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Security in Iraq, Myths and Realities

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Introduction

What is democracy: the implementation of democracy has been proven throughout history to need a common structure of independent and well developed institutions with an educated population that would be ready to take the responsibilities and practices of a successful democracy. Thus, the establishment of any democracy should be preceded by a well functioning set of institutions. Since Iraq currently does not have those institutions ready in place, it could be argued that the country is transfer to a democratic state will not be successful in the near future. Moreover, the last time the Iraqi people experienced a semi-democracy was(more than seventy years ago) in 1930s during the constitutional monarchy of King Faisal. Since then there has been no presence any democracy in Iraq. We therefore have a whole generation of Iraqi people who simply do not know how to function? practice responsibly in a democratic state in order to make the experience successful.

Iraq was created after the First World War from the three Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The country has a history of political oppression and instability, which has been exacerbated by its ethnic and religious divisions and regional rivalries. The British-backed monarchy was overthrown in 1958, leading to a period of coups and short-lived governments. The situation stabilized after the second Ba'thist coup in 1968 and the establishment of an authoritarian one-party state. The Bathe party's strongman, Saddam Hussein, entrenched his position over the following decade, officially taking power in 1979.

Saddam tried to weaken Iran in the wake of its Islamic Revolution; but the Iraqi invasion of 1980 turned into a mutually debilitating, and ultimately inconclusive, eight-year war of attrition.

 In August 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait, hoping that the annexation of the Emirate would save Iraq from its massive post-war economic problems. But the move prompted a severe response from the International Community, which could not accept the expansion of Iraqi power. Iraqi forces were evicted from Kuwait by a US-led coalition in early 1991. Saddam then survived rebellions, coup plots and international sanctions until March 2003, when another US-led coalition invaded Iraq and

deposed the Ba'thist regime. The Coalition subsequently assumed responsibility for administering Iraq, promising that the country would be transformed into a democracy. [1]

The establishment of security in Iraq should be looked on as a foremost step toward the realization of any democratic society in the embattled country. Without law and order imposed through an effective and moral military police presence, there will not be a real opportunity to achieve other important objectives, like the rebuilding process and the re-orientation of a civil society. The overall process will be long and difficult.

This paper calls for the coalition forces to change its course of action and it will provide a blue print on how to achieve a better security outcome for the benefit of Iraq, its neighbors, and the coalition army.

The first part of the paper describes the social background of Iraq including domestic and regional factors. Then a discussion follows about the future and nature establishment of the political system in Iraq. Next is a critical analysis of the current security situation in Iraq, Then the paper describes the characteristics of the new security organization and goes into depth about the difference between "security sector" and "security sector reforms" with a forecast on the future security system of the country. Finally, the paper discusses the impact of a newly secured Iraq on the Gulf States and the future impact of the permanent presence of US forces on the region from a national security perspective.

History of Iraq

In 539 B.C., Semitic rule of the area ended with the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus the Great. The successors of Cyrus paid little attention to Mesopotamia, with the result that infrastructure was allowed to fall into disrepair. It was not until the Arab conquest and the coming of Islam that Mesopotamia began to regain its glory, particularly when Baghdad was the seat of the Abbasid caliphate between 750 and 1258.

Great Britain gained control of Iraq, after the First World War. In 1917, Iraq became a British protectorate[2]. Four years later , the British colonial government helped set up the

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[1] RISK POINTERS, http://www.janes.com/security/international_security
[2] http://www.scn.org/wwfor/raqhist.html

Hashemite monarchy[3] in Iraq. During the same year, Britain embarked on defining the territorial boundaries of their newly colony. The British colonial government then created boundaries without taking into consideration the tribal and ethnic settlements present in this region. In order to prevent Iraq's access to the Persian gulf[4], the British colonial government created Kuwait by carving it out of the southern part of Iraq. The British influenced both the composition of the Iraq parliament and the drafting of the Iraq constitution.

In 1932, Iraq became an independent nation. In the same year, it also joined the League of Nations. Iraq maintained close ties with Britain even after attaining independence .Britain not only had interests in Iraq oil resources but also considered Iraq's strategic location in the Middle East important to its defense. The British occupation of Iraq did more harm than good for the Iraqi people.

The British occupation of Iraq excluded the Iraqis from participating in the political process of their own country. The British also did little to resolve internal conflict that arose in Iraq. At times British forces even supported one ethnic group at war with another. Britain's occupation of Iraq, therefore, left Iraq deeply divided and did very little to help unite the people. The political institutions the Britain left behind had neither the capacity nor the power to transform Iraq into a stable nation with a prosperous economy. This left Iraq susceptible to dictatorial rule.

In 1958, a revolution led by Abdal Kassem Quassim[5] deposed the monarchy imposed on the Iraqi people by the British. Saddam Hussein emerged as one of the leaders in this left wing coup. The regime that took over chose not to cooperate with the west. This regime nationalized the Iraqi oil industry and removed the ban on the Iraqi Communist Party. In 1963, the CIA helped to overthrow this new, "unfriendly" regime. However, in 1968, the radical socialist Ba'ath party, led by General Ahmed Hassan Bakr[6], took control of country. In 1979, Saddam Hussein overthrew General Bakr. One year later, Saddam Hussein received backing from the United States under the Carter Doctrine to invade Iran. The Carter Doctrine stated that the "U.S will intervene militarily to protect U.S.

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[3] http://www.nationbynation.com/Iraq/History1.html
[4] http://www.world66.com/asia/middleeast/iraq
[5] http://www.nationbynation.com/Iraq/history1.html
[6] http://www.europehouse.com/Euronomics. /RM/rm_iraq.htm

access to oil"[7] The war between Iran and Iraq lasted until 1988, when both parties signed a ceasefire agreement. President Reagan's administration had resumed diplomatic ties with Iraq in 1984, while at the same time it sold weapons to the Iranian government. Iraq borrowed heavily in order to wage the war against Iran. After the war, Iraq's economy was in very bad shape. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait after accusing Kuwait of conspiring to ruin its economy. A U.S. led coalition expelled Saddam's troops from Kuwait in 1991.

The Iraq Social Background

Iraq is home to a diverse mix of ethnic and religious groups. Its population is approximately

55 % Shia Arab, 20 % Sunni Arab, and 25 % Kurdish (Sunni and Shia), This ratio is 53% (Arab and Kurds are about 7-10% of the whole population). with a smattering of Turkmen, Chaldeans, and Assyrian Christians. Iraq does not readily divide into "parts." The Kurds make up the majority population (about 3.8 million) in the three northern provinces, but their territorial aspirations extend further. The Kurdish parliament that met in late 2002 agreed that Kirkuk, not now under Kurdish control, must be the capital of a common autonomous Kurdish region with virtual independence from Baghdad except in national defense. Kirkuk and its oilfields are also claimed by the Turkmen and is inhabited by Arabs. Turkey threatens military invasion if the Kurds seize Kirkuk, declare self-rule, or threaten the vulnerable Turkmen minority.

Iraq's Sunni Arabs have formed its political and military elite since the time of Ottoman rule. They trained in the best Ottoman government and military academies, and they were the last to break with the Ottoman Empire. The long years of British mandate, monarchy, and republic did little to alter this basic pattern. Sunni Arab clans and tribes, many linked to Saddam Hussein's clan, constituted a large part for-the Republican Guard, special military and security units, and the intelligence services. The base for the regime's support, they have also been the greatest threat to it: All coup attempts during the past decade have come from this strategic center. Contradictory, and when all coup attempts had come from the strategic center (security systems). It meant that Saddam was not accepted by the Sunni themselves.[8]

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[7] Ibid
[8] Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath, International Crisis Group, Brussels, October,1,2002.

Iraq's Shia Arabs form the majority of Baghdad's population of nearly 5 million and dominate a large portion of southern Iraq in the land between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. In many areas, they live interspersed with Sunni Arab tribes and villages. Many clans, including Saddam's own, have both Sunni and Shia branches. Intermarriage is common. Some Shia are urban, secular (Western educated and oriented.), and were Ba'thist or even Communist Party members. Some are more rural, tribal, and traditional in both faith and social outlook. A smaller number who reside in the shrine cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad, are of Persian origin, and restrict their activities to faith, education, and good works.

Few Shias look to Iran for political solace or as a model to emulate. Rather, they are apolitical by tradition and custom. Spurned by both the Turks and the British and denied any opportunity to share in real power by the various governments since 1920, Iraq's Shias retreated from political life for the most part. But the number of Bathists from the Shia in the leadership of the Bathi party are more than the Sunnis. Some were attracted by the Iraqi nationalism envisioned by Saddam and the early Ba'th Party, but they rejected its pan-Arabism, fearing it would eventually submerge Iraq's Shia majority in a Sunni-dominated culture. Iraq's Shia shrine cities, Najaf and Karbala, in particular have long been home to religious Shia clerics and scholars from Iran, Lebanon, and the Gulf, as well as India. Once great centers of learning and pilgrimage, they have been decimated by years of repression because of the presence of anti-Saddam extremist religious elements and by United Nations-imposed sanctions dating from the Kuwait war.

The Shias of Iraq and Iran share a common faith; both are (Twelve Shia Muslims)but all similarity ends there. Iraq's Shias remained loyal to the state and to Saddam during the eight-year war with Iran because they saw themselves as Arabs and Iraqis against the enemy, rather than as a religious cohort. Religious practices, conversion experience, and Persian links to the state, historically have also set them apart.

Despite their differences, Sunni and Shia Arabs share a common vision of Iraq. The vision is a united Iraq with all oil and land resources governed from Baghdad. Sunni and Shia clerics and tribes joined with city-bred nationalists in 1920 to oppose the British occupation of Iraq. Clerics spoke from common pulpits and issued decrees legitimizing revolt against the foreign invader. Although they had different visions of governance-secular state versus Islamic government, their opposition to imposed rule and feelings of political disenfranchisement linked them for a short

period of time. Sunni Arabs and Shias who left the villages for the more cosmopolitan ways of Baghdad regard the more tribal and traditional tribes of the south with disdain.

The United States has been able to invade Iraq to get rid of Saddam Hussein . It has the power and resources to maintain an occupation and administer the country in the same way. But the United States alone cannot establish a stable government in Iraq and security in the region. Iraq's diverse political and social groups must participate actively and forge at least a minimal consensus about the new political system. Iraq's neighbors, the United Nations, the Arab League, and other members of the international community must all be involved if Iraq is not to turn once more into a flashpoint for conflict.[9]

THE DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS

Despite their fundamental differences, the Iraqi National Congress (comprised mostly of formerly exiled Iraqis), the Kurdish political parties, and the formerly Really the Iraqi don't respect the INC, exiled Shi'a community have all released declarations or draft constitutions calling for a fully democratic Iraq. Crucially, the views of the general Iraqi population or of key elements of political, tribal, and religious leaders within Iraq are not yet publicly available.

Although broadly committed to a democratic form of government, known proposals from some of the parties differ quite dramatically in terms of substance. The Kurdish proposal which is the only one to date reflective of large populations within Iraq, envisions a near confederal state made up of a Kurdish province and an Arab province with nearly all important powers devolved to these provinces, and with the Kurdish and Arab groups sharing near equal power and responsibilities at the federal level. The INC draft constitution and the Democratic Principles Working Group call for a heavily centralized federal structure, with a general but vague call for the people of Kurdistan to choose an appropriate formula for partnership with the other peoples of Iraq in a unified state. The Declaration of the Shi'a of Iraq party? only addresses the federal structure in the broadest terms and calls for a government that confirms the unity of Iraq while addressing its diversity and pluralism

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[9] Marina Otttaway Judith Yaphe, Political Reconstruction in Iraq, March 27 2003,p2.

without promoting sectarianism. More recently, local Shi'a clerics, with support from Iran, have called for a theocratic Iraq. It will therefore require intensive efforts to bridge these differences.[10]

DOMESTIC FACTORS

The Kurdish Factor. Over the past three decades, the Kurdish population in northern Iraq has been subjected to gross and massive violations of human rights, including the attempted genocide known as the Anfal campaigns, which led to the deaths of nearly 200,000 Kurds and which involved the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians. Over the past decade, the Kurdish population has been protected by an American/British "no-fly" zone. This has established a near-independent level of autonomy with quasi democratic state institutions, which they will be reluctant to surrender or dismantle.

Since the mid-1990s, the Kurds have operated under the constitution of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and they have established a functional Kurdish regional government. The regional government recently proposed a Constitution of the Federal Republic of Iraq. The draft constitution provides for a confederal Iraq comprised of an Arab Region and a Kurdish Region. The Arab Region would consist of the middle and southern territories of Iraq while the Kurdish Region would be made up of historically Kurdish territories in the northeast, including the city of Kirkuk as its capital. This area would roughly account for twice the size of the territory controlled by the Kurds since 1991. Some Kurdish groups appear to call for the redressing of the effects of Saddam's campaign of Arabization with the return of Kurds and removal of Arabs who were forcibly settled in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1957.[11]

The Shi'a Factor. Under the reign of Saddam Hussein, the Shi'a Arabs, who constitute the majority of the Iraqi population, were largely precluded from participating in political organizations. During Saddam's regime, most of the leaders and the ministers were shias. The exiled Shi'a have produced a document entitled the Declaration of the Shi'a of Iraq, which has received wide support outside of Iraq and calls for a secular democracy. The views of the Shi'a in Iraq are to date still largely unknown. Recently, there have been strident calls from some groups within the Shi'a community for

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[10] Iraq Policy Briefing, Is There an Alternative to War? International Crisis Group, Brussels,February24,2003.
[11] Establishing A Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in Iraq, Public International Law & Policy Group and The Century Foundation, May 2003.

the removal of American forces and the establishment of an Islamic state similar to the Iranian model.

Sunni Factor. Elements of the Sunni Arab minority, which makes up 20 percent This is incorrect. The Arab Sunnis are about 43-45%. of the Iraqi Arab population and have controlled the Iraqi government for decades. While not all Sunni Arabs were Ba'ath party members, the Sunni minority is likely to fear retribution from other ethnic and religious groups and will greet with skepticism all efforts to minimize their exercise of political power.

The Minority Factor. Ethnic Turkomans, Chaldeans, Yezidi, Assyrians, and other minorities, who constitute a substantial portion of the population, will require some form of representation in the Iraqi state and the establishment of mechanisms to protect their interests. The Turkomans are concentrated in the northeastern provinces and constitute the largest minority population after the Kurds. Some of the Turkomans political parties are allied with Kurdish political groups, while others are more allied with the interests of Turkey and seek official recognition of their distinctive identity and language, while also contesting Kurdish claims to Kirkuk and Mosul. On the whole, Iraqi minority groups fear a lack of recognition of their identities and protection of their interests in a state structure focused on resolving tensions between the Kurds and Arabs.

The Iraqi Exile Community. The Iraqi exile community is politically sophisticated and well connected in the United States and Great Britain. Their proposals reflect a commitment to secular democracy and the protection of minority and human rights. While some exiles have returned with substantial international political financial backing and in some instances American-trained militia, their ability to sway the indigenous Iraqi community is as yet questionable.   .

To date the exile community has produced three major documents concerning the future constitutional structure for Iraq. The Iraqi National Congress has produced a comprehensive draft constitution for the Republic of Iraq. After an opposition conference attended by all the major exile groups in December 2002, the parties agreed to a Political Statement of the Iraqi Opposition Conference setting out a framework of principles for a new Iraqi constitution. In cooperation with the U.S. Department of State, a mix of Iraqi exiles and international experts convened a Democratic Principles Working Group and issued a report addressing many of the key constitutional issues facing a new Iraq.

The Islamic Factor. During the course of Saddam's reign, religious influences were highly monitored and suppressed by state security forces. The extent of religious conviction among the Iraqi people is unknown and the degree of politicization and radicalization among their religious leadership is unclear. Currently, some religious leaders are responding to requests by the American forces to take a civic leadership role and are thereby establishing a prominent position in civil society. Others are taking up leadership positions and organizing bureaucratic infrastructures in opposition to the wishes of the American forces. The degree to which they will continue their involvement in political matters, whether they will evolve into a homogeneous or a pluralistic force, and the extent to which some of them may embrace more radical forms of Islam remains to be seen.

Political Flashpoints. The cites of Tikrit, Karbala, Kirkuk, Mosul, Basra, Arab (Faluja, Ramadi, Haditha) and Baghdad are all political flashpoints that may erupt before or during the constitution-making process and substantially hinder it. Each area also presents special concerns that must be addressed in a new constitutional structure. Kirkuk, for example, is claimed by both the Kurds and the Turkomans as their historic capital, and it has been the site of ethnic cleansing and forced Arabization, with recent reports of intimidation against non-Kurds being carried out by some Kurdish groups.

REGIONAL FACTORS

Iranian Interests. The complex and often hostile relationship between Iran and both Iraq and the United States will undoubtedly influence efforts to build a stable democracy in Iraq. While the exact manifestations of Iran's interest are not yet clear, it is reasonable to assume that Iran will seek to support and align itself with some of the major political factions within the Shi'a community., It may seek to destabilize the American military presence, and it will take measures to protect its own regime from the political influence of a potentially democratic and western aligned Iraq. Already a number of clerics in Basra and Nasiriyah have been identified as being supported by Iran, and the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq is openly organized and funded by Iran. Iran is also concerned that the continued presence of the United States in Iraq may have a destabilizing effect on the Islamic regime's wavering hold in Iran.[12]

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[12]   Jonathan Wright ,US Tries to Curb ,Iranian Role in Iraq,*Reuters***, April 23, 2003**

Turkish Interests. Turkey's primary interest is to ensure a stable Iraq that maintains its territorial integrity and represents all of Iraq's constituents. Having recently quelled the activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)[13] terrorist organization, Turkey is very concerned that Iraq will fragment, or a federal province of Kurdistan would ultimately lead to a resurgence of the PKK. Turkey is further concerned that autonomy for Iraqi Kurds will eventually lead to increased claims for autonomy of its own Kurdish population. Separately, Turkey worries about the need to ensure protection for the human and cultural rights of the Turkoman population in Iraq. To protect its interests, Turkey has previously deployed its military forces into northern Iraq and has declared its intent to do so in the future if it perceives its interests to be threatened.[14]

Syrian Interests. Like Iran, Syria has a complex relationship with both Iraq and the United States. Recent allegations that Syria is both harboring former senior Iraqi officials and that it possesses chemical weapons further complicate its relationship with the United States. While Syria may not seek to actively undermine the democratic transformation in Iraq, the United States will likely continue to apply political and economic pressure until Syria expels members of the former Iraqi regime or precludes them from using Syria as a base from which to destabilize Iraq. These are some of the Syrian interests but the most important is the (4 millions) Kurds who are waiting to see.[15]

CHOOSING A STATE STRUCTURE

Given the diverse ethnic and religious makeup of Iraq's population, there is substantial debate as to the state structure that would best allow for a democratic, representative administration, while ensuring Iraq's territorial integrity. The two primary options are a unitary state or federal state. The unitary state is what the Sunni , Shia,Turkmen are looking for while the second (federal) is what the Kurds desire. If a federal structure is selected, additional questions must be addressed: the number of

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[13] The PKK (Kurdish acronym for the "Kurdistan Workers' Party"), formed in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan, is the most notorious terror organization in the world. It has been waging a vicious campaign of terror against Turkey since 1984 with the external support of certain states and circles whose aim is to destabilize Turkey.

[14] Ron Synovitz, Syria/Turkey: Common Interests In Iraq, January 08,04, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/01/757d2bba-5847-4aad-972c-cdbe1440fc31.html
[15] Ibid.

federal units; how they are delineated; for example, by ethnicity, geography, and economic viability; and which powers are to be held by the central government and which are to be held by the federal units.

Previously, Iraq has operated as a unitary state with administrative authority divided among eighteen provinces. All administrative officials were appointed by the central government.

VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES

Nearly all the various parties support some form of federalism in a new Iraq. Turkey has cautioned that such a structure will be unstable and has noted that there is no historical precedent in the region. The main point of contention arises in the construction of the federal structure, with some views supporting a very decentralized confederation made up of only two constituent entities, and others indicating support for numerous constituent entities with a limited devolution of authority. Importantly, few of the parties enumerate exactly which powers should be retained by the central government and which should be devolved to possible federal regions.

The Kurdish draft constitution proposes a bimodal confederation that would allow the Kurdish Region to preserve and expand its existing level of self-rule. The delineation of the regions would be based on ethnicity and would be referred to as the Arabic Region and the Kurdish Region. Importantly, the document reaffirms a commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq. This reaffirmation may, however, be politically contingent on the adoption of this highly decentralized model.[16]

The federal executive authority would be vested in the president and a Council of Ministers, which would consist of members from both regions. Each region would also designate half of the members of the High Court. The draft envisions the substantial devolution of powers from the central government to the regions, with the central government authority limited to that necessary to carry out foreign affairs, defense, international treaties, general economic planning, and management of oil resources. Each region would assume all other responsibilities unless otherwise delegated to the federal government. The Kurds will get something of the situation now but they will lose in the future.

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[16] Draft Constitution of the Kurdistan Regional Government, August 2002.

The Declaration of the Shi'a of Iraq, adopted in July 2002, stresses the need for national unity, Shi'a participation in the central government, and the establishment of a democratic, parliamentary constitutional order that carefully avoids the hegemony of one sect or ethnic group over the others.

The declaration proposes a federal state made up of numerous provinces, and in particular a "federal structure for Kurdistan." While not providing specific criteria for delineating provincial boundaries, the declaration does argue that provinces should be delineated according to administrative and demhm

The INC draft constitution provides that all power not specifically delegated to the federal government shall be delegated to the regions. The regions in turn are obligated to convey substantial powers to communes. The national government would preside over defense, foreign relations, economic regulations, taxation, the legal code, education, and financial equalization.[20]

The report of the Democratic Principles Working Group assumes that any future Iraq would be federal. Based upon that assumption it lays out national and territorial/administrative federalism as options, and leaves the eventual decision to a yet to-be-created Constituent Assembly. The report does argue that if constituent units are based on ethnicity, a federation of many constituent national and ethnic groups is less favorable than a federation composed of two large groups. If constituent units are based on territory, the report proposes that the existing eighteen provinces should serve as a temporary starting point.[21]

Current Situation

The future of Iraq's security will be in the hands of the Coalition Forces… what is the expected result? The prediction by retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, the Pentagon's first choice to run the US reconstruction effort, that the transition to an indigenous administration would last "months, not years" was an optimistic prediction. Since General Garner failed to make any obvious progress in

significant course correction is required in order to lay the foundation for a solid, stable, and indigenous security structure.

According to many military analysts and career politicians, disbanding of the former army was almost certainly the most controversial and arguably the most ill-advised CPA decision. The decision caused an immediate reaction of humiliation among former army officers and soldiers. The absence of a plan to get the soldiers back to work on reconstruction and humanitarian tasks alienated a significant part of the population. Another ill advised step on the part of the CPA was the recruitment of former security and intelligence service personnel who have been far more loyal to the Baathist regime and far more implicated in its campaign of repression[24]. Hundreds of thousands of former soldiers, most of whom had displayed no loyalty to the regime and many of whom were too young to have participated in the atrocities in which the army had played a part, found themselves without pay, future and honor.

The failure to re-establish law and order in Iraq is undermining the efforts to rebuild its shattered infrastructure and government. Daily attacks on coalition forces and on the newly established Iraqi security elements are the most highly profiled symptoms of the anarchy that has reigned since the fall of Saddam's regime last April. This has made restoring security a top priority.[25]

While these attacks have received widespread media coverage, they are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of Iraq's security problems. Iraq's political, administrative, legal, security and police structures were all 'decapitated' by the US-led attacks during the war, creating a serious security vacuum throughout the country. The depleted economy left more than three-quarters of the adult population unemployed or without any means to support their families. This confused situation provided perfect cover for elements that wanted to attack coalition forces, while at the same time stoking popular discontent with coalition efforts to rehabilitate Iraq.

Following the first few months of the occupation, the primary responsibility of the US-led military forces was the establishing of security. As the enormity of the task became apparent, efforts were quickly made to get local Iraqi policeman back on the streets under CPA supervision. The police

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[24] http://www.propagandamatrix.com/040903saddamagents.html
[25] Tim Ripley, Unstable Iraq looks to new security forces, 28 November 2003, http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir031128_1_n.shtml

reacted to incidents on foot, because they lacked the firepower, organization or communications necessary to counter any problems.[26]

Meanwhile, the Tribal militia around the country grew in number to secure religious sites and provide security to the political leaders and local private institutions. The British attempted to bring tribal militias in the south under the umbrella of the new security organization, but the US has not been able to merge these groups into any of their new security organization[27].   The US was short sighted and believed that such merger was not necessary due to the establishment of the local consul and due to their large military presence. To add insult to injury, US troops have been engaging in a an offensive against Iraqi insurgents and supporters of the previous regime in the Sunni flashpoint cities of Baghdad and Falluja. Although the incident killing involving the brutal of four American security contractors in Falluja was done by a small number of insurgents—by US admission—the whole city appears to pay the price for it. At the same time, the US agenda to liberate the oppressed Shia of Iraq seemed to backfire because of US miscalculation in dealing with Mr. Muktada Al-Sadr. Part of the Shia majority has been actively participating in the fight against the occupying forces. From early April, the number of casualties among the coalition forces has been continuously rising.

The security situation in Iraq varies by region. The north is controlled by the Kurds. The British, who were wise in dealing with the tribal leaders, control the south which is mainly Shia dominated. The Shia clerics and the Shia population originally supported the coalition effort but this support is beginning to look sketchy as a result of the proposed political structure and the new constitution. Moreover, the increase of attacks against some Shiat religious sites has led the Shiites to demand the retention of militias associated with political parties. Yet, the US is concerned that legitimizing militias such as the Badr brigade will lead to the intimidation of their political opponents. The country's interim constitution prohibits the existence of irregular security or military forces. Nevertheless, the new federal law does permit exemptions if authorized by the government.

Sadr's young age (he is 31 years old) and family heritage have influenced the young Iraqis to join his militia/army and participate in what was originally a peaceful demonstration. The coalition forces arrested Sheik Yacoubi (Sadr's deputy) and closed Mr. Sadr's newspaper, which has incited anti-US violence. These actions ignited a series of protests across Iraq that were followed by a major attack

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[26] Tim Riple,y, Unstable Iraq looks to new security forces, 28 November 2003, http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir031128_1_n.shtml
[4] Tim Ripley, Unstable Iraq looks to new security forces, 28 November 2003,

led by US forces.   Sadr was then able to influence both the Shia and Sunni to rise and participate in the military confrontation against the US forces.

The increase in violence between the US forces and the Iraqis generated a storm of adversaries and has become a threat to the CPA. Disbanding the former army provided the insurgents with a pool of military expertise to draw from.   The British military sources described the insurgents as being highly organized cells that operate in small numbers.[28] The main source of explosives for the insurgents is the huge ammunition depots abandoned by the Iraqi military, which were open to looting.[29]

How can security be achieved? And what kind of agencies can achieve the stability in a post-war Iraq? The dissatisfaction among Iraqis and the inability of the CPA agencies to deliver law and order will fuel further attacks on foreign targets. A vicious spiral of chaos and anarchy could develop. The longer-term challenge is to ensure the loyalty of the security organizations and their local sub-groups to the central government formed in Baghdad. [30]

A review of the current situation is a must in order to assess the current standing. The population in Iraq is not homogeneous; therefore, the US approach of dealing with one party might not necessarily be effective in dealing with others. Recent events clearly indicate that the US misunderstood of the nature of thinking certain parties by the Iraqi people.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said "We had hoped that coalition forces would have by now succeeded in making the environment safe enough to allow us (the UN) to lead our reconstruction mission with success. This did not happen".[31]

Judging by current events, one could reasonably conclude that the US alone cannot pursue the same approach for long. The US will need international support in order to give its mission credibility.

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[28] Tim Ripley The insurgency threat in southern Iraq,
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jtic/jtic040220_1_n.shtml
[29] Ibid.
[30] Tim Ripley, Unstable Iraq looks to new security forces, 28 November 2003
[31] http://www.gulfnews.com/Articles/Opinion.asp?ArticleID=96728

New Security Organization

Any proposed security organization in Iraq should contain the following main pillars:

- **New Iraqi Army**: it should report to the Ministry of National Security and Defense, and its official task should be the protection of the territorial integrity of Iraq. Although it would be under Iraqi military leadership, it Should initially serve in coordination with coalition forces. Troops should wear desert camouflage uniforms and be armed with AK-47s, PPK light machine guns and mortars. Its heaviest equipment should be wheeled vehicles. By September 2004 three divisions, each with nine battalions, should be operational. Combat support and logistic elements should also be formed.

- **New Iraqi Navy**: Tasked with patrolling and protecting Iraq's coastal territorial waters and major inland water borders, the Navy should be under Iraqi military leadership in co-ordination with coalition forces. It would operate impounded patrol boats and arms would include AK-47s. Its main units would be a patrol boat squadron and a 550-strong battalion of marines. There are no current plans to form a new air force.

- **Iraqi Police Service**: This would be the largest security force, and would number some 65,000 personnel when fully recruited. It would be responsible to the Ministry of Interior for law enforcement throughout the country. Arms should include pistols, shotguns and AK-47s.

- **Iraqi Border and Customs Police**: Their task should be to enforce customs and immigration on behalf of the Ministry of Interior. Like the police, it would have small arms, but they would wear khaki uniforms. Eventually some 10,000 personnel would be needed to bring it to full strength.

- **Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)**: This force of 15,000 men would eventually report to the Ministry of National Security and Defense, but would be initially operating under the command of coalition military forces. Their tasks would involve operating in larger groups to provide route/convoy security, fixed site security, disaster relief and humanitarian aid. On an individual basis, ICDC members would act as drivers, translators and human intelligence support for coalition troops. It is logical to recruit one battalion of 846 men to serve in each of Iraq's 18 provinces. They would be equipped with AK-47s, jeeps and trucks. Brown camouflage uniforms should be purchased.

- I**raqi Correctional Service**: This service would report to the Ministry of Justice to ensure prison security and welfare of prisoners. Plans are for 10,000 personnel by 2005.

- **Facilities Protection Service (FPS):** This service includes the security personnel who work for all ministries and government agencies that are tasked with protecting buildings, facilities and personnel. It also includes the oil, electricity and port security police. Privately hired security guards of government bodies also come under its rubric but all personnel will have to meet standards set by the Ministry of Interior. There are currently some 6,050 FPS personnel in Baghdad and 14,500 nationwide.[32]

By analyzing the new Iraqi security forces structure, one can easily conclude that a fully operational and effective force to control all aspects of security in the new Iraq does not exist on the ground and is unlikely to be established in the near term. Thus, this structure makes it mandatory for the Iraqi new government to be fully dependent on the US.

Defining the Security Sector and Security Sector Reform

What do we mean by security sector and security sector reform? The security sector includes all organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of force, or threat of force in order to protect the state and its citizens. In addition, the security sector includes the civil institutions that are responsible for its management. The security sector reform, on the other hand is defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC)[33] as the 'transformation of the security sector so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms, the rule of law, including a well functioning and just judicial and prison systems, and sound principles of governance [34]. It defines the key actors in the security sector as:

"...the security bodies and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions) and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the

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[32] American Forces Press Service, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2004/n01212004_200401215.html + http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east.stm + http://www.cpa-iraq.org + risk pointers, http://www.janes.com/security/international_security /Iraq.
[33] The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the principal body through which the OECD deals with issues related to co-operation with developing countries.
[34] Informal DAC task force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Security Issues and Development co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development {OECD}: Paris,200),p,8.

Executive, the Defense Ministry, etc.)." [35]

There are three areas that constitute the security sector. The first consists of a section that exercises power like the military, paramilitaries and police forces. The second deals with the management of the security sector like civilian ministries, parliaments and NGOs and the third ensures that the law is adhered to like the judiciary system, penal system…[36]

The concept of defining the security sector and security sector reform consists of two elements.The first is ensuring democratic and civilian control and development of efficient and effective tools in the security sector.[37] The challenge for the security sector authority is to come up with effective and reasonable security means that is capable of providing security for the state and its citizens on a basis of fairness and democracy.[38]

The concept of self-governance and security is easier said than done. This applies not only to new governments but also to current democracies. The experience in the Middle East is not good in such situation due to the lack of real democracy and security.   The security sector reforms can be grouped into four categories: strengthening of democratic control over security institutions by the state and civil society, professionalism of the security forces, demilitarization and finally peace building and strengthening the rule of law. [39]

The goal of security sector reform is the transformation of security institution so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security

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[35] OECD/DAC, *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict. Orientations for External* Partners, Paris, 2001, pp. 22-24, citation from Box 5, p. 23 (www.oecd.org/dac, click on "Good Governance, Conflict and Peace," click on "Conflict and Peace"). Public sector management principles require small adjustments to ensure appropriate national security-related confidentiality, but the need for confidentiality should never be allowed to override key principles such as accountability, comprehensiveness, and transparency.

[36] Hendrickson, Dylan, A review of the Security Sector Reform, London: The conflict, Security and Development Group funded by DflD, Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London, September 1999, p 29.

[37] See Edmunds, T., Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation, DCAF Working Papers, no,3, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, 2001,p.2.

[38] Nicole Ball, Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP,unpublished paper, October 9, 2002, http://www.undp.org/erd/jssr/docs/nicoleballpaper.htm#intro.

[39] Clingendael, International Alert and Saferworld, Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform: Broadening the Debate, Occasional SSR paper No.1 (Clingendael, International Alert, Saferworld: The Hague, London, August 2002), pp.3-4, see UNDP, 2002,pp,90.

for their citizens. [40]   While the processes aimed at improving the government security sectors' armed forces, police, intelligence services, judiciary, oversight bodies etc, the transformation of the security sector requires broad consultation and includes aims such as strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector, professionalism of the security forces, demilitarization and peace building, and strengthening the rule of law.

Linking Conflict, Government and the Security Sector

Promoting the security sector can be seen as a mean to enhancing human security and development of the country. Poor governance of the security sector always leads to conflict and is a key obstacle to peace building (currently, there are numerous countries in conflict around the world). Conflict analysis presents a mean for recognizing and understanding the reasons in common that can underline the risk of violent conflict. Three categories can summarize these means: structural, where forming a force from ethnic groups can lead to giving preferential treatment to these groups; trigger, where situations can be the catalyst for certain hidden problems to surface; and, perpetuating, where the existence and availability of arms can increase the tension level among groups that are supported by certain militia and have not properly integrated back in society. [41]

The Ideal Structure of a Security Sector Reform

There are many lessons learned in security sector reform and are based on the examination of the following areas:

Understanding the context: the outcome of any action taken is based proper realization of the issues. Therefore, knowledgeable people who are aware of the culture should do proper evaluation.

Principles of security reform: the principle factors are to ensure having a good management and efficient security sector. In addition, fairness in treating the population and paying a good attention to human right is paramount.

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[40] Clingendael, International Alert and Saferworld, Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform: Broadening the Debate, Occasional SSR paper No.1 (Clingendael, International Alert, Saferworld: The Hague, London, August 2002),.p1.

[41] Broadening the debate, Netherlands institute of International Relations Clingendael , Toward a better practice framework in security sector reform, Occasional SSR Paper No. 1 August 2002.p2.

Additional changes: Faith, trust and support are key factors in assembling security sector reform. Furthermore, discussing these issues and getting feed back are very helpful to build a system with solid foundation where corruption is non-existent.

Local ownership: to ensure the authenticity of the process.

Coherence, sequencing and co-ordination: ensuring teams are on time and on schedule without are key factors in assuring that local and external actors work toward a common goal without wasting resources.

Measuring impact: this is done by keeping an eye on the output through the implementation of structured processes.

Engagement and entry point: the relationship between politician and the military should be carefully examined to secure a positive working relationship.

Resources and sustainability: A reviews must en sure they available and adequate, but they should be divided efficiently and properly allocated to different project activities (i.e., The rough a review of the local resources in Iraq, the country is very wealthy in oil and gas).

The Future of Iraq Security Systems

The Army, police, internal security, military intelligence, general intelligence and special security represented the security structure during Saddam's regime. After the fall of the regime in April 2003, the occupation forces disarmed all those security branches which led to a substantial security vacuum. The occupation forces were determined to take responsibility in order to preserve security to all Iraqi cities; they found themselves not capable of keeping order because of the emergence of the Iraq armed resistance which included some or all of the previous security elements.

In order to avoid high rates of losses in personnel, the US established new security systems represented by the new Army, Police, Civil Defense Forces and the Internal Security Intelligence. By doing so, the US thought it controlled the internal security situation and benefited from Iraqi internal division and plots against each other.

The occupation forces relied mainly on the previous elements of security systems that had been fired, expelled or convicted in various crimes. These elements took the opportunity to settle old debts with colleagues by exercising killings and execution of Iraqi people.

The occupation forces were forced to re-evaluate their standing by calling for the restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Headquarters. They called for re-employment of officers in

many security systems with the priority given to those who were not fully aligned with the previous regime, followed by those who were willing to cooperate with the occupation forces but were not associated with the previous regime. It was previously known by the Iraqi people that many elements of the security establishments did not support the regime but were forced to follow orders.   The occupation forces had to force a quick solution by reconstructing most of the previous security structures and giving them privileges in order to contribute in the security and development of the new security structure.

Impact on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[42]

Iraq was, and always will be, the Eastern gate of the Arab world, and a gulf extension of the south Eastern front. In addition, Iraq had acted as a barrier against Iran's intention of expansion into the Arabic gulf area.

The occupation of Iraq by the Americans and, previously by the British, has lead to the emergence of sects that are for and against US policy in Iraq. Iraqi Shia and their religious followers, whose desire is to have control over the government and establish a religious government similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran, represent some of these groups. The opportunity that Khumani was looking for in 1979 to export the Islamic revolution to Iraq has now emerged.

The Americans knew about this issue and therefore quietly worked in cooperation with Iraq when it fought Iran for eight straight years. However, now the direct presence of the American and British forces and the interference of Iran in Iraq's affairs will have an impact on the Arabian Gulf through the following:

1-   Establishing a pro-Shia regime in Iraq might pose a threat to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These two countries have borders with Iraq and are home to a large Shia minority (about 30% of their population)

2-   There will be an extension to the Shia influence on all GCC by order of countries – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, U A E, Oman and there is a threat that any Shia public revolt could claim the control of these governments.

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[42] On 25th May 1981, Their Majesties and Highnesses, the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar and State of Kuwait met in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, where they reached a cooperative framework joining the six states to effect coordination, integration and inter-connection among the Member States in all fields in order to achieve unity, according to article 4 of the GCC Charter. Article 4 also emphasized the deepening and strengthening of relations, links and areas of cooperation among their citizens.

3-   Instability in Iraq will give occupation forces and the American leadership the pretext to be present in GCC permanently establishing of military bases with the aim of providing stability and protection.

On the other hand, if the situation becomes stable in Iraq it will also reflect positively on the entire region. Any newly established potential stability coupled with the US presence in the area would likely lead to greater peace in the area which would give people an impression that the US is truly working toward the establishment of peace and democracy in the Middle East.

Moreover, Iraq is an essential member of OPEC and has the second largest proven oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia. During the sanctions on Iraq, several countries tried to compensate the Iraqi oil absence by increasing their production level. With sanctions lifted, Iraq will be back as a normal country producing over 3 million bpd. This production would provide stability in the oil market.

What Roles Should the Americans play in Case they remain in Iraq?

The military forces should establish their bases outside Iraqi cities to minimize any daily interaction with Iraqi people. These forces should only be used under extreme cases, and only when local Iraqi police/army units can't control the situation. They should also contribute to the training and arming of the new Iraqi Army and other security agendas (civil defense police, intelligence and military intelligence).   In addition, they should actively participate in restoring public services to Iraqi civilian by establishing water and electricity services and rehabilitation of Iraq; also, the American should actively contribute to the protection of Iraqi borders guarding against Iranian and foreign interference.   Furthermore, they should ensure the protection of foreign personnel and the installation of foreign companies working in Iraq.   To encourage the United Nation and other organization to participate in the re-construction, the US need to provide a peaceful and secure environment.

Conclusion

Can the Iraqi take care of their own security? The establishment of security is a first step toward the realization of any democratic society. Without law and order imposed through either an effective military or police presence, there will not be a real opportunity to achieve other important objectives

in the implementation of democracy in Iraq. The process will be long and difficult, because coalition forces now have to convince the present religious and sub-nationality factions to give up their weapons, their independence dreams and to try to live peacefully with each other.

According to the International Crisis Group, ICG, all Iraqis assert that they alone could better guarantee their own security than the Coalition Forces[43]. The main thing they lack is technical support. The reasons given by the ICG are as follows:

- The Iraqi have a far better grasp of human intelligence
- They would better respect traditions and customs when taking security actions; and
- They don't have a language barrier, a problem that is plaguing the occupation forces.

The Coalition force inevitably is torn between its obligation to defend itself and the goal of ensuring the security of the country at large. The notion that the security responsibility should be transferred to the Iraqis within the short term is complicated, unrealistic and dangerous from both a military and political point of view. The likely future of Iraq's security is that it will remain in the hand of the Coalition Force for a long time, possibly for the next 3-5 years.

As currently indicated, the processes in the security field are unlikely to produce that outcome. There is not even the illusion of central Iraqi command, and the interim Governing Council has had nothing to do with the decision-making process. The Coalition has been "calling the shots", assisted by an assortment of political and social forces that each want to use the military to their advantage.

A credible, non-political, non-sectarian military institution, viewed as under the control of Iraqis representative, is critical for the country's future development. Otherwise, the Iraqis will continue to doubt whether they enjoy genuine sovereignty and the risk of sectarian or ethnic conflicts will be exacerbated.

The CPA needs to shift course, turn over decision-making and command of the future military or the security sector at large to the Iraqis. Thus could take place after making the Iraqis capable of achieving the security requirements, which should involve all Iraqis regardless of their religious background. This should also include former Baathists and in particular, the ones who have not engaged in crimes or human right violations.

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[43] Iraq: Building a New Security Structure, Middle East Report N°20, 23 December 2003

The new Iraq should not be solely dependent on only oil as the main and only driver of the economy. Moreover, the Iraqi government should not take control of oil under the newly proposed democracy. One of the main obstacles in Iraq for the last seventy years has been an extremely powerful and rich state where its people depend on the state for their life support. Moreover, with well-developed economic sectors outside oil, the economy will be more diversified and the Iraqi people with their vast educational background would be better fitted for a well-diversified economy.

The deployment of a systemized organized violence against the people of Iraq requires a period of rehabilitation (5 years) for the Iraqi people to understand how to accept differing point of views, respect them, and accept hoe to peacefully react to them.

Neighboring states can exert significant influence on the new established Iraq. How would the US be assured that in times of difficulties the Shiites would not ask the help of Iran and/or the Arabs would ask the help of Syria and other Gulf states? Moreover, how a truly democratic Iraq would be regarded by its Arab neighbors especially in Syria (where a military dictatorship exists) and neighboring Gulf countries.

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