Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, you can request alternate formats on the "Contact Us" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n’a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s’appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada, vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « Contactez-nous ».

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
NSSC 5 / CESN 5

Canada: to lead or not to lead…

By /par Col T.J. Grant

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

ABSTRACT

Canada has been criticized for both leading and failing to lead multinational peacekeeping operations. This paper examines recent peacekeeping operations, sanctioned by the United Nations. This examination highlights the evolving types of operations and their component parts. A review of Canada's experiences as lead nation for the humanitarian intervention in Zaire in 1996 is used to determine if Canada is more or less capable today to assume lead nation status for certain types of operations. While it is determined that Canada is capable of leading some multinational operations, no definitive answer is provided to which type of operations Canada should lead in the future. The review does provide, however, a suitable framework for the decision making process.

Canada: to lead or not to lead…

The fall of 1996 saw a major humanitarian crisis in eastern Zaire surface onto the world scene. Canada played a major role in the United Nations' (UN) reaction to this crisis. Raymond Chretien, then Canadian Ambassador to the United States of America, was appointed Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region. In addition, Canada agreed to take on the role of lead nation for a Multi-national Force (MNF). The MNF was to be dispatched to the region to "establish the conditions to allow the immediate return of humanitarian organizations and the safe delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in eastern Zaire."[1] The Canadian operation was known as Operation ASSURANCE.

Canada started to build a 'coalition of the willing' and deploy headquarters and liaison elements of the Canadian Forces (CF) into the Great Lakes Region of Africa, including Uganda, Rwanda, Zaire and Kenya. As a result of actions on the ground by armed elements in Zaire and Rwanda, the humanitarian crisis was resolved in early December 1996. This was prior to the deployment of any armed units of the MNF.

There is a belief, particularly in the CF, that Operation ASSURANCE was a failure.[2] Lessons learned by the CF identified a number of issues that would need to be addressed in order for Canada to take on the status of a lead nation in the future. Lessons learned by a government inter-departmental group were not as critical and can be interpreted to show that Canada's participation in resolving the Zaire humanitarian crisis was a success.

---

[1] Canada's Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Eastern Zaire. AIA, 96/1168, released 2 February 1998.

[2] Douglas Bland, "A Sow's Ear from a Silk Purse," International Journal Vol LIV, No 1 (Winter 1998-9) p. 167. In quoting from Access to Information Request # 1463-A, 97/0732, Bland found that privately, many officers did not think that the Zaire operations was successful.

The request from the UN for Canada to take the lead in forming a MNF came on short notice. The government was required to respond quickly to this request, leaving little time for a complete analysis of the situation and the determination of the requirements for a lead nation. While Canada is not likely to be asked to lead UN operations on a regular basis, it is appropriate that we be prepared to answer when asked. In fact, it is timely to undertake this review in light of the Liberal Government's recent announcement indicating that Canada will take a lead role in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan in the fall of 2003.[3]

This paper will review the UN operations from 1996 to the present in order to categorize the different types of operations. This will be followed by a review of a developing analytical tool that can be used to identify the myriad of component parts of modern UN sponsored missions. The Zaire mission will be used as a case study to show that Canada was a suitable choice to play the role of lead nation in that particular mission and remains a suitable choice for lead nation for certain types of peace support missions. A short historical examination of Canadian foreign policy will show that the Canadian government has been and should continue to be prepared to take on lead nation responsibilities. The missions identified earlier in the paper will then be examined in light of the assessment tools available in order to define the range of missions, which Canada could lead. Examining three critical issues will test this thesis. First, a review of the steps taken by Canada to build a suitable coalition will allow for an assessment of Canada's capacity in the international diplomacy arena. Second, the ability to mount and deploy the headquarters for the MNF reflects on Canada's capacity to develop military and inter-agency relations at the operational level. Finally, additional actions required to achieve a Canadian capability in this area, particularly at the strategic and operational levels, will be presented.

---

[3] Minister of National Defence, John McCallum announced in Question Period on 12 February 2003 that "Canada has been approached by the international community for assistance in maintaining peace and security in Afghanistan for the UN mandated mission in Kabul. Canada is willing to serve with a battle group and a brigade headquarters for a period of one year, starting late this summer. We are currently in discussion with a number of potential partners." www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/058_2003-02-12/han058_1445-E.htm#Int-414761 Accessed 24 February 2003.

Models for Classifying UN Sponsored Operations

Several authors have attempted to categorize the types of operations undertaken by the UN. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as Secretary General of the UN categorized the instruments the UN has for managing conflict as; preventative diplomacy and peacemaking, peace-keeping, post-conflict peace-building, disarmament, sanctions and enforcement actions. Boutros-Ghali used this categorization in an effort to determine which steps needed to be taken to address shortcomings in the UN control of operations. [4] This review was instituted in part by failures of the UN in complex peacekeeping operations such as the one in Bosnia. In the words of Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, "if you are a commander of a UN mission, don't get in trouble after five P.M. or on the weekend. There is no one in the UN to answer the phone."[5] John Hillen more forcefully articulated this belief in his book, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* "…the UN simply has not had the institutional competence to manage military forces engaged in…dangerous and complex tasks."[6]

---

[4] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 1995, 2nd ed, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995, p. 12-29.

Lakhdar Brahimi in his *Report on the Panel of the United Nations Peace Operations* developed a slightly different list. He found that peace operations fell into three broad categories; conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building. Conflict prevention and peacemaking were activities undertaken in order to resolve conflict prior to the need for armed intervention. Conflict prevention includes those actions designed to establish a solid foundation for peace. Peacemaking activities are undertaken by diplomats or prominent personalities, with the aim of ending hostilities through dialogue rather than force.[7]

Peacekeeping includes those traditional UN activities associated with the separation of combatants by an armed military force[8] and the subsequent nation and reconstruction activities. Peace-building in the modern context "defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war."[9] Peace-building incorporates many of the activities that are currently being practiced in large missions such as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, support to the rule of law and all that entails, respect for human rights, the establishment or repair of national institutions and democratic development.[10] The underlying principle put forward by Brahimi is that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex peace operations and that more has to be done to prevent conflicts. The Report calls for increased co-ordination between peacekeepers, civilian police, human rights specialists and other personnel involved in peace support operations.[11]

---

[5] Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: the Road to Sarajevo, Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993, p. 330.
[6] John Hillen, Blue Helmets: the Strategy of UN Military Operations, 2nd ed. Dulles: Brassey's, 2000, p. 238.
[7] Lakhdar Brahimi, Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, New York, United Nations, 21 August 2000, p. 2-3.
[8] "It was in 1956 that peacekeeping procedures were standardized into a forma that is recognizable today, to be improved upon in 1973 in the matter of command and control when a peacekeeping force was deployed into Egypt and Sinai following the war of *Yom Kippur*. The precedent was established that peacekeepers were not normally drawn from among the permanent membership of the Security Council and they confined the use of lethal force to self-defence. There were two implicit understandings: first, peacekeepers were to act *impartially* at all times and second, their presence required *consent* of the parties

John Hillen developed a third model. This model has four levels: observation missions, traditional peacekeeping, 2nd generation peacekeeping and enforcement actions. The model is reproduced at Figure 1, below. The dots on the chart reflect how Hillen classified the missions undertaken by the UN during the period in question. Hillen determined that there were 19 observation missions, eight traditional peacekeeping missions, and 14 2nd generation and enforcement actions.[12] Observation and traditional peacekeeping missions are based on principles proposed by the Secretary-General (S/11052/Rev 27 October 1973) and adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 341 (1973).[13]

---

to the dispute." See Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: the Reality, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, p. 27-28.

[9] Brahimi, p. 3.

[10] Ibid, p. 3.

[11] Lieutenant-Colonel Roy Forestell, Directorate Peacekeeping Policy, Department of National Defence, 21 January 2003.

[12] Hillen, p. 16-31.

[13] Ibid, p. 24. Hillen presents the 'principles of peacekeeping' as described by the then-under secretary-general for peacekeeping operations in 1993.


The Spectrum of UN Military Operations
Belligerent
● = UN Military Operation
Operational Environment
Benign
Enforcement Actions
Congo
2nd Generation Peacekeeping
Traditional Peacekeeping
Observation Missions
Low
High
Level of Military Effort/Use of Force

Figure 1[14]

Second-generation peacekeeping missions first appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the end of the Cold War and increased participation among members of the Security Council.[15]

> These missions were much more comprehensive, with the UN attempting a near-simultaneous management of political, societal, economic, humanitarian, electoral, diplomatic, and military initiatives.[16]

---

[14] Hillen, p. 19.

[15] Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, p. 3. See also Thomas Weiss, Military-Civilian Relations: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p. 14, and Charles W. Kegley Jr., "Thinking Ethically about Peacemaking and Peacekeeping." Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts, eds Tom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce, and Malcolm Dando, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

[16] Hillen, p. 26.

Hillen's final category is enforcement actions, which "represent the high end of the operational spectrum, taking place in a bellicose and adversarial environment that necessitates the use of large-scale military force."[17] These missions require large numbers of capable military forces and a robust command and control architecture in order to be successful. This was clearly demonstrated in Somalia and Bosnia where approximately 20,000 and 60,000 coalition forces were initially deployed. It is generally accepted that the UN is not capable of managing or commanding these complex missions.[18] The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre has coined the term peacekeeping by proxy. As noted by Hans Haekkerup, Minister of Defence, Denmark in the forward to *Peacekeeping by Proxy*:

> The limitations in the UN's capabilities are particularly pronounced in operations at the higher end of the peace support spectrum. The UN does not have the capacity or experience to manage such complex military operations. Therefore, such operations will have to be carried out by proxy, as we have seen recently in the former Yugoslavia and with the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. … Proxies should be used for operations beyond the UN's capability and capacity. Nonetheless, such operations must still be carried out under a UN mandate.[19]

While these categorizations provide some discrimination of types of operations, they do not provide the fidelity required to determine where the efforts of a particular organization should be focused. What is required is a system of examining the complete range of tasks performed by the military, governmental, and non-governmental organizations during an international intervention. David Davis and the staff of the Program on Peacekeeping Policy (POPP) at George Mason University designed such a system called the Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO).

---

[17] Hillen, p. 29-30.

[18] Ibid, p. 30. See also Jett, p. 18, and MacKenzie, p. 334.

[19] Alex Morrison, ed, Peacekeeping by Proxy. Toronto: Brown Book Company, 1999, p. vii-viii.

> [The CMPO] is a framework for examining, planning, and analyzing that environment, or domain, established when the international community intervenes in a conflict zone. It captures the processes, functions, tasks, relationships, and organizations involved in an operation.[20]

Early versions of the Model used three major sub-sets: peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace support. The current CMPO, Version 5 has added peacekeeping. Each of these four categories has been given a numeric identifier, as is each sub-sub-set. An example of one of the sub-divisions of 'Peacebuilding' is shown at Figure 2, below. These tasks under the title of 'Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief' are a sampling of the 282 functional tasks contained in the CMPO. A complete functional list is attached as annex A to this paper.

ID	**CMPO 5.0 Function**
3	***Peace Operations***
3.2	**Peacebuilding**
3.2.1	***Humanitarian Assistance /Disaster Relief***
3.2.1.1	Provide for Food
3.2.1.2	Provide for Water and Sanitation
3.2.1.3	Provide for Medical Care
3.2.1.3.1	Provide Public Health and Welfare Surveillance
3.2.1.3.2	Provide Medical Services
3.2.1.3.3	Provide Public Health Services
3.2.1.3.4	Provide Mental Health Services
3.2.1.4	Provide for Clothing
3.2.15	Provide for Shelter
3.2.1.6	Provide for Additional Assistance
3.2.1.7	Conduct Search and Rescue
3.2.1.8	Provide Veterinarian Services/Vector Control

Figure 2[21]

Given the extensive list of tasks in the CMPO, it is evident that a wide-range of agencies is required to deal effectively with all of them. No one organization, be it military or civilian, has the expertise or the resources needed to address all the tasks that arise in a post-conflict situation. Even for the tasks clearly associated with the military, a wide range of expertise can be called upon. These include the entire spectrum of activities from military observers to dealing with weapons of mass destruction. In order to determine which tasks should be part of a training program for military forces about to deploy on peace operations Davis developed a minimal task list. This list is included at annex B.[22] This type of task list could also be developed to identify the types of NGOs and government organizations required to deal with a crisis situation.

---

[20] Allison M Frendak, "The Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO)" Unpublished paper.

[21] Ibid.

The CMPO provides an excellent methodology for examining a developing situation in order to determine what resources need to be brought to bear in order to achieve effective resolution. While this will not identify specific organizations by name, it provides an excellent start point to bring together the interdisciplinary team needed to deal with the situation. This tool will be especially important for a lead nation or organization to identify the range of military and civilian capabilities required and subsequently provide them internally or source them from partner states or groups. For the purposes of this paper this tool will be used to examine Canada's potential to assume a leadership role for certain missions or parts thereof.

Zaire as a Case Study of Canadian Leadership

In the fall of 1996, the UN was still dealing with the fallout of two failed peacekeeping missions in Africa - Somalia and Rwanda. Notably, Canadian troops were involved in both missions.[23] The UN mission to Somalia that had been quickly launched in December 1992 under the leadership of the United States (Unified Task Force (UNITAF)) ended following the death of several US soldiers in Mogadishu. The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was subject to a UN sponsored inquiry. While the *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*[24] was not published until 1999, the events that unfolded in the summer of 1994 in Rwanda had attracted the attention of the UN and the world since they occurred. The UN could not afford another humanitarian disaster if its credibility as an effective institution was to be preserved.

---

[22] David Davis, "Functional Requirements for Peace Operations Training Systems." Technical Note: September 1999. The Program On Peacekeeping Policy The Institute of Public Policy George Mason University.

Following the civil war and subsequent genocide in Rwanda in 1994 it was estimated that over one million Hutu refugees left Rwanda and made their homes in refugee camps in eastern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) close to the Rwandan border. Many were Hutus rebels (the *Interhamwe* militia who had been involved in the genocide of Tutsis[25]) or ex-members of the Rwandan army who subsequently gained control over the refugee camps. Zairian Tutsis, known as Banyamulenge, undertook offensive operations against the Hutus and Zairian Army in mid-October 1996. This caused some of the refugees to move out of the camps, west, deeper into the jungle. This mass migration led to a humanitarian crisis.[26] "A regional summit was held 5 November in Kenya under the Chairmanship of Tanzania with representatives from Burundi, Cameroon, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia and the OAU…The summit called for the immediate establishment of safe corridors and temporary sanctuaries inside Zaire to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian aid to refugees and to facilitate their repatriation to Rwanda. It called upon the Security Council to deploy a "neutral" force to ensure the security of these corridors and sanctuaries."[27] By 7 November 1996, the situation had deteriorated to the point that the Secretary-General "was obliged for security reasons to authorize UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies to withdraw their international staff temporarily to neighbouring countries."[28] The following day a Spokesman for the Secretary-General summarized the situation as follows:

---

[23] Canada's contribution to Somalia was known as Operation Deliverance and led to the now famous Somalia Inquiry. Then Brigadier-General, Romeo Dallaire was Force Commander for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda. General Dallaire continues to speak on the need for the United Nations to remain involved in peacekeeping in Africa.

[24] Source: http://www.United Nations.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm Accessed 16 May 2000.

[25] Michael A. Hennessy, "Operation "Assurance": Planning a Multi-national Force for Rwanda/Zaire." Canadian Military Journal, Vol 2, No 1 (Spring 2001), p. 12.

[26] Op ASSURANCE – DCDS Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive, 25 February 1998, p. A-1/17, AIA, 96/1168, released 2 February 1998.

> The world has been watching on television screens the unimaginable sufferings to which the populations in Eastern Zaire have been and continue to be subjected. The fact that a fairly large movement of people from Zaire has taken place towards Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi emphasizes the regional dimension of the crisis. The Secretary-General is confident that the international community will not fail to discharge its moral obligation to rescue these most unfortunate populations and to take immediate action to put an end to the hostilities in the region.[29]

On 9 November the Security Council adopted the first Resolution concerning the situation developing in the Great Lakes Region. This Resolution was in large part a response to inputs from the Secretary-General and the Kenyan Summit. The Resolution expressed grave concern over the situation in the Great Lakes Region, and while it did not authorize force, it called upon member states to "create the conditions necessary for the speedy and peaceful resolution of the crisis…"[30] On 15 November the Security Council, in response to the worsening situation in Zaire and Canada's offer to lead a MNF, adopted Resolution 1080 (1996). The authorization provided for the following:

---

[27] Briefing Note for MND, 6 November 1996, AIA, 96/1168.

[28] Secretary-General Letter to Mr Nugroho Wisnumurti President of the Security Council 7 November 1996. AIA, 96/1168.

[29] Statement Attributed to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General. New York, 8 November 1996. AIA, 96/1168.

> …the establishment for humanitarian purposes of a temporary multinational force to facilitate the immediate return of humanitarian organizations and the effective delivery by civilian relief organizations of humanitarian aid to alleviate the immediate suffering of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in eastern Zaire, and to facilitate the voluntary, orderly repatriation of refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as well as the voluntary return of displaced person, and invites other interested States to offer to participate in these efforts.[31]

Concurrently with developments at the United Nations in New York, plans were being developed in Ottawa for a Canadian contribution to assist in resolving the crisis. By 6 November, briefing notes produced for the Minister of National Defence and the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff indicated that Canada was prepared to provide "military assets as part of a larger humanitarian effort … within the limits of the capabilities of the Canadian Forces and within the context of our traditional guidelines for such actions."[32] This proposed contribution was clearly articulated in the DCDS Warning Order message released on 9 November. The task organization was stated to be the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), including an infantry company for security and a CC-130 aircraft detachment comprising three aircraft and an aircraft control element (ALCE).[33]

A series of interdepartmental meetings were held in Ottawa over the weekend of 8-11 November to refine Canada's response to the crisis. As it turned out, Canada was to take on a larger role than that planned for by the CF. By 11 November the Prime Minister had intervened indicating "subject to parliamentary approval [he was] seriously considering involvement in a multinational humanitarian operation in Central Africa."[34] Canada announced its intention "to take on a substantial role in mounting a multinational humanitarian intervention force to make possible the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees; to, that is, save lives."[35]

---

[30] Security Council Resolution 1078 (1996), http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/311/91/PDF/N9631191.pdf Accessed 25 February 2003.
[31] Security Council Resolution 1080 (1996), http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/323/32/PDF/N9632332.pdf Accessed 25 November 2003.
[32] Briefing Notes for MND and A/CDS, 6 November 1996, AIA, 96/1168.
[33] DCDS Warning Order 091841Z Nov 96, AIA, 96/1168.

Lieutenant-General Baril, at that time the Commander of the Canadian army, had recently completed three years as the Military Advisor to the Secretary General of the UN. He was one of the few Canadian officers with the requisite experience and rank to under take this mission. As a result he was chosen to be the Force Commander for Operation ASSURANCE and deployed into theatre on 17-18 November having left a planning cell in Stuttgart Germany. By 24 November, the planning cell had developed a general framework for the operation.[36] On the ground in Africa General Baril faced several challenges. Determining the actual number of refugees and their locations proved to be the most important and most difficult. United States and United Kingdom reconnaissance aircraft were used in an attempt to track and count the number of refugees moving in eastern Zaire. In hindsight, the actions of the Banyamulengi in October and November were instrumental in solving this crisis. An increase in the level of combat operations in the Goma area, close to the Rwanda border, on 15 November led to about

---

[34] DCDS Message 110200Z Nov 96, AIA, 96/1168.

[35] Ambassador Robert Fowler Speaking Notes delivered to the Security Council, 15 November 1996, AIA, 96/1168.

[36] Multinational Force Plan, 24 November 1996, AIA, 96/1168.

400,000 refugees returning to Rwanda. Once across the border, they were provided with humanitarian assistance by relief agencies.[37]

Securing a suitable location for his forward headquarters was also problematic for General Baril. Zaire and Rwanda were not willing to allow MNF personnel to operate from their countries. In the end Uganda agreed to host the headquarters in Entebbe, allowing for the establishment of "…the Multinational Force Headquarters…and to set up the staging base required for forward operations".[38]

Internationally, Canada worked with like-minded countries to form a Steering Group to direct the work of the MNF. The United States, France, Belgium, South Africa, Malawi, Senegal, Denmark and Japan were key members and would make decisions through consensus. The Steering Group initially met in New York on 20 November with Canada as chair. A subsequent meeting at the ambassadorial level in Ottawa on 29 November was convened with 14 countries were in attendance.[39] Representatives of the military component of the MNF met in Stuttgart on 24 November. This meeting was key, as consensus on the number of refugees would allow for political direction to the Force Commander regarding the conduct of operations. It was agreed that 575,000 refugees had made their way back to Rwanda while an additional 250,000 remained in eastern Zaire. The meeting also agreed on the priority of reconnaissance efforts to locate any additional refugees.[40]

---

[37] Hennessy, p. 15.
[38] Briefing Note for the MND, 29 November 1996, AIA, 96/1168.
[39] Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Lloyd Axworthy and Minister of National Defence Douglas Young, 28 November 1996, AIA, 96/1168.

Separate reports by Ambassador Chretien and General Baril in early December led to mission closure. Difficulties in determining the exact scope of the problem had already led members of the Steering Group to question the necessity of continuing with the operation. General Baril concluded on 10 December "after nearly four weeks of careful and deliberate information gathering by all elements of the MNF, it is now clear that the mission…has, in large part, been accomplished…There is no evidence that there exists any sizeable group of refugees that is being denied voluntary repatriation by military force.[41] In the end, no nation except Canada placed any troops under command of the MNF Commander.[42]

Lessons Learned

Two sets of lessons learned were produced following Op ASSURANCE. James Appathurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, officials who had served on the Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force in the Privy Council Office, produced one.[43] The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) produced the second set of lessons learned.[44] While both documents identified areas that could be improved upon, neither stated that the mission was not successful nor that Canada should not take on ‘lead nation’ in the future.

---

[40] Zaire Interdepartmental Task Force – Privy Council Office, 25 November 1996, AIA, 96/1168.
[41] Commander Op ASSURANCE. Multinational Force (MNF) in Eastern Zaire: Assessment of the Situation, 10 December 1996, AIA, 96/1168.
[42] Hennessy, p. 15.
[43] James Appathurai, and Ralph Lysyshyn, "Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission." Government of Canada, Supply and Services, June 1997, AIA, 96/1168.
[44] Op ASSURANCE – DCDS Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive, 25 February 1998, AIA, 96/1168.

In what may be their most important observation, Apputhurai and Lysyshyn found that Canada was in fact a good choice to lead the MNF. Canada brought important skill sets to the table. This included military professionalism and impartiality honed on numerous peacekeeping operations, practical experience in the Great Lakes region, and all without the historical baggage carried by colonial powers like FrancelofntiesSte3.3ngTmoup.3.75999 Tm to deal effectively with the non-governmental organizations operating in Zaire. General Baril did establish a small multi-discipline liaison cell to keep him abreast of NGO activities. This cell seemed to work well, however, it did not eliminate problems between NGOs.[47] The situation on the ground was confusing. Humanitarian Agencies had been responsible for the construction of and support to the refugee camps in eastern Zaire. The Agencies established parochial relationships with state and non-state actors in the region and at times competed with each other for financing and influence.[48]

Once a decision to commit has been taken, the government must be prepared to use all resources at its disposal. Organizations such as the International Development Research Centre and the Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre have extensive links with the NGO community. Organizations such as the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee and the Canadian Council for International Cooperation are able to provide information on the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs and links to potential partners. These relationships should be leveraged to provide a range of capabilities to resolve conflict as well as a source of reliable information on the actors involved in a conflict.[49] This lesson learned is reinforced in the *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect.* Military interventions are complicated and every effort must be made to "build an effective political coalition, work out agreed objectives … devise a common plan of operations, and marshal the necessary resources."[50]

---

[47] Appathurai and Lysyshyn, p. 15.
[48] Ibid, p. 6-7.
[49] Last, p. 24-26.

The CF learned from this mission as well as others at the time. The DCDS established the Peace Support Training Centre in 1996 to ensure that all CF personnel deployed fully prepared for modern operations. "Training conducted at the PSTC focuses primarily on non-traditional military subjects… students are given a general awareness on topics such as … Negotiation and Mediation Techniques and Cultural Awareness to name a few. The aim is to make them better prepared to perform their duties in the complex world of Peace Support Operations."[51] This concept for training has been recognized by others. Michael Williams noted that the establishment of the Peace Support Training Centre highlighted the importance of providing training in preparation for peace support operations that went beyond normal combat training.[52]

Canada's lack of influence to take the MNF in any direction not supported by the larger members of the Steering Group, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France, was identified as a serious weakness. Canada had equal difficulty dealing with state actors on the ground. If Canada is to be successful in these types of missions in the future it is important that while she have access to the intelligence and strategic lift assets of the large powers, their influence in the conduct of operations must be limited.[53]

---

[50] Gareth Evans et al, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa, The International Development Research Centre, 2001, p. 58. Following the Millennium Summit, the Government of Canada established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The mandate of the Commission was to "promote a comprehensive debate on issues, and to foster global political consensus on how to move from polemics, and often paralysis, towards action within the international system particularly through the United Nations." p. 81.

[51] http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/mission.asp Accessed 2 March 2002.

[52] Michael C. Williams, "Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping." International Institute for Strategic Studies. Adelphi Paper 321, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 72.

A common trait among all participating countries was the requirement for the United States to contribute ground forces, particularly in light of the fact that the Security Council Resolution authorized a Chapter VII operation. The presence of United States ground troops was seen as assuring access to American strategic level assets (such as logistics, communications and intelligence) and a commitment to see the operation through to the end. Failing United States participation, small lead nations must take extra-ordinary steps to ensure they understand the American priorities and take steps to influence them in Washington.[54]

This need for the United States to be involved in operations was not specific to Zaire. A review of recent successful operations shows that the United States has been involved in some manner. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States played significant diplomatic and military roles. The United States was also involved in other regions, even if in a less visible manner. The resolution of the crisis in East Timor may provide some clues for Canada vis a vis the United States. Australia and Canada have much in common and have been compared favourably in the past. In 1999 Australia led an international operation of over 10,000 to resolve the humanitarian crisis that was developing in East Timor. The perception of Australia as a large, well-developed and politically stable country, together with its competent record and long involvement in UN peacekeeping activities, might suggest that an Australian leadership role in East Timor was the obvious solution.[55] Being the lead nation for such a complex operation was not a task that had been formally assigned to the Australian defence forces by the government.[56] The fact was however, that Australia was not able to take the lead role, in a neighbouring country, without the support of the United States.[57] This sentiment is supported by Alan Ryan as shown by his comments that although

---

[53] Appathurai and Lysyshyn, p. 4.

> the US presence was not obvio

Division Headquarters, which was allocated to the Army. The Headquarters had a low manning priority and lacked much of the equipment it required to fulfill its mission. In addition, many of the specialist functions that would normally be found in an operational level headquarters were either missing or not capable.[61]

Much has changed in the intervening years. The CF Joint Operations Group (JOG) has replaced 1st Canadian Division Headquarters. The mission statement of the JOG, "[t]o provide a rapidly deployable, operational-level command and control headquarters capability in order to meet domestic and international commitments"[62], clearly indicates that much has been learned. The JOG is designed to take command of forces in a range of operations including humanitarian assistance, UN Peace Support and International operations.[63]

The second most important issue identified was the need for a capable intelligence system. As we have well and truly entered into the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), good intelligence may be more important now than it was in 1996. Andrew Richter contends that the key to success in modern warfare is capitalizing on the concept of collecting, analyzing and acting on information. He suggests that modern military forces must master the skills necessary to be able to quickly gather intelligence, analyse that intelligence to determine the critical elements then act upon the results.[64] While

---

[60] Appathurai and Lysyshyn. p. 9-10.

[61] Op ASSURANCE – DCDS Lessons Learned, p. A-4/17.

[62] JOG – Joint Operations Group Business Plan 2003/04, Department of National Defence.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Andrew Richter, The Revolution in Military Affairs and its Impact on Canada: The Challenges and Consequences. Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 28, March 1999, p. 2.

Richter continues in his paper to suggest that the RMA is less applicable to the conduct of peacekeeping missions than it is to high intensity conflict,[65] the need for timely accurate intelligence is applicable to all operations. This need was noted in the *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect.* The Report raised a key issue regarding the lack of early warning of serious conflict. The Committee found that a lack of intelligence and analysis prevented timely and useful decisions being taken by the international community.[66]

The CF has at last taken steps to address the gap in its ability to process information. A Canadian Press article published on 30 January 2003 outlined plans for a $65 million "national fusion centre to process a projected explosion of intelligence and surveillance information..."[67] This project, combined with the 120 plus other intelligence-related projects, should adequately address the shortfalls identified during Op ASSURANCE.

This review of the lessons learned from Op ASSURANCE and the steps taken by the CF to remedy the shortcomings shows that Canada is in a much better position to take on leadership roles today. While Appathurai and Lysyshyn saw the original deployment on Op ASSURANCE as being successful, the changes made since their report was tabled should ensure that future missions continue to meet with success.

---

[65] Richter, p. 22.

[66] Evans, p. 21. Also see Thomas Weiss, Military-Civilian Relations: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p. 202-203.

[67] Judy Monchuk, Military Plans $65M Centre to Co-ordinate Intelligence, Canadian Press, 30 January 2003.

What Types of Missions should Canada Lead?

Prior to answering this question it is important to determine if Canada should be prepared to lead UN missions at all. Canada has long been a country based on multi-lateralism. Even Prime Minister Trudeau with his strong beliefs was unable to withdraw from international organizations. “Trudeau could not resist the pressures often placed on Canada to play intermediary roles in international disputes. Canadian diplomats and politicians had acquired a reputation that was not easily abandoned.”[68] This status of Canadians diplomats has not changed as we watch today the role played by Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations Paul Heinbecker in trying to present a compromise solution to the Iraq crisis at the UN. Heinbecker’s efforts should not come as a surprise to Canadians. In an interview in 2000, Heinbecker stated:

> Whether we want it or not, we are inevitably affected by these conflicts. First, the abuse of the innocent affronts our values and is in violation of the growing body of international humanitarian law. Second we have a direct interest: we accept refugees, we send humanitarian assistance, we contribute peacekeeping troops, we help rebuild afflicted societies and rehabilitate their populations. When we see acute suffering and widespread loss of life, we have a moral obligation to respond and, if necessary, to intervene. Having said that, it is important that the international community act collectively, preferably through the UN, first to try to prevent conflict and then to intervene to stop a conflict or gross abuse of human rights.[69]

There is little doubt that “in an increasingly interconnected world, where we are travelers, exporters and importers, investors and donors, we cannot afford to ignore the problems of others – even if we wanted to.”[70] Canada clearly has an important diplomatic role to play on the international stage. From a military perspective we also have a role to play. Canadians take great pride in the role the CF have played in peacekeeping over the years. There is an expectation that we will continue to be involved.[71] This expectation is reflected in the current defence policy statement:

---

[68] Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993, p 167. For a concise summary of Trudeau’s impact on Canadian foreign policy see Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. 3rd ed. Scarborough, Prentice Hall, 1997, p. 180-181.

[69] ‘Interview with Paul Heinbecker’ Canada World View, Issue 7, Spring 2000, p. 7.

[70] J. Jockel, and J.Sokolsky, “Lloyd Axworthy’s Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy.” International Journal, Vol LVI, No 1 (Winter 2000-2001) p. 2.

> Canada - which has unfailingly lent its political and financial support to the United Nations – remains committed to UN reform. In the security sphere, Canada brings superbly qualified personnel, significant military capabilities, and a great deal of experience to UN operations. Other countries look to Canada for leadership.[72]

The key phrase in this statement concerns leadership. Canada's political leaders have and continue to see a leadership role for this country. Lloyd Axworthy, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International trade has been quoted as saying "Canadians have the potential to assume a leadership role because Canadian "middle power" diplomacy has always stressed the importance of coalition building and has provided Canada with valuable experience in fostering consensus."[73]

Prime Minister Chretien while speaking at the UN Millennium summit in New York in September 2000 stated,

> [w]ith the will and the resolve, the United Nations – which is the cornerstone of Canada's foreign policy – will remain the world's indispensable institution in the 21st century. And Canada is committed to being an indispensable partner.[74]

This sentiment has been reinforced by the Prime Minister's decision not to commit military forces to the United States led coalition against Iraq. This decision clearly shows that the Prime Minister believes that Canada should remain committed to the UN even if such a decision ultimately affects our relations with the United States.

---

[71] 1994 Defence White Paper, Ottawa: Supply and Services: 1994, p. 27. See also Andrew F. Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions, Scarborough, Prentice-Hall, 1997, p. 173-205.

[72] Ibid, p. 34.

[73] Adam Chapnick, "The Canadian Middle Power Myth." International Journal, Vol LV, No 2 (Spring 2000) p. 203.

[74] 'A New UN for a New Millennium.' Canada World View, Issue 10, Winter 2001, p. 3.

These statements, combined with the fact that the government has offered Canada to play a leadership role in both Zaire and recently in Afghanistan, clearly indicate that the CF must be prepared to assume leadership roles in the future. Therefore it is in the interests of the CF to articulate for the government the types of missions that could be undertaken given the current operational capabilities. This approach may limit the type of response alluded to by Canadian military historian Jack Granatstein in his book, *Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Difference did Peacekeeping Make in Canada?*, that "for too many Canadian peacekeeping has become a substitute for policy and thought," adding that governments, like individuals, are supposed to be capable of rational decision-making. And automatic responses, whether "my country right or wrong" or "send in the Canadian peacekeepers," are no substitute for thought."[75]

Based on the types of UN operations reviewed earlier in this paper, it is possible to eliminate certain types of missions from the list of those that Canada should consider leading. The first type of mission to eliminate from the list is enforcement actions. Traditionally, only large nations or organizations such as the United States and NATO are able to lead complex missions authorized under Chapter VII such as the Korean War, the Gulf War (90-91), and Bosnia (post Dayton). This is due to the requirement for lead nations to provide large well-trained bodies of troops with a wide-range of military capabilities that are able to accomplish the complete list of tasks found in the CMPO. These tasks include everything from sanctions through non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) to conventional combat to logistics management. The other type of mission that should be eliminated is the observer mission. The UN has shown it is capable of dealing with these types of operations and should continue to do so unaided. In reality, "the very traits that make [the UN] a somewhat bumbling leader of serious military missions make it a trusted and reliable manager of quasi-military peacekeeping missions."[76]

---

[75] Granatstein as cited in David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, Canada's International Security Policy, Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1995, p. 214.

We are now left with a range of missions that involve sub-tasks, such as those described in the CMPO, that may be appropriate for Canada to take the lead. A review of the UN missions extant in 1996 or started since that time reveals 16 missions that remain.[77] These missions vary in complexity from the relatively simple and stable such as the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to the large yet fragile UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). It was this latter mission that Major-General (retired) Romeo Dallaire suggested that Canada should support more fully instead of ISAF during a recent interview.[78]

It is in this range of traditional and 2nd generations missions that Canada has the most to offer. In his paper, *Picking up Peaces: Comparative Advantage and Post-conflict*

---

[76] Hillen, p. xviii.

[77] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml Accessed 7 March 2003. A complete listing of operations for the selected time frame is found at annex C. The classification of missions is based on Hillen.

[78] Major-General Romeo Dallaire, on CBC TV, 27 February 2003. http://montreal.cbc.ca/template/servlet/View?filename=dallaire030227 Accessed 10 March 2003.

Restoration" Canada- US Defence Co-operate, David Last suggests that following a policy of 'community-based peacekeeping' places Canada at a comparative advantage to the United States. This advantage is based on our experience, simple procedures and ability to access all elements of the government, including the military, police and humanitarian agencies.[79] This advantage, which has yet to be realized, is best shown through the Canadian use of multiculturalism.

> Canada has a pool of compatible culture and linguistic experts from which to draw. Secondly, by being less specialised and deployed more intimately in the community our military deployments at least have the potential to help bridge the entry of new NGOs with the inter personal skills necessary to build new organizations – refugee associations, pensioners' rights groups, student unions, and sol on. Soldiers do not help with local groups directly. In the first 12 to 18 months of a deployment, they may help to prepare the ground for the NGOs that do.[80]

The *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* is useful in determining where Canada could exercise her 'responsibility to protect.' The focus on 'protecting' includes the responsibility to both 'prevent' and 'rebuild'.[81] The report discusses the roles of the military and humanitarian agencies as they relate to the protection of individuals prior to, during and after intervention has taken place. The CMPO is therefore attractive as it covers all of these aspects of an operation.

While there are tools available to categorize operations and indicate the complexity of each based on the tasks required to be successful, there is one additional factor that must be examined. The government has developed a set of principles that should be examined prior to becoming involved in operations. This list includes:

- There be a clear and enforceable mandate.
- There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority.

---

[79] Last, p. 19-20.
[80] Ibid, p. 23.
[81] Evans, p. 17.

- The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among missions partners.
- In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures.
- With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict.[82]

When these tools are all combined, it puts in place a structured process by which the Government can examine a situation, and decide if it is appropriate for Canada to be involved. However, given the complexity of modern interventions it in not possible to be able to predict in advance which operations would demand Canadian participation.

Conclusion

The UN has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. The number and types of mission authorized by the Security Council have risen dramatically. This has placed an increased demand on member states to assist in the resolution of a wider range of disputes in addition to interventions to ensure the preservation of human life. In the words of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, as quoted by Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, "[i]n this era, and more so with every day that passes, the interests of nations states and the imperatives of geopolitics must be subordinated to the interests and well-being of people."[83] While larger nations and organizations have shown the desire and capability to resolve certain conflicts, many others go unchecked.

---

[82] 1994 Defence White Paper, p. 29.
[83] Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, , p. 213.

No one is certain where the next conflict or humanitarian crisis will erupt. Nor is anyone certain where or when the UN will decide to become involved in an ongoing crisis. We can state with some certainty, however, that there will likely be threats to Canadian security regardless where in the world the conflict occurs.[84] This will ensure that Canada remains engaged on a multi-lateral basis as a matter of government policy.

Canada has shown the ability to step forward and take the lead in the complex mission in Zaire in 1996. Today, Canada is about to take a lead role in another difficult operation in Kabul Afghanistan with ISAF. While not specifically stated in the Defence White Paper, the government has shown that the military may still be requested to undertake a leadership role in multinational operations. The CF is not alone in facing these unexpected demands from their political masters. As noted previously the Australian Defence Force faces many similar challenges to the CF. In dealing with the crisis in East Timor, '[f]orming and leading an international, regionally-based, peace-enforcement coalition was not a military response option previously considered by the Australian government for Australia's defence forces."[85] Therefore it is prudent for the CF to be prepared for the eventuality of a request from the government to take the lead in a UN operation.

In order to ensure that Canada is selecting the appropriate mission in which to take lead-nation status a process is required to guide the decision makers. First we must accept that Canada is capable of leading on certain types of operations from the traditional and 2nd generation categories as proposed by Hillen. Zaire has shown us this is the case. Further, the use of the CMPO as a tool will serve to identify all the elements of any given operation whether they are focused on the military, governmental or non-governmental organizations. Finally, the principles for participation as articulated in the 1994 Defence White Paper would serve to focus Canadian involvement on missions with a high chance of success.

---

[84] Louis Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales." Canadian Military Journal, Vol 1, No 2 (Summer 2000) p. 15.

[85] Dee, p. 9.

In the end we will not be able to determine in advance the types of missions Canada should lead. However, we should be able to recognize one when we see it.

Annex A

Conceptual Model of Peace Operations – Functional Form
Version 5.0 – 1/24/02

3	Peace Operations
3.1	Peace Making
3.1.1	Non-Adjudicatory Processes
3.1.1.1	Negotiation
3.1.1.2	Good Offices
3.1.1.3	Mediation
3.1.1.4	Conciliation
3.1.1.5	Inquiry
3.1.2	Adjudicatory Processes
3.1.2.1	Arbitration
3.1.2.2	Adjudication
3.1.3	Confidence Building Measures
3.1.4	Status
3.1.4.1	Civilians
3.1.4.1.1	International
3.1.4.1.2	Local
3.1.4.2	Forces
3.1.4.2.1	International
3.1.4.2.2	Local
3.1.4.3	Territory/Borders
3.1.5	Verification
3.1.6	Rewards
3.1.7	Sanctions
3.1.7.1	Embargoes
3.1.7.1.1	Economic/Financial/Trade
3.1.7.1.2	Travel
3.1.7.1.3	Information
3.1.7.2	Quarantine
3.1.7.3	Reduced Access to International Systems
3.1.7.3.1	Reduced Support for Loans/ Grants
3.1.7.3.2	Reduced Support for International Mail/ Commerce
3.1.7.4	Address Warlords and Spoilers
3.1.7.4.1	Marginalize Spoilers
3.1.7.4.2	Relocate Spoilers (Exile)
3.1.8	Identify Envoys and Special Representatives
3.2	Peacebuilding
3.2.1	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
3.2.1.1	Provide for Food
3.2.1.2	Provide for Water and Sanitation
3.2.1.3	Provide for Medical Care
3.2.1.3.1	Provide Public Health and Welfare Surveillance
3.2.1.3.2	Provide Medical Services
3.2.1.3.3	Provide Surgical Services
3.2.1.3.4	Provide Public Health Services
3.2.1.3.5	Provide Mental Health Services
3.2.1.4	Provide for Clothing
3.2.1.5	Provide for Shelter
3.2.1.6	Provide for Additional Assistance
3.2.1.7	Conduct Search and Rescue
3.2.1.7.1	Search and Rescue Pre-Deployment Actions
3.2.1.7.1.1	Receive Mission
3.2.1.7.1.2	Obtain Background Information
3.2.1.7.1.3	Obtain Situational Information
3.2.1.7.1.4	Conduct Reconnaissance
3.2.1.7.2	Search Activities
3.2.1.7.3	Rescue Activities
3.2.1.7.4	Immediate Medical Activities
3.2.1.8	Provide Veterinarian Services
3.2.1.8.1	Provide Animal Veterinarian Services
3.2.1.8.2	Provide Veterinarian Health Surveillance
3.2.1.8.3	Provide Vector Control
3.2.2	Refugee and Displaced Persons/ At-Risk Population
3.2.2.1	Manage Refugees, DPs, and At-Risk Population
3.2.2.1.1	Identity
3.2.2.1.2	Camps
3.2.2.2	Return Refugees, DPs, and At-Risk Population
3.2.2.3	Reintegrate Refugees, DPs, and At-Risk Population
3.2.3	Human Rights
3.2.3.1	Determine Status
3.2.3.1.1	Commission of Atrocities/Abuses/War Crimes
3.2.3.1.2	Victims
3.2.3.1.2.1	Repatriate Victims
3.2.3.1.2.1.1	Repatriate Civilians
3.2.3.1.2.1.2	Repatriate Prisoners
3.2.3.1.2.1.3	Repatriate Human Remains
3.2.3.1.2.2	Make Victims Whole
3.2.3.1.3	Perpetrators
3.2.3.1.3.1	Apprehend and Hold War Criminals
3.2.3.1.3.2	Judge War Criminals
3.2.3.1.3.3	Punish War Criminals
3.2.3.2	Human Rights Education
3.2.3.3	Human Rights Programs
3.2.4	Self Governance
3.2.4.1	Institution Building
3.2.4.1.1	Rebuild Executive
3.2.4.1.1.1	Rebuild Ministries
3.2.4.1.1.2	Rebuild Services
3.2.4.1.1.2.1	Rebuild Military
3.2.4.1.1.2.2	Rebuild Police
3.2.4.1.1.2.3	Rebuild Emergency Services
3.2.4.1.1.2.4	Rebuild Social Services
3.2.4.1.1.2.5	Rebuild Postal Services
3.2.4.1.1.3	Rebuild Policy Structure
3.2.4.1.2	Rebuild Legislative
3.2.4.1.2.1	Legal System
3.2.4.1.2.2	Representation of Public
3.2.4.1.3	Rebuild Judicial
3.2.4.1.3.1	Rebuild Prosecutors
3.2.4.1.3.2	Rebuild Courts
3.2.4.1.3.3	Rebuild Penal System
3.2.4.1.4	Rebuild Subordinate Governments
3.2.4.1.5	Train for Transition
3.2.4.2	Democratization
3.2.4.2.1	Develop Political Parties
3.2.4.2.2	Foster Civil Society Organizations
3.2.4.3	Election Support
3.2.4.3.1	Decision Issues
3.2.4.3.2	Identify Rules and Procedures
3.2.4.3.3	Perform Election Management
3.2.4.3.4	Identify Funding and Resources
3.2.4.3.5	Conduct Voter Registration
3.2.4.3.6	Polling/Voting
3.2.4.3.7	Post Election Activities
3.2.4.3.8	Conduct Election Education
3.2.4.3.9	Monitor Election Process
3.2.4.3.10	Inauguration
3.2.4.4	Transition from Conflict
3.2.4.4.1	Government Transition
3.2.4.4.2	Security Transition
3.2.4.4.3	Social Support Transition
3.2.5	Economic Stability
3.2.5.1	Market Activities
3.2.5.1.1	Investment
3.2.5.1.2	Manufacturing
3.2.5.1.3	Banking and Finance
3.2.5.1.4	Wholesale
3.2.5.1.5	Retail/Small Business
3.2.5.1.6	Service
3.2.5.1.7	Agriculture
3.2.5.1.8	Forestry
3.2.5.1.9	Mining/Raw Material
3.2.5.1.10	Fishing/Hunting
3.2.5.2	Employment
3.2.5.3	Property Control
3.2.6	Infrastructure
3.2.6.1	Physical Infrastructure
3.2.6.1.1	Transportation Networks

3.2.6.1.1.1 Maintain/Repair Roads
3.2.6.1.1.2 Maintain/Repair Rails
3.2.6.1.1.3 Maintain/Repair Ports
3.2.6.1.1.4 Maintain/Repair Ports (Water)
3.2.6.1.2 Distribution Networks
3.2.6.1.2.1 Maintain/Repair Power Networks
3.2.6.1.2.2 Maintain/Repair Water Supplies
3.2.6.1.2.3 Maintain/Repair Sanitation/Sewerage
3.2.6.1.2.4 Maintain/Repair Fuel and Oil Pipelines
3.2.6.1.3 Communication Networks
3.2.6.1.3.1 Maintain/Repair Communications Networks
3.2.6.1.3.2 Maintain/Repair Broadcast Infrastructure
3.2.6.1.4 Maintain/Repair Structures
3.2.6.1.4.1 Maintain/Repair Private Housing
3.2.6.1.4.2 Maintain/Repair State Housing
3.2.6.1.4.3 Maintain/Repair Business Structures
3.2.6.1.4.4 Maintain/Repair Government Structures
3.2.6.2 Virtual Infrastructure
3.2.6.2.1 Support to Families and Individuals
3.2.6.2.2 Support to Schools and Education
3.2.6.2.3 Support to Communities
3.2.6.2.4 Support to Churches and Religious Organizations
3.2.6.2.5 Support to NGOs
3.2.7 Reintegration of Former Combatants
3.2.7.1 Cantonment
3.2.7.1.1 Location of Cantonment
3.2.7.1.2 Support of Cantonment
3.2.7.2 Time Line Development
3.2.8 Environmental Protection
3.2.8.1 Remediate
3.2.8.1.1 Air
3.2.8.1.2 Ground
3.2.8.1.3 Water
3.2.8.2 Species Protection
3.2.8.3 Environmental Protection Education
3.2.8.4 Environmental Protection Programs
3.3 Peacekeeping
3.3.1 Observation
3.3.1.1 Static Observation
3.3.1.1.1 Observation Posts
3.3.1.1.2 Listening Posts
3.3.1.1.3 Unattended Posts
3.3.1.2 Mobile Observation
3.3.1.2.1 Foot Patrols
3.3.1.2.2 Mechanized/Motorized Patrols
3.3.1.2.3 Aerial Patrols
3.3.1.2.4 Overhead/Technical Patrols
3.3.1.2.5 Maritime Patrols
3.3.2 Force
3.3.2.1 Defensive Operations
3.3.2.2 Enforcement Operations
3.3.2.2.1 Zone Stability Operations
3.3.2.2.2 Separation Operations
3.3.2.2.3 Cordon or Exclusion Operations
3.3.2.2.4 Control Civil Disturbances
3.3.2.3 Retrograde/Rescue Operations
3.3.2.3.1 Military Rescue Activities
3.3.2.3.2 Non-Combatant Evacuations
3.3.2.3.2.1 Permissive NEO
3.3.2.3.2.2 Non-Permissive NEO
3.3.3 Presence
3.3.3.1 Demonstrations
3.3.3.2 Presence by Observers
3.3.3.3 Presence by Patrols
3.3.3.4 Presence by Over Flight
3.3.3.5 Presence by Naval Forces
3.3.3.6 Virtual (Ephemeral) Presence
3.3.4 Security
3.3.4.1 Force Protection
3.3.4.1.1 Active Force Protection
3.3.4.1.1.1 Air Defense
3.3.4.1.1.2 Security Patrolling
3.3.4.1.1.3 Rapid Reserve
3.3.4.1.1.4 MCM (Mil Ops)
3.3.4.1.1.5 Combat Search and Rescue
3.3.4.1.2 Static Force Protection
3.3.4.1.2.1 Physical Barriers/Field Fortification
3.3.4.1.2.2 Personal Equipment
3.3.4.2 Protect Real Property/Personal Property/Goods
3.3.4.2.1 Secure Cultural Artifacts/Monuments
3.3.4.2.2 Secure Gravesites/Burial Locations
3.3.4.2.3 Secure Buildings/Installations
3.3.4.2.4 Secure Assets
3.3.4.2.5 Secure Goods/Services
3.3.4.3 Protect Individuals
3.3.4.3.1 Locals
3.3.4.3.2 Internationals (Non-Military)
3.3.4.4 Security of Mandate
3.3.4.5 Protect Lines of Communication
3.3.4.6 Area Security
3.3.5 Military Force/Unit Movements
3.3.6 Provide for Law and Order
3.3.6.1 Judicial
3.3.6.1.1 Prosecutors
3.3.6.1.2 Courts
3.3.6.1.3 Penal System
3.3.6.2 Police
3.3.6.3 Customs and Border Patrol
3.3.7 Demining
3.3.7.1 Demining Operations (Human Use)
3.3.7.1.1 Assess Demining Requirements
3.3.7.1.2 Determine Demining Assets
3.3.7.1.3 Allocate Demining Assets
3.3.7.1.4 Conduct Demining
3.3.7.1.4.1 Demine Areas
3.3.7.1.4.2 Demine Routes
3.3.7.1.4.3 Demine Structures
3.3.7.1.5 Other Explosives Neutralization and Removal
3.3.7.2 Demining Operations (Military Use)
3.3.7.2.1 Assess Demining Requirements
3.3.7.2.2 Determine Demining Assets
3.3.7.2.3 Allocate Demining Assets
3.3.7.2.4 Conduct Demining
3.3.7.2.4.1 Demine Areas
3.3.7.2.4.2 Demine Routes
3.3.7.2.4.3 Demine Structures
3.3.7.2.5 Other Explosives Neutralization and Removal
3.3.8 Demobilization and Disarmament of Former Combatants
3.3.8.1 Disarmament of Individual Weapons
3.3.8.1.1 Militia/Formal Militaries Side Arms
3.3.8.1.2 Warlord/Gang Weapons
3.3.8.2 Disarmament of Crew Served Weapons
3.3.8.2.1 Militia/Formal Militaries
3.3.8.2.2 Warlord/Gang Equipment
3.3.9 Specific Missions
3.3.9.1 Cordon Areas for Safety/Operations
3.3.9.2 Search and Find Items
3.3.9.3 PSYOPS
3.3.9.4 Freedom of Movement
3.3.9.5 Control and/or Destruction of Weapons
3.3.9.5.1 Conventional Weapons
3.3.9.5.2 WMD/NBC
3.4 Peace Support
3.4.1 Situation Awareness/Monitoring
3.4.1.1 Gather Information
3.4.1.2 Classify and Categorize (Analyze)
3.4.1.3 Integrate (Fusion)
3.4.1.4 Disseminate Information
3.4.2 Decision Support
3.4.2.1 Planning and Replanning Response
3.4.2.2 Requirements Analysis
3.4.2.3 Determine Resource Constraints
3.4.2.4 Option Generation
3.4.2.5 Choose Preferred Option
3.4.3 Supervision and Synchronization
3.4.3.1 Direct Replanning
3.4.3.2 Consensus Building

3.4.3.3 Coordinate and Cooperate with Others
3.4.3.3.1 Liaison with Internal Actors
3.4.3.3.1.1 Liaison with Refugees and IDPs
3.4.3.3.1.2 Liaison with Local Governmental Entities
3.4.3.3.1.3 Liaison with Local NGOs
3.4.3.3.1.4 Liaison with Local Military
3.4.3.3.1.5 Liaison with Local Internal Security Forces
3.4.3.3.1.6 Liaison with Other Locals
3.4.3.3.2 Liaison with External Actors
3.4.3.3.2.1 Liaison with Regional Population
3.4.3.3.2.2 Liaison with Regional Governmental Entities
3.4.3.3.2.3 Liaison with International Governmental Entities
3.4.3.3.2.4 Liaison with International NGOs
3.4.3.3.2.5 Liaison with International Organizations
3.4.3.3.2.6 Liaison with Military
3.4.3.3.2.7 Liaison with International Civilian Police
3.4.3.3.2.8 Liaison with Other Internationals
3.4.3.3.3 CMOC/CIMIC
3.4.3.3.3.1 Communications Channels
3.4.3.3.3.2 Procedures
3.4.3.3.3.3 Common Operational Picture
3.4.3.4 Determine Future Actions
3.4.4 Information Operations
3.4.4.1 Media Operations
3.4.4.2 Information Management
3.4.4.3 Language Support
3.4.5 Logistics
3.4.5.1 Support to Military Forces
3.4.5.1.1 Rations
3.4.5.1.2 Supplies
3.4.5.1.3 POL
3.4.5.1.4 Medical
3.4.5.1.5 Ammunition
3.4.5.1.6 Transportation
3.4.5.1.7 Maintenance
3.4.5.1.8 Services and Personnel
3.4.5.1.9 Mobility Operations
3.4.5.1.10 Counter/Mobility Operations
3.4.5.2 Support to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
3.4.5.2.1 Food
3.4.5.2.2 Water and Sanitation
3.4.5.2.3 Medical Care
3.4.5.2.4 Clothing
3.4.5.2.5 Shelter
3.4.5.2.6 Technical Infrastructure
3.4.5.2.7 Warehouses
3.4.5.2.8 Service/Repair Capability
3.4.5.2.9 Local and Distant Transportation
3.4.5.2.9.1 Air
3.4.5.2.9.2 Air Drop
3.4.5.2.9.3 Ground
3.4.5.2.9.4 Sea
3.4.5.3 Logistic Support Agreements
3.4.5.3.1 Inter-Military Agreements
3.4.5.3.2 Military-Civilian Agreements
3.4.5.3.3 Inter-Civilian Agreements
3.4.5.4 Logistic Management
3.4.5.4.1 Logistic Site Activities
3.4.5.4.2 Logistic Distribution

Annex B

Initial Recommended Minimal Task List for Simulation and Training

Task	CMPO	Function	Likelihood
Observing and Reporting - On Developments	3.3.1	Observation	100.00%
Assist - Conflict Diffusion, Stabilization, and Resolution	3.1	Peace Making	95.12%
Maintain - Information on Disposition of Belligerents	3.3.2.1.1	Gather Information	95.12%
Investigate - Complaints and Violations	3.1.1.2	Fact Finding	92.68%
Monitor - Conditions Potential Conflict Area	3.3.2.1	Monitor the Situation	92.68%
Transmit - Messages	3.3.2.3.3	Coordinate/Consensus Building	92.68%
Supply - Military Information and Liaison	3.3.6.4	Liaison with Other Military	92.68%
Support - Monitoring Cease Fire	3.3.1	Observation	87.80%
Provide - Communication Between Parties	3.1.10	Good Offices	85.37%
Investigate - Alleged Violations of Peace Agreements	3.1.2.1	Political Requirements Analysis	85.37%
Provide - Area and Route Reconnaissance	3.3.1.2.1	Foot Patrols	85.37%
Conduct - Reconnaissance	3.3.2.1.1	Gather Information	85.37%
Provide - Legal Services	3.2.4.2	Judicial Reconstruction/Support	85.37%
Monitor - Combatants or Belligerents Activities	3.1.1.2	Fact Finding	85.00%
Observe And Report - On Alleged Violations (MILOB)	3.3.1	Observation	82.93%
Dissemination - Public Information	3.1	Peace Making	80.49%
Supervise and Monitor - Cease-Fires, Armistices or Peace Agreements	3.1.1.2	Fact Finding	80.49%
Perform - Actions at Checkpoints and Observation Posts	3.3.1.1.1	Observation Posts	80.49%
Provide - Early-Warning Capabilities	3.3.2.1.1	Gather Information	80.49%
Patrol - Security	3.3.5.3	Presence by Patrols	80.49%
Provide - Liaison Between Parties	3.3.6.5	Liaison with Parties to Conflict	80.49%
Encourage - Resumption of Normal Interparty Relations	3.2.4	Self Governance Activities	78.05%
Liaison - Opposing Parties Conflict	3.3.6.5	Liaison with Parties to Conflict	78.05%
Investigate - Breaches Cease-Fire	3.3.2.1.1	Gather Information	77.50%
Employ - Air Surveillance	3.3.2.1.1	Gather Information	75.61%
Discourage - Infiltration and Confrontations	3.3.7.1	Force Protection	75.00%

Perform - Claims and Liability Adjudication	3.1.1.2	Fact Finding	73.17%
Develop - Recognized Procedures Dealing With Violations	3.1.3.4.2	Incident Resolution Agreements	73.17%
Inspect - Demilitarized Zones and Weapon Sites	3.2.7	Demobilization	72.50%
Stabilize - Conflict Among Belligerents	3	Peace Operations	70.73%
Supervision - Demilitarization and Demobilization	3.2.7	Demobilization	70.73%
Verify - Cease-Fires, Cantonments and Disarmaments	3.1.1.2	Fact Finding	70.00%
Support - Political Efforts at Mediation	3.1	Peace Making	68.29%
Perform - Logistic Functions	3.3.4	Logistics	68.29%
Perform - Fact-Finding Missions	3.1.1.2	Fact Finding	60.98%
Monitor - Refugee Flows	3.2.2.1	Manage Refugees and IDPs	60.98%
Provide - Direct Medical Support Operations	3.2.1.3	Provide for Medical Care	60.98%
Monitor and Investigate - Human Rights Violations	3.2.3.1	Human Rights Monitoring	60.98%
Perform - Negotiation and Mediation	3.1.7	Perform Mediation Services	60.98%
Assist - Weapon Collection/Confiscation	3.2.7	Demobilization	60.98%
Provide - Emergency Relief	3.2.1	Humanitarian Activities	58.54%
Provide - Food	3.2.1.1	Provide for Food and Water	58.54%
Support - Local Authorities to Create Conditions Necessary Consensual Operations	3.2.4.1	Institution Building	58.54%
Mediate - Conflicts	3.1.7	Perform Mediation Services	58.54%
Conduct - Medical Operations Including Surgery	3.2.1.3.3	Provide Surgical Services	58.54%
Disarm - Belligerents	3.2.7	Demobilization	58.54%
Establish - Area as Limited Military Strength and Armaments	3.2.7	Demobilization	57.50%
Mediate - Local Dispute	3.1.7	Perform Mediation Services	56.10%
Provide Information - Human Rights	3.2.3.3	Human Rights Education	56.10%
Engage In - Confidence Building Measures	3.1	Peace Making	53.66%
Deliver - Relief Assistance	3.2.1	Humanitarian Activities	53.66%
Report - Human Rights Situation	3.2.3.2	Human Rights Reporting	53.66%
Support - Development Competent Civil Authority	3.2.4	Self Governance Activities	51.22%
Construct Sanitation Facilities	3.2.1.5	Provide for Sanitation's and Sewerage	51.22%
Provide - Lift Support	3.3.4.2.7	Provide Local Transportation	51.22%
Security, Support - Facility or Embassy	3.3.7.2	Security of Property/Goods	46.34%

Assist - Broadcast (TV/Radio) Re-Establishment	3.2.6.1.3.2	Maintain/Repair Broadcast Infrastructure	46.34%
Conduct - Visits and Meetings with Other Diplomats	3.1.1.1	Diplomatic Liaison	39.02%

Annex C

Peacekeeping Missions
(Extant in or authorized since 1996)

Type of Operation	**Name**	**Mandate**	**Remarks**
Observers	UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	Established in 1948	- Monitor cease-fire
	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Established in 1949	- Monitor cease-fire
	UN Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	SCR 689 (1991)	- Established under Chapter VII - Monitor cease-fire
	UN Mission fro the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	SCR 690 (1991)	- Monitor cease-fire and administer referendum
	UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	SCR 866 (1993)	- Monitor cease-fire / embargo / demobilization
	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)	SCR 968 (1994)	- Monitor cease-fire
	UN Observer Group in Georgia (UNOMIG)	SCR 973 (1994)	- Previous SCRs 858 (1993) & 881 (1993) - Monitor cease-fire
	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)	SCR 11038 (1996)	- Observers previously deployed with UNCRO and UNPROFOR
Traditional	UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	SCR 186 (1964)	- Occupy buffer zone (from 1974)
	UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	SCR 350 (1974)	- Supervise disengagement
	UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	SCRs 425 & 426 (1978)	- Occupy buffer zone
	UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)	Established 31 March 1991	- Initially part of UNPROFOR, independent mission 1 Feb 1996 - Monitor border area
	UN Mission Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	SCR 1320 (2000)	- Monitor border and cease-fire
Second Generation	UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)	SCR 743 (1992)	- Demilitarization, monitoring of 'safe areas' and 'no-fly zones' and delivery of humanitarian aid
	UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)	SCR 872 (1993)	- Additional SCRs 912 (1994), 918 (1994), 965 (1994), 997 (1995), and 1092 (1995) - Supervise cease- fire and provide secure environment
	UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	Established in 1993	- Assist democratic transition
	UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III)	Established 8 Feb 1995	- Supervise cease- fire and provide a secure environment
	UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO)	Established 31 Mar 95	- Replaced UNPROFOR in Croatia - Monitor cease-fire - Economic development - Humanitarian assistance

	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)	SCR 1037 (1996)	-Maintain peace and security
	UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG)	SCR 1145 (1997)	- Assumed police function from UNTAES
	UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	SCR 1270 (1999)	- Additional SCR 1289 (2000) under Chapter VII - Implement peace agreement, and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Relocation - Security of key locations
	UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	SCR 1279 (1999)	- Additional SCR 1291 (2000) under Chapter VII - Monitor cease-fire - Protect civilians - Humanitarian affairs
	UN Mission in Support in East Timor (UNMISET)	SCR 1410 (2002)	- Nation building
	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	SCR 1244 (1999)	- Nation building - Humanitarian and disaster relief - Maintain law and order

List of Works Cited

Books

Connaughton, Richard. Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: The Reality. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001.

Cooper, Andrew, F. Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1997.

Dewitt, David, B. and Leyton-Brown, David. Canada's International Security Policy. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1995.

Hillen, John. Blue Helmets: the Strategy of UN Military Operations. 2nd ed. Dulles: Brassey's, 2000.

Jett, Dennis, C. Why Peacekeeping Fails. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Keating, Tom. Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993.

Kegley, Charles, W, Jr. "Thinking Ethically about Peacemaking and Peacekeeping" Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts . Eds Woodhouse, Tom, Robert Bruce, and Malcolm Dando. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

MacKenzie, Lewis. Peacekeeper: the Road to Sarajevo. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993.

Morrison, Alex, ed. Peacekeeping by Proxy. Toronto: Brown Book Company, 1999.

Nossal, Kim Richard. The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. 3rd ed. Scarborough, Prentice Hall, 1997.

Weiss, Thomas. Military-Civilian Relations: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Williams, Michael, C. Adelphi Paper 321: Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping. Oxford: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.

Periodicals

Bland, Douglas. "A Sow's Ear from a Silk Purse" International Journal, Vol. LVI, No 1 (Winter 1998-9) Pp 143 - 174.

Chapnick, Adam. “The Canadian Middle Power Myth” International Journal, Vol. LV, No 2 (Spring 2000) Pp 182-206.

Davis, David. “Functional Requirements for Peace Operations Training Systems” Technical Note: September 1999. The Program On Peacekeeping Policy The Institute of Public Policy George Mason University.

Dee, Moreen. “Coalitions of the Willing’ and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia’s Involvement with INTERFET” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No 3 (Autumn 2001) Pp 1-20.

Delvoie, Louis. “Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 1, No 2 (Summer 2000) Pp 13-24.

Frendak, Allison, M. “The Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO)” Unpublished paper.

Hennessy, Michael. “Operation “Assurance”: Planning a Multi-national Force for Rwanda/Zaire” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 2, No 1 (Spring 2001) Pp 11-20.

Jockel, J., and Sokolsky, J. “Lloyd Axworthy’s Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy” International Journal, Vol. LVI, No 1 (Winter 2000-2001) Pp 1-19.

Last, David. “Picking up Peaces: Comparative Advantage and Post-conflict Restoration” *Canada- US Defence Co-operate*, Security and Defence Forum Seminar. Queens University and Royal Military College of Canada. Kingston, Ontario, 15 June 2000.

Ryan, Alan. “The Strong Lead-Nation Model in an ad hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation *Stabilise* in East Timor” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9 No 1 (Spring 2002) Pp 23-44.

Richter, Andrew. The Revolution in Military Affairs and its Impact on Canada: The Challenges and Consequences. Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 28, March 1999.

Government Documents

Access to Information Request (A) 96/1168. Canada’s decision in the Fall of 1996 to propose and lead a peacekeeping force to Zaire as well as the subsequent decision to withdraw the force. Release da

'Interview with Paul Heinbecker' Canada World View, Issue 7, Spring 2000, Pp 7.

'A New UN for a New Millennium' Canada World View, Issue 10, Winter 2001.

Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper. Ottawa: Supply and Services: 1994.

Canada, Department of National Defence, CFJOG Business Plan 2003/04.

Canada, Department of National Defence, Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020. June 1999.

Evans, Gareth et al. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa, The International Development Research Centre, 2001.

Record of Parliamentary Debate. www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/058_2003-02-12/han058_1445-E.htm#Int-414761 Accessed 24 February 2003

United Nations Documents

Brahimi, Lakhdar, et al. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. New York: United Nations, 17 August 2000.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace 1995. 2nd ed. New York: United Nations 1995.

Security Council Resolution 1080 (1996). http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/323/32/PDF/N9632332.pdf Accessed 25 November 2003

Security Council Resolution 1078 (1996). http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/311/91/PDF/N9631191.pdf Accessed 25 November 2003.

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml

Interviews

Dallaire, Major-General Romeo, on CBC TV, 27 February 2003. http://montreal.cbc.ca/template/servlet/View?filename=dallaire030227 Accessed 10 March 2003.

Forestell, Lieutenant-Colonel Roy, Directorate Peacekeeping Policy, Department of National Defence. Personal Interview. 21 January 2003.

Other Sources

Durch, William J., ed. The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Moxon-Browne, Edward, ed. A Future for Peacekeeping. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
O'Hanlon, Michael. Saving Lives with Force: Military Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institute Press, 1997.

Bashow, David L. "Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Canada's Foreign and Defence Policy Linkage." Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 1, No 1 (Spring 2000) Pp 17-26.
MacKenzie, Lewis. " General Lewis MacKenzie on peacekeeping in the grey zone" Transcript of a Press Conference, 28 January 1993.

Meren, David. "Destinies with Greatness or Delusions of Grandeur? Causes and Consequences of Canadian Prime Ministerial Interventions in International Crises." Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1999) Pp 127-148.