despite inherent military and other national limitations. In order to accomplish this, it will be necessary to review some key areas and consider them in terms of their relevancy to the key elements of defence strategy; namely, the defence of Canada, the defence of North America and international peace and security.

As will be demonstrated in this examination, new thinking is needed in determining how these three areas can be better-harmonized and/or bridged, with continental defence and security with the United States representing the prevailing factor. In this regard, a departure from our conventional outlook appears to be in order, with several well-established principles in need of sufficient challenge to enable us to progress beyond contemporary views of sovereignty, autonomy and national interests. This will require scrutiny of not only existing policy, but the general practicality of maintaining interdependent, yet separate defences of contiguous

⁷ Fred F. Fowlow, "When will the Government Reconcile Rhetoric with Reality?" *Maritime Affairs*; available from http://www.naval.ca/article/fowlow/Reconcile_Rhetoric.html; Internet; accessed 9 April 2004, n.p.

territories. This will lead to a review of select aspects of Canadian national policies, discussion of appropriate adaptation of the bi-national North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement, and consideration of several other consultative, planning and component mechanisms of defence and security cooperation with America. The United States Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Program will receive some specific attention, given that, despite some recent momentum, Canada has largely sidestepped this major issue through extended consultations and decision deferral over the course of several years. In addition, some specific courses of action with respect to select areas of Canadian Forces structure, strategic systems and components will be broached, all with a view to demonstrating how the Government of Canada, despite ongoing constraints, can render itself more useful to the United States in the context of continental defence and “homeland” security.

Principles and Pragmatism

Within the context of this paper, the key frame of reference is Canada’s relationship with the United States. Given the continuing trend of ever-increasing industrial/trade integration and defence/security interdependency, more recent developments concerning America’s views on its relationship with its allies in the post-Cold War era should be a cause for real concern by the leaders of this country:

The new unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and deploy it on behalf of the goals they have defined themselves, instead of continuing with international agreements. Polls in the United States show that two-thirds of the American public favors working with allies, while some members of Congress and the Administration believe that the U.S should liberate itself from the ties it has with other countries.⁸

⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Geopolitics in 3-D,” *Time Magazine*, 3 June 2002, n.p.

In spite of observations such as these, there appears to be no end in sight concerning the ongoing debates on Canadian defence policy and in particular, the government's lack of resolve in meeting essential requirements. As such, a fundamental question that needs to be answered is what *can* be done under the current circumstances to secure our defence and security interests, despite the constraints (self-imposed and otherwise) that we face? In the collective defence and security context, how can we be *more useful* and *effective* to the United States, despite such limitations?

In any examination of Canadian defence and security, it is difficult to precisely delineate between that which would be described as uniquely or exclusively Canadian and that which encompasses a United States/North American perspective. In most key government documents, as well as a host of other papers and studies, national and continental defence considerations are generally interspersed within one another. This is a key point that will be expanded upon later in this paper. As alluded to previously, a key element of the 1994 Defence White paper and the policy positions which have emanated from it since, remains the development and sustainment of viable combat capable forces to operate effectively alongside United States and other allied forces, "within the limits of our resources."⁹ The White Paper acknowledges that the Canadian Forces have had to divest themselves of several key capabilities, yet boldly pronounces that "selective divestiture" has generally enabled us to attain our defence obligations. It would be an understatement to point out that considerable disagreement exists on this point. It has been widely acknowledged that the Canadian Forces have lost significant defence capabilities and as

⁹ Department of National Defence. *1994 Defence White Paper*, ... 8.

such, have been forced to deal with a steady course of cumulative degradation, in which priority has seemingly been accorded to those areas deemed to provide the best residual value and/or utility. While in theory, the retention of multi-purpose, combat capable forces appears reasonable, it is painfully apparent by all practical standards that the Canadian Forces have fallen through their “threshold of viability,” even with respect to the longstanding argument of qualitative advantages gained through interoperability with United States forces. That we are no longer able to rationalize what the Americans and other allies have long concluded to be a steady path of deterioration and lack of political will, is underscored by Richard Sharpe who states that “Canada’s military is “losing its heart because of severe under funding and the ‘political myopia’ of the federal government.”¹⁰ As stated by Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire (Ret’d), Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations:

We in CDA are especially worried that the defence update, now in its final stages in DND, will result in arbitrary cuts to military capabilities and will amount to little more than an exercise aimed at constraining our armed forces to live within the existing annual budget of \$12 billion (25% of which is spent on other than direct operational readiness requirements), and increase the decline of the armed forces.¹¹

Given that the funding levels necessary to sufficiently return the Canadian Forces to a viable, sustainable and balanced state in their own right remain largely unattainable, some new or significantly evolved approaches to securing Canadian defence and security interests must be undertaken.

¹⁰ Richard Sharpe, in “Entering the Arena: The Canadian Forces and Parliament,” by Joel J. Sokolsky, (Kingston: Royal Military College of Canada, 2000), n.p.

¹¹ Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire, “A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces” *Conference of Defence Associations*; available from http://www.cda-cdai.ca/Nation%20_at%20_Risk/chairmans_%20remarks_secondva.htm; Internet; accessed 25 May 2004, n.p.

“National” Defence and Current Context

So how do we determine these approaches? A good start would be to consider them in the context of the three principal defence priorities – defence of Canada, defence of North America and contributing to international peace and security. With respect to the defence of Canada, sovereignty and jurisdictional authority have endured as key pillars. Central to these has been the ability to provide surveillance of, and prosecution within, Canadian territory, aerospace and coastal approaches. Most of Canada’s strategic surveillance capability resides through its continental defence arrangements with the United States; in particular, the aerospace warning and control mission assigned under the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) Agreement. Building upon traditional continental aerospace defence and security capabilities, NORAD formally assumed a counter-narcotic monitoring and surveillance mandate

As illustrated here, the vast majority of Canada's vital surveillance capabilities have been acquired through collective effort with, and assistance from, the United States, along with certain cooperative undertakings with other nations. Surveillance and control of territorial waters and maritime approaches have been further solidified through extended NORAD coordination with other Canadian and US military commands (Maritime Command, United States Navy subordinate commands, and more recently, United States Northern Command, or NORTHCOM). In terms of assured capability, there is little question that more than a continued close partnership with the United States is unavoidable, as noted in a 2000 Defence Policy Forum report, which acknowledged that, "... this degree of interconnectivity also creates interdependence,"¹³ As might be imagined, there are various pros and cons of interoperability worthy of consideration and debate; however, given this paper's assertion that major improvements in Canada's integral military capability through significantly increased defence spending are unlikely, the following observation from Danford Middlemiss and Dennis Stairs is germane:

In concrete terms, one of the purposes (although certainly not the only purpose) of interoperability is to compensate for the unwillingness of the political leadership, and perhaps ultimately of the electorate, to allocate a larger portion of public funds to the armed forces.¹⁴

National Defence is Continental Defence

¹³ Department of National Defence. *Defence Forum Report*. (Fredericton, NB, 2000), n.p.

¹⁴ Danford Middlemiss and Denis Stairs. "The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues (excerpts); *Canadian American Strategic Review*; available from: <http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-middle1.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 May 2004, n.p.

As suggested earlier, the defence of Canada cannot be considered without the inclusion of the United States or a North American context in one way or another. Most “exclusively Canadian” aspects of national defence pertain to internal contingency operations and services, including responses to natural disasters (floods, ice storms, forest fires, etc), support to public safety and security, and core Search and Rescue capabilities. Outside of this, national and continental defence are, for the most part, indistinguishable from one another. Joel J. Sokolsky notes that “the ease of the CF’s (evolving) North American roles will be made even more comfortable by the fact they will mesh neatly with its domestic tasks...” and that “North American defence has become the only military activity, apart from domestic roles, which (Ottawa) cannot abandon.”¹⁵ The “universality” of national and continental defence is further reinforced by acknowledgement of the interests and actions of the United States in recent years. While Canada had been earlier regarded somewhat as a frontier or “buffer” within the context of United States strategic defence planning and posture, more recently the North American continent has come to be formally accepted by Americans as a single “defended area.” This was recently demonstrated by the creation of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), within the United States Unified Command Plan. The creation of this latest US military geographically assigned combatant command cannot be under-estimated in demonstrating the resolve of the United States to defend itself, including if necessary, the wherewithal to “unilaterally move to defend its security perimeter – which it primarily defines as North America – without Canadian knowledge or consent.”¹⁶ It is apparent, at this juncture, that Canada would be well served to more formally

¹⁵ Joel J. Sokolsky, “The Bilateral Defence Relationship with the United States,” in *Canada’s International Security Policy*, ed David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1995), 191-192

¹⁶ Canadian Senate. Standing Senate Committee on Security and National Defence. *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility. Eighth Report*. September 2002, 24.

acknowledge the true “singularity” of North American defence in both the national and bilateral contexts and take immediate action to reinforce and consolidate the Canada-United States strategic relationship in this regard.

While the full “jurisdictional impact” of the creation of NORTHCOM remains to be seen, the preservation of Canadian sovereignty within its continental defence arrangements remains a longstanding issue. Ever since Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1938 pronouncement that his country would “not stand idly by if the Dominion of Canada soil is threatened by any other Empire,”¹⁷ Canada has followed a difficult path of working alongside the United States in such a way as to maintain its credibility as a defence partner, while preserving sufficient “distance” to preserve the integrity of its sovereignty and autonomy. This approach has endured for the past several decades, at least partially due to the fact that such a course could be undertaken within the boundaries of accepted risk, given the nature of the international strategic environment and the assessed/perceived threat to North America. However, over time, Canada-United States trade and economic interdependence/integration have risen to unprecedented levels, further reinforcing the critical requirement for both nations to secure a stable “homeland” security environment. At the same time, critical evolutions and changes within the international security dynamic, including non-traditional, asymmetric threats to North America, have increased substantially, effectively obviating Canada’s ability to preserve the same measure of autonomy in its defence and security cooperation electives. Arguably, continued and increased United States unilateralism in defending its “security perimeter” (i.e., North America) can be expected,

¹⁷ Sean M. Maloney, *The 200th Meeting of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1997), 4.

with detrimental impact, if Canada continues to “stand idly by” or otherwise offer little to collective defence. Herein lies the newest manifestation of a longstanding predicament for Canada: whether to allow expanded or increased bilateral cooperation in support of North American defence at the expense of a measure of its autonomy, or to adhere to established policies with the increased risk of being overtaken by events governed by America’s resolve in protecting its interests. As Philip Legassé states: “... Canadian governments are keenly aware that they must contribute to the defence of North America, or they run the risk of having the United States shoulder the burden alone, usurping the final pillar of any national sovereignty: self-defence.”¹⁸

It has been commonly asserted that the Canadian and United States Governments possess similar overarching ideals, values and interests, particularly with regard to the objectives of a stable international economic environment, advancement of human rights, and democratic institutionalism. As such, broad defence and security objectives have become not only closely aligned, but indistinguishable in several respects; indeed, the notion of sustained “duality” in addressing continental defence aims and objectives has grown increasingly dated, a point recognized in the United States:

Creating a notional North American theater of operations -- instead of focusing on a definition of homeland defense that is concerned mainly with the United States - - therefore removes any possibility of a perimeter defense. It is then necessary to think and operate continentally rather than nationally.¹⁹

¹⁸ Legassé, Philip. “Northern Command and the Evolution of Canada-US Defence Relations.” *Canadian Military Review* (Spring 2003): 19.

¹⁹ “War Plan Part 3 – North American Theatre of Operations;” *Free Republic* [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/533760/posts>; Internet; accessed 25 May 2004, n.p.

Notwithstanding that some variances in strategic development between the two countries must be expected, the only way that Canada would be able to truly reassert a full measure of autonomy in bilateral defence and security cooperation would be to invest considerably more in defence and security than is conceivably possible, thereby “bringing more to the table” with which to bargain. Otherwise, it appears logical for the Canadian Government to accept the reality of North American economic and security “fusion,” concede a measure of “traditional” autonomy and embrace an “evolved” Canada-United States geo-strategic relationship that would be more useful in jointly addressing evolving threats, thereby better serving Canada’s real interests. As stated by the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century:

“Canadian officials can no longer assume that such (security) concerns are somehow distinct and separable along geographic lines. As a strategic partner, Canada needs to engage the US in developing common approaches and strategies within a continental defence network.”²⁰

Based upon the premise that there is little likelihood of Canada significantly improving its integral military capabilities, it would seem that to achieve the utility advocated above, the Government must act decisively in applying new approaches to its partnership with United States. These would include some significant evolutions in established policy, bilateral arrangements and defence system constructs.

Some Service Considerations

²⁰ J. Fergusson, F. Harvey and Rob Huebert. *To Secure a Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper* (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2002), 5.

The “protection of Canada,” in both policy and by convention, has evolved in close parallel with continental defence arrangements with the United States, with particular emphasis on surveillance and control exercised through aerospace and maritime forces. Worthy of mention here is the lack of a “traditional” role for ground troops in the context of Canadian territorial defence. While the national interest clearly demands Land Force resources for international interventions, domestic security and in providing contingency capabilities in response to natural disasters and other calamities, the longstanding absence of a “direct” land based military threat challenges the requirement for a standing Land Force specifically maintained as a *defence force* per se. In its September 2002 report, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, acknowledging the effectiveness of aerospace defence arrangements through NORAD, made specific recommendations reflecting the need for Canada to “move with some urgency to upgrade the defence of its *territorial waters* (author’s emphasis), and that upgrading should include cooperative planning and cooperation with the United States, with the ability to conduct joint operations in cases of emergency.”²¹ While the report also acknowledged the need for closer cooperation between respective land forces, its rationale focused upon the need to “allow the armies of the two neighbouring countries to plan for potential disasters, natural or otherwise, that jointly threaten both countries”.²² Comments within the report emphasize the requirement for binational training and exercises at the brigade and battle group level, which, in the post 9/11 and homeland defence context, are activities aligned more with domestic security and expeditionary operations than territorial defence in the

²¹ Canadian Senate. Standing Senate Committee on Security and National Defence, *Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*, ... 6.

²² *Ibid*, 21.

traditional sense. As such, reprioritized operational orientation and restructuring of Land Forces could enable some reapportionment of Canadian Forces sea and air resources so as to better balance continental defence, homeland security and the expeditionary force capabilities required for international peace and security interventions.

The Canadian Militia – Revisited

Conceivably, a revitalized Reserve Force (Militia) could provide the means through which the Land Force could transition from its existing structure in order to more effectively realign, posture and integrate its principal components within North America's unfolding homeland security dynamic. Given ongoing resource constraints, this would require some significant changes in Canadian Forces and Land Force doctrine, organization, training and employment. Nevertheless, reductions in the size of the Regular Land Force in favour of a commensurably expanded Militia, configured and aligned with a "tiered" readiness organizational structure, would appear to have merit. Building upon the existing large proportional size of the Army's reserve cadre, such a structure, featuring a higher level of readiness and deployability, along with medium and low readiness (regeneration and training) elements, could prove more effective and efficient than the status quo. This would enable the Regular Land Force to concentrate on key core, immediate reaction and expeditionary capabilities, while further optimizing the Regular-Reserve Force "mix" as a logical extension of the Total Force concept. Reserve growth and expanded utilization has been at least partly embraced by senior Land Force commanders. In a 2003 address, Major-General E.S. Fitch,

Project Director of Land Force Reserve Restructure, acknowledged the Militia's key role in the current North American "homeland security" context:

It is interesting to note that NORTHCOM places very heavy expectations on the Reserves and National Guard. In the Canadian context, the Army Reserve with its basing in 110 communities from coast-to-coast, its local knowledge, and ability to maintain a continuous planning relationship with first responders, is a natural candidate for the regionally based component of HD²³

There is no question that the somewhat "radical" notion suggested here would be strongly challenged. Nevertheless, in order to establish some basis for debate, it is noteworthy that the United States Army's Guard and Reserve components are significantly larger than its active duty forces (596,000 to 491,000), but cost considerably less to generate and sustain:

Even though reserve personnel outnumber active-duty soldiers, the bulk of the Army's resources are spent on its active-duty forces. The service's 1997 budget devoted \$38 billion to the pay, operations, and maintenance of active-duty forces, compared with only \$9 billion for reserve forces. The fact that part-time soldiers cost so much less to maintain than full-time soldiers has led some people to argue that reserve forces provide an inexpensive insurance policy against an unknown future.²⁴

If Canada expects to better secure its defence and security interests in cooperation with the United States and within continued budgetary limitations, it appears that reductions to the costs in maintaining a relatively larger Regular Force in favour of a Militia-centric construct would be desirable in order to meet both continental and international security demands, as pointed out in a 1998 Reserves 2000 concept paper:

²³ MGen E.S. Fitch, "Army Reserves in Homeland Defence," *CDAI Panel Discussion: Sovereignty, Homeland and Continental Defence/Security*, 27 February 2003, n.p.

²⁴ United States, Congressional Budget Office, *Restructuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, December 1997), n.p.

The most obvious contribution a larger Militia can make is to provide Canada better defence and security. The concept of managed readiness, under which units are cycled through states of readiness, from low to high and back to low, is part of the new strategy for the Army. Using this concept and the long awaited Army mobilization study to guide planning it should now be possible to assign missions and tasks to all Army units, in logical sequence, to ensure the forces required will be available at all four stages of mobilization.... An expanded Militia would allow even more augmentation, relieving the pressure of high operational tempo on regular force individuals and freeing more regular units and personnel for collective training.²⁵

Additional benefits could include a better interface of key joint/combined capabilities in direct support of continental defence and security cooperation with respective defence departments (including the US Guard and Reserve), as well as Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, US Homeland Security and other associated departments and agencies. It would also be useful to determine if a Reserve-centric organizational structure would be feasible for both Maritime and Air Commands; however, given ongoing high readiness/alert demands placed upon the Navy and Air Force with respect to continental defence, along with their relatively small Reserve Force ratios, organizational structure and nature of employment, such an approach would appear, at first blush, to have less merit than the Land Force example.

Another Look at Canada-United States Defence Arrangements

Current defence policy defines our bilateral defence cooperation within a “wide range of

²⁵ Reserves 2000, *Canada's Army of the Future: A New Concept*, 8 December 1998; available from http://www.reserves2000.ca/restructuring_for_prudent_defenc.htm; Internet; accessed 12 February 2004

bilateral arrangements, including formal government-to-government agreements, interdepartmental memoranda, and service-to-service understandings.”²⁶ More than 80 treaty level agreements, 250 memoranda and 1,400 bilateral fora dating back to 1814 cover a broad spectrum of defence and security cooperation, ranging from joint planning and research and development, to mutual assistance and shared intelligence. For senior military and civilian staff responsible for Canada-United States defence relations at National Defence Headquarters, it remains readily apparent that this complex array of cooperative arrangements underscores not only profound defence and security interdependency between the two countries, but also the urgent need to review, streamline and simplify them. Too frequently, these agreements cannot be exclusively exercised and must often be deconflicted or further coordinated to ensure compliance and/or a firm legal basis from which to undertake specific courses of action. In other words, despite the grounds and authority provided in many of these arrangements, it is often impossible to proceed without extensive additional consultation within and between the governments of the two countries.

An example is found in the Canada-United States Test and Evaluation Programme (CANUSTEP) Agreement, originally signed in 1983. Over time, this agreement was extended and exercised; however, difficulties in obtaining Canadian Government approval for successive United States Cruise Missile testing in Canada under the aegis of CANUSTEP, due to unique Canadian apprehensions, have diminished the value of the agreement. In 1994, then-Minister of National Defence David Collenette, argued against Canada honouring its obligations, despite

²⁶ Department of National Defence. *1994 Defence White Paper*, ... 21.

approval-in-principle by the previous government, using the following rationale: “When we cooperate in the furtherance of the arms race, which is what testing of cruise missiles is, we put in jeopardy our Canadian role as an honest broker internationally. We put in jeopardy our credibility as a peaceful nation.”²⁷

While recognizing that agreements are only just that and that governments reserve the right to withdraw from them, there is no question that the current matrix of bilateral agreements with the United States, developed over an extensive period, are plagued by excessive policy overlap, contradiction and ambiguity, justifying a comprehensive review and revision. The Bi-national Planning Group, (established through a 2002 exchange of notes between Canada and the United States) will, amongst several other defence planning tasks, undertake such a review; however, there needs to be clear senior level oversight to not only deconflict these various documents, but to further validate, consolidate and simplify them as overarching successor agreements. Within the context of this paper, this process should be undertaken with a view to improving reciprocal benefit and improving Canada’s value as a continental defence partner. While such an approach had been extensively discussed at the staff level between respective NDHQ and Pentagon policy staffs during bilateral defence consultations in the late 1990s, there has been no clear indication that the current effort will progress to the level espoused in this paper.²⁸ Colonel David Fraser, co-director of the Bi-national Planning Group, stated: "we just

²⁷ Canada. House of Commons, Government Orders, *Cruise Missile Testing*. Hansard. 26 January 1994, 427.

²⁸ Colonel Michael Blythe, USAF, Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), bilateral staff discussions with author, October 1997.

want to enhance again those ties and protocols to make sure we're not missing anything,"²⁹ Given current circumstances, there is little question that such a process, if taken to higher levels of renewed cooperation and commitment by Canada to improve the continental defence partnership, would result in some quantifiable gains for both partners.³⁰

Another area of particular benefit to be realized entails the review, update and consolidation of formal defence plans for North America. This responsibility was also recently assigned to the Bi-national Planning Group, which is undertaking a review and update of the long-established Canada-United States Basic Security Document and Combined Defence Plan, ostensibly with a view to rendering them more relevant within the current North American defence and security dynamic. Again, it would be useful to progress this effort towards consolidation of these documents into one overarching operational plan for North America. This approach would be consistent with the concept of North America as a single operational area and, if undertaken along such lines, could represent a logical transition for the North American Aerospace Defence Command Contingency Plan 3310 (NORAD CONPLAN 3310), which already provides the overarching guidance for the aerospace surveillance and control of North America.³¹

²⁹ "Sorting Through 50 Years of Military Agreements....U.S.-Canadian Planning Group Eyes Enhanced Cooperation," Inside the Pentagon *Inside Washington*, 14 August 2003, n.p.

³⁰ Colonel David Eberly, USAF, US Defense and Air Attaché, bilateral staff discussions with author, Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence meeting, 15–18 October 1996.

³¹ NORAD NJ5RV, NJ5V staff discussions with the author, April 2000.

Bilateral Defence Fora

Established through the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) is the principal bilateral consultative and advisory body for defence and security between the two nations. Several publications and historical documents acknowledge the Board's essential role, as stated in the Ogdensburg Declaration, in "considering in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere."³² For more than 60 years, the Board has faithfully fulfilled its responsibilities as a vehicle for unrestricted high level dialogue on key defence and security issues of concern and it has been involved in some way with every major continental defence issue affecting either or both nations. While its composition and perspectives have evolved over time (including the establishment of a separate and distinct Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) in 1946), the Board has preserved its integrity as a highly effective executive level bilateral defence mechanism:

The PJBD and its derivative body, the MCC, have symbolized both great nations' intimate connections.... Responses to all these [defence and security] challenges will require continued close collaboration between our two great nations and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Military Cooperation Committee will continue to contribute significantly to these efforts.³³

Unfortunately, despite the continued good work of the Board, the manner in which its deliberations and recommendations have been received, reviewed and further coordinated at the senior levels of the Canadian government would indicate a less than desirable effect. While both

³² Sean M. Maloney, *The 200th Meeting of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence* ... 5.

Co-Chairs formally report directly to their respective Heads of Government, the Canadian process has come to be characterized as somewhat superficial, with respect to receipt, dissemination, review, analysis and response at the senior levels of government. Indeed, Mr. Jacques Saada, M.P., upon his appointment as Canadian Co-Chair in 1998, immediately recognized shortcomings in the existing reporting and consultative protocols (generally speaking, the submission of a letter) and quickly moved to insure direct reporting through personal meetings with the Prime Minister. In addition, the routine of semi-annual meetings in the face of several critical defence and security issues emerging in the late 1990s was regarded as a constraint and as such, Mr. Saada and his American Counterpart, the Honorable Dwight Mason, agreed to more flexible approaches, including the use of inter-session, single issue, and sub-component staff discussions, as required.³⁴

Despite these efforts and notwithstanding its continued utility as our pre-eminent bilateral consultative body on defence, the PJBD appears to have diminished somewhat in stature over time and otherwise remains challenged in harmonizing and expediting cooperative effort on key bilateral defence and security issues. This can be at least partially attributable to the reduced profile of defence in Canada generally, along with the manner in which the Board's activities are coordinated and reports promulgated within government -- shortcomings that limit our collective potential in engaging key defence and security issues at the national executive level in both countries. In its Third Report, the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International

³³ Maloney, *The 200th Meeting of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, ...*, 3. 23.

³⁴ PJBD Canada-US Section staff discussions (various) with the author. April 1998, October 1998.

Trade made the following recommendation to improve the bilateral defence and security consultative process in this context:

In view of the changed security environment in North America since September 11, 2001, the governments of Canada and the United States should expand the mandate of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to include relevant security issues and officials. The Government of Canada should also facilitate interactions between the Board and Canadian Members of Parliament, and encourage the Government of the United States to do likewise. More generally, the Canadian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence along with the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense — and other relevant Cabinet members as may be necessary — should meet at least once a year, alternating between Canada and the United States, to discuss mutual defence and security issues. These meetings should be coordinated with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.³⁵

The government's response to the report was to acknowledge the "privileged" status of the PJBD and to support increased interaction between Parliamentarians and the Board. In addition, the Government conveyed its continued support of regular bilateral meetings as well as indicated its openness to the possibility of joint meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence with the United States Secretaries of State and Defense. The response also alluded to existing bilateral defence consultations between Ministers and their US counterparts; however, there was little response to how this interaction could be better coordinated with the PJBD, as recommended.³⁶ While the government response supported the recommendation, it provided little specificity other than its openness to a somewhat vague notion of increased interaction between Ministers, Parliamentarians and the Board. It would therefore be useful to develop

³⁵ House of Commons. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico, Committee Report Recommendation* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2002), 14.

³⁶ Canada. Government of Canada. *Government Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2003), 21.

specific new protocols and conventions pertaining to such expanded interaction, with a view to building on the success of the PJBD by elevating its profile and expanding its access to Parliament. This could be accomplished a number of ways, including ministerial-level participation in special joint sessions, formal tabling of PJBD reports in Parliament and Congress and direct reporting by both PJBD Co-Chair(s) to Cabinet and Parliamentary/Congressional Committees on a regular basis. Given the Board's unique ability to discuss any defence or security related issue, expanded and improved interaction would almost certainly reduce some of the ambiguity of the bi-national defence and security agenda in Canada resulting from a lack of centralized focus and somewhat ad hoc involvement of various other consultative mechanisms.

The Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee has served as key body for bilateral defence planning for nearly 60 years. In addition to its stewardship of the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan, the Committee serves as a critical military staff link between the two nations' senior military staffs and represents a principal point of departure in establishing and coordinating courses of collaborative and cooperative military planning. The Committee's members have also served concurrently as members of the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of NATO, which, in addition to representation from respective senior national staffs, has provided a North American theatre interface with the NATO International Military Staff and other components in the absence of a designated NATO command for North America. Although the Regional Planning Group has contributed to the development and coordination of defence and security plans for the Canada-United States Region and a secretariat was established within the Office of the Secretary of Defence International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA) to support it, most of the actual planning and representational effort has emanated from the

respective national staffs in recent years. Indeed, the Regional Planning Group's meetings have been conducted on the margins of the Military Cooperation Committee for some time, with notably less attention accorded to its agenda, deliberation and deliverables. This may at least partially reflect the view that most key items for discussion in the Canada-US regional planning context were being sufficiently addressed at the MCC and further coordinated within respective national staffs; however, this also appears to signify a lack of effective utilization of the Planning Group in consolidating North American representation within NATO. While some specific CUSRPG reports were submitted to NATO HQ within the past few years, they were exceptional, with most formal representations by Canada and United States remaining decidedly separate and distinct.³⁷ This lack of utilization may have formed at least part of the rationale associated with allowing the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group to lapse, in favour of the new Canada-United States Bi-national Planning Group.

Given the imperative to form a Bi-national Planning Group in the wake of the establishment of NORTHCOM, along with the prospect of a consolidated North American defence command structure being created, it would be useful to review and consider a more viable way ahead for the Military Cooperation Committee, as well as consider the continued utility of the CUSRPG. Arguably, a single, fully integrated Canada-United States military command structure would be able to assume the detailed military planning and staff responsibilities of both the MCC and CUSRPG. This is logical, given that the current Bi-national Planning Group is collocated with NORAD Headquarters and Northern Command and

³⁷ CANUS Military Cooperation Committee/Regional Planning Group staff discussions (various) with the author. September 1998

includes staff from both organizations. In the event that a single bilateral defence command is not created, however, then it would remain highly important to ensure that bilateral military planning and regional representation to the MCC/RPG is not only retained, but further reinforced and consolidated in order to advance the concept of North American defence and security as a singularly distinctive entity within the NATO construct. In some respects, this would parallel certain developments within the evolution of the European Security Defence Initiative (ESDI), including the recent establishment of the Military Staff Organization, with plans for eventual consolidation of the Western European Union (WEU) and its current defence and security responsibilities within an expanded and strengthened European Union.³⁸ A reinvigorated, reinforced North American linkage with NATO would be one way to alleviate at least some Canadian concerns regarding expanded military command integration with the United States. This idea is not new, as Canadian sensitivities were evident to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) several decades ago:

The JCS correctly perceived that Canada's political leadership would consider the issue of a joint command to be a hot potato. Canada's politicians were uneasy about close bilateral defense ties with the United States, conceivably so strong it could dictate terms to Canada. More appealing to Canada was linking North American defense with NATO.³⁹

In the view of the author, this approach does not represent unorthodox thinking; rather, it re-establishes a longstanding consultative mechanism that has atrophied somewhat in favour of

³⁸ European Union. *Council Decision of 22 January 2001 on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union*. Official Journal L 027 , 30/01/2001 P. 0007 – 0011, (Brussels: Official Publisher of the EU, 22 January 2001), n.p.

⁴⁹ Kenneth Schaffel, *The Emerging Shield. The Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air Defense 1945-1960* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1991), 250.

other approaches, which have yet to demonstrate the ability to replace CUSRPG's mandated bi-national scope, function and utility within the larger NATO construct. More "out of the box" thinking – such as a designated NATO command for North America or the operational stationing of NATO European forces on this side of the Atlantic – appear to remain well outside the current sensibilities of most politicians and military planners. Nevertheless, given the expanding asymmetry of the global security dynamic and growing confederate nature of the North Atlantic alliance, such notions may not be so unorthodox in the not too distant future; as such, they should not be entirely dismissed.

NORAD and USNORTHCOM

Created in 1958, the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) has realized tremendous success in the fulfillment of its mandate through a combination of evolution and adaptation from its original air defence mission to that of aerospace surveillance, warning and control. There is no question that, through successive amendments to the NORAD Agreement, this organization remains a key pillar of Canada-United States defence cooperation and arguably possesses the core elements for a single integrated continental defence organization. NORAD's development over four decades is noteworthy and in its current context, is highly attuned to the broader facets of North American "homeland" defence, as reflected in CINCNORAD's posture statement to the United States Senate Armed Services Committee in 1997:

...from a NORAD perspective, homeland defense is the most basic responsibility of our military. I'm proud to lead the bi-national command, made up of men and

women from Canada and the U.S., representing land, sea and air services, assigned the responsibility of defending our citizens against aerospace threats.⁴⁰

With some notable exceptions pertaining to environmental orientation, the roles and missions of both NORAD and NORTHCOM have greater similarities than differences and are highly complementary to one another, underscoring the logic of the Commands' collocation and "double-hatting" of CINC NORAD as CINC NORTHCOM. With respect to its mission statement, NORTHCOM's focus is homeland defence and civil support through which it specifically:

... deters, prevents and defeats threats and aggression aimed at the United States and its interests within its assigned area of responsibility - generally the North American continent and maritime approaches out to approximately 500 nautical miles from the coastline. As the command in charge of providing military assistance to civil authorities in the United States, USNORTHCOM provides "one-stop shopping" for federal agencies when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense to lead efforts to mitigate disasters and their after-effects.⁴¹

As previously noted, the establishment of NORTHCOM represents one of the most significant developments in the history of the Unified Command Plan and reflects the clear resolve of the United States government to protect its interests, in which "homeland" (national) defence objectives are clearly articulated in a continental context. Accordingly, it would make sense, particularly in light of current Bi-national Planning Group efforts in investigating courses

⁴⁰ United States. CINC NORAD Posture Statement. Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings 11-12 March 1997; available from <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/congress/1997/s970313.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 February 2004

⁴¹ United States. NORTHCOM Mission Statement. Department of Defense. February 2004, available from http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_homefront; Internet; accessed 16 February 2004. n.p.

of action to improve continental Maritime warning and assessment,⁴² to link the NORTHCOM mandate to formalized bilateral defence cooperation within a modified NORAD construct. That key pronouncements have recently been made at various levels concerning the direction that should be taken with respect to NORAD mission expansion, as well as closer military integration across the full operational spectrum, is noteworthy. Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, alluded to this in remarks pertaining to the bilateral discussions that took place between Canada and the United States as NORTCOM was being stood up:

We declared ourselves ready to consider an arrangement that could extend to land and sea.... It's in our mutual interest to look at the threats to North America together. That's what we've done in NORAD for 44 years. I think it's important that the possible threats that may involve land and sea resources also be considered."⁴³

Such an approach would certainly reinforce the proven operational efficiencies of NORAD's integrated bi-national military command structure, as well as ideally preserve Canadian interests, including key Canadian personnel assignment within a broadened command hierarchy, ideally including that of Deputy-Commander-in-Chief, Canadian regional command and deputy command of US regions. Issues associated with unique national security requirements, such as the United States Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP - which outlines the use of strategic nuclear weapons and detailed target delivery execution), could be addressed through evolved organizational and procedural mechanisms. This has already been achieved in large measure through specific command authorities assigned within NORAD (including delineated responsibilities and procedures within its operational construct) and demonstrated by

⁴²“Sorting Through 50 Years of Military Agreements....U.S.-Canadian Planning Group Eyes Enhanced Cooperation,” (Washington: *Inside Washington*, 14 August 2003), n.p.

⁴³ Paul Koring and Daniel Leblanc, “Canada Aims to Join “Americas Command,” *Globe and Mail*. 29 January 2002.

discretionary national activities involving the Canadian and US elements of NORAD. Through such deconfliction, operations in support of respective national interests, such as Cuban military flight activity in the Florida Straights or environmental surveillance of the Canadian Arctic, have been effectively exercised. While the United States element of NORAD is more formally defined (USELMNORAD) within the Unified Command Plan, the Canadian element effectively exists as the non-USELMNORAD component. As such, similar accommodation of unique national interests and deconfliction requirements could arguably be reached by either country within a “*North American Defence Command*” structure, in a manner approximating that of the current USELMNORAD:

Commander, US Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CDRUSELEMNORAD), the senior US officer assigned to NORAD, exercises COCOM [combatant command authority] over the forces assigned by the Secretary of Defense. If directed by the Secretary of Defense CDRUSELEMNORAD may employ or reallocate US NORAD forces to another combatant commander for unilateral US action.⁴⁴

The establishment of a single bi-national military command with an expanded defence mandate would also serve to mitigate some of the difficulties experienced by Canada in protecting its interests in emerging continental defence and security activities that while related, do not reside exclusively within the NORAD Agreement. These include information operations (primarily computer network defence) and certain areas of space operations, such as the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), which will succeed the legacy Defence Support Program (DSP) satellite constellation as a key component of missile warning and attack characterization. These initiatives and programmes, while closely linked to NORAD as a principal “user,” have been

⁴⁴ United States, Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-01.1, Aerospace Defense of North America* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2001), II-2.

developed as US national programmes (involving the former United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and other affiliated US commands), rendering Canadian arguments for direct involvement and access under the existing NORAD arrangement subject to strict interpretation. Strong challenges by US military authorities, for reasons of national security, have resulted in separate bilateral and multilateral arrangements having to be negotiated, a complex process which has clearly proven to be sub-optimal in preserving the integrity of the NORAD Agreement as a principal authoritative agreement and best meeting Canadian defence needs.⁴⁵


Cost Sharing and the North Warning System

The Government of Canada contributes between 15 and 20 percent to the cost of NORAD operations and maintenance (this does not include funding to supporting US commands, such as US Strategic Command, which provide NORAD with much of its capability), roughly equating to C\$350 million annually.⁴⁶ Accordingly, it should be open to opportunities within its financial means to improve not only the operational effectiveness of the Command, but to demonstrate Canadian resolve in serving as a more credible partner. Such an opportunity could be found in the stewardship of the North Warning System (NWS), an early warning radar system successor to the former Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, stretching across the High Arctic from Alaska to Labrador. The system consists of 11 AN/FPS-117 long-

⁴⁵ NORAD NJ5 and US Air Force Space Command planning staff consultations with the author. February 2001.

⁴⁶ House of Commons. Government Orders, *North American Aerospace Defence Command*, Monday 11 March 1996, 1135

range radars (LRR), supplemented by 24 AN/FPS-124 short-range radars (SRR). The cost-sharing arrangement for operation and maintenance of the Canadian portion of the radar chain is a 60 to 40 percent US to Canada ratio.⁴⁷ This arrangement, established within the 1985 Air Defence Modernization Agreement, constituted an important increase in Canada's contribution to North American aerospace defence, particularly when compared with the cost sharing arrangement that previously existed in support of the legacy Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar chain, for which the United States bore the entire cost of construction and nearly all of the operations and maintenance costs.⁴⁸



North Warning System ⁴⁹

⁴⁷ MPRM Group Limited. *History: National Defence Capital Projects*. nd. Available from http://www.mobrien.com/twr/crown_projects.html#0.2.L39QK2.VEHTFB.QP2ZWE.Z7; Internet; accessed 18 February 2004

⁴⁸ Centre for Military and Strategic Studies; *NORAD and Space Command*. (n.d). Available from: <http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/elearning/NORAD/Readings/noradformation.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 May 2004, n.p.

⁴⁹ Roy J. Fletcher. "Military Radar Defence Lines of Northern North America: A Historical Geography." University of Lethbridge (October 1989); available from <http://www.pinetreeline.org/articles/resartg.html>; Internet; accessed 25 May 2004, n.p.

On 10 January 2000, a fire at the PIN-3 Lady Franklin Point LRR site, located at the western portion of the chain, almost completely destroyed the facility, creating a coverage gap in the North Warning System. While reconfiguration of adjacent radars has reduced this gap, a replacement AN/FPS-117 has not been obtained, partly because of problems between Canada and the US in reconciling differences over NWS cost sharing. Over the course of the 1990s, actual costs borne by Canada in maintaining its segment of the NWS have come to represent an approximate 40 to 60 percent US-Canada split – a reversal of the original cost-sharing arrangement. In addition, various accounting reviews placed the US in arrears with respect to “balancing out” the cost-sharing arrangement. Regrettably, this has significantly impacted efforts to replace of the PIN-3 radar. While the Canadian position has been to “stand on principle” with respect to reconciling the cost imbalance as a prerequisite, most of the bi-national NORAD planning staff agreed that it would have been far more appropriate for Canada to have engaged this problem by first taking on the task of replacement and then seeking recourse to reconcile the cost-sharing issue. In addition, during the course of discussions pertaining to the radar’s replacement, senior Canadian officials began to openly question the actual need for PIN-3 and even the NWS radar chain itself. Around the same time and without previous consultation, the Canadian NWS office advised NORAD staff of their intent to place some SRR sites within the Canadian segment in “warm storage” as a cost-savings measure.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ NORAD NJ3, NJ5 and NDHQ staff consultations with the author (various) January – March 2000.



PIN-3 Lady Franklin Point Long-Range (FPS-117) Radar Site⁵¹

In terms of both NORAD obligations and the bilateral defence partnership, the approach taken by Canadian officials with respect to the NWS underscores some serious shortcomings. In the interests of credibility and demonstrated commitment to their responsibilities, Canadian officials should have taken on the task of system replacement as the first priority. As the impasse necessitated resolution by the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence that year, there is little doubt that such an approach would have been far better received by US officials, likely facilitating the reconciliation of the cost-sharing imbalance. Unfortunately, it seems that some Canadian officials preferred to adopt a “damn right” posture, at the expense of a strategic warning system’s integrity, not to mention the Canada-US bilateral defence relationship.⁵²

Financial constraints notwithstanding, it is reasonable for Canada to assume a more equitable share of the burden for the North Warning System, based upon actual costs incurred. A

⁵¹ “Fire Destroys North Warning System Radar Station.” *Nunatsiaq News*. Iqaluit, January 2000; available from <http://www.lswilson.ca/pin3.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 May 2004, n.p.

⁵² NORAD NJ5, NDHQ and DoD OASD ISA staff consultations with the author (various). January – April 2000.

similar approach should be taken to operations and maintenance of the AN/FPS-117 Canadian Coastal Radars (CCR) located at Holberg, British Columbia, Barrington and Sydney Nova Scotia, and Gander Newfoundland -- including efforts to address west coast coverage deficiencies that have existed since the system was constructed.⁵³ In general terms, current contract operations and maintenance costs for the Canadian NWS segment amount to \$550 million over 10 years.⁵⁴ Accordingly, it should be possible to assume some increased responsibility, not only within existing defence budget parameters, but through more equitable cost sharing with other Canadian departments and agencies such as Transport Canada and Navigation Canada, in supporting this national strategic capability, given post-9/11 imperatives to improve northern and coastal air traffic surveillance and control.

United States Ballistic Missile Defence

Canada's various and ongoing missile defence debates over the past 40 years very much reflect an "on again, off again" cycle of Canadian Government policy "angst" over numerous factors associated with Canadian security interests, sovereignty, and its role as a stalwart advocate of international arms control regimes. These enduring concerns have affected successive renegotiations and renewals of the NORAD Agreement, wherein the inclusion and exclusion of ballistic missile defence options have taken on an almost cyclical characteristic. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Program, a component of a layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), represents the current iteration of the American National

⁵³ NORAD NJ3, NJ5 and NDHQ staff consultations with the author (various) January – March 2000.

⁵⁴ Doug Ashbury, "North Warning Contract on the Line" *Northern News Service*, 15 June 1998, n.p.

Missile Defense Program and the United States Government's intent to defend itself from what it has assessed to be a legitimate "capability-based" aerospace threat.⁵⁵ Discussion on the validity of US policy and consideration of myriad opinions concerning BMDS would require an extensive discussion paper in its own right; in the context of this paper, however, the resolve of the United States government to proceed with fielding a strategic missile defence system is accepted as a given, with the remaining issue being that of what Canada's role should be in embracing, or otherwise accommodating this capability within the scope of continental defence. American officials have made it clear that the command and control of this defence system will be highly integrated within existing surveillance and integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA) infrastructure, which serves the core mission capability requirements of NORAD and United States Strategic Command. The new missile defence system build will be essentially "grafted" onto the existing ITW/AA system, with the addition of new Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellations, an In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS), improved Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars, a series of ground-based X-Band radars and the installation of ground based interceptors. Recent developments include the integration of the core land-based defensive strategic system design with other US and potentially, allied strategic and tactical missile defensive systems (US Navy Theatre Wide, Theater High Altitude Area Air Defense and European Medium Extended Air Defense systems, for example), which will improve capability in a wider range of missile defence engagements.


⁵⁵ "Ground-Based Midcourse." *MDA Facts*; 30 January 2004; available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/gbm.pdf>; Internet; accessed 24 May 2004

This overarching defensive system, to initially employ a relatively small number of interceptors, represents a significant departure from earlier ballistic missile defence system designs.⁵⁶

Of particular note is the employment of Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) technologies that will employ kinetic energy (as opposed to nuclear or other explosive warheads) to destroy incoming missiles. American rationale emphasises that this evolved system will actually contribute to international stability by enabling the United States to adopt a “shoot-look-shoot” approach to missile defence; that is, a limited defensive engagement with the first inbound ballistic missiles will provide US military forces additional time to further analyze and confirm the situation, including a determination of the event being deliberate, unauthorized or accidental. American officials view this capability as a means to expand their defensive options, which are currently limited to “absorbing” a catastrophic nuclear first strike, with or without launching a massive retaliatory strike.

⁵⁶ Dr. Donald R. Beaucom, “Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History.” *US Missile Defense Agency*. May 2000; available from <http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/briefhis.html>; Internet; accessed 14 February 2004, n.p.

NMD NOTIONAL ARCHITECTURE



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Consistent with established conventions, Canada’s approach to its dialogue with the United States has been one of cautious consultation and measured consideration. In its representations, Canadian officials continue to emphasise the importance of NORAD and its desire to sustain it, but have remained relatively vague with respect to what the government is willing to do to contribute to or otherwise accommodate ballistic missile defence within NORAD’s existing missile warning and attack characterization mandate, to which it remains fully committed. US officials have also been somewhat unclear in articulating precisely what they seek from Canada; however, through countless discussions it has become apparent that a formal Canadian endorsement of missile defence, ideally linked to the NORAD Agreement

⁵⁷ “National Missile Defense Fact Sheet” *Ballistic Missile Defense Organization*. No

(which was extended without change in 2000 so as to buy additional time)⁵⁸ would be highly desirable. Canadian involvement could be addressed a number of ways, contingent upon Canada's formal position. Should Canada wish to remain outside of this mission, it may be possible for certain accommodations to be made to de-conflict surveillance, warning and attack characterization with the defensive engagement components of the system. This approach, while potentially feasible as an interim arrangement, may risk requiring more than what the United States is prepared to allow, given its investment in this complex and highly integrated "system of systems." Specific questions concerning key Canadian positions within the various command, operations, surveillance and warning centres could create more difficulty than deemed worth the trouble to the Americans. As such, it would be far preferable for Canada to make a specific declaration that fully embraces ballistic missile defence, or, as a minimum, provides a clear acknowledgement of the need for NORAD and for Canadian personnel to function seamlessly within the larger command structure – the price of membership, so to speak:

Thus, it is in Canada's vital interests to seriously consider a US decision to develop and deploy a limited ballistic missile defence system for North America. The earlier Canadian support is offered the better the position Canada will be in to influence the system's architecture through NORAD (consistent with the 1996 agreement on new missions) and ensure that Canada's security interests are considered and protected.⁵⁹

The logic of this approach has been gradually making its way into the senior levels of the Canadian Government, reinforced by developments following the withdrawal of the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- so often sanctified by Canada as a cornerstone of the international legal regime. The fact that the "sky didn't fall", and that other

May 2004.

⁵⁸ NDHQ/DWH Pol, OASD/ISA and NORAD/NJ5 staff consultations (various) with the author, 1997 – 1998.

⁵⁹ J. Fergusson, F. Harvey and Rob Huebert. *To Secure a Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper*,5.

successor arrangements are falling into place, have arguably facilitated Canada's ability to openly participate:

[Minister of Foreign Affairs] Graham rejects critics' fears of a new arms race by pointing out that the United States and Russia recently agreed to a new strategic arms control treaty that will significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals. The agreement in question is the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), signed in Moscow on 24 May 2002 and ratified by the United States Senate on 7 March 2003 and the Russian Duma on 14 May 2003.⁶⁰

Moreover, the imperative of action now rather than later, would also seem to be better appreciated within government, in order to preserve and consolidate Canada's position within the new continental security paradigm:

Also implicit in the government's case is the notion that Canada must have a role in missile defence if the prized bi-national North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is to survive. Arguably, absent a role in missile defence, NORAD will be reduced to a conventional air defence function. Already, indications are that United States Strategic Command (StratCom) will fulfill the missile defence mission if NORAD does not. Coupled with the fact that the United States' new continental defence command, United States Northern Command (NorthCom), is prepared to provide for the conventional air defence of the United States, NORAD's abstention from missile defence may therefore end the bi-national command.⁶¹

In best serving its defence and security interests, the Government of Canada can no longer afford to merely wait and acquiesce to what many would consider the inevitable. Rather, it needs to recover lost ground by openly supporting the Ballistic Missile Defence System Program and determining the means through which Canada could render itself useful to this effort. Despite Canada's limited means and the fact that its participation is not specifically required by the United States, there are nevertheless some specific courses that would go well

⁶⁰ Philip Legassé. "The SORT Debate: Implications for Canada." IRPP Working Paper Series no 2003-01. Institute for Research on Public Policy (January 2003), 3.

⁶¹ Philip Legassé. "The SORT Debate: Implications for Canada."... 3-4.

beyond a positive gesture of support-in-principle. This could include a return to some “first principles” concerning the utility of the Canadian landmass as part of a single defended area. In most respects, US military planning has had to “work around” Canada in terms of developing Ballistic Missile Defense System kinematics to ensure defensive coverage of the contiguous 48 States, Alaska and Hawaii. During staff discussions at Colorado Springs, Washington and Ottawa in the late 1990s, it became apparent that the use of Canadian territory for some land-based components of National Missile Defense could be of significant value in improving system coverage and performance.⁶² This point was later acknowledged by the Honorable Dwight Mason, in October 2003:

Access to Canadian territory for expansion of the system could be useful for the Americans. Mr. Mason notes that BMD's tracking radars, one stationed in Greenland, the other in Britain, are extremely vulnerable to attack. A single cruise missile fired into either site would effectively blind the system. Additional radars could be installed in Canada, not only for backup tracking, but also to deal with new threats.⁶³

Accordingly, an offer of Canadian basing or other forms of territorial access for certain Ballistic Missile Defence System components could conceivably constitute a contribution and commitment that no modest financial or technical involvement could match. If accepted, it would also be consistent with the theme of this paper; i.e., enabling Canada to play a meaningful role in this key facet continental defence and better secure its interests, despite inherent military and other national limitations.

⁶² NORAD NJ5, NDHQ, and DoD OASD/ISA staff consultations with the author (various) January-April 2000.

⁶³ David Pugliese. “Going Ballistic: Twenty years after he announced it, Reagan's missile defence legacy lives on in the U.S. -- and Canada.” *Ottawa Citizen*. 18 October 2003, n.p.

Complementary to an offer of Canadian basing would be renewed effort in other undertakings derived from existing NORAD and North American defence and security arrangements. As rationalized by senior officials in both National Defence and Foreign Affairs, focused and coordinated advancement of national initiatives in support the existing NORAD mission could constitute helpful “asymmetric contributions” to the broader ballistic missile defence equation in a number of ways. For example, the Department of National Defence’s Joint Space Project (JSP – a major undertaking managed by the Directorate of Space Development), has been reduced over the past decade from an original \$1.2 Billion to approximately \$625 Million. As such, apportionment of the remaining funding will require considerable precision to attain both the specified aim of acquiring a national military space surveillance capability, while concurrently contributing effectively to the United States Space Surveillance Network. Development of a land-based deep space surveillance system, as well as a surveillance from space capability demonstrator (satellite based ground moving target indicator (GMTI) package) has been undertaken. Both surveillance of space and surveillance from space projects need to progress without further delay or risk to budget reductions, while efforts must continue to determine other prospective areas of asymmetric contribution.⁶⁴

In addition to the Joint Space Project, some other potential approaches in support of NORAD and ballistic missile defence appear within the current means of the Canadian Government, but have only received cursory senior staff level consideration. Among them is the potential employment of the National Research Council’s highly capable but somewhat underutilized Algonquin Radio Telescope, in conjunction with compatible US systems, as a

⁶⁴ NDHQ Director of Space Development staff consultations with the author, February 1999

means of bringing some quantifiable improvement to deep space surveillance and space object tracking. The Algonquin facility could be linked with facilities such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Millstone Hill Radio Telescope, as a standalone component of a networked deep space surveillance system, or as part of a single bi-static or multi-static array.⁶⁵ Such approaches could also aid National Defence in its efforts to solidify its precarious foothold in the broader space arena through personnel assignment to NORAD "associate" commands (US Strategic Command, US Air Force Space Command, etc), an undertaking no longer justified exclusively within the terms of the existing NORAD Agreement.

Another means of "making a difference" to American efforts in ballistic missile defence would be through the expansion of current linkages between Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) and its American counterparts. On several occasions, United States officials have signalled a general willingness to expand Canadian involvement in research and development in ballistic missile defence and other programmes; however, it remains apparent that the full potential of DRDC's impressive range of capabilities is yet to be fully exploited. Indeed, despite some promising starts, Canada-US collaboration in missile defence-related research and development has diminished over the past two decades. This can be at least partly attributed to the lack of a clear Canadian position on missile defence, as well as the carefully worded White Paper guidance pertaining to "...gaining a better understanding of missile defence through research and in consultation with like-minded nations,"⁶⁶ which places somewhat of a

⁶⁵ NDHQ Directorate of Space Development staff consultations with the author, February 2001

⁶⁶ Department of National Defence. 1994 Defence White Paper25.

constraint upon developmental involvement with current United States research, which includes “spiral” development and experimentation. While there exist a few promising areas of collaboration, such as, Hyper-Spectral Infraredometry applications in ballistic missile detection/characterization, as well as High Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR) applications for small target detection, current collaboration falls well short of potential. Although asymmetric in nature, renewed commitment to these and other potential areas of research and development, both within and beyond the scope of CANUSTEP and Defence Production/Defence Development Sharing Arrangements, would serve Canada well in both expressing more overt political support, as well as providing tangible contributions to a harmonized NORAD and/or NORTHCOM effort. This would be consistent with defence policy regarding cooperation with the United States in, amongst other things, “the examination of ballistic missile defence options focused on research and building upon Canada’s existing capabilities in communications and research.”⁶⁷

Concluding Remarks

While Canada has been blessed by its geography and close friendship with the United States throughout much of its history, it is apparent that its longstanding limitations as a middle power, chronic deficiencies in its integral military capability and inescapable dependency upon America leave it with few real choices in dealing with current and emerging threats. With continental defence representing the key enabler to achieving national and international defence and security objectives, it makes sense to invest in collaborative courses with the United States

⁶⁷ Ibid....26

that will garner the best return across the full defence and security spectrum. Given that there is little likelihood of a significant and sustained increase in defence spending, those limited military capabilities that do exist must be optimized within a more highly integrated Canada-US defence and security structure. This, combined with new and evolved approaches that build upon existing bilateral and continental defence arrangements, would render Canada more useful and valuable to the United States as a defence partner.

Canada needs to recognize that sometimes its sovereignty and interests can be best served by saying yes to the United States, especially with the decisions 30 million Canadians make can have an impact on the lives of 300 million Americans. The defense and foreign policy reviews now under way, however hasty they may be, offer the opportunity to bring Canadian policy into line with the new realities and to create a new partnership with the United States that, rather than weakening Canada, can enhance our capacity to make independent choices and protect our sovereignty.⁶⁸

While only a few select areas have been examined in this paper, key changes to bi-national organizational structures and mechanisms, as well as specific national undertakings, would serve Canada well in ensuring the defence of its territory and interests, as well as the safety and security of its people. While the luxury of retaining traditional levels of autonomy may no longer be possible through such courses, action taken now will safeguard Canadian sovereign interests later. As the Government of Canada slowly comes to grips with the full impact of its diminished stature as a defence partner and growing paralysis in securing its defence and security interests through traditional means, time is of the essence.

⁶⁸ J.L. Granatstein, "A Friendly Agreement in Advance. Canada-US Defense Relations Past, Present and Future," *The Border Papers*. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, No. 166 (June 2002): 16-17.

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