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UNIFICATION AND THE STRONG-SERVICE IDEA: A 50-YEAR TUG OF WAR OF CONCEPTS AT CROSSROADS

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ABSTRACT

The institution that is the Canadian Forces is at a crossroads. For fifty years, a "tug of war" has been going on between two powerful ideas within the Canadian Forces. On one side is the concept of unification, the establishment of a single military service in Canada, while on the other side is the strong-service idea, focused on the preservation of the army, navy and air force as separate institutions. This study examines the ideas behind these two powerful concepts and the consequences that have resulted from this conflict of ideas, focusing more specifically on the last decade. In recent years, some scholars have been advocating of the need to unify the Canadian Forces once more, asserting that much de-unification and disintegration of the Canadian Forces has taken place over the years. To the contrary, this paper argues that the principles behind unification, as envisaged by Minister Hellyer in 1964, are still very much alive, to the point where unification is clearly winning the "tug of war" over the strong-service idea. This paper explains why a more harmonized top-down approach to defence strategy and management, the recent adoption of jointness as the new organizational principle of the CF, and the centralization of many functions are coalescing to unify the Canadian Forces. Several areas of Canadian defence management such as defence policy, force development, organizational structure, operations, and resource management are analyzed to prove this argument. The paper concludes that recent trends toward more integration of defence functions and more unification are beneficial to the Canadian Forces. In spite of this remarkable progress, the CF institution remains confused in a number of areas affecting day-to-day defence management, and it is imperative for senior defence leaders to articulate soonest a clear and pragmatic vision and strategy for the institution as it prepares to enter in the coming years the most critical stage of the CF transformation.

UNIFICATION AND THE STRONG-SERVICE IDEA: A 50-YEAR TUG OF WAR OF CONCEPTS AT CROSSROADS

> In the early years of the twenty-first century, thirty-five years after the unification of the services, some intelligent senior officers were beginning to argue that it was time to unify the Canadian Forces once more. In a tiny military with limited funds, divisive strategic concepts and a wasteful organization are simply intolerable. Where is Paul Hellyer now that we really need him?[1]
>
> J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military*

PART I - INTRODUCTION

For fifty years, a "tug of war" has been going on between two powerful ideas within the Canadian Forces (CF). On one side is the idealistic and progressive concept of unification, the establishment of a single military service in Canada, while on the other side is the traditionalist strong-service idea, focused on the preservation of the army, navy and air force as separate institutions. This unremitting, often veiled, confrontation between two dominant concepts gathered momentum in the 1950s and 1960s, when senior defence leaders sought more integration of defence functions and structures and the unification of the army, navy and air Force into one single service.[2] The consequences resulting over the years from the application of those competing concepts, and their constituents, have frequently produced misdirections and have generated significant tensions in the defence establishment.

Without a doubt, important concepts have constantly battered the CF institution over the years, and include, unification, integration, service protectionism and parochialism, civilianization, centralization, devolution, privatization and alternate service delivery, jointness, interoperability and, added more recently to the mix, transformation. These competing ideas[3] have and continue to be relentlessly shaped, strengthened and weakened by many factors including international events, national realities, defence strategies and priorities, decisions,

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[1] J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishing, 2004), 94.
[2] To assist the reader, a glossary of the most important terms referred to in this paper is enclosed as Appendix A.
[3] For the reader interested in more information on the "role of ideas" in influencing policy formation and the processes of decision-making, see "Ideas and Canadian Public Policy," in Bruce G. Doern and Richard W. Phidd. *Canadian Public Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process (*Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992) 35-44.

organizations and structures, bureaucratic politics and the power of the players, and military culture. At the core of the institution, however, there remain two competing, powerful, and strategically divisive ideas that continue to cause turbulence. The concepts of unification and the strong-service idea act like strong opposing currents, and dominate and continue to exert strong internal pressures on the institution. The purpose of this paper is to examine those dominant concepts, with the objective of initiating a discussion on the important factors affecting the workings of the CF.

It is clear to anyone serving at the senior levels of the CF that the debate on unification did not disappear in 1967 with the reorganization of the CF into one unified service;[4] instead, the struggle has simply moved away from the front pages of the newspaper to be absorbed in the day-to-day bureaucratic politics of the department.[5] As Sean Maloney and Douglas Bland, two astute observers of Canadian defence management issues for the past two decades, recently noted, "... in unified forces ... service tensions are not far below the surface. The strong service idea haunts the policy process and may move the service battles, which were once fought before the minister, deeper into the structure."[6]

The dialogue on these two concepts was reawakened and gained resurgence with the return of the Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECSs) to Ottawa in 1996-97.[7] Moreover, throughout the 1990s, the influence of the ECSs on defence management increased progressively, for a variety of reasons.[8] The autonomy of the ECSs mushroomed with the devolution of funding and the delegation of authorities that took place along with the massive

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[4] The Act to unify the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) was Bill C-243, The CF Reorganization Act, voted in parliament in 1967; the unification of the three services took place until on 1 Feb 1968.

[5] There are occasional flare-ups that make the news; see notably the 1991 public debate between Vice Admiral Charles Thomas, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, and General John de Chastelain, CDS, in "Warriors Cross Swords," *Vancouver Sun,* 1 May 1991, and "Defence in Disarray," *Globe and Mail* editorial, 30 Apr 1991.

[6] Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 2004), 43.

[7] The environmental chiefs of staff are meant to include: the Chief of the Land Staff, the Chief of the Maritime Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff, who have also retained the "Commander of Command" title. While the Deputy Chief of Staff group has recently grown significantly, adding to the force employment responsibilities those of joint force development and generation, he is nevertheless not considered an ECS, but a group principal.

[8] The term "defence management" is used in this paper to incorporate all elements of defence implementation and defence administration (defence policy is excluded). While the term "administration" was frequently used in the past, the term "management" is considered more inclusive. The object of defence management is to "establish, equip, and sustain the armed forces to produce as much usable coercive force as is possible from the resources provided by the government." Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security,* 57.

downsizing of DND. In addition, the escalation of contingency operations for the CF – especially expeditionary stability missions –, provided the argument necessary for the commanders of command (i.e., ECSs) to gain control of those resources which were considered critical to improving operational effectiveness and accomplishing mission success. Consequently, de-unification of the CF reached its peak in the late 1990s.

That being said, the tug of war between the two dominant concepts is certainly not over. The ideas behind unification remain very powerful and recent trends to increase centralization of resources and activities, to focus on jointness and interoperability, to integrate more defence support functions, to civilianize the department, and to improve efficiency clearly indicate that the forces of former Minister of National Defence (MND) Paul Hellyer are getting the upper hand. The argument to "unify the services once more," as suggested by the eminent historian Jack Granatstein, is resurfacing as the CF are transforming and possibly facing significant changes to the institution. In mid-2002, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), in his 2001-2002 annual report to Parliament, declared that the CF was "at a crossroads as an institution – a crossroads between the past and the future,"[9] while in his most recent annual report, he adds that the focus for the CF is clearly on the need for transformation and in establishing a new course for the future.[10] If the CF institution has reached such a defining moment in its evolution as it prepares to chart a new path, it is imperative that the contest between unification and the strong-service idea be settled or, at the very least, fully understood and lucidly explained to allow the institution to move forward without the weight of this incessant and tiring "baggage."

This paper is divided in three main parts. In a first part of the paper, the early attempts and goals of integration and unification are reviewed to offer an understanding of the ideas that continue to influence the debate and that are embedded in the structures and processes of the institution. The second part outlines the counterforce to unification, the strong-service idea, using the bureaucratic politics model as a framework of reference for analysing the concept, with the services as the prime players in this "game." It will be argued that the three services, such as

[9] R.R. Henault, *CDS Annual Report 2001-2002*, available at: http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/anrpt2002/message_e.asp, accessed on 15 Apr 2004.
[10] R.R. Henault, *CDS Annual Report 2002-2003*, available at: http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/anrpt2003/intro_e.asp, accessed on 15 Apr 2004.

the army, the navy and the air force, have distinct and enduring personalities of their own that govern their behaviour, which contribute to make the CF institutional structure "more a bargaining arena than a command structure" with the strong-service idea constantly acting as a powerful counterweight to unification. As will be explained, almost all CF issues are processed through what can be described as "service filters," which significantly affect the institution's response to ideas and concepts and eventually shape the ensuing policies and the outcomes.[11]

The third and central part of this study discusses the pivotal elements of Canadian defence that have been shaped and influenced by the concepts of unification and the strong-service idea. The main thesis of this paper, which is developed in this part of the paper, is that the concept of unification in the CF, as envisaged by Minister Hellyer in 1964, is still very much alive, albeit hidden under the cover of several other ideas and initiatives, and, more importantly, winning the "tug of war" over the strong-service idea. Selected outcomes and areas of defence management are analyzed to prove this argument.

The late General Thériault, CDS in the mid-1980s, declared in 1996 that unification had failed and that the broader perspectives and higher loyalties, which were sought through unification, did not take root.[12] Despite the flaws and spotty record of unification since 1967, there are in 2004 several positive signs pointing to the fact that the dominant concept of unification remains valid. To be certain, declaring the death of unification was premature. While the strong-service idea remains a force to be reckoned with in many areas of defence, inside the CF institution, however, the unification ideas clearly dominate the current debate. The paper will be shown that despite the return of the ECSs to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in the mid-1990s, which helped restore some of their former power and authority, in the past few years, the pendulum has clearly swung in favour of unification, with the end result that the strong-service idea is gradually fading.

[11] The framework used for the analysis in this paper is loosely adapted from Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 52-53.

[12] Gerry Thériault, "Democratic Civil-Military Relations: A Canadian View," from the *Canadian Strategic Forecast 1996: The Military in Modern Society*, eds. Jim Hanson and Susan McNish (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), 12.

This study will also highlight that there is confusion within the CF with respect to the organizing and decision-making principles guiding the institution. A number of concepts will need to be refined and simplified by CF senior leaders to allow for a clear understanding of those elements of the CF that must be either loosely or fully integrated (hence unified), tri-serviced, amalgamated into joint structures, or devolved and entrusted to single services. Decision-making processes will need to be reviewed and explained in the same fashion.[13] It is also the belief of the author that, since the powerful concept of a strong service will never be eliminated completely, for a variety of historical reasons, it is imperative for the benefit of Canada's defence that the strong-service idea, even a weakened one, be harmonized soonest with the concept of unification. If the dominant ideas of unification and strong-service are not appropriately reconciled and judiciously focused to improve the institution, the consequences that will follow from the continued disarray in ideas will conspire to pull the CF apart, as they have on occasion over the past fifty years.

PART II – THE EVOLUTION OF INTEGRATION AND UNIFICATION

The progressive concepts of integration and unification did not originate in 1964 with Minister Hellyer; on the contrary, these dominant ideas have been continually in the minds of several perceptive senior military and civilian leaders since the 1920s, both in Canada and in the U.S., with the consistent themes that prevail today dominating the discussions over the years. This part of the paper will review the evolution of service integration and unification in Canada, and conclude by briefly reviewing the American developments on unification and jointness to draw lessons that may be applicable to Canada.

[13] While it is understood that, by law, there is only one service in Canada, the Canadian Armed Forces, and three environments, the term service is used in this paper to refer specifically to the traditional core Army, Air Force and Navy components of the CF. The term Chiefs of Staff is used alternatively throughout to mean the service chiefs of staff or the environmental chiefs of staff depending on the context of the discussion presented. For those readers who have difficulty acknowledging the concept of a service in a unified CF, they are also encouraged to visit the national defence web site at www.forces.gc.ca under Careers, and note the selections offered to potential recruits who want to join the Forces. Potential recruits *cannot* select the CF, but must select the Army, the Navy or the Air Force.

Colonel Maurice Pope and the Seeds of Unification

Although there were abortive efforts of integration in the period 1922-1927,[14] it was Colonel Maurice Pope, a staff officer serving under the chief of the general staff in Ottawa, who planted the seeds for unification with his *Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence* written a few years before the Second World War.[15] Pope's concise but clear memorandum was focused on an examination of the principles on which Canadian organization for the higher direction of national defence should be based, and on the search for a suitable organization to control the means of defence. His diagnostic of the problem of national defence, as articulated at the time, remains instructive and insightful.

> From the standpoint of the Government, the problem of national defence has always been fundamentally a single one, incapable of complete division in terms of the fighting Services.... It has thus become more than ever apparent that what is required is not three separate and more or less independent Service policies, but a single concentric policy of National Defence, embracing, not only the activities of the three Services but, to some extent in peace and certainly in war, those of many civil Departments of State as well.[16]

Pope proposed several general rules and changes to the various senior committees and the system as a whole and many of his recommendations and suggestions were adopted, contributing to the relative success of the central staff in managing the war effort and the activities of the deployed forces.

As Bland observed, Pope was "in the vanguard of those who believe that the unification of defence policy is not only necessarily but inevitably linked to the unification of the services themselves."[17] In addition, Pope had already envisioned the growth and importance of joint operations and the need for more integration of defence activities, assessing that "recent developments, notably the constant and inescapable necessity for combining air action with that

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[14] See Bland, *Chiefs of Defence* (Toronto: The Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), for a more complete discussion on the attempts at coordination during the period 1922-1928, 31-37.

[15] M.A. Pope, Colonel, "Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence: 8 March 1937," from *Canada's National Defence Volume 2: Defence Organization*, ed. Douglas L. Bland, (Kingston: Queen's University, School of Policy Studies, 1998), 7-20. Colonel Pope reached the rank of Lieutenant-General toward the end of the war and was appointed to be the military secretary to Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

[16] Ibid, 9.

[17] Bland, ibid, xv-xvi.

of the other Services, and the ... almost total dependence of all three services on the resources of industry and skilled manpower, make this fact of much greater importance at present."[18] Although Pope's concepts were aimed at the higher and strategic level of defence, it is remarkable to note that his ideas on integration are as relevant today as they were when they were introduced in 1937.

Brooke Claxton and Georges Pearkes: Some Integration, But No Unification Yet

The first meaningful steps toward integration of the Canadian Forces Headquarters and the Department of National Defence began with Brooke Claxton, MND between 1946 and 1954 and "became an evolutionary process since that time."[19] Bland explains that Claxton "came to the Department determined to streamline its organization and to find efficient and inexpensive ways to meet Canada's defence needs. This ... would be manifested through a series of reforms, reorganizations, and policies intended to foster the integration and, where possible, the unification of responsibilities and functions in the department and in the Services."[20] In a Canadian defence policy statement of 1947,[21] Claxton introduced ideas that would survive in future white papers and to this day, including the concept of unification.[22] He outlined several long-term objectives, suggesting "progressively closer co-ordination of the armed services and *unification of the Department* so as to form a single defence force in which the three services work together as a team."[23] Claxton faced resistance for his integration concepts from the service Chiefs of Staff.[24] As a compromise, he focused on measures to enhance coordination between the services. Reforms that took place during Claxton's tenure included the creation in 1951 of the post of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), to try to impose coordination

[18] Ibid, 9. Pope did not used the term "joint" which was coined much later. In those days, the term "combined operations" was often used to refer to operations involving two or more services of a country.
[19] R.L. Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1982), 1.
[20] Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada* (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987),13-14.
[21] The policy document is now commonly referred to as the 1947 White Paper on Defence. See Bland, ed., *Canada's National Defence Volume 1* (Kingston, Queen's University, School of Policy Studies, 1998), 1-56, for a complete discussion and a copy of the defence policy document.
[22] Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 1*, 4.
[23] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, 15. Emphasis added.
[24] Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*, 2.

on the services and to give the Minister advice on how Canada could have a single defence policy.[25]

Diefenbaker's first MND, General Georges Pearkes, continued the trend to amalgamate the armed forces, integrating the medical and chaplain functions, and some recruiting units.[26] Other minor functions such as food procurement and postal services were integrated.[27] Pearkes wanted to go further but "did not have much enthusiasm for the practical problems ambitious unification schemes might raise."[28] R.L. Raymont, an influential officer and official in the 1940s and 1950s who in the early 1980s studied unification and integration, noted that while Pearkes wanted to avoid competition among the services through integration, he did not want to destroy their traditions, and his primary concern appeared to be integration at the top.[29] General Foulkes, the first Chairman COSC, quickly realized that he was only a coordinator and that the service Chiefs of Staff effectively retained a veto in the COSC for any contentious issues that dealt with changing priorities and realigning resources. Upon leaving the office for retirement in 1961, Foulkes, at the express request of Pearkes, presented his views on several areas of defence.[30] He believed that before there could be more progress on any future integration of the services including "a complete amalgamation of the three services administration."[31] However, with regard to implementing the integration of the service Chiefs of Staff, Foulkes assessed that the chiefs' attitude was, "Yes, I believe in integration but please do not do it while I am here. I do not want to be known as a Chief of Staff who ruined these services."[32]

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[25] Claxton also made other progress, re-opening RMC as a tri-service institution, creating a National Defence College and a unified Defence Research Board and integrating some support services such as the military's legal and dental services, with one of the armed services operating the specific function for the other two. Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*, 2-3.

[26] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, 23.

[27] Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*, 3.

[28] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, 23.

[29] Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*, 3.

[30] Raymont states that these views were presented verbally to MND Pearkes. Based on an interview of General Foulkes by Raymont, see *Report on Integration and Unification*, 4.

[31] Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*, 4.

[32] General Foulkes, as quoted in Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, 44. In 1963, while appearing before the Special Committee on Defence, Foulkes voiced similar comments again, and summed up very well the challenges associated with complete integration: "I think that what is required to put this plan in motion is really a decision by the government that this will be done. This is not something you can expect the Chiefs of Staff to do on their own, because … it is going to be very difficult to put this to a Chief of Staff and tell him to cut his throat. Therefore, this has to be imposed on the Chief of Staff by the government." Ibid.

The Diefenbaker Defence Debacle and the Glassco Commission

Three separate but interconnected series of events that took place in the period 1957-1963 would be the catalyst for Hellyer to help convince him, and the subsequent Liberal government, of the necessity to move seriously toward implementing the concept of unification.[33] These events consisted of Diefenbaker's defence policy chaos, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1960 Glassco Commission on Government Reorganization.

Jon McLin, an analyst of Canada's defence policy of the period, stated that "the years 1957-1963 were a time of turmoil in Canada's defense [*sic*] policy," with many controversial defence issues ... marking the period.[34] The resolution of many contentious defence issues created a strain with the military advisors and eventually affected the solution of other military problems later. The armed forces had suffered a series of embarrassing and expensive procurement fiascos, and personnel and administrative costs were rising dramatically to the point that if the current trend in expenditures continued, there would have been no money for capital equipment by the end of the decade.[35] It was also clear that the armed forces did not offer a unified approach to the government in the formulation of defence policy.[36] The controversies during the period also confirmed that the services based their plans and estimates on the assumption that a strong navy, army or air force was good and essential for national defence without regard of the needs of the other services.[37] As Bland concluded on the period, "[b]y 1962 faith in the direction of the defence policy and how it was being administered had almost completely broken down."[38]

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[33] During the period 1957-1963, Paul Hellyer was the *de facto* defence critic for the Liberal opposition.

[34] These included the rushed decision to establish a joint international command for North American air defence (NORAD), the cancellation of the Avro CF-105 Arrow, the selection of the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile, the acquisition of interceptor aircraft, namely 66 F-101B "Voodoo", the re-equipping and changing of the role of the Canadian units allocated to NATO (with respect to nuclear warheads), and the problem of control and deployment of nuclear weapons. Jon McLin, *Canada's Changing Defence Policy 1957-1963: The Problem of a Middle Power in Alliance* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), 3.

[35] Harriet Critchley, "Civilianization and the Canadian Military," in D.B. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, eds., *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), 229.

[36] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 52.

[37] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence,* 16.

[38] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*: 23.

The low point of this period would be reached with the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, when uncoordinated defence policies led to "the near collapse of civil-military relations in Canada when the control of the armed forces passed briefly out of the government's hands."[39] The impact of the lack of foresight in developing and practicing a national command capability surfaced during the crisis, when a total lack of coordination between the various levels of the command structure and the high command, including the political executive, became a serious problem.[40] McLin contends that it is manifest that the military response to the crisis – independent action by the services in the belief that the international situation was deteriorating rapidly – "indirectly became one of the issues underlying the reorganization of the Canadian Forces introduced by the Liberals in 1964."[41] In the opinion of Peter Haydon, a military analyst and author of a study on the Canadian involvement during the crisis, the event "had a lasting effect on Canadian defence policy and the structure of the Canadian military," and was perhaps the catalyst that led the Pearson government to proceed with unification in 1964.[42]

The third significant action that would have an impact in shaping the views of Hellyer and others toward more integration and unification was the federal government appointed Royal Commission on Government Reorganization – known as the Glassco Commission named for its chairman – "to inquire into and report upon the organization and methods of departments and agencies of the government of Canada" with the goal of improving "efficiency, economy and improved services in the despatch of public business."[43] The observations and recommendations of the commissioners were being made in the interest of managerial efficiency, although integration and unification were mentioned.[44] Ultimately, the Commission's work was important

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[39] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 2.

[40] Accounts of the military aspects have focused on Diefenbaker's reluctance to declare a formal alert rather than MND Harkness' decision to increase the war readiness of the CF without Cabinet authorization. The result is an incomplete picture of what happened and of Harkness' decision. The military took independent action in the belief that the international situation was deteriorating rapidly. Canadian naval and air commanders increased the levels of readiness of their forces before the crisis became public. Peter T. Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), 207.

[41] McLin, *Canada's Changing Defence Policy 1957-1963,* 3-4.

[42] Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis*, 1.

[43] As quoted in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, 21.

[44] Defence became a major focus of the commission's inquiry and was singled out for a number of reasons (size, unique composition of department, the range and cost of its activities). *Report 20* on DND recommended that the three armed services should be integrated under a single authority, and also greater interchange of officers and civilians in the higher HQ. Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, 21, and Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*, 10.

"not so much because it led to significant changes in the administration of defence policy in Canada … [but because it] was to provide the authority and validity to concepts that others would champion later on."[45]

By 1964, the armed forces and DND were "under increasing strain with no knowledge of where to go."[46] The most fundamental problem areas that consistently surfaced included an inability of senior military leaders to embrace the facts of national life[47] and a disconnect by the military leaders from the government and its political leaders. In addition, disparate structures and processes resulting from the existence of three independent services tended to result in confusion in defence administration, in inefficiencies created by duplicate and triplicate organizations, and in a divided command and control construct created by separate headquarters and command formations. Bland concluded that by 1963 "conditions were right for the introduction of new ideas and for a strong minister to push them through a supposedly ossified defence establishment."[48]

Minister Hellyer and Full Speed Ahead with Unification

The story of Hellyer's fight with the military establishment for unification has been told several times and need not be repeated here.[49] What is important for this study, however, is Hellyer's vision, the ideas and concepts that drove him toward unification, the structural changes he proposed to achieve his vision, and the resulting outcomes of his bold initiative.

The most important outcome of Hellyer's first years at defence was the release in 1964 of a *White Paper on Defence* for Canada. The ideas contained in this policy document had been significantly shaped by his strong views on a number of issues affecting Canada's defence,

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[45] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada,* 31.
[46] Bland, *Chief of Defence*, 59.
[47] The term is adopted from MND Brooke Claxton, from Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, see 75-84 for a more complete discussion on the "facts of national life."
[48] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*: 23.
[49] See notably Hellyer, *Dawn the Torpedoes*, Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification,* David P. Burke, "Hellyer and Landymore: The Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces and an Admiral's Revolt," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, Vol VIII (Autumn 1978), 3-27, and Vernon J. Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973).

stemming from a comprehensive review of defence policy and administration.[50] Hellyer was disturbed early on in his term as minister by "the realization that, wittingly or otherwise, each service was preparing for a different kind of war … [which] was the ultimate confirmation, if any were needed, of inadequate coordination and joint planning at the strategic level."[51] He placed the responsibility for this condition squarely on the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which "instead of spending the time agreeing on the probabilities of the different kinds of war and then adjusting their plans and priorities accordingly for different kinds of weapon systems, the committee was a little more than a back-scratching club." Hellyer lamented that "each chief had direct access to the minister and could present his case without any interference or negative comment from his colleagues."[52] He wanted the military staff to present to him what he considered to be a coherent defence program, something that was beyond the responsibilities of the service Chiefs of Staff, and an anathema to the *modus operandi* of the COSC.[53] Hellyer also saw nothing but open competition among the services and constant political manoeuvring, which made no sense to him. Finally, to reinforce his views of the military organization, Hellyer leaned on the conclusions of the Glassco Commission – "which had done such a splendid job of exposing the waste and extravagance resulting from duplication and triplication"[54] – to attack the problems of tri-service inefficiencies, proposing to integrate the command structure of the armed forces and several common support services, and to streamline the organization and cut the bureaucracy and costs.[55]

Hellyer's ideas were eventually elaborated in a number of documents, which included the 1964 White Paper, Bill C-90, and Bill C-243. The white paper contained several innovative concepts and set out the basic philosophy and rationale for the unification of the armed forces.[56] Hellyer's objectives as enunciated in the policy document were "centred on integration of staffs

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[50] Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 1* (Kingston, Queen's University, School of Policy Studies, 1997), 58.
[51] Hellyer, *Dawn The Torpedoes*, 33-34.
[52] Ibid, 34.
[53] In 1962, the DND had two structures, one under the direction of the DM concerned with administration, finances and procurement, and another under tTj10.02 0 0 10.02 1..l1009346 143.34006 TTm(c)Tj10.02 0 0 1054. 409989874 143.34006 on

in headquarters."[57] He further revealed, "this will be the first steps toward a unified defence force for Canada."[58] His dominant ideas included the creation of one national defence strategy for Canada, a single coherent defence policy, a single war plan, a unified system of command, and a single higher loyalty. He strongly believed that unification "would remove the tendency to plan from an institution or service perspective and encourage planning from a mission or program perspective."[59]

Bill C-90, an act to amend the *National Defence Act*, aimed notably at improv
centralization of the control and administration of defence policy,[60] resulted in the
the existing command structure of the COSC and the service chiefs, the integr
under a single CDS and the creation of a single integrated Defence Staff a
Forces Headquarters (CFHQ). In terms of command and control of th
CDS was intended by Hellyer to be the focal point for developmen
for the direction – the command – of the forces in the field.[61] T
be the *de facto* creation of a unified command of the Canad

Hellyer addressed Parliament to introduce B
Reorganization Act, confirming that "[u]nificati
evolutionary progression."[63] He outlined th
influence of rising costs were two aspec
attention. Moreover, the new minist
were not projected under the ne
sufficient money for capital
achieved or more fundin
defence strategy, a ne

[57] Bland, *The A*
[58] *White Pap*
[59] Bland, *C*
[60] Bland
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Consequently, in February 1968, the unification concept vaguely alluded to in the *1964 Defence White Paper* became a reality and the law of the land with the creation of a single service, the Canadian Armed Forces, ending the existence of three separate services (the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force) and the independent separate authorities of three service Chiefs of Staff.

By the time Hellyer left office in 1967, integration had greatly progressed and unification was around the corner. The Defence Council had been reactivated, a plethora of tri-service committees and boards that "threatened to strangle the decision making process" had been abolished, and the position of the CDS had been created in 1964 – giving to the office the full executive authority required to plan and implement defence policy. A Canadian Forces Council had also been established (later to be renamed Armed Forces Council).[65] Command and control of the armed forces had been vested into one headquarters (CFHQ), when the three services came, as Hellyer noted, "under integrated management."[66] CFHQ, structured along functional branches,[67] was "a military headquarters devised to provide the CDS with the staff and process to allow him to 'control and administer' the unified Canadian Forces."[68] Besides providing the Minister with a single coordinated military opinion on defence policies and operations, it was to be an operational headquarters that "assisted in the development of national policies but one that was primarily intended to interpret that policy into force structure, equipment and personnel organized so as to accomplish the military objectives set by the Government."[69] He changed the field command structure, creating six functional organizations in Canada in lieu of the three services' eleven commands,[70] believing that the functional nature of both CFHQ and the Command organization would enable common planning, financing and administration of

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[65] A complete summary of the positive and negative effects of unification is detailed in R.L. Raymont, *The Formulation of Canadian Defence Policy 1968-1973: Developments after Proclamation of Bill C-243 and Implementing Unification* (Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 1983), 70-81.

[66] For a diagram of the new HQ organization, see Hellyer, *Dawn The Torpedoes*, 88.

[67] For a detailed description of the organization and its evolution during the period 1964-1968, see Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*, 49-70 and 101-105.

[68] Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, 159.

[69] Ibid. The Defence Services Program, which provided an overview of resource allocation and re-allocation decisions across the Department was in place as well.

[70] The six commands included: Mobile Command which encompassed the army and tactical air support; Maritime Command; Air Defence Command; Air Transport Command; Training Command; and the crown-jewel Material Command. For a detailed discussion on the creation of the commands, see Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification*, 70-101.

personnel.[71] He had also achieved considerable reduction in the duplication and triplication of facilities and services through the introduction of common administrative and base structures, resulting in significant personnel reduction in the armed forces.[72]

Despite what many would judge to be very significant achievements in just over four years as MND, Hellyer is often most remembered for the controversy surrounding his term. He had acknowledged several times that objections might be raised with respect to unification, notably that it might weaken morale or esprit de corps and that competition between the services would be diminished. He summarily dismissed both doubts, arguing that esprit de corps is by nature associated with ship, regiment or squadron as well with the service and that the effectiveness engendered by integration would produce high morale. As for concern about the lack of competition between services, he stated that this competition was "as natural as breathing…. [and] will not be lost but contained at the service level."[73] To a large degree, he was correct on both assertions, since strong loyalty to one's unit, formation and command will always be present, and competition between services, or environments, will never be lost. What Hellyer failed to comprehend, however, is that loyalty to a service can never be totally eradicated, keeping alive for almost forty years the concept of strong services.

The most significant criticism of the unification plan, as explained by Kronenberg, was that a "totalist attitude seemed to have been adopted" by Hellyer, without consideration of the special needs of the various elements to be unified. The minister was determined to "impose his will on a very large and complex department and to use it as a stepping stone to higher offices,"[74] such as prime ministership of the country. Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, highly critical of unification, also viewed Hellyer's efforts as an "opportunity to make political capital." Writing in 1972 (and retired for many years by then), he stated that, typically, conflict between military

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[71] Implicit in the 1964 White Paper and subsequent direction from the Minister "was an assumption that there must be decentralization of authority... [with] field commands participating in policy formulation to a greater extend." Raymont, *Report on Integration and Unification,* 74.

[72] The reduction in personnel was estimated at 25,000 over the period 1964 to 1969. Hellyer instituted a single recruiting system, a common basic training organization and trades training system, a single comptroller-general and a common pay system, a uniform personnel system, a common logistics system and integrated technical services branch, combined public relations, as well as integrated construction engineering and real property, intelligence and communications.

[73] Hellyer, *Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization,* 7 December 1966, 92.

[74] Kronenberg, *All Together Now*, 9-10.

leaders and their political masters occur when "political leaders intervene in what should be strictly military field of domestic organization and administration affecting the essential qualities of service discipline and morale."[75] Simonds added that, "contrary to the most experienced advice" he had received, Hellyer had aped Robert McNamara, the United States Secretary of Defence, referring to McNamara and the terrible lessons of the Vietnam War to speculate that Hellyer's experiment could one day have "damaging consequences ... which cannot yet be measured."[76]

Indeed, it is almost certain that Hellyer had borrowed many ideas from some of his NATO counterparts, such as the Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom, Duncan Sandy, and from U.S. Secretary of Defence McNamara. In his four years as minister, Hellyer had several opportunities to share his frustrations over the implementation of unification and to learn lessons from the American experiences.[77] Accordingly, reviewing briefly the American developments with regard to unification and jointness and assessing their usefulness to the Canadian tribulations will be beneficial at this stage of the study.

The American Experiences with Unification and Jointness

The U.S. military experiences are instructive for a number of reasons. First, any reorganization of the American armed forces along unification lines would definitely have "operational effectiveness" at its primacy, embracing a joint mission perspective. This is especially true in light of the lessons of the Vietnam War, the "record of failure and incompetence in its military operations" in the late 1970s and early 1980s,[78] and the many mishaps stemming from and attributed to service competition.[79] Second, it is fair to state that military service parochalism is more entrenched in the U.S. than in Canada, especially with regard to service budget autonomy and procurement of weapons systems and equipment

[75] G.G. Simonds, "Commentary and Observations," in Hector J. Massey, ed., *The Canadian Military: A Profile* (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Co., 1972), 269.
[76] Ibid, 288.
[77] Hellyer, *Dawn The Torpedoes*, 223-224.
[78] For a highly critical review and analysis of five military operations in which the US military failed to accomplish its mission, see Richard A. Gabriel, *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 3-5.
[79] Also, see Bill Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War*, for a list of mishaps starting with Pearl Harbor in 1941, 152-155.

resulting in a more powerful service culture.[80] Accordingly, any strengthening of civil control over the military or attempts at efficiencies would likely focus on dismantling certain elements of this "stovepipe" environment. Finally, changes in the American governmental or military organizations have a way of drifting north over the years, providing an additional impetus to carefully study these developments.

In 1945, at the time Claxton was attempting to integrate and unify the CF, the U.S. was also involved in a unification debate.[81] Some pieces of legislation related to unification passed between 1947 and 1958, mostly related to the power of the Secretary of Defense and the creation of a weak joint staff.[82] McNamara, as Secretary of Defense under President Kennedy, became the first civilian leader to attempt to truly establish civilian control over the military through its planning and budget process. Bernard Brodie, author of the seminal work *War and Politics*, wrote that McNamara "had a determination to exercise both the prerogative and the duties of that office as he saw them."[83]

McNamara's plan was based on two assumptions, not dissimilar to those that drove Hellyer to initiate the reorganization of the CF. The first one was that there was a general consensus across the military services as to the primary national security threat to the U.S., acknowledging that each military service "would see the specifics of the threat through the lens of its unique perspective," in essence seeing the threat it wished to see.[84] His second assumption was that regardless of this consensus, "no military service would sacrifice funding for its core mission to accommodate increased joint capabilities."[85] McNamara recognized that the determination of the appropriate funding mix between services, especially insofar as changes

[80] The late Carl Builder argued that the US armed services may have become the most powerful institution in the American national security arena, which is certainly not the case in Canada. See Carl Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins university Press, A RAND Corporation Research Study, 1989), 3.

[81] Between 1921 and 1945, Congress considered some 50 proposals aimed at reorganizing the U.S.Armed Forces, with some contemplating the complete unification of its separate services into one military force. Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act* (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 1.

[82] Congress still feared the creation of too much centralized authority over the military. Lovelace, *Unification of the United States Armed Forces*, 5.

[83] Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), 464.

[84] Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War*, 162.

[85] Brodie, *War and Politics,* 464.

were called for, should not obviously be left to competitive infighting between services. As Brodie maintained, the services had often been less avid about purchasing equipment primarily intended to enable them to assist another service than they were about equipment intended for "their independent missions – which only tells us again that the services are normally not strategy-minded but rather means-minded."[86] Speaking of McNamara, Brodie concluded, "It was not alone the lack of objectivity among the services concerning their respective needs that was the issue. It was [McNamara's] opinion that the individual services could not be depended upon to make wise decisions concerning their own major weapon systems."[87] Unfortunately, McNamara achieved little success in setting defence requirements and changing defence spending. Even to this day, budget autonomy remains a key element contributing to service parochialism and independence.[88]

There had been numerous efforts in the McNamara era to consolidate functions for efficiency. The most notable was the creation of defence agencies to "provide integrated intelligence, communications, and logistics support for all military components."[89] But it is the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that had the most significant influence on the pursuit of U.S. military jointness.[90] Up to 1986, the Department of Defense (DOD) "was dominated by the services, which had been traditionally responsible for planning and warfighting as well as preparing [the] forces for war. The services were unwilling to relinquish operational functions to a joint system. They continued to dominate both the maintaining and employing sides of DOD. The services exercised vetoes over JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] advice and controlled the weak unified commands. As a consequence, joint institutions failed to become effective."[91] The overarching concern of Congress with the act was to reduce "the excessive power and influence of the four services, which had precluded the integration of their separate capabilities for effective joint warfighting."[92]

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[86] Ibid, 465.
[87] Ibid, 465.
[88] Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War*, 162.
[89] Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1999, 78.
[90] The act is officially called the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which consisted of introducing amendments to Title 10 of the United States Code, available at http://uscode.house.gov/title_10.htm, accessed 3 Apr 04.
[91] Archie D. Barrett, as quoted in James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Force Quarterly* Autumn 1996: 35.
[92] Ibid, 34.

The purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to mandate for the military services to collaborate on developing joint doctrine for the integrated employment of joint military operations, in short "to make jointness – the formal concept of interservice cooperation and planning – the law of the land."[93] While the desire of Congress was clearly focused on improving warfighting as a result of the debacles of at least two American military joint operations,[94] many changes were clearly intended to create a more appropriate balance between joint and service interests. As one leading specialist remarked at the time, "[t]he overwhelming influence of the four services is completely out of proportion to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities."[95]

The Act proposed changes evocative of the CF reorganization of 1966. In addition to improving operational effectiveness, several of the changes dealt with increasing authorities of the joint staff in the areas of strategic and contingency planning, reducing the dominant role of the services in shaping resource decisions, and strengthening the independence of military assessments of service programs and budgets. It has been claimed that the Goldwater-Nichols Act attained, in the decade following its passage, most of the objectives established, helping to transform and revitalize the military profession in the process.[96] Reviewers, such as Vice Admiral Owens, former Vice Chairman of the JCS, have been critical of the progress in certain areas, such as in the integration of support functions and in force planning. He admits that there is greater planning coordination and more cross-service operational integration and, while a joint perspective is not absent from considerations of requirement for future force, "it remains far subordinate to that of each individual services … [with] service parochialism still the most important factor in force planning."[97] Owens referred to the "disease" preventing changes within the massive military structure of the U.S. as "military service unilateralism," arguing that the

[93] Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War*, 164.
[94] The two operations most frequently referred to, which eventually led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act are: Operation *URGENT FURY*, a U.S. military effort to rescue and evacuate endangered citizens on the Caribbean Island of Grenada in 1983, and Operation *EAGLE CLAW*, a joint military service operation to rescue hostages at the American embassy in Iran.
[95] Barrett, as quoted in Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," 34.
[96] Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," 40.
[97] Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 76.

four services still operate within an organizational structure reflecting decades of bureaucratic rivalry.[98]

Another critic, Colonel Douglas MacGregor of the U.S. Army, concluded that "for many members of the military, the idea of jointness presents a Pandora's box of unattractive possibilities. Parochialism, not cooperation, remains the watchword despite the common deference to jointness."[99] He asserted that the services discovered in the 1990s inventive ways to respond to the pressures of joint operations by linking weapons and communications systems to those activities that they regard as most vital to their missions and their needs, rather than those of the joint community, adding critically that "[t]ransformation that occurs without joint influence and oversight will not change the single-service warfighting establishments."[100] Moreover, the fact that there are very strong links between weapons, procurement, doctrine, and organization for operations continues to foster single service independence.

Despite its critics, there are many who believe that more jointness is the way of the future for the U.S. military forces. General John J. Sheenan, Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Atlantic Command, writing at the high-water mark of budget reductions in 1996, underlined the need for greater integration and jointness, stating that "[r]esources are insufficient to allow each of the services to maintain its current force structure, modernize … and perform all required missions. [It] … must restructure for a changed world, focus on core competencies and shed overhead that does not add value … by leveraging technology to reduce unnecessary and burdensome command layers, improve joint training and exercises, and encourage much greater efficiency in joint logistics."[101] He went on to add that the changed security environment, advances in communications and weapon technology, and mounting fiscal constraints were pushing the U.S. military toward greater integration. Comments of this type were echoed by the CDS in his recent 2003 annual report to Parliament.[102]

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[98] Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War,* 152.
[99] Douglas A. MacGregor, "A Decade, No Progress," *Joint Force Quarterly* 27, Winter 2000-01, 18. MacGregor conducted an analysis of the progress of joint warfighting in the U.S. in the 1990s and a study of the lessons of major joint operations.
[100] Ibid, 20 and 23.
[101] John J. Sheenan, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13

While the American military experiences and advances may seem to be in a different league than Canada is, there are nevertheless many striking similarities that are very useful to consider for the CF. The U.S. military is tackling the challenges of service parochialism and unilateralism through the achievement of true jointness, for the purpose of enhancing combat effectiveness. The successes of the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 and the lessons of the recent war in Iraq seem to indicate that the U.S. military is making substantial progress in this regard, validating to some degree their approach to transformation.

But the U.S. is not resting on their laurels. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is aggressively pushing the agenda even further with his plan to transform the military, "not so much technologically, perhaps, [but] institutionally and conceptually."[103] There are indications that he is attempting to get at the organizations and systems that are critical to the survival of the services, including controlling the service budgets, which are key in facilitating service autonomy.[104] His champion organization for this purpose is the Joint Forces Command, which has been mandated to effect the U.S. military transformation.[105] Elinor C. Sloan, a Canadian defence analyst, recently conducted a review of the U.S. transformation and assessed that the concrete steps taken by the military services to transform reveal a mixed picture, with some elements of the long-term strategy in place. The zeal of Rumsfeld to move toward the long-promised transformation "came up against the same bureaucratic, political and financial restrictions that was faced by the previous administration."[106] While it is certainly too early to assess how Rumsfeld's initiatives will measure up, there are bound to be more "sparks" before the objectives are achieved.[107] Rumsfeld certainly appears to be to the U.S. military what Hellyer was to the CF.

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[103] See Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, "Afterword" in paperback edition (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 2003), for a detailed account of "Rumsfeld's War," 227-228.

[104] Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs* 81 No.3 (May/June 2002), 20-32.

[105] Transformation is the process of changing form, nature or function. Within the U.S. military, transformation requires changing the form, or structure of our military forces; the nature of our military culture and doctrine supporting those forces; and streamlining our warfighting functions to more effectively meet the complexities of the new threats challenging our nation in the new millennium. From the USJFCOM web site, at http://www.jfcom.mil/index.htm, accessed on 15 Apr 04.

[106] Elinor C. Sloan, "Terrorism and the Transformation of US Military Forces," *Canadian Military Journal* (Summer 2002), 23. Sloan is an assistant professor of political science at Carleton University.

[107] See Robert Schlesinger, "Rumsfeld, Army leaders in discord," *The Boston Globe*, 9 Jan 2003, and Barbara Starr, "Rumsfeld, Army chief on collision course," *CNN.com,* 6 May 2002, available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/05/06/rumsfeld.army.sec, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

Despite the often-mentioned negative aspects of service independence and parochialism, there are many long-standing reasons for the services to act the way they do. An understanding of the roots feeding the strong-service idea is critical to fully appreciate the challenges Secretary Rumsfeld is facing, to understand the roadblocks that Minister Hellyer faced in the 1960s, and to foretell the "speed bumps" that will continue to be in the way of more integration, unification, jointness and transformation in the Canadian military. This next part of the paper will cover this fundamental element in more detail.

PART III – BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND THE MASKS OF UNIFICATION

> Perhaps the most deep-seated idea in the minds of Canadian Forces officers is that a tri-service organization of the Canadian Forces based on the army, navy and air force is the preferred organizing principle for thilitaroorces bass "speed bum

framework within which the CF must transform. The next sections will explain what contributes to the strong-service idea, why the services behave as they do and propose a framework to assist in assessing their interests and strategies.

Bureaucratic Politics: The Perfect Environment for the Strong-Service Idea

To assume that the implementation of Canadian national defence is the result of conscious and deliberate policy work is certainly a most satisfactory way to assess outcomes. Treating national defence as if it were centrally coordinated and purposeful provides a convenient, albeit naïve, approach to understanding DND and the CF. In fact, the process is much more complex, and searching for a single frame of reference to explain decision-making in national defence is a daunting task.

In the early 1970s, Graham Allison developed a classical model to assess U.S. foreign policy, the basis of which is relevant for this study. In his seminal work to explain the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Allison outlined three frames of references to answer the major questions of the crisis. While these models were developed to assess foreign policy outcomes, adapting them to study national defence decisions and outcomes provides a very useful frame of reference for analysis. While model I – Rational Actor – is built on the premise of rational behaviour of organizations, such as a national government, and model II – Organizational Process – focuses more on outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard pattern of behaviour, it is model III – Politics – which is of most interest to this study.[112]

The "bureaucratic politics" model presented by Allison is constructed on the premise that each individual in a group is a player in a central, competitive game. "The name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuit among players positioned hierarchically within the government … Players who make government d

> In this process, sometimes one group committed to a course of action triumphs over other groups fighting for other alternatives. Equally often, however, different groups pulling in different directions produce a result ... distinct from what any person or group intended. In both cases, what moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons that support a course of action, or the routines of the organizations that enact an alternative, but the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question.[114]

There is limited literature on the applicability of the bureaucratic model to the Canadian defence context, with the most recent succinct analysis on rationality and non-rationality in Canadian defence policy expressed by Kim Richard Nossal, a political scientist at Queen's University. Nossal suggests as well a more sceptical view of defence policy and implementation, not one marked by the tenets of rationality usually associated with the classic rational model, but rather a non-rational view informed by the bureaucratic, or government, politics approach to decision-making: "[t]he bureaucratic politics approach sees policy-making and policy implementation as essentially messy processes, and certainly rarely as cleanly rational as the classical means/ends definition would have it."[115] The bureaucratic politics model perspective argues that a much clearer account of particular decisions can be derived from an examination of the process by which policy was made rather than an examination of the outcomes.[116]

The centrality of this model is the players or the actors, and an essentiality of the "bureaucratic politics approach is the assumption that on every policy they face, each of the players in the policy 'game' will have their own perspectives and their own interests."[117] Thus, the service Chiefs of Staff, as the key players in the game, wil have their own conception of the national interest, shaping their views about the best goals for the nation and how best to achieve those goals. Further, their actions will be shaped by the interest of the organization (service or

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[114] Ibid, 145. In addition, Samuel Huntingdon, who analyzed U.S. defence policies and force postures from the end of World War II to 1960, focused specifically on one segment of defence policy – namely, decisions on the overall size of the military effort, force levels, and weapons. His investigation reinforces the deductions argued by Bland. Huntingdon went on to argue that decisions are explained not as the product of expert planning but rather as the "result of controversy, negotiations, and bargaining among officials and groups with different interests and perspectives." Ibid, 156.

[115] Kim Richard Nossal, "Rationality and Non-Rationality in Canadian Defence Policy," in *Canada's International Security Policy*, 353-354.

[116] Ibid, 354.

[117] Ibid. While the bureaucratic politics model discussed by Nossal is intended for the entire defence policy process, a microcosm of this model can be tailored to analyze issues presented in this paper, and by adapting Nossal's argument to the service Chiefs of Staff.

group) they are leading and what outcomes will be best for their organization and, to a lesser degree, their own individual interest.[118]

Bland, an authority of matters of defence management, has also searched for a model, and, as was mentioned above, employed various frames of references over the years to help him analyse Canadian defence policy making. His most recent study, co-authored with Sean Maloney, contains the most comprehensive discussion to date in the Canadian literature on this theme,[119] and his insightful analyses over the years have helped to partially throw light on decision-making at NDHQ. In this regard, he explains "that 'who decides who gets what' today is determined by the dynamic interplay among the three elements of the defence structure."[120] These elements include the actors who have authority to make decisions, the organizations that represent the formal power relationships between the actors, and the processes for taking decisions. While it is certainly "the strength of concepts acting dynamically through structure that determines sets of decisions about defence strategy and policy," Bland certainly believes that it is a form of "bureaucratic politics" which determines the outcomes on issues.[121]

He has characterized the Canadian defence structure, as "a bargaining arena rather than a command structure in which bargaining is the controlling mechanism.... guided by declaratory policy [to produce] operative policies through a combination of muddling through, satisfying, compromise and accommodation."[122] Bland contends that the structure "is a random management system in which decisions are driven by immediate needs that appear on the defence agenda haphazardly rather than a so-called rational management system that maximizes values."[123] Consequently, if this were the case, one would characterize NDHQ decision-making in many ways. These would include a reliance on avoiding controversial issues – delaying decisions or referring them to other committees or further reviews, compromise and/or trading off subordinate interests when a major interest is at stake, expressing policies in generalities so as

[118] Ibid, 354-355.
[119] See Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 30-54 for a more complete discussion. Their study only became available while this paper was being finalized; hence the more extensive references to earlier publications by Bland on this topic.
[120] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 4.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid, 5.
[123] Ibid.

not to create a controversy or to avoid being committed to the policy later, and worse, basing policies upon assumptions which may not be realistic.[124]

Consequently, by accepting the premise that bargaining is the mechanism, driven the actors, it is imperative at this stage of the paper to fully understand the needs and motives of the three services. While few inside the department would openly admit it (after all the CF is a unified service), the hard reality is that decision-making for several areas of defence management continues to be influenced by the services' self-interests, as is amplified in this next section.

The Service Masks of the Canadian Forces

Carl H. Builder, a researcher with the RAND Corporation, conducted in the late 1980s a study of the U.S. service institutions, devoted to analysing and explaining why the army, navy and air force behave the way they do. Builder argued that the institutions, "while composed of many, ever-changing individuals, *have distinct and enduring personalities* of their own that govern much of their behaviour."[125] He stated that the interests, problems and aspirations of the military institutions are best revealed in their approaches to military strategy, planning and analysis. More importantly, understanding the services' attitudes allows a better comprehension of the nature and the issues of the debate with the higher authorities and among them. While his study focused strictly on American military institutions, the themes and conclusions offered are certainly applicable to the CF.[126]

Builder described in detail the "five faces of service personalities." These include, what each service reveres the most as a principle or cherish as an ideal (in essence the roots of the traditions), how each service measures itself and determines success, how each service differs in their devotion or pride toward their equipment and skills, how each service differs in their intra-service distinctions and how it deals with them, and, how each service is confident in its rightful

[124] Adapted from Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 157.
[125] Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*, 3. Emphasis added.
[126] Builder admits that there is a risk in attributing a personality to an institution, more so when that personality is imbued with motives. It is by looking at their behaviour and their history – instead of their words – that one can best explain the institutions, since those reflect their character or personality. His study presents a short discussion on this issue. See Builder, *The Masks of War*, 10-11.

independent status and the relevance of its missions and capabilities.[127] Accordingly, a brief summary of the Canadian service identities and behaviours can be deducted by applying Builder's concepts and findings to the CF.[128]

The navy, more than any of the other services, is marked by its independence, stature and traditions. The fiercest opposition to unification and jointness in Canada and in the U.S. has been the navy. There is a confidence in its legitimacy as an independent institution, and its contribution to Canadian national security – domestic or international.[129] Operationally, the navy would prefer to be given a mission, command its own forces and be "left alone." It is not surprising, therefore, to find the navy most disgruntled over the encroachment of NDHQ into the details of its command and control and its general support during expeditionary operations. The navy would prefer to do it alone – as it has proven capable of doing so several times in the past.[130] Navy personnel are more likely to associate themselves with the navy, its traditions and identity, than with its ships and equipment.[131] The navy always seems to have the clearest sense of its identity and interests; their lucid strategy and up-to-date doctrine are frequently the first of the three services out, as demonstrated by the so-called Brock Plan that laid out a twenty-year development plan for the navy[132] or the recent navy strategy for 2020, *Leadmark*.[133] Every senior navy officer in the CF shares the same assumptions as the senior navy leaders and clearly identify with the purpose and missions of the service. The navy always have less difficulty than the other services in making decisions, even painful decisions.

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[127] Ibid, 17-30.

[128] A detailed analysis of Canadian military culture and its differences with American military cultures has been prepared by English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*.

[129] See notably the recent speech by CMS to the 2004 annual general meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, as the navy positions itself for the forthcoming defence policy review. See Admiral Ron Buck, "The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy," available at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/english-frame.htm, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

[130] Examples abound, such as the Korea War and the Persian Gulf War.

[131] In this regard, the words and emphasis of Rear Admiral Landymore, who was eventually fired for his opposition to unification, are instructive. Speaking to his personnel about the effect of unification on the Navy, he "had repeatedly told his subordinates that there was no plan to destroy Service identity or morale or to replace the traditional Service uniforms." David P. Burke, "Hellyer and Landymore: The Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces and an Admiral's Revolt", *American Review of Canadian Studies* VIII (Autumn 1978), 5.

[132] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 70.

[133] Department of National Defence, L*eadmark: The Navy Strategy for 2020*, available at http://www.navy.dnd.ca/leadmark/doc/index_e.asp, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

The air forces of the world see themselves as a decisive instrument of warfare, a strategy made possible and sustained by modern technology.[134] Since the airplane – a marvel of technology – gave birth to independent air forces, the air forces have always nurtured and applied technology. The air force is extremely proud of its people, the professionalism of the institution and its crews, delighting the public with air shows and air demonstration teams to exhibit this pride. Air force pilots often identify themselves with an airplane, even before the institution; some see themselves as pilots before officers. The newest of the three services, the air force has always been most sensitive to defending and guarding its legitimacy and its independence as an institution. The elimination of the RCAF in 1968 due to unification of the three services, and the partition of its assets in several functional commands, was a critical setback for the Canadian Air Force.[135] Survival of the air force as an institution is closely tied to retaining the decisive and independent instruments of warfare – the CF-18s in Canada's case – and employing it as often as is practically possible in international operations to demonstrate its importance and relevance.

The army sees itself as the essential "artisan of war," forged by history, having its roots in the citizenry with the Militia.[136] The army is very proud of its history of service and loyalty to this country. The army takes pride in being the keeper of the essential skills of soldiering. Until recently, the army was notorious for its reluctance to embrace new technologies, methods, or even professional education. Regimental affiliations are at the centre of self-identification within the army, where strong loyalty is focused. The army is the most secure of the three services, as modern warfare and recent stability operations have demonstrated the need for more than a few highly trained soldiers. The army, not being concerned with survival of the service, has been the most supportive of unification and jointness. Command of national forces is important for the army, as it considers itself the true professional arm of the CF – the one who best understands joint operations and how the CF can be best employed to meet the national goals and objectives.

[134] Builder, *Masks of War*, 32-33.
[135] The establishment of Air Command in 1975, as a de facto air force headquarters, in essence re-created the Canadian Air Force as an independent entity.
[136] Builder, *Masks of War*, 32-33.

Allan D. English, a retired CF officer and senior research fellow at the CF Leadership Institute, recently published the first comprehensive examination of the Canadian military culture, with specific attention being devoted to assessing the impact of Americanization on the CF. English contends that the appearance of a CF culture, as opposed to three separate service cultures, occurred forcibly with unification in the 1960s. That being said, he admits that "[o]ne uniform and one command structure did not, however, create a single military culture in Canada," but that unification "did bring cultural change to the officer corps of the CF."[137] The decision to restore distinctive service uniforms in the mid-1980s, English continues, was a statement reflecting the continued existence of three service cultures within the CF,[138] and certainly a step backward toward creating a unified culture.[139]

The three CF services are undeniably different, extremely proud of their heritage and traditions, and highly professional. The challenge with service military culture occurs when this "relatively healthy expression of solidarity to a community hardens into an unreasoned, blind commitment to existing doctrine or structure."[140] Admiral Owens, in a critical analysis of the joint journey made in the U.S. since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, recognized a need to overcome what he characterized as "crystalline stovepipes [which contain the traditions, doctrine and loyalties] that separate the services." Owens referred to them as crystalline because it is easy to miss them. "Sometimes we see through them as if they were not there. Yet if you look closely you will discover them."[141] While the walls of the Canadian service stovepipes may not be as solid as they were in 1964, and certainly not as inflexible as those of the U.S. military, they are nevertheless omnipresent and continue to influence, to varying degree, the resolution of many CF issues.

The dilemma for the proponents of unification is that there is no comparative unified or "purple" culture, and it is unlikely there will ever be one. The services' cultures, by their simple existence rooted in history and traditions, and constantly reinforced and shaped by the demands

[137] English, *Understanding Military Culture*, 95-96.
[138] Ibid, 96.
[139] See also Thériault, "Reflections on Canadian Defence Policy and its Underlying Structural Problems," who stated that the healthy trend of growing internal cohesion was arrested by the government's ordered decision to re-introduce distinct environmental uniforms," 8.
[140] Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War*, 53.
[141] Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 93.

of combat effectiveness, are unconsciously generating centrifugal forces pulling apart the unified approach to defence management, against which there is no strong counterbalancing culture – only rational ideas and concepts. Thus, the strong-service idea manages to survive, and works its magnetism daily in the CF continuing to influence outcomes and policies.

One simplified approach proposed in this paper to explain the impact of service protectionism is through the concept of service filters, modelled with the use of four concentric circles, used to "classify and filter" issues. The innermost circle filters issues that are considered critical to the growth and survival of a service, while the outside circle filters issues of minor importance to the service, with two intermediate circles representing issues of interest and importance to a service (see Figure 1). For instance, in the inner circle are core issues to each service and these would, for instance, include issues such as, assignment of missions, changes to the "balanced force" argument (explained in the next part of the paper), decisions related to capabilities, force structure, acquisition and replacement of weapon systems. Accordingly these issues require undivided attention at the most senior levels of the services, most often demanding the personal attention and engagement of the service Chiefs of Staff. The inner intermediate filter would include issues such as government decisions on which elements of the CF should participate in international operations, changes to the structure of combat support, or the selection of task force commanders for significant expeditionary operations. Issues like the creation of a new CF agency or changes to base/garrison logistics and infrastructure arrangements, while hotly debated at times, are of interest to the services but seldom worth a service Chief of Staff "falling on his sword" over them. Issues of this type are part of the outer intermediate filter. Finally, there are many issues that the services consider relatively minor, from their standpoint, and that are usually addressed through the staff process at the more junior staff level. Of note, it is important to appreciate that issues will move from one filter to another over time, and this for varying reasons.[142]

[142] Some critics may argued that issues of "vital" national security are too important to be "settled" through the influence of Service filters, and therefore, for obvious reasons, should not be affected by them.



FIGURE 1 - THE POWERFUL SERVICE FILTERS

While it is understood that services do not formally classify and prioritize issues, concepts and ideas along the specific categories described above, it is clear that there is within NDHQ a *de facto* ranking of issues which, ultimately, strongly influences the amount of energy and effort devoted to an issue (including a determination by the staff if the Chief of Staff needs to be personally engaged, or not), the rank of the representation at meetings, the level of negotiation, bargaining, and compromise, and the strategies that services are prepared to use and invest for progressing – or delaying – each issue. Issues are frequently "ranked" in a manner that is largely consistent with the distinct service personalities that were described above.

Bland correctly points out that power and influence within the defence establishment is defined by the defence structure. The defence structure, with its decision-making apparatus focused on a requirement for high horizontal integration, and centred largely on the consensus decision-making principle, is conducive to allowing the services to move their agenda. The result is often a defence policy that is the sum of a number of discrete decisions about aims and allocation of resources among competing demands that result in military capabilities and the

deployment of armed forces,[143] rather than being the result of a deliberate top-down strategy. Consequently, over the years, the three traditional services have continued to defend and reinforce their institution – as the expense of unification – with most key interactions and associated decisions often assessed by the services and their proponents from the angle of service survival, growth or even dominance. The advancing of the service strategies is most effective in a highly bureaucratic environment. Thus, it should be evident from the above discussion that any attempt by senior DND leaders to progress integration, unification and even jointness needs to be mindful of the particular service interests and strategies, to the point that defence structures and processes must be devised to limit to a minimum the impact of bureaucratic politics. More importantly, senior leaders must be cognisant of those issues that fall within the inner filters of the services, to ensure that strategies and decisions on those issues are elevated as much as possible to senior departmental leadership forum where service influence is less dominant.[144]

This part of this paper has highlighted the many reasons why there is a strong tendency for the traditional services to defend and reinforce their respective institution and, in doing so, to contest many of the ideas behind unification. The next part of this study will assess the status and progress of unification in the CF, with the purpose of determining in which sphere of national defence and the CF the strong-service idea remains dominant.

PART IV – THE CF IN 2004: DOMINANT CONCEPTS AT CROSSROADS

As was mentioned above, the penchant for service parochialism, and the degree of success of this unilateralism approach, varies depending on the nature of the defence issues. This part of the paper will assess the direction of the "unification – strong-service pendulum" in 2004, with a view to determining where the CF institution is heading in the coming years. Each section will review specific themes of defence policy and defence management, consistent with those ideas and concepts espoused by Hellyer's unification, assess their status and determine the prevalence of the strong-service idea for each of those.

[143] Ibid: 4.
[144] These would include the Armed Forces Council, Defence Management Committee and Joint Capability Requirements Board, chaired by either the CDS or co-chaired by the CDS/DM.

Defence Policy Disarray: Why the Services Have Managed to Survive

In a discussion on the pre-Hellyer period, Bland commented that "without a national strategy to guide the expenditures of the defence budget the service chiefs were content to promote the merits of their own services and to compete for defence funding as best as they could."[145] The result of this strategy void has cultivated institutional competition, which, in turn, has fostered an appropriate allocation of resources to meet "the needs of a unified defence plan constructed from a national appreciation of Canada's strategic situation."[146] Indeed, the national policy gap in Canada over the years has been pretty consistent, with defence policy and the efficiency of policy and outcomes consistently being "backburner issues in Canadian governments," to the point where, "[d]efence policy is more or less whatever the prime minister says it is at any one time."[147]

In the mid-1990s, General Thériault, CDS between 1983 and 1986, offered through the publication of a series of articles, his reflections on the making of defence policy, including a most critical and insightful assessment of unification. Thériault remarked that,

> The absence of political leadership is the most serious problem.... It compounds weaknesses in policy directions, all of which it is also the cause. In the absence of a lucid and coherent policy framework ... there is a significant risk that orientation and management of defence will be shaped more by internal forces, including institutionally based perceptions or requirements.... This phenomenon is an inherent characteristic of the behaviour of all large institution, especially those with so strong a sense of their own mission.[148]

As he astutely observed, the lack of policy direction in the 1970s and 1980s created the perfect environment for the services to operate. He argued that this problem was compounded by the unification of the three services, the great deal of emotion and misunderstanding involved, and the manner of implementation of the policy. The combination of this situation with simultaneous budgetary reductions has "triggered strong institutional reflexes, which have lived on." As further evidence that defence policy disarray is an impediment to effective defence implementation and administration, he observed that, "[a] traumatic experience for the Forces,

[145] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 224.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Bland and Maloney, *Campaign for International Security*, 79.
[148] Thériault, "Reflections on Canadian Defence Policy and its Underlying Structural Problems," 8.

unification engendered considerable organizational turmoil and stresses."[149] Consequently, without a coherent policy framework and a single strategy, the ideals of unification were left to flounder over the years, with the strong-service idea inside the institution fostering "a bias against planning from a national perspective."[150]

To make matters worse, as Bland noted in 1995, defence policy in Canada over the years usually did not originate from a strategic idea but rather from the dynamics of the annual federal budget,[151] with defence policy driven by what defence spending is available, not by what is needed.[152] The result is that, although Cabinet will tend to set high-level policy, the detailed implementation of that policy is almost always left to the military. While it seems self-evident to most observers that senior officers and officials should always ensure that defence policy is implemented in response to the real interests of the state, and not institutional interests,[153] it remains, as Bland observed, that "defence ministers are often content to leave to members of the defence establishment the resolution of defence matters and that [approach] promotes contests within the establishment."[154] He goes on to add that it is thus an obligation for politicians "to set out plainly the government's interpretation of its defence commitments and to ensure that military officers understand and comply with that interpretation."[155] Without real political control, the implementation of defence policy in Canada ends up being the outcome of bureaucratic politics. Left to their own, military officers make their own interpretation of commitments. A microcosm of this reality within DND, and the associated dynamics that a defence policy void will often generate, is discernible in the development of military commitments for international operations.

The deputy chief of the defence staff (DCDS) and the ECSs have a significant influence in proposing military options to the CDS and to the government when long-term military commitments to an alliance or military contributions to an contingency international mission are

[149]Ibid.
[150] Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 82.
[151] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 158.
[152] Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 77.
[153] Ross Graham, "Civil Control of the Canadian Forces," *Canadian Military Journal* (Spring 2002), 27.
[154] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 159.
[155] Ibid, 15.

being considered.[156] The consequence of these commitments and engagements is often an important determinant of future service capabilities.[157] The Chiefs of Staff will seldom let an opportunity pass to have elements of their respective service engaged in an operation, especially if the mission is high profile, it can be accomplished successfully, the risks are reasonable, and the military capability is available and sustainable.[158] The Canadian military does have an important role to play in support of Canada's foreign policy but that role is "conditional on the ability of those forces to achieve the aim of the mission and to do so without unacceptable risk."[159] Back-room negotiations take place at the highest levels to ensure potential force contributions presented to the minister and the government will include a contribution from each service (needless to say, this depends on the overall mission and the specificity of the theatre of operations).[160] The recent contributions and experiences with Operation *APOLLO*, the Canadian participation in the United States-led campaign against terrorism, are a case in point.

The opportunity for a service to get some of its high-profile military components engaged in an operation could, eventually, make an important difference in future years in acquiring new capabilities, funding a retrofit or upgrade program or even ensuring the survival of a key core capability. A mid or high-intensity international operation, while demanding and potentially costly, is indispensable to the CF for validating equipment, doctrine, concepts of operation, interoperability and procedures.

Bland claims that "service commanders work to create and to enhance their service's commitments because commitments can be translated into resources and the accumulation of resources is a measure of success."[161] Commitments such the UN Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT),

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[156] The DCDS is responsible on behalf of the CDS for planning and commanding and controlling of contingency international operations, and thus has a key role to play in recommending military contributions.

[157] The views of Mackenzie King on this issue are quite interesting, as relayed by Bland and Maloney: "The danger in defence spending ... is that it creates capabilities and if Canada has military capabilities, it might wander into some kind of operational commitment. Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 77.

[158] Sustainability is not always the key issue, especially considering the 'early in, early out' policy of the government; that being said, ECSs are aware that, once the troops are deployed, they may have to rotate them a few times, as the current scenario in Afghanistan is showing.

[159] Peter T. Haydon, "Panel Discussion: Canada's Military Roles Abroad," in David E. Code and Ian Cameron, *Canadian Forces Roles Abroad* (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1995), 90.

[160] Little has changed over the years; see the interesting discussion on inter-service fights for the Canadian participation to the Korean War in Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint*, 75.

[161] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 169.

Immediate Reaction Force (Land), Rapid Reaction Force (Air) or NORAD are typical commitments that are critical to the survival of core capabilities of the services,[162] and are cited as frequently in internal defence documentation as possible as examples of why a certain capability must be retained or upgraded. Over the years, officers and officials have advanced plans and procedures aimed at so-called rational policy-making. These separate systems had dual roles, such as advancing real or perceived commitments and ensuring the health and longevity of particular services. While service Chiefs of Staff now know better than to develop plans that will gobble the entire defence capital budget,[163] the process has been largely bottom-up and, until recently, frequently driven by service survival and growth.

To be fair, the senior military leaders certainly have a crucial role to play in advising and in influencing the decision-makers for the selection of the military capabilities that best deliver the defence policy for the government of the day. The fact that officials at national defence have been functioning in a policy deficit for many years, has resulted in many senior military officers getting used to – even comfortable – operating in this environment. Considering the policy void and the uncertainty of the international environment, national defence analyses, estimates, and plans often reflect more strategic considerations than is often given credit by critics and analysts. Certainly, the nature of the military roles in post-Cold War and 9/11 eras, combined with continued funding challenges – especially capital funding – made the choices of military capabilities even more contentious. But, there are clear signs on the horizon that the defence policy process is about to change, to one reflecting a more national strategic approach which will likely result in a more coherent unified defence policy, and a diminished influence for the services.

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[162] See Defence Plan 2003-2004 online, at http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/DPOnline/Main_e.asp, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

[163] For instance, in the early 1960s, the so-called The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Naval Objectives, produced under the direction of Rear-Admiral Jeffery Brock in 1961, set out a naval plan for 25 years. The "plan was too ambitious, incredible in scope, cost, and special interest and, for these reasons, was rejected by Hellyer soon after he became Defence Minister." Douglas Bland, "Everything Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-Making in Canada," *Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, The Canadian Strategic Forecast, 2000), 16.

The new December 2003 Paul Martin government has unambiguously indicated that it intends to take charge of the foreign and defence policy agenda and process,[164] publishing a new agenda for the government which includes the creation of several new Cabinet committees, the establishment of a new position of National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in the Privy Council Office and the undertaking of a comprehensive review of Canada's place in the world. This review will consist of the development of an "integrated and coherent international policy framework for diplomacy, defence, development and trade."[165] Indicative of this commitment to more national strategic direction in all areas of government, the federal government recently published a comprehensive *National Security Policy* setting out an integrated strategy and action plan to address current and future threats to Canada.[166] Most notably, the policy states that the forthcoming "International Policy Review will make important recommendations regarding the Government of Canada's diplomatic, defence and development, *as well as the structure of the Canadian Forces*."[167]

If these policy statements are not sufficient to indicate a change in trend in the formulation of Canadian defence policy and the determination of future CF military capabilities, the recent address by Prime Minister Martin at CFB Gagetown is a clear indication, for one, of his personal interest in this important dossier but, more significantly, of the recognition of the need for a more strategic and integrated approach in developing policies for Canadian defence, diplomacy and development. The words of the Prime Minister are worth reiterating to highlight the importance of the forthcoming change, "Canada is now at a defining moment in its history. Putting in place a new strategic plan for the Canadian Forces is a critical element in ensuring that Canada's role in the world is one of influence and pride."[168] What the international policy review will also likely mean is that the new defence policy will not be developed in isolation,

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[164] The Paul Martin vision was first enunciated in a document titled *Making History The Politics of Achievement* published in anticipation of the Nov 2003 Liberal Party leadership convention. Available at http://www.liberal.ca/PDF/politics-of-achievement_e.pdf, accessed 24 May 2004. See also notably the 14 Apr 2004 address by the Prime Minister at CFB Gagetown, available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=172, accessed 24 May 2004.

[165] See *Changes to Government*, from the web site of the Prime Minister, available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/chgs_to_gov.asp, accessed 24 May 2004.

[166] Policy available at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/natsecurnat_e.pdf, accessed 24 May 2004, 47-50.

[167] Ibid, 47. Emphasis added.

[168] Paul Martin, address by the Prime Minister at CFB Gagetown, 14 Apr 2004, available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=172, accessed 24 May 2004.

with service interests at its core, but as part of a new international policy, considerate of all its constituents, including diplomacy, development and trade, and even elements of the national security policy applicable to National Defence. The signs are indicating that the next Canadian defence policy, and by extension the definition of future CF military capabilities, will be determined based on the real interests of the state, and not institutional interests. The current Liberal government has certainly given the impression in the past few months that it is prepared to invest the intellectual effort to construct a new strategy and structure for the defence of Canada.[169]

Top-Down Strategy and the Demise of the Balanced Force Argument: The Keys to CF Transformation

> The Government has had to make hard choices. Most areas of defence will be cut ... some substantially more than others. The relative weights of the naval, land and air establishments that have prevailed for many years will be adjusted ... primarily to allow for the transfer of resources to ... land combat and combat support forces.[170]
>
> *1994 White Paper on Defence*

If the combination of a lack of a coherent unified defence policy and the inability of the politicians to impose a top-down strategy has been fostering service unilateralism, it is undeniably the strength and perpetuation of the "balanced force" argument that has allowed the individual services to survive and even flourish at times. The focus in the past has always been on equipment acquisition, modernization and replacement, which meant that the services were often the key offices to define requirements, fostering a bottom-up approach to defence policy implementation which, in turn, perpetuated the concept of a balanced CF.

The principle of balanced forces within the CF is well explained in Bland's *Chiefs of Defence*, and will be summarily defined here for the purpose of this paper. The "balanced force" argument is the contention that the maintenance of certain key fighting capabilities within each service is good for Canada, a principle that has been reflected practically in the way NDHQ

[169] This suggestion is not novel; it had been advanced by Bland in 1995. See Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 266.
[170] Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 40.

allocates funds and resources among activities.[171] There seems to be strong internal consensus built over the years within the CF that tended to sustain the bottom-up balanced service-oriented approach to defence planning. Clearly, this long-standing principle is in danger of being relegated to a minor role, as will be discussed in this section of the paper.

This "balanced force" principle was put to the test in the early 1990s when Vice Admiral Charles Thomas, then Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), submitted his resignation to the CDS, General John de Chastelain, in protest over departmental priorities and "the absence of strategy in Canadian defence policy."[172] His public letter stated that he was unable to accept "a policy proposal that will minimize the capability and development of the maritime forces," further asserting the argument – in an effort to promote the employment of maritime forces in potential combat environments – that he "did not believe that land force combat units at the brigade group level will be similarly deployed ... [as] there is no stomach to see large number of Canadians die on television."[173]

De Chastelain replied publicly to Thomas, admonishing him in the same arena for his "farfetched ... and insulting" suggestions about the potential army commitments abroad. More telling, however, de Chastelain "counterattacked not with a more precise strategy, but from an essentially service point of view," stating that to follow Thomas' argument would produce a "lopsided menu of defence choices."[174] The CDS comments, written in 1991, are quite telling and worth restating here:

> It would be unconscionable to recommend that we allow these capabilities [air force and army] to atrophy in favour of the further development of the naval forces. Within the limits dictated by funding, we must offer the government the broadest possible range of military options to meet the ever-changing security challenges at home and abroad.... no matter what restrictions are placed on our

[171] See Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, for a more complete discussion on this issue, including a table with distribution of defence expenditures, 268-272.
[172] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 271.
[173] Letter from Vice-Admiral Charles Thomas, to General de Chastelain, CDS, reproduced in "Top Warriors Cross Swords," *Vancouver Sun*, 1 May 1991. The fact that Thomas was the VCDS – not the Commander of Maritime Command – when he wrote his protestation letter is quite telling about where the higher loyalty of certain senior officers stands in dire times.
[174] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 271.

> size in the restructuring process, I will attempt to ensure that *we maintain professional fighting capabilities in each of the environmental elements*.[175]

De Chastelain then added that as "chief of the defence staff I must consider, and represent to government, the interests of all elements of the Canadian Forces."[176] The central issue of this debate, in that a service-oriented defence policy is preferable to a national defence policy, was implied in the CDS letter. This principle remained sheltered even during the drastic reductions of the mid-1990s when, in the face of rapidly declining budgets, senior military officers again argued for balanced military forces in order to preserve the skeletal remains of the three services when the national defence likely demanded choices based on other interests.[177]

Besides strictly blaming service parochialism, there are several valid reasons explaining why the "balanced force" solution is so strong within the senior military leadership and the continued preferred approach to force structure planning. First, Bland speculates that "the desire for a balance general-purpose force originates in most officers' insecurity about the uncertain future. It is an understandable and reasonable reaction to their responsibility to provide for the defence of Canada now and in years to come."[178] Any process of reduction will always be tempered by an intention not to repeat the mistakes of the 1930s and the 1970s when Canadian military capabilities declined. This apprehension will necessarily almost always translate into a cautious approach to capability definition and, consequently, will tend to foster capability preservation.

Senior military leaders and the CDS make choices that are rational from their perspectives and that tend to minimize risks for the future, especially in the face of continuing government policy inconsistencies. The one major obstacle to executing an internal risk assessment of this type in support of any review is that there is no satisfactory set of metrics available to appropriately measure the risks, in the short and long term, for both the government and the CF. This leaves only subjective judgement, and a heavy reliance on history, which is not always the most reliable guide for the future. In the absence of a well-enunciated defence policy

[175] De Chastelain, as quoted in Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 271-272. Emphasis added.
[176] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 271.
[177] Ibid: 17.
[178] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 268.

or a rigorous force development methodology – beyond stating that a balanced force must be maintained – a risk assessment based solely upon judgement is nevertheless open to interpretation and questioning.

Second, service chiefs clearly view their role as one of trustee of the capabilities of their service. As Bland noted, "there are few accolades for officers who voluntarily give up command assets to enhance other command's needs," and it is all but certain senior officers, retired and active, of a service would long remember who the Chief of Staff was when a capability was eliminated. Every Chief of Staff is well aware that a new capability can seldom be acquired in the two to four year reign that he is serving. But a capability can be eliminated by the stroke of a government pen, *à la* Airborne Regiment.[179] General Foulkes statement's in front of the Special Committee of Defence in 1963 best summarizes the predicament facing Chiefs of Staff: "No Chief of Staff of his service wants to be known as the man who does away with his own service. Therefore, there is considerable reluctance to do away with a system which essentially ... may lead to a considerable reduction in a particular service."[180]

Finally, service Chiefs of Staff truly and professionally believe that their service is the best placed to contribute to Canada's national defence, especially when jockeying for contribution to international operations. Andrew C. Richter, a well-published Canadian academic, recently wrote an article for the U.S. *Naval War College Review*, which is worth referring to illustrate this point here. He argued that, "the service that can make the best case for first priority [for defence funding] is the navy, as a result of its modern fleet, widespread political support, and broad range of missions that it can undertake."[181] Richter goes on to state that since the government will not be able to fund adequately all three services, then the CF needs to prioritize among the services to "ensure that at least one maintains a wide range of

[179] Within the Air Force community, Lieutenant-General Bill Carr is till revered, as he managed during his tenure as a senior general officer to re-establish Air Command. His brief résumé in Canada's Aviation Hall of Fame is telling, "... he was appointed the first Commander of the Canadian Forces Air Command. He is known as the 'Father of the Modern Air Force' for his work in consolidating military aviation in the aftermath of the unification of the forces." See Canada's Aviation Hall of Fame, available at http://www.cahf.ca/members/C_members.htm, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

[180] Foulkes, quoted in Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada*, 43.

[181] Andrew C. Richter, "Alongside The Best: The Future of the Canadian Forces," *Naval War College Review* 56 (Winter 2003), 67.

interoperability capabilities."[182] And this service should be the navy, according to Richter. Three points are worth making with regard to this article. Richter is clearly not taking about prioritizing based on capabilities, but on services. His views, while articulated from a navy perspective, would likely be similar if expressed publicly by proponents of the other two services, albeit admittedly argued from a different perspective. Thirdly, views like those of Richter tend to come from outside the military; there is a sort of "gentlemen's code" that discourages service Chiefs of Staff, while still wearing the uniform, from publicly making dramatic force structure statements and to seek gains at the expense of the other services.

The challenge constantly facing senior planners over the years has been the lack of a top-down definition of desired capabilities, which would have likely questioned the retention of certain warfighting capabilities. Accordingly, the "balanced force" argument has continued to prevail. The Minister's Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency completed in August 2003 a study to assist the MND in finding $200 million in savings for internal relocation within DND and the CF.[183] The committee was fairly critical of the management culture within DND, including many aspects of strategic planning. In their report, the committee recognized the weaknesses with the current force development planning, stating that "capital equipment and other requirements are driven 'bottom up' rather than 'top-down' and they do not flow from a coherent overall plan,"[184] and recommended more top-down direction based on a broader CF perspective.

While defence policy in Canada has always been decided by what is available, not by what is needed, there are strong indications that this approach is changing, starting at the most senior levels of the department. The changes in this regard include efforts devoted in the past few years to develop a top-down defence strategy and a true capabilities-based planning process. Further, the last few years have seen a more active role by recent MNDs in determining future

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[182] Ibid.

[183] Minister's Advisory Committee of Administrative Efficiency, *Achieving Administrative Efficiency: Report to the Minister of National Defence* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2003). The Minister appointed his Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency to contribute to his efforts to find $200 million in internal savings to reallocate from lower to higher priorities within the defence program. The Committee was composed of four experts with experience in private and public sector administration, management, and restructuring, including a former VCDS. Available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Focus/AE/AEReportFull_e.pdf, accessed 24 May 2004.

[184] Ibid, 17.

force capabilities and prioritizing capital acquisitions, and, most significantly, the commencement of a discussion on the concept of an asymmetric CF.

A more top-down approach to strategy and force development planning within DND started with the publication of *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020* (hereinafter *Strategy 2020*), the first internal strategy promulgated by the department in years, which provided "a strategic framework for Defence planning and decision-making to help guide the institution well into the next century."[185] Work is underway to produce the next version of defence strategy, which is expected to be released within the year. In terms of capability planning,[186] the Joint Capability Requirement Board (JCRB), chaired by the VCDS, was created a few years ago to review all major crown projects as well as cross-environmental procurements to ensure commonality across the CF. A number of Joint Capability Action Teams (JCAT), reporting to the JCRB on a regular basis, have been instituted to address specific CF-wide capability issues that require extensive horizontal integration with the intent of bringing greater operational focus to the delivery of future capabilities.[187]

Processes have also been reviewed. The *Strategic Capability Planning for the CF* manual outlines the process for determining resource allocation consistent with defence strategy,[188] and a *2002-2012 Capability Outlook,* to provide context to defence planning activities to better harmonize strategic planning and future force development, was issued in 2002.[189] In addition, "Joint Force Planning Scenarios" and a *Canadian Joint Task List* [190] were

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[185] *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, available at http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/strategy2k/intro_e.asp, accessed 24 May 2004.

[186] For a more complete discussion, see Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 40-50. See also the DND Strategic Capability Planning Framework document, available at http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/strat/intro_e.asp, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

[187] Ibid, 7. The Sustainment JCAT and Command and Control, Information and Intelligence (C2I2) are two of the most active JCATs. For instance, the C2I2 JCAT has been directing the development of the CF C4ISR Campaign Plan, and overseeing the development of the Canadian Forces Command System,[187] and have been quite directive, under the authority of the DCDS, in imposing their CF-integrated solution to these issues. There are many other examples.

[188] Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, *Strategic Capability Planning for the CF* ,http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/strat/intro_e.asp, accessed on 15 Apr 2004.

[189] Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, *Capability Outlook 2002-12,* http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/CAPABILITY_OUTLOOK_E.pdf, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

[190] Canadian Joint Task List: establishes a framework for describing, and relating, the myriad types of capabilities that may be required, to greater or lesser degrees, by the CF. It provides a common "language" for CF/DND force development within the context of force planning scenarios

developed to assist planners, and a new CF "Strategic Operating Concept" is being written to become the doctrinal framework for future CF Operations.[191] More telling perhaps, many senior officers now firmly believe that coherent CF planning can only start at the top.

Small, but significant changes are being introduced and contemplated to minimize the influence of bureaucratic politics and develop a more unified approach to defence implementation. Recently, the CDS announced the creation of a new three-star position within his office to advise him for the forthcoming defence policy review, a step that highlights the requirement for senior military independent advice to the CDS into the formulation CF input into a new defence policy. Further, the Minister's Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency report was fairly critical of the management culture within DND, and made several recommendations to enhance management effectiveness, notably at NDHQ. These included the development of a more centralized development philosophy, which would include the creation of a senior executive committee (senior to the Defence Management Committee), as a focal point of defence policy, strategic planning and corporate decision-making.[192] Although this recommendation of the committee has not been formally endorsed nor implemented yet, the mere mention of the creation of a senior defence executive committee that would formally exclude the service Chiefs of Staff is a sign that the "winds are changing."

In addition to structural changes within NDHQ to enable a more coherent CF process to defence and force structure planning, significant time has been devoted by senior leaders over the past eighteen months to develop a unified and integrated *Strategic Investment Capital Plan* (SCIP). The SCIP, formally released in early May 2004, represents a "comprehensive roadmap for ensuring the CF have the capabilities they need in the future."[193] The preparation of the SCIP extensively involved the former MND, John McCallum, and since December 2003, the new MND, David Pratt. While it is true that the SCIP process was largely focused on equipment replacement, modernization and acquisition (instead of end-to-end CF capability planning), the

[191] At the time of the writing of this paper, the author was advised that the Concept was with the CDS for final sign-off.
[192] Minister's Advisory Committee of Administrative Efficiency, *Achieving Administrative Efficiency: Report to the Minister of National Defence,* recommendations 3 and 4, 13-16. Besides the DM and the CDS, the membership would include the Assoc DM, VCDS, DCDS, ADM (Pol) and ADM (Fin CS).
[193] Acting DM & CDS Letter, "Strategic Investment Capability Plan," 11 May 2004, 1, available at http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/scip/letter_e.asp, accessed 26 May 2004.

personal involvement for several half-days of the former MND is a obvious sign of the strong interest of the government in shaping future CF capabilities.

Concerns with the SCIP were voiced by the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) who stated in a June 2003 open letter that "without a clear connection to transformation objectives," the SCIP was creating "widespread dissatisfaction" with the end product.[194] The issuance of the letter by Lieutenant-General Hillier was clearly an allergic reaction to the "apparently flawed" unified capability development approach reflected in the plan. Despite its criticism and its imperfections, the SCIP can certainly be considered a major step forward for Defence. Indeed, "it seeks to make long-term capability planning and resource investment more *strategic, top-down and holistic*,"[195] something that has been non-existent within the institution in the past.

Of equal importance, however, are the comments of CLS in his letter who suggested that perhaps it is time for the CF to abolish the "balanced force" principle, implying the possibility of asymmetric military forces in the future for Canada. The Commander of the Army called for a review of the international roles of the CF suggesting that "[t]he reality of the emerging security environment suggests that it is unlikely that the CF will be called upon to fight in blue skies or blue waters."[196] His letter essentially suggested the elimination of certain navy and air force capabilities to allow for funding of the army transformation.[197] While it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the correctness of the strategic assessment offered by CLS (forthcoming foreign and defence policy reviews may confirm it), the issue here, which is central to the argument of this section of the paper, is that the validity of the concept of a "balanced force" within the CF is being questioned at the most senior levels within the department, and not only by academics, as is frequently the case. Whereas Hillier's treading into the defence policy arena – and challenging the sacrosanct "balanced force" argument – was considered a *faux pas* by

[194] Hillier, "Strategic Capability Investment Plan," Letter 3136-5 (CLS) 26 Jun 2003, 1.
[195] Acting DM & CDS Letter, "Strategic Investment Capability Plan," 1. Emphasis added.
[196] Hillier, "Strategic Capability Investment Plan," 4.
[197] Ibid. There are indications that the letter created hostile "waves" within the halls of NDHQ that are still reverberating, continuing to give credence to the argument that service "tribalism" remains alive and healthy.

some, he must be admired for the courage of his convictions, and for initiating a most important debate.[198]

In the end, government officials must rely greatly on the professional military advice of their senior military leaders (as it should be) and, when applicable, on the independent counsel of other senior defence officials, such as the deputy minister. "The military profession has strong institutional instincts and unique knowledge that make it an indispensable part of the defence policy process," as many would agree.[199] It is thus important for the generals and admirals to provide advice that is, and perceived to be, service-neutral; this will mean seriously reassessing the long-standing principle of the maintenance of the balanced services in response to Canada's future needs.[200] In this vein, the concept of an "asymmetric force" is starting to appear in selected defence statements, although, at this stage of the debate, the context of its use and the consequences that may result from its application are creating certain ambiguities and some apprehension. The comments made the CDS in his most recent annual report to Parliament, are instructive.

> This [transformation] will require difficult choices. We will have to reallocate from lower to higher priorities. Our choices will need to be *selective, strategic and asymmetric*. We will have to choose which new capabilities to invest in, and what existing capabilities to maintain, reduce or eliminate. We cannot and will not pursue a transformation agenda by 'tinkering' at the margins in new capabilities without reducing or eliminating those that are no longer relevant in the current and future strategic environment.[201]

There are obvious signals being sent in several quarters suggesting that the long-standing "balanced force" argument is softening with the current civilian and military leaders. It remains to be determined if an asymmetric force is what is best for Canada. What seems certain, however, is that the forthcoming CF transformation choices will be decided on the basis of top-down strategy.

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[198] In his recent February 2004 address to the Conference of Defence Associations, CMS responded to the challenge, by making it clear that "the Navy is well positioned with a broad range of military capabilities to address ... potential conflicts anywhere in the world ... [and] the Navy's role will be critical to our government's ... intention to participate on the world stage," clearly implying that there is more to international operations than providing ground troops. Address by Vice Admiral R.D. Buck to the Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, 25 Feb 2004, available at http://www.cda-cdai.ca/english-frame.htm, accessed on 15 Apr 2004.
[199] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 287.
[200] Ibid, 272.
[201] R.R. Henault, *CDS Annual Report 2002-2003*. Emphasis added.

Resource Devolution and Operational Effectiveness in The "Decade of Darkness"

> The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will, in particular, continue to improve resource management ... to ensure the best possible use of resources at all levels of the organization. The management policy emphasizes the delegation of decision-making authority, the empowerment of personnel, the elimination of 'red tape' and overlapping functions and the promotion of innovation.[202]
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> *1994 Defence White Paper*

If the continued disarray in Canadian defence policy and the safeguarding of the "balanced force" argument were beneficial to preserving the strong-service idea over the years, it is undoubtedly the response to the challenges created by the end of the post-Cold War that has contributed more to de-unification of the CF than any other episode. The need to bring the federal deficit under control and the expected post-Cold War "peace divided" would mean huge military spending cuts over a few years, with the expectation that significant savings could be achieved by eliminating waste and bureaucracy.[203] In addition, the transition from routine and static operations to contingency and expeditionary operations would add significantly to the complexity of Canadian defence throughout the 1990s. It is therefore important to understand some of those key elements to better appreciate the nature of the transformation that is taking place in the CF today. This section of the paper will review briefly the 1990s, a period "convulsed by contradictions, confusions, and difficulties,"[204] when the management-based reforms to Defence also reached their apex.

The 1994 Defence White Paper guidance and the ensuing Management, Command and Control Re-engineering (MCCR) initiative were a "bonanza" for the services, removing the shackles of restrictions, bureaucracy and red tape and allowing them to manage their resources the way they always wanted to do it. Yes, the budget cutbacks were draconian, headquarters structures were being slashed by fifty percent, fewer resources and personnel were left to do

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[202] Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*, 40-41.
[203] Discussion on this period on this issue can be found in Sharpe G.E (Joe) and Allan D. English, *Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces* (Winnipeg, MB: published for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Group by the Canadian Forces Training Materiel Production Centre, 2002), and recently, Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*.
[204] Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, xii.

anything, but the good news was that many of the old rules of the game had been thrown away with the reductions. Many senior commanders had adopted a "can't say no rule" to ensure only the illegal and most brainless ideas coming from the field could be rejected by higher headquarters.[205] Out-of-the-box thinking was strongly encouraged. It was too good to be true for the services and, unfortunately, it was.

The MCCR initiative had been established under direction of the federal budget in 1995 with the mandate to "re-engineer the DND/CF command, control and resource management structure, with emphasis on NDHQ, command and operational headquarters restructuring and downsizing,"[206] including developing structural options and implementation plans. With the creation of MCCR and *Defence 2000* concepts[207] was renewed the long-standing principle of military organization that commanders must have under their direct control the resources necessary to carry their assigned responsibilities. Authorities were thus realigned commensurate with the responsibilities of the commanders, and significant delegation of authority took place. The most significant of those devolutions consisted of the introduction of single operating budgets, suddenly giving total control of large budgets to the ECSs.[208] Generally, commanders of command further delegated much of their authorities to their base and wing commanders. A salary wage envelope was established allowing commanders to better control the civilian workforce to account for seasonal work fluctuations. Moreover, NDHQ, in the wake of the MCCRT recommendations and its own downsizing, was extremely keen on divesting itself of almost anything, including units that were transferred wholesale to the ECSs. Certain functions, such as many aspects of personnel management and individual training, were devolved back to the army, air force and navy for the first time since the 1960s.

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[205] Air Command HQ had such a rule, where the authority to say NO to ideas from wings had been elevated to the Deputy Commander level, a major-general.

[206] Department of National Defence, *MCCRT Historical Report* (Ottawa: Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, 1997), background and paragraph 9.

[207] Defence 2000 initiative evolved from Public Service 2000 and was launched in the early 1990s "to provide a foundation for continuous improvement in the way DND/CF manage and conduct business in support of Canada's defence mission and task objectives." The objectives included improving efficiency in the Department, renewing the culture, and improving innovation and risk taking at the lowest levels of the organization. Daniel Gosselin, *Defence 2000 – A Critical Perspective* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, Ex New Horizons Paper, 1994).

[208] For instance, the Commander of the Air Force – almost overnight – had the authority to save jet fuel if flying hours were reduced (for whatever valid reasons) and apply the savings elsewhere within his command – something that had not been seen since the early 1960s. Some capital funding, in the areas of construction and minor capital requirements was also devolved to commanders, with delegated financial authorities varying.

In general, commanders and individuals were given much greater latitude to do their jobs, and, in so doing, were expected to gain more personal and professional satisfaction. In turn, they were also expected to exercise a greater measure of self-discipline and exemplify flawless ethical behaviour in the performance of their duties and in the use of resources.[209] Mission accomplishment took priority, and it was determined that operational effectiveness could only be achieved by giving the commanders full control of their resources. This was one of the strongest arguments used for the devolution and decentralization of the mid-1990s. Delegating decision-making and empowering people meant giving them the resources to do the job. The lessons learned by commanders during operations of the period, such as the Oka crisis of 1990, were being adopted to drive significant changes. In the past, commanders had repeatedly not been given authority for operational decisions or control over resources commensurate with their responsibilities or in keeping with the approved concept of operations.[210]

Operationally, the impact was equally significant. With the explosion of contingency operations, the focus of the ECSs was now on developing deployable capabilities to meet the demands of the new world disorder, in which Canada wanted to make a difference with military contributions.[211] Services, now engaged in operations all around the world, and always operating independently of other CF services within coalitions,[212] quickly found out that expeditionary operations demanded responsive deployable support elements. In the field, especially in the areas of combat and general support functions,[213] the argument constantly advanced was "that having someone else, another service or a central organization, perform these mission-critical tasks would potentially degrade operational capability." After all, as the argument went, the support tasks unique to a particular service were performed in different ways, and best understood by people of the same service. Ironically, one of the reasons given to Hellyer by his

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[209] Department of National Defence, *Organization and Accountability*, 2nd ed., 1999, available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister/eng/authority/oa_e.htm, accessed 15 Apr 2004.
[210] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 200.
[211] There were also a number of high-profile domestic operations for the CF in the 1990s such as the Oka crisis, the Manitoba and the Saguenay Floods, the Eastern Canada ice storm, forest fires and Y2K.
[212] The issue of "interoperability" is an important one for the CF, but is beyond the scope of this paper. Interested readers should consult Ann L. Griffiths ed., *The Canadian Forces and Interoperability: Panacea or Perdition?* (Halifax: Dalhousie University, The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2002).
[213] The doctrine is still in flux with respect to support terminology. NDHQ has adopted the term 'close' support to identify the support that must be integral to fighting units (what used to be called first-line and a part of second line). General support is the term to designate the rear-area support, including the reach back to Canada for deployed operations.

senior military commanders in the 1960s to substantiate the postponement of integration and unification, as relayed by Vernon Kronenberg in his 1973 study of unification, was that "a serious loss in efficiency would result from integrating supporting services under one or other of the armed forces as the other service commanders would no longer have full control of their supporting services. This would be a bad thing, under the accepted 'command and control' concept which was a significant element of military thinking."[214]

These changes affecting CF organizational, command and control, management and doctrinal concepts were indeed significant for the CF in the 1990s. While many critics today contend that the framework for downsizing and organizational restructuring was shaky, at best,[215] the plain fact is that the government had mandated drastic cuts, to be effected very rapidly, and MCCRT was the "sharpest tool in the tiny toolbox" at the time. While headquarters were significantly reduced and some capabilities were eliminated (providing the much-needed savings),[216] ironically, until MCCRT came about, the accepted belief at national defence was that more integration, more unification and more centralization were the solutions to address resources shortfalls. This theme had been repeated in white papers and defence statements since the 1940s. Almost overnight in the early 1990s, the tables were reversed, and it was decentralization and de-unification at its best.

To add to the complexity and ambiguity that this chaos generated, during the same period commanders of command were brought back to Ottawa, significantly changing the dynamic within NDHQ. Commenting on the impact, Granatstein summarily concludes, in his latest study of the Canadian military, that "[a]s unification weakened ... the environments assumed more and more of the old service prerogatives... The Chief of the Land Staff, Air Staff, and Maritime Staff returned to Ottawa in the 1990s and began to acquire almost all the powers and perquisites their predecessors had had before unification became the law in 1968. Committee started to multiply,

[214] Kronenberg, *All Together Now*, 12.
[215] This argument was alluded to during several presentations to the National Security Studies Course at Canadian Forces College, Toronto, Jan to Apr 2004, which the author attended. See also Sharpe and English, *Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces*, 91-92.
[216] The final tally for HQ reductions was 24 percent. See *MCCRT Historical Report*, paragraph 127.

and the triplication of functions began to creep back."[217] The return of the service Chiefs of Staff meant that as the recognizable leaders of the services, they and their staff could not be forgotten when important discussions were taking place and, consequently, the services regained some of their lost influence.

Allan D. English called the 1980s/1990s period one of "disintegration," which saw, in a most visible sense, organizational and uniform changes that marked the return of the three services in appearance if not in name. More importantly, the substantial downsizing – with all its associated sub-themes – "threw the CF into further disarray."[218] That being said, while Granatstein and English's assessments might have been correct as the new century was beginning, the next sections of this paper will show that, to the contrary, almost ten years after MCCRT, the services are quickly losing their grip on day-to-day defence management, with unification now clearly gaining momentum.

Jointness: The New Organizing Principle for the CF

At some point in the late 1990s for the CF, unification died and jointness was born. This transition just happened in the midst of cashing in the peace dividend through massive DND downsizing, endless budget reductions and continued high operational tempo. The terms unification and unified are non-existent today in CF documents and lexicon.[219] While the concept of unification used to mean full integration of service functions and headquarters, as envisaged by Foulkes and Hellyer, it is now at best viewed with suspicion. A few years ago, jointness, and all things joint, suddenly became the preferred mechanism to rekindle the unification ideals of the 1960s.[220]

While the term jointness is more strictly focused on the conduct of military operations in the U.S. joint culture, the meaning in Canada has been broadened to include more than the

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[217] Granatstein, *Who Killed The Canadian Military*, 92-93.
[218] English, *Understanding Military Culture*, 3.
[219] For instance, the glossary of the strategic capability manual for the CF does not include the term *unified*, see *Strategic Capability Planning for the CF*, available at http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/strat/glossary_e.asp, accessed 24 May 2004.
[220] For a more complete discussion on "the joint culture" and its impact on the CF, see English, *Understanding Military Culture*, 118-124.

undertaking CF joint operations. Jointness has become the organizing principle for the new CF, resulting in more integration of CF-wide and tri-service organizations, and adjustments to defence decision-making processes. Much of the early transformation of the CF over the recent years has been under the influence of jointness. Interestingly, in 2002, a senior officer studying at the Canadian Forces College suggested that the CF revisit integration and unification for the purpose of embracing jointness "as the solution to the current challenges of operational effectiveness, efficiency and dwindling budget."[221] In fact, his paper was five years late, as the joint "bandwagon" had already started without fanfare in the late 1990s.

The reality, however, is that jointness – the Canadian flavour – is just another differently wrapped version of the same progressive ideas that originally drove Hellyer to strive for a unified CF. Under the heading of "The Demands of Modern Warfare," in his address on the CF reorganization, Hellyer had predicted a greater role for integrating services for warfare, stating that "the White Paper of 1964 would not have recommended integration as a first step toward a single service if we had not been certain of the improved capacity of a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare…. Commanders and staff … must act together and in unison as the situation demands.... I believe it is a fair conclusion that a single organization which works and thinks together day-in and day-out ... eliminates the self-inflicted problems associated with the three-service system of coordinating combined operations."[222]

An astute observer of Canadian defence could have detected that a series of decisions and events of the past five years have created a *de facto* basis for organization, doctrinal changes and decisions within the Canadian Forces, *à la* unification, all under the banner of jointness. Launched under the pretext of the concept of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA), jointness in Canada and in the U.S. caught fire.[223] As Vice Admiral Gary Garnett, VCDS, stated in 2001, a few months before his retirement from the CF, "an RMA is actively shaping the

[221] Kenneth Bailey, *Integration and Unification Equals Jointness in 21st Century Canadian Forces* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, Master of Defence Studies Thesis, 2002), abstract.
[222] Hellyer, as quoted in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, 140-141. Combined was employed by Hellyer to mean *joint* in today's context.
[223] RMA has been defined as "a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technology which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations." Benjamin S. Lambeth, as quoted in Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs*, 3.

Canadian Forces of the future... and we [the CF] must not squander this very real opportunity to create a truly modern, combat capable and joint CF."[224] The RMA was viewed as much as an opportunity as a challenge for the CF, as author Sloan put it, because selected investments in the RMA can enhance the abilities of the CF to respond to high and low intensity tasks.[225]

Jointness and recently transformation are the new ideas dominating the agenda these days. Today, the expression "RMA" has for all intent purposes disappeared from the military lexicon (the Americans ceased to use it, so did every other armed forces). Joint entities, from committees to units/formations to doctrine manuals have mushroomed in the CF. Indeed, structures, organizations and projects bearing the term *joint* prominently in their titles will virtually guarantee their survival.[226] The 1994 Defence White Paper made one mention of joint activities, while *Defence Plan 1997*, the first integrated business plan at the strategic level, made scan mentions of jointness.[227] Prepared in 1999, *Strategy 2020* listed jointness as one of the eleven critical attributes of a future force structure.[228] Jointness now figures prominently in the last two CDS annual reports to Parliament. Moreover, one key measure of success to assess the progress of the transformation of the CF is jointness.[229]

An assessment of the progress made under the banner of jointness is indeed quite impressive. The CF can certainly congratulate itself on how far it has come in the past few years. At the strategic level, in terms of decision-making bodies, Armed Forces Council remains the highest joint strategic committee. A number of senior joint committees have been created

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[224] G.L. Garnett, "The Evolution of the Canadian Approach to Joint and Combined Operations at the Strategic and Operational Level," *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2002-2003) 5.

[225] Elinor Sloan, "Canada and the Revolution in Military Affairs: Current Responses and Future Opportunities," *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2000), 13.

[226] For instance, the Joint Support Ship, the replacement for the naval auxiliary oilers (AOR) vessels, was originally titled the Afloat Logistics Sealift Capability until someone realized that the project could get more mileage with a change of name.

[227] Department of National Defence, *Defence Planning Guidance 1997*, available at http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dfppc/dpg/dpg97/intro_e.asp, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

[228] Strategy 20202 originally defined jointness as a need to "identify and strengthen those specific capabilities that enable the CF to fulfil Canadian security priorities, deliver a joint capability to deal with weapons of mass destruction, information operations and other asymmetric threats, and form counter-threat partnerships with domestic and international partners." Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy 2020*, 6, available at http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/00native/docs/2020_e.doc, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

[229] See notably, Garnett, "The Evolution of the Canadian Approach to Joint and Combined Operations at the Strategic and Operational Level," 3-8.

including the JCRB and the JCATs, discussed above, and the Program Management Board (PMB). Closer to operations, the Joint Staff Steering Committee (JSSC), chaired by the DCDS, has been introduced to review all military-strategic issues of CF operations, while its more junior committee, the Joint Staff Action Team (JSAT), a highly integrated matrix-style committee inclusive of all functional disciplines necessary for the planning and controlling of operations, review on a daily basis all operational matters for on-going and future missions. The services are participants to these committees. The challenges at NDHQ, even in a unified force, have always been to integrate the environmental inputs for operations in a timely fashion, and the above two committees are filling this need well.

While the day-to-day command structure of the CF has not changed significantly since the 1980s (some intermediate HQs were eliminated in the 1990s), the command and control of CF elements for contingency operations has been improved dramatically since the early 1990s, building upon the lessons learned from Operation *FRICTION*, the Canadian contribution to the First Gulf War in 1990-1991, the Oka crisis and, most notably, Operation *DELIVRANCE*, the 1993 peacekeeping mission to Somalia. In 1988, following concerns about the inability of NDHQ to plan operations, the CDS of the day commissioned an examination of the role of NDHQ in times of emergencies and war,[230] resulting in the Little-Hunter Study.[231] The study had confirmed that command arrangements for operations were flawed, plans for operations were often inadequate and responsibilities were unclear.[232] Unfortunately, the study was shelved by the new CDS, General de Chastelain, and it took repeated breakdowns of national command for the criticality of having foolproof arrangements during contingency operations to be understood by senior leaders.

The new doctrine for command and control of operations is now well tested and solidly entrenched. Task forces, or joint task forces when two or more environments participate in the

[230] Douglas Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, Study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997), 54.
[231] The study was officially NDHQ Study S1/88, *The Functions and Organization of National Defence Headquarters in Emergencies and War*, named after its authors, Major-General W.E. Little and D.P. Hunter, a public servant. A copy of the report of the study is available in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, 417-509.
[232] Bland, *National Defence Headquarters*, 54-55.

same operation (such as Operation *APOLLO*), are constituted as soon as a mission is launched, with the designated task force commander reporting directly to the DCDS, and not to the service Chiefs of Staff as it was before the mid-1990s.[233] In addition, the DCDS is now endowed with a fairly robust and highly professional military joint staff, a state-of-the art command centre (which includes a fully integrated operations and intelligence centre),[234] a CF Joint Imagery Centre, and a CF Information Operations Group to assist him (and the CDS) to perform his responsibilities.[235] It is highly unlikely that a crisis of command similar to the one that took place during the missile Cuban crisis would develop in 2004.[236]

In terms of organizations and actors, the DCDS has accepted many additional responsibilities over the past five years, especially in the areas of joint force development and joint force generation. Joint force development projects include several high profile CF joint projects such as the Canadian military satellite project, the joint space support project, and the nuclear-biological-chemical defence initiatives, to name a few. There are two aspects of the growth of the responsibilities assigned to the DCDS in the areas of joint force development that must be appreciated. First, projects assigned to the DCDS usually get resourced from the top of the funding envelope since they are considered, for the most part, to be high CF priority, usually having a very close link to CF operations and command and control. Second, the DCDS is the designated CF "joint champion" and is being regarded (certainly by the CDS and the VCDS) as the "purple" honest broker, and will be mandated to develop the joint force doctrine when the topic is clearly joint, pan-CF or the services cannot agree.[237] While a senior-level unified staff organization has existed at NDHQ since the 1960s, the key difference today is that the DCDS

[233] Full command always rests with the CDS, with the DCDS acting on his behalf and running CF operations worldwide on a day-to-day basis. While ECSs, acting as commanders of their respective command, continue to conduct routine domestic operations (i.e., coastal surveillance, search and rescue), the DCDS may command forces in Canada for select contingency domestic operations, relegating the ECSs to the role of force generators. Examples include the Op *ASSISTANCE* (Manitoba Flood), Op *RECUPERATION* (Ice Storm in Quebec/Ontario), and Op *GRIFFON* (Support to Kananaskis G-8 Summit).

[234] A new capability is currently being developed, in addition to the traditional operations centre, and will be referred to as the Joint Intelligence and Information Fusion Capability.

[235] Of note, the composition of the planning group for operations is now almost exclusively made of senior military officers, with few if any civilians engaged in this military activity.

[236] Interestingly, for a recent international operation, Op *ALTAIR*, some staff officers proposed to the DCDS staff that, since the operation consisted of just one ship, the command and control be reverted to MARLANT HQ, only for this one operation. The proposal was turned down by the DCDS.

[237] Recent examples of contentious doctrinal areas include the doctrine with respect to the development, generation and employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and for CF national support.

has clear responsibilities and accountabilities for planning and commanding contingency operations on behalf of the CDS, and for the readiness and generation of several new joint units.

In the area of joint force generation, a major shift of philosophy took place in the CF with the decision in 1999 to separate the Joint Headquarters from the 1st Canadian Division structure, to reassemble it under a new name and assign it to the DCDS. [238] Since then, formations and units that have been created, either from the amalgamation of existing units (that used to belong to the services)[239] or new creations, and include, *inter alia*, the Joint Operations Group (JOG), the Joint Support Group (JSG) , the Joint Signal Regiment (JSR), 1st Engineering Support Unit (1 ESU), and the Joint Nuclear Biological Chemical Defence (JNBCD) Company.[240] In addition, the CF Experimentation Centre (CFEC) was established in 2000 as a centre of excellence for joint concepts and experimentation to support CF transformation.[241] There are proposals on the table to transfer even more units to the DCDS group in the coming years.[242] More importantly, however, is the fact that little CF operational transformation is taking place in the CF these days without joint influence.

Needless to say, the impact stemming from the CF organizational restructuring around jointness is "killing" the services at the operational and tactical levels. Joint restructuring is gradually but surely moving issues from the core service filters to the outer filters, where the services have less immediate influence and a reduced interest in some cases. Jointness, applied in the CF fashion, is "chewing" away at several elements that contribute to preserving the strong-service idea. Indeed, the growth and development of these CF or joint units is having a

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[238] The term unit will be used thereafter and be inclusive of formations for the purpose of this discussion.

[239] For instance, the core of the Joint Operations Group came from the Joint Headquarters that belonged to the army under 1 Canadian Division HQ and Signal Regiment. The Joint Signal Regiment was the amalgamation of two units, one owned by the Army and one by ADM (IM). 1 Construction Engineering Unit used to belong to ADM(IE), was transferred to the DCDS a few years back, and it now under the CF JOG.

[240] The Joint Operations Group (JOG) is responsible for provided a rapidly deployable command and control capability to the meet domestic and international commitments; the Joint Support Group (JSG) to provide deployable national support to CF elements; the Joint Signal Regiment (JSR) providing deployable communications and information systems to the CF worldwide; 1st Engineering Support Unit (1 ESU) to provide general engineering support to the CF; and the Joint Nuclear Biological Chemical Defence (JNBCD) Company to provide first response to domestic incidents an

detrimental impact on the concept of independent strong services, for several reasons. For one, while the newly formed units are an important component of the transformation of the CF (a number of those had been enunciated in *Strategy 2020*), sustaining their growth and maintenance – in an era of tight defence funding – entails taking funding away from the environments. Initiatives such as the JOG, JSG, JNBCD and CFEC are recent capabilities that needed to be resourced from the centre from the same limited defence funding envelope.[243] Further, many of these new units have assigned high readiness roles, which usually mean that their manning priority is higher than other CF units, depriving personnel from the three environments to satisfy this higher CF priority need. Finally, instead of having only one champion to promote their growth, these new capabilities usually have two to three high-level champions in the persons of the VCDS, DCDS and other senior officers or officials.[244] In short, the muted decision by the senior CF leaders in the late 1990s to assign to the DCDS group the responsibilities to absorb and develop the joint capabilities of the CF is having significant repercussions, barely five years later. To a certain degree, the DCDS has become the "fourth service" that the Glassco Commission alluded to in their report – the "integrated independent direction."[245]

Much progress toward a more unified CF has taken place in the past years under the banner of jointness, mostly to strengthen specific military capabilities and to improve operational effectiveness, but at times because adopting a joint approach made sense economically and was a convenient way to resolve service disagreements. Jointness has picked up many of the unification ideals, gradually undermining the strong-service idea. To add to this trend, the centralization of many CF common activities and the civilianization of NDHQ are achieving almost as much for unification as jointness is, as will be explained in the next section

Centralization and HQ Civilianization: Even More Defence Integration

The integration of common services has always been a dominant theme, even before the Hellyer days. The Glassco Commission, focusing on efficiency, had recommended the consolidation of common functions, further indicating "effective consolidation cannot be based

[243] Part of the NBCD Coy development is being funded through the special federal budget focusing on security, announced in Dec 2001.
[244] Such as ADM (Mat)/J4 for JSG, and ADM (IM) for the JSR.
[245] The Glassco Report, in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, 71-72.

on joint control by the three Services with the object of preserving the traditional responsibility of the three Chiefs of Staff for the control and administration of the Armed Forces."[246] As mentioned above, the Commission had even considered the creation of a fourth independent service with a single executive authority independent of the service Chiefs of Staff. While this fourth service never saw the light of day (nor did the idea of having one service provide the common services to the other two services), today's national defence command structure achieves many of the same objectives as envisaged by the Glassco Commission, namely, the provision of common services administratively controlled by several non-service actors.

The late 1990s saw an acceleration of the centralization of resources and several common services, and the privatization of non-core defence activities through an initiative called "alternate service delivery."[247] While many functions were regrouped before (such as postal and dental, for instance), the new centralization took place in two ways. First, the services were "nationalized" or unified from a control perspective (with the CF acronym added to their title) and, second, the field representation associated with the services was considerably reduced.[248] Examples of newly formed centralized services include the CF Personnel Support Agency (CFPSA),[249] the CF Housing Agency (CFHA)[250] and the creation of the CF Medical Group (CFMG).[251] Several other functions are now provided centrally under various groups, such as real property and many environment stewardship functions (ADM (IE)), legal services (JAG), and Public Affairs (ADM (PA)). An independent National Investigation Service, independent of the chain of command, and a Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) were also created. In the wake of the 1997 *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, the office of the Ombudsman and a CF Grievance Board were constituted.

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[246] The Glassco report, in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, 71.

[247] Alternate service delivery (ASD) included the outright contracting out of Defence of certain services and activities or the transfer of certain functions being performed by uniformed personnel to civilian personnel or agencies. The maintenance of married quarters, carried in part by military personnel, was transferred to the CF Housing Authority.

[248] There are several reasons given, the main one being a greater reliance on information networks and technology. For instance, real property management was centralized in Ottawa with the assumption that those services could all be provided remotely. The experience failed, and regional HQs have selectively re-hired property officers to have access to the necessary expertise.

[249] CFPSA is responsible for all CF personnel support including for international operations. See CFPSA's web site at http://www.cfpsa.com/en/, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

[250] CFHA responsible for managing the private married quarters and official residences. See CFHA's web site at http://www.cfha-alfc.forces.gc.ca/info/aboutcfha_e.asp, accessed 15 Apr 2004.

[251] CFMG responsible for health care support to CF personnel both in Canada and abroad.

In all these cases, significant resources in terms of personnel and operating budgets were either taken off the top of the DND budget, or completely or partially transferred from the three services; more importantly, control of several activities which used to be within the purview of the services has been completely removed. To top it off, many activities are being contracted out, including operational support tasks that used to be considered the sole exclusivity of the military and the services. In sum, the integration and centralization of common functions and privatization are doing much for unification of the CF.

The continued civilianization of NDHQ since the early 1970s, whereby civilian public servants perform more functions in the integrated defence headquarters, is also robbing the limited influence the services have left in defence management.[252] Again, the Glassco Commission had planted the seeds with its 1963 report, believing that "the career opportunities for civilians in the senior management of supporting activities should be enlarged."[253] It recommended the creation of a strong civilian group to balance the advice the minister received from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Under Hellyer, reforms took place that increased the power of the deputy minister.[254] The climax of this transformation came in 1972 with the shotgun wedding of DND with CFHQ into "what was for all practical purposes a single bureaucratic organization."[255] This was the result of a study by the Management Review Group (MRG) appointed by the MND in 1971, tasked to examine all aspects of the management and operation of DND.[256] In retrospect, it was a most influential event that changed NDHQ. While flawed in its depth of analysis and conclusions,[257] the study nevertheless made recommendations that are continuing to have a significant impact for Canadian defence, the most important of which being a suggestion to amalgamate the CFHQ and the Defence headquarters into one NDHQ (which

[252] Civilianization: the transfer of members of the armed forces to civilian status or their replacement by civilians. *Oxford English Dictionary Online*. In the CF, civilianization is usually meant in three ways: increased number of civilians in key positions affecting defence, the belief that CF members have adopted civilian norms and standards to an unacceptable standard and, most relevant for the purpose of this paper, undue influence over matters that are (or should be) exclusively military in nature. Peter C. Kasurak, "Civilianization and the military ethos: civil-military relations in Canada," *Canadian Public Administration* 25 no. 1 (Spring 82), 108-129.
[253] The Glassco Report, in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, 78.
[254] Kasurak, "Civilianization and the military ethos: civil-military relations in Canada," 120.
[255] John M. Treddenick, "The Defence Budget", in *Canada's International Security Policy*, David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, eds. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 445.
[256] See the MRG Report in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, 166-248.
[257] Ibid, 163-164.

took place in 1972).[258] To this day, Hellyer contends that this "final" civilian-military headquarters integration, which was certainly not his inspiration, was and continues to be a mistake.

Since the HQ reductions of the 1990s, the number of senior departmental civilian positions has increased,[259] and in many cases, the rank of the positions has crept up in order to remain competitive with industry.[260] Moreover, positions that used to be filled by military personnel are now, for all intent purposes, "hard" civilian positions.[261] The distressing part of this latest civilianization of NDHQ is that civilian officials arriving at Defence frequently have very little prior knowledge of defence, if any, being parachuted into Defence to "learn the ropes" within a large department.[262] Some senior military officers will admit, however, that, in some instances, the fact that these new civilians are usually well versed in the Ottawa bureaucratic process (many of them having worked at Treasury Board or the Privy Council Office) has brought benefits to selected areas of defence.

Bland contends that the "integration of the NDHQ civilian and military staff has … heightened the conflict between the two elements … and has created institutional ambiguity."[263] Granatstein has argued that the 1972 reorganization and its repercussions were certainly at least

[258] For a complete discussion on the impact of the MRG study in the administration of defence, see Bland, *The Administration of Defence in Canada*, 65-86, and for a fuller discussion of the impact of civilianization upon the office of the CDS, see Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 127-174. It is worth noting that in 2004, the term integration is most commonly used to refer to this NDHQ integration, generating confusion at times with the integration of common services that Hellyer had in mind.

[259] For a fuller discussion, see Treddenick, "The Defence Budget", 444-446. An analyst specializing on defence resource management, he wrote that "though the period 1964 to 1973 was a period when DND learned how to become a bureaucracy. DND discovered its bureaucratic strength and rising prestige, began to attract officials who were strongly oriented to a management philosophy and who were steeped in the use of management techniques and jargon. DND was "especially fortunate in attracting energetic and purposeful deputy ministers who were endowed not only with these dispositions and talents, but also with an intimate knowledge of the landscape of bureaucratic power in Ottawa." This trend has continued to this day, not only with deputy ministers, but with many senior departmental officials.

[260] In fairness, the same has taken place with some senior military positions as well, such as JAG and Director General Medical Group.

[261] For instance, at the ADM level: ADM(Material), ADM(Infrastructure and Environment), ADM(Information Management), Chief of Review Services,

[262] This is fairly typical of the federal bureaucracy in 2004. Donald Savoie presents a most convincing argument in his latest study, *Breaking The Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers and Parliament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).

[263] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 161.

as significant as unification in its long-term impact on the Canadian military.[264] As one management consultant concluded in 1982, "[a]lthough the number of civilians has not increased, the present structure of the department has allowed civil servants to penetrate many areas which were previously exclusively military."[265] It was in 1972 that the CDS and his senior commanders at NDHQ began losing their control over the CF, providing public servants "a degree of authority over military affairs without responsibility for military accountability or performance."[266]

Following the episode of the mid-1990s, changes in the headquarters in clarifying responsibilities and accountabilities between senior officers and officials have somewhat corrected this untidiness and adjusted the responsibility imbalance that had accumulated over thirty years.[267] Further, as Bland and Maloney noted, the increased "focus on actual operations [in the last ten years] has disarmed civilian advisors skilled and experience in old times and old ways of thinking.... The demands in Ottawa to cope with actual conflict situations increases the status and power of military advisors with present-day experiences."[268] In sum, there is more unity in the general staff at NDHQ than there has been in years, with the CDS and his closest advisors (VCDS and DCDS) being more influential as ever. The impact for the service Chiefs of Staff is that they have continued to lose power, authority and influence, to the "fourth service," to other defence agencies, to contractors and even to assistant deputy ministers. There is certainly no indication that this trend is about to change.

Attaining the Elusive Higher Loyalty: The Last Piece of the Puzzle

Military parochialism – defined at the individual level as a service member's "traditional loyalty to service or military specialty over the armed forces as a whole, whatever his or her rank or position"[269] – probably turn out to be the most serious obstacle preventing meaningful reform over the last fifty years, and sustaining the strong-service idea. It should thus not be surprising

[264] Granatstein, *Who Killed The Canadian Military?*, 87.
[265] Kasurak, "Civilianization and the military ethos: civil-military relations in Canada," 117.
[266] Admiral Falls, CDS in 1978, as quoted in Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 162.
[267] The decision to include the environmental commanders in Armed Forces Council in the early 1980s was to provide counterbalance to the civilians at the three-star or equivalent level.
[268] Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 149.
[269] Owens, *Fog of War*, 151.

that most of Hellyer's hopes in reforming the military institution rested on redirecting the loyalties of the officers away from their traditional service to the newly unified force. He readily acknowledged the challenges he was facing with his unification ideals, stating that, "it would be surprising if men who had been associated and identified with individual services did not encounter some difficulty in the re-alignment of loyalties involved in the establishment of a single Service."[270] Recognizing that CF members would continue to have "intense loyalties to the fighting units and broader associations within it," he nevertheless strongly believed that loyalty to a unified CF could be achieved.

> It is nonetheless important that a sense of purpose and a sense of belonging to a single Service, covering all aspects of defence and designed to tackle the complex defence problems of the future, be developed. The band of brothers must take in the whole family…. One force, with one name, a common uniform, and common rank designation will nurture this total family loyalty.[271]

While Hellyer frequently stated that loyalty to unit and formation was important and needed to be retained, military leaders have always carried primary responsibility for providing a sense of purpose to members of their units. Primarily, they did so by identifying and reinforcing shared values and identities, and linking unit goals and tasks to these values and identities. As Kronenberg wisely remarked in 1973, "if environmental tensions act inevitably against unification and if they are … 'of their very nature insoluble,' then overlooking them can only cause their effects to erupt somewhere in the structure at some future date."[272] In fact, what was, and is still, required is recognition that in a military force loyalty has to gradually evolve with rank and responsibility, with the senior officers progressively adjusting their loyalty to the nation as embodied through the unified CF as they rise in rank.

Bland tried to pinpoint the source of the struggle for the officer corps to develop a higher loyalty to the institution and the government of Canada, to explain why unification did not catch fire, and to identify the challenges the CF faced in this regard. He pointed out in 1995 that the problem of the decline of the intellectual and pragmatic values of unification since its introduction "is exaggerated by the ascent to high command of officers promoted within their

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[270] Hellyer, as quoted in Bland, *Canada's National Defence Volume 2*, 132.
[271] Ibid, 133.
[272] Bland, 283.

own services for advancing their service's interests and [which] has produced, predictably, an officer corps that for the most part still perceives its responsibilities in service terms."[273] This obstacle, which Hellyer faced in the 1960s, remains to a certain extent to this day, and it is fair to state that the services' influence on the career of officers was further amplified by the outcome of the disastrous Somalia mission and the lessons learned from the failure of some of its senior leaders and commanders.[274] The process for selecting commanding officers and commanders explained below is a case in point.

In 2004, senior officers who reach the rank of Colonel/Captain(Navy) and are eligible for promotion to the general/flag officer rank are selected for promotion through the use of an integrated CF merit selection process, without consideration of the service they come from. Of significance, however, is the fact that the single most important influence on their advancement to that level remains their opportunity to command units or formations at the senior officer ranks. Without command, there is little to no chance of any promotion to higher ranks.[275] The lessons derived from the Somalia mission of 1992-1993, exposed through the subsequent Somalia Inquiry, coupled with the growth, nature and importance of CF contingency expeditionary operations over the past ten years have placed a very high premium on command ability and field experience for senior officers – as it should be. While services certainly have no direct influence or control over the promotion merit process, their ability to decide who gets command assignments is a *de facto* control mechanism on officer progression. Every senior officer knows this.

Minister Doug Young, mandated in March 1997 that formal selection process be established to ensure that only the best are selected for command and senior leadership positions.[276] Soon after, the ECSs and superior commanders established command selection

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[273] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 288-289.

[274] See Department of National Defence, *Somalia Inquiry Report Volume 4*, focused exclusively on the failure of senior CF leaders, available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/somalia/index_e.asp, accessed 15 April 2004.

[275] While many important factors, such as education, bilingualism, experience, and personal and leadership attributes, affect the criteria for the selection of senior CF officers to higher ranks, high performance in a demanding command position is undoubtedly the key and certainly the most influential determinant for advancement. This excludes the specialist officers, such as legal, medical, and dental officers.

[276] Douglas Young, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, 25 March 1997, available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister/eng/pm/mnd60.html, accessed 15 April 2004. Recommendation 30 of the report dealt with command selection.

boards.[277] For command positions not controlled directly by one of the three ECSs,[278] nominations that need to be considered by the command selection boards are proposed by the ECSs. In sum, any senior officer striving for command must have been recommended by his affiliated environment, including short-tour command positions for international operations. This is not to say that the process is flawed; on the contrary, the command selection process is fairly rigorous. In some cases (such as positions outside the ECS), two separate boards must recommend an individual, and this recommendation requires formal endorsement by the superior commander before gaining the command appointment. It is thus manifest from the above that much greater attention is devoted to selecting the most qualified officers for command. The point made here, however, is that while the influence of the functional branches and regiments in selecting commanders has been nearly eliminated, the services remain the most dominant influence in the career of an officer, at least up to the rank of Colonel/Captain(N), which weakens any achievement of a higher loyalty to the CF.

On the positive side, conversely, much progress has being made in the past years to ensure officers develop the necessary higher loyalty as they go up in rank. In an important step forward, for one, there has finally been a recognition that loyalty is evolving over one's career. The recently published manual on the profession of arms *Duty With Honour* acknowledges, after almost forty years of denials by the unification conformists, the importance of environmental identities to the armed forces.

> The [military] ethos permits Environmental distinctiveness and allows for cultural adaptation…. These unique-to-Environment expressions of ethos derive from and reflect the distinct military functions associated with sea, land and air operations…. The unifying power inherent in the concept of the Canadian Forces must be balanced against the differentiation of the three Environments, which is essential for readiness, generating force, and sustaining a multi-purpose combat-capable force.[279]

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[277] Superior commanders are those with powers equivalent to that of a commander of a command. In addition to the CMS, CAS and CLS, these would include the DCDS and ADM (HR-Mil) groups. In essence, any level 1 organization that owns units or formation for which a commander/commanding officer must be selected and appointed. In addition, to be fair, several ECSs had, even before Minister Young's report, some form of command selection boards, the navy being a good example. That being said, several COs were still selected by their Branch or their regiment's senior officers, often creating the impression of an old boy's net.

[278] Examples are the Joint Operations Group, the Joint Support Group, Joint Task Force 2, 1 Engineering Suppot Unit, or the CF Recruiting Group within ADM (Hr-Mil), to name a few.

[279] *Duty With Honour*, 25 and 74. Of note, Kasurak, writing in 1982 on the issue of civilianization of the Canadian Forces from the context of military personnel adopting civilian norms and standards, recommended the

In concert with this new belief, it is therefore imperative, as Bland recommended in 1995, that traditions that flow from the history of warfare be incorporated appropriately in the CF. At the same time, senior officers must be educated to a higher loyalty that places the unified CF above service.[280] In this regard, the continued development of a complete unified/joint course at the Command Staff College for Majors/Lieutenant-Commanders,[281] and the creation of the Advanced Military Studies and the National Security Studies courses for Colonels/Captains (N) are making an important contribution to this end. With graduates of the first courses now reaching senior general/flag officer rank, it will be interesting to observe, in the coming years, the change in attitude that will take place with those officers. To minimize the influence of the services on senior officers, it is further suggested that selection for any Colonel/Captain (N) command appointment be conducted through the use of CF integrated boards, in lieu of ECS boards, in the same fashion that is currently done for promotion selection. Finally, it is expected that with the continued growth of the "purple" positions within the CF and joint positions in international organizations, more and more officers will develop this higher loyalty earlier in their career, and truly develop this sense of higher purpose to the CF.

PART V – CONCLUSION: FROM INTEGRATION TO UNIFICATION TO JOINTNESS TO TRANSFORMATION

Writing in 1990, Hellyer lamented that, "perhaps it was inevitable that there would be some regression in the twenty years since unification became law."[282] The return in the early 1980s of the commanders of the command as members of Armed Forces Council and, more visibly, the introduction of distinctive uniforms in 1984 have also been contributors to the decline of unification. There was clearly a retrenchment of unification in the 1980s and 1990s, a period of "disintegration," as English called it. General Thériault remarked in 1993, that unification had been a traumatic experience for the CF, suggesting that Canadian defence was "overdue for a comprehensive and independent 'hard look' from the standpoint of a unified Force which has drifted somewhat from the spirit of the 1966 Canadian Forces Reorganization

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establishment of a formal military ethos. It took twenty-one years for a manual on the profession of arms to be published. Kasurak, "Civilianization and the military ethos: civil-military relations in Canada," 128.

[280] Bland, 283.

[281] The course is expected to be completely unified in 2006, and will not include any environmental terms.

[282] Hellyer, *Dawn the Torpedoes*, x.

Act.... Such a comprehensive re-examination is overdue because the driving concepts, at best, have had no more than incremental adjustment for decades."[283]

The de-unification that started slowly soon after Hellyer left office[284] was certainly accentuated by several additional factors in the 1990s that included, most notably, the devolution of budgets and a greater focus on operational effectiveness. These actions and others coalesced to amplify the power of the Chiefs of Staff and gave them both the moral authority and the autonomy to undertake activities that specifically addressed the needs of their service, with more latitude and flexibility that was even considered possible in the 1970s. In 1995, Bland added to Thériault's diagnostic of the CF, reasoning that, "[t]he decline of the intellectual and pragmatic values of unification as the organizing concept for the CF and the failure to replace it with another clearly enunciated and officially sanctioned basis for organization and decision, increased the *de facto* power of ... the so-called service chiefs.[285] He added that defence policy makers were faced again, as in 1964, with a structure that was eccentric and in which the survival of its elements had become a crucial objective.

As this paper has argued, much has changed in the last ten years in the CF, and the ideas and concepts behind integration and unification are as strong as they have ever been since Hellyer left the department in 1967. To some extent, many of the same unifying concepts were rejuvenated as a result of crises, government policies and senior-level decisions that unconsciously created second and third order unification effects. For instance, the impact of dwindling defence budgets that decimated the CF through the 1990s resulted in the Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate commanders having very limited resources to accomplish their daily tasks, to the point where the issue of insufficient authority for effective mission accomplishment – a theme so frequently raised only a decade ago – is now largely moot. Centralization, privatization and alternate service delivery, and civilianization are now concepts that have become tolerable to the Chiefs of Staff, and which have contributed to more integration of the CF. In the end, however, it is the "old-fashioned" ideas of "single coherent defence policy" and

[283] G.C.E. Thériault, "Reflections on Canadian Defence Policy and Its Underlying Structural Problems," 3.
[284] In fact, Leo Cadieux who replaced Hellyer as MND reversed in 1968 the decision concerning the designation of ranks for the navy, authorizing them to retain navy ranks instead of using army rank designations.
[285] Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 288.

"top-down" strategic planning, when combined with the joint influence, that are weakening the strong-service idea, and unifying the CF in ways that Pope, Claxton, Pearkes, Foulkes and Hellyer had only dreamed.

The concept of unification has been used over the years to serve different unifying purposes. For Colonel Pope and Minister Hellyer, it meant the achievement of one unified defence policy instead of three incoherent service policies. There are certainly many signs indicating that the Liberal government, if re-elected, intends to develop and implement a new defence policy that will respond to a new international policy framework for Canada. Despite the criticism voiced by the Minister's Advisory Committee, significant efforts have been devoted in the past few years inside the department to progress a coherent integrated and unified capability-based planning framework. Some of the changes have been more significant than is frequently acknowledged, and the recent publication of the SCIP is a prime example that there is more inter-service integration than before, more top-down direction, and that the senior department leaders (MND, DM and CDS) are personally engaged in this important definition process. Equally vital in this dynamics, the three service Chiefs of Staff must to continue to have sufficient influence to be able to provide service-level professional military advice to the CDS, DM and the Minister, as necessary. This last element must remain an important component of the equation in a professional military institution.[286]

The expansion of the DCDS group is probably achieving more in unifying the CF, especially in the areas of joint force development and joint force generation, and in the critical sphere of national command with the enhancement of capabilities for commanding and controlling contingency operations. There are more joint/CF units than there have ever been since unification was launched, providing more opportunities for junior officers to serve in units outside of their service. In terms of integration of common support services, some duplication and triplication has been eliminated, with more tri-service functions being delivered from central

[286] The words of Mackenzie King are instructive for senior military leaders, a useful reminder of how military advice is at times stereotyped by politicians. King complained that Minister of National Defence Ralston often stood up for the generals, fought the cabinet on their behalf. Kind eventually said of Ralston: "I have talked to him again and again. I have asked him once but many times why he does not tell the generals what we, in cabinet, think instead of continually telling us what the generals think. Generals are invariably wrong. Mackenzie King, as quoted in John Macfarlane, *Ernest Lapointe and Quebec's Influence on Canada's Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 181.

groups, agencies and units. But there remains much work to be done in this realm. A senior general/flag officer speaking recently at the Canadian Forces College indicated that, in his estimation, there will be more unification in the CF in the coming years, but that the changes will be done smartly and in an evolutionary fashion. It seems that the new generation of senior leaders has learned the hard lessons of the 1990s, in that "swinging the pendulum" hard and recklessly is not the most effective approach for changing a military institution.

It is at the tactical level of the institution that the services continue to have a strong role to play, and influence – and this is how it should be. Granatstein argued recently that Hellyer went one step too far in trying to implement his higher loyalty concept, that "[h]e wanted something above single service loyalty – a loyalty to the Canadian Forces. But loyalty to the navy, army, and air force, to corps and regiments, ships, and squadrons was vital for sailors, soldiers and air-men and women whose job was to fight and risk their lives to serve their country's interests.... [I]t was heritage, tradition, and hard-earned distinctions to fighting men."[287] Unfortunately, Hellyer could never understand this distinction, and tried wholesale unification as the panacea for obtaining a unified defence policy. A reasonable balance is being achieved in 2004 in this regard – as was enunciated in *Duty with Honour* – with the recognition that services have an essential role to play in taking the newly recruited soldiers, airmen and airwomen, and sailors and turning them into combat-capable individuals, and into fighting units. The reality is that a service-centred culture up to unit level is well ingrained into the existing CF culture; it is necessary and is certainly not detrimental to the implementation of the defence agenda. As English insists, "[t]o avoid the potential dysfunctional effects of misplaced loyalties, the leadership of the CF must ensure that there is a healthy balance between small group loyalty and loyalty to the organization."[288] It took forty years for the CF institution to properly articulate in *Duty with Honour* what the three service Chiefs of Staff could not get across to Hellyer in the mid-1960s.

Is remains a truism even in 2004 that "there is no clearly enunciated and officially sanctioned basis for organization and decision" in the CF, although elements of *Strategy 2020*

[287] Jack Granatstein, *Who Killed The Canadian Military?*, 82.
[288] English, *Understanding Military Culture*, 104.

attempted to address this void. As argued in this paper, for the past five years there has been, for all intents and purposes, a basis for moving the CF institution forward, largely centered on centralization and jointness. In spite of this progress, the institution remains confused in a number of areas affecting day-to-day defence management. Accordingly, it will be imperative for the first CF "Strategic Operating Concept" and the forthcoming "Strategy 2025" to articulate a pragmatic vision and strategy for the organization and for decision-making within the CF and the department. Failure to do so will continue to engender misunderstandings, promote uncertainty and create unneeded tensions within the institution and within the department at large.

In spite of the important work that remains to be done, the CF institution appears well poised to enter the next phase of its evolution. Events and activities of the past fifty years have always pitched the two powerful concepts of unification and the strong-service idea against each other. It is evident that the enduring concept of unification, espoused over the years by several senior leaders, is returning as the more dominant idea, with the strong-service idea becoming more submissive to the higher needs of Canada's national defence. To a large degree, it is jointness that has launched the re-unification that Granatstein hoped for in his recent book, with other important concepts and events contributing along the way. The tug of war between unification and the strong-service idea is certainly fading, which will greatly facilitate the CF transformation that the CDS is anticipating in the coming years. Winston Churchill once said, "There is nothing wrong with change, so to be perfect is to have changed often."[289] There is indeed nothing wrong with more change in the Canadian Forces.

[289] As quoted in Code and Cameron, *Canadian Forces Abroad*, 118.

APPENDIX A – GLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERMS

Centralization – The concentration of administrative power in the hands of a central authority, to which inferior departments, local branches, etc. are directly responsible [290]

Civilianization – The transfer of members of the armed forces to civilian status or their replacement by civilians. [290] In this paper, refers to the increase in ratio between civilian and military members in higher headquarters

Combined - An adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies [291]

Contingency Operations – Those operations dealing with contingency events in support of Canadian interests at home and abroad, requiring the application of military forces or the provision of military assistance [291]

Decentralization – The action or fact of decentralizing, the weakening of the central authority and distribution of its functions and resources among the branches or local administrative bodies[290]

Force Development – Planning and conceptualizing associated with the creation, maintenance and adaptation of military capabilities in the face of changing security and resource circumstances. Ideally, force development should be holistic, that is, encompass the entire range of considerations associated with creating, maintaining and adapting military capability [291]

Force Generation – The process of bringing forces, or part of them, to a state of readiness for operations, by assembling, and organising personnel, supplies, and materiel. This task includes the training and equipping of forces and the provision of their means of deployment, sustainment and recovery to meet all current and potential threats. Account must be taken of the need to cater for concurrent operations and timely recuperation. It also embraces the mobilisation, regeneration and reconstitution necessary to meet a major conflict, such as general war, and the long-term development of capability to meet changing circumstances [291]

Force Structure – A general term to describe the broad elements of an actual or proposed military force. Detailed force structures describe the organization and equipment of a military, while more general force structure descriptions focus on the overall nature of the force. For example, some force structures are designed for specific circumstances, while others are designed for a variety of possibilities and may therefore be described as multi-purpose [291]

Integration – Refers to the amalgamation of the headquarters, commands, and support establishments of the three services while preserving the services themselves as separate institutions [292]

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[290] *Oxford English Dictionary On-Line*, available at http://dictionary.oed.com/, accessed 24 May 2004.
[291] *Glossary for Strategic Capability Planning for the CF*, available at http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/strat/glossary_e.asp, accessed 24 May 2004.
[292] David P. Burke, "Hellyer and Landymore: The Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces and an Admiral's Revolt," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, VIII (Autumn 1978), 3.

Interoperability – The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together [291]

Joint – in the official CF doctrinal publications, is defined as an adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate [293]

Jointness – In the U.S., refers to changes to bring the armed services together into a functional and effective fighting force and in Canada, refers to increased operational integration among the various components of the armed services [294]

Service – used in this paper to refer specifically to the traditional core Army, Air Force and Navy components of the CF [295]

Strong-service idea – The idea that a tri-service organization of the CF based on the army, air force and navy is the preferred organizing principle for the armed forces, on the assumption that a strong navy/army/air force is, in all situations and in all times, good for national defence [296]

Transformation - Transformation is a process of strategic re-orientation in response to anticipated or tangible change to the security environment, designed to shape the nation's armed forces to ensure their continued effectiveness and relevance. Transformation does not however seek the complete re-structuring or re-equipping of Canada's military forces but will instead blend existing and emerging systems and structures to create greatly enhanced capabilities relevant to future missions, roles and tasks [297]

Unification – The establishment of a single military service in place of the army, navy and air force, with unification incorporating all elements of integration [292]

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[293] There are almost as many definitions of *joint* and *jointness* as there are joint publications. A few are provided to assist the reader. *Joint*, in the official CF doctrinal publications, is an "adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate," from: *Canadian Forces Operations* manual, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, Glossary, 4. The official US definition is very similar: "Joint connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate," from: *US Joint Doctrine Encyclopaedia*, 35, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jrm/encyi_l.pdf, accessed 15 Apr 2004. Jointness is the noun often used to purport the same meaning. Some writers, like Admiral Bill Owens, will use the term *jointness* when referring to the "changes necessary to bring the armed forces together into a functional and effective fighting force," from Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2000), ix. Finally, for Elinor C. Sloan, *jointness* "refers to increased operational integration among the various components of the armed services," from Sloan, T*he Revolution in Military Affairs*, 9.

[294] Owens, *The Fog of War,* ix, and Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs*, 9.

[295] Defined by the author as such.

[296] Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 73.

[297] From the Strategic Capability Investment Plan, available at http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/ddm/scip/scipc04_e.asp, accessed 24 May 2004.

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