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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES COURSE 4/COURS DES ETUDES DE SECURITE  
NATIONALE 4

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**National Defence Headquarters: Does it Work?**

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## ABSTRACT

The Canadian Forces (CF) and the Department of National Defence (DND) have undergone numerous internally and externally provoked organizational changes over the last fifty years. These organizational changes have inextricably changed the nature of the strategic authority, responsibility and accountability relationships. Certainly unification and integration posed relationship challenges for government, civil servant and military leaders, but significant shortfalls were not really identified until the Somalia scandal and the imposed peace-dividend personnel and headquarters reductions in 1997. Ministerial reforms, directed after the Somalia scandal, have largely been implemented and these actions have corrected serious problems in civil-military relations and the ambiguous authorities residing with the Minister, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Deputy Minister. As well, the re-engineering coordinated by the Management, Command and Control Re-engineering Team achieved good success to meet government directed economies. The purpose of this paper is to show that there are few significant problems with the current Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework; the structure is just about right. That said, the key political, civil service and military authorities have to work together to make the framework effective.

This paper briefly outlines strategic authority, responsibility and accountability changes from unification and integration to the present situation. The paper then highlights several recognized theoretical organizational principles and definitions that are used to evaluate the current Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework. In this analysis the paper will identify a number of strengths, deficiencies and concerns of the current strategic Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework applied by the CF and the DND.

## National Defence Headquarters: Does it Work?

### INTRODUCTION

World War I generally marked the start of concern for formal structures in all large organizations whether they were businesses, government departments or large standing armies<sup>1</sup>. Not to be excluded, the organizational structures of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) and their associated Authority, Responsibility and Accountability frameworks have been the subject of regular review since World War II. David Bercuson states that there “are without doubt tens and maybe hundreds of feet of shelf space at the Directorate of History and Heritage on Holly Lane groaning under the weight of all the documents generated by all those who have looked into whether or not the currently structured NDHQ [National Defence Headquarters] works or doesn’t work.”<sup>2</sup>

Rather than assume that bureaucrats have still not found the optimal solution, one should heed Peter Drucker when he states,

“There are only organizations, each of which has distinct strengths, distinct limitations and specific applications. It has become clear that the organization is not an absolute. It is a tool for making people productive in working together. As such, a given organization structure fits certain tasks in certain conditions and at certain times.”<sup>3</sup>

Undoubtedly there are lessons to learn from the past. Understanding the factors that led to the previous organizational structures and, more specifically, what worked well or

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<sup>1</sup> Drucker, Peter K., Management Challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. New York: HarperCollins, 2001, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Bercuson, D.J., A Report for the Minister of National Defence. March, 1997, 22.

<sup>3</sup> Drucker, Peter K., Management Challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. New York: HarperCollins, 2001, 11.

what did not work well, can help us today. That said, current departmental and CF leaders have little to gain if they conclude that their predecessors got it right or wrong. Rather, it is more important to determine whether the current structure and associated Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework is the right one for today.

The purpose of this paper is to show that there are few significant problems with the current Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework; the structure is just about right. That said, the key political, civilian and military authorities have to ensure that personalities do “not interfere with the effective running of the Department and the Armed Forces” and “to make it [the headquarters] work efficiently and effectively”<sup>4</sup>. In this context, this paper is limited to the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework of the National Defence Headquarters, addressing hierarchical management down to Level 1, that of the Environmental Commanders and the Assistant Deputy Ministers.

To present this review of the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework the paper will first briefly outline “the history of the ideas and decisions that brought NDHQ [National Defence Headquarters] into being” since “the lines of accountability in the headquarters today cannot be fully understood without reference to them”<sup>5</sup>. This section of the paper will conclude with reference to the current Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework. This paper will then explore some theoretical organizational principles, provide relevant definitions and compare the current

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<sup>4</sup> De Chaslelain, General (retired) John. “A Personal Perspective on Command”. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Stephens Harris eds., *Warrior Chiefs* (347-357). Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001, 355.

<sup>5</sup> Bland, Douglas L., *National Defence Headquarters: Centre of Decision*. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, ix.

Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework against a proven set of principles. During this analysis the paper will identify a number of strengths, deficiencies and concerns of the current Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework applied by the CF and the DND.

## FROM THEN TO NOW

All things change over time and Canada's defence headquarters is no exception to this rule. This institution is significantly different from that at the turn of the last century. The nature of the changes over the past 100 years has been driven by frequent and broad-based reviews, and the result is quite unique. Although the seeds of reform predate World War II, the momentum of change since 1945, driven by the desire to "improve efficiency and effectiveness"<sup>6</sup>, has been staggering.

For the purposes of this paper, the change process began in 1946 when Brooke Claxton, then Minister of National Defence, amalgamated the separate service departments into a single department, creating the present DND. While this integration improved the Minister's business, some of Brooke Claxton reforms were contentious<sup>7</sup>, and still more changes were in store.

In 1963, Paul Hellyer, another Minister of National Defence, "decided to make other –some say radical– changes to the structure of the armed services and the department"<sup>8</sup>. "To satisfy the recommendations of the Glassco Royal Commission, to

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<sup>6</sup> Bland, Douglas L., National Defence Headquarters: Centre of Decision. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, 39.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

control the every-swelling numbers in Ottawa, the tri-service wars, and the difficulties between the Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Minister”<sup>9</sup>, Bills C-90 and C-243<sup>10</sup> were passed through Parliament a few years apart. Combined, these Acts of Parliament mandated an integration of the three services under one command structure and unified the CF into “one Service”<sup>11</sup>.

With unification Paul Hellyer intended “greater efficiency and more civilian participation in the unified CF Headquarters under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the departmental headquarters under the Deputy Minister, but he had no intention of amalgamating the two separate entities”<sup>12</sup>. He did this largely because he was actively involved in managing his portfolio and he wanted to keep his advisors in their mandated areas of responsibility. As a result, the new CF Headquarters “allowed him [the CDS] to contribute to the formation of national policy, to plan long-term military force development and equipment requirements, and to control the operations of the CF in the field” while the Deputy Minister “continued to provide financial management, audit capabilities, and political advice to the Minister with the aid of his departmental staff”<sup>13</sup>. If the change introduced by Brooke Claxton to amalgamate the service departments had been contentious, the creation of the single CF headquarters proved to be the true

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<sup>9</sup> Granatstein, J.L., A Report for the Minister of National Defence. 25 March, 1997, 5.

<sup>10</sup> Bill C-90, imposing a single common command and management system for the three services, became effective 1 August 1964. Bill C-243, unifying the three services, became effective 1 February 1968. Legault, Albert. Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces into the Twenty-First Century (Report submitted to the Minister of National Defence). Quebec: Laval University, 1 March 1997, 10.

<sup>11</sup> *National Defence Act*, section 14.

<sup>12</sup> Bland, Douglas L., National Defence Headquarters: Centre of Decision. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, 40.

<sup>13</sup> Bland, Douglas L., Chiefs of Defence. Toronto: Brown Book Company, 1995, 93.

watershed in the history of the Canadian military culture. More change was soon to follow.

When Donald Macdonald became the Minister of National Defence in 1970 he was not interested in actively managing his busy portfolio like his predecessor and grew quickly “impatient with the DND and the leaders of the CF”<sup>14</sup>. Subsequently, the 1971 White Paper, *Defence in the 70s*, introduced another review, subjecting “the DND and the CF to an examination of administrative methods aimed at ensuring maximum effectiveness”<sup>15</sup>. “The Management Review Group of 1972 was [consequently] created in part to end the war between the civilians and the military by integrating them into a common headquarters as a defence team”<sup>16</sup>. The Management Review Group thus “assumed that the ambiguity inherent in the CDS-Deputy Minister relationship was the most debilitating problem” and in the final report the Management Review Group “proposed an organizational fix as a way to define the relationship more precisely”<sup>17</sup>.

Donald Macdonald did not remain in office long enough to implement the findings of the review group. Rather, Edgar Benson, who became the Minister of National Defence in 1972, directed, two months after accepting the portfolio, the implementation of organizational changes recommended in an interim report.

Consequently, the CF and the DND headquarters were effectively welded together “for

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<sup>14</sup> Bland, Douglas L., National Defence Headquarters: Centre of Decision. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, 40.

<sup>15</sup> Bland, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas L., Institutionalizing Ambiguity: The Management Review Group and the Reshaping of the Defence Policy Process in Canada. Kingston: Queen’s University, Centre for International Relations, July 1986, 1.

<sup>16</sup> Granatstein, J.L., A Report for the Minister of National Defence. 25 March, 1997, 6.

<sup>17</sup> Bland, Douglas L., Chiefs of Defence. Toronto: Brown Book Company, 1995, 97.



all practical purposes [into] a single bureaucratic organization”<sup>18</sup>. It wasn’t long, however, before problems developed because the *National Defence Act*, assigning responsibilities to the CDS, was not amended to reflect the new headquarters; thus, “the uncertain legitimacy of its [the headquarters] birth confused and blurred the relationship between the CDS and the Deputy Minister in NDHQ [National Defence Headquarters] and their relationships with Ministers and Parliament outside the headquarters”<sup>19</sup>.

Eventually, extremely vocal dissatisfaction was aired from outside National Defence Headquarters and particularly from the commanders following the amalgamation of the headquarters. Two reports, a Task Force on Review of Unification of the CF in March 1980 and the Review Group of the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the CF in August 1980, were completed in an attempt to resolve the organizational confusion and to appease the concerns of the commanders, the CDS and the Deputy Minister<sup>20</sup>. These reports and the associated measures taken to resolve reported problems, however, did not address the heart of the headquarters-amalgamation problems and ambiguity remained until after the Somalia scandal in the autumn 1993.

Several issues, surrounding the deployment to Somalia and directly connected to the distribution of responsibility in National Defence Headquarters, were investigated extensively and the Commission of Inquiry documented numerous problems and made

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<sup>18</sup> Treddenick, John M., “The Defence Budget”. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (eds.), *Canada’s International Security Policy* (413-454). Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1995, 443.

<sup>19</sup> Bland, Douglas L., *National Defence Headquarters: Centre of Decision*. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, 40.

<sup>20</sup> Detailed accounts of the process resulting with the final reports are described in Douglas Bland’s *Chiefs of Defence*. Toronto: Brown Book Company, 1995, 101-122.

corresponding recommendations.<sup>21</sup> Armed with these results and several other independently commissioned reports, Doug Young, the Minister of National Defence in 1997, directed reforms to correct deficiencies, which included clarifying authority, responsibility and accountability in National Defence Headquarters, arguably caused by the amalgamation of the headquarters in 1972.<sup>22</sup> With this direction, the Minister had a difficult decision as to whether he would reverse the amalgamation of the headquarters as recommended in several ‘Reports for the Minister’ or alternately, whether he would attempt to clarify the ambiguity in authority, responsibility and accountability caused by the amalgamation of the headquarters. In the end and after some consideration, the Minister decided in favor of an integrated headquarters in which authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities would be clearly distinct. Therefore, he requested changes to the headquarters’ authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities by directing:

- the clarification of the “Deputy Minister and the CDS accountability among senior staff along lines of primary responsibility<sup>23</sup>”; and
- the “issue of a guidance document entitled Authority, Responsibility and Accountability to help our military and civilian personnel better understand how the work of National Defence is conducted and the role they play”<sup>24</sup>.

To satisfy the Minister’s direction the CDS and the Deputy Minister later approved the publication of *Organization and Accountability– Guidance for Members of*

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<sup>21</sup> Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Dishonoured Legacy – The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997.

<sup>22</sup> Department of National Defence. (March 1997). Minister of National Defence Report on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces. Ottawa: Minister of National Defence.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

*the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence* in September 1999<sup>25</sup>. This policy direction will be examined in detail later in this paper.

Concurrent, but unrelated to the Somalia scandal, the government was anxious to bring the federal deficit under control. Using the so-called “peace dividend” as justification, the government made dramatic cuts to the defence budget. In response to these budget cuts, changing organizational responsibilities and the subsequent *1994 Defence White Paper*, a Management, Command and Control Re-engineering team (MCCRT) was established in 1994.

While the MCCR initiative was tasked to achieve significant resource reductions it also examined the headquarters organization in an attempt to improve efficiency and reduce the overhead of the command and control structure. MCCRT toiled with the difficult re-engineering task for three years and in July 1997 the remaining renewal responsibilities were transferred to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS). “In his overview of the MCCRT history, Acting Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, MGen L. Campbell, writing in June 1997 described the MCCR initiative as an unparalleled project in the history of the DND and the CF. Not since unification has the organization undergone such dramatic change”<sup>26</sup>. He also advised that MCCRT had succeeded in achieving the required resource reductions but that “it would not be clear for some time

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<sup>25</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author.

<sup>26</sup> Sharpe, BGen (retired) G.E. & English, Allan. (28 June 2001) Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces (Report prepared for the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff), 13.

whether the ultimate integrity of the headquarters as a functioning command and control system would survive the cuts”<sup>27</sup>.

The 1999 Chief of Review Services’ (CRS) review of the MCCR supports the critical assessment of others. Specifically, the CRS report notes that the MCCRT achieved some success, but it also concludes there is “a general belief that re-engineering that crosses organizational boundaries has been limited” and that problems “still exist with respect to stabilizing the Defence Management System and clarifying the relationships between the ECSs [environmental chiefs of staff] and central service providers<sup>28</sup>”. The CRS report also recognized that there were lingering problems such as “the relationships between organization and process owners and lateral accountability...”<sup>29</sup>.

Recognizing the importance of the issues reported by CRS, further reviews and initiatives were commissioned to correct deficiencies in the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework. This work, which included analyses of command and control in the CF and horizontal accountability, will be discussed later in this paper.

The 1999 publication of the *Organization and Accountability– Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence* reflects the current Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework within National Defence Headquarters. Unfortunately the document, although amended from the first edition published in March 1997, does not reflect recent amendments to the

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Department of National Defence. (May 1999). NDHQ 99: Review of Restructuring and Re-engineering, Vol 1. Ottawa: Chief of Review Services, 8/15.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

organizational restructure, such as the recently assigned responsibilities of the Associate Deputy Minister. That said, the document is a description of “the laws and constitutional principles that underpin”<sup>30</sup> the authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities of the Minister, the Deputy Minister and the CDS. This document will, therefore, serve as this paper’s basis of analysis of the current framework against acceptable organizational or authority, responsibility and accountability principles.

## ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

The Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework must be compliant with the law, the *National Defence Act*. This paper will certainly attempt to highlight any problems in this regard. The purpose of this paper, however, is to show that there are few significant problems with the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework. Therefore, the paper will highlight the strengths, deficiencies and concerns of the current headquarters structure or framework. Therefore, to meet this aim, some fundamental management principles will be used to analyze management issues that require attention.

Principles. As explained by Henry Mintzberg, organizational charts reflect a simplistic description of how formal vertical authority flows through an organization. To fully appreciate the effective organizational structure, however, one has to consider “the power and communication relationships that are not put down on paper”<sup>31</sup>. In fact, the five parts of any “organization -operating core, strategic apex, middle line,

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<sup>30</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author.

<sup>31</sup> Mintzberg, Henry. The Structuring of Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979, 36.

technostructure, and support staff - ... are joined together by different flows of authority, of work material, of information, and of decision processes”<sup>32</sup>.

With this in mind, one should consider bureaucracies to be organizations that rely on formal behavior in response to vertical and horizontal authority. In fact, Mintzberg defines “a structure as bureaucratic - centralized or not – to the extent that its behavior is predetermined or predictable, in effect, standardized”<sup>33</sup>. Accepting Mintzberg’s definition, National Defence Headquarters is a bureaucracy, the form of which has changed over time.<sup>34</sup>

Max Weber, a German sociologist, “described bureaucracy as an ‘ideal’ type of structure, ‘ideal’ meaning not perfect but pure”<sup>35</sup>. Weber provided the characteristics or principles of this pure structure, which were later studied by Derek Pugh when he investigated whether the ‘ideal’ structure existed in the real world. Mintzberg, and more recently, Peter Drucker also provide characteristics or principles of bureaucracies. Table 1 reflects a synopsis of these four different opinions of the principles of a bureaucracy.

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, 35.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, 86.

<b>Weber</b> <sup>36 37</sup>	<b>Pugh</b> <sup>38</sup>	<b>Mintzberg</b> <sup>39</sup>	<b>Drucker</b> <sup>40</sup>
Fixed Jurisdictions	Specialization	Division of Labour Specialization	
Office Hierarchy		Hierarchy Chain of Command	Chain of Command One boss
System of Abstract Rules	Standardization Formalization	Formalization	
Modern Management		Regulate Communication	Flat Structures
Efficient Administration		Standardized skills	
			Transparent

Table 1. Documented Principles of Bureaucracy

While there are many other versions or descriptions of bureaucracies it is clear that many of the principles documented over the last fifty years have common threads of reasoning. It is also clear that these principles “do not tell what to do. They only tell us what not to do”<sup>41</sup>. The elements outlined in Table 1 and the explanations and concepts

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, 85.

<sup>37</sup> Blau, Peter M. & Meyer, Marshall W. (1976). “Theory and Development of Bureaucracy”. In the Associates, Office of Military leadership, United States Military Academy (eds.), A Study of Organizational Leadership (441-459). Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 442.

<sup>38</sup> Mintzberg, Henry. The Structuring of Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979, 85.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>40</sup> Drucker, Peter K., Management Challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. New York: HarperCollins, 2001, 13.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*.

provided by these subject matter experts are correlated, for purposes of this paper, into the following principles:

- Division of Labor. This principle concerns the division of labor or a clear jurisdiction within the headquarters. An effective division of labor will ensure that activities are completed without redundancy or duplication.
- Chain of Command (or line of Departmental authority and accountability). This principle concerns the clear system of authority concerning supervision and subordination. In other words, personnel are accountable to their superiors for assigned responsibilities whereas the superiors have the authority to issue direction to their subordinates. The authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities should be transparent and easily understood.
- Rules-Based. This principle concerns clear directives, orders, rules, procedures and instructions.
- Effective Administration. This principle concerns modern administration and office management. This principle also requires appropriate attention to training, effective communication and business management.

Implementing these principles purely we could theoretically create a completely effective bureaucracy where “precisely defined jobs [are] organized in a hierarchical manner through precisely defined lines of command or communication ... reconciling the contrary requirements of centralization and decentralization to preserve an appropriate flexibility in different parts of large organizations”<sup>42</sup>. Gareth Morgan warns, however, that this mechanical approach could produce an organization that is unable to adapt to

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<sup>42</sup> Morgan, Gareth. Images of Organization – The Executive Edition. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler and Sage Publications, 1998, 25.



change and a self-serving “mindless bureaucracy”<sup>43</sup> that underestimates the human dimension. For example, a pure bureaucracy intentionally does not account for human nature where the individual needs to be “enriched” to achieve innovation or for the varying values or cultures that exist in every organization or sub-organizational<sup>44</sup> and which need to be managed. In this sense, the above principles can only then guide us to understand the symptoms of problems or issues in organizations.

Definitions. The 1999 publication of the *Organization and Accountability—Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence* provides explanations for the terms: authority, responsibility and accountability, as used in the defence establishment. More specifically, the document provides that,

“Having a responsibility involves having the authority and the obligation to act, including the authority to direct or authorize others to act. It also means being accountable for how those responsibilities have been carried out in light of agreed expectations. In a public sector organization such as the CF or the DND, each individual is obliged to account fully and promptly to those who, in the hierarchy, conferred the responsibilities, for the way they have been carried out and for how the relevant authorities have been used”<sup>45</sup>.

The document provides a very precise expectation of what accountability means to every individual in the DND or the CF. The policy states that all members are accountable for their actions and the results of their actions. It also provides that individuals who occupy positions of authority are accountable for those for whom they are responsible and they

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<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, 32.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, 111- 146.

<sup>45</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author, section IV.

should provide appropriate direction to regulate the expected results of their organization. And finally, the document explains the requirement for horizontal authority, responsibility and accountability because of horizontal relationships (or work “cliques”<sup>46</sup>) and vertical and horizontal decentralization.

It should be noted that these explanations or definitions satisfy the proposed explanations or definitions and address the concerns documented in several of the reports<sup>47</sup> that were commissioned by Doug Young, the Minister of National Defence in 1997 and in the Somalia Commission of Inquiry report<sup>48</sup>.

Analysis of the Minister’s Authority, Responsibility and Accountability. The Minister is responsible to Parliament for those duties assigned in his/her portfolio. Although the Westminster system of Cabinet government binds the Minister, and in fact all Cabinet Ministers, to Cabinet solidarity, the Minister is accountable to Parliament under the law for assigned government policies and programs.

The Minister of National Defence is also legally responsible and “is accountable to Parliament for the administration of the *National Defence Act*, the *Emergencies Act*, the *Emergency Preparedness Act*, the *Visiting Forces Act*, the *Aeronautics Act* (in relation to Defence), the *Canadian Forces Superannuation Act*, the *Garnishment*

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<sup>46</sup> Mintzberg, Henry. The Structuring of Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979, 53.

<sup>47</sup> Schafer, Arthur. The Buck Stops Here - Reflections on Moral Responsibility, Democratic Accountability and Military Values. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, 3-9; Bercuson, D.J., A Report for the Minister of National Defence. March 25, 1997, 19; and Bland, Douglas L., National Defence Headquarters: Centre of Decision. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, 47-60.

<sup>48</sup> Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Dishonoured Legacy – The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997, Volume II Chapter 16.

*Attachment and Pension Diversion Act*, and the *Pension Benefit Division Act*<sup>49</sup>. The Minister is also responsible for other legislation, such as the *Constitution*, including the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and the *Financial Administration Act* that apply to any department or any Canadian citizen.

Under these acts the Minister of National Defence is responsible for the proper management and direction of the DND and the CF. The Minister, therefore, is ultimately accountable for the actions or results of actions of the DND and CF officials. As such, the civil authority, as practiced by most, if not all, Western democracies, retains firm control of the subordinate military establishment<sup>50</sup>.

As suggested earlier in this paper, Brooke Claxton had a significant workload managing both the legal and political aspects of his portfolio, despite having amalgamated the separate service departments into one defence department. Under Paul Hellyer, the portfolio workload was somewhat less because he only had to work with a unified CF Headquarters under the CDS and the departmental headquarters under the Deputy Minister. But under Edgar Benson the amalgamation of the CF Headquarters and the DND staffs was expected to simplify the Minister's workload by compelling the CDS and Deputy Minister to provide a coordinated leadership and management of the CF and the DND from a single office. This notion, of course, does not suggest that the Minister's authority, responsibility and accountability had changed over this time; certainly the law has not changed fundamentally since 1951. Rather, it meant that the Minister simply had

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<sup>49</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author, Section II.

<sup>50</sup> Bland, Douglas L., "Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations". Armed Forces & Society, Vol 27, No 4 (Summer 2001), 532.

two principal advisors who were charged to lead and manage the department and the CF without an organization based in law or custom to define who did what to whom. Doug Young addressed this ambiguity when he directed the clarification of the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework.

While these civil-military relations are appropriate for Canada, there are concerns that the Minister of National Defence, today, has to constantly manage.<sup>51</sup> Policy development and control specifically are major concerns complicated by the new integrated headquarters in that the Minister has to rely on advice and control from both the CDS and the Deputy Minister. After all, the CDS, who is appointed by Governor-in-Council, shares responsibility with the Minister, for the formulations and implementation of defence policy “to provide a reasonable assurance of national defence [which] is a responsibility derived from the people of Canada...”<sup>52</sup>. While the present construct eases the Minister’s workload it does require that the CDS and the Deputy Minister work together to provide harmonious advice and coordinated policy control. Collegiality is usually is not a problem and for the most part differences can be resolved. But this does not absolve the Minister from ensuring that both the CDS and the Deputy Minister act within their legal responsibilities. Nor does it absolve the Prime Minister, Cabinet, the Minister and Parliament from making final, sometimes difficult decisions, no matter the advice of both the CDS and the Deputy Minister.

The Somalia scandal highlighted other concerns or problems in the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework. With Ministerial direction, measures have

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<sup>51</sup> Bland, Douglas L., “Who Decides What? Civil-Military Relations in Canada and the United States”. Canadian-American Public Policy, No 41 (February 2000), 10-13.

<sup>52</sup> Bland, Douglas L., Chiefs of Defence. Toronto: Brown Book Company, 1995, 129.

been taken to resolve these problems. For example, Ministerial oversight, conditioned by advice from “whiz kids or

Analysis of the CDS, Deputy Minister and Associate Deputy Minister's Authority, Responsibility and Accountability. Both the CDS and the Deputy Minister's authorities are defined in the *National Defence Act*. They are also both appointed by the Governor-in-Council<sup>54</sup> on the advice of the Prime Minister. While they have separate and clear authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities in law and regulations, together they contribute to the leadership and management of the CF and the department on the behalf of the Minister. That said, it is clear that the CF and the department are two separate entities and, in this manner, the headquarters is quite unique.<sup>55</sup> Because of this complex uniqueness, ambiguity, caused by the integration of the department and the CF, has been an issue of repeated and vocal concern and misunderstanding.

CDS. The CDS is clearly responsible for the command<sup>56</sup>, "control and administration of the CF"<sup>57</sup>. The CDS is also responsible to advise the Minister of National Defence and, if necessary, the Prime Minister and Cabinet on all military requirements, capabilities, operations and appropriate defence policy matters or issues. The *National Defence Act* also states that all orders to the CF members will be issued through or by the CDS. This means that the CDS issues orders to the CF to implement government or ministerial direction or policy and that the CDS is accountable to the

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<sup>54</sup> *National Defence Act*, sections 7 and 18(1).

<sup>55</sup> Bland, Douglas L., The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985. Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987, 90-93.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, 89.

<sup>57</sup> *National Defence Act*, section 18(1).

government “for the conduct of CF activities, as well as for the readiness of the Forces and their ability to fulfill the military commitments and obligations of the government”<sup>58</sup>.

Deputy Minister. The Deputy Minister supports the Minister by providing policy advice while managing the department on behalf of the Minister. More precisely, the Deputy Minister provides advice on the “means of achieving government objectives, and on implementing effectively the government’s policies and programs”<sup>59</sup>. He also manages the department ensuring that all Canadian law, government policy and delegated authorities are respected. With this in mind, the Deputy Minister “is an important link for the Minister to the wider government machinery for policy development and decision-making”<sup>60</sup> and, therefore, participates in numerous interdepartmental coordination committees.

Associate Deputy Minister. On 5 February 2001, the Prime Minister announced the creation of an Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP). He further advised that the Minister of National Defence would be responsible for the organization but that an Associate Deputy Minister would lead the new organization. As noted earlier in this paper, the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework does not yet reflect this new position and, therefore, it is appropriate to comment on the Associate Deputy Minister’s mandate.

The Associate Deputy Minister’s authorities are initially limited to forming an office combining “the federal government’s traditional emergency preparedness role with

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<sup>58</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author, Section III.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

new work focused on enhancing the protection of Canada's critical infrastructure from disruption and destruction"<sup>61</sup>. However, one would expect that the Associate Deputy Minister would, in all respects, be bound by the standing Authority, Responsibility and Accountability policy.

Prior to 1972 the roles of the CDS and the Deputy Minister were clear. When Paul Hellyer unified the CF it allowed the CDS to effectively command and administer the CF thus simplify the Minister's job by eliminating competing centers of power and authority. It also allowed the CDS to work with the Minister and the Deputy Minister to facilitate a top-down defence policy. This didn't mean that there weren't differences of opinion that were highlighted particularly when the CF headquarters and the department staffs were amalgamated in 1972.<sup>62</sup> Despite these issues, however, the headquarters structure did not change substantially, for the purpose of this paper, from 1972 until the Somalia scandal occurred and the MCCRT introduced major changes to the size and composition of the headquarters in 1997.

The ambiguity in accountability, since the headquarters amalgamation in 1972, was stressed in several reports to the Minister following the Somalia scandal. As stated earlier, the 1999 publication of the *Organization and Accountability– Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence*, in response to Ministerial direction following the Somalia scandal, did clarify authority, responsibility and accountability within the headquarters. In other words, the document

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<sup>61</sup> Purdy, Margaret, DMC Retreat 14-25 March 2001 Speaking Notes, Ottawa.

<sup>62</sup> More information regarding the concerns of the service chiefs, the CDS and the Deputy Minister are highlighted in Bland, Douglas L., *Chiefs of Defence*. Toronto: Brown Book Company, 1995, Chapter 4.



clarified the ambiguity that had been institutionalized with amalgamation in 1972<sup>63</sup>.

Reviewing this guidance with the principles developed for the purposes of this paper to review the authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities does highlight that there are still nagging issues that require continuous attention by the CDS and Deputy Minister.

For example, as stated earlier, only the CDS can issue orders to members of the CF. It is also clear that the CDS and the Deputy Minister are jointly responsible for the Government Security Policy<sup>64</sup>. Despite this joint responsibility, the Deputy Minister recently and unilaterally directed that the Associate Deputy Minister would coordinate interdepartmental representation for intelligence and security, work with other departments for threat assessments and response coordination and work with the appropriate authorities to develop the recently amended Government Security Policy.<sup>65</sup> Clearly this Deputy Minister direction is not appropriate, as it appears to violate both government policy and the *National Defence Act*. In effect, the Deputy Minister assigned responsibilities to the Associate Deputy Minister, with no clear indication that the CDS concurred with the direction, to develop and implement new government policy for which the CDS is jointly, with the Deputy Minister, responsible. As well, the Deputy Minister circumvented the authority and responsibility of the CDS, improperly and

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<sup>63</sup> Bland, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas L., Institutionalizing Ambiguity: The Management Review Group and the Reshaping of the Defence Policy Process in Canada. Kingston: Queen's University, Centre for International Relations, July 1986.

<sup>64</sup> Note that this joint responsibility had been also incorporated in the policy that was subsequently replaced with a new policy - Government of Canada. (1 February 2002) Government Security Policy. Ottawa: Author.

<sup>65</sup> Department of National Defence. (3 July 2001). Responsibilities of the Associate Deputy Minister - Appointment of Assistant Deputy Minister (Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness). Ottawa: J. Judd.

indirectly, by issuing direction to members of the CF to support the Associate Deputy Minister with regards to these intelligence and security coordination responsibilities.

Admittedly, this one example does not indicate a major recurring problem. However, it does mean that while the principle of accountability, as documented<sup>66</sup> (of military members' accountability to the Deputy Minister, and the civilian members' accountability to the CDS) is clearer, the CDS and Deputy Minister have to remain vigilant to respect government policy and custom, and Canadian law. This, therefore, means that while the CDS and Deputy Minister should minimize jointly-signed direction to the CF and the DND<sup>67</sup>, there should be no doubt that there is a requirement for some joint direction or alternately, that cooperative direction should be released by both offices. As well, the specific problem of the Associate Deputy Minister's responsibilities should be addressed, as soon as possible, by documenting her responsibilities in the formal Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework.

Most other responsibilities outlined in the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework are clear and appropriate considering the principles developed for the purposes of this paper. However, there is a second issue that requires continuous attention by both the CDS and the Deputy Minister and this issue involves defence policy. Both the CDS and the Deputy Minister are responsible to advise the Minister. As stated earlier, the headquarters is unique in this regard. While, the Deputy Minister

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<sup>66</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author, Section III.

<sup>67</sup> Department of National Defence. (March 1997). Minister of National Defence Report on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces. Ottawa: Minister of National Defence.

certainly has a “central”<sup>68</sup> role in formulating advice for the Minister on government policy and programs, the CDS, on the other hand, is also responsible to provide military advice to the Minister. It is recognized that a tension may exist between the two officials and their responsibilities but it can be reduced and controlled if their expert advice is restricted to their expertise and they resist meddling with unsubstantiated opinion. Alternately, while joint or cooperative advice to the Minister would be ideal, it is recognized that this will not always be possible and, therefore, the Minister should seek appropriate advice from both of his two principal advisors in most matters.

In summary, the integration of the headquarters has been challenging, but a separation of the Ministry into two parts “would only be harmful and would be a major disservice of the military”<sup>69</sup>. That said, it is deduced that there are only a few concerns within the current integrated headquarters that require the constant attention of both the CDS and the Deputy Minister. More specifically, the CDS and the Deputy Minister have to be careful issuing direction to those in the department and the CF to ensure that government policy and Canadian law are not violated. Also, the CDS and the Deputy

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<sup>68</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author, Section III.

<sup>69</sup> Legault, Albert. Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces into the Twenty-First Century (Report submitted to the Minister of National Defence). Quebec: Laval University, 1 March 1997, 2. This paper agrees with Legault that the integrated headquarters is appropriate recognizing the implications of recommendations in other reports to the Minister, mentioned earlier in this paper. While this solution does not prevent public servant – military personnel conflicts it does allow the CF to concentrate on military affairs and disengages the Minister from coordinating the day-to-day Department and CF operations. After all, splitting the headquarters does not resolve the fact that the Minister would still have to resolve differences, when they occur, in policy advice. Doug Young, the Minister, also agreed with Legault when he directed in 1997 the clarification of the CDS and Deputy Minister’s authorities within the current integrated headquarters. It is therefore a question of how the Minister, CDS and Deputy Minister can work together, speaking “with one voice and be jointly responsible for the entire set of defence policies”.

Minister should continue to ensure that they work as cooperatively as possible to ensure that they respect each other's role to provide appropriate advice to the Minister.

Analysis of other Senior Advisors' Authority, Responsibility and Accountability.

There are numerous other senior staff that provide support to the Minister directly or through the CDS and Deputy Minister. For the most part, their authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities<sup>70</sup> are clear and considered to be appropriate.

However, in considering the principles discussed earlier in this paper, there are several issues that require attention.

Firstly, as highlighted earlier in this paper, the MCCR initiative did succeed to reduce the number and size of the headquarters. However, Acting VCDS, MGen L. Campbell was correct in 1997 when he warned that the implications of MCCR would not be known for some time. While the investigation of the Somalia scandal did help to resolve some command and control reporting and accountability deficiencies, the recent high operational tempo also conclusively proved that there are other command and control issues not adequately addressed by the MCCRT. This problem has already been identified and the CDS and commanders are now considering various approaches to improve operational command and control, as well as readiness. For example, the Mason-Crabbe study<sup>71</sup> and more recently, the Sharpe-English study<sup>72</sup> both provide

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<sup>70</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author, Section III and annex C.

<sup>71</sup> Mason, Lynn G. & Crabbe, Raymond. (December 2000) A Centralized Operational Level Headquarters (Report for the Department of National Defence).

<sup>72</sup> Sharpe, BGen (retired) G.E. & English, Allan. (28 June 2001) Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces (Report prepared for the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff).

recommendations concerning force generation, force employment and command and control.

Secondly, as discussed earlier in this paper, authority, responsibility and accountability in any bureaucratic organization can be decentralized both vertically and horizontally. Agreeing with Mintzberg<sup>73</sup>, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to not decentralize authority both vertically and horizontally within any large organization like the DND and the CF. As stated earlier, the 1999 publication of the *Organization and Accountability– Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence* recognizes this requirement although horizontal authorities are not specifically identified. The CDS and Deputy Minister have already identified this shortfall and they have approved or are considering functional direction in areas, such as public affairs, comptrollership, civilian human resource management and general safety direction. This element of the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework, whether communicated through directives, amendment of the published framework or through Part 3 of the current business plan template, is urgently required. Until such time as functional direction is complete, ambiguity in authority, responsibilities and accountabilities will continue to cause turmoil.

The third issue that requires attention is the harmonization of the employment of civil servants and military personnel in the integrated headquarters. There is a requirement for military personnel to be employed in the department reporting to the Deputy Minister, and similarly, there is a requirement for civil servants to be employed in organizations led by senior CF officers. The quantifiable requirement for civil servants

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<sup>73</sup> Mintzberg, Henry. The Structuring of Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979, 182-213.

and military personnel is one matter that has been, in part, logically addressed through military occupation structure (MOS) reviews<sup>74</sup>, but these reviews did not fully define the military personnel requirements in the integrated headquarters. While the MOS review determined the minimum operational number of military personnel required to be maintained in the headquarters it did not address those positions that are required to professionally develop military personnel, particularly those personnel at the senior officer ranks who require experience to prepare them for future key appointments in the headquarters. Similarly, there is a requirement to groom civil servants for future employment in the defence establishment, although civil servants also have opportunities for professional development outside the DND. Succession planning for senior civil servant and military personnel and transparent professional development planning for civil servants would greatly facilitate the harmonization of staffing throughout the headquarters rather than relying solely on the personal preferences of the Group Principals.

Fourth, it is important to recognize that Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military) is not really an Assistant to the Deputy Minister. This position is clearly a position primarily responsible to the CDS. While the military officer occupying this position is responsible for compliance with government human resource legislation, this fact does not imply that this person should be addressed as an Assistant Deputy Minister. On the other hand, the officer's responsibilities<sup>75</sup> are very much assigned from

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<sup>74</sup> Department of National Defence. (5600-1 (VCDS) 31 August 1999). MOS Review Follow-On Summary. Ottawa: VAdm G Garnett.

<sup>75</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author, Section III and annex C.

the prerogatives of the CDS. Therefore, it is suggested that the title and the terms of reference of the position should be changed – to Chief of Military Personnel, or another appropriate title – to more accurately reflect the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework.

The fifth and final issue concerns the responsibilities and reporting channels of the VCDS. This issue is not an issue at all. Rather, it is a current practice that is already used in the integrated headquarters and which is stressed by recognized authorities in organizational theory. Mintzberg best describes the requirement for an “integrating manager”<sup>76</sup> by stating that the integrating manager’s role “always includes some aspects of the decision processes that cut across the affected departments, but it never (by definition) extends to formal authority over the departmental personnel”<sup>77</sup>. The creation of the VCDS position, the integrating manager, with its present responsibilities is key to the operation of the integrated headquarters. This officer, as the chief of staff for both the CDS and the Deputy Minister, ensures the collaborative effort by both departmental and CF senior advisors. This position, in theory, should protect the integrity of vertical authority while ensuring differences in advice or horizontal authority (i.e. reduce or eliminate the causes or symptoms of ambiguity) are addressed before issues require attention by the CDS, Deputy Minister or the Minister of National Defence. The fact that the VCDS is “stipulated in the National Defence Act to act for the CDS in the latter’s

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<sup>76</sup> Mintzberg, Henry. The Structuring of Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979, 161.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*, 165.

absence”<sup>78</sup> and that the VCDS is not in the CF chain of command or the departmental line of authority, allows the VCDS to oversee the CF military police and effectively provide for resource management and force structure planning for the DND and the CF. The VCDS is also the perfect change champion, a difficult responsibility for any bureaucracy, as many change initiatives horizontally cross the headquarters. In short, the current VCDS’ position, with its authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities, is a best practice that is a key ingredient to the effective integration of the headquarters.

Summary of the Analysis of National Defence Headquarters. The above analysis of the present National Defence Headquarters notes several items that require attention by DND or CF senior officials. Undoubtedly, there are many strengths incorporated into the current organizational design or Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework. That said, one particular strength or best practice is highlighted. See Table 2.

Principles	Issues or Strengths
Division of Labor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CDS requires unfettered access to the Minister and to the Prime Minister, if required, for policy advice and accountability thus respecting the CDS’ role in civil-military relations.</li> <li>• The CDS and the Deputy Minister should continue to work as cooperatively as possible to ensure that they respect each other’s role to provide appropriate advice to the Minister.</li> <li>• Ensure that the CDS is free to fulfill his legal responsibilities to command, control and administrate the CF thus allowing for due process and effective management of the CF.</li> </ul>

<sup>78</sup> Department of National Defence. Organization and Accountability – Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence. Second Edition, 13 September 1999. Ottawa: Author, Section III and annex C.



Division of Labor (continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CDS and the Deputy Minister should address force generation deficiencies in the department and the CF and the CDS should quickly address operational command and control, readiness and capability issues in the CF.</li> <li>• The CDS and the Deputy Minister should publish formal functional or horizontal direction as soon as possible.</li> <li>• The CDS and Deputy Minister should reconsider the title and terms of reference of the Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resource – Military) position.</li> <li>• The VCDS position, as chief of staff to the CDS and Deputy Minister, plays a key role to ensure that the headquarters works effectively.</li> </ul>
Chain of Command	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CDS and the Deputy Minister have to be careful when issuing joint or unilateral direction to those in the department and the CF to ensure that government policy and custom and Canadian law are not violated.</li> <li>• The Associate Deputy Minister’s responsibilities should be documented as soon as possible in the formal Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework.</li> </ul>
Rules Based	
Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CDS and the Deputy Minister should complete succession planning for senior civil servant and military personnel and transparent professional development planning for civil servants.</li> </ul>

Table 2. Summary of Issues and Strengths

## CONCLUSION

Unification and integration posed many challenges for the CF and the DND, but despite many different reviews or analyses, the Somalia scandal and the budget-driven personnel and headquarters reductions acted as the catalyst to address authority, responsibility and accountability problems that had lingered for over fifty years. The

Ministerial reforms, directed by Doug Young, the Minister of National Defence in 1997, have largely been implemented and these actions have corrected serious shortfalls in civil-military relations and the ambiguous authorities residing with the Minister, the CDS and the Deputy Minister. As well, the re-engineering coordinated by the MCCRT achieved good success to meet government directed economies.

That said, there is more work yet to be completed to fully address problems that have, on the most part, already been identified within the headquarters. More specifically, force generation, force employment, command and control, military-civilian professional development and staff harmonization and particularly, functional or horizontal direction issues require attention with varying degrees of urgency. Once these problems are addressed, the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework will satisfy the strategic level principles recognized in documented organizational theory.

This conclusion, however, does not mean that there will not be problems in the future. Rather, there will always be tension between the military, civil servant and government officials particularly in regards to disagreements over government policy. Also, there will undoubtedly be management crises in the future that will demand personal attention by the strategic leaders of the CF and the DND. And as in the past, reviews and analyses of the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework will be required to deal with the perceived problems. At this point, however, one should be cautioned, as suggested by Drucker, that there is no “one right organization”<sup>79</sup> and cookie cutter solutions are probably not appropriate for the unique Canadian National Defence Headquarters.

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<sup>79</sup> Drucker, Peter K., Management Challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. New York: HarperCollins, 2001,16.

As well, there will always be the human side of Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework. The Minister, CDS, Deputy Minister and the other senior advisors have to work together to make the framework effective. Emotions and logic don't always mix and as in a good marriage, the strategic leaders must always remember to respect the authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities of the others. In spite of everything, the most effective organizational structure will not work if the strategic leader partnerships don't make it work.

In conclusion, National Defence Headquarters is a living organization that can function quite effectively. That said, the headquarters requires regular and detailed review to ensure that any significant changes to the Authority, Responsibility and Accountability framework or the strategic environment are properly addressed before problems fester and disrupt the legal responsibilities of the CF and DND strategic leaders.

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