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Authority, Responsibility and Accountability:

two

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ABSTRACT

Following the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Douglas Young, initiated a full-scale review into the state of the Canadian Forces (CF). The review, not only examined the CF, but also the Department of National Defence (DND) and the relationship between these two separate legal entities. The review work completed by independent academic advisors questioned the accountability structure of National Defence and recommended, by way of solution, separating the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) into a Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) and a civilian Department.

This paper argues that a fundamental change to the organizational structure of NDHQ is not required and that effective functioning of the current CF/DND organization can be achieved through the application of a clear framework of authority and accountability. Existing and evolving problems can be addressed within such a framework through evolutionary change that respects legal accountabilities, accounts for horizontal responsibilities and is properly communicated.

AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY:
THE KEY TO THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF
NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS

By

Captain(Navy) R. Westwood

“Civilians must have a significant role in the national defence structures of every democracy. There are, of course, many ways of structuring complementary civilian and military work relationships. No one model is perfect. Everywhere, however, the effectiveness of the system rests on cooperation and consultation at all levels – not on totally separate structures working on the same things at the same time often at cross purposes and in ignorance of one another.”¹

INTRODUCTION

On 31 December 1996, the then Minister of National Defence (MND), the Honourable Douglas Young, launched a detailed review into the state of the Canadian Forces (CF). This review resulted from fallout from the *Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* and a handful of unsavoury incidents that had been made public in the preceding months.

Minister Young reported on the results of his review to the Prime Minister on the 25th of March 1997, simultaneously outlining a plan for detailed reform. One aspect of this reform was the need to improve the authority, responsibility and accountability structure of the Canadian Forces (CF) and the Department of National Defence (DND). The review work completed by independent academic advisors had recommended to Minister Young that the accountability structure within the CF and DND was seriously flawed and required corrective action. The majority of these academics, in fact, recommended wholesale changes to the structure of the National Defence Headquarters

¹ M. Douglas Young, *Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 29.

(NDHQ). Most notably they recommended a division of the Headquarters into two distinct entities: a Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) and the Department of National Defence (DND). To quote Dr. J.L. Granatstein: “The time has come to separate the civilian and military components of NDHQ. ... Accountability would be clearer in a separated headquarters – if there is a military cock-up, no one will doubt that the military will be unquestionably responsible”²

This was not a new recommendation. In fact, taking such an action would return the structure to that which existed immediately following unification in 1968: a separate Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) and a departmental organization. Many who have studied NDHQ over the past thirty years, had oft recommended this change. This recommendation appears to have been founded in the perception that a well-defined authority and accountability framework did not exist. Both current and past studies have commented that the Deputy Minister and his civilian Assistant Deputy Ministers have played too large a role in the formulation of defence policy and that the lines of command over the CF were blurred. In addition, findings from the Somalia Inquiry tended to demonstrate a CF culture that was unwilling to accept, or perhaps ignorant of, the concepts of authority, responsibility and accountability.

This paper will argue that a fundamental change to the organizational structure of NDHQ is not required and that the effective function of the current CF/DND organization can be achieved through the application of a clear framework of authority and accountability. Existing and evolving problems can be addressed within such a framework through evolutionary change that respects legal accountabilities, accounts for horizontal responsibilities and is properly communicated. This paper will use the term “National Defence” to describe collectively two separate entities: the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence.

² Dr. J.L. Granatstein, A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence: For Efficient and Effective Forces (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 6,7.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

“The NDA provides the legal base for civil control of the armed forces, command authority in the CF and defence organization, and places politicians military officers and public servants (or “officials”) in separate camps. These differences arise from Parliament’s need to ensure that responsibility and accountability for defence policy, command of the CF and defence administration are distinct.”³

Within a democracy, such as Canada, the relationship between the armed forces and the political executive is complex. The essence of, and indeed the basis for, the relationship is the necessity for civil control of the military by the duly elected government. Bland sees it as follows: “Control of the military, however, demands and requires the active supervision of the armed forces by civilians elected to Parliament. Ultimately, the government of the day must be held accountable for the effectiveness, good order and discipline of the armed forces and for the uses to which its power is applied.”⁴ In Canada, the CF and the DND are established by statute, the National Defence Act (NDA), as separate and distinct entities. The NDA also establishes the unique authorities of the Minister of National Defence (MND) and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). The NDA empowers the MND with the authority to manage the CF and all other matters relating to the national defence. The CDS is charged with the control and administration of the CF and issuing all required orders and instructions to the CF.⁵

Although also appointed under the NDA, the Deputy Minister’s responsibilities are not found in this act but rather in the Interpretation Act, an act that provides deputy ministers with all the statutory powers of a minister of the crown except for the authority

³ Douglas L. Bland, National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) 3.

⁴ Douglas L. Bland, National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) 3.

⁵ National Defence Act, Department of Justice Web Site, <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/N-5/78280.html>

to make regulations. In essence, the Deputy Minister (DM) provides the Minister broad support, advising on policy issues and management concerns and managing the Department on behalf of the Minister. Law requires the DM to observe government-wide financial, administrative and human resources management standards and practices. These standards and practices derive from laws such as the Financial Administration Act, the Public Service Employment Act and the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act.⁶

Some believe that the requirement for civilian control extends further than supervision of the armed forces by the elected government. Granatstein opines that “Civilian control comes primarily from having a Minister of National Defence elected by the people and responsible to Parliament; it also derives from a permanent public service involved in the management of defence.”⁷ The permanent public service accountable to the elected government officials for meeting its responsibilities (i.e. responsibilities assigned to the public service) contributes indirectly to the civilian control of the armed forces. When one considers the DM’s responsibilities to the government under the various acts, the indirect contribution to civilian control of the armed forces is evident.

The legal framework forms the basis for an authority and accountability framework for National Defence.⁸ A fundamental understanding of this legal relationship between the key officials (MND, CDS and DM) is essential to developing an appropriate authority and accountability framework that will govern the day-to-day workings of the organization. Although it has always been there, it has not received much attention, at least in these terms, until recently. In the 1990s, public interest in accountability

⁶ DND, Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, September 1999) 9.

⁷ Dr. J.L. Granatstein, A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence: For Efficient and Effective Forces (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 7.

⁸ The concept of an authority and accountability framework is discussed later in the paper under the section, Organization and Accountability, where definitions for authority, responsibility and accountability are provided.

especially with respect to governments and their supporting organizations, be they military or civilian, increased markedly. Public interest in accountability within National Defence peaked during the *Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia*.

THE ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF NDHQ

“Like any human experiment, unification has had its successes and failures. It should cease to be a blinding dogma and become a useable foundation, with a unified command strong enough to ensure that it gets the benefit of the doubt over service particularism. In truth, that has been happening since the mid-1970s.”⁹

The current structure of the National Defence Headquarters is a product of a number of factors: the legal establishment of the Department and the CF via the NDA, the previous existence of three services each with their own headquarters organizations; government direction resulting in the integration of the headquarters staff; government direction resulting in the unification of the three services into a single armed force; organizational change associated with the work of the Management Review Group in 1972; and a series of evolutionary changes effected over the past thirty years. To gain an appropriate appreciation for the current organization, it is necessary to briefly examine each of these factors and their resulting impact.

In order to bring the non-operational administration of the three services into a single department, the Department of National Defence (DND) was formed in 1922. The departmental organization, headed by a Deputy Minister, was very small and its focus was on pure defence administration. At this time and through the end of World War II, each of the services had its own statute, Minister and Service Chief. Although there was a Chiefs of Staff Committee chaired by a Chief of the General Staff, the Committee lacked the authority to bring about the coordination of the three services.¹⁰

⁹ Desmond Morton, A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence: What to Tell the Minister (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 20.

¹⁰ Dan Mainguy, What Good Old Days (Ottawa: National Network News, Vol IV, No. 1, January 1997) 5.

Following World War II, the Government appointed a single Minister of Defence and the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee was given authority for inter-service coordination. These changes were formalized in the National Defence Act (NDA) that was introduced in 1950 to consolidate all defence related statutes. In 1961, faced with a growing concern with the lack of control of public spending, the Government appointed the Royal Commission on Government Reform (The Glassco Commission). The Commission was charged with examining all operations of the government; National Defence did not escape its scrutiny. The Commission's Report stated that the principal function of the headquarters organization in DND was one of support rather than operational command and thus saw the need to strengthen the role of the Deputy Minister and his staff.¹¹

The work of the Glassco Commission likely triggered the major changes that were to be introduced later in the decade under the leadership of Minister Paul Hellyer. The Defence White Paper of March 1964 announced the government's intent to integrate the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff as a first step towards a single, unified force. The next step in the process was to introduce the legislation required to effect the required changes. The legislative vehicle, Bill C-90, which was introduced in April, passed in July and put into effect on 01 August 1964, led to the stand up of an integrated National Defence Headquarters.¹² Although advertised as an integrated headquarters, it was not totally amalgamated. It was still composed of two distinct entities: a Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) and a civilian department. CFHQ, which was formed with the personnel from the three former service headquarters, was functionally, rather than service, oriented and featured four groups: operations, personnel, comptroller and logistics/engineering. The civilian or Departmental portion of

¹¹ Douglas L. Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada: 1947 to 1985 (Kingston, Ontario: Ronald P. Frye & Company Publishers, 1997) 25–31.

¹² Vernon J. Kronenberg, All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973) 30.

the Headquarters remained virtually unchanged and also featured four groups headed by Assistant Deputy Ministers responsible for finance, personnel, requirements and works.

Although the 1964 White Paper had indeed indicated that the ultimate goal was a single unified force, many at the time felt that complete unification would only come years later. This was not to be the case. Minister Hellyer moved quickly to complete his objective of unifying the forces. In November 1966, Bill C-243, the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, was introduced and following considerable debate both in the House of Commons and before the Standing Committee on National Defence was approved by Parliament in April 1967 and came into effect on 01 February 1968. Under the Act the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force were abolished and Canada's armed forces became a single service, the Canadian Forces. Although the formal unification of the Canadian Forces did not have much direct effect on the headquarters organization at this time, it resulted in fundamental changes to the structure of the forces that have since continually impacted on the NDHQ organization. It is interesting to note that in a recent (1994) analysis, Murray still cites unification as a fundamental issue in Canadian defence policy.^{13,14}

For all of the criticism and controversy that accompanied integration and unification, in retrospect, as Desmond Morton has observed, it appears to have been a step in the right direction. "Unification solved or eased some old problems of triplication and confusion. Though the route may have been tortuous, Hellyer's reforms gave Canada early experience with systems that Australian, British and American defence

¹³ D.J. Murray, "Canada", D.J. Murray and P.R. Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989) 84.

¹⁴ A number of detailed accounts of the history concerning integration and unification exist. The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985 (Bland) and All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972 (Kronenberg) are two such accounts which provide further detail concerning this era of Canada's National Defence history.

departments have adopted, mixing military and civilian expertise, unified theatre commands and a greater range of common administrative and logistic services.”¹⁵

“Though the period between 1964 and 1973 was a purgatory of organizational change, it was also a period when DND learned to become a bureaucracy like the others. The climax of this transformation came in 1972 when the last organizational upheaval of the period led to the wedding of DND and the Canadian Forces Headquarters into what was for all practical purposes a single bureaucratic organization.”¹⁶ Such is Treddenick’s description of the next important phase in the evolution of Canada’s National Defence organization. In June 1971, the MND of the day, the Honourable Donald Macdonald, initiated a study of the management of NDHQ conducted by the Management Review Group (MRG) chaired by Mr. J.B. Pennefather. According to Granatstein, “The Management Review Group of 1972 was created in part to end the war between the civilians and military by integrating them into a common headquarters as a “defence team”.”¹⁷ In all likelihood, it probably went much deeper than this. The NDHQ that had been formed out of integration and unification of the CF was struggling through teething pains and had not yet reached the point where it was functioning effectively as a cohesive headquarters. The Government of the time was seeking an effective organization to administer defence policy.

The MRG, which was composed principally of private sector officials from industry, conducted its review over a year-long period and submitted a report to the new MND, the Honourable Edgar Benson in July 1972. The MRG found that the “principal difficulties in carrying out operational tasks were due to basic management problems

¹⁵ Desmond Morton, A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence: What to Tell the Minister (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 18.

¹⁶ John M. Treddenick, The Defence Budget, (Scarborough, Ontario: Canada’s International Security Policy, 1995) 443.

¹⁷ Dr. J.L. Granatstein, A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence For Efficient and Effective Forces (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 6.

within the civilian and military components of the Headquarters.”¹⁸ The MRG recommended a number of major changes including a major realignment of the relationship between the MND, DM and CDS. The DM was to become the senior official within the Department and the CDS would be subordinate to the DM in the normal daily function of National Defence. In general, the MRG recommended that the CF and DND become a single departmental entity clearly under the bureaucratic control of the DM.

Prior to the delivery of Mr. Pennefather’s report, and based on a verbal interim report, Minister Benson agreed to make the DND and the CFHQ a single entity.¹⁹ He left the details with respect to how this was to be implemented in the hands of the DM and CDS of the day. The integration of NDHQ begun by Hellyer in 1964 by amalgamating the naval, army and air force headquarters into a functionally oriented Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) was taken a step further by integrating the CFHQ and the civilian Departmental staff. Bland comments that “The diarchy at the top and the amalgamation of CFHQ and the departmental staff in NDHQ eventually more or less combined all the staff functions of the CF and DND. Thus the ‘defence team’ notion was born, although the term only came into vogue in the late 1980s”.²⁰ Of note, although this satisfied much of the intent of the MRG report, it did not subordinate the CDS to the DM but rather left a diarchy or duopoly responsible for National Defence.

“That organization of the national headquarters, more or less, remains today [1997], although there have recently been changes related to down-sizing of the Headquarters. It has been going much in the same form for nearly 25 years, getting close

¹⁸ Management Review Group, Report to the Minister of National Defence, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, July 1972) i.

¹⁹ Douglas L. Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada: 1947 to 1985 (Kingston, Ontario: Ronald P. Frye & Company Publishers, 1997) 81.

²⁰ Douglas L. Bland, National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) 38.

to a generation.”²¹ Indeed the NDHQ of today in basic organizational concept is a direct product of the fundamental changes implemented in 1972. In addition, to the reductions highlighted by Mainguy, minor evolutionary changes have been implemented but none have resulted in fundamental change to the structure of the organization. Over the past thirty years, the CF and DND have learned to work effectively within this organization. By evolving to an organization capable of succeeding in a bureaucratic environment with its penchant for formalized planning, budgeting and management, the CF and DND have survived through good and bad times. It is a realistic approach; to get that which is required, National Defence has learned the Government’s bureaucratic system and worked it to advantage.

The recent work of the Management, Command and Control Re-engineering (MCCR) Team is one aspect of evolutionary change that is worth mentioning. MCCR was basically a product of three initiatives: armed forces downsizing in the post Cold War period; fundamental restructuring of the Public Service aimed at reducing the cost of Government operations and a Ministerial driven initiative to move the Commanders of Commands to NDHQ. The MCCR Team was stood up in January 1995 with a mandate to re-engineer the command, control and resource management structure of National Defence with an emphasis on NDHQ. The guidance that the team received from senior management included the following: resources devoted to headquarters functions would be reduced by 50%; Chiefs of Environmental Staff would be established in NDHQ as both Commanders and as strategic staff to the CDS and DM; command headquarters would be eliminated; NDHQ would continue to function as an integrated civilian/military headquarters; and resource management would continue to be improved.²² All of these changes were implemented over the following three years with the Environmental Chiefs of Staff moving to NDHQ in the summers of 1996 and 1997.²³

²¹ Dan Mainguy, What Good Old Days (Ottawa: National Network News, Vol IV, No. 1, January 1997) 7.

²² MCCRT Historical Report, Executive Summary, Paragraph 3, http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsc/tem1_e.asp?doc=page4a&sec=lin

²³ Although all of the prescribed changes from the MCCR initiative were implemented to a certain degree, some critics argue that the required re-engineering work was not completed in all organizations and thus

The NDHQ that exists today is a product of this evolutionary, and sometimes revolutionary, history. NDHQ serves three broad functions: defence policy-making, command of the CF and defence administration.²⁴ The document, *Organization and Accountability*, further defines these functions as:

- providing advice to the Minister and Cabinet on defence issues, CF matters and related Government priorities, policies and programs;
- ensuring that the military tasks and defence activities ordered by the Minister and Cabinet are carried out effectively and efficiently;
- providing a cost-effective organization for the acquisition and provision of materiel and other resources to the CF;
- ensuring that government-wide policies, regulations, practices and guidelines are followed in the management of the DND and CF;
- assisting the Minister in consulting and informing Parliament and Canadians and in advancing Canada's defence relations and other interests.²⁵

there is still considerable room for improvement in the resource management area. Others opine that reductions were made without changing processes resulting in insufficient resources in parts of the organization to conduct all of the work elements involved in the antiquated processes.

²⁴ Another, more recent view of the functions of NDHQ, and National Defence in general, sees a different breakdown. The functions consist of defence policy making, elements of force generation, elements of force employment and defence administration. Under the functional breakdown I have used in this paper, those elements of force generation for which NDHQ is responsible are included in the two functions "command of the CF" and "defence administration". Similarly those elements of force employment for which NDHQ is responsible are included in the "command of the CF" function. There are elements of both the force generation and the force employment functions that are not the responsibility of NDHQ but rather the Commands and their Formations.

²⁵ DND, *Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, September 1999) 3.

SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

“While the most efficient organizations are probably those with all authority concentrated in one person, this quickly becomes impossible due to the limitations of people’s capacities and knowledge, and the complexity of tasks to be performed. As soon as you start dividing up authority, you create ragged edges.”²⁶

As noted earlier, the separate authorities of the DM and the CDS give rise to different responsibilities. In broad terms: the DM has primary responsibility for resources, policy and international defence relations; and the CDS has primary responsibilities for command, control and administration of the CF and military strategy, plans and requirements. Despite their separate responsibilities, in practice the CDS and DM jointly decide many issues affecting Canada’s defence activities.²⁷ Most likely, they arrive at some sort of consensus as a result of consultation and then proceed within their individual terms of reference.

The need to share responsibility in some areas between the service, or services, and the Department has been evident since the advent of the Department of National Defence in 1922. Even prior to unification and integration, the Department and the three services were required to work together in delivering defence to the Government and people of Canada. The recognized commonalities in the administration of the three services and the need for government to eliminate obvious overlap and duplication naturally led to a single Ministerial organization responsible for the common elements of defence. With the Government’s decision to unify and integrate its armed services, coordinating responsibility between the Department and the Service became increasingly important. Shared responsibility is not unique to defence. In most modern organizations, responsibilities overlap and must be coordinated between organizational arms. As the complexity of the business and the organization grows, there are growing overlaps in responsibility that must be understood, accepted and controlled.

²⁶ Dan Mainguy, What Good Old Days (Ottawa: National Network News, Vol IV, No. 1, January 1997) 8.

²⁷ DND, Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, September 1999) 9.

Command of the CF is the one area in which shared responsibility cannot and does not occur; maintaining a pure organizational construct for command and control of an armed force is essential. “Command in military usage is the legal authority to give orders and to enforce compliance. The military chain of command linking responsibility and accountability is delineated by who gives orders and who obeys.”²⁸ As the CDS has sole legal authority for the control of the armed forces and is the link between the armed forces and the Government, he heads this chain of command. Recalling the NDA, “all orders and instructions to the Canadian Forces that are required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the Government of Canada or the Minister shall be issued by or through the Chief of Defence Staff.”²⁹ From the CDS down to the soldier in the field or the sailor at sea, there must be a clear, direct line of command. This chain of command cannot be interrupted by civilian/military overlap in responsibilities or any other discontinuity. The present organization of the CF and NDHQ allows for such an unfettered chain of command.

Additionally, a specific military staff assists the Chief of Defence Staff in fulfilling his command function. In recent years, there has been an increased focus on joint operations with a resultant strengthening of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff’s (DCDS) roles of strategic level operational planning and provision of operational direction to commanders in the field. This renewed focus has led to a better understanding of the pure military chain of command controlling the CF for both routine and non-routine operations by all involved factions. Simply put, command and control of the CF is not an area of shared responsibility – the CDS’s responsibility for control of the Armed Forces must not be jeopardized by the shared responsibility arrangements that facilitate the other major functions of the Headquarters. Many previous recommendations that focused on dividing NDHQ into a distinct defence department and

²⁸Douglas L. Bland, *National Defence Headquarters: Centre for Decision* (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) 1

²⁹National Defence Act, Article 18(2), Department of Justice Web Site, <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/N-5/78280.html>

a CFHQ have based a large part of their arguments on blurred chains of command or poor command and control of the CF due to structural problems. Although perceived or real problems may have existed in the past, there are no, nor have there been any, structural discontinuities to a direct military chain of command between the CDS and the lowest elemental level of the CF.³⁰

When it comes to the other functions of NDHQ, shared responsibility usually leads to increased effectiveness and efficiency but it also may lead to duplication, overlaps and, in the worst of cases, things falling through the cracks. These problems tend to come and go with time. They are a product of involved personnel not properly understanding or coordinating their shared responsibilities. Since shared responsibility is inevitable within any large, complex organization, there are going to be issues that need to be resolved. These problems tend to arise when the organization goes through the changes that are part of its evolution. Since National Defence, in general, and NDHQ, in particular, have been subjected to an ambitious change agenda in recent years, problems at the edges should not be surprising. The key here is to address these issues when they arise and to reinforce the solutions through constant communication.

Prior to the changes and reductions of the early 1990s, generally associated with the so-called peace dividend and the subsequent re-engineering of organizations, most of the problems that occurred were probably in areas of duplication and overlap. At this time, NDHQ was commonly referred to as a 'matrix organization' and shared responsibility was out of control. Shared responsibility had reached the point where, at times, no one could properly identify the responsible arm of the organization. The majority of organizations in both NDHQ and in the Commands were well staffed and situations arose that resulted in friction between the various arms of the organization that were competing to deliver in overlapping areas of responsibility. Staff in Commands

³⁰ With respect to a functional breakdown that includes force generation and force employment, shared responsibility does not occur in the force employment area. When forces are being employed on missions, clearly the military chain of command is responsible. With respect to force generation, shared responsibility does exist particularly between ADM(Mat) and the Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS). It is in this area of force generation where problems are sometimes experienced; an example is provided later in this section.

attempted to oversee (or perform quality assurance) on the work of NDHQ and vice versa. Although this situation was inefficient and at times resulted in conflict between NDHQ and Commands, it generally resulted in the delivery of an effective product.

Things changed with the reduction in staff levels in the 1990s. Although shared responsibility still necessarily exists, the problems that occur today tend to be associated with organizations under-resourced to exercise their responsibilities rather than cases of overlap or duplication. This changing nature of shared responsibility within National Defence can best be illustrated by example. Naval engineering and maintenance is a responsibility shared between Director General Maritime Equipment Program Management (DGMEPM) who works for the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) (ADM(Mat)) and the Chief of Maritime Staff (CMS). DGMEPM is acknowledged as the authority for naval engineering and maintenance, a responsibility that flows from ADM(Mat)'s responsibility for "maintaining overall design authority of Forces' equipment and systems and providing certain aspects of engineering and maintenance, repair and overhaul."³¹ However, the CMS, through his second line maintenance units and the crews of HMC Ships, is responsible to deliver much of the required naval engineering and maintenance support. It is a classic case of shared responsibility that makes a great deal of sense – efficiency and effectiveness are realized by using available CMS resources to support DGMEPM's overall responsibility as the naval engineering and maintenance design authority. In the past, this arrangement has functioned very well albeit with the occasional, resolvable problem. The infrequent problems encountered usually arose when actions were taken in the Command that impacted directly on ADM(Mat)'s design authority.

Problems with this arrangement have been more frequent in recent years and have forced ADM(Mat) and CMS to examine the shared responsibility concept. In general, these recent problems are a result of resource shortages at both ends of the arrangement. The result is an increased incidence of conflict when an under-resourced DGMEPM is

³¹ DND, Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence (Ottawa, Department of National Defence, September 1999) 29

not capable of meeting CMS expectations particularly when the shortfall directly impacts operations. As a result, CMS and ADM(Mat)/DGMEPM have recently sought improvements to their construct for shared responsibility. The conclusion is that there is no simple and easy solution but rather the two organizations need collectively to understand better their individual and shared responsibilities. In addition, they must learn to improve communications at all levels between the two organizations especially with respect to requirements, capabilities and expectations.

This shared responsibility relationship between ADM(Mat) and CMS is considered to be typical of many horizontal responsibility relationships that exist in NDHQ today. Changes in NDHQ in the early 1990s left many groups with smaller staffs, lower budgets and evolved Terms of Reference. In this new environment, the pure military chain of command organization must continue to be respected. However outside of this specific area, shared responsibility relationships, such as ma

have called for the splitting of the Headquarters into two separate organizations: a department and a Canadian Forces Headquarters. The studies completed for Minister Young in March 1997 were no different with the majority of his advisors recommending major changes to the NDHQ structure and segregation of the military and departmental arms of the Headquarters. However, Minister Young like all of those before him chose to maintain the status quo.

Despite his decision to forego fundamental organizational change, Minister Young recognized that much of the criticism of the NDHQ organization was based on valid observation. Many within the Department, within the CF and also those on the outside expressed concern with lapses in accountability, blurred military and civilian accountabilities and the “civilianization” of military staffs in the Headquarters. Minister Young saw the need to take concrete action to address these problems. Coincidentally as part of its work at the time, the MCCRT was developing an authority and accountability framework for National Defence. The MCCRT requirement to develop such a framework had been derived from a number of factors: the legal framework upon which the CF and DND are based, the complexity of National Defence work, the need for shared responsibility and the ever increasing level of public exposure. Minister Young seized the opportunity to use this ongoing work to address the concerns raised during the review. His commitment to the Prime Minister contained two important recommendations in this area:

- “51. Clarify accountability to the Deputy Minister and the Chief of Defence Staff among senior staff along lines of primary responsibility.
52. Issue a guidance document entitled *Authority, Responsibility and Accountability* to help our military and civilian personnel better understand how the work of National Defence is conducted and the role they play.”³³

³³M. Douglas Young, Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Department of national Defence, 25 March 1997) 30.

The first version of *Authority, Responsibility and Accountability* was released coincident with the Minister's Report to the Prime Minister in March 1997. A second updated version, entitled *Organization and Accountability* that included a more complete discussion of "accountability" and of the principles governing full and prompt reporting of results was issued in September 1999. The latter version of this document clearly outlines the responsibilities of the MND, DM and CDS as well as all military and civilian officers who directly report to the DM and CDS. It further explains the principles of authority, responsibility and accountability:

"Having a *responsibility* involves having the *authority* and the obligation to act, including the authority to direct or authorize others to act. It also means being *accountable* for how those responsibilities have been carried out in light of agreed expectations. In a public sector organization such as the CF or DND, each individual is obliged to *account* fully and promptly to those who, in the hierarchy, conferred the responsibilities, for the way they have been carried out and for how the relevant authorities have been used."³⁴

Organization and Accountability recognizes that there are going to be complementary roles and shared responsibility within a complex organization like National Defence. Furthermore, it explains the accountability of military personnel to the DM for the exercise of delegated statutory, policy and administrative authorities related to the management of funds, public service employees, property and other resources. It also explains that civilian employees can be responsible and accountable to the CDS without being part of the military chain of command.³⁵

A document such as *Organization and Accountability* which clearly articulates the authority and accountability framework within which civilian employees and military personnel work is a key to maintaining an effective, efficient organization. This publication recognizes the complexity of the organization, dispels myths about blurred responsibilities and communicates basic concepts to all levels of the organization. The

³⁴ DND, Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, September 1999) 14.

³⁵ DND, Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, September 1999) 2-5.

document also provides the underpinning for developing service level agreements and lateral accountability agreements between various elements of the overall organization.³⁶ These subsequent agreements must be consistent with the overall authority and accountability framework. *Organization and Accountability* allows all personnel involved in National Defence to clearly understand their authorities, responsibilities and accountabilities and how they properly fit into the integrated organization.

A second important aspect of developing the necessary culture for a widely accepted authority and accountability framework is continuing education. CF training and education establishments have recently incorporated *Organization and Accountability* as an important reference in appropriate course packages. As well, the values, principles and processes of accountability are now an inherent part of the training and education program in all four development periods for CF officers.³⁷ Similarly NDHQ indoctrinations for new employees and military personnel posted into NDHQ include the necessary exposure to the principles of authority and accountability.

MAKING IT WORK

“On one hand, the basic NDHQ set up has achieved a great record of success for over 20 years. It is by no means a perfect organization, but it does work.”³⁸

Although a clear authority and accountability framework is the key to the effective and efficient function of NDHQ and National Defence, there are other

³⁶ The sort of agreements being discussed here concern areas such as force generation where the Environmental Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff and the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) all have complementary roles to play. To account for the shared responsibilities clearly, some detailed service level agreements or horizontal accountability agreements have been established between various organizational arms. The previous discussion of shared responsibility between CMS and ADM(Mat)/DGMEPM is an example.

³⁷ DND, *Report on the Recommendations of the Somalia Commission – Part 1*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, October 1997) 7. <http://www.forces.ca/menu/press/Reports/somalia/p1e.htm>

³⁸ Dan Mainguy, *What Good Old Days* (Ottawa: National Network News, Vol IV, No, 1, January 1997) 8.

instrumental factors in “making it work”. Despite criticisms to the contrary, the organization is largely effective and has been able to adequately support operations, cope with an ambitious change agenda and lead National Defence into the 21st Century. The challenge remains to sustain this effectiveness. As such, the organization must be dynamic, must evolve to meet challenges and must continually improve its ability to work in harmony.

By most accounts, the current NDHQ organization appears to conform to the governing legal framework and is functionally sound. There are no fundamental disconnects and all functional areas of responsibility are adequately covered. As Chief of Staff to both the DM and the CDS and as the senior resource manager in NDHQ, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) is glue that holds the organization together. As discussed earlier, a clear distinct military chain of command exists – the military chain of command has clear accountability for the both the routine and contingency operations of the CF. Is the current organization perfect – by no means. But it does work, it fulfills the requirements of the Government and it is stable. As organizational theorists such as Bolman and Deal report, “There is no one best way to organize. The right structure depends on an organization’s goals, strategies, technology and environment.”³⁹ Arguably the current structure of NDHQ is well adapted to its environment and those in charge feel that it is well suited to advance the organization’s goals and strategies.

The personality of key actors has a significant influence on the performance of an organization such as NDHQ. Personalities can exert an influence that transcends not only the organizational structure but also the terms of reference of the key actors. Since 1946, the personality of senior defence establishment actors has had a profound effect on the function of NDHQ. Key actors, either abrogating their responsibility or seizing responsibility beyond their authority, have caused some of the past problems experienced. Changes to the structure of an organization will not necessarily correct problems resulting from over-zealous or ineffective personalities.

³⁹ Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal, Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice and Leadership. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, 1997) 57..

Canada shares the characteristic of a close working relationship between the military and civilians within the defence establishment with other democracies. A recent study of the top-level defence organizations in six democracies (Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) reveals that only in New Zealand is there a deliberate attempt to separate the military from the civilian. “In all other cases, it seems to have been accepted that the benefits of close interaction (even organizational integration) between the military and civilian sides of the overall defence organization outweigh any potential difficulties with who is accountable for what.”⁴⁰

Perhaps one of the strongest arguments against fundamental organizational change at this juncture is the disruption that would result from such an action. Following integration and unification, National Defence struggled to find its place as the organization resisted change, struggled to establish effective working relationships and generally muddled through. To turn the clock back after thirty years and introduce a radical change such as splitting National Defence into separate CFHQ and departmental organizations would be devastating. Or as Legault finds “Dissociating the two civilian and military functions within NDHQ would merely exacerbate the tensions between the two communities, civilian and military. The senior military officials must also accept reality: Whether they like it or not, they are and must be part of the top civilian decision-making apparatus.”⁴¹ In the last ten years, National Defence has contended with major reductions in personnel and a huge change agenda. It has also contended with the fallout from the *Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* implementing many changes resulting from the inquiry and the subsequent review.

⁴⁰ DND, A Comparative Study of Authority and Accountability in Six Democracies (Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 2

⁴¹ Albert Legault, Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces into the Twenty-first Century (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 18

Despite these challenges, the organization has continued to take on new commitments, support operations and meet all of the Government's requirements.

Lacking a fundamental reason to initiate a major structural change, the challenge becomes to make the current organization work ever more effectively. The useful work initiated in the mid-1990s under the MCCR initiative is, in essence, part of a continuous improvement regime. It represents necessary evolutionary change introduced via a structured framework that will result in cultural renewal in National Defence.⁴² It is virtually impossible to introduce radical cultural and organizational change while simultaneously continuing to conduct high tempo operations. The alternative is renewal through gradual evolution. The application of the authority and accountability framework and its accompanying education program is an essential component to the renewal process and the maintenance of organizational effectiveness.

The authority and accountability framework provides a vehicle for ensuring that the legal authorities entrusted to the DM and CDS are properly respected across the organization. As Bland observes: "Once it is understood that each official has specific responsibilities under the law and that these cannot be collegially shared that ambiguity disappears."⁴³ If an authority and accountability framework is used properly, it provides a good guide for eliminating ambiguity and enhancing accountability by identifying those areas where responsibility can be shared and those areas where under the law responsibility cannot be shared.

Organization and Accountability also provides a sound basis for the required work to further develop horizontal or lateral accountabilities within National Defence.

⁴² Bland sees this evolutionary change and cultural renewal as the introduction of a "New Command Era". In his work, **The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada: 1947 to 1985**, he speaks of the "Command Era" as the period between 1946 and 1964 while the "Management Era" covers the period from 1964 to 1987 (Pages 1- 11). Later in his work he recommends "Instituting a Command Concept of the Control and Administration of the Canadian Forces" (Pages 225-6) resulting in a "New Command Era".

⁴³ Douglas L. Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada: 1947 to 1985, (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company Publishers, 1987) 93.

As noted in the Chief of Review Services report on the MCCR efforts: “Future effort should concentrate on formalizing an accountability framework, resolving lateral accountabilities, updating high level NDHQ TORs [Terms of Reference] and possibly providing more guidance with respect to specific accountability frameworks and Service Level Agreements.”⁴⁴ Work has continued in this area within NDHQ since the close out of the MCCR and lateral accountabilities are becoming better defined, better understood and less problematic. ***Organization and Accountability*** needs to be a living document. It should be reviewed annually and be updated if changes occur to the organization or the authorities and responsibilities of the various actors. This work will help to ensure that all parts of the organization can continue to function together effectively. Such work is simply part of the evolutionary change that is needed in any dynamic organization that faces evolving requirements and an aggressive strategic change agenda.

Effective communication is also a vital factor. All levels of the organization must be familiar with the authority and accountability framework and those in key positions must understand it intimately. In NDHQ, those at the director level and above should read it every six months and those at the section and sub-section head level annually. The senior staffs working in the Formations should also read it annually. It should be compulsory reading for new DND employees in the headquarters and for all CF members on posting to NDHQ. In addition, as areas such as lateral accountability arrangements evolve, they must be properly communicated to those who need to know. This is one area where lack of effectiveness in the past may have led to a number of the problems that were being experienced. Although the organization has been relatively sound for the past thirty years, many of those working with, or within, it did not understand the specific authorities and accountabilities upon which NDHQ was based. Recent work has gone along way to resolving this problem; the future challenge lies in resolving accountability issues as they arise and maintaining the high level of communication required to ensure that everyone is kept informed.

⁴⁴ DND, NDHQ 99: Review of Restructuring and Re-engineering Volume 1 Executive Overview, (Ottawa: Chief of Review Services, February 2001) 8.

CONCLUSION

“It is nevertheless true that DND is a special department, and the question that arises is whether or not the “planning and management of policies” managed together by civilians and the military seriously undermines the principle of effectiveness of the Armed Forces.”⁴⁵

The legal framework upon which the National Defence organization in Canada is based requires the civilian and military arms of the organization to work closely together. By virtue of its unified armed forces, the Canadian defence establishment is somewhat different than most others in the world. This fundamental difference in conjunction with the legal framework and a number of elements encountered during NDHQ’s evolution has resulted in the current structure of the headquarters. It is a headquarters in which the CF and the Department work together collegially sharing many responsibilities. Murray in his analysis of Canadian defence policy sees it as follows: “The working relationship that the DMoD [Deputy Minister] and CDS maintain with each other and with the MoD [Minister of Defence] and the rest of the staff is best described as collegial. They must work closely together. In fact, the Acts of Parliament that established these offices give them distinct powers that cannot be shared legally but must be shared informally if the system is to work.”⁴⁶

The current NDHQ organization is essentially sound and has been able to adapt itself over the past thirty years to meet constant challenge. A fundamental structural change to the organization is not required and would likely be more disruptive than constructive. Problems that have been encountered are not due to organizational structure but mainly due to breakdowns in communication and, in particular, a lack of clear understanding within the organization concerning the roles and responsibilities of the MND, CDS and DM. The recent work to develop an authority and accountability

⁴⁵ Albert Legault, Bringing the Canadian Armed Forces into the Twenty-first Century (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 13

⁴⁶ D.J. Murray, “Canada”, D.J. Murray and P.R. Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989) 78.

framework is the key step towards solving National Defence's communication problems. Publishing the authority and accountability framework within the document ***Organization and Accountability*** allows all military personnel and civilian employees to gain a good understanding of the unique relationship between the CF and DND as well as how they fit into the organization.

There is still considerable room for improvement. The education and cultural renewal programs resulting from the introduction of an authority and accountability framework must continue. It is important that ***Organization and Accountability*** become a living document that is revised when any major changes to shared responsibilities occur. It is also important to continue the work aimed at taking the authority and accountability framework down to the next levels and to address formally the many lateral accountabilities that currently exist in National Defence. As this work continues it must be communicated to the appropriate audience and must become part of the education and indoctrination programs for all military and civilian personnel.

In his March 1997 Report to the Prime Minister, Minister Young spoke of the changes taking place within National Defence. "The defence organization is moving away from rigid controls and strict hierarchies to a management culture that encourages flexibility, empowerment, team effort, innovation and some risk-taking."⁴⁷ Within a more flexible and innovative organization, the importance of a well structured, well understood accountability framework increases – it becomes the key to the effective functioning of NDHQ and the entire National Defence organization.

⁴⁷M. Douglas Young, Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces (Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 25 March 1997) 29.

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