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DECISION ON IRAQ:

PUTTING CANADIAN VALUES AND INTERESTS IN CONTEXT

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the Canadian decision on non-participation in the USA led 'coalition of the willing' invasion of Iraq. In particular, it examines the decision in the context of Canadian values and interests in order to demonstrate the interplay between these concepts and the complexity of the issue from a strategic perspective. It also discusses the importance of balancing foreign and defence policy between international, multilateral, bilateral and national approaches, according to a priority of interests and values in any given circumstance.

Starting from a discussion of values and interests and the foreign policy foundations in Canada, the path to war is examined. Just War, international law and intervention ideas are probed to determine perspectives of Canadian values and interests. The consequences of the decision and the ensuing outcomes then lead to some observations for future makers of Canada's foreign policy. These lessons include the importance of determining when interests such as national prosperity or alliance commitments might take precedence over the export of Canadian values in an international context. Additionally, the issue of using polling as justification for Cabinet decisions in the absence of any government sponsored debate suggests that the government might reassess whether 'take-note' debates and Question Period are the best means to either set or discuss vital national interests such as the question of going to war.

"If you haven't the strength to impose your own terms upon life, you must accept the terms it offers you." T.S. Elliot

INTRODUCTION

Soon after the events of 9/11, and the commencement of the war against terrorism it became apparent that the United States intended to carry the war from Afghanistan to Iraq. Not all participants in the war on terrorism accepted this new course. For reasons that went largely unexplained, the Canadian government elected to follow a path of wholehearted support of the United Nations process. The Prime Minister chose the course of internationalism and linked our decision to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The ensuing lack of consensus at the UNSC resulted in Canada abandoning its closest ally in favour of internationalism.

> Decisions to deploy forces, to engage in military operations, and to put troops in harm's way are among the gravest which any government is required to make. They should never be taken casually, and should certainly not be based on the spontaneous reactions of politicians or publics to media images no matter how dismal. They should instead be based on policies reflecting an accurate assessment of the country's interests and capabilities.[1]

At the time, the approach taken seemed to be far more oriented towards ideals and values rather than any pragmatic interest. Notably, parliament was not engaged by the Chrétien government and consequently, Question Period became the primary source of internal political debate.

Canada may wish to lay claim to being a "moral superpower"[2] but the reality is that our course will almost always be tied to that of a larger power or institution and hence any pretence at moral superiority is self-deluding. Although it is perhaps too early to truly understand the consequences of the Iraq decision, we can nevertheless conclude that Canada's international reputation and our relationships, within and external to the

[1] Louis Delvoie. *Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales*. (Canadian Military Journal, Vol 1, No. 2, Summer 2000) 22.
[2] J.L Granatstein. *The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through tighter ties with the U.S.* (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2003) 11.

country, have been affected. The outcomes as they develop and our 'lessons-learned' will influence future foreign policy decision-making.

This paper examines the Canadian decision on non-participation in the USA led 'coalition of the willing' invasion of Iraq. In particular, it examines the decision in the context of Canadian values and interests in order to demonstrate the complexity of interplay between these concepts and the complexity of the issue from a strategic perspective. It also discusses the importance of balancing foreign and defence policy between international, multilateral, bilateral and national approaches, according to the priority of those interests and values in any given circumstance. It will conclude that Canada's national interest will not always lie with the UNSC, and that we need active debate in the country to ensure the best course is selected in such situations. To accomplish the task, the paper will start with a discussion of values and interests and the foreign policy foundations in Canada. It will then briefly examine the path to war leading to the Canadian decision. The consequences of the decision and the ensuing outcomes will be examined, in order to conclude with some observations for future policy makers.

FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

"Most Canadians agree that their country is secular, democratic, liberal, and pluralist."[3] This broad description takes us no closer to understanding or ascribing values and interests to Canadians. However, if we are to understand the interplay between values and interests in the 2003 Iraq War, we must at least establish some foundation by broadly defining those values and interests, as they are generally understood, in the 'national' arena. For our purposes here we shall limit national values to those conceptual ideals or principles on which interstate and interpersonal relations should be based. National interests will be used to describe the practical objectives of foreign policy.

Noting then how Canadians would like the world to be shaped, we will then examine Canada's view of its role in the world. In this way we will lay the foundation

[3] J.L. Granatstein. *The Importance of Being Less Earnest*, p 6.

for our understanding of the direction the government took in responding to the Iraq crisis.

Canadian Values

As Steve Lee notes in *Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy*:

> Our experience to date suggests a core set of values which includes respect for the environment; commitment to democracy; defence of human rights; a desire to encourage fairness in developing societies (fair labour, business, legal and governance arrangements); a recognition of the importance of tolerance and diversity in our own society; a desire to promote that to others; and a strong attachment to the idea of an engaged civil society both at home and abroad. This can be described as a set of quality-of-life values. The natural environment, and a desire to improve the non-material aspects of the human environment are the two sides of this quality-of-life coin."[4]

Canadians should have the best opportunity for quality living and nobly want the same for everyone else. As Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted in a speech at the International Press Freedom Awards, November 13, 2002:

> The world we want is much like the Canada we want; a sustainable future of shared security and prosperity; of tolerance and respect for diversity; of democracy and the realization of human rights; of opportunity and equal justice for all.[5]

But are these values constant or in flux? The DND Directorate of Strategic Human Resources Coordination, reported on some general characteristics of three generations in Canada, elders, boomers and generation X. Notable differences between generations include decreasing sensitivity to violence, greater willingness to take risks, and increasing consumption in each succeeding generation.[6]

To this we must add the 'Y' or Nexus generation, focused on the Internet and the age of information and less discerning of such concepts as borders, nationality or national uniqueness. This suggests that there is a lack of continuity of values between

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[4] Steve Lee. "Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Foreign Poli*cy, Vol 10, No. 1 (Fall 2002), 1.

[5] Bill Graham Minister of Foreign Affairs, Speech to International Press Freedom Awards, Nov 13 2002.

[6] Canada, Dept. of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Human Resources Coordination Research Note 2/02, Author, T. Wait, Ottawa, 2002.

generations. If we also consider that many Canadians are pursuing higher education[7], and that immigration is adding ideas and interests from around the globe, we must assume that some change is inevitable. Given that lifestyles and cultural sectors are normally defined by behaviours, common attitudes and values[8], the evolving Canadian demographic will most certainly affect Canadian values. It is perhaps too early to characterize the direction of such change but a general increase in interest in humanitarianism, liberalization and international engagement is likely.

Notwithstanding the evolving differences in the Canadian value 'tree', one thing that does seem to be common is a general sense of disillusionment regarding any 'new world order' set against "a corresponding desire for security and stability."[9] The new world order is not the world of peace and security that was expected following the Cold War. It now requires more and greater effort to bring stability to regions of strife and want. One enduring principle or niche in the Canadian imagination is found under the heading of peacekeeping. As Dewitt and Brown noted in *Canada's International Security Policy,*

> It is virtually inconceivable that Canada would not wish to continue participation in peacekeeping at a level which will enable the country to uphold its own pride and to continue to earn the respect and admiration of other nations.[10]

Peacekeeping is an article of faith in this country. Although we might wonder whether it would be the case had Lester Pearson not won the Nobel Peace Prize, nevertheless, today peacekeeping is a source of pride and identity for Canadians and it continues to hold such sway through continued emphasis by successive governments.

Canadians also value their differences. The desire to be different drives the Canadian compulsion to deride much that is American. Jack Granatstein has opined that

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[7] Stats Canada 1996 figures indicate that Canadians hold over 2 million bachelor, .5 million masters, and 100,000 doctorates and a similar number of medical degrees.
[8] DSHRC Research Note 2/02, p7.
[9] *Ibid, p 17*
[10] David Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown. *Canada's International Security Policy*. Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1995, p223.

anti-Americanism seems to be our state religion.[11] Prime Ministers who fail to recognize this facet of the Canadian character, risk much in rapprochement with U.S. presidents[12].

The key elements of Canadian values fall under three broad pillars; liberty (democracy), fairness (Rule of Law/Equal Opportunity/Social Justice), and respect for the environment. Canadians feel good about these values and are somewhat self-righteous in their espousal. What we must not forget is that Canada is not unique in wishing to promote such ideals internationally and many other nations' ideals differ little from Canadian values. In other words, Canadians are not that special in their thinking.

Canadian Interests

Determining Canadian interests seems somewhat easier than its values. Indeed, lists of these interests abound in academic literature. For our purposes here, we need to understand two key elements. Firstly, it is worth noting that although the lists may differ somewhat, in totality they generally cover the same ground. Paradoxically, however, the fact that the lists are broadly similar does not imply similar meaning or interpretation. So the second point worth noting is that the interpretation of what is in Canada's best interest in any particular case will likely be in the eye of the beholder. This key point will factor into our analysis later. Our discussion of national interests will be kept to those interests external to the country.

Broadly speaking, national interests fall into the categories of vital or essential, important, and peripheral. Any particular interest will fall into different categories according to circumstance and perception. As Liotta notes in *To Die For: National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties*,

> At its simplest understanding, the national interest demands the willingness of a state to uphold its moral and national values with the commitment of its blood, treasure, time and energy, to achieve sometimes specific and sometimes inspecific ends.[13]

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[11] Jack Granatstein, *The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests Through Tighter Ties with the U.S.*. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2003, p2.
[12] Richard Nossal notes in *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*.(Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1996, c1997 p182.) that Mulroney was called a border-boy politician long after he stepped down as Prime Minister.

Liotta goes on to propose that, in the most extreme case, we can describe our vital national interest with the question: "What are we willing to die for?"

Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald categorize interests as political, economic, social, cultural, defence, security and alliance and then modify Nuechterlein's National Interest Matrix, which is repeated here at Table 1. [14]

Table 1. Nuechterlein's National Security Interest Matrix (as modified for Canada by Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald) (shading in original)

Intensity of Interest / Basic National Interests	Survival Level (Critical)	Vital Level (Dangerous)	Human Level (Serious)	Peripheral Level (Bothersome)
Defence of Canada/North America				
Economic Well-being				
Stable World Order/International Security				
Promotion of Canadian Values Abroad				

It must be emphasized that, in their analysis, Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald have essentially weighted the broad areas of national interest by intensity. Economic well being and a stable world order are essentially given equal value in the abstract, although clearly individual circumstance would seemingly tend to tip the balance in favour of one or the other interest. More significant is the evident conclusion that the promotion of Canadian values abroad holds less weight in their abstract assessment of what really

[13] P.H Liotta. "To Die For: National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties" *Parameters*, US Army War College, 00311723, Vol. 30, Issue 2, Summer2000.

matters, being essentially never more than a "serious" interest. However, this suggests that national values are not 'worth dying for', a matter for considerable debate.

The 'Turbot War' of 1995 bears some mention at this point. The then Minister of Fisheries, Brian Tobin, and his Cabinet colleagues, seemed willing to go to the precipice of conflict over Spanish fishing *largesse.* The unilateral policing of the Grand Banks beyond the 200 nautical mile economic zone was expressed as being essential and in the vital national interest category. Surely nobody would have wanted anyone to die 'for fish', but in the heat of the moment warning shots were fired over the bow of the Spanish fishing vessel Estai. One could argue that the protection of fishing regulations for the purposes of conservation of stocks or species was on some level value-oriented, but it is unlikely that Canada would have been so engaged if the fishing violations had taken place off Iceland. Thus, clearly the national interest was significant. In that sense then, it is hard to see how this wasn't a clear recognition of circumstances where national interests can trump values.

According to Jack Granatstein, Canada's national interests are the security of its people and territory, national unity, independence, economic growth, and enhancing democracy and freedom globally.[15] These seem straightforward though perhaps independence would bear some clarification. The degree of independence lies in the manner in which Canada is, or is perceived by Canadians and others to be aligned with the United States. The last item on Granatstein's list is again the idea that promoting 'values' is a key national interest.

By comparison, Colin Gray in *Canadians in a Dangerous World* tries for a more prescriptive list as he describes Canadian vital and major interests as:

- Keeping the US engaged overseas as the principal guardian of order;
- The development of a tolerable new security order for Europe, including a transatlantic link;

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[14] W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald. "A National Security Framework for Canada." *Policy Matters* Vol. 3, no. 10, October 2002 p 23.
[15] Jack Granatstein,. *The Importance of Being Less Earnest…, 7.*

- The development of a tolerable new security order for Asia along lines similar to that for Europe;
- Enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations within the international order;
- Promoting fair trade; and
- The protection of national, regional and global geophysical environments.[16]

Notably missing from this list is the promotion of Canadian values, which fails to make his vital and major interest category. Like the Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald model, promoting values abroad is considered by Gray to be no more than a serious or peripheral interest.

Each of these lists attempts to itemize, in its own way, Canadian national interests in either an abstract or prescriptive way as a means to determine what is important to Canadians and to the nation. Additionally, while these lists highlight the diversity of interests, missing is a sense of priority when these interests come into conflict. For example, if United Nations effectiveness was no longer a U.S. priority and they chose to go their own way, how should Canada adapt the course of its foreign policy?

No two groups are likely to find satisfaction in any one list or agree to the priority of interests. In *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy*, the Canadian government avoids this problem by using a simple approach. Interests as described as three pillars, security, prosperity, and values and culture. Perhaps somewhat flippantly, but equally succinctly, Denis Stairs summarized this as – Canadians want to be "safe", "rich", and to be seen as "virtuous"[17]. Canadians want their domestic and foreign policy to align in order to deliver safety, prosperity and a moral sense of well being; and they want it in that order. Absent in this simple analogy or description is a clear means or policy basis to advance these interests or prioritize them when conflict arises. This leads us to the need to

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[16] Colin Gray, *Canadians in a Dangerous World*. Toronto: Atlantic Council of Canada, 1994.

[17] Denis Stairs. "Myths, Morals and Reality in Canadian Foreign Policy." *International Journal*, Vol 58, No. 2 (Spring 2003).

properly articulate the basis and content of Canadian foreign policy in order to allow for a measured approach to crises affecting national values and interests.

General Foreign Policy Ideas

While the term Middle Power seems less in favour today, it will serve as a starting point for describing Canadian foreign policy, particularly given that Canada's claims to middle power status popularized the concept after 1945.[18]

> It is most common to define middle power by its *position* in the international hierarchy. In this view, middle powers are said to be those states occupying the 'middle' point in a range of bigness to smallness – usually measured by reference to such quantifiable attributes as area, population, size, complexity and strength of economy, military capability, and other comparable factors. Such an approach has its problems, particularly its dependence on quantifiable measures of power, but it does satisfy the intuitive desire to differentiate between those states which clearly are not great powers but are not minor powers either.[19]

In *Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies,* John Ravenhill describes the five attributes of middle power diplomacy as capacity, concentration, creativity, coalition building and credibility. Capacity comes from both the ability to engage, resident in a diplomatic corps of sufficient depth and reach, combined with energy and stamina to see the desired outcome through to its conclusion. A middle power has limited resources and so can only pursue limited objectives, so it must concentrate those resources. Creativity implies both leadership in the advancement of ideas and values, and the brokerage skills to build the necessary coalitions. Finally, credibility lies in consistency of ideals and values, and an ability to stand by those ideals with resources and will. [20]

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[18] See John Ravenhill, "Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies." *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 10357718, Vol. 52, Issue 3, Nov 98.

[19] Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Nossal, *Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993.

[20] *Ibid*. See also Andrew Cooper, et al, *Relocating middle powers*….

> …the essence of middle power diplomatic activity is best captured by emphasizing not what this group of countries should be doing but what type of diplomatic behaviour they do, or could, display in common.[21]

This idea of credibility can also be linked to the idea of functionalism; where a small state has both the interest and expertise to effect change; it should be regarded as a major power.[22] As Lester Pearson described it, "Representation [in any key decision making body or coalition] should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question."[23]

Being a 'niche major-power' in order to exercise a degree of influence over the course of international events is at the very heart of foreign policy thinking in Canada. Through 'soft power', and the pursuit of the Lloyd Axworthy 'human security agenda' Canada sought to exert a degree of influence well outside its weight class in order to advance its values. A measure of this influence should lie in a consistent message regarding where Canada stands on issues of global stability. In this approach, a certain degree of consistency in values is necessary, even under circumstances where national interests may be directly involved.

To move this agenda, Canada exhibits the behaviour of the middle power, as a catalyst, facilitator or manager.[24] In other words, it focuses on the persuasion technique of power. Canada is constrained to this course since successive governments have elected, through the allocation of resources, to minimize the capacity to induce or coerce, and the capability to use force. "Functionally', Canada is limited to persuasiveness and some limited participation in collective measures in the other techniques of power. Again, such limitations affect the ability to advance a values-based agenda, particularly when other interests come into play.

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[21] Cooper et al, *Relocating Middle Powers*…19.
[22] Kim Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1996, c1997, 54.
[23] Hansard, House of Commons *Debates*, July 9 1943 4558.
[24] *Ibid* 24-25.

Internationalism in the Canadian context can be described as a form of post-modern foreign policy where increasing emphasis is placed on trans-national cooperation. This would seem simple, and relatively practical conceptually, but in practice there are three principal concerns. First, middle powers have greater influence "under conditions of waning hegemony."[25] This would hardly seem to be the case in the current international paradigm. The growth in power of the United States and the emerging influence and capability of the European Union argue against any resurgence of middle power influence in the short term.

Secondly, in a sense, foreign policy is all about internationalism; they are inextricably linked as ideas. Ask an ordinary Canadian to describe internationalism and a broad range of ideas can be expressed; conflicting ideas from isolationism, nationalism, bilateralism, multilateralism, through to internationalism as described previously can all arise. In its broadest context, internationalism can imply the ceding of authority to international mechanisms such as the United Nations. Essentially, internationalism can be vague. For our purposes here we will use the separate terms and limit internationalism to a purely international-organization (read United Nations) based approach. Multilateralism by contrast will be kept to activities within groups such as NATO or the OAS. Bilateralism for the Canadian situation will be taken to mean solely a Canada-U.S. relations dominated policy.

A third concern that relates to both multilateralism and internationalism is that collective security, even within alliances, is difficult to manage. Obtaining consensus within any collective security arrangement can be nearly as difficult as obtaining consensus at the UNSC. Perhaps of greater concern, collective security can be a path that tends to hasten war rather than prevent it. As David Hendrickson has pointed out,

> One of the most insistent arguments for Desert Storm was that the coalition was bound to fall apart, given sufficient time.[26]

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[25] Cooper et al, *Relocating Middle Powers*…12.

[26] Hendrickson, "The Ethics of Collective Security" in *Ethics & International Affairs: a Reader,* edited by Joel H. Rosenthal. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, c1999, 234.

To take the criticism of collective security further, an even greater weakness is that recourse to any collective approach normally requires that participants actually participate. Moral participants have some value but any collective arrangement really requires that participants commit national resources and the lives of their service personnel to the united effort. Hendrickson suggests that this is where the ideal of collectivism breaks down.

> The most common criticism directed against the idea of collective security is that it is inherently unworkable. States are, in the main, perfectly willing to pay lip service to the idea of collective security, but they are generally unwilling to make the tangible sacrifices that collective security requires, particularly regarding the commitment of military forces.[27]

The Canadian government has been self-critical here, for it was not without some justification that John Manley made the remark, "you can't just sit at the G-8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom."[28] Lester Pearson's 'functionalism' should presumably compel the government to invest in the principal vehicles of diplomacy, namely foreign aid, a foreign service with global reach, and a relevant and capable armed force, also able to be deployed.

Thus, in relation to Canada's national interests, existing foreign policy seems to be aimed as much at advancing ideals related to Canada's place in the world and advancing general interests related to global security, as it is to necessarily advancing any direct pragmatic interests. If we consider that the most pragmatic interest after internal security would be prosperity, then Canadian interests would be heavily weighted in favour of links to the United States. In a pragmatic sense then, the priority of the Canadian government from an interest perspective is to assure prosperity through stable relations and trade with the USA. As Donald Barry notes in *Managing Canada-US Relations in the Post-9/11 Era: Do We Need a Big Idea?,*

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[27] *Ibid,* 229.

[28] Wells, Paul. "We Don't Pull Our Weight: Manley" *National Post*, 5 October 2001.

> The most important challenge facing Canadian decision makers is how to respond to the new security environment while ensuring the uninterrupted flow of people and commerce across the 3,989-mile common border.[29]

We can then conclude that certain interests are more pragmatic in character whereas others may be more principled, and that the existing foreign policy process may not be clear enough to prioritize between practicalities and idealism. With this backdrop, we should now examine the onset of the crisis in Iraq, and where interests and values were affected.

THE GATHERING STORM

The war against terrorism originated in the tragic events of 9/11. When the United States declared an intention to shift the war to Iraq, this was largely viewed as a unilateral change in the scope of the war on terrorism, which to that point had been waging war against those who had attacked the US and against those other groups of global reach.

> Iraq became the most divisive issue the international community has encountered in over 30 years, damaging severely both the 'western' community and the newer major power alignments that had emerged since the end of the Cold War.[30]

Even the personal efforts of Colin Powell failed to sway world opinion in their favour with his detailed intelligence briefing to the UNSC on February 5, 2003. As the French Foreign Minister had already said earlier, "We believe that today nothing justifies envisaging military action."[31] Not surprisingly, this view was supported by French polling, which showed 76% opposition to war.[32] Indeed many in the world wondered why all of this evidence had not already been passed on to the inspection teams in order

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[29] Donald Barry, "Managing Canada-US Relations in the Post-9/11 Era: Do We Need a Big Idea?" *Policy Paper on the Americas* Volume XIV, Study 11 (November 2003), 1.

[30] Ron Huisken, *The Road to War on Iraq,* Canberra Papers on Strategy & Defence, No. 148, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 2003*,* 1.

[31] French Foreign Minister, de Villepin, to the Security Council 20 January 2003.

[32] Ron Huisken, *The Road to War on Iraq,* 26.

to produce the smoking gun. The subsequent lack of evidence is sufficient for many to conclude, with perfect hindsight, that the war was unjustified.

For our purposes here, the arguments should not rest on the intelligence assessments presented before the invasion nor the ensuing results. Rather, the arguments for and against the invasion should be based on a reasonable assumption that those involved were pursuing policies of good intention based on the best information available at the time. Nevertheless, the concept of going to war as a last resort will necessarily bring us back to this point.

Just War and Legal Arguments

It would not be possible in this paper to treat exhaustively all of the factors that led the United States to conclude that war against Iraq was necessary. Indeed, the debate on the reasoning will likely go on until some future time when the full consequences and realities are a matter of public record, and when some historian will lay out the case in its entirety. Rather, the purpose here is to demonstrate the broad reasoning from the US government perspective and to show how the arguments should be considered from the Canadian perspective.

For a value-based decision to go to war, I suggest that Canadians would require that the war be 'just'. So, what is a just war? The *Ad Bellum* principles that are used here are taken from Gordon Graham's *Ethics and International Relations*.[33] The sub-paragraph comments have been added to address the relevance to the Iraq crisis and to note some of the differences in newer versions of Just War Theory.

The war must be undertaken and waged exclusively by the leaders of the state.

- This condition is certainly met by the 'coalition of the willing'. Each participant was state sponsored and the leaders were fully engaged. Newer versions of Just War theory opine that proper authority to wage war has both

[33] Gordon Graham, *Ethics and International Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Pub., 1997, 57.

national and international dimensions and in the modern context is legitimized by the UN and not heads of states. Support for the UN and the peaceful resolution of conflict are certainly oft-espoused Canadian values, as we will see later. In that case, the authority should stem from provisions in the UN Charter and from supporting UNSC resolutions. What must be remembered is that the UNSC is often hampered by the veto powers of the permanent five members and so consensus for action is not always achievable. In that case, reference to the General Assembly may be useful, but a majority there may still not carry the weight to influence those with strong moral arguments.

The war must be fought in a just cause.

- While those who chose not to participate can debate the justness of the cause, it cannot be argued that the protagonists failed at the time to meet this criterion from their perspective. Any of the arguments of eliminating WMD, destroying a regime characterized as 'evil' and upholding previous UNSC resolutions could be used. Just cause as a principle is flawed, therefore, as it will always fall to a difference of opinion. Indeed, for many detractors, there are never good grounds for the use of force, though in reply to this peaceful coexistence idealism the view of Leon Trotsky is germane, "Not believing in force is like not believing in gravity." Gordon Graham reinforces the weakness of the just cause argument when he writes:

  > Everyone could agree with the principle that a just war must be in a just cause, but if they then disagree about what is to count as a just cause, their agreement on principle counts for very little.[34]

- For Canada, the position with respect to the 'justness' of the conflict was not clarified by government policy. A point worth noting here is that Canada decided to allow its soldiers serving on exchange tours with US and UK forces to become combatants in the conflict. This would be entirely inconsistent with a view that the war was unjust. However, withdrawing those soldiers from allied combat units at the eleventh hour would have been detrimental to their effectiveness and cohesion and would, therefore, have

[34] *Ibid* 59.

been contrary to the national interests (and perhaps values) of preserving alliance relationships.

Recourse to war must be a last resort.

- Since 1998 the US had consistently noted that they felt Iraq was in violation of the ceasefire agreement and so they chose to view the situation as meeting the last resort criterion.[35] In the contrary view, the criterion of imminent threat is critical. Arguing that Saddam Hussein would have had to be mad to support attacks on the U.S. presumes a sanity that is not likely to be accepted by all.
- Nevertheless, many states did not accept that the situation in Iraq had reached its 'last resort' and indeed many felt that the inspectors could be granted additional time. A Canadian diplomatic effort was made in the final days before the conflict, which tried to get a six-week extension on inspections in order to fully satisfy this last resort criterion for the UNSC. When this failed, the Canadian position was the same, namely to withhold support for the invasion in the absence of any UNSC mandate.

There should be a formal declaration of war.

- It is arguable whether formal declarations are still required, but certainly there is a requirement to formally declare to the UNSC an intention to exercise self-defence. This will be addressed more fully in a moment. The lack of a declaration can be supported, however, by the link the US makes to UNSC resolutions, which we will also address later.

Those engaged in the war must have reasonable hope of success.

- The rapid outcome would suggest this condition was met but significantly, the restoration of stable government in Iraq is showing less success in the short term and will require an ongoing commitment by the US and its allies. A failure to see this through, resulting in anarchy within Iraq, would arguably result in more harm and not reflect favourably on the participants in the 'coalition of the willing'. The other potential conclusion from the speed of

[35] United States of America, Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (PL 105-338) October 31 1998. Available from http://www.fcnl.org; accessed 3 March 2004.

victory supports the opposing view of the war by suggesting that the weakness of the Iraqi forces and absence of any WMD proves the earlier point that the threat was not imminent.

- For Canada's part, the words of hope for quick victory by the US and UK expressed by the Prime Minister will be key points that will come out as we look to the Canadian position below.

The damage done in war must be proportionate to the perceived injustice that precipitated the conflict.

- This assessment will depend on perception, which will be aligned to the respective view as to the justness of the cause in the first case. Since there can be no consensus on this matter, there will never be agreement that the result justified the damage done to get there. Moreover, the subject of WMD and their potential damage further clouds this assessment. While the presence of WMD at the start of the conflict seems less and less likely as time passes, there is no doubt that the Iraqi regime had used such weapons in the past, and against their own citizens. When words such as 'evil' are used, the matter of injustice is relative to the beholder.

This then leads us to international law. Canadians would normally expect that any decision by their government to go to war would be based on international law. Opinions differ markedly as to the legality of the US led action. In *The Use of Force Against Iraq: a legal assessment,* Jutta Brunnée notes three tests where he concludes that the legal argument for war fails.

Firstly, he points out that the US did not invoke self-defence formally through the Security Council as they did for Afghanistan. Indeed the argument of pre-emptive self-defence finds additional critics who find no basis for it in any international law.

- Brunnée's argument fails when one considers the US action to be one of enforcement of previous UNSC resolutions.

Secondly, Brunnée notes that no effort was made prior to its commencement to cast the war as a humanitarian effort, as in Kosovo.

- Throughout the crisis, President Bush makes numerous references to the need to help free the Iraqi people from oppression. Thus this argument has little weight.

Thirdly, UNSC Resolution 1441 did not specifically authorize war. The for-war argument stems from the connection or reference back to UNSC resolutions 678 and 687, which carry more clear authority for the use of force. However, these resolutions date from a decade earlier, and it is a stretch to suggest that they were intended to be an open-ended justification for the continued use of force.[36]

- Of the three arguments of Brunnée, this last one is perhaps the strongest. Nevertheless, it is also weak given that the UNSC authorized force for the Korean War and this was considered to remain in effect until such time as the UNSC were to determine that a state of peace and security existed. Of course the UNSC subsequently failed to remain 'seized' of the situation due to Russian and Chinese influences. Nevertheless, there is no basis to declare that a UNSC resolution will time expire without further intervention by the UNSC.

From an opposing legal perspective, David Wingfield notes in *Why the Invasion of Iraq Was Lawful:*

> The legal basis for this war, for example, is much sounder than the legal basis for the military action against Serbia over Kosovo, which of course was not supported by any Security Council resolution before battle was joined.[37]

In the same text, Wingfield demonstrates a linkage between UNSCR 1441 and the previous resolutions, 678 and 687, which authorized force if Iraq was in material breach of the ceasefire agreement. This agreement included the requirement to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and permit inspections. Of critical importance here is the notion that the proof of WMD is essentially immaterial to the matter of being in

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[36] Jutta Brunnée, *The Use of Force Against Iraq: a legal assessment*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 2003, 2-6.

[37] David Wingfield, Why *the Invasion of Iraq Was Lawful*. Toronto, ON: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 2003, 15.

breach of the ceasefire agreement, which required unfettered inspections. Nevertheless, Wingfield concludes with a view that:

> The legal issue is quite narrow and straightforward: can a rational case be made that the invasion of Iraq was supportable under international law. Such a case can be made, and therefore the debate over this war should stay where it belongs: in the arena of politics, not that of law.[38]

The legal arguments notwithstanding, it is fair to state that the US government focussed the debate on politics and doing the "right thing". The Bush administration and Congress were consistently of the opinion that Iraq was in violation of the ceasefire for the entire post-Gulf War period. This idea was noted in the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which concluded that Iraq had systematically defied the ceasefire conditions.[39] Moreover, the Act also lays the foundation for a regime change policy that would later be added to the justification argument:

> It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.[40]

Thus, we might determine that the US simply availed itself of an opportunity to pull together a coalition to bring this 'unfinished business' to its proper conclusion. Interestingly, regime change was not the primary argument that the Bush government had used to justify the conflict before it began, however, it does begin to come to the forefront when the WMD argument finds a small supporting cast. Here it must be noted that the Charters of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States, both of which are applicable to external perceptions of Canadian 'values', provide no cover for intervention in the internal affairs of other states to effect regime change.

> No state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.[41]

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[38] *Ibid, 16.*

[39] USA, Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] Charter of the Organization of American States of 1948, Article 15.

Similar sentiments are expressed in the UN Charter. To get around the UN/OAS Charters, it can be argued that a state loses its 'statehood' and hence its rights when it fails to conform to the accepted standards and norms of an international system. A rogue state, that linked WMD with terrorists (Iraq in the US perception), would meet this broad criterion. Moreover, the Charters' clear 'prohibition' against intervention or regime change clearly has its limitations and can be argued to be inconsistent with the human security agenda, which contends that the rights of human beings must take precedence over the rights of states.

From this brief legal analysis it can be seen that international law is not always sufficiently clear to justify action. Legal opinions are likely to diverge in difficult cases. International law is no panacea for decision-making in the international arena because it cannot provide a comprehensive framework for determining legality without reference to some court for adjudication. The International Court of Justice has no authority unless the disputing parties refer the case to it. Moreover, the existing international law fails to address when the rights of states ought to be violated in favour of other states or in favour of individuals. Some matters should remain in the province of politicians and their constituents, particularly when existing international law fails to address the situation. This is a fundamental issue of international morality and the 'Responsibility to Protect'.

Implications of International Morality and the Responsibility to Protect

> ***Power is no blessing in itself, except when it is used to protect the innocent.***
> *Jonathan Swift*

To answer the question of why western states will become involved in future human security crises, CJ Dick in *The Future of Conflict: Looking out to 2020* writes:

> …the main impulse is likely to come from the "moral imperative". The end of the Cold war and growing perceptions of the need to further the globalisation (*sic*) process and

> behave like responsible members of a global society may impel western powers to adopt foreign policies that help others as well as themselves.[42]

International morality is reinforced by globalization and the consequences of the media bringing a story of atrocity into the living rooms of an educated and sensitized international community. The argument goes something like this: if we accept that there is going to be broad agreement as to what is right and wrong, if we accept that we are a community of individuals rather than solely states, and if we accept the importance of human rights to world order, then how can we fail to react to a sense of injustice and suffering? As Denis Stairs notes in *The Changing Office and the Changing Environment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Axworthy Era,* " the proper objects of international politics are not, in the end, the sovereign states themselves, but the individuals who inhabit them."[43] As noted in *The Responsibility to Protect,*

> Where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression, or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.[44]

> The defence of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters, does not include any claim of unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people.[45]

This concept expands previous Just War or *Ad Bellum* principles where it reinforces the concept of right intention, that being to avert human suffering. The Responsibility to Protect does, however, specifically exclude regime change as the objective. Nevertheless, provided one can make the link to human suffering, or imminent human suffering, then action that is likely to overthrow a government would seemingly be reasonable, if it is the only way to eliminate that suffering. Weaknesses in the application of this principle will arise in the same areas as Just War, namely in the belief

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[42] C. J. Dick, *The Future of Conflict: Looking out to 2020*. Conflict Studies Research Centre, Camberley, England 2003, 21.

[43] Stairs, Denis. "The Changing Office and the Changing Environment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Axworthy Era" in Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy, Ed Fen Oster Hampson, Norman Hilmer and Maureen Appel Molot, Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press, 2001, 20.

[44] *The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun, Co-Chairs International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Dec 2001, XI.

that the international community can agree to the injustice or humanitarian imperative in any particular case. As Nicole Gnesotto opines in *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations after Iraq:*

> Can democracies overstep the boundaries of international law in defence of democracy itself? The answer was unanimously affirmative during the Kosovo crisis, Europeans and Americans agreeing that a NATO intervention without a UN mandate was justified.[46]

Hence international law and humanitarianism are going to continue to be in conflict and this dilemma is unlikely to be resolved through either philosophical debate or international law. As Mary Maxwell puts it in *Morality Among Nations*, "changes in moral behaviour of nations will come about less under the influence of these academic arguments than under the pressure of *new circumstances*."[47] For the United States at least, the situation in Iraq would qualify as 'new circumstances' and the case for war can then be made on principled grounds.

CANADIAN POLICY ON IRAQ

It is fair to say that none of the Bush arguments resonated with the Liberal government. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien held firmly to a policy that he had established publicly as early as mid-2002 and reiterated in January 2003, namely, that clear UNSC support would be required before Canada would participate in any coalition.

> Mr Speaker, it is because we believe that the unity of the Security Council is vital. We are seeing that the process works.[48]

Unfortunately, the UNSC process did not work to everyone's satisfaction. This was a policy that essentially set internationalism as the priority over either bilateralism with the USA, or multilateralism with the 'coalition of the willing'. Missing was any assessment regarding the threat or the view of the prevailing threat of WMD. Rather, in

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[45] *Ibid. 8.*

[46] *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations after Iraq*. Ed. by Gustav Lindstrom. Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris 2003, 31.

[47] Mary Maxwell, *Morality Among Nations : an Evolutionary View*. Albany: State University of New York Press, c1990, 156. Emphasis in original.

[48] Hansard Number 048, 37th Parliament 2nd Session, January 29, 2003.

statement after statement, Chrétien just repeated that Canada was going to follow the UNSC. One would like to think that there was more to the Canadian policy than this, and there may be, but it was neither mentioned nor debated publicly. So, where did this policy originate and was it supported or even understood by the majority of Canadians?

Given the earlier observation that the legal case for war was stronger in the case of Iraq than it was for Kosovo, at first blush at least, it seems a weak argument that the lack of consensus at the UNSC would be sufficient reason for Chrétien to decide not to participate. Yet this was the position of the liberal government from the onset of the crisis until it concluded with the US and its 'coalition of the willing' invading Iraq.

Munton and Keating point out in *Internationalism and the Canadian Public* that internationalism is central to Canadian foreign policy, but they also note that "Canadians collectively distinguish at least four different types of internationalism, termed here active internationalism, economic internationalism, liberal-conservative internationalism, and independent internationalism."[49] They go on to say that "While Canadians broadly support an active role internationally, they are divided markedly on how internationalism ought to be pursued." In other words, "Internationalism divides Canadians as well as binds them."[50] This is even more likely when the government policy is not explained.

To be fair, the Liberal view to act only on a UNSC decision received consistent Canadian public support throughout the crisis. Although the questions were different, the general trend exhibited in polling by Ipsos-Reid suggests that between 59 and 71 percent of Canadians did not support involvement in the 'coalition of the willing' without UNSC support, though half also felt that such a resolution would be warranted.[51] Notably, the Quebec results were significantly less supportive of any military action. Also interesting are the findings of a 28 March 2003 poll, which indicated that 61% of Canadians

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[49] Munton, Don, and Tom Keating. "Internationalism and the Canadian Public." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol 34, No. 3 (September 2001), 546.

[50] *Ibid,* 547.

acknowledged that the position taken would have serious economic consequences for Canada, while 47% of Canadian also felt that they had turned their back on the country's closest friend.

It is equally true that most Canadians have a view of foreign policy and all Canadians have a view about Canada-US relations. As Derek Burney puts it in a somewhat 'tongue in cheek' way:

> When I served as Canada's ambassador to the United States, I learned very quickly that I had about 30 million advisors at my disposal on any given day. Almost every Canadian has a view on how to manage our relations with the U.S. Some have very strong views. Consensus is seldom apparent.[52]

Notwithstanding, it is the duty of governments to lead and to explain their policies. A proactive approach by government in support of a clear policy choice can sway public opinion. Thus, polls are as much a matter of policy as they are of strong views. Moreover, in the absence of public debate, or at least balanced media debate, governing by poll is rather like leaving the decision making to the uninformed.

Many critics of a U.S centred approach argue that it aligns Canada too strongly with the U.S and hence cedes sovereignty and independence. A view that Canada's policy and action will only be determined through waiting and following the United Nations Security Council is hardly a more sovereign approach.

So what of the views of the other Canadian political parties? Although Question Period in the House of Commons provided an opportunity for limited debate through the give and take of that forum, it should be noted that the Prime Minister clearly wanted no debate on the matter. Kim Nossal argues that this may be linked to a view that argument in the parliament actually weakens a government's ability to negotiate its position in a

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[51] Ipsos News Center - Press releases from Jul 31 2002 through Jan 3 2004, Iraq War related polling data. Available from http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/results.cfm?cat=16; accessed 5 February 2004. The latter view that the UN should authorize action received 52% support in a poll conducted on 14 March 2003.
[52] Derek Burney, "Canada-US Relations: The Risk of Complacency, The Need for Engagement." *Policy Options*, (December 2003 – January 2004), 46.

crisis.[53] This may be true, but the drivers for the Liberal government seem to be more matters of control and precedent and so, they resisted debate or any open discussion of the matter by making the decision subject only to a no-confidence vote.

> …when we have to make decisions like that, for example, in the case of Kosovo, we follow the precedent that has existed for a long time. It is a decision of the government and the government can always be defeated if it makes the wrong decision through a confidence vote.[54]

The absence of proper political and public debate is key here. Parliamentary systems can only represent the people if there is proper debate on the issues of greatest import. As Roy Rempel has noted, "The absence of any serious debate in our national legislature has profound implications for the ability of Canada to shape international events, to respond to internal crises and emergencies and even for our capacity to protect our national sovereignty."[55]

Notwithstanding efforts to limit debate, we can perhaps dissect the basic views of the other parties from their questions in the house. Our ability to do this in any meaningful way is however, hampered significantly by the "melodramatic nature" of Question Period and the manner it which it "encourages superficiality".[56] The very conduct of this event, and the efforts by the players to speak in sound bites for media consumption, results in a less than appropriate forum for proper national debate on fundamental issues of foreign policy. Thus, at best we can attempt to discern the various viewpoints from the tone and content of the question raised to embarrass the government, and the responses in its defence.

The requirement for a second resolution at the UNSC was strongly supported by the Bloc Quebecois and certainly not refuted by the Progressive Conservatives. Canadian Alliance policy is somewhat easier to determine. Stephen Harper characterized the

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[53] Nossal, *the Politics of…. 274.*
[54] Jean Chrétien speaking during Question Period. Hansard Number 047, 37th Parliament, 2nd session, January 28, 2003.
[55] Roy Rempel, *The Chatter Box, An Insider's Account of the Irrelevance of Parliament in the Making of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy.* Toronto: Breakout Educational Network in association with Dundurn Press, c2002, 16.
[56] *Ibid,* 21.

Liberal policy as one of "abandonment of our closest traditional allies".[57] Thus, at the surface, the Canadian Alliance could be said to have adopted the bilateral approach. Based on comments made in the house, it would seem that the NDP would not likely have supported participation regardless of UNSC resolutions. As Alexa McDonough declared in the House of Commons, "Mr. Speaker, Canadians want clarity. They want the government to be an unapologetic voice for peace."[58]

In this milieu, as noted earlier, the Liberal policy was clear. The Prime Minister noted on 18 February, "If there must be a war in Iraq, we want it to be approved by the Security Council. …our policy is to follow the directives set out by the Security Council."[59] Of course the reality was that the Security Council did not work to the satisfaction of all. The Canadian government had previously not followed UNSC direction nor waited for it to 'work' when the decision was taken to participate in Kosovo. In that case, the departure was argued on the basis of NATO solidarity, or multilateral interests. It should be noted of course that NATO solidarity was lacking in the 2003 Iraq War case. Nevertheless, one can see inconsistency in a message that the UNSC and the course of internationalism had to be followed in the case of Iraq.

Inconsistency of message is apparent again when the Prime Minister says on one hand that we will not participate on principled grounds, and then declares that he wants the U.S. and U.K to succeed; "Mr Speaker, the first day of the war or the second day, I said that I wanted, and we wanted, the Americans and the British to succeed."[60] He also conceded, "It was the Americans' privilege and right to make that decision. We respect that." [61] Moreover, as noted earlier, the presence in theatre of Canadians on exchange with armed forces of coalition nations placed Canadians, in Canadian uniforms, as combatants in the conflict. They did not have to see actual combat to be considered combatants since personnel engaged in supporting roles are also considered as combatants in a conflict. Moreover, the relatively small number of Canadians engaged in

[57] Hansard Number 074, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, March 20, 2003
[58] Hansard Number 051, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, February 3, 2003.
[59] Hansard Number 062, 37th Parliament, 2nd session, February 18, 2003.
[60] Hansard Number 086, 37th Parliament, 2nd session, April 8, 2003.

Iraq is immaterial. No manner of explanation regarding exchange agreements would make it otherwise; intentionally, formally or by sheer circumstance, Canada became a participant in the conflict by proxy if not by declared intention. The Iraqis would not have viewed it otherwise had they captured a Canadian in uniform, in their country during hostilities. Moreover, if the government had felt that the war was either unjust or unlawful, then it should, at least on moral grounds, have directed its military personnel not to participate. Failure to do so implies at least tacit agreement that the conflict is both just and lawful.

An additional argument used in favour of the Canadian policy was military capability. Canadian Forces were stretched by the further commitment to Afghanistan, and so the ability to send forces to Iraq was severely limited. Indeed, the commitment to Afghanistan was meant in some respects to be a substantial Canadian contribution to the war on terrorism while avoiding Iraq directly. The reality, from the United State's perspective, was simply that the 'coalition of the willing' needed moral allies more than military ones. The US and UK forces were adequate for the task and so Canadian inability to commit significant forces was immaterial. The significance would have come from the commitment alone. Moreover, as noted in the preceding paragraph, Canada was by many measures a participant by circumstance. Thus, Canada only had to say that it was 'willing' in order to be reasonably considered a coalition member.

As PM Chrétien stated in the house, it is true that "Canadians will make our own policies. I remember that I was a member of the House of Commons when the government did not support the intervention of the Americans in the Vietnam War."[62] What he could have added was a reminder that the Liberals only changed policy direction in the previous gulf conflict, which was supported by the UNSC, once the Progressive Conservatives committed Canadian Forces personnel to the war. As Jean Chrétien, then Leader of the Opposition, said, "We are at war and we have to be united because

[61] Hansard Number 074, 37th Parliament, 2nd session, March 20, 2003.
[62] Hansard Number 054, 37th Parliament, 2nd session, February 6, 2003.

Canadians are fighting right now."[63] We might speculate that he may not have agreed to participate even with a new UNSC resolution on Iraq, but to suggest that the policy was actually disingenuous would be a matter for tangential debate. Rather, the fact that Canada strove to break the French/German versus American impasse with a compromise, suggests that the Canadian government hoped to see consensus emerge. Thus, we will assume that it was only the lack of UNSC consensus that limited Canadian action as stated by Chrétien.

Thus, we can conclude that the Liberal government set a policy, generally supported by Canadians, which placed an internationalist agenda ahead of bilateral interests with the United States. Moreover, the policy was established without much debate and justified by a faith in the UNSC, which had heretofore been either respected or ignored according to the interests of the day. The argument here is not that the government was right or wrong in the decision taken on the Iraq situation. Rather, the obvious conclusion is that there was no proper debate. This conflict was not resolved through any meaningful national debate. It was decided by the inner circle of the government and never properly explained. Of equal lasting concern is the fact that the decision was not taken on any concrete policy grounds. The position was ambiguous and simply stated as a matter of following the Security Council, which is as much an abrogation of national sovereignty as any blind adherence to U.S policy. Neither course does Canada justice, nor does it set Canada on a course of consistent value or interest based policies.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

Canada-American Relations

Whether Canadians like it or not, U.S. foreign policy has been dramatically affected by 9/11. Canadians may have felt they understood the implications of the attack, but the reality is that the impact to U.S. psyche was far more than Canada or its government understood. Norman Mailer captured some of the mood when he wrote in

[63] Hansard, House of Commons, Debates, 16 January 1991, 17166-7.

Why are we at War, "The fear that waved the flag in every hand was our nightmare of terrorism."[64] The nightmare for the Americans is not over.

The result is a new paradigm in U.S. foreign policy. The United States is less inclined to debate *jus ad bellum*, and is more inclined to act in a spirit of preventative and pre-emptive self-defence. The Bush administration outlined this succinctly in their new national security strategy as, "We cannot let our enemies strike first."[65] For the U.S today, nothing is more important than security. Their sense of vulnerability is such that all other matters are secondary. Canadians cannot doubt that all other interests will be addressed only after U.S. security is assured. This was most evident in the rapid but temporary shutdown of the Canada-U.S border, which categorically demonstrated that security could take precedence over trade.

Equally significant to other nations, in their relations with the U.S. is an understanding of their thinking with respect to friends and allies. The sentiment is perhaps best captured in a quote from Euripedes:

> I hate a friend whose gratitude grows old, who would enjoy his friends' prosperity, but will not in misfortune sail with them.[66]

The U.S expected that its allies would be there in force throughout their war on terrorism, regardless of how it played out. In their view, the Iraq invasion was but the next phase in that conflict. As David Gompert wrote, "Iraq has ended the American fantasy that France would always 'be there' when it really counts."[67] It has also ended the fantasy the Canada would always be there when it really counts. While Canadians may consider Americans their best friends, the reverse is no longer true, if it ever was.

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[64] Norman Mailer, *Why are we at War?* New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, c2003, 18.

[65] United States of America, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.

[66] Euripedes, Hercules Furens, I. (c 420 B.C)

[67] David C. Gompert "What does America want of Europe" in *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations after Iraq*. Ed. by Gustav Lindstrom. Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris 2003, 46.

Only 20 percent of Americans currently think that Canada is their best friend, whereas Britain ranks number one with them at 62 percent.[68]

A fundamental theme of the new American approach lies in the elements of power and responsibility. As the old proverb says, *he who pays the piper calls the tune.* Indeed, those pundits of Pearson's 'functionalism' would have to concede the point that those who make the greatest contribution have certain rights. Responsibility comes with the power to act and influence the course of events, for better or worse. American experience from war also suggests that defeated enemies can become new allies. Although it may be naïve to extrapolate this idea to Iraq, there is a view that the establishment of democracy in Iraq will create a new ally in a region rife with anti-Americanism.

Turning to the Canadian-American relationship, it would seem that these two countries reached some early accord in terms of acknowledging and respecting the others opinion and position. America would promote the war and build their support without any direct Canadian criticism, and Canada would support the UNSC process without any direct pressure or official requests for support from the United States. However, this concordance was not to last when various members of the Liberal caucus and the PM's office were overtly critical of President Bush. In the subsequent days the U.S. Ambassador 'took off the diplomatic gloves' and began to criticize Canada's position and contributions militarily to global stability. Suffice it to say, as Kim Nossal noted in *Canada: fading power or future power?*

> …for the Canadian government to be able to exercise influence in Washington on matters of global policy, the government in Washington had to be willing to listen to what Canadians had to say on such matters.[69]

The question that remains unanswered, and is particularly difficult to quantify is – What real negative impact is there to Canada when it disagrees with the United States on

[68] The Canadian Press, "Americans are our best friends, Canadians say", *National Post,* 15 March 2004. Story based on a Leger Marketing Poll.

foreign policy? Is punitive action either possible or significant enough to influence future governments to be more supportive of the U.S. position? We will attempt to address both of these questions in the section below on consequences. At this point, it is worth briefly comparing the policy of another 'middle power', Australia, which took a completely different approach.

Australia

In *The Road to War on Iraq,* Ron Huisken notes that a similar debate went on in Australia regarding the case for supporting the United States. In particular he notes, "the government worked doggedly to swing public opinion with, at best, limited success."[70] Relationships or friendships figured prominently in Australia's established policy on Iraq. In the final government view, sticking by their long-term allies was the right thing to do, and the action conducted was lawful and in the national interest of Australia. Certainly, the Australian decision was focussed on national interest. As the Australian Prime Minister said in an address to his House of Representatives:

> The government will continue to develop and enhance relationships wherever and whenever we can see an advantage for Australia. Our national interest is best served by a network of alliances and relationships. …. The strengthening of these long standing and important ties with America and Britain does not mean for a moment that Australia has diminished other important relationships. Indeed, we have been very careful to ensure that our region understands our involvement in Iraq.[71]

As will be emphasized again later, interests are not absolute and differing opinions are to be expected. This is also the case for Australia. Ron Huisken offered a word of caution when he wrote:

> The manner in which it got involved, in my view, was clearly damaging to Australia's long-term interests.[72]

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[69] Kim Nossal, *Canada: fading power or future power?* Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 2003, 12.

[70] Ron Huisken, The *Road to War on Iraq*. Canberra Papers on Strategy & Defence, No. 148, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Canberra, 2003, 50.

[71] Australian Parliament, May 14 2003. Available from http://aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/dailys/dr140503.pdf accessed 13 March 2004, 14424.

[72] Ron Huisken. *The Road to War on Iraq,* 57.

> Being close to the United States remains natural and beneficial for Australia. On the other hand, being seen as indistinguishable from the United States can only damage our standing and influence in Asia.[73]

This view is not markedly different from the one held by Canadian critics of bilateral ties with the United States. It is true that any alignment can be seen as an abdication of sovereignty, be it to the United States or the United Nations. Equally, a choice to side with one party or another is still an exercise in sovereignty, provided that the position taken is clear from the start.

European Relations

Where the United States may choose a path more oriented with Hobbesian thinking due to their hegemony, the Europeans are perhaps more inclined towards using internationalism as a substitute for the individual power they lack. The French position seems to be clearly aligned to a policy intended to advance multi-polarity, with Europe taking on a balancing position with the United States. Organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations and NATO, do allow these nations some means to counterbalance the power of the United States. For Europeans, the danger is less from any individual state than it is from a decline in the value and effectiveness of such international mechanisms. Nicole Gnesotto writes that "The notion of 'rogue states' is quite simply missing from European thinking, which is more focussed on the risks presented by 'failing states' and bad governance."[74]

For Britain, siding with the United States seems to be more a matter of its long-term relationship with the United States, as it was for Australia. Although, in fairness, the government in the UK also made much of the threat to stability posed by Iraq and their failure to comply with UNSC resolutions. However, this position also reinforces the role of the U.S. in promoting stability in Europe, and acts in some measure to counter the potential imbalances that could develop from the increasing Franco-German dominance in the European Union.

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[73] *Ibid* 58.
[74] Nicole Gnesotto, "EU, US: visions of the world, visions of the other" in *Shift or Rift*…, 25.

The search for a new world paradigm, where global security and liberal order will be assured through the cooperation of nations, is no less idealistic than the American dream of world-wide democracy, supported by the defenders of the free. The genocide in Rwanda, and the crisis in Kosovo show in large measure that the UN can be ineffective in assuring human security. Indeed, the Kosovo crisis would more naturally point to the need for multilateral solutions, be they NATO or a coalition of the willing. For the case of Iraq and the UN, Alyson Bailes, writing for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces writes:

> Overall, the crisis has highlighted the importance which the great majority of states in the world attach to the UN as a legitimating authority, as well as the various practical benefits of tackling multi-dimensional crisis management tasks in a UN framework.[75]

In contrast, however, is her other rather pragmatic conclusion that "…the UN will only be used to the extent that the world's greatest powers want to use it and are prepared to some degree to modify their national preferences to that end."[76]

So, what then is the European view of Canada's independent decision in the case of Iraq? It is difficult to find any serious commentary outside of North America that even remarks on the Canadian position. In *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations after Iraq*, published under the auspices of the European Union's Institute for security Studies, Canada fails to get even honourable mention. This is not unique to this particular publication or analysis. The reality is that it is the U.S. that dominates European thinking on trans-Atlantic relations. Canadians may think that their opinion and position on key issues matters a lot, but as a minor contributor, frankly, Canada's position doesn't seem to matter much. Returning to the Pearsonian idea of functionalism, Canada should not be surprised if its influence is in proportion to its concrete contributions to world stability. In a game of chess, the expressed views of the non-participants, those without pieces on the board, are not much appreciated by those playing the game, whose reputations are on the line.

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[75] Alyson Bailes, *The Iraq War: Impact on International Security*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Policy Paper, Geneva, August 2003, 11.
[76] *Ibid.*

Consequences of an Internationalist Primacy

To reiterate: for the purposes of this discussion, an internationalist primacy in foreign policy is taken to mean a focus on aligning foreign policy with the UNSC, rather than a multilateral approach, such as through consensus at NATO or a bilateral approach with the United States. It is also tied to the idea of setting national values, of the way the world ought to be ordered, ahead of any specific national interest.

Arguably, the fundamental problem with aligning Canadian foreign policy to internationalism lies in the conundrum that while Canada's interests may be multi-polar, the world is not. As noted previously, collective security has its weaknesses. That said, when Canada chooses a path counter to the United States, what are the real consequences, if any? What are the consequences of rejecting the U.S. path from a bilateral versus a multilateral or international perspective?

Adherence to U.S. foreign policy has never been the Canadian way. The slow and limited response to the Cuban missile crisis and rejection of the subsequent policy to isolate Cuba was a clear separation. Another dramatic example was the Ottawa treaty to limit anti-personnel land mines. As Nelson Michaud and Louis Belanger note this as an example of "Ottawa trying to set itself apart from Washington so as to maintain a form of diplomatic independence" and build "a diplomatic niche".[77] Where this approach fails to support the Iraq crisis is in the lack of sound reasoning. As Denis Stairs puts it, Canada seemingly argued against the U.S not on principle or "substantive policy analysis", but instead on the basis that they didn't "round up enough votes" at the Security Council.[78]

Jack Granatstein has opined that Canadian values ought to be subordinated to interests.[79] In stating this, he is suggesting that bilateral interests with the United States

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[77] Michaud, Nelson, and Louis Belanger. "Canadian Institutional Strategies: New Orientations for a Middle Power Foreign Policy?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 10357718, Vol. 54, Issue 1, April 2000, 106.

[78] Stairs, Denis. *Trends in Canadian foreign policy…,* 5.
[79] Jack Granatstein, *The Importance of Being Less Earnest…, 8.*

should take precedence due to the potential impact to Canada. Missing from this and other texts is any clear proof that Canada is or has ever been really hurt when it has diverged from the U.S. in foreign policy, though perhaps Cuba came close.[80] To the contrary, Donald Barry postulates that there is a certain degree of immunity from damage when he states, "…although Canadian-US relations were strained, the economies of the two countries were so closely intertwined that reprisals would be very difficult to undertake."[81] However, as John Noble writes;

> Another possible downside is that individual members of the U.S. Senate or House of Representative, who already have their own protectionist agendas, will use the excuse of Canada's non-participation in the war as a further excuse to forward their agendas. …I am not saying we cannot differ with the United States. But we have to choose our battles with the U.S. carefully, and appearing to side with Saddam Hussein put us in bed with a tyrant.[82]

Although government level reprisal may be limited, the impact can still be enormous if the populace chooses to protest with their buying power or tourism, by boycotting Canada and its goods. Since perception is critical to this impact, it is worth noting that Canada came off lucky when polling showed that 47 percent of Americans actually thought that Canada supported the U.S. in Iraq. This same polling indicated that while 26 percent claimed to be avoiding Canadian goods, 17 percent were more likely to buy Canadian, thinking Canada a supporter. If this is an accurate predictor we might forecast a net potential decline in buying power or tourism of nine percent.[83]

Nor has the corollary been shown, that aligning with the U.S. pays dividends. In the Mulroney era, the warm relations between the Prime Minister and the President did result in the Canada-US and North American Free Trade Agreements. However, this close relationship never delivered in any specific dispute on the economic front for the

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[80] *Ibid, 25*.

[81] Donald Barry, . "Managing Canada-US Relations in the Post-9/11 Era: Do We Need a Big Idea?" *Policy Paper on the Americas* Volume XIV, Study 11 (November 2003). 14.

[82] John J. Noble, "Canada-US Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era: Stop The Drift Towards Irrelevance." *Policy Options*, (May 2003), 20 and 24.

[83] Ipsos-Reid Polling data, 13 April 2004.

simple reason that even the strong presidency of Reagan was insufficient to hold any real sway over Congress.

Whatever the financial impacts, the real consequence from a Canada-U.S. perspective may be a loss of influence on a broad range of issues. A cancelled Bush-Chrétien meeting certainly affected to some degree the Prime Minister's ability to influence US policy. If it is true that reprisals are problematic from either side, then perhaps Washington need not consider the Ottawa view. In other words, in adopting a non-participative approach to their agenda on foreign policy, Canada risks becoming immaterial to U.S. thinking.

One could argue that an ambiguous foreign policy provides a government with the greatest latitude to set an independent course of action whenever a crisis arises. Ambiguity does make it difficult for allies, and opposition governments, to understand and criticize a particular policy. Thus, perhaps ambiguity is the greatest strength and weakness in Canadian foreign policy. Donald Savoie, in *Governing from the Centre* views it that in Canadian government, "The emphasis is less on policy coherence and more on keeping the lid on".[84] A coalition or collective strategy can also be used as a vehicle to avoid setting a coherent national strategy. It can allow a government to deny support to a major power or ally – on the basis that the decision needs to await further consensus building.

"Be ambiguous and join any emerging consensus". This simple maxim seems to describe Canadian foreign policy. Like defence policy, the real challenge to describing any national security strategy has been the absence of a threat, at least until 9/11 came along, and even then most Canadians tend to view terrorism as something that happens elsewhere. Thus, arguably, Canadian foreign policy has little to do with security and everything to do with maximizing influence globally for both altruistic and pragmatic reasons. If this is the case, there is an inherent risk that 'soft power' will be seen as little

[84] Savoie, Donald J.. *Governing from the Centre: the Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999, 336.

more than soft-selling principle in favour of getting another opportunity to sit on the Security Council. Ambiguity also sends a message of lack of resolve. According to Andrew Cohen, in *While Canada Slept*, "The critics call Canada an immature country, unable or unwilling to make hard choices."[85]

Perhaps the reason Canadians avoid the hard choices is because they can. When the biggest threat to internal security seems to be referenda, then making hard foreign policy choices doesn't appear necessary. In that case, the choice is not between hard national interests but rather between maximizing influence and promoting values. However, when dire emergencies arise, such as the Iraq case, the abandonment of long-term allies can result from sticking to your principles.

SOME LESSONS

Canada approached the Iraq crisis with ambiguity, and in the end elected to side with a divisive United Nations Security Council at the expense of its relations with its best and closest friend, the United States. There was no proper public debate and Question Period was a sorry substitute. Values were thus set as a priority ahead of interests, and without the people of Canada hearing all of the possible perspectives.

Today, very few Canadians would argue that the government decision was wrong. With no WMD evidence, U.S support in the region is evaporating, and with more U.S soldiers dying in Iraq every day, it would seem that they are now trapped. They cannot quit until stability is assured, or the good that was done in removing Saddam Hussein will be lost. In the meantime more U.S soldiers and Iraqis will die. Those against the war from the beginning are declaring, "I told you so". Certainly, the chosen course was subsequently justified by polling those same Canadians who were never given the opportunity to hear any debate.

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[85] Cohen, Andrew. *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*. The Canadian Publishers, Toronto ON: 2003, 33.

Canada sees itself as a country particularly rich in its principles and values. In reality, Canada is just one of many voices preaching 'egalité' and humanitarianism. Only, Canada preaches with little real political clout and without allocating the resources necessary to demonstrate that commitment. While a value based foreign policy is altruistic and worthy of merit, neglecting national interests risks the very prosperity on which Canada's ability to advance the human security agenda is based.

Perhaps ignoring interests is the Canadian thing to do. Nevertheless, by recognizing the critical importance of the United States to all of its interests, including promoting values abroad, Canada will be better placed to influence the future course of events in the international arena. This influence will only exist if Canada is a participant in international debate, and that participation starts at home. Canada must remember that partners listen to one another. Being a partner means that Canada has a chance to influence within a group. Partners have a stake in the issue through willingness to commit resources and people. In the case of the U.S., partners have the capacity to adjust the approach. This point is emphasized in *Canadian Defence and Security in the 21st Century:*

> The Canada-US defence and security relationship has evolved in a *strategic partnership*. Unfortunately, the Canadian government continues to underplay the realities of that strategic partnership, preferring instead to overplay Canada's distinctiveness and autonomy with respect to security and defence priorities. The gap between political rhetoric and strategic reality needs to be addressed to ensure the nature and importance of the relationship. …threats to American security interests are threats to Canada, and vice versa.[86]

It is also an unhappy truth that Canada's position, on issues such as the 2003 Iraq War, is relatively insignificant in the trans-Atlantic dynamic. Notwithstanding the best efforts to distance itself from the U.S. Policy and shape a separate course, most of the world will likely continue to see Canada in the influence sphere of the United States. Perception in this area will always dominate reality. Tying the cart to the United Nations horse without a key policy basis is probably the least effective of options. The UNSC

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[86] Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. *Canadian Defence and Security in the 21st Century, To Secure a Nation, The Case for a New Defence White Paper.* (November 9 2001), 4.

record of late is mixed with notable successes such as Ethiopia-Eritrea, East Timor and Bosnia and notable failures such as Rwanda, Kosovo, and Iraq.

Regardless of how one might view the decisions of the Security Council members, the fact remains that in the Iraq War crisis, old alliances broke down and the consensus strategy failed. The concern for NATO is the harm done to lasting trans-Atlantic relations. David Gompert puts it succinctly when he concludes that the crisis "injected venom into the blood stream of US-European politics. While the fever is subsiding, the damage will last."[87]

Whether Canada was right or wrong not to go to war, the methodology for reaching this decision garnered no new friends in Washington. When it chooses to go it alone without the U.S., Canada must take great care to both explain why, to Canadians and Americans, and avoid criticizing the White House for doing what it thinks is best.

Rejecting the U.S. approach would, to some commentators, be very much in the national interest. Certainly, one could argue that the current economic dependence on Canada-U.S. trade is a weakness and that Canada should take whatever measures are necessary to diversify trade and interests globally. This is a worthy goal perhaps but the reality is that even the most concerted of efforts in this area is unlikely to change Canadian trade patterns in the short term. To put this rather simply, Canadians cannot drive to Europe, and the Orient Express does not stop in Ottawa, but every road leads to the Canada-US border.

Notwithstanding any potential economic harm to Canada, the greatest threat is that Canada will become immaterial to U.S. thinking. Looking strictly at the Iraq case, it would seem that middle power influence, such as it is or was, has been marginalized. In the post-9/11 paradigm of coalition building, a middle power's ability to influence the international course of action in any meaningful way lies solely in adding credibility to

one viewpoint or another. Australia added credibility to the 'coalition of the willing'. Canada's non-participation really added little to the debate since it was characterized publicly as solely an adherence to the principle of UNSC authority rather than a stand on the justness or legality of the action being taken. As John Adams wrote, "…in politics the middle way is none at all."[88]

Many people expected the end of the Cold War to bring peace but instead the ensuing decade brought 50 ethnic and communal conflicts, 170 border disputes and two major wars.[89] There has been much emphasis since 9/11 on the newness of the strategic paradigm. A war against terrorism, bringing democracy to the trouble spots, has resulted in the U.S., and others becoming embroiled in a long stabilizing mission. However, as Kim Nossal has noted, "…the emphasis on the newness of the post-9/11 era risks obscuring the degree to which so many elements of foreign policy tend to remain fundamentally unchanged."[90]

What we can expect is greater chaos since uncertainty only grows with time. We can know the tree and hence predict the rough shape of the leaf, but its pattern will always be a surprise. Global stability isn't going to get any easier. Nossal suggests that failed states and humanitarian crises are more likely in the next decade.[91] As we approach these conflicts, care must be exercised distinguishing between terrorism and local guerrilla warfare. For Canada, debate on these matters to determine what is and what is not in the country's best interest is critical to ensuring foreign policy is consistent with those interests and values. This debate can only get more complex as more elements of the information age come into play.

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[87] David C. Gompert "What does America want of Europe" in *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations after Iraq*. Ed. by Gustav Lindstrom. Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris 2003, 44.
[88] John Adams in a letter to Horatio Gales, 23 March 1776.
[89] C. J. Dick, *The Future of Conflict: Looking out to 2020*. Conflict Studies Research Centre, Camberley, England 2003, 3.

[90] Nossal, K.R.. "Canadian Foreign Policy After 9/11: Realignment, Reorientation, or Reinforcement?" in *Foreign Policy Realignment in the Age of Terror, Canadian Strategic Forecast 2003*, Eds. Lenard Cohen, Brian Job and Alexander Moens, Toronto ON: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003.

[91] *Ibid*, 5.

> Within mature democracies, increasingly organised and vocal publics are demanding an increasing role in politics. NGOs and pressure groups, from consumer watchdogs through environmental and ethnic lobbies to humanitarian organizations, demand and receive more attention form governments. So, too, do the multinational businesses on which so much wealth creation and employment depend. All these limit governments' room for manoeuvre in both domestic and foreign policy.[92]

In this evolving world order, to make a difference Canada will need to redefine its relationship with the United States but perhaps no particular course of action will make much difference. Andrew Cohen expresses this view when he notes that

> In the new world order, Canadians will have to adjust to becoming less and less relevant to the United States despite its robust trade. By virtue of its staggering military, economic, scientific, and cultural power alone, everyone, including Canada, has become smaller.[93]

Nevertheless, this is hardly sound reasoning for abandoning efforts to make the very most out of the relationship with the U.S. For now, a U.S. foreign policy of pre-emption may not be one that Canada likes, and it may or may not be lasting, but does it matter? Indications are that Prime Minister Paul Martin sees the importance of the U.S. to Canada's future. Indeed, as Jack Mintz wrote,

> Martin understands well that the United States presents an opportunity, not a challenge, for us to define our foreign policy. The US not only is our best trading partner, but also supports our own security. We should never discount the importance of this relationship.[94]

But, like Mulroney, Martin will have to walk the balance beam between currying U.S. favour and being aloof to avoid excessive internal criticism.

CONCLUSION

Returning to Canada's national values and interests, what conclusions might we draw? A values based approach in the early stages of any crisis is an excellent starting point, but as positions solidify and in particular, as the United States sets its course, national interests must be given careful consideration. Canadians should realize that the

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[92] *Ibid,* 13.
[93] Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept…,* 191.
[94] Mintz, Jack. "Fretting over foreign policy". *Canadian Business,* Vol 76, Issue 10, May 26, 2003.

U.S. is our best friend and we should be theirs. In the post 9/11 world, security is the top priority for the Americans. Friendships, trade, economics and every other interest will be set aside if necessary to assure that security. Jim Travers put it thus:

> Shocked awake by Sept. 11, Washington, or Gulliver, is not about to be constrained by the petty concerns of the Lilliputians. Canada is the most exposed of the Lilliputians. Perched precariously along the great undefended cliché and historically committed to securing America's back door, this country faces an unambiguous imperative: It can share responsibility for continental defence or it can be tossed aside as Gulliver stirs.[95]

Notwithstanding the obvious setbacks to diplomacy as evidenced by the Iraq War crisis, there is a developing theme that is coming out of such ideas as the Responsibility to Protect and the human security agenda. The long-term results of globalization will exert increasing force on all of the world's major and middle powers to adapt their foreign policy for the greater good. Valclav Havel captured this sentiment in an address to the House of Commons in 1999:

> Individual countries must gradually abandon a foreign policy category that, so far, has usually been critical to their thinking, the category of 'national interests'. National Interests are most likely to divide us than bring us together.[96]

Perhaps the most important lesson is that the country has not as yet exercised the level of debate on these issues that it should, bearing in mind the enormity of the potential consequences. The fact that Canada was lucky to suffer few real consequences this time is hardly substantiation for similar courses in the future. Matters of foreign and defence policy should not be the domain of a few. Simplistic answers, for or against the Americans, and for or against the United Nations, are not sufficient. Whatever definitions we might choose for values and interests, in complex situations such as the Iraq conflict, certain values and interests will conflict with others. It is only through dialogue and debate that the country can be assured of choosing the path best suited to Canada's future national interests. Limited 'take-note' debates and Question Periods do not do the country and its people justice when it comes to determining foreign policy in crisis. Opposition parties in turn criticize this process and then perpetuate it when they

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[95] Jim Travers, "Share Defence or be Tossed Aside" *Toronto Star,* February 26, 2002, A23.
[96] Valclav Havel, Czech President, in "Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State", an address delivered to the Canadian Senate and House of Commons in Ottawa on 29 April 1999.

get in power. Canada must develop the mechanisms to foster proper debate and decision-making without leaving it solely to votes of confidence in parliament.

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