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The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation

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*This paper was written by a student
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Abstract

The aim of this article is to examine the Kananaskis G8 Summit as a case study in interagency cooperation. Although a plethora of municipal, provincial and federal agencies were involved in the conduct of the Summit, the emphasis will be on the interaction between the CF/DND, the RCMP/SOLGEN, and the Summit Management Office (SMO)/DFAIT. The lens of the case study will be that of the CF and, for the most part, from the view of CF Joint Task Force (JTF) formed to assist in the conduct of the Summit. A synopsis of the preparations and the Summit itself will provide the background for the eventual examination of selected areas of interagency cooperation where lessons should be learned or reinforced for the inevitable conduct of future similar events. These lessons are drawn from the domains of the National Command Authority, the request and approval process, joint (interagency) planning, unified command and control, and interpersonal relationships. The article concludes that the G8 Summit was a highly successful operation from virtually every perspective, including that of interagency cooperation; however, there were some valuable lessons learned or reinforced that need to be corrected well before planning for another such operation commences.

“Comprehensive civil military coordination [; and] effective coordination and timely decision making between the CF and Other Governmental Departments are key to effective support without trespassing on civilian responsibilities”¹

Comd Joint Task Force GRIZZLY's
Strategic Center of Gravity

“Cops don't do woods [or mountains]”²

anonymous

INTRODUCTION

In June, 2001, the Prime Minister announced that the 2002 G8 Summit would be held in Kananaskis, Alberta. The selection of Kananaskis as the site came as somewhat of a surprise, and was not welcomed by all Albertans. The significant demonstrator violence and property damage that had come to be associated with recent international events such as the Genoa G8 Summit and the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in April, 2001, was cause of great concern for the organizers, hosts, and Canadians in general. There was little doubt that the Canadian Forces (CF) would be involved in a major way as part of the security and supporting arrangements for the G8 Summit. Indeed the CF support to the Summit of the Americas had been the top domestic priority for the Department of National Defence (DND) and effectively consumed the full

¹ Land Force Western Area Headquarters. (Ops 174), *Operation Order 002 – Op GRIZZLY*. 22 May, 2002. pp. 1-2. Although quoted from the final version of the Op Order, BGen Fenton consistently stated this as his Strategic Center of Gravity for the Planning and Preparation Phase as early as September, 2002.

² This expression was often used as the short explanation as to why the Canadian Forces had such a unique role to play in the security effort for the Kananaskis G8 Summit.

resources of Secteur du Quebec de la Force Terrestre (SQFT), as well as some additional elements from across the CF.³ Notwithstanding the significant CF contribution, very little was actually committed to the security aspect. The security of the Summit of the Americas was the responsibility of the police and law enforcement agencies. Although there was an infantry battalion on stand-by as a contingency force of last resort, the majority of the CF contribution was in support of logistics, infrastructure, communications, ceremonial and command post activities.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the security concerns surrounding the hosting of the G8 Summit increased dramatically. In addition to the security challenges posed by the forested and mountainous terrain surrounding the Kananaskis site, there was a new threat to consider. The anarchist was no longer the primary concern for the security forces. The terrorist threat, ranging from the lone sniper to bombs to weapons of mass destruction – with an equally wide range of delivery means – was clearly beyond the capacity and, more significantly, the capability of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and local law enforcement agencies. The CF was now going to be a key partner in the effort to secure the G8 site from both land based and especially airborne threats.

³ The additional elements required from outside of SQFT were primarily Military Police.

AIM

The aim of this article is to examine the Kananaskis G8 Summit as a case study in interagency cooperation. Although a plethora of municipal, provincial and federal agencies were involved in the conduct of the Summit, the emphasis will be on the interaction between the CF/DND, the RCMP/Solicitor-General (SOLGEN), and the Summit Management Office (SMO)/Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The lens of the case study will be that of the CF and, for the most part, from the view of CF Joint Task Force (JTF) formed to assist in the conduct of the Summit. A synopsis of the preparations and the Summit itself will provide the background for the eventual examination of certain areas of interagency cooperation where lessons may be learned for the inevitable conduct of future similar events.

OVERVIEW OF THE PREPARATIONS AND CONDUCT OF THE SUMMIT

The Organization and Key Players

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade was the lead agency responsible for the successful coordination and conduct of the G8 Summit. Ambassador Robert Fowler was appointed as the Prime Minister's special representative for oversight of the Summit⁴, but DFAIT's Summit Management Office, led by Executive Director, Mr John Klassen, was clearly in

⁴ Ambassador Fowler (a former Deputy Minister of DND) was also the Prime Minister's special representative charged with developing the G8 response to the African initiative known as NEPAD.

overall charge of the preparations for the Summit. This organization grew as time went on, and commuted back and forth from Ottawa to Calgary from July until March, 2002, when it then moved full-time to Calgary.

The SOLGEN had overall responsibility for the security of the G8 Summit, with the RCMP as the lead agency. Chief Superintendent Lloyd Hickman was the Officer in Charge of Summit Security Operations and was clearly the person overall in charge of security planning and preparations. However, during the actual Summit, “the Incident Commander [Superintendent Bob Boyd for the day shift and Inspector Tim Gray for the night shift] was ultimately responsible for making operational decisions related to G8 Summit Security and all information was directed into the Unified Command Center (UCC) [located in Calgary].”⁵ This only became clear to the JTF late in the planning cycle and caused some command and control concerns for the JTF Commander (Comd) that will be discussed later in the case study. The Calgary Police Services (CPS) were subordinate to the RCMP, but were responsible for their own area of operations (Calgary) which included the significant security challenges of the Media Centre and the Calgary Airport; whereas the RCMP focus was primarily on the Kananaskis site, but also included all security associated with moving the Heads of State to and from the Calgary Airport and Kananaskis.

The CF contribution to the Summit was divided into two main parts. First there was the JTF GRIZZLY, commanded by Brigadier-General Ivan Fenton, and

⁵ RCMP. *RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report*. ca. Fall 2002. p.48. The UCC was the “supreme” headquarters for the G8 Security operation and included the Joint Intelligence Group. The JTF had two Liaison Officers (day and night shift) with this HQ.

based primarily on his Land Force Western Area (LFWA) whose mission was “to support the Government of Canada in the successful execution of the 2002 G8 Summit.”⁶ In addition to a JTF Headquarters (HQ), JTF GRIZZLY was broken down into four components: a Land Component, based on 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG) whose primary task was to assist the RCMP in securing the approaches to the Kananaskis site; a Support Component, based on 1 Area Support Group (1 ASG) whose main tasks were to support the JTF logistically and administratively, provide a NBC Decontamination capability, and to assist the SMO with movement control, transportation, communications and ceremonial support; an Air Component, whose main tasks were to provide aerospace coordination over the Kananaskis Valley and to provide aviation support to the JTF and to the RCMP for the transport of Heads of State; and a small JTF Reserve which was prepared to respond to a number of contingencies, but was uncommitted at the outset of the Summit so as to maintain its flexibility of employment for the JTF Comd⁷. Although other CF elements were employed in the Kananaskis area in support of the RCMP that were not part of the JTF (i.e. the Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Response Team and JTF 2), the significant second part to the CF contribution, that was outside of the control of Comd JTF GRIZZLY, was the Defensive Counter Air organization tasked to secure the airspace over the G8 Summit. These Canadian F-18s, selected Griffon

⁶ Land Force Western Area Headquarters. (Comd 032), *JTF Op GRIZZLY Warning Order 001*. 20 November, 2001. p.6.


helicopters, Ground Based Air Defence Missile Systems and United States Air Force AWACs and strategic air-to-air refueling aircraft were coordinated and controlled by MGen Lucas, Comd Canadian NORAD Region (CANR), from Winnipeg.⁸ The authority to engage air threats to the Summit, involved NORAD, but ultimately rested with the Canadian National Command Authority. The figure below depicts the CF organizations and internal command and control relationships of the military forces involved in the G8 Summit, as well as the supporting interagency relationships.⁹ The CF at all levels was in support to both the RCMP/SOLGEN and the SMO/DFAIT, with the exception of the CANR commanded Defensive Counter Air Component, which reported to the National Command Authority, through the CDS for 'shoot-down' decisions.

⁷ There was also a national level strategic reserve (an infantry battalion) that was co-located in the JTF Area of Operations that would have been "cut" to the JTF Comd had he required their assistance.

⁸ Col C.S. Sullivan. "North American Homeland Defence Coalition." Canadian Forces College, Advanced Military Studies Course 5, December, 2002. p.19.

⁹ The diagram was designed by the author to show the interagency relationships. The CF portion of the diagram differs somewhat from the diagram portrayed in: DCDS Staff. National Defence Headquarters, Annex A, 3453-31/GRIZZLY (J7 Lessons Learned), *Operation GRIZZLY Lessons Learned – Staff Action Directive (LLSAD)*. 22 November, 2002. p.A7.

Kananaskis G8 Summit Organizational Relationships



Note:

Arrows indicate direction of inter-agency support.
 Solid lines indicate normal command relationships.
 Dotted lines indicate bi-national coordination.

Although there were countless other organizations and departments at all levels of government and the public and even private sector, the aforementioned were the key players and organizations that drove the planning and conduct of the Summit, and as a result had to work closely together.

Planning and Preparations

Planning for the G8 Summit commenced early within all the participating agencies. LFWA HQ received its initial Warning Order on 5 August, 2001, but it was clear that the anticipated tasks as laid out in this initial strategic guidance, were based on the Summit of the Americas's experience and did not reflect the unique terrain challenges of Kananaskis. The preliminary estimate done by the small JTF planning team in LFWA HQ anticipated a far greater range of Assistance to Law Enforcement (ALEA) tasks than anticipated by NDHQ. This was briefed to Comd JTF GRIZZLY at his first Information Brief on 11 August and subsequently a request for greater clarification of potential CF tasks was staffed from LFWA HQ to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) on 17 August.¹⁰ In any case, the events of September 11th changed the situation and the strategic estimate concerning CF involvement dramatically. Shortly thereafter, the requests for significant CF involvement began to arrive from the SMO and the RCMP. Planning, particularly with regard to the requirement for an Air Exclusion Zone (AEZ) over Kananaskis and Calgary, was carried out in some detail through the Fall. This was focused by the need to have the parameters of the AEZ identified and published by NAVCAN/Transport Canada in the form of a NOTAM

¹⁰ Maj D. Senft, J5 Plans. Joint Task Force HQ. Land Force Western Area, 7370-1 (J5 Plans), *J5 Plans Post Operation Report – Op GRIZZLY – CF Support to G8 Summit*. 5 August, 2002. p.2.

by 24 January, 2002. Although a relatively detailed Warning Order was issued by the JTF HQ in late November 2001, detailed security planning and a clearer definition of the role that the JTF was to have on the ground was not truly achieved in a constructive way until the Spring.

In the New Year, the pace of coordination meetings and planning sessions involving all agencies picked up significantly, and the JTF Comd was required to brief the DCDS and eventually the CDS on his concept of operations. The major impediment to JTF planning was a changing concept of how the Land Component was to be employed in the outer security zones surrounding the G8 site. In an interview with C/Supt Hickman, he affirmed that up until March or April, he believed that the CF would only provide Observation Posts (OPs) that would ideally have no potential for any confrontation, let alone contact with civilian intrusions into the security perimeter. These OPs on the surrounding high ground and mountains would detect and report potential intrusions to the RCMP patrols and then vector the RCMP patrols onto the intruders. He clearly recalled from briefings that he attended in Ottawa with the DCDS present, that the CF was not to be employed in a way that had any real potential of having them have contact with civilians¹¹. On the other hand, the JTF anticipated scenarios where the OPs might have to confront a suspected terrorist, or at the least, be able to defend themselves with armed force as a last resort. In any case, in April the situation changed dramatically, when the “RCMP human resource projections were subsequently shifted to a maximum of 4,500 regular members [reduced from

¹¹ Chief Superintendent (Ret'd) Lloyd Hickman. Telephone Interview. 6 June, 2003.

original projection of 6,000]. DND was asked to accept a more substantive role in the 'policing' of the zone surrounding the Kananaskis village."¹² This relatively late significant change of task resulted in planning and training challenges for both the RCMP and the JTF that were further exacerbated by delays in getting the JTF Rules of Engagement (ROEs) amended, approved and issued by NDHQ.¹³ However, this change of task also resulted in much closer ties with the RCMP and eventually led to the highly successful Joint CF/RCMP 'Wilderness Patrols' conducted in what was essentially the JTF's own security zone.

All the JTF components carried out their own training and scenario driven cloth model and contingency exercises, with the Air Component being the most detailed and thorough. The critical JTF level training event was Exercise VIRTUAL GRIZZLY, held in Edmonton from 6-10 May. This exercise, conducted by the Army Simulation Centre, involved all the JTF components, the RCMP, SMO and several provincial and municipal agencies. It was the only interagency exercise of its kind conducted, and was deemed to be a key factor in the overall success of the G8 Summit in the post operation reports of all the involved agencies.

¹² RCMP. *RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report*. ca. Fall 2002. p.103.

¹³ BGen J.I. Fenton, Comd Joint Task Force GRIZZLY. Land Forces Western Area, 3301-7 (Op Grizzly), *Post Operation Report – Operation GRIZZLY (Executive Summary)*. 28 August, 2002. p.4. The report goes so far as to say that "while there [were] good reasons why we experienced a change in our ROEs, the resulting delay in their authorization by NDHQ was unacceptable." In fact the JTF had to begin deployment without all aspects of the ROE having been approved.

The Conduct of the Operation

Initial deployment of JTF HQ communications personnel began as early as May, but the deployment of the main bodies of the JTF did not begin until mid-June. On 19 Jun, concurrent with the start of the JTF deployment, the JTF HQ and the RCMP Unified Command Post became operational. By 22 June, all JTF elements were deployed and the Kananaskis security perimeter was established in conjunction with the RCMP on that same day. All rehearsals were completed by 24 June. 25 June saw the arrival of the first dignitaries, and the Summit itself occurred on 26-27 June. At 0001 hours, 28 June the RCMP UCC stood down, and redeployment of CF assets commenced at daylight on the 28th.

There were no violent demonstrations and - less one small gathering at the entrance of the Kananaskis Valley - all the demonstrations were confined to Calgary¹⁴. All the protests were generally peaceful and the RCMP made two arrests for Criminal Code violations.¹⁵ The CPS reported that protester related damage was limited to one broken window. The Land Component patrols did have to steer some civilian personnel (hikers for the most part) out of the security zone, but there were no significant incidents. There were three inadvertent 'no fly zone' infractions, all of which cooperated by leaving the area once informed of the violation.¹⁶ In short, the G8 Summit had been conducted successfully, and

¹⁴ This assessment applies only to Calgary/Kananaskis. There were significant, but peaceful demonstrations in Ottawa, and in the lead up to the G8, the potential for demonstrations in Ottawa and other major cities was a cause of great concern at the national level.

¹⁵ RCMP. RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report. ca. Fall 2002. p.1.

¹⁶ The third incursion was by a small plane that did appear to be heading in the general direction of the G8 site. Initial attempts to communicate with the pilot were unsuccessful, and it did take

the “Summit Security effectively broke the cycle of violence that had been steadily escalating since the WTO Conference.”¹⁷ While all agencies quoted interagency cooperation as being key to the success of the Summit, there were areas of interagency participation that deserve further analysis.

ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED

National Command Authority

While the Defensive Counter Air (DCA) piece of the G8 Security plan was ably executed by CANR and NORAD assets, it was not clear whether the experience and practical procedures were in place at the highest levels of government to authorize a shoot-down of an airborne threat to the Summit in a timely manner. Col Duff Sullivan, who was the A3 Operations during the planning and conduct of the G8 Summit, stated in his Canadian Forces College examination of a National Command Authority (NCA) that:

The manner in which the NCA [authority for shoot-down] prepared to participate in the G8 Summit in June 2002 was also of great concern. The Prime Minister was the host of the G8 Summit and was not available to fill the role of NCA. Deputy Prime Minister John Manley was designated as the NCA, but only a few days before the event. This last minute appointment precluded Minister Manley from participating in any part of the extensive four-month training period.¹⁸

visual contact with a CF-18 to make the hapless pilot and his wife all too suddenly aware that they were in a place that they best leave in a hurry – which they proceeded to do.

¹⁷ RCMP. *RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report*. ca. Fall 2002. p. 8.

¹⁸ Col C.S. Sullivan. “Canada’s National Command Authority.” Canadian Forces College, National Security Studies Course 5, April, 2003. p.16.

Clearly for future events like a G8 Summit, let alone for the possibility of having to deal with an unpredictable terrorist threat that could manifest itself at any time, a thoroughly prepared authority must be in place and empowered to make a 'shoot-down' decision. Furthermore, should the Prime Minister be prepared to delegate NCA - as he did during the Kananaskis G8 Summit - all potential holders of that authority (including the Minister of National Defence) must be similarly practiced in the procedures and process.

Request and Approval Procedure

The procedures utilized by the SMO and RCMP to request CF support were seen to have both pros and cons. BGen Fenton, points out that:

Of particular concern is the request and approval procedure, which brings unique military capabilities to bear in support of OGDs [Other Government Departments]. Op GRIZZLY, like other domestic operations, did not follow the request procedures to the letter; however, this is not a negative lesson learned. To the contrary, the informal and early practice of agency-to-agency discussion, planning and refinement allows for longer timelines to prepare for an operation. The normal process can take an inordinate amount of time because of the political dimension of some domestic operations. Agencies, which know of their eventual involvement in an operation, do well to begin the coordination process as early as possible to facilitate both the formal process and the subsequent execution of the task.¹⁹

Early and detailed coordination allows the agency being requested for support (in this case the CF) to help the supported agency craft the request in a way that will ultimately better support the achievement of the overall mission. Liaison Officers can facilitate this, but it is through "joint"²⁰ planning – well before

¹⁹ BGen J.I. Fenton, Comd Joint Task Force GRIZZLY. Land Forces Western Area, 3301-7 (Op Grizzly), *Post Operation Report – Operation GRIZZLY (Executive Summary)*. 28 August, 2002. p.1.

²⁰ For the purposes of this paper, "Joint" refers to interagency activities, i.e. RCMP/CF planning.

the formal request is submitted – that this is best achieved. This interagency coordination (if not joint planning) was successfully utilized in the preparation of requests for CF support. Having said that, the approval process at the strategic level, particularly legal approval, was often either too slow or held up approval of all requests for support contained in a letter of request, while one or two contentious items were examined in detail. This may account for C/Supt Hickman’s concern with “this area [which] is focused on the process by which an MOU is amended, once signed.”²¹ He questioned whether it is “necessary to reopen the MOU in order to change certain clauses, or is it necessary to engage in new negotiations and create a completely new agreement?”²² In any case, in a post 9/11 world, it is certain that the RCMP and CF will be working closer and more often than ever before, and the request and approval procedures need to be streamlined to reflect that relationship, or standing broad MOUs should be established.

Interagency (Joint) Planning

It is in the domain of interagency planning, particularly between the CF and RCMP as evidenced during the lead-up to the G8 Summit, that there is the greatest room for improvement. That is not to say that there wasn’t tremendous cooperation between the two agencies – there was – but cooperation and planning is one thing and joint planning is another. Once it became clear that the CF would have integral and unique roles in assisting the RCMP in the security of

²¹ RCMP. *RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report*. ca. Fall 2002. p. 99.

²² RCMP. *RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report*. ca. Fall 2002. p. 99-100.

the Summit, there should have been a Joint Planning Team established. While Liaison Officers were provided to each other, it was not enough to allow coherent plan development. Maj Don Senft, the key JTF planner (J5 Plans) summarized the problem:

While the integration of an LO was of great benefit, it is my recommendation that for future operations of this nature, a truly “joint” planning team be formed...By not integrating our two planning teams, the JTF ended up essentially one planning cycle behind the RCMP. The RCMP planners would develop their plan, making a number of assumptions as to the support available from the CF and its capabilities, then upon completion of that planning cycle, they would “task” the CF for the already integrated support required. JTF planners would then have to begin their planning cycle, seeking authority to employ the assets requested by the RCMP, re-aligning assets where required to better match capabilities to tasks... A truly joint planning team, fully integrated from its inception, would eliminate this “planning lag”...We expended a great deal of time and effort by not integrating these teams fully...²³

Although the RCMP post operation report does not make a formal recommendation for a Joint Planning Team, it does quote C/Supt Hickman as stating, “they’re [CF] very good planners and I think that we can learn a lot from them.”²⁴ Supt Boyd went on to say, “they’re [CF] outstanding, they’re extremely cooperative and professional and the planning methods are something to behold. We could learn a lot from the way they do business.”²⁵ In an interview with C/Supt Hickman, however, he expressed some concern that the RCMP Post Operation Report did not have an explicit recommendation for a Joint Planning

²³ Maj D. Senft, J5 Plans. Joint Task Force HQ. Land Force Western Area, 7370-1 (J5 Plans), *J5 Plans Post Operation Report – Op GRIZZLY – CF Support to G8 Summit*. 5 August, 2002. p.2-3.

²⁴ RCMP. *RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report*. ca. Fall 2002. p. 102.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Team, as he was “adamant that joint planning was absolutely essential”²⁶ for future operations that involve the CF in the security apparatus to the same degree as the G8 Summit. BGen Fenton, when interviewed, was just as emphatic in his recommendation for joint planning between the RCMP and the CF, but cautioned the CF planners to remember that “the although the CF needs to be part of the Joint Planning Team, it is not an equal partner in security planning – the RCMP/SOLGEN remains the lead agency.”²⁷

Finally, although the focus has been on some of the difficulties in joint planning between the JTF and the RCMP, it should be highlighted that the joint planning between the JTF and the SMO was judged to be very effective. In an interview with the John Klassen, Executive Director of the SMO, he attributed this to not only the SMO led Joint Planning Groups, but also to the fact that CF personnel were actually seconded to the SMO to work in some of the key functional areas where there was to be significant CF support to the SMO, such as communications and movement control. These personnel were in fact embedded in the SMO organization and are not to be confused with the two JTF Liaison Officers sent to the SMO.²⁸

²⁶ Chief Superintendent (Ret'd) Lloyd Hickman. Telephone Interview. 6 June, 2003. He re-iterated that in his view, the main reason that there had not been a Joint Planning Team from the outset was due to the initial RCMP understanding of a much smaller security role for the CF on the ground than what actually transpired as a result of the “major shift” in the tasks for the CF that occurred in April.

²⁷ BGen Ivan Fenton. Telephone Interview. 5 June, 2003.

²⁸ John Klassen. Telephone Interview. 5 June, 2003.

Unified Command and Control

Despite the integration of significant CF assets into the overall Summit security plan, the RCMP and JTF HQ were not co-located at the UCC. BGen Fenton clearly felt that this was significant:

Since we are usually in support of the RCMP... in matters of security, we need to insist on a unified command structure and location. This issue was raised early in the planning process but the RCMP could not find a building with the space capacity required to accommodate us and we ended up in different locations depending, once again, on Liaison Officers. Separate HQs unnecessarily complicates coordination, direction and control.²⁹

This position was supported by the DCDS staff who commented that, “a co-located HQ would be indeed desirable in a Domestic Operation to facilitate coordination and crisis management. The fact that it was not possible for this operation should not prevent us from considering the issue for the next such operation.”³⁰

Perhaps most importantly, the RCMP, in their after action report also identified this as something to strive for in the future as well:

If anything was learned in this process it was the need for as much integration as possible...it would have been advantageous to have all managers located in the same facility....This is regarded from the OIC's [C/Supt Hickman's] perspective, as absolutely essential in any future endeavour. Such a facility should also be designed to include the Department of National Defence; the degree of their participation and their importance to the success of the mission was not anticipated at the outset of planning.³¹

²⁹ BGen J.I Fenton, Comd Joint Task Force GRIZZLY. Land Forces Western Area, 3301-7 (Op Grizzly), *Post Operation Report – Operation GRIZZLY (Executive Summary)*. 28 August, 2002. p.3.

³⁰ DCDS Staff. National Defence Headquarters, *Observations on Executive Summary Post Operation Report – Comd JTF Grizzly*. Fall, 2002. p. 2.

³¹ RCMP. *RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report*. ca. Fall 2002. p. 101.

Another challenge for the overall unity of command of the Summit was the different command and control philosophies of the JTF and the RCMP. The RCMP philosophy was very much driven by the 'Incident Commander' approach to security operations. As a result, C/Supt Hickman, who was clearly the 'Commander' (in CF terminology) throughout the planning and preparations, had a different relationship with the UCC during the actual conduct of the Summit, than BGen Fenton had with his JTF HQ. During the Summit itself, Supt Boyd and Insp Gray – the day and night Incident Commanders at the UCC – were essentially 'Commanders' in terms of their authority to make decisions in responding to foreseen and unforeseen security incidents. They were far more empowered than a 'Chief of Staff'. This only became an issue when it was suggested that the 'Troika' of Klassen/Hickman/Fenton should stick together (which meant in the Kananaskis Valley) during the Summit itself, in order to be able to advise each other should a Summit altering (or ending) decision have to be made. While this may have seemed reasonable at first look, once it became clear that the security decisions, and potential requests for JTF assistance were going to be made at the UCC and probably without reference to C/Supt Hickman, it caused a dilemma for BGen Fenton, who ideally needed to be able to co-locate from time to time with the Incident Commander at the UCC in Calgary. In CF terminology, when C/Supt Hickman was away from the UCC it was not in the role of a 'Comd's Tactical HQ.' He had (from the JTF viewpoint) essentially established another level of Command above the Commanders at the UCC. However, it should be pointed out that, while this issue was a concern for the JTF

HQ, it was not seen as an issue of concern for either the SMO or the RCMP.³² In the end, there were no direct problems as a result of the different approaches, but it must be remembered that the structures were not truly tested by a significant security event. Notwithstanding, given the RCMP/SOLGEN lead in domestic and Homeland Security operations, it is the CF and future JTFs that should be prepared to adjust their command and control structures if necessary to remain in synchronization with the lead agency.

Interpersonal Relationships

Ideally the structures, organizations, and interagency procedures will be perfectly sound, efficient, well understood, and operationally effective. However, this will probably not always be the case, nor was it perfect for the G8 Summit. Fortunately, where there were problems, the growing spirit of mutual respect, trust, and even camaraderie that evolved between the players at all levels of the agencies involved in the Summit, tended to facilitate solutions. That example of cooperative spirit was set and observed at the top of the organization amongst the three main principals: Mr John Klassen, C/Supt Lloyd Hickman, and BGen Ivan Fenton. The excellent personal relationships established between these three were key to the success of the Summit, and should not be underestimated as a factor for the success of interagency operations:

The relationships among the Executive Director of the SMO, the officer-in-command for the RCMP [referring to C/Supt Hickman], and the commanding officer of the CF [referring to BGen Fenton] were critical to overall good coordination among the three bodies. The example of close

³² Interviews with John Klassen and C/Supt Hickman confirm their comfort with the Command and Control during the Summit itself.

cooperation, respect and cooperation at the top sets the tone for all three organizations. This was very much the case for the Kananaskis Summit.³³

Interviews with the three principals affirmed the importance of their close and frank relationships to the operation, and John Klassen summarized their almost identical views stating that “good interpersonal relations can make-up for deficiencies or difficulties in the structure and organizations; and that he was confident throughout that there was no serious operational problem that could not be overcome by the three of them getting together.”³⁴

CONCLUSION

Unquestionably the G8 Summit was a highly successful operation from virtually every perspective, including that of interagency cooperation. Notwithstanding, there were some valuable lessons learned or reinforced that need to be formally embraced well before planning for another such operation commences – and let there be no doubt - there will be other such operations with similar security challenges. The requirement for a National Command Authority (delegated or otherwise) to be well briefed, rehearsed and competent in making the difficult but timely decisions required in the full range of terrorist scenarios is paramount. The more formal and less ad hoc this process is – the better.

The security environment has changed, and for the foreseeable future the CF, RCMP and other agencies will be working together more often than they

³³ DFAIT. Summit Management Office, *G8 Summit 2002 - Executive Director's Report*. ca. Fall 2002. p. 12.

³⁴ John Klassen. Telephone Interview. 5 June, 2003.

ever have and on a more regular basis. Regardless of how important and advantageous good interpersonal relations are between the key players and their staffs, the request and approval procedures for providing support needs to be streamlined even more with respect to domestic and most especially Homeland Security operations. Where there is a significant contribution from another agency or agencies, there must be Joint Planning, while still respecting the principle of 'lead agency.' For security operations, the key agencies must have meaningful command and control elements co-located in a truly Unified Command Center. Ideally these three process related lessons learned should be formally embedded in a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between SOLGEN and DND that stipulates that for Homeland Security operations there will be Joint Planning Teams and co-located command and control elements. This MOU must be broad with regard to the type of support that the RCMP can expect to receive from the CF so as not to hamstring the operational level commanders in the CF and RCMP by detail. What the MOU should do in this regard, is to empower the operational level commanders to work out the details of equipment, capabilities that are needed to ensure the success of the overall mission – with reference to the strategic level headquarters (and their lawyers) for only the most sensitive issues. An MOU that covered these three areas would save a tremendous amount of time, energy and angst at the outset. In effect, it would form the basis for the development of more useful interagency standard operating procedures. Not surprisingly, this notion of a broad MOU that covered the areas of joint planning, unified and co-located command and control

structures and most importantly empowered the interagency operational level commanders in working out the details of the support to provide each other - resonated well with BGen Fenton, C/Supt Hickman and John Klassen.³⁵

In 2010 Canada will next host the G8 Summit, and with a bit of luck, the Winter Olympics as well. Between now and then there will no doubt be several other high profile international events that will occur in Canada that will also demand 'post 9/11 security' measures. Canada's recent success in hosting the Kananaskis G8 Summit was due in no small part to the excellent interagency cooperation at all levels, but most especially between the Summit Management Office/DFAIT, the RCMP/SOLGEN and the CF/DND. Reinforcement and where necessary, implementation of the aforementioned interagency lessons learned will ensure that the planning and conduct of future events like the G8 Summit and the Olympics is even more joint and operationally sound. Only then will "comprehensive civil military coordination and timely decision making between the CF and Other Governmental Departments"³⁶ not be a strategic center of gravity, as it was for BGen Fenton – it will instead be a given.

³⁵ All three supported this notion of a new MOU during the interviews of 5 and 6 June, 2003. BGen Fenton saw its value as a "default setting, from which to start the conversation" at the start of the operation.

³⁶ BGen Fenton's slightly paraphrased Strategic Center of Gravity as cited in Land Force Western Area Headquarters. (Ops 174), *Operation Order 002 – Op GRIZZLY*. 22 May, 2002. pp. 1-2.

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