

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

Implications of the War on Terrorism for Canadian Defence Policy and Force Structure

By/par Colonel David Barr

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfillment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Abstract

Implications of the War on Terrorism for Canadian Defence Policy and Force Structure

Abstract

This paper contends that the events of 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. led War on Terrorism have significant implications for Canadian national security that should lead to changes in defence policy and force structure.

To that end, the paper will first look at the national security issues as they relate to Homeland Security and Homeland Defence, leading to a short summary of the domestic implications of the War on Terrorism for defence policy and force structure. In the second part of the paper, Canada's foreign policy in a post 9/11 world will be discussed (particularly in light of U.S. unilateralism) in order to determine what the international implications of the War on Terrorism are for defence policy and force structure. Finally the paper will conclude with an overall summary of the combined domestic and international implications of the War on Terrorism for Canadian defence policy and recommended changes for force structure.

“If you don’t like change, you’re going to like irrelevance a lot less.”¹

- General E.K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army c.1999

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that the international security environment “did not change instantaneously with the 11 September attacks... but America’s perception of the world, and its role within it, has altered dramatically.”² With the United States leading a non-United Nations sanctioned pre-emptive invasion of Iraq - who cannot say that this is true? Indeed, more accurately, it is the United States’ perception of what (and who) constitutes a threat to its national security that has changed its view of the role it is going to play in the new international security environment – and how it is going to act. For the United States, September 11, 2001, marked the beginning of a new world war - the Global War on Terrorism - in which (as is so clearly articulated in their National Security Strategy) the United States will:

...disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:

- direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction or their precursors; [and]
- defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will

¹ Quoted in Peter Boyer, “A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?” The New Yorker, 01 July, 2002, 54.

² Elizabeth Speed (general Editor and one of several authors), in Department of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, “Strategic Assessment 2002” (Ottawa, 2002) 11.

constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country....³

Furthermore, in the same National Security Strategy, it is made clear that the strategy of preemption applies not just to terrorists, but that the United States “must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends.”⁴ Finally, the National Security Strategy of the United States, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, concludes that “the major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed.”⁵ With respect to the United States armed forces, this meant that:

A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur.... We must prepare for more such deployments [Afghanistan] by developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long range precision strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces. This broad portfolio of military capabilities must also include the ability to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical infrastructure and assets in outer space.⁶

The United States, through their post 9/11 National Security Strategy, has, in broad terms, clearly defined the implications of the War on Terrorism for the

³ United States. The White House. *The National Security Strategy* (17 Sep, 2002) 6-7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

security aspects of their domestic and foreign policies,⁷ the supporting military security strategies (which Canada would articulate as defence policy), and has given strategic direction to guide the transformation of the U.S. military and its force structure. Therefore the implications of the War on Terrorism for *American* 'defence policy and force structure' have been determined and to varying degrees are being acted upon. Unfortunately, this has not been the case for *Canadian* 'defence policy and force structure.'

AIM

The aim of this paper is to determine what the implications of the War on Terrorism *should* be for Canadian defence policy and force structure. The word 'should' is used because in the absence of a clearly articulated and overarching Canadian National Security Strategy *à la* the U.S. National Security Strategy, it is difficult to be definitive. Indeed, a partial exploration of Canadian national interests and security issues in a post 9/11 national and international security environment will be necessary in order to make the required deductions about Canadian national security, domestic and foreign policies that are necessary in order to eventually recommend appropriate changes to defence policy and force structure.

To that end, the paper will first look at the national security issues as they relate to Homeland Security and Homeland Defence, leading to a short summary

⁷ Interestingly, the National Security Strategy states that "Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America's borders have a greater impact inside them." *Ibid.*, 26.

of the domestic implications of the War on Terrorism for defence policy and force structure. In the second part of the paper, Canada's foreign policy in a post 9/11 world will be discussed (particularly in light of U.S. unilateralism) in order to determine what the international implications of the War on Terrorism are for defence policy and force structure. Finally the paper will conclude with an overall summary of the combined domestic and international implications of the War on Terrorism for Canadian defence policy and recommended changes for force structure.

CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

The impact of the September 11th attacks and the ensuing War on Terrorism on Canadian national security should not be understated:

For Canada, the implications for post-11 September developments span the entire spectrum of socio-economic, political, diplomatic and defence issues. Canada's geographic proximity, shared border, extensive bilateral trade and partially integrated defence structure mean that any perceived threat to the United States is, by definition, a threat to Canada. Whether within a continental or a global context, post-11 September developments will profoundly affect Canada for years to come.⁸

Domestically, there are two major aspects to the terrorist and asymmetric threat. First, is the direct threat to Canada herself. Second is the indirect threat to Canada should it be used (or is being used now) as a staging area or 'port of entry' for the terrorist threat to the United States. While Canada has not yet been attacked directly by the Al Qaeda network or other asymmetrically disposed enemies, it would be dangerous to assume that Canada will not be (or is not

⁸Elizabeth Speed (general Editor and one of several authors), in Department of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, "Strategic Assessment 2002" (Ottawa, 2002) 11.

now) a target. The case for Canada as a terrorist target has been made in the recent Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Security and Defence, which stated that:

Our lifestyle—so loathed by extremists in the Bin Laden mould—is similar to the lifestyle of Americans. Our economies are intertwined. In a little over a decade these two countries have fought twice in a common cause—in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. Canada may not be the bull’s eye in the sights of most extremists—the United States undoubtedly is. But Canada is clearly positioned as one of the inner rings on the target, and if our country is perceived to be much easier to penetrate than the United States, we will move closer to the centre.⁹

Furthermore, the negative implications for Canadian economic security and prosperity cannot be overstated. Should the United States believe—rightly or wrongly—that the insecurity of Canadian immigration, customs and border security is a threat to the national security of the United States:

[t]he federal government will have to do whatever it takes to assure the United States that terrorists like Ahmed Ressam or Nabil al-Marabh no longer will be entering Canada from abroad and that any of their associates who are already here will be rounded up and either put in jail or deported. Failing this, a continuation of the border delays we have recently witnessed [immediately post September 11th] as the Americans scrutinize everything and everyone crossing their border could seriously damage the Canadian economy”¹⁰

Homeland Security And Homeland Defence

The security response to the identified terrorist and asymmetric threats to Canada, and the reasons for defending against them as described above, will, for

⁹Canada. The Senate. *Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility* (Supply and Services Canada, 2002), 23.

¹⁰Patrick Grady (an economic consultant and former senior official in the federal Department of Finance). “After Sept. 11: The Case for a Federal Deficit,” *Policy Options* (Nov. 2001), 56.

purposes of this paper be grouped under the term – ‘Homeland Security.’¹¹ The responsibility for Homeland Security lies, for the most part, with federal non-military agencies, including the Solicitor-General, The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), The Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Immigration Canada, Fisheries Canada, Transport Canada, and the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency. In this realm of security, with the exception of arrangements for the Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA) and the employment of unique military capabilities such as national-level counter-terrorist hostage rescue and nuclear, biological and chemical response capabilities, the Canadian Forces has traditionally played a supporting role, and as a force of last resort in Aid of the Civil Power.

The term ‘Homeland Defence,’ on the other hand, implies the security responses to the military threats to Canada and North America that were, and continue to be, for the most part associated with ‘Defence of Canada’ and ‘Defence of North America.’ The responsibility for these security responses lies with the Canadian Forces, alone and in conjunction with the United States through bilateral military security agreements such as NORAD.

Recently, with the greater need for significant military capabilities to be used to defend against the terrorist threat domestically, there has arguably been potential for a blurring of the boundaries between Homeland Security and

¹¹ John Mikulaniec. “The Contemporary Security Relationship Between The United States and Canada.” In David Rudd, Jim Hanson, and Nicholas Furneaux, editors. *Vision Into Reality: Towards a New Canadian Defence and Security Concept* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), 40. His definition of homeland Security is consistent with the parameters I have used.

Homeland Defence with respect to who is responsible for what. A case in point is the requirement for the majority of the CF Fighter capability to be employed on a day-to-day basis with the sole purpose of being able to prevent a terrorist commandeered airliner from repeating a 9/11 scenario in Canada. Furthermore, in a post 9/11 environment, the use of CF forces to actively *assist* (as opposed to providing a *contingency* force of last resort) the Solicitor-General and law enforcement agencies in the securing of venues for high profile events like the recent G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, is likely to become the norm - not the exception.¹²

IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM (DOMESTIC) FOR DEFENCE POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE

It is assumed that the responsibility and 'lead' for Homeland Security will remain with an enhanced SOLGEN which will coordinate the security related activities of the other involved federal agencies – including the Department of National Defence. The implications for defence policy and *Regular* Force structure should be relatively minor. There will of course be a need for a more integrated interdepartmental and interagency approach to Homeland Security, but as a recent Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs stated:

The CF is only one component in the fight against terrorism. Overall success will depend on the effectiveness of interagency coordination and

¹² The G8 Summit in Jun, 2002, saw approximately 5000 military personnel deployed to assist DFAIT and SOLGEN in its conduct. Of this number approximately 2500 soldiers were involved in direct assistance to the RCMP including participation in joint military/RCMP patrolling. The Fighter component of the security operation was a stand-alone military operation reporting directly to the National Command Authority – not through the SOLGEN.

on partnerships between these and domestic and international law enforcement agencies. As relevant government organizations adjust to meet new challenges, the CF will need to do the same.¹³

CBRN Preparedness

One of those adjustments will likely lay in the area of preparedness for, and response to, Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear (CBRN) attack. While there is an understanding that this capability must also be developed within other public sectors, the SOLGEN led federal/provincial/territorial formal consultations in 2002 regarding options to strengthen national consequence management capability for terrorist incidents concluded that “DND should have an enhanced role in national CBRN preparedness.... However the role of DND in a national domestic security crisis is not clear, particularly one involving CBRN. It is strongly felt that DND should have a more visible role.”¹⁴ This should result in further enhancement of the CF capability contained in what is presently called the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Response Team (NBCRT).

Reserves

It is with respect to the Reserves (and most especially the Army Militia) that the new Homeland Security environment has the potential to significantly change defence policy and transform Reserve Force structure. At present, the Militia is stagnating waiting for a Reserve restructure that seems more difficult to

¹³ Canada. Parliament. *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs: Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002), 8.

¹⁴ Canada. Department of the Solicitor-General of Canada. *Summary of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Consultations on Developing Options to Strengthen National Consequence Management Capability for Terrorist Incidents* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002), 14-15.

achieve than (and taking as long as) constitutional change. That is not to say that the Militia is not making meaningful contributions, particularly in individual, and sub-unit augmentation to mature missions overseas, such as SFOR. However, it can be argued that the operational capability produced (particularly that which is above platoon level for overseas missions) is only done so at great expense of time, resources, and Regular Force involvement in Reserve training. At the same time, the Regular Force (and most especially the Army) is becoming increasingly burdened with providing security assistance to law enforcement agencies, *à la* the G8 Summit, at the expense of preparing for overseas missions.

A better approach might be to have the Army Militia redefine its roles, and organizations to take on Homeland Security as its primary mission, and limit overseas missions to individual augmentation as an important, but secondary role. This could potentially include all but the most high readiness aspects of CBRN preparedness. Although the lack of job protection legislation has made even short-term mobilization of Reserve units difficult, it is not necessarily a show-stopper. Indeed, the Naval Reserve has already demonstrated its success in the Homeland Security role, *vis-à-vis* the port security missions successfully conducted on both coasts in response to the post 9/11 threat. It is also of interest to note that one of the major recommendations of a United States Homeland Security Task Force was to “free the National Guard and Reserves for homeland security and boost port security quickly.”¹⁵

¹⁵ *Defending the American Homeland*. A Report of the Heritage Homeland Security Task Force (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2002), 77.

Northern Command

The Homeland Defence implications for Defence Policy are in two areas: U.S. Northern Command (NORCOM) and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). In short, DND should embrace the concept of NORCOM as a means of contributing in a meaningful and cooperative way to ensure participation and a say in the security of the Canadian portion of North America. Let there be no doubt, the United States will defend the continent and approaches into the U.S. - with or without Canadian participation. The benefits of participation certainly outweigh the risks of non-participation. This approach would appear to be supported by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs who recommended that “the Canadian government authorities continue to explore with their U.S. counterparts possible ways of improving the longstanding cooperation between Canada and the U.S. in NORAD and in the defence of North America in general, in light of the establishment by the U.S. of its new Northern command....”¹⁶

Ballistic Missile Defence

For similar reasons, Canada should participate to the extent that it is financially able in BMD. Indeed, it has been argued that “missile defence [is] the issue which could make or break NORAD... [and] that Canada’s role in missile warning and aerospace defence of the continent through NORAD would become

¹⁶ Canada. Parliament. *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran’s Affairs: Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002), 68.

meaningless if it did not participate in BMD.”¹⁷ This view would appear to be supported by Lieutenant-General George MacDonald who stated that:

If a decision to deploy the system [BMD] is made, and the governments of Canada the US agree to address this threat together as NORAD partners, we can expect a renewed emphasis on our alliance.... On the other hand, if a “continental approach” is not taken in addressing the threat, NORAD could be relegated to responsibility for only limited and “compartmentalized” areas of aerospace defence, which would result in a change to its overall focus and scope.¹⁸

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

The foreign policy goals and objectives should be derived from the National Security Strategy; but in the absence of said strategy, “in Canada, the development of foreign and defence policy is a somewhat ad hoc process, lacking in detailed analysis from first principles...”¹⁹ Major-General Lew MacKenzie goes so far as to observe that:

In every other country in the world...a nation’s foreign policy dictates its military policy. Well almost every country, because tragically, in Canada, it’s the other way around. Our military policy limits, if not actually dictates, our foreign policy strategy and responses to crises around the globe.²⁰

While his supposition is debatable, and regardless of how foreign policy is derived, or whether it is or is not driven by defence policy, it should have been

¹⁷ Cynthia Larue and Nigel Thalakada. In Department of National Defence, Directorate of Strategic Analysis, “Strategic Assessment 2002” (Ottawa, 2002), 91.

¹⁸ LGen Macdonald (Former DCINC NORAD) quoted by John Mikulaniec. “The Contemporary Security Relationship Between The United States and Canada.” In David Rudd, Jim Hanson, and Nicholas Furneaux, editors. *Vision Into Reality: Towards a New Canadian Defence and Security Concept* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002), 46.

¹⁹ W.D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald. “A National Security Framework for Canada.” *Policy Matters* 3.10 (2002), 12.

²⁰ Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie. “We Need Light, Lethal and Mobile Forces.” *National Post*, 15 Jan 2003.

significantly impacted by the events of September 11th, and the ensuing War on Terrorism. In particular, Canadian foreign policy towards the United States needed to be re-examined in light of the threat to Canada's closest ally and largest trading partner and what Canada should or shouldn't try to do in light of the threat and the inextricable relationship with the U.S. As the United States took the War on Terrorism abroad to Afghanistan, Canada had to quickly determine whether it wished to be *with* the U.S. and in how meaningful a way. With the contribution of a Joint Force that included significant naval and air transport assets; but in particular, included Special Operations Forces and a Battalion Group - all working directly with American forces in combat (or at least combat-potential operations) - Canada made a clear foreign policy statement, regardless of how it was formed. Canada was not only *with* the United States in the War on Terrorism, but she was also prepared to share the risks as well. The recent announcement to not only send a 1500 person force back to Afghanistan for a year, but also to potentially lead the international mission itself – further reinforces what would appear to be a shift in foreign policy that seems willing (if not eager) to continue participation in the War on Terrorism. Even if the skeptic would say that this more recent Afghanistan contribution was a tactic to obviate a meaningful (ground force) contribution to the military action against Iraq, it must surely be said to have been done with a view to maintaining good relations with the U.S.

Hard versus Soft Power

To be sure, the War on Terrorism has not been the sole *raison d'être* for Canada to deploy military forces abroad. Canada has a history and tradition of international intervention, as summarized by Dr James Fergusson:

It is true that the Canadian government has not articulated a national strategy similar to the annual strategy released in the United States. Nonetheless, there is a Canadian national security strategy or vision.... This strategy is grounded upon the principle of internationalism, and begins with the assumption that Canadian security is consonant with international security. Canada's national security strategy is an international one. It is in Canada's national interest to promote international peace and security and in order to do so, Canada must contribute resources.²¹

While the argument that Canada's security can best be guaranteed abroad, is not new, in the past it has more often than not been expressed in terms of peacekeeping, and certainly prior to 1995²², that meant that the majority of our troops on operations wore the UN blue beret. These UN missions, while certainly utilizing combat capable troops, were in many ways an extension of "soft power"²³ from a foreign policy perspective. In recent years however, our

²¹ Dr James Fergusson (Deputy Director Center for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba). "Getting to 2020: The Canadian Forces and Future Force Structure and Investment Considerations." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 9.3 (2002), 23.

²² With the introduction of the NATO IFOR to the Balkans in 1995 (replacing UNPROFOR), deployed Canadian soldiers in "NATO helmets" would significantly outnumber deployed Canadians in "Blue helmets" up to and including the present.

²³ Joseph Nye compares soft and hard power in "Limits of American Power." *Political Science Quarterly* 117.4 (2002-03), 552. He states that "military power and economic power are both examples of hard command power that can be used to induce others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks). But there is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may obtain outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This aspect of power – getting others to want what you want – I call soft power. It coopts people rather than coerces them."

significant participation in more aggressive intervention missions like the 1999 Kosovo air campaign and follow on ground intervention of KFOR have tended to have more of a 'hard power' foreign policy flavour to them. Certainly, it would appear "that the government has a preference for deploying ground forces across the range of peace operations, including war. The current government, in particular has responded to almost every international crisis through such deployments."²⁴ With American preponderance in a unipolar world engaged in a protracted War on Terrorism for the foreseeable future, and assuming that "Canada's national and global security interests [continue to] significantly overlap those of the U.S.",²⁵ it can be argued that Canada's foreign policy will also continue to seek involvement of Canadian Forces in 'hard power' (combat or combat-potential) roles likely in support of the U.S. led War on Terrorism.

Canadian Multilateralism versus United States Unilateralism

The crux of the issue then for Canadian foreign policy in the post 9/11 world is to determine what the Canadian response will be to U.S. unilateralism. In the words of Stephen Lewis, Canada has "a lasting and visceral commitment to multilateralism which is ingrained, and endemic to the Canadian character."²⁶ But that commitment to multilateralism was forged during the Cold War. While it has taken some time to determine how relevant the old Cold War alliances and

²⁴ Fergusson, 24.

²⁵ David L. King. "We Need a Romanow Commission for Defence and Foreign Policy." *Policy Options* (Apr. 2002), 11.

²⁶ Quoted in Tom Keating. *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1.

multilateral institutions would be in the aftermath of the end of that 'war', it is now very clear what the U.S. position is. It does not require the United Nations to validate its actions abroad, and even NATO harmony is seen to be becoming less relevant to the pursuance of U.S. security and foreign policy objectives given the divisions created by the U.S. led war on Iraq. Furthermore, as the European Union tends to concentrate more on the development of its own regional institutions for foreign policy and defence, Canada's participation in the old trans-Atlantic multilateral organizations and alliances will become less relevant to both Europe and Canada. As Jeffery Simpson recently observed:

The U.S. [has] put its faith in its own power, and those old institutions [UN and NATO] are of interest mostly when they supplement or support that power, but they are not essential for using that power. This poses terrible dilemmas, of course for a country such as Canada...[and other allies who] counted on having influence on the U.S. within those institutions....This new set of circumstances leaves a country such as Canada with a starker choice than before. It can integrate its military and foreign policy even more closely with that of the United States... or take issues one by one, thereby reserving for itself a margin for manoeuvring [sic] but risking a growing reputation in the U.S. for being unreliable.²⁷

While the recent decision by the Government of Canada to not support the U.S. in the War on Iraq would suggest that it hopes to 'take issues one by one', it remains to be seen whether any backlash, (internal and/or from the U.S.) will make a difference in determining whether Canada continues to try and go it alone with its trust in institutions that appear to be becoming increasingly irrelevant or less interested in Canada's view – or whether it sees its interests

²⁷ Jeffrey Simpson. "Sleeping with the 'Postwar' Americans." *The Globe and Mail*. 25 Mar, 2003, A17.

being better served in the long run by aligning itself more closely with the United States:

It was an easier world for Canada when the post-Second World War institutions still operated effectively. But the post-Cold War world makes them less relevant to the world's most important country. And it is Canada's lot to live beside that country, as it reshapes its attitudes toward the world and the institutions within it.²⁸

For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that Canada, while not totally abandoning its multilateral tradition, will over time, gradually realign its foreign and defence policy to be more in line with the foreign policy objectives of the United States and its unilateral view of the world. Canada will do so, because it will be in her national interest to do so.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM (ABROAD) FOR DEFENCE POLICY

With the assumption that Canada will seek to continue participation in the U.S. led War on Terrorism, and in a combat capable way, there can now be recommendations (in the international context) made with regard to defence policy.

U.S. Interoperability

First and foremost should be the requirement for Canadian forces to be interoperable with U.S. military forces. In particular, this operability goal is to be pursued with a view to "the dramatic improvement in operational effectiveness that can be achieved by using advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems and sharing information in a timely manner.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

A 'common operating picture' along with the associated decision-support capabilities, can have enormous effects on the pace and nature of military engagements."²⁹ The objective of being interoperable with the U.S. is consistent with the strategy for the future of the CF as articulated in "A Strategy for 2020," which states that:

Our most important ally now and for the future is the United States.... We must plan to nurture this relationship by strengthening our interoperability with the US Armed Forces, training together, sharing the burden for global sensing and telecommunications and pursuing collaborative ways to respond to emerging asymmetric threats to continental security.³⁰

Perhaps most importantly, when one assumes that an interoperable force structure must also be affordable (to be interoperable with the U.S is expensive), it may mean that the whole range of fully combat capable forces may not be possible to field.

Rapidly Deployable

The War on Terrorism reinforces the requirement for a significant portion, if not all, of CF force structure to be rapidly deployable. This capability is also required to support the type of humanitarian intervention missions that demand rapid deployment of forces in order to be relevant and to achieve early mission success. In short, this means that certain forces must be lightly equipped and that they must have ready access to strategic airlift and preferably sealift as well. In practical terms, this means acquisition, or leasing of strategic lift. This is supported by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs

²⁹ Andrew C Richter. "Alongside The Best? The Future of the Canadian Forces." *The Naval War College Review* (Winter 2003), 70.

³⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Shaping the future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa, 1999), 8.

which recommended that “Canada acquire additional heavy lift and transport aircraft...to ensure the strategic and tactical airlift capacity required to rapidly and effectively deploy ...for overseas operations.”³¹ The Committee also supported the requirement for “roll-on roll-off capabilities to provide a strategic sealift capability for overseas deployments...”³²

Relevance to the War on Terrorism

One implication for defence policy, as a result of the War on Terrorism, is that any significant defence policy and force structure changes will need to be justified (particularly capital expenditures) in terms of their relevance to the terrorist and asymmetric threat. This was demonstrated in no uncertain terms in the December 2001 budget that provided some increased funding to DND, but with specific direction as to where that funding was to be spent – the enhancement of the counter terrorist and NBCRT capabilities, as examples. It could be argued that this ‘fencing’ of the money by the government was due in no small part to a lack of confidence that, left to its own devices, DND would allocate the funding to what the government... considered irrelevant capabilities. True or not, the lesson on relevance should not be lost on defence planners.

Affordable Modernization

Despite the defence policy implications of the War on Terrorism listed above, the realities of the federal government spending practices are that the resultant force structure must be affordable. However, in order to be

³¹ Canada. Parliament. *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs: Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces*. (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002), 52.

interoperable, rapidly deployable and relevant, the force must be modernized in accordance with the precepts of the Revolution in Military Affairs – and it will be expensive. Even with the recent \$800M baseline increase to the Defence budget, it will be impossible to keep and modernize all the extant force structure. It is probably safe to assume that future baseline increases to the Defence budget will be modest at best, if at all. Inevitably this will require a reduction or even elimination of those capabilities that cannot be justified as relevant in the new security environment.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM (ABROAD) FOR FORCE STRUCTURE

From the general defence policy implications discussed above, the recommendations for changes to force structure will be grouped as either Joint, Special Operations, or environmentally.

Deployable Joint Headquarters

While there has been an ever increasing desire for the CF to become more 'Joint' in the development of doctrine, equipment definition, operational planning, and information sharing - the War on Terrorism and its imperative for rapidly deployable forces, further reinforces the need for a just as rapidly deployable Joint Force Headquarters. This headquarters must deploy with the interoperable capability to achieve, distribute and act upon the 'common operating picture.'

³² *Ibid.*, 49.

Special Operations Forces (SOF)

It is clear that SOF units have been highly effective in the War on Terrorism abroad:

One of the most noted features of combat operations in Afghanistan has been the extensive use of Special Forces that have not only confronted the enemy in its lair, but also identified targets on the ground for allied combat aircraft. The combination of Special Forces who can designate targets on the ground and combat aircraft that have an easier time in locating targets has worked effectively.³³

What must be determined is how many of these troops can be recruited, trained, and maintained at the high standards associated with SOF units. Certainly the effectiveness of the JTF 2 elements in Afghanistan validate the requirement for that unit to expand so as to be able to maintain a fully capable domestic hostage rescue capability while simultaneously deployed abroad in counter-terrorist/SOF operations. However, it is unrealistic to expect JTF 2 to expand beyond what is planned (still one unit, albeit much larger than it was). The scope to increase the number of units with many of the SOF capabilities desired for operations abroad lies within the recommended changes for the Army below.

Army

For the Army to be relevant in the War on Terrorism it must transform dramatically. If Afghanistan taught the Army one lesson, it was the relevance of Light Infantry. David Rudd states that:

What we have witnessed in recent months [in Afghanistan] is an exercise in counter-terrorism. We have seen the waging of conventional warfare on a country in order to get at terrorists operating within its borders. It is clear

³³ *Ibid.*, 42.

from this that certain conventional military capabilities – strategic airlift, tactical air power, reconnaissance and light infantry operations – are relevant to counter-terrorism.³⁴

In order to best optimize the capabilities resident in Light Infantry and achieve the desired SOF capabilities described above, the three existing Light Infantry units extant in the present force structure should be transformed into SOF battalions (less the Hostage Rescue and other advanced SOF skills that would remain within JTF 2). These SOF units would be more akin to US Army Ranger Battalions (that are members of the US Army SOF community). To optimize their capability and interoperability, these units would have to be affiliated with a combat capable Tactical Aviation Battalion or Wing. Sadly, the present CF tactical aviation helicopter is not combat capable and never will be without completely comprising its utility lift capability. *Combat capable* in this context should mean a Tactical Aviation Battalion equipped with a new utility helicopter à la the UH 60 Blackhawk, with an appropriate number of integral gunships³⁵.

While mechanized units would not be eliminated, the tank and self propelled artillery units would, leaving the remaining Mechanized Infantry (LAV 3), Armoured Reconnaissance (Coyote) and Field Engineer Regiments to be

³⁴ David Rudd (Executive Director CISS). “Canada’s Defence Policy After September 11: To Review or Not To Review?” *The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies: Strategic Datalink* 103 (Mar. 2002), 3.

³⁵ Of interest at the time of writing is the fact that Paul Martin, the heir apparent to Prime Minister Chretien, “believes Canada’s military should be multi-purpose and combat-ready with the capabilities to carry out any task assigned to it. For example, if Canada were to send troops to oversee an Israeli-Palestinian peace plan, then they should have **helicopter gunships**, armoured personnel carriers, hospitals, and all the equipment necessary to perform the mission without relying on other allied forces.” Fife, Robert. “Martin Would Seek Closer Ties to U.S.” *National Post*, 05 Mar 2003, A6.

regrouped into six to nine Tactical Self-Sustained Units (TSSUs) capable of low intensity peace support operations, and selected or mid-intensity operations subject to attachment of coalition Tank and/or Artillery assets as necessary. Having said that, it is envisaged that the TSSUs would eventually benefit from the acquisition of a Direct Fire Support Vehicle (DFSV) capability to partially replace the direct fire capability of the tank. With respect to Artillery, the expertise along with the light guns would be parked in the Reserves in low readiness.³⁶

Air Force

The ability to prosecute the War on Terrorism in a timely and credible way will require guaranteed access to strategic airlift. Whether that means purchase of C-17s or leasing or cooperative arrangements with other like-minded smaller Air Forces to jointly purchase a 'motor pool' of strategic airlift is not the issue, as long as the access will ensure rapid deployability of expeditionary forces.

"UAVs played an important role in Afghanistan and there is now added impetus on the development of such vehicles for reconnaissance and other roles"³⁷ The associated technology is expensive but clearly operations both abroad and at home³⁸ in the War on Terrorism, would justify their acquisition, particularly given their long term potential for replacing (or at least reducing) the requirement for manned maritime surveillance aircraft (i.e. the Aurora fleet).

³⁶ This whole notion of mechanized TSSUs and selective tasking in mid-intensity operations was explored in detail by a syndicate of the National Security Studies Course 5 (of which the author was a member) during the week long Exercise "Strategic Bridge" in March 2003.

³⁷ Canada. Parliament. *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs: Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces*. (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002), 59.

Finally, whereas there is clearly a role for Canadian CF-18s in operations abroad in the War on Terrorism, their first priority is necessarily to Homeland Defence, leaving, at present, little residual capability to employ abroad. That residual capability should be expanded, made interoperable, and armed with precision-guided munitions so as to allow the government the ability to deploy a squadron and the Canadian flag to relatively low risk, but nevertheless combat coalition operations abroad.

Navy

With the exception of the requirement for strategic sealift capability, the War on Terrorism has the least potential impact for additional maritime force structure. Indeed, some of its capabilities, and in particular its sub-surface capability may have difficulty demonstrating its relevance in the fight against the terrorist and asymmetric threat. The surface fleet, with the possible exception of the MCDVs should be able to demonstrate its continued relevance in terms of coastal patrol (Homeland Security) and coalition operations abroad in support of the War on Terrorism.

SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

This analysis of the implications of the War on Terrorism for Canadian defence policy and force structure is by no means detailed or definitive. It attempted, in the absence of (but in much need of) a clearly articulated Canadian National Security Strategy, to extrapolate broad defence policy themes from deductions and assumptions about the impact of the post 9/11 domestic and

³⁸ The UAV capability was employed to great effect during the G8 Summit in Kananaskis.

international security environment on foreign and defence policy. Key deductions included:

- the increased importance of Canada's relationship with the United States;
- the general understanding that, while DND would assist in the Homeland Security effort, it would do so in a supporting role behind the lead of civil agencies and the SOLGEN in particular;
- the intent of Canada to continue to employ her military in combat roles alongside or in support of the U.S. in its prosecution of the War on Terrorism; and
- the Canadian tradition of having a foreign policy based on multilateralism as a priority, would shift over time to a policy more aligned with U.S. unilateralism.

These then led to defence policy themes that stressed the requirement for Canadian Forces:

- to be interoperable with U.S. military forces at home and abroad;
- to be able to rapidly deploy Canadian Forces abroad;
- to be relevant in view of the War on Terrorism and the foreseeable overall security threat to Canada and her interests; and
- to be affordable – even if that meant a trade-off or elimination of capability in less relevant areas in order to modernize in more urgent areas.

The most significant transformational force structure changes proposed

included:

- Reserves being assigned Homeland Security support to law enforcement agencies and civil authorities as their primary mission, with a secondary role of individual (vice sub-unit or unit) augmentation to Regular Force operations abroad;
- Enhancement of the NBCRT capability to support Homeland Security;
- Confirmation of the need to expand JTF 2 in order to allow significant simultaneous hostage rescue capability at home and SOF capability abroad;
- A rapidly deployable Joint Force HQ able to direct operations from a 'common operating picture';
- Conversion of the three Light Infantry battalions into three SOF battalions (modeled on US Army Ranger Battalions);
- Elimination of the Griffon helicopter fleet in favour of a combat capable Aviation Battalion (or Wing) equipped with UH 60 Blackhawks and Gunships (or equivalent capability);
- Elimination of the heavy armoured (tank) capability and self propelled artillery (with the tank eventually being replaced by a Direct Fire Support Vehicle, and the light artillery capability being transferred to the Militia);
- Creation of 6-9 TSSUs with integral mechanized infantry, armoured reconnaissance, field engineers, and eventually DFSVs – capable of low-intensity combat operations and mid-intensity combat operations with augmentation or alone in selected missions;
- Acquisition of (or guaranteed access to) strategic airlift capability;
- Acquisition of UAVs;
- Upgrade of CF-18 capability to allow a squadron to be fully employable in mid-intensity combat operations abroad;
- Acquisition of a Roll-on Roll-off strategic sealift capability; and a
- Probable reduction of the MCDV and submarine fleets.

Assuming no significant augmentation of the Defence budget in the foreseeable future, above and beyond that just announced in the February 2003 Federal Budget, Canada will no longer be able to “afford to invest in a balanced force structure and capabilities as the United States can, nor should Canada or the CF attempt to do so. There will never be enough money, and any attempt to do so will simply continue the linear decline of the CF in terms of its actual combat capability.”³⁹ Although unrealistic military purists might disagree, an unbalanced force structure for the CF is not necessarily a bad thing. The transformation of the CF that incorporated the aforementioned force structure proposals would be threat-focused, but also a foreign policy-based force structure that would be interoperable, rapidly deployable, affordable, and above all else - relevant – to both Canadians and our closest ally, the United States. Yes, there would be some specialization and tendency towards ‘niche’ capabilities, but in the new security environment:

...instead of ‘general purpose, fully combat capable forces,’ Canada needs ‘specific-purpose and specific-capability forces’ that reflect her foreign and domestic policy including her existing alliance commitments. This does not imply a single-purpose, single-capability force; it implies a set of specific purposes with a set of specific capabilities fine-tuned to policy.⁴⁰

In the transformed force described in this paper, influenced by the need to be relevant to the security threat and continued participation in the War on Terrorism, the specialization will be centered on the Army, and while new to many in appearance, ironically it will finally resemble the force that Major-General

³⁹ Fergusson, 28.

⁴⁰ King, 11.

Lew Mackenzie professes to describing in general terms in a paper that he wrote attending a staff course in Toronto in 1966:

I wrote a paper outlining what I thought would be an optimum structure for the navy, army, and air force of the day. I haven't changed my mind.... Canada needs light, lethal, and mobile self-contained fighting forces capable of getting to the crisis area on their own, sustaining themselves while there and getting home on their own.⁴¹

Almost 40 years later, it is indeed a light, lethal, mobile, self-contained and *specialized* fighting force that has the best chance of being affordable and truly relevant in a world and security environment dramatically changed and dominated by the United States' response to the terrorist threat.

⁴¹ Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie. "We Need Light, Lethal and Mobile Forces." *National Post*, 15 Jan 2003.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government Documents

- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Shaping the future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*. 1999. Available: CDS Web Site.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Directorate of Strategic Analysis, *Strategic Assessment 2002*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Directorate of Defence Analysis. *Military Assessment 2002*. 2002. Available VCDS Website.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *White Paper on Defence*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1994.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *2002-03 Report on Plans and Priorities*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002. Available VCDS Web Site.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Defence Plan 2002-03*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002. Available: VCDS Web Site.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Directorate of Strategic Analysis. *New Defence Policies for a New Security Environment – A Select Review of Policies, Budgets, Force Structures and Procurement*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Directorate of Strategic Analysis. *The World in 2015*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Directorate of Strategic Analysis. Research Note 2001/04. *Asymmetric Threats: The Homeland Dimension*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2001.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. Directorate of Strategic Analysis. Research Note 02/02. *NATO and the War on Terrorism*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2001.
- Canada. Parliament. *Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence: State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces: Response to the Terrorist Threat*. Supply and Services Canada, 2001.

Canada. Parliament. *Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran's Affairs: Facing Our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002.

Canada. The Senate. *Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence: Defence of North America: A Canadian Responsibility*. Supply and Services Canada, 2002.

Canada. The Senate. *Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence: Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*. Supply and Services Canada, 2002.

Canada. Department of the Solicitor-General of Canada. *Summary of the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Consultations on Developing Options to Strengthen National Consequence Management Capability for Terrorist Incidents*. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 2002.

United States. The White House. *The National Security Strategy*. Sep. 2002.

United States. The White House. *The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Dec. 2002.

Books

Cordesman, Anthony H. *Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002.

Keating, Tom. *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy*. 2nd ed. Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Kosiak, Steven M. *Analysis of the FY 2003 Defense Budget Request*. Washington: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002.

Rudd, David, and Jim Hanson, and Nicholas Furneaux, editors. *Vision Into Reality: Towards a New Canadian Defence and Security Concept*. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002.

Sloan, Elinor C. *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002.

Van de Linde, Erik, et al. *Quick Scan of Post 9/11 National Counter-Terrorism Policymaking and implementation in Selected European Countries*. Netherlands: Rand Europe, 2002.

Periodicals and Articles

- Axworthy, Thomas S. "Put Some Muscle Into Multilateralism." *National Post*, 27 Feb 2003.
- Binnendijk, Hans, and Richard L. Kugler. "Adapting Forces to a New Era: Ten Transforming Concepts." *Defense Horizons* Nov. 2001: 1-8.
- Binnendijk, Hans, et al. "The Virtual Border: Countering Seaborne Terrorism." *Defense Horizons* Aug. 2002: 1-12.
- Bland, Douglas. "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?" *Policy Matters* 3.3 (2002): 1-50.
- Boyer, Peter J. "A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?" *The New Yorker*, 01 Jul. 2002: 54-67.
- Clarkson, Stephen. "After the Catastrophe: Canada's Position in North America." *Canadian Institute of International Affairs: Behind the Headlines* 58.3 (2001): 1-15.
- Fergusson, James. "Getting to 2020: The Canadian Forces and Future Force Structure and Investment Considerations." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 9.3 (2002): 21-30.
- Fife, Robert. "Martin Would Seek Closer Ties to U.S." *National Post*, 05 Mar 2003: A6.
- Gimblett, Richard H. "A Strategic Overview of the Canadian Security Environment." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 9.3 (2002): 7-20.
- Grady, Patrick. "After Sept. 11: The Case for a Federal Deficit." *Policy Options*, Nov. 2001: 53-57.
- Henault, General Raymond. "Combat Capability and the Canadian Forces." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 9.3 (2002): 1-6.
- King, David L. "We Need a Romanow Commission for Defence and Foreign Policy." *Policy Options* Apr. 2002: 7-14.
- MacKenzie, Major-General (Retired) Lewis. "We Need Light, Lethal and Mobile Forces." *National Post*, 15 Jan 2003.
- Macnamara, W.D., and Ann Fitz-Gerald. "A National Security Framework for Canada." *Policy Matters* 3.10 (2002): 1-28.

- Morden, Reid. "Finding the Right Balance." *Policy Options* Sep. 2002:45-48.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. "Limits of American Power." *Political Science Quarterly* 117.4 (2002-03): 545-559.
- Richter, Andrew C. "Alongside The Best? The Future of the Canadian Forces." *The Naval War College Review* (Winter 2003): 67-107.
- Rudd, David. "Canada's Defence Policy After September 11: To Review or Not To Review?" *The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies: Strategic Datalink* 103, Mar. 2002.
- Simpson, Jeffery. "Sleeping with the 'Postwar' Americans." *The Globe and Mail*, 25 Mar 2003.
- West, Bing. "Rediscovering the Infantry in a Time of Transformation." *Defense Horizons* Mar. 2002.

Other

- A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces*. Ottawa: The Conference of Defence Associations, 2002.
- A Wake Up Call For Canada: The Need for a New Military*. A Proposal by The Defence Studies Committee of the Royal Canadian Military Institute. Toronto: RCMI, 2001.
- Defending the American Homeland*. A Report of the Heritage Homeland Security Task Force. Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2002.
- Metz, Steven and Douglas V. Johnson II. "Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts." *Strategic Studies Institute Special Report*. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2001.
- Martin, Colonel John, R., ed. "Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses." *Strategic Studies Institute*. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2002.
- The Impact of September 11th: An Update*. London, UK: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002.
- The People's Defence Review*: Prepared by The Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. Calgary: University of Calgary, 2002.