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Reserve Roles in the Future

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ABSTRACT

The 1994 White Paper specifies the current regular and reserve relationship and allocates defence responsibilities to both the regular and reserve forces. In November 1999, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) released strategic guidance to align the regular and reserve force structures with the defence policy. This guidance provides a synopsis of reserve roles, as directed in the White Paper, and a reserve force mission.

Some critics, including militia lobby groups, would say that the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 demonstrates that the global security environment has changed considerably since the 1994 White Paper. They would also argue that the government defence policy, including the force structure, roles and mission of the Canadian Forces should be amended appropriately. This paper argues that the current policy and its interpretation within the Department of National Defence, regarding the complementary and supplementary roles and mission of the reserve force as promulgated by the VCDS in 1999, remain valid. Further, this paper argues that all reserve force roles are critical to national security and the ability of the Canadian Forces to meet government policy particularly in the present geo-strategic and threat environment.

Reserve Roles in the Future

Introduction

Since about 1815, with some exceptions[1], Canadians went abroad to fight in wars. That said, "…two generations have grown up in Canada without knowing, as three previous generations did, the experience of war"[2]. When they did go to war they proved themselves to be very capable soldiers. Yet, "Canadians… are not a military people" [3] and they look at the world with great optimism. They have had different concerns and despite the active role that the Canadian military has played in global peace and security, domestic issues have most often dominated public interest. It is not surprising, therefore, that military matters are generally not a government priority. After all, it is inconceivable that Canada should have to be defended or that it is even possible given its vast geography. And in the worse case, an ally would help protect Canada. Even Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier echoed this defence strategy when he advised that the military, while useful to suppress domestic problems, would "not be required for the defence of the country"[4] since the Monroe Doctrine protects Canada from aggression.

With no wars to fight, "…the post-Confederation militia was a social and political institution"[5] and the militia lobby was the key to successful reserve funding and

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[1] The Fenian raids in 1886 and 1870 and the deployment of U-boats in the St Lawrence during World War II are two exceptions.

[2] Graves, Donald E. (ed), Fighting for Canada. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2000, 15.

[3] Stanley, George F.G., Canada's Soldiers. Toronto: Macmillan, 1974, 1.

[4] Quoted in Bland, Douglas L., The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present and Future. CDA Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999, 2.

[5] Morton, Desmond, A Military History of Canada. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1990, 94.

recognition. While the militia had a powerful lobby, their influence did not prevent the establishment of the permanent or regular force (for simplicity, the rest of this paper will refer to this component of the Canadian military as the regular force), which was created in 1883 primarily to train the militia. Unfortunately, the jealousy and suspicion caused by the creation of the regular force remain even today as the reserve and regular components vie for resources and recognition[6]. With this thought, it is interesting to note that while the regular force is excluded from political ambitions, the reserves, and more specifically the militia[7], continue to seek political influence mainly through the prudent selection of Honorary Colonels who can maximize friendly and close relations with members of parliament.[8]

The reserves continue to press active relations with politicians largely because of the successful lobbying campaigns of the past. Thus, it is a shame but not surprising that a militia lobby group recently identified its major threats in 2002 as: "a battle for resources; the possibility of a new untried and inexperienced Minister; and a defence review which further threatens the very existence of the Army Reserves"[9]. Certainly the shift of military strategy in the 1950s to a forces-in-being defence posture was a significant catalyst to the on-going feud. After all, the reserves lost their proud role and

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[6] Stanley, George F.G., Canada's Soldiers. Toronto: Macmillan, 1974, 248 describes the opposition to the creation of the regular force whereas Willett, T.C., Canada's Militia: A Heritage at Risk. Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1990, 56-91 describes the competition between the two components.

[7] The reserve component includes the air, navy, communication and land reserves as well as the Rangers, Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructor Cadre. The land reserve is normally called the militia. The air, navy, communication and land reserves are collectively called the Primary Reserve. The Supplementary Reserve comprises retired regular or Primary Reserve force soldiers.

[8] Willett, T.C., Canada's Militia: A Heritage at Risk. Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1990, 97.

[9] Reserves 2000 bulletin, The Army Reserves Face Major Threats in 2002, January 2002.

respective funding. While the regular force gained new importance, a continuing low government defence priority and fiscal pressures made both components perceive to be poor cousins relatively compared to Canadian allies.

The most recent defence policy, the 1994 White Paper, establishes the current regular and reserve relationship and allocates defence responsibilities[10] to both the regular and reserve forces. In November 1999, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) released strategic guidance[11] to align the regular and reserve force structures with the defence policy. This guidance provides a synopsis of reserve roles, as directed in the White Paper, and a reserve force mission. The Minister of National Defence confirmed these reserve roles in a government policy statement 6 October 2000.

The tragic terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 caused most Canadians to conclude that "without national security, nothing else mattered"[12]. The Federal Security Budget in October 2001[13] reflects the government's agreement. That said, regular and reserve force responsibilities are an appropriate topic of discussion, particularly now that the United States has announced the formation of a Northern Command[14] and the Canadian government has not formally stated its intentions to homeland/continental defence.

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[10] The Minister of National Defence subsequently amended the 1994 White Paper policy on 7 May 1996, increasing the Militia personnel ceiling to 18,500. The reserve roles were not changed.

[11] Department of National Defence. (26 November 1999). Rethinking the Total Force: Aligning the Defence Team for the 21st Century. Ottawa: VCDS.

[12] http://cda-cdai.ca/medialetters/macnamara3.htm dated 27 February 2002.

[13] http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2001/budlist01_e.htm.

[14] http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/.

Some critics, including militia lobby groups[15], would say that the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 demonstrates that the global security environment has changed considerably since the 1994 White Paper. They would also argue that the government defence policy, including the force structure, roles and mission of the Canadian Forces, should be amended appropriately. This paper will demonstrate that the current policy and its interpretation within the Department of National Defence, regarding the complementary and supplementary roles and mission of the reserve force as promulgated by the VCDS in 1999, remain valid. To complete this review, the paper will first outline the current government policy in the present geo-strategic and threat environment and then examine mobilization planning from a historical perspective. The Paper will then highlight both political and domestic considerations and give an outlook for the way ahead including recommendations for consideration.

Government Policy

The 1994 White Paper identifies the three traditional roles of the Canadian Forces: protection of Canada; North American defence; and international security contributions. While the White Paper states that there is no immediate direct threat to Canada it does support a "multi-purpose, combat-capable" (capability based rather than threat based)[16] military force. Finally, the White Paper assigns roles to the reserve force while outlining a new approach to mobilization planning and a new total force structure.

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15 For examples, Reserves 2000 have stated that the September attack proves that defence planning assumptions and policy statements, such as VCDS reserve force guidance, are not valid. Further, Reserves 2000 state that such guidance "… leads LFRR [Land Force Reserve Restructure] to an Army Reserve structure ill suited to respond to a September 11th scenario". See http://www.reserves2000.ca/.

16 Government of Canada (1994). 1994 Defence White Paper. Ottawa: Author, 13.

The government policy directs a four stage mobilization framework[17] clearly stating that the regular and reserve peacetime structure of the Canadian Forces would be capable of meeting specified mobilization stages 1 and 2 vanguard and main contingency force objectives albeit with some temporary (Persian Gulf 1990) force enhancement or reorganization. Whereas mobilization stage 3 would entail "enlargement of the Canadian Forces" or "force expansion"[18] to meet a major crisis or emergency (Korea 1950), stage 4, as described in the White Paper, would be the more traditional national mobilization to meet a war emergency. The White Paper is also clear that the stage 4 national mobilization plans are to be 'no cost' plans until such time as there is a proclamation of a war emergency.

In summary, the White Paper mobilization approach requires a peacetime force structure to meet mobilization stages 1 and 2 requirements. It also requires stage 3 mobilization plans albeit the military peacetime force structure will not be large enough to meet all of the mobilization stage 3 requirements. In fact, there will be force expansion during stage 3 necessitating the formation of new units to meet military requirements. Finally, stage 4 mobilization plans are required but there is to be no incremental (beyond the current peacetime force structure) costs. The reserve force structure was assigned in the White Paper but was later amended by other government

[17] *Ibid,* 44. The White Paper outlines a phased (or staged) approach to defence readiness and capabilities. Stage 1 requires force generation and training whereas stage 2 requires vanguard or main contingency force deployments as defined on pages 38 and 39 of the White Paper. Stage 3 would require "enlargement" of the Canadian Forces to meet a specific emergency such as the deployment to Korea 1950-1952. Stage 4 requires national mobilization to satisfy a Governor-in-Council proclamation of a "war emergency".

[18] *Ibid*, 44.

policy to be 30,000 Primary Reservists[19]. This Primary Reserve, with augmentation from the Supplementary Reserve[20], is to be in the peacetime force structure to meet the mobilization stages 1 and 2 and part of stage 3 (force expansion).

The mobilization approach, force structure and reserve roles are the main issues that are currently at the heart of the reserve/militia lobby issue. On this note, the VCDS' strategic guidance in November 1999 states that the mission of the reserves, as directed in the White Paper, is:

> *The Reserves will, as an essential part of the order of battle,: provide individual and formed unit augmentation, at specified states of readiness, for operations across the spectrum of conflict in order to enable the Canadian Forces to mount and sustain operations; build and maintain links between the Canadian Forces and local communities; and expand as directed to achieve national mobilization objectives.*[21]

The VCDS also provided strategic guidance pertaining to the required operational supplementary and complementary roles of the reserves. The Minister of National Defence confirmed the VCDS guidance in a government policy statement 6 October 2000. However, the Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee (MMC) recently reminded the Minister that he had requested, 6 October 2000, "further consideration of national mobilization planning"[22]. Also, the MMC reminded the Minister that the Minister had stated that the reserves' 'raison d'etre' was force expansion

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[19] The Minister of National Defence amended the policy direction 7 May 1996 to reflect a primary reserve personnel ceiling at 30,000.

[20] The reserve component includes the air, navy, communication and land reserves as well as the Rangers, Supplementary Reserve and Cadet Instructor Cadre. The land reserve is normally called the militia. The air, navy, communication and land reserves are collectively called the Primary Reserve. The Supplementary Reserve comprises retired regular or Primary Reserve force soldiers.

[21] Department of National Defence. (26 November 1999). Rethinking the Total Force: Aligning the Defence Team for the 21st Century. Ottawa: VCDS, 16.

[22] Government of Canada Policy Statement Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) dated 6 October 2000.

[mobilization stage 3] while the reserves would also augment the regular force in mobilization stages 1 and 2.[23] It is interesting that a reserve lobby group also requested the completion of a stage 3 mobilization plan as well as a national mobilization plan [stage 4] stating that the peacetime militia force structure should be increased to 45,000 to ensure that mobilization stage 3 can be completed, with augmentation by the Supplementary Reserve, with no further force expansion.[24] As shown earlier in this paper, this expansion of the peacetime reserve force is clearly not in accordance with the current government policy as the peacetime force structure is limited to mobilization stages 1 and 2. Any uncommitted regular or reserve peacetime force structure after stages 1 and 2 would facilitate further mobilization to meet stage 3 requirements. How then can the reserves' 'raison d'etre' be force expansion or mobilization stage 3? Perhaps stakeholders do not understand the intent of mobilization planning as defined by most allied nations and the fact that reserve force augmentation of the regular force is part of stages 1 and 2 mobilization. This aspect will be examined later in this paper.

Occupation Structure (MOS) review in 1999[25] that found that the regular force structure was capable to meet the White Paper mobilization stages 1 and 2 obligations albeit the reserves would have to augment the regular force by providing up to 20 percent of the vanguard/main contingency force. In theory, this same analysis can provide the methodology to estimate the capacity of the reserve force to provide the necessary mobilization stages 1 and 2 augmentation and estimate the reserve force structure that would be available to provide the stage 3 mobilization base. This framework analysis can be used, therefore, to plan the reserve force peacetime structure and reserve unit roles within government directed resource limitations.

There has been some recent discussion about the relevance of the current government policy and it is understood that the policy is now being reviewed. Some critics would suggest that the world is much different from when the White Paper was written. But what has changed? After all, the White Paper does state that "Canada faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity"[26]. As well, recent geo-strategic and military assessments agree that "a new, stable international order has not yet emerged" [27]. Indeed, the White Paper predicts an unipolar world with many different

[25] Department of National Defence (31 August 1999), MOS Review Summary. Ottawa: VCDS. This review examined the stages 1 and 2 vanguard and main contingency force responsibilities assigned in the 1994 White Paper. The aim of the review was to determine the minimum number of regular force soldiers required by occupation and rank to meet government policy.

[26] Government of Canada (1994). 1994 Defence White Paper. Ottawa: Author, 3.

[27] Department of National Defence (September 2001), Strategic Assessment 2001. Ottawa: Director of Strategic Analysis and Department of National Defence, 15 and (January 2001) Military Assessment. Ottawa: Chief of Defence Staff.

trouble spots in the world. As well, while the White Paper did not specifically predict the 11 September 2001 attack, it did warn of non-traditional or asymmetric threats.[28]

The attack on 11 September 2001 does demonstrate that while no one country or enemy can easily confront the United States conventional military force, asymmetric weapons do allow the means to threaten homeland security. That said, the "…United States has taken measures to respond to the prospect of asymmetric threats to the homeland"[29], whereby emergency measure organizations have been strengthened and the Department of Defence has examined its capabilities to support 'first responders'. For Canada, while the asymmetric threat is slight[30], there remains a chance of "an indirect threat of asymmetric warfare as a result of our interconnectedness with the United States"[31]. On this note it is, therefore, important that the government identify or confirm through the policy review what capabilities are required to support civil authorities or homeland defence 'first responders'.

While the threat to Canada is clearer, there is still little threat to national security. Therefore, it is argued that the White Paper remains relevant despite the 11 September 2001 attack. Certainly, although Canada is committed to the war against terrorism and supports world stability, recent strategic threat analyses, as shared by Canadian allies, also remain valid:

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[28] Government of Canada (1994). 1994 Defe:

> *…the threats postulated reflect only "limited" strategic offensives by hostile powers – offensives likely to necessitate, at most, the deployment and sustainment of the Main Contingency Force, or Stages two and/or three, respectively of mobilization. None of these presents a conceivable near- or mid-term [defined as 3-5 years] strategic threat that would be likely to necessitate Stage Four Mobilization. The threat assessments and strategic warning times outlined in policy therefore in all probability remain valid*[32].

The above section outlined the government's new approach to mobilization planning which expects the peacetime regular and reserve force structure to provide for mobilization stages 1 and 2 operations and be capable through incremental force expansion to conduct mobilization stage 3 operations. The government expects mobilization plans for all mobilization stages but does not provide the resources to fully meet mobilization stage 3 or any incremental costs for national mobilization stage 4. Therefore, mobilization stage 3 is important but given the current government policy and limited resource allocation, obviously mobilization stages 1 and 2 are more important.

The above section also demonstrates that the White Paper remains relevant although the policy review should emphasize the Canadian Forces' homeland defence role. After that, it will be important to apply the force structure, including mobilization requirements, and appropriate resources to meet the new geo-strategic environment defence policy requirements. That said, the next section will examine mobilization planning from a historical perspective.

Mobilization Planning

As stated earlier in this paper, history clearly demonstrates that Canadians, and the politicians that represent the interests of Canadian citizens, are not a military people.

[32] Department of National Defence (2 November 2000), VCDS Force Structure Guidance: Strategic Warning for National Mobilization, Ottawa: VCDS, 5.

The most vivid example of this mindset is the government's decision in 1878 to not invest in the defence of Saint John and Sydney harbors stating that "…it would be cheaper…to let the Russians blaze away"[33]. Yet, "…the history of Canada is filled with military and naval exploits"[34]. Mobilization plans are also not new to Canada. Rather, mobilization plans were used prior to the deployment of Canadian Forces for both world wars.

In 1910, Canada, with some guidance from England, realized the poor condition of its regular and reserve forces and hence improved its mobilization plans to meet contingency operations possibly necessary to meet the increasing tensions in Europe[35]. With these plans and increased military funding, Canada was able to increase its force structure and eventually deploy some 33,000 soldiers shortly after the formal declaration of war[36]. Canada, through mobilization, ultimately made significant contributions to the war effort with over 20,000 airmen in the British Air Service, approximately 5500 sailors in the Royal Canadian Navy and some 619,636 men in the Canadian Army[37]. The Canadian World War I contribution is indeed incredible considering that the "…greatest [Canadian] military effort for over 150 years had not exceeded 10,000"[38].

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[33] Morton, Desmond, A Military History of Canada. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1990, 99.

[34] Stanley, George F.G., Canada's Soldiers. Toronto: Macmillan, 1974, 1.

[35] *Ibid*, 306.

[36] *Ibid*. 311.

[37] Lotz, Jim, Canadians at War. London Ontario: Bison, 1990, 65-80.

[38] Stanley, George F.G., Canada's Soldiers. Toronto: Macmillan, 1974, 313.

Mobilization for World War II was somewhat different. Despite increasing world tensions Canada reduced its army peacetime force structure in 1936 while the Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Navy increased between 1936 and 1939 in size and operational capability[39]. Although "…it seemed unlikely in 1938 that Canada would go to war[40]", mobilization planning, in less than a year, eventually prepared the Canadian military to fight with its allies. In 1939, only 46,251 militia trained compared to 55,000 in 1913, whereas the navy only had some 2000 officers and ratings and the air force had only a limited number of reserve squadrons and a few military aircraft[41]. The Canadian contribution to World War II was also incredible because Canada provided 232,500 airmen and 17,000 women in the air force[42], as many as 21,000 seamen and 229 ships at the height of the Atlantic struggle and some 730,625 men and women in the army to join the allied war efforts[43].

In both these cases it is important to note that both reserve and regular force men and women fought in the wars but it was largely the Canadian citizen, with no prior military training, that volunteered to fight for Canadian interests. Despite the unit battle honors, neither just the reserve nor just the regular force soldier fought the world wars and after four years of full-time war experience it certainly did not matter what profession the men or women had before the wars; the men and women were professional sailors, airmen and soldiers at the end of the wars. History also demonstrates that standing

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[39] Morton, Desmond, A Military History of Canada. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1990, 177.

[40] *Ibid*, 178.

[41] *Ibid*, 177.

[42] Lotz, Jim, Canadians at War. London Ontario: Bison, 1990, 136.

[43] Morton, Desmond, A Military History of Canada. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1990, 201 and 209.

mobilization plans were not the key to mobilization success or operational capability at the start of either war. As Douglas Bland states, "Canadian officers today are haunted by the unpreparedness of the armed services before both worlds wars and especially by the lack of government attention to the military in the inter-war period"[44]. That said, Canada did mobilize when the tensions indicated the possibility of World War I in Europe. In the case of World War II, the government was more concerned with the national fiscal situation than preparing for a war but did mobilize when war proved to be inevitable. While some critics could argue that the war would have been settled much quicker if Canada would have mobilized earlier, Bland provides -

> *...assuming that the government in 1929 had opened the treasury doors to unlimited military spending, what forces would have been produced? There is no evidence that Canadian military thinking was running in advance of British ideas and given Canadian military dependence on British mentors, defence spending would likely have been directed to outmoded concepts and tactics ---horses rather than machines…The probability is that by 1939 the Canadian armed forces would probably have been, like most other forces in the world, over equipped with the wrong weapons, inappropriately trained, and imbalanced between competing services.*[45]

Canada also mobilized for the Korea conflict by recruiting volunteers to fill a 10,000 man force. Fortunately, recruitment for mobilization was not difficult because there were many veteran soldiers that volunteered for service because there was a mild national recession at the time. Also, there was an ample supply of World War II materiel to equip the three new regular force units that fought in Korea. Concurrently with the

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[44] Bland, Douglas L., The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present and Future. CDA Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999, 4.

[45] *Ibid*.

Korea conflict, however, Canada also mobilized when significant force expansion was deemed necessarily to increase the force structure to meet the new cold war era[46].

The cold war, however, brought a significant change to defence policy. "In contrast [to the prior government policy to mobilize reserves or solicit volunteers for conflicts], the policies of the cold war were predicated upon the theme of a short, sharp, intensive war…when there would be little time to mobilize anything"[47]. This new forces-in-being policy, which is still valid today albeit the cold war is over, signaled a fundamental, but hotly debated within the militia lobby groups, change in the resource balance wherein the reserves would essentially exist to provide civilian assistance, act as a mobilization base and augment the regular force. The reserve debate is quite emotional wherein the reserve spokespersons will warn of the "sin of unpreparedness"[48] and the glory and the accomplishments of the citizen-soldier whereas the realists will preach that the "…two world wars of this [the 20th] century, horrific though they were, were anomalies"[49].

History teaches us that while mobilization has contributed to the preparation of the Canadian Forces to fight in the world wars and international conflicts, mobilization planning did not ensure the operational readiness of the deploying units and formations. Rather, history proves that while Canada maintains a small standing military force of regular and reserve components, timely political direction is critical to ensure that the

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[46] Morton, Desmond, A Military History of Canada. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1990, 232-247.

[47] Dawson, Peter F., "Canadian Military Mobilization", Armed Forces & Society, Volume 16, Number 1, Fall 198, 38.

[48] Bland, Douglas L., The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present and Future. CDA Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999, 5.

[49] *Ibid*.

military's operational readiness is achieved. Therefore, it follows that the government policy, during appropriate times of increasing regional or global tensions, should be more specific as to defence requirements. As well, Canadian military capabilities could then be tailored and expanded with some priority to the required tasks but facilitated by both the present regular and reserve force structure. That said, the next section of this paper will consider political considerations that influence the reserve roles.

Political Considerations

Some critics have said that "Canada must be one of the few NATO nations that does not have a coherent mobilization plan to allow the country to effectively man, sustain and deploy its conventional military contribution to the NATO alliance"[50]. These and other critics have also suggested that Canada has not adequately resourced its military compared to NATO standards of defence expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product. Bland responds to these comments by stating that –

> *Canada's policy for national defence tends to be whatever the prime minister of the day says it is. Further, …[the politician and ultimately the prime minister's] judgment …rests on two historic assumptions: there are no threats, and if there were any, no strategy invented by Canadians would address them. Political leaders direct and manage defence policy sporadically from crisis to crisis and issue by issue, free from the fetters of national policy*[51].

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[50] D'Aquino, T., "Paying the Bill", Guns and Butter: Defence and Canadian Economy, ed. B.MacDonald, Toronto: Canadian Institute on Strategic Studies, 1984, 49 and quoted in Dawson, Peter F., "Canadian Military Mobilization", Armed Forces & Society, Volume 16, Number 1, Fall 198, 48.

[51] Bland, Douglas, "Everything that Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-making in Canada", Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century. The Canadian Strategy Forecast 2000. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2.

This frank statement is very much the same principle of the past as proven when Mackenzie King stated that "Parliament would decide what is to be done"[52] in a crisis notwithstanding military plans. Therefore, is it a surprise that Canada does not have a national security policy or that the Defence White Paper is generally vague when describing the military's roles, objectives and military requirements? After all, can the government really predict how it will selectively employ the military in the new global order? To answer these questions, one must consider the "facts of national life" and, more specifically, that "national funds are always limited and, because there are no threats nor any imperative purposes for defence spending, defence policy will be driven by what is available, not by what is needed"[53]. One example of this maxim is when in 1950, the Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton warned his chiefs of staff that they were to closely supervise their staffs because they were "…apt to draw up plans that are utterly unrealistic and impossible of fulfillment"[54].

"The lesson from this is that defence policy will be decided by what is available, not by what is needed. Defence planners have to work within that framework"[55]. That said, it has been difficult within these restraints for defence planners to rationalize the real 'general-purpose combat-capable force' or hard power/defence requirements[56]. Is it

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[52] Quoted in Bland, Douglas L., The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present and Future. CDA Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999, 6.

[53] Bland, Douglas, "Everything that Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-making in Canada", Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century. The Canadian Strategy Forecast 2000. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 4.

[54] *Ibid*, 3.

[55] *Ibid,* 5.

[56] Bland, Douglas, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How, and with Whom?", Policy Matters, February 2002, Volume 3, Number 3. Institute for Research on Public Policy, 16.

therefore practical to even contemplate what would be required in a wartime force structure or establishment as previously referenced in mobilization plans, or is it more logical to develop mobilization plans that document the activation procedure or methodology that will be required to mobilize the reserves through mobilization stages 1 through 4? This methodology based mobilization plan is certainly the approach employed by England[57] and the United States[58] as their plans do not establish the detailed war establishment requirements of theoretically required units but rather their mobilization plans describe the process by which the reserves will be mobilized or activated to augment the regular force. And after all, is not this premise in agreement with the NATO definition of mobilization:

> *Mobilization: The act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing natural resources. The process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organizing personnel, supplies and materiel for active military service* – A-AD-121-AAP/JX-001 (NATO Glossary or Terms and Definitions)[59]

Given this reality and as indicated earlier in this paper, mobilization plans are required for all phases albeit the peacetime reserve force is not resourced by government to meet all mobilization stage 3 requirements and certainly not national mobilization stage 4 requirements. As well, these mobilization plans have to address the mobilization framework and certainly should not address theoretical and hence probably unrealistic military requirements beyond mobilization stage 2. With this in mind, the Mobilization

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[57] Department of National Defence, 1775-3 (Commander Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (London)) dated 11 January 2001, Report on Visit of the Hon. John A. Fraser MND Monitoring Committee on Change. London, England: Comd CDLS(L).

[58] https://www.2xcitizen.usar.army.mil/soldierservices/mobilization/moblevels.asp.

[59] Quoted in Department of National Defence, 4955-7/NCP/E-21/99 (DD NSS) dated 28 July 1999, Report – Exercise Defence Planner – CFC Toronto, June 1999. Toronto: Commandant CFC, 4.

Planning Framework directed by the VCDS[60] should be reviewed and amended to ensure that government's mobilization expectations are met.

Considering the current geo-strategic and threat environment and given government's domestic and foreign policies following the events of 11 September 2001, it is clear that the government requires reserves that can mobilize to meet government's expectations. The next section of this paper, an analysis of the domestic considerations, further supports this requirement underlining the required future roles of the reserves.

Domestic Considerations

It is documented by many different sources that the Department of National Defence is inadequately resourced to satisfy what the department defines as the required peacetime force structure to meet the White Paper's roles and obligations. The Office of the Auditor General, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and the Conference of Defence Associations, as examples, have reported that the department requires more resources. Similarly, the department has documented resource shortfalls in various reports such as the annual level one business plans and sustainment studies[61]. In general these reports document a recurring annual resource shortfall of

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[60] Department of National Defence (11 February 1999), Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence Mobilization Planning Framework. Ottawa: VCDS, provides the strategic guidance and doctrine for planning and implementation of Canadian Forces mobilization through all government directed mobilization stages.

[61] Resource shortfall details can be obtained from the following sources: http://cda-cdai.ca/pdf/opred.pdf, http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoCom/CommitteeMain.asp?Language=E&CommitteeID=155&Joint=0, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/0110ce.html, Department of National Defence, Defence Policy Update – Sustainability, Version 1, 1700 hours 22 October 2001. Ottawa: DGSP and Bland, Douglas, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How, and with Whom?", Policy Matters, February 2002, Volume 3, Number 3. Institute for Research on Public Policy, 36-40.

approximately one billion dollars to which the government has consistently advised that "…over the last three years some $3 billion in additional resources has been provided to Defence"[62]. More recently, in response to criticism from military lobby groups following the Fall government security budget, the Prime Minister recently announced a defence policy review to confirm the government's defence policy. While some resource shortfall relief may be provided through this policy review, history demonstrates that the department has frequently, if not always, faced a perceived resource shortfall and, therefore, the department will have to live within the limited means provided by government. In other words, defence planning results need to reflect that government domestic or fiscal priorities are not defence related and that a resource gap will probably still exist after the defence policy review.

Thus, it is safe to suggest that the department will have to rely on an affordable total force structure to meet the real government defence policy rather than "…the interpretations of white papers as though they were concrete policies …to disguise service … interests"[63]. This means that the concepts such as the current 'general-purpose combat-capable force' definition, readiness levels and contingency plans, as examples, will have to be re-examined without any environmental or component prejudice. With this in mind, one should heed Lord Kitchener when he said that "…we make wars as we must, not as we would like to"[64].

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[62] A government response is shown at http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/InterParl/Associations/RespNDVA-e.pdf .

[63] Bland, Douglas, "Everything that Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-making in Canada", Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century. The Canadian Strategy Forecast 2000. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 11.

[64] Quoted in Bland, Douglas L., The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past, Present and Future. CDA Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999, 5.

This paper agrees with the VCDS that there is little efficiency that can be gained within the current force structure that hasn't already been gained other than by realigning the total force structure[65]. That said, as proven in the MOS review and the current operational tempo[66], it should be recognized that it is difficult to have the reserve force, as currently structured, provide even the planned mobilization stages 1 and 2 requirement. This argument is shared by the MMC when they advise that the militia has personnel shortfalls and training deficiencies[67].

Further to the fiscal situation, the Canadian Forces are mandated by the *National Defence Act* to be prepared to provide assistance to 'first responders' during regional or national emergencies. As detailed by T.C. Willett and George F.G. Stanley[68], this has been a traditional reserve task although this role is not necessarily perceived by some as 'proper soldiering'. In this regard, the reserve force footprint across the country, as proven by the total force deployments to assist the civil authorities during the Manitoba floods and the ice storm, is a significant benefit. Further, the asymmetric threat and a required Canadian homeland defence, although a domestic responsibility, will have to be addressed through government policy.

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[65] Department of National Defence. (26 November 1999). Rethinking the Total Force: Aligning the Defence Team for the 21st Century. Ottawa: VCDS, 6.

[66] Department of National Defence, Vanguard Presentation to the Deputy Minister (August 2001). Ottawa: VCDS.

[67] Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee letter dated February 2002. Ottawa: John Fraser.

[68] Willett, T.C., Canada's Militia: A Heritage at Risk. Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations, 1990, 77 or Stanley, George F.G., Canada's Soldiers. Toronto: Macmillan, 1974, 389.

To this point, this paper has argued that current government policy requires a flexible force structure that meets the White Paper defined approach to mobilization planning. That said, the government has defined a peacetime structure that is limited to mobilization stages 1 and 2 but provides that the reserve force structure should be capable to provide a limited stage 3 mobilization base. As well, this paper has demonstrated that political and domestic considerations indicate that the government will continue to require a military that can deploy to satisfy selective national interests albeit the government will continue to not treat defence expenditures as a priority. Thus, defence planners will have to review operational capabilities, readiness and contingency plans to ensure that assigned roles are realistic and efficient. The next section of this paper will now explore a perspective to define deductions as they relate to the reserve mission, including reserve force supplementary and complementary roles.

A Way Ahead

It is submitted that the inadequacy of the reserve force structure to meet the mobilization base role for stages 1 and 2 and allow for stage 3 force structure expansion is not clearly proven. As stated earlier, a detailed analysis based on a theoretical model, such as that used during the MOS review, could confirm whether the reserve force structure would be able to provide supplementary augmentation to 'flesh out' the regular forces vanguard and main contingency force obligations. This same analysis could also help prove the ability of the reserves to provide for some force expansion. After all, the traditional mobilization base role applies to all mobilization stages, whether it is to augment the regular force during mobilization stages 1 and 2 or to provide a foundation

for stage 3. Certainly the current operational tempo is such that regular force cannot sustain itself without mobilization stages 1 and 2 augmentation.

That said, the reserve force structures in the navy and air environments require closer attention for mobilization stage 3. While the navy reserve has a clear operational role during mobilization stages 1 and 2, there is no perceived navy reserve force structure to satisfy a force expansion during mobilization stage 3[69]. In fact, the navy reserve is not thought to provide any augmentation to the regular force structure during mobilization stages 1 and 2. Similarly, the air reserve requires considerable attention, as there is no perceived air reserve mobilization base in the current force structure[70]. Rather, the air reserve is currently structured to provide total force and transparent augmentation to regular force units in peacetime operations. Surely navy and air environment sustainment will be required during mobilization stage 3 and therefore this requires consideration in peacetime force structure design. When the mobilization base requirement is addressed, government policy and VCDS strategic guidance will be satisfied.

Also, the restructuring of the Supplementary Reserve as directed by the VCDS[71] is equally important as the realignment of the Primary Reserves. The Supplementary Reserve, if visible and effectively maintained, is recognized as a personnel source that could be as effective as when the World War II veterans volunteered for service in Korea.

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[69] Speaking Notes Address by Vice-Admiral Murray to the NOAC Annual Seminar Meeting, The Reserves, Society, and Operational Roles: Comparative Perspectives, 9 June 1995.

[70] www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/organization.

[71] Department of National Defence (November 2000). Sustaining the Total Force: Realigning the Supplementary Reserve for the 21st Century. Ottawa: VCDS.

As such, the Supplementary Reserve remains a key and yet not expensive resource that requires consideration in mobilization planning.

Mobilization planning is clearly required albeit the planning should focus on the mobilization process and not on an unsubstantiated war establishment. In the end, the present geo-strategic and threat environment is such that the five-year strategic warning is adequate to complete force structure planning for possible mobilization stage 4 contingency plans. Similarly, it could be assumed that mobilization stage 3 could require sustainment of the main contingency force but this is an assumption that could only be confirmed by government policy directed to cope with increasing international tension. In the short term, therefore, the VCDS Mobilization Planning Framework should be further examined to ensure that the mobilization process or plan is suitable to meet government defence and fiscal policy expectations.

Homeland and continental defence have to be addressed coherently by government particularly now that the United States has created Northern Command. Surely the traditional reserve role to provide assistance to the civil authority is critically important in this regard. As well, perhaps the asymmetric threat requires more of a military aligned role when considering assistance to the civil authority. That said, clarification through the government defence policy review would significantly explain the reserve force responsibility. Certainly the 'non-traditional' reserve roles, such as Human Intelligence, Civil-Military Cooperation, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence, Long Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Critical Infrastructure or Vital Point Protection roles identified in the VCDS strategic reserve force structure guidance and as planned in the Land Force Reserve Restructure Strategic

Plan[72] are now important roles that have to be considered to meet the new security concern. As well, these new requirements are more aligned with the reserve traditional roles than the pure aid to the civil authority role that has not necessarily been seen as 'proper soldiering'. These meaningful roles, for that matter, can be strengthened even further if the reserves are seen to be 'soldiers first' regardless of military occupation[73]. Besides encouraging reserve recruitment by providing operational roles, the soldiers would have better interaction with their communities than that documented by Willett[74].

Meaningful and practical reserve roles, whether complementary or supplementary, have to allow for a more affordable and operationally capable regular and reserve force structure within government policy. A 'multi-purpose, combat-capable' force can have many interpretations but it is suggested that most interpretations are not affordable. The operational roles of the navy reserve within mobilization stages 1 and 2 have to be a lesson learned in this regard. It is therefore suggested that all planned or present Canadian Forces capabilities be examined in this light. Perhaps the readiness levels of some capabilities can be adjusted to minimize high readiness operational capabilities. For example, search and rescue, artillery or battle tank armor capabilities could be operationally tasked to the reserve component with higher readiness reserve sub-

[72] Department of National Defence. Land Force Restructure Strategic Plan, 29 September 2000. Ottawa: CLS and Department of National Defence. Issue Synopsis: Progress Report to AFC (Armed Forces Council) – Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR), 19 February 2002. Ottawa: Staff Officer Concept Project Management Office LFRR.

[73] Occupations in the Canadian Forces are now trained in environment operations regardless of occupation. For example, all army occupations are committed to infantry training prior to occupational training.

[74] Willett, T.C., Canada's Militia: A Heritage at Risk. Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations, 1990, 191-201 provides that municipal authorities and provincial emergency measures officials did not value either the civil or military contributions provided by the militia.

units on unlimited liability[75], such as those formed within the navy reserve, to meet peacetime obligations. In this way the government and defence planners will not be obliged to consider legislative solutions, something probably as sensitive as conscription, to ensure a timely reserve force response to an impending issue.

Before concluding this paper, the analysis has led to several deductions and/or recommendations that should be considered:

- The MOS Review methodology should be used to estimate the reserve force that will be required to theoretically satisfy government policy directed mobilization stages 1 and 2. This methodology could then be used to establish if further reserve force restructure is required to meet mobilization stages 1 and 2 while providing some capability to provide a mobilization base for stage 3 and while recognizing that the government has not resourced the regular or reserve force to satisfy all perceived mobilization stage 3 obligations.
- The VCDS Mobilization Planning Framework should be examined to confirm that the principles of mobilization planning are fulfilled recognizing that there is no value in establishing wartime establishments.
- A government policy review or statement is required to confirm the reserve and regular force obligations for homeland or continental defence.
- Whereas Land Force Reserve Restructure and Supplementary Reserve Restructure should be completed, Navy and Air Reserve restructure should be considered to allow for a limited mobilization stage 3 base.

[75] http://www.forces.ca/eng/archive/2002/may02/02may02_b_e.htm.

- The affordability of the peacetime force structure should be considered with the intent to incorporate certain 'multi-purpose, combat-capable' functions as future reserve force complementary roles.

Conclusion

"The military have been an important element in the development of Canadian society, and yet the military role has been consistently misunderstood and under-emphasized. Only in time of war or during rare domestic crises have the military been conspicuous"[76]. With the terrorism of 11 September 2001, Canadians have renewed their interests in national security. Therefore, the current review of the government defence policy is quite appropriate as it will hopefully formalize the military and, more specifically, the reserve, roles in homeland defence in the new security environment.

The reserves are a key component of the Canadian Forces. More specifically, the reserves allow the government to address defence issues, whether they are domestic or international, from a national footprint and within reasonable costs. The challenge, of course, has been and will continue to be the optimization of the two components of the Canadian Forces to meet government policy; this hasn't proven easy ever since the regular force was created in 1883. After all, "…no nation, not even the richest, can afford to maintain continuously forces-in-being capable of meeting unforeseen emergencies". Therefore, "…a proper balance between the strengths of a forces-in-being…[regular and reserve forces]… is critical"[77].

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[76] Massey, Hector J. (ed), The Canadian Military: A Profile. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972, 1.

[77] Lieutenant G.G. Simonds quoted in Massey, Hector J. (ed), The Canadian Military: A Profile. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972, 287.

This paper has demonstrated that the current policy and its interpretation within the Department of National Defence, regarding the complementary and supplementary roles and mission of the reserve force as documented by the VCDS 26 November 1999, are still valid. In fact, these reserve force roles and mission are critical to national security and the ability of the Canadian Forces to meet government policy. This is more important today given the geo-strategic and asymmetric threat assessments. The reserve force must be structured to augment the regular force, operate from a footprint across the nation and provide for a mobilization base; all three roles are important. Similarly, the reserves have to be able to provide both supplementary and complementary support to the regular force. If not, any resistance by the regular force defence planners or the reserve lobby group may very well result with a government that is "…not interested in an efficient defence force, as it …[is]…not something that Canada need[s]…"[78] or with a prime minister that will get "…defence advice from his barber"[79].

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[78] Bland, Douglas, "Everything that Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-making in Canada", Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century. The Canadian Strategy Forecast 2000. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 6.

[79] General Miller referring to Diefenbacker and quoted in Bland, Douglas, "Everything that Military Officers Need to Know About Defence Policy-making in Canada", Advance or Retreat? Canadian Defence in the 21st Century. The Canadian Strategy Forecast 2000. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 6.

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