WAR IN A NEW MILLENNIUM

" THE SECOND HORSEMAN AT A SLOW TROT "

Col W. Semianiw
Syndicate A
MGen (Retd) Holman
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> War is more than a true chameleon that slightly
> adapts its characteristics to the given case. As
> a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always
> make war a paradoxical trinity composed of
> primordial violence, hatred, and enmity.

<div align="right">Clausewitz[1]</div>

INTRODUCTION

In the opening chapter of his seminal work *On War*, Karl von Clausewitz noted that the nature of war would never change.[2] Although Clausewitz did believe that new manifestations resulting from changes to the strategic factors of war could transform the character and methods of war, he nevertheless held the conviction that the nature of war would remain a constant through time.[3] In making such a pronounced statement almost two centuries ago, Clausewitz was echoing a theme that has captivated generations of Western statesmen, soldiers, and scholars during the nineteenth, and in particular, the twentieth century.[4] Yet, Clausewitz' eighteenth

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[1] Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75.

[2] There are as many definitions of war as there are people who have tried to define it. For the purposes of this study, war is defined as "a violent contact of distinct, but similar entities." See Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 17-18.

[3] Clausewitz, *On War*, 610. Also Michael Howard, *Makers of Modern Strategy* ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 186-213.

[4] The influence of Clausewitz on Western military thinking and in particular the American military since the close of the Vietnam War has been pervasive to say the least. See Donald M. Snow and Dennis M. Drew, *From Lexington to Desert Storm: War and Politics in the American Experience* (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1994) and John Keegan, *The History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1994), 3-24. Also Larry D. New, "Clausewitz'

century dynastic understanding of the nature of war was based on a belief that the irrational forces at work in civilisation did not shape the nature of war.[5] This is understandable given that Clausewitz viewed the phenomenon of war through the lens of a period in history when the social, economic, and technological forces at work in civilisation were viewed as external to armed struggle and the use of military force represented the utmost means to attain a social end for the state. Little was known and understood of the social, economic, and technological forces at work in civilisation and their impact on the nature of war at the time that Clausewitz wrote *O W .*[6] It has, nonetheless, been these irrational *a* forces that have shaped our understanding of war in Western civilisation and that are once again beginning to change the nature of war in the Western world.

The historical record of the past decade lays bare the fact that the social, economic, and technological forces that have been at work throughout the history of Western civilisation are again transforming the elements that have defined the nature of war in the Western world for the past two thousand years. These changes are so profound and their

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Theory: On War and its Application Today," *A p w J u   l* (Fall, 1996), 78-85.

[5] The irrational forces in civilisation are social, economic, and technological. Clausewitz, *O W* , 75.   *a*

[6] Civilisation is a cultural entity defined by common objective elements such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. Samuel P. Huntington, *T Cl   f C v l   ?* (New York: Foreign Affairs Press, 1996), 2-3. *a*

interactions so complex that they are beginning to transform not only what Clausewitz had prophesised, the character and methods of war, but also the nature of war. The proposition to be considered is that the social, economic, and technological forces at work in post-modern civilisation are changing the nature of war, leading to a new trend in the evolution of our understanding of war in the Western world.

Following a brief historical examination of the development of the dominant view of the understanding of war in Western civilisation, the elements that comprise the institution of war in the Western world will be analyzed. From this foundation, the changes to the social, economic, and technological forces at work in post-modern civilisation will be surveyed, noting their impact on the understanding of the nature of war in the Western world using history as a guide.

THE WESTERN CONCEPTION OF WAR

The study of war as an art and a science has been ongoing for almost three thousand years. For almost as long, scholars, philosophers, and theologians have debated the phenomenon of war.[7] To the writer of the book of _v l_ , war appeared as

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[7] War has been a subject of serious analysis in the Western world since the fifth century BC when Herodotus and Thucydides chronicled the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. See Richard A. Preston, Alex Roland and Sydney F. Wise, _M I A : A H y f W f I l p w W y_ (London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc, 1991) and J.F.C. Fuller, _A M l y H y f W W l_ 3 vols (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1954).

a conquering destroyer in the form of the Second Horseman, riding with pestilence and famine through time. For General William Tecumseh Sherman, viewing war through the eyes of the most savage conflict of the nineteenth century, war was simply "hell."[8]

Such widespread abstract understandings of the phenomenon of war found throughout the history of the Western world provide little relief in an attempt to better understand such an obtuse ingredient of the fabric of Western civilisation. A review of the common literature on the nature of war in the Western world does, however, point to the conclusion that the single most important factor in any appreciation of the nature of war is how war is conceived.[9] Conceptions of war nevertheless change, driven in a large part by their own distinct historical circumstances.[10] Viewing the phenomenon of war through the prism of the history of Western civilisation should therefore shed some light on the understanding of the nature of war in the Western world.

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[8] The American Civil War left a deep scar on America with 622,000 soldiers dead – more U.S. soldiers than in both world wars, Korea, and Vietnam. It was the first war to use practically every modern weapon. T.N.Dupuy, *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare* (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1980), 170-172 and see Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare* (Cornell: Indiana University Press, 1988).

[9] Julian Lider, *Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Problems* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 60-65.

[10] Ian Clark, *Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction* (London: Clarendon Press, 1988), 19.

The roots of our Western understanding of the phenomenon of war can be traced back to the classical or the second period of history.[11] The *polis* or city-states of Greece were the first known political organisms to use the ordered application of violence to resolve social problems.[12] It was around the fifth century BC that the Greeks produced a "civilised fighting body" in the form of the *polis* that for the most part constrained and limited the use of force and violence in Greek society.[13] All able-bodied men of the city-states were expected to join the *polis* as an essential element of "standing as a free citizen."[14] Aside from providing a strong sense of fellowship to the *polis*, the use of the

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[11] Theodore Ropp conveniently categorised Western history into four periods: history before 1000 BC; sixteen centuries from 1000 BC to 600 AD which include the classical period; 600 to 1400 AD which are the Middle Ages of history; and finally 1400 to today which is defined as the modern period of history. Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), xi-xii.

[12] Hans Delbruck, *History of the Art of War in Antiquity* trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 53-63. See also Doyne Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 47-101 and Victor Davis Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989).

[13] Hanson noted that "the Greek manner of battle was a paradox of the highest order, a deliberate attempt to hardness, to modulate, and hence to amplify if not sanctify the wild human desire for violence through the stark order and discipline of the *polis*. Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, 16-24. Robert L. O'Connell agrees that the Greeks did their killing on neutral ground away from women and children, and according to a prescribed code of conduct. However, O'Connell also notes that it is possible to conclude that "the Greeks hardly thought about constraints on the way that they waged war and that they did wage, at times, irrationally and in such a manner that even the victors came off with great loss." For a countervailing view of the conduct of Greek warfare see Robert L. O'Connell, *Of Arms and Men* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 45-68.

[14] Plato, *The Republic* trans. and ed. I.A. Richards (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 53-56.

citizen soldier also gave state sanction to the use of military force and the conduct of war in classical Greece.[15]

As noted by Robert O'Connell, the Greeks developed their style of war to suite their political, sociological, and psychological paradigms that were rooted in deeply held values of how war should be conducted in Greek civilisation.[16] As such, war for the Greeks was a condition that was as much as practically possible kept external to the Greek city-states by conducting battles away from populated areas and at times when war would not affect the harvest. In addition, the Greeks did not wage war for religion, patriotism, or a desire for the spoils of war. Rather, the Greeks used war as a means to restore balance to the social order of classical Greece.[17] By distinguishing war as a condition or counter-acting response to variables in and outside of the state, the Greeks were able to establish a clear understanding of the purpose of war as a social institution and function of classical society.[18] Moreover and more importantly, by limiting the destructive forces of war to the citizen soldier in the *p l* and by confining wars to particular places in time, Greek civilisation had the opportunity to flourish for over five

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[15] Preston, Roland and Wise, *M I A : A H   y f W f   I   l   p w   W   y*, 14-21.

[16] O'Connell, *Of A   M* , 57.

[17] For a concise overview of Plato's work see Abbot A. Brayton and Stephana J. Landwehr, *T   P l   f W   P   : A u v y f T ug* (New York: University Press of America, 1981), 42-45.

[18] Preston, Roland and Wise, *M I A : A H   y f W f   I   l   p w   W   y*, 14-21.

centuries. It was with such a simple philosophical appreciation of the nature of war and peace that the Greek city-states were able to master the art of *war* and control the basin of the Mediterranean under the standard of the *Delian* League for more than three centuries.[19]   *a*

The understanding of war changed little during the early days of Rome. The Republic grew from the single city-state of Rome where the army was a national or citizen levy found in the beginning of all states.[20] The surviving military thoughts of Marcus Tullius Cicero show that all male citizens of Rome were expected to join the military to fight the Republic's wars in the *legions* as part of a "civic sense of duty."[21] As the representative of the body politic, the Roman Senate ensured that when the *legions* were used to conquer Italy between the fifth and second century BC, they did so for the common good of the Republic and in an organised and legitimate manner respecting the "primacy of law." Although Roman military campaigns could be extremely brutal, war, nevertheless, was conducted by the Romans with the *auspicious*

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Of all of the works from antiquity, the works of the Roman Flavius Vegetius Renatus are the best known. His works were the result of a systematic review of all of the military works of antiquity. Some historians would argue that his works have been the most influential on military thought over the centuries. See Flavius Vegetius Renatus, *The Military Institutions of the Romans,* ed. Thomas R. Philip (Harrisburg: *a* Stackpole Books, 1944) and M. Cary, D. Litt, *A History of Rome* (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1965), 64-156.

[21] Cicero was the most prominent of Roman orators. He believed that a "civic sense of duty" provided the foundation for Rome's greatness. See Brayton and Landwehre, *The Politics of War and Peace: A Survey of Thought,*

or the Roman "law of peoples" in mind. The *ius gentium* was based on a view that there were legal norms binding on all people regardless of nationality.[22]

As the Republic grew in numbers and territory into an empire at the close of the first century BC, so too did its understanding and use of war. At the heart of the desire for empire manifested in the *Pax* or the Roman theory of peace was the need to gain riches for Rome. The Roman imperial economy was largely based on agriculture and dependent on slave labour. Both could only be found in the conquered territories and gained and held with large standing armies.[23] Understandably, to support 30 *legions* of approximately 60,000 men each stationed along the frontier of the Empire demanded a large proportion of the state's revenue.[24] The Romans therefore came to appreciate at the beginning of the first century AD the that the use of military power as a means to political ends was limited due to the explosive growth of the Empire and a need to maintain the *legions* at the four corners of the

145-146. Also Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World*, 47-101.

[22] Doyne Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World*, 47-101.

[23] E. Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, 2nd ed. (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968), 3-8.

[24] Walter Opello and Stephen J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Polity* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Riemer Press, 1999), 18. According to Dawson, one-fifth of all eligible citizens of the Roman Empire were under arms each year. Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World*, 112-114.

known world.[25] The Romans came to realize that war was costly and could quickly change the political landscape. It therefore needed to be subordinated as much as practically possible to political goals. As noted by Edward Luttwak, the goal of Roman statecraft was to provide security for civilisation without prejudicing the vitality of the economic base and evolving political order.[26]

At the close of the classical period of history, military power had become an instrument of decentralised state politics as part of a greater Roman Imperial strategy that included economic and diplomatic power - the essential condition of the strategic success of the armies of Rome.[27] This is not to say that the Roman Empire was not a highly organised military state, or that war was not a common denominator throughout the history of Rome. Without a doubt, given the inextricable linkage between Roman economic prosperity and Roman imperialism, it is understandable that war rose in magnitude and importance during the rise and fall of Rome. The death of one tenth of the Roman male population during the First Punic Wars is a testament to the degree of militarism in Roman society.[28] Even so, military power and the conduct of war were

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[25] Litt, *A H____y _f ____*, 156-257.

[26] Edward N. Luttwak, *T__ G__ ____gy _f ___ ___ _ E_ p___* (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976), 1.

[27] Luttwak, *T_ G__ ____gy _f ___ ___ _ E_ p___*, 2 and Graham *a d S a* Webster, *T__ ___ _ I_ p__ l A__y: T__ F___ _ ____ C__u____ AD a a* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1969), 16-46.

[28] Webster, *T__ ___ _ I_ p__ l A__y: T__ F___ _ ____ C__u___ a AD*, 26-27.

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conserved and constrained, and more importantly, integrated into the Roman state. This allowed Rome to realise long periods of relative peace that permitted prosperity, an advanced civilisation, and the Golden Age of Rome. In the end, by regulating the condition of war through a singleness of purpose, Roman civilisation was not solely focussed on making war, a point that was overlooked by the Spartan military oligarchy a thousand years before the fall of the Empire.[29]

It was with such a clear political understanding of the dyadic relationship between the conditions of war and peace that Rome became the first civilisation to achieve *imperium* *_____* and the first empire.

The fall of the Roman Empire in the fourth century AD ushered in one of the most pervasive influences on our understanding of the nature of war in the Western world. In the final days of Rome, Christianity was taking a full hold on early Western civilisation. By the third century AD, the administrative framework of the Christian Church was firmly established and the New Testament was accepted as authoritative throughout most of the Empire.[30] Much of the work

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[29] It was sociologist Stanislav Andreski who first advanced the idea of a Military Participation Ratio or MPR that allows one to measure the degree to which a society has been militarised. In short, a society that has a high MPR will have most of its citizens supporting the military complex. Such an arrangement cannot be sustained for long periods of time before such a society begins to atrophy. In these cases, civilisation and war are one and the same. See Stanislav Andreski, *M l____ y O g_____ _____ y* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1968), 116-118. *S*

[30] The emergence of Christianity as the predominant religion in the Roman Empire was due, in the main, to an organisation whose bureaucracy surpassed all other private religions at the time. The Church was complete

of the early Christian Church was taken from the Greek Stoic philosophers whose anti-militaristic view of war had silently permeated the laws and statecraft of Greece and Rome.[31] It was against this backdrop that Roman theologians and jurists of the new Christian Church began to interpret and to define war in religious and legal realms using in one hand the scriptures as a guide, and in the other an overriding belief that "war's cause lay in man's sin and in God's answering punishment, though the punishment obviously had to be administered by other men."[32] It was left to the Roman theologian Saint Augustine in the third century AD to create and codify the accepted classical justification of war in the Christian faith. In his landmark work *The City of God*, Saint Augustine outlined the beginning of the "just war theory " and unleashed on Western civilisation a view that war could be a means to religious ends if it was fought to avenge injuries."[33]

The political and social cohesion that provided order to the classical period of history collapsed around the fourth century AD. Much of the Roman Empire was overrun by highly mobile and barbaric nomads from the western, eastern, and the northern frontiers. The barbarians divided the Empire into

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in all of its essentials throughout the Roman Empire at the time of Marcus Aurelius in the first century AD. Litt, *A History of Rome*, 762-765.

[31] Dawson, *The Western Way of War: Military and Military in the Ancient World*, 123-126.

[32] Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1973), 232-233.

[33] Dawson, *The Western Way of War: Military and Military in the Ancient World*, 123-141 and 172-173.

barbarian kingdoms in Italy, France, Spain, and North Africa, while the Roman Empire continued in the east.[34] The collapse of Rome ushered in the Dark Ages of Western civilisation and a return to a primitive, eccentric, but yet practical understanding of the nature of war for almost six centuries throughout Europe.[35] Since the barbarians shared none of the values and assumptions of civilised societies, there was a total breakdown during the Dark Ages of the order found in classical civilisation as well as the disappearance of a rational understanding and use of the institution of war. As noted by Gwynne Dyer, the successive waves of barbarian invaders caused delays and setbacks to Western civilisation, explaining in part why progress is a relatively recent concept in the Western world.[36]

War for the barbarians or foreigners lacked any political or military purpose. They did not conquer nor occupy, but rather chose to go to war for primitive reasons - to plunder. They relied on their ability to avoid battle in order to preserve their military strength using an "indirect approach" to the conduct of war.[37] They were less well organised, trained, and disciplined than the Roman legions, but were

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[34] Hans Delbruck, *History of the Art of War Vol III The Medieval Age*, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982) and Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 92-148.

[35] Preston, Roland and Wise, *Men In Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society,* 44-85.

[36] Gwynne Dyer, *War* (London: The Bodley Head, 1985), 47-49.

[37] Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World*, 92-109.

highly mobile, being mostly mounted on horse which allowed them to outmanoeuvre the slower moving l g .[38] Of greater import is that the barbarian horsemen were able to "put practically their entire male population of military age into battle" since they were by nature hunters and herdsmen who also possessed superior fighting skill and mobility.[39] The slaughter of 40,000 Roman soldiers and the emperor Valens in a matter of hours at the city of Adrianople by a smaller mounted barbarian Gothic force provides a stark reminder that a rudimentary understanding of war based on mass, and the fighting skill and courage of the individual warrior, can be a lethal combination even against a highly trained, disciplined, and organised military force.

When a stable social structure finally re-emerged in Europe during the ninth century AD, a varied number of decentralised geographical agrarian powers and small local medieval citizen peasant armies had replaced the barbarian invaders.[40] For that reason, medieval peasant armies and military tactics became organised around an understanding of war that was a reflection of local political, social,

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[38] Ibid., 43.

[39] Dyer, *W* , 47-49.   *a*

[40] The Moslem disruption of the historic Mediterranean trading area meant that by the beginning of the ninth century, land was the only source of wealth in Europe. C.W.C. Oman, *T A f W M l Ag : A.D 378-1515* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1953), 152-165. Also Michael Howard, *W Eu p H y* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 2.*a*

economic, and most importantly geographical conditions.[41]
Little time was spent to train medieval armies before they
would embark on a campaign due to the high costs of
maintaining decentralised feudal armies. Violence in battle
could therefore be rarely constrained or checked through
discipline and training as it had been during the classical
period of history. The results were savage and brutal wars, as
war during the medieval period became a reflection of simple
tactical objectives such as "to assert or defend personal
rights of property, to enforce obedience of vassals, to defend
or extend Christendom, or to protect the Church's interest
against heresy."[42]

In all, war during the Middle Ages became an inefficient
and blunt instrument of barbarian and feudal limited
objectives. The perceived clear delineation between war and
peace that was prevalent in Greek and Roman civilisations
became blurred. The lack of any central political authority in
Europe and the lack of control over armies made war a
ubiquitous and unruly part of European civilisation during the
Middle Ages.[43] The decline of government, culture, art,
commerce, and technology that was witnessed during the Middle

[41] Keith F. Otterbein, *The Evolution of War: A Cross-Cultural Study* (New York: HRAF Press, 1970), 104-108. Also J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of War from the Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages: From a Eighth Century and 1340* (Woodbridge: Woodbridge Press, 1997), 276-349.

[42] Kalevi J. Hoslti, *The Peace, War and the State of War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2 and Archer, *The Art of War in the Western World*, 107-136.

[43] Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages: A.D. 378-1515*, 152-153.

Ages was also extended to the study and understanding of the phenomenon of war. In fact, no military literature worthy of name can be found in Western Europe from the fourth to the fifteenth century AD.[44] At the end of the day, it is fair to conclude that the understanding of the nature of war as a function of society was lost during the Middle Ages in Europe.[45] Yet even in the obscurity of the Middle Ages, certain aspects of Western civilisation did have an impact on the evolution of the understanding of war in the Western world both in substance and in spirit.

The supremacy of the church reached its peak during the Middle Ages from 1000 to 1300 AD. As noted by Bernard Brodie, the medieval church supported the ideal of *P E l* which "permeated all aspects of the understanding of medieval war."[46] The popes did strive with some success during this period to suppress both national and international wars by pursuing the goal of *u   v l* with the ruling class.[47] Yet, it was left to the Dominican Friar Saint Thomas Aquinas in the middle of the thirteenth century to bring various strands of the

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[44] John E. Jessup, Jr. and Robert W. Coakley, *A Gu   u y   f M l y H   y* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 63-65.

[45] So little attention was paid to strategy, or to such fundamental questions of supply and knowledge of terrain and of the enemy's movement during the Middle Ages that opposing armies often searched fruitlessly for each other. Preston, Roland and Wise*, M I A : A H   y f W f   I   l   p w l W   y,* 70-71 and Colin S. Gray, *M   gy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1-2.

[46] Brodie, *W   P l   ,* 234.

[47] Ibid.

church's understanding of war together to produce a comprehensive body of law on war for the Western world. Building on the classical works of Saint Augustine and Aristotle, Aquinas developed the concept of "just and unjust wars" into the notion of *qu l* or the "peace that comes from within." His landmark work was the first to bring focus and form to the study of war in the Western world in over two thousand years by providing rules outlining "the right intention of war," that being when war was considered "just and unjust."[48] As such, Aquinas provided the spiritual justification that Christians needed to use war in the temporal realm during the Middle Ages and to accept its consequences for the next five hundred years:

> True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars
> that are waged not for motives of *g* ,
> or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace,
> of punishing evil doers, and of uplifting the good.[49]

The understanding of war took a sharp turn beginning around the middle of the fifteenth century forming a watershed in the political and social development of Europe and our understanding of war in Western civilisation. Powerful forces at work in society gradually replaced the notion of empire, diminished the power of the Church, and replaced the feudal aristocracy with the modern state. As noted by Richard Preston, Alex Roland and Sydney Wise," the transformation of

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[48] See J.T. Johnson, *I l gy, L f W d* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[49] Brayton and Landwehr, *T P l f W P : A u v y f T ug* , 66-70.

dissension-ridden feudal states into strong national
monarchies and the breakdown in the temporal authority of the
Church were due primarily not to military developments, but
rather to vast social and economic movements" at play in
Western civilisation.[50] In the end, the combination of the
Renaissance and the Reformation proved powerful enough to
introduce secularism into the conduct of state affairs. On the
other hand, the collapse of military feudalism, the growth of
commerce and exchange, the money economy, and international
bankers all gave way to strong and independent states that
slowly began to use the institution of war as an instrument to
achieve state policy.

Adding to the social jumble of the early modern age was a
rise across Europe and North America in democratisation and
more importantly liberal cosmopolitalism. The humanists
throughout Europe began to openly assail the "just war theory"
of the Church with a view that "war was a man made evil that
could be minimised."[51] As the works and ideas of the
"idealists" such as Desiderius Erasmus, John Colet, and Sir
Thomas Moore became widespread and were discussed within and
between the states of Europe, the European states slowly began
to take into account the views of their citizens when it came

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[50] Preston, Roland and Wise, *M   I   A   : A H   y f W f   I   l   p   w   W   y,* 70-71.   *a*   *S*

[51] Brodie, *O   W   P l   ,* 234-235.   *a   a d*

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to the matter of war.[52] In contrast, the terribly devastating

Thirty Years War led realists such as Hugo de Grotius to

codify customs and uses of war based on "natural law" and a

conviction that war would always remain part of modern

civilisation. His pioneering and widely read work *De jure*

belli ac pacis made it possible for the warring factions of

the time to know what was expected of them if they wished to

retain good repute among civilised Christian states.[53]

It was in the fifteenth century that the first modern

classic military treatise on war in almost one thousand years

was written by the politico-military theorist Nicolli

Machiavelli. In his most famous work *The Prince*, Machiavelli

resurrected a classical Roman understanding of the nature of

war. Machiavelli was of the view that war was, in essence, a

branch of politics that was best fought by the nation in arms

and with humane restraint.[54] Such a lethal conception of war

would haunt Western civilisation for five hundred years as the

armies of Europe and North America went to war to defeat the

enemy's army, occupy territory, or break the will of the

people with little regard to the harm that the institution of

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[52] For a comprehensive examination of the rise of socialism and the
emphasis of the "power of the individual and ideas" in modern history see
Edmund Wilson, *To the Finland Station: A Study in the Writing and Acting of History* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940) and Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[53] Abbott and Landwehr, *The Philosophy of War and Peace: A Survey of Thought*, 99-105 and Brodie, *On War and Politics*, 243.

[54] Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 11-31.

war had on civilisation. At the end of the day, what evolved in Europe and was extended to North America by European colonialism was a system and understanding of war distinguished by its rational and disciplined application of military power by the state.[55]

It was left to the military theorists Baron de Jomini and Karl von Clausewitz to bring Machiavelli's ideas to full bloom in the middle of the eighteenth century and to codify the "state centric concept" of war for the Western world.[56] In his most famous misquoted and misunderstood dictum, Clausewitz rallied the Western world at the end of the nineteenth century under the banner that "war was an extension of politics by another means."[57] According to Clausewitz, war could be understood and manipulated by man for the good of mankind if war was viewed as a trinity that kept the state, the military, and the people in harmony and perfect balance.[58]

From a military point of view, the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 and the War in Kosovo in 1999 became the bookends for the modern era of history for the Western world.[59] The

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[55] Howard, *W   Eu p H   y*, 94-115 and see Snow and Drew, *B   a L   g   D   : W   P l   A   E p   . S   a a*

[56] Paret, *M   f M   gy*, 143-185 and 186-213.   *a   d S*

[57] Clausewitz actually wrote that "war is the continuation of political intercourse" which in German has a more delicate and multifaceted idea than it does in English. Clausewitz, *O W *, 77.

[58] Michael I. Handel, *M   f W : Cl   l   g T ug   a* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 102-109.

[59] Opello and Rosow, *T N   -   Gl l O   *, 29-153.   *a*

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brutality of the Thirty Years War forced Europeans to reject the mercenary armies that had become commonplace throughout Europe during the late Middle Ages. Instead, large standing armies were formed to provide for the security of the nation state at home and abroad. All kingdoms in Europe from 1650 to 1800 had created standing armies controlled and paid directly by governments.[60] Yet due to the prohibitive costs of maintaining large standing armies, war remained a limited tool of European statecraft. This is not to say that war was not almost a constant of the early period of modern history. Indeed, as noted by William Eckhardt, the intensity and duration of war from 1600 to 1800 in Europe almost doubled from the Middle Ages.[61] Yet, the political consequences of the use of military power in broad terms during the seventeenth, and specifically during the eighteenth century, was unusually small. Monarchs safeguarded their wealth and national economy. War became slow and cumbersome and restricted to well defined borders leading to an "age of limited warfare" which spared civilians the tactical consequences of war.[62]

It was Napoleon Bonaparte with the *levée en masse* and a renewed French nationalism that showed the Western world how war could become total in the eyes of the nation state at the

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[60] Howard, *War in European History*, 32-94.

[61] William Eckhardt, *Civilizations, Empires and Wars: A Quantitative Analysis of War*, (Jefferson N.C.: McFarland Publishing, 1992), 107-109.

[62] Howard, *War in European History*, 20-92.

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beginning of the nineteenth century.[63] The transformation of

mass warfare by the *levee en masse* into total war in the

modern style took little more than one century with the help

of the Industrial Revolution.[64] Yet the additional study and

resources that were applied to the understanding of war in the

Western world over the past two centuries did not make the

institution of war progressively more decisive, even if it did

increase in speed, complexity, and destructiveness.[65] The First

and Second Great Wars are testaments to an age where the

institution of war increased in magnitude, understanding, and

purpose, but failed to provide a lasting and durable peace. In

consequence of this paradox, citizens began to challenge the

validity and the relevance of Clausewitz' trinity in

explaining the nature of war and why men should die for the

state.[66] The mutiny of fifty-four divisions of the French Army

in March 1917 and four hundred thousand Italian troops at

Caparetto in the same year were a reflection of the inability

of citizens to appreciate, and more importantly, to accept the

"trinitarian element of subordination" as a rational

instrument of state policy.[67]

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[63] Keegan, *The History of Warfare*, 350.

[64] Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: the conflict in international relations 1648-1989* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 138-169.

[65] John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973), 31.

[66] Robert A. Doughty and Ira D. Gruber, *Warfare in the Western World* (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996), xxi and xxii.

[67] Hugh McManners, *The scars of War* (Suffolk: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 78-84.

In the final analysis, the conception of war in Western civilisation during the modern age of history was based on a rational and methodical use of the institution of war that attempted to mate ends with means at any cost as part of international statecraft.[68] As a result, the world witnessed two total wars that had a devastating effect on mankind and Western civilisation leaving approximately fourteen million dead and three million missing. Nevertheless, it did not bring an end to the use of war by the Western world to achieve political ends. Rather, following the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union brought a new meaning to the understanding of the phenomenon of war with the birth of the Cold War that was based on a view that nuclear war could be a means to political ends if it was categorised by certain thresholds that international law and opinion recognised as war.[69]

The potential of global devastation as a result of a worldwide nuclear war ensured, nonetheless, that the institution of war in the Western world at the close of the modern age of history again became limited in nature as it had during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Korean War, Vietnam War, Falklands War, Gulf War of 1991, and finally the War in Kosovo in 1999 are all testaments to a period in

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[68] Collins, *G   gy: P   pl   P   *, 5-6 and Jessup *a d S   a* and Coakley, *A Gu   u y   f M l y H   y*, 117.   *d   S d*

[69] Wright, *A   u y f W *, 5-7 and Michael Howard, * u   W   S d   a   P   * (London: Western Printing Services, 1970), 213-227*a*

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history when war was constrained by the Western world through
a blend of understanding and imposed international agreements
on the use of military force. Yet limiting the destructive
powers and effects of modern war to ensure that war could
continue to be used by Western civilisation as a means to
political ends did not, however, bring greater clarity to the
understanding of war in the Western world. Rather, the
introduction and the widespread use of new forms of warfare
called peacekeeping and peacemaking during the final decade of
the second millennium only served to obscure the conception of
war in the Western world. Even to this day, there is little if
any agreement among military theorists on a common
understanding of these new forms of warfare that have
attempted to minimise, and in some cases, remove the realities
of war from Western civilisation through restraint.[70] As noted
by Clausewitz, "to introduce the principle of moderation into
the theory of war itself would always lead to logical
absurdity."[71] Leaving broad generalities behind, it may be fair
to conclude that the social condition of the Western world at
the beginning of the third millennium may have led the
institution of war in its current form and practice to a point
of irrelevance and absurdity in the history of the evolution
of Western civilisation.

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[70] See Martin van Creveld, *T* *T* *f* *f W* (New York: The Free Press, 1991).

[71] Clausewitz, *O* *W*, 76. Also see Van Creveld, *T* *T* *f* *f* *a W*.

COMMON THREADS IN THE WESTERN CONCEPTION OF WAR

It is evident from this brief historical review of the development of the conception of war in the Western world that the nature of war has changed in keeping with the shifting conceptions of the particular societal framework that emerged in Western civilisation.[72] Indeed, even Clausewitz noted, "every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions."[73] Yet despite the underlying major differences in the conception of war during the history of Western civilisation, history suggests that by its very nature war exhibits some continuity in the midst of change.

The history of the development of the conception of war in the Western world demonstrates that there are elements or nodal points that are common to the understanding of the phenomenon of war in the Western world. Yet, since the nature of war is the result of the interaction of innumerable unrelated processes that cannot be measured nor predicted, these signposts do not form a *pu* or a body of theory on war.[74] They cannot therefore explain the realities of the whole, but rather can suggest generalities where no specifics

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[72] Clark, *W g g W : A P l p l I u*, 19.

[73] Clausewitz, *O W*, 93.

[74] Bretnor, *D v W f*, 23.

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can be found or theory formed. The principal point which seems worthy of attention is that these signposts can, however, be used to extrapolate, in general terms, the possible curves of the future development of the understanding of war in the Western world.[75]

Any attempt to impose a modicum of analytical order on this complex issue must first begin with the line of reasoning that war in the Western world was not viewed as a force of nature, but rather as a force that was the product of Western civilisation and in control of mankind. Granted, aggression is a part of man's genetic makeup, however, war is not.[76] The past has shown the institution of war was an invention that was developed during the classical period of history and refined into an art and science during the modern period of Western civilisation.[77] Simply put, the more primitive the people, the less warlike. When humans survived by gathering and scavenging during the primitive age of history, there was little if any war at all.[78] Yet, as Western civilisation evolved and increased in scope and scale throughout the world, so too did the phenomenon of war. With the emergence of the state system in Europe at the beginning of the fifteenth century, the institution of war began to play a predominant role in the

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[75] Ibid., 14.

[76] S.P Reyna and R.E. Downs, *Study ng Wa: A nthropolg cal Pspectvs* (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1994), 185.

[77] Ibid., 69-113.

[78] Otterbein, *Th Evlutin f Wa: A Css-Culual ludy*, 1-4.

Western world and the international order. By the close of the twentieth century, the institution of war had become firmly embedded in the political and social fabric of Western civilisation.

Given the pervasive influence of the Western world on the evolution of war and the international system during the past five hundred years, some scholars have argued that the history of war is ⊔⊔ ⊔⊔⊔ Eurocentric.[79] Although this supposition may seem attractive at first glance, it fails to appreciate that the institution of war developed in Eastern civilisation much earlier than in Western civilisation and along a dissimilar path of understanding. Indeed, as noted by John Keegan, "long befo 4nyin Westerd soetyar haarrctidve aa phi clophyon of w,ng thChinelos

Western civilisation invented war in its own image during the past two thousand years.

Next, war was not waged throughout the Western world by states or by individuals, but by mankind. It was fought by groups of people and therefore has implied a certain "social cohesion" throughout the history of Western civilisation. War was fought throughout the history of the Western world by people or citizens formed into cohesive fighting bodies such as the *p l* , the *l g* , or the *l v* that fought *a a* under a common cause such as a civic sense of duty, economic reasons, religion, the spoils of war, or nationalism. As so fittingly noted by Napoleon, this is why the moral force that binds individuals into a cohesive social group is to the physical four to one in determining the outcome of battle.[82] Granted, moral force does not win wars; physical force wins wars. Yet, the success of the French Revolutionary armies against the Prussian forces at the battle of Valmy in 1792 and the Austrians at Jemappes in 1793 was not due to a revolution in military affairs, but rather a fervent French nationalism that bound French citizens into a cohesive fighting force of the *l v* .[83] To be sure, the weapons and the tactics *a* that the French Revolutionary armies used at Valmy and Jemappes were not new and were available to others before the

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[82] Justin Wintle, *T D   y f M l   y u   * (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 69.

[83] For a detailed account of the battles of Valmy and Jemappes see Louis Gottschalk, *E   f   F   v lu   * (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, *a* 1929). Also, see Keegan, *T H   y f W f   *, 222.

Revolution. Instead, it was the solidarity of French citizens, formed into the *levée en masse* around a common cause that became an effective and ruthless instrument of the body politic of France at the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth century under Napoleon.[84] It was the same social solidarity at the end of the eighteenth century that unhinged the state and replaced the power of the monarchy with power of the people in France and began the "liberal revolution" that swept across the Western world from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. All told, the understanding of war throughout the history of Western civilisation has taken into account that war has been a social phenomenon waged by groups of people bound into a cohesive force under a common cause.

At the heart of the understanding of war in the Western world has been the concept of *res publica* or common good for the polity defined in the modern period of history as the vital interest of the state.[85] Indeed, during the Classical and modern periods of history war was used and justified as a means of policy, constrained, and limited by the body politic as part of a greater strategy to create, maintain, and expand

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[84] See Preston, Roland and Wise, *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society*, 159-163.

[85] John Collins provides a simple, but yet useful definition of the state or national interest, "highly generalized abstractions that reflect each state's basic wants and needs." See Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices*, 1. Also Jeffrey Record, "A Note on Interests, Values and the Use of Force," *Parameters* (Spring, 2001), 15-21.

the political order based on the common good of the polity.
This is not to say that one can place a degree of tactical
granularity on the realities and benefits of war. In this
respect, Clausewitz' eighteenth century tactical understanding
of war speaks volumes to a pragmatic examination of the
harvest of war – war is bloody and results in death and
destruction no matter how small or how large, or for what
common good.[86] Understandably, the attempt by modern Western
scholars to quantify and to form a nomenclature of war based
on tactical values clearly fails to appreciate that
underpinning the understanding of war throughout the history
of Western civilisation has been a strategic appreciation of
the use of war for the common good of the polity.[87] Indeed,
even when the Western powers formally outlawed the use of war
as a means of state-craft as signatories to the General Treaty
for the Renunciation of War - Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, it
did not prevent the Western powers of Germany, France, and
Great Britain from leading the world into a total war only ten
years later from 1939 to 1945. Simply put, the use of the
institution of war for the common good of the polity was
ingrained both in the intellectual understanding and how war
was practiced in each of these Western states and could

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[86] Clausewitz, *O   W *, 75.   *a*

[87] For example, the work of Lewis F. Richardson states that the
threshold of war is only crossed when there are 1,000 deaths. See Lewis F.
Richardson,   ⸱ ⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱ *f D   ly*|*u ⸱⸱⸱ l*⸱ (Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press,   *ad*
1960). Also Eckhardt, *C v l⸱ ⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱, E p⸱⸱ ⸱ W ⸱: A*|*u ⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱ v⸱ A⸱ ly*⸱⸱ ⸱   *a*
⸱*f W ⸱* and see T.N. Dupuy, *Nu ⸱⸱⸱ , P⸱⸱ ⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱ ⸱   W ⸱: ⸱a ⸱g H⸱⸱⸱⸱ y*⸱⸱   *b*
Ev lu ⸱⸱ C⸱⸱⸱ F⸱⸱⸱⸱⸱ ⸱ P⸱⸱ ⸱⸱⸱ ⸱⸱ Ou ⸱⸱⸱⸱ ⸱f B ⸱⸱l⸱a (New York: The   ⸱⸱⸱   *a d   d*
Bobbs Merrill Company, 1979).

therefore not be "shaken off easily" through degrees of diplomacy.

In sum, the evolution of our understanding of war in Western civilisation has been an appreciation of war from a strategic vantagepoint, one based on a comprehension that sees the justification of the use of the institution of war when a common good or vital interest of the polity is discernible. As the high watermarks in the use of military power during the modern period of history, The Gulf War of 1991 and the War in Kosovo in 1999 clearly show that war continues to be doled out by Western powers in a graduated and measured strategic approach, culminating in a final Clausewitzian grand recipe of decision that attempts to serve the vital interest of the state or the nation regardless of the outcome.[88] As Ernest Renan so aptly noted:

> A nation is to have common glories in the past,
> common will in the present; to have done great
> things together; to wish to do greater: these are
> the essential conditions which make up a people.[89]

A regular theme in the understanding and practice of war in the Western world has also been the use of sets of ethical and legal constraints founded on the ancient primacy of "law and good." The function of these constraints in the past was to provide moral weight to the conduct of war as well as a

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[88] See Norman H. Schwartskopf, *I   '   * ed. Peter Petre (New York: Bantam Books, 1992) and Wesley K. Clark, *W g g M   W * (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2001).

[89] Collins, *G   gy: P   pl   P   *, 14-21.   *a d S a*

restrictive element that would outlaw wars that did not meet certain "criteria of justness." Greek and the Roman laws provided, in some measure, a standard conduct of international and regional action that attempted to make human affairs and conflict susceptible to the legal control of the Classical state.[90] In accordance with the Roman laws of the time, Caesar justified his military actions to the Senate during the Roman campaigns against the Helvetians in 55 AD, explaining why he was using force and his plan of action to achieve his ends.[91] Moreover, he even explained to his adversary the German Teutonic king why he was waging war against the Germans – to defend an ally of Rome.[92]

Complementing and building on the work of the Greek Stoic and Roman philosophers, the Christian church in the third century AD began to provide greater fidelity and clarity to the Western conception of war. However, as the political power of the medieval state grew out of the Dark Ages, mankind began to realise that what happened was not due to any divine action, but rather the result of mere chance.[93] Even then, as the intellectuals of society, the clergy had enormous power since it was the Church until the Treaty of Westphalia who

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[90] Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World*, 121-135.

[91] Ibid., 111-124.

[92] See R.L. Phillips, *War and Justice* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984).

[93] Opello and Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order*, 57.

interpreted and communicated legal and moral ideas to Western

civilisation. Following the Treaty of Westphalia, however, it

fell to the state to create and to maintain order in Western

civilisation through the use of an emerging body of

international customs, that in many cases, became law in

Western civilisation over the past five hundred years.[94]

It was at the end of the nineteenth century that most

European states met to establish and codify the laws of war

and how war should be conducted in a Western tradition by

Western nations in order to avoid unnecessary casualties among

innocent bystanders or prisoners of war.[95] By doing so, the

Western powers ensured that the primacy of "law and good" that

was first established by the Greeks and Romans would be

omnipresent during the prosecution of war in the modern period

of history. As a case in point, the notion of "law and good"

as embodied in The Hague and Geneva Conventions provided the

basis for Germany's war guilt in 1919. It was also used as a

leavening agent against the leadership of Germany and Japan at

the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. When all is said and done, the

conception of war in the Western world has been based on an

understanding of war that has included both ethical and legal

constraints founded on the ancient primacy of "law and good."

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[94] Christopher Greenwood, *I D f   f   L w   f W   (*New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), 133-147.

[95] Opello and Rosow, *T   N   Gl   l O   ,* 227 and *a* Michael Walzer, *Ju   ju   W   (*New York: Basic Books, 1977), 51-73. *a d*

Finally, war and peace in Western terms do not have
definite physical beginnings or ends, even though there have
been many attempts during the last century to demonstrate that
they in fact do.[96] To attempt to separate war and peace using
specific physical values has proven futile. Lying between
these two extremes or social conditions are other forms of
conflict that have been used to define the phenomenon of war
throughout the history of the Western world.

The beginning of war can be consciously calculated;
however, history has shown that the time and place for the
condition or state of peace to begin can be rarely
determined.[97] From a military angle, peace is dependent on two
interrelated variables that are in a state of constant flux
and friction. First of all, the ends to be achieved in war
define, in most cases, when war can and will be brought to an
end. On the other hand and more importantly, the scope and the
scale, or the allotment of means to the pursuit of ends
defines how far war will come to a stated or unstated end and
when peace will begin. Given that these two military variables
of the equations of war and peace can be easily affected by a
myriad of other factors, history has demonstrated that
attempting to bring order to the study of war by defining war,
conflict, and peace in terms of physical values, not only
complicates, but also confuses the understanding of the nature

[96] Wright, *A u y f W* , 218-248.   *S d   a*

[97] Brodie, *W   P l   ,* 276-340.   *a   a d*

of war. The Vietnam War showed that it was difficult if not impossible for Western scholars to define war as a precise condition in even simple physical terms of time and space.[98] As a result, the United States never did declare war on North Vietnam during the eleven years that it was at war.

In short, war and peace are social conditions that cannot be explained using only objective factors. They cannot be determined or defined in military terms using thresholds of force, degradation of force levels, types of military activities, or legal conditions as values to discriminate when they begin and end.[99] Rather, the history of the Western world has shown that the conception of war is determined by a vastly complex interplay in civilisation of political, social, economic, and finally technological forces. To be sure, the anthropological study of war during the past century has shown that concepts of war "belong to the societies that raise the armies, to the economies and technologies that those societies sustain."[100] Given the foregoing, it follows that generalities could only be found to attempt to explain the phenomenon of war in the Western world that has been shaped over the past

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[98] For a concise examination of the Vietnam War from a strategic perspective see Collins, *G   gy: P   P   pl ,* 237-258.   *a d S*
Also see Harry G. Summers, Jr., *O   gy: A C   l A ly   f   *
*   W * (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982).   *a   a*

[99] Lawrence Freedman, *W * (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994),   *a*
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[100] Morton Fried, Marvin Harris and Robert Murphy, *W : T *
*A   p l gy f A   C fl   Agg   * (New York: The Natural   *d   a*
History Press, 1968), 91-96.

two thousand years by the social, economic, and technological
forces at work in Western civilisation.

THE FORCES AT WORK IN POST-MODERN CIVILISATION

As the Western world slowly begins to move into the third
millennium, it is becoming increasingly clear that powerful
forces are once again transforming Western civilisation and
its conception of war. These changes are comparable to the
changes that pulled humanity out of the Middle Ages and led to
a new understanding of war in the Western world with the birth
of the state in the fifteenth century. This is not to argue
that the state will disappear in the future.[101] As noted by
Kalvi Holsti, "alternative configurations of state-like
political units are at least imaginable in the next
millennium."[102] Yet, until another political creature is
conceived and developed in the minds of man, the state as a
social and economic unit will remain unparalleled and
attractive to the Western world. At a more fundamental level,
since it took approximately three thousand years for
civilisation to produce the state, it is fair to presume that
many centuries will elapse before a new political organism is

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[101] For an excellent overview of both sides of the argument on the
future of the state see "The State," *The Economist* September 20 1997: 5-
48. Also Martin van Creveld, "The Fate of the State," *Parameters* (Spring,
1996), 4-18.

[102] K.J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: *S a*
Cambridge University Press, 1996), xii.

found to take the place of the state in the international arena. Nonetheless, the social, economic, and technological forces that transformed the understanding of war in Western civilisation during the past two thousand years are again transforming the elements at the heart of the understanding of war in the Western world, leading to a conception of war that will be different in character than in the past. Given that the interaction between the irrational forces and Western civilisation will be so complex, some scholars have termed the new age, "the age of complexity."[103]

At the heart of the concept of the nation-state that emerged during the fifteenth century in Europe was the notion of belonging, a notion that defined citizens as those who were part of the state, and barbarians or foreigners as those who were not.[104] The sense of belonging was manifested in the Western conception of war as "social cohesion" or solidarity as embodied in the *p l *, the early *l g   *, and   *l v   * .[105] As has been noted, it was the "social cohesion"*a* of the citizens of the state that provided the foundation on which the Classical and modern state went to war and successfully fought its wars to achieve political ends.

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[103] Hans Binnendikj, "A Strategic Assessment for the 21st Century," *J   F |u   ly* (Autumn, 1996), 67-69.   *a*

[104] Howard, *W   Eu p   H   y*, 115-118.   *a*   *a*

[105] James N. Rosenau, *I   l P l   F   g P l y* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 76-90.

In establishing such a socio-political framework over the past two thousand years, the "fathers of the state concept" purposely developed social and territorial boundaries for the notion of citizenship and its commensurate rights in Western civilisation.[106] In doing so, a sense of social and cultural solidarity developed in the Western world due to common language, religion, and culture. Beginning in the Classical period of history, citizens began to identify themselves with a particular state that was defined by geographical boundaries and social limits. The homogeneity of Western society firmly embedded this view, forming in broad terms, "closed societies" throughout much of Europe and North America from the seventeenth to the twentieth century.[107]

Yet the exponential increase during the past decade in *l g* is beginning to challenge the concept a a of belonging, citizenship, social cohesion, and geographical boundaries in Western civilisation.[108] Without a doubt, the scope of movement of humankind across state and international boundaries over the past decade is making it difficult for Western states to be able to portray themselves as they did in

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[106] Ibid. In reality, the "true origin" of the state remains a mystery. Martin Sicker, *T G f* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 139.

[107] Keegan, *T H y f W f*, 134.

[108] See Oliver Schmidtke, "Transnational migration: A challenge to European citizenship regimes in World," *F g Aff* (Summer, 2001), 73-79.

the past as economically and geographically "closed."[109] Walter Opello and Stephen Rosow write "civil society at the end of the twentieth century moves rather freely across and through the territorial boundaries of the state."[110] All parts of the globe are affected as millions of people from all ethnic backgrounds are moving across state and international boundaries every year. As noted in the past, some 40% of the growth of the United States in the 1970s was from immigration.[111]

Given the increase in migration of humankind around the globe over the past decade, many Western states are finding themselves no longer as homogenous as they were in the past.[112] Instead, states that are formed on "islands of sub-cultures and sub-national group identities and communities" are slowly beginning to emerge on the international scene as they did after the collapse of the Roman Empire during the Dark Ages of history. Understandably, when the Germanic nomadic tribes overran the Roman Empire from the northern frontier in 4 AD, their spatial understanding of rule became defined by non-territorial ties due to the ongoing migration of kinfolk

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[109] Peter Kivisto, "Theorising transnational immigration: A Critical review of current efforts," *E   l u   * 24 (July, 2001), 549-577.

[110] Opello and Rosow, *T N   Gl l O   *, 232-233.   a

[111] Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *T Ag f M g   * (New York: The Guilford Press, 1993), 66-68.

[112] Ibid., 75-90.

throughout Europe.[113] In the end, as migration continues to increase particularly in Western civilisation over the next millennium, the geographical boundaries of the state will hold less relevance in defining the spatial dimensions of the state in the Western world.

The advances and the spread of telecommunication and transportation technologies during the past decade around the globe are also facilitating the rapid expansion and growth of *international law*. These emerging technologies are *also* beginning to break down the traditional characteristics of the state concept by linking immigrants with people and institutions in their home countries and increasing the awareness among the world's people through liberal cosmopolitanism.[114] This is not to say that *international law-making* produces "negative sovereignty." To be sure, *international law-making* has been identified as the key to *a* sustainable and equitable state and international economies in the future given the increased effects of globalisation on the demand for access to scarce resources.[115] Nevertheless, the exponential rise in *international law-making* coupled with

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[113] Kristian Berg Harpviken, "The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society," *Journal of Peace Research* 38 (September, 2001), 648-653. Also see Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1993). Also Opella and Rosow, *The New Global Order*, 243.

[114] Michael Maynard, "Policing transnational commerce: Global awareness in the margins of morality," *Journal of Business Ethics* (March, 2001), 17-27.

[115] See Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).

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unprecedented advances in technology and transportation around the globe will likely lead to states that lack a common language, history, and culture in the next millennium.

In the past, however, it was these social values that led to a common administrative authority on which the state based its power and right to use war as a means of state-craft in an integrated manner with all elements of national power to protect the state's vital interests. But where little common ground or good can be found due to the lack of a homogeneous social state structure, and where international relations cannot be defined by geography and state boundaries, it will be difficult for the state to find its vital interests and to define territorial boundaries as sub-national groups based on ethnic, religious, regional, linguistic, ideological, economic, or class disrupt the social cohesion of the state and the international order. In addition, since interests are not concrete ideas, but rather generalised abstractions that reflect the wants and needs of the citizens of the state, the task will be even more daunting for Western civilisation. Adding to this challenge as noted by Samuel Huntington is the fact that "cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved."[116]

Working on a parallel with the powers of   *l*   *g*   since the early 1970s and in particular during the

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Huntington, *Cl   f C v l   ?*, 5.   *a*

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past decade is the phenomenon of capital *globalisation* and industrialisation.[117] Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the mid-nineteenth century, *globalisation* has slowly been increasing the scope and scale of economic activity and exchange between people and industrialisation to a point where approximately $1.2 trillion dollars flows through the New York currency exchange each day.[118] Although the industrial capitalist system was developed as an international system, the world-wide exponential increase in technology and transportation systems, coupled with a rise in world wide capitalism during the past decade, are now slowly leading to a pattern of capital economic interdependencies that will make Western civilisation less economically self-sufficient and more specialised than ever before in the next millennium.[119] As a point in fact, the share of exports and imports in the United States has almost doubled from 7% in 1986 to 13% in 1996 due to market openings; it is expected to increase well into the future.[120] In the end, *globalisation* is freeing capital from national restraint and producing an integrated

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[117] Globalisation refers to "the complex of economic, technological, ecological, and cultural structures that are emerging on a global scale which ignore or deny the relevance of any state's territory." Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 117.

[118] John Kirton and George M. von Furstenberg, *New Directions in Global Economic Governance* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001), 133.

[119] Stephen J. Korbrin, "The Architecture of Globalisation: State Sovereignty in a Networked Global Economy," in John H. Dunning, ed., *Governments, Globalisation, and International Business* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 146-171.

international political and economic system where the interests of many states will in the future be involved in the "collision of a few."[121] To an extent, this change has already begun when one examines the growth in international unions and organisations over the past hundred years that are now responsible to manage the industrial capitalist system beyond traditional state boundaries.[122] The phenomenon of "synchronized economic recessions" that has been witnessed around the globe over the past decade and in particular in Western civilisation is also reflective of the general theme and thrust of an interdependent and integrated Western political and economic system in the next millennium.[123]

Adding to the shock of *globalisation* to Western civilisation is the fact that more wealth is now concentrated internationally than ever before through a system of large *multinational companies*. Unlike in the past, these *multinationals* are no longer tied to a single state or region, but instead have world-wide investments and therefore strategic vital interests around the world. In some cases, their political and economic power rivals those of some

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[120] Richard E. Harris, "Globalisation, Trade and Income," *Journal of Economics* 26 (November, 1993), 755-766.

[121] Ian Clark, *Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction*, 25.

[122] Craig N. Murphy, *International Organisation and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 47-48.

[123] "Room for Improvement," *The Economist* March 16 2002: 69-71.

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states.[124] The 500 largest *transnational corporations* produce one third of the world's manufactured goods, are responsible for three quarters of all commodity trade and provide four fifths of trade, technology, and management services.[125] Given their ability to potentially wield change globally by affecting the decisions of governments and international bodies, *transnational corporations* have been referred to by some as agents of cultural and economic hegemony."[126] Should the present trend continue, they are a force that "will have to be reckoned with" by governments in the future when they act on the international scene.

Finally, the state has been slowly loosing its ability to achieve state policy internationally through the use of military force and the institution of war since the beginning of the Cold War. On the one hand, the technological revolution witnessed during the last century has made modern weapon systems so lethal that they have, in some cases, lost their importance and developed to a point of diminished utility. The threat of thermonuclear war and the fear of an attendant worldwide nuclear winter limited and constrained the use of nuclear weapons by the international community to the point

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[124] Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1994), 15 and see Michael L. Maynard, Policing transnational commerce: Global awareness in the margins of morality, *Journal of Business Ethics* 30 (Spring, 1999).

[125] Kirten and Furstenberg, *New Dimensions in Global Economic Governance*, 65.

[126] Ibid.

where these weapons are now considered by most military planners to be obsolete.[127] As noted by Garrity Patrick, the domestic and international barriers for most states to use nuclear weapons remains very high.[128] One could extend this view slightly by suggesting that the even use of conventional warfare is not free from risks that may be unacceptable, making its use problematic in an integrated and globalized world of the future. In the end, the technology of modern warfare is limiting the reason for which it was developed by the state.

On the other hand it could be argued that it has been the steady increase over the past decade of the public outcry in Western civilisation against the devastating effects of the institution of modern war and not the revolution in technological affairs over the past century that has imposed legal restrictions and prohibitions on the conduct of modern war in the Western world. Indeed, most recently, the attempt by most Western states to prohibit the use of anti-personal landmines demonstrates the ability and the power of the third element of the Clausewitzian trinity – the people, to constrain the application of military power in the modern

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[127] See F.H. Hinsley, *P w   Pu u   f P   : T   y*   *P   H   y   f   l   B   w   * (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

[128] Garrity Patrick, "The Next Nuclear War," *P   * (Winter, 1995), 92-111.

period of history.[129] Regardless of the reason why, it is fair to conclude that modern technology and public opinion driven by a common humanity may together continue to limit and constrain the use of military force and the institution of war by Western civilisation well into the next millennium.

In the end, war was fought in broad terms in Western civilisation during the past two thousand years for economic gain or a sense of territorial security to achieve a specific strategic end for the common good or vital interest of the polity. In addition as noted by Francis Underhill, "it was also useful, satisfying and profitable for those who won."[130] The Greek *p l* , the Roman *l g* , and even the NATO coalition forces of the War in Kosovo in 1999, all achieved military aims that brought wealth, prestige, and/or a sense of territorial security to the victors. Yet the mammoth changes over the past decade to Clausewitz' irrational forces in Western civilisation have clearly diminished the ability of the state to represent itself as sovereign in the post-modern world. Given these changes, can the "state centric concept" of war that was developed in the Western world over the past two thousand years be applicable in the next millennium, or will it have lost its precise historical meaning and relevance?

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[129] See Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams, *Af Gu F ll l :
T E u g L g y f L* (Washington, DC: Vietnam Veterans of *a a d* America Foundation, 1995) and John English, "The Ottawa Process: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead," *Au l J u l f I l Aff* 25 (1998), 121-132.

[130] John McIntyre, *T Fu u f C fl* (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1978), 7.

Regardless of the answers to this fundamental question, it is clear from the history of Western civilisation that the understanding of war in the Western world will need to reflect future prospects if it is to serve the state and to be relevant in the next millennium.[131] Indeed, as noted by Clausewitz in his seminal work *On War*, any useful understanding of war will need to reflect the requirements of reality and not be in conflict with it.[132]

TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTION OF WAR

The impact of the social, economic, and technological changes on our understanding of war in the Western world will be profound. Firstly, the current "state centric" conception of war that was developed in the Western world around the remarkable Clausewitzian trinity will no longer be relevant as a "means to understand war in advance" as Clausewitz had hoped in the eighteenth century when he wrote *On War*.[133] Given the constraints on the calculus of war and peace in the future due to the irrational forces at work in post-modern civilisation, it is inevitable that the Clausewitzian trinity will collapse

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[131] For an alternate view of the future of the Western military in the post-modern world see Bradford Booth, Meyer Kestnbaum and David Segal, "Are Post-Cold War Militaries Post-modern?" *Armed Forces & Society* Vol 27 (Spring, 2001): 319-342. Central to their argument is the view that as long as militaries serve the nation-state, then militaries in the post-modern world will continue in the tradition of modernity and not post-modernity.

[132] Clausewitz, *On War*, 142.

[133] Ibid., 122.

over time when applied to the realities of the post-modern world. The breakdown of the remarkable trinity will be grounded in two tendencies that Clausewitz defined in the conclusion of the first chapter of *On War* as the "purpose of war" or the government and the "nature of war" or the people.[134]

At the heart of Clausewitz' understanding of the nature of war when he developed the remarkable trinitarian analysis of war was that the second tendency - the purpose of war "was the business of governments alone."[135] According to Clausewitz, it was the government who was solely responsible to determine the policies and objectives of war on behalf of the people and to re-examine both, taking into consideration, the anticipated price and benefit of the policies and the objectives for the state. By doing so, governments were to ensure that armed forces were responsible for the conduct of war and that armed forces and not the people experienced the devastating and lasting effects of war.

As noted by Michael Handel, "this conclusion is unacceptable even in modern democracies and was perhaps incorrect even in Clausewitz' time."[136] Unmistakably, war is no longer "the business of governments alone" and may not have been as far back as the sixteenth century.[137] The inability of

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[134] Handel, *Masters of War*, 102-106 and Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

[135] Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

[136] Handel, *Masters of War*, 103 -109.

[137] Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 201.

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the Western world to remove the devastating effects of war
from its people beginning around the turn of the last century,
even though international convention forbid the people to
fight if they were not part of an armed force, clearly shows
that Clausewitz' remarkable trinity may have been based more
on a theoretical ideal, than on reality. Without a doubt,
governments of today are increasingly turning to their
citizens to determine the "mood" of their citizens before
deciding on the use of military force to achieve state ends.[138]
In sum, the decision to use military force as a means to
political ends has become, not only the purview of
governments, but also the "business of the people" in Western
civilisation.

   With respect to the third tendency – the nature of war,
Clausewitz was of the view that "the passions that are kindled
in war must already be inherent in the people for the state to
be successful on the field of battle."[139] His observations were
taken from the Seven Years War and in particular the French
Revolution where the "social cohesion" of the *l v* resulted in an unprecedented mobilization of humankind.
However true and applicable his views may have been to the
nineteenth century and in particular to the French Revolution,
they are of limited value and relevance when applied to what

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[138] See E, *G l E. D l f H l , D v l l a a d v l y f* (NATO Defence College, 1995) and Talukder Maniruzzaman *M l y w w l f p l* (New York: Ballinger Publishing, 1987).

[139] Clausewitz, *O W*, 42. Also see Peter Paret, *Cl u w a* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). *S a*

is known about the ongoing impact of the social, economic, and technological forces at work in civilisation today and in all likelihood, well into the future.[140]

The "social cohesion" that has been at the heart of our Western understanding of war and that has been responsible, in a large part, for many of the successes witnessed on the field of battle during the past two thousand years may be difficult to find and to build in a stratified international state system of the future. Indeed, during the Gulf War of 1991 and NATO operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in 1994, the "kinship syndrome" already proved to be an issue that states had to factor into their decision-making processes when using military force on the international scene.[141] More recently, the voices of dissension in the Western world against the Western coalition when it bombed Serbia during the War in Kosovo in 1999 again demonstrated that "social cohesion" of the state might be difficult for Western governments to find in the future.[142] Of greater concern to the military and more importantly to the state is the fact that without "social cohesion" citizens may not be prepared to die for the state as they have throughout the history of Western civilisation. The problem is compounded when one takes into account that most wars are now conducted as part of coalitions

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[140] Ibid.

[141] For an understanding of the "kinship syndrome," see Huntington, *Cl   f C v l   ?,* 12-14 and Otterbein, *T Ev lu a   f W ,* iii.

[142] Clark, *W g g M   W ,* 364-365.   *a   d   a*

where national interests and a common good are difficult to ascertain and to maintain in coalition warfare.[143] All in all, in a world where the common good and interests have an international flavour, where the boundaries of the state are difficult to define, where the citizens of one state are culturally tied to citizens in other states, and where economies are inextricably interconnected, it may be difficult to find "social cohesion" in states and to rally citizens of one state under the banner of a common good for the polity against another state.

In the end, it is clear that Western civilisation will continue to refine the art and the science of war as it has during the past three thousand years and in particular during the last century. As noted in the work of Keith Otterbein, as political organisms evolve and become more centralised either regionally or internationally, they also become more proficient in understanding and making war.[144] Given that regional and international political systems will, in all probability, become more centralized due to the rise in ᵢ ᵢᵢᵢ ᵢᵢᵢᵢ *l* ᵢ *g* ᵢᵢᵢ and *gl* *l* ᵢ ᵢᵢᵢ in Western *a* *a* *a* *a* civilisation, one can safely conclude that war in the Western world will become more efficient and effective, and continue to be a product of development, rather than instinct.

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[143] Thomas J. Marshall and Philip Kaiser, *P* *l* ᵢ *lu* ᵢ ᵢ *Fu* *u* *C* *l* ᵢᵢᵢᵢ *Op* ᵢᵢᵢᵢᵢ (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1993), vii. *a*

[144] Otterbein, *T* *Ev* *lu* ᵢᵢᵢ *f W* , 34.

Yet, that is not to say that Western civilisation will finally learn the "ground truth" about the institution of war and its delicate interrelationship with the condition of peace. Western civilisation has been examining and studying the conditions of war and peace for the past three thousand years; some scholars would even argue that very little has been learned during this period.[145] Nonetheless, it will be in the next millennium that Western civilisation will witness a breakthrough in its understanding of the conditions of war and peace. The single disciplinary view of war in the Western world based on a "state-centric" conception of war will be replaced by a multi-disciplinary understanding of the phenomenon of war. Such an approach will synthesize different perspectives of war grounded in politics, strategy, philosophy, sociology, economics, and technology into one overarching post-modern filter through which the phenomena of war and peace will be examined and better understood in the Western world. In some respects, such a multidisciplinary approach is already being used to better explain and to understand a myriad of other disciplines and issues in the post-modern period of history.[146] Such great strides in the understanding of war and peace in the Western world will, however, only be experienced if the Western world can "break the chains" from its "state centric conception" of war and

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[145] See Keegan, *The History of Warfare*.

[146] Queen's University. *Conferences in Developing Professionals for the 21st Century* (April 11-12 2002).

return the remarkable Clausewitz trinitarian analysis to the wastebasket of history.

Adding to the complex security environment of the future will be the rejection of war on moral grounds in the Western world. Underpinning the understanding of war throughout the history of Western civilisation was a view that war would only be used in accordance with the law and for good intentions by the state. Without a doubt, states reserve the right to go to war in defence of their national existence. Nevertheless, the likelihood that Western states will need to use military force to go to war for their national survival in the future globalized economic international system is highly doubtful. Most citizens will, all the same, expect states in the future to take some form of action either regionally or internationally regardless of their "kin ties." In these cases, states will need to have military forces to deal with the domestic and international demands of their citizens. Still, front and centre in the public debate over the use of military force in these instances will be the means that will be employed and how the means will be used to achieve political ends. In this respect, given the deep-seated international linkages and ties of people to one another around the globe in the future, it can be construed that war will become even more restrictive and limited than in the recent past, as kinfolk demand that the institution of war be minimised through time and space as it was in Classical Greece.

In the end as noted by Reginald Bretnor, the military means selected and employed in war need to be relevant to the contemporary values of the society that uses the institution of war.[147] Where international economics and cultural values are part of the calculus of war, war will continue to be used in the Western world based on ethical and legal constraints founded on the ancient primacy of "law of good." Citizens of the Western world will therefore expect the institution of war to be used by states, but only as the last resort of statecraft. They will also demand that when it is applied to a domestic or international predicament, that its duration and scope be limited and reduced to the smallest denominator possible. In this respect, the use of other forms of national power to achieve political ends on the international scene may become more attractive to states when determining how the state will conduct war in the future security environment. In this respect, contrary to the views of Clausewitz, the attainment of the political objective may be achieved without fighting.[148] The rise in the concepts of natural justice, human rights, and the rule of law which have all led to an overarching common humanity during the last decade in the Western world will demand no less of the state and the Western world in the future. Given the rise of the economic interdependence of states around the world, economic warfare

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[147] Bretnor, *D   v W f   *, 137.   *a   a*

[148] Clausewitz' view was that "everything is governed by a supreme law, the   *y f   f   *." Clausewitz, *O W *, 99.   *d   b   a*

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may become the most efficacious means to shape the
international environment and the actions of rogue states.
Even Napoleon, on who Clausewitz based his work, noted that
the means selected in war should be commensurate with the aim
to be achieved.[149] After all is said and done, the strategic
image of war serving the state may finally be out-of-place in
Western civilisation in the next millennium.

CONCLUSION

In the end, the Western world is at a crossroads in its
understanding of war. The nature of the state and
concomitantly international politics are being transformed by
powerful social, economic, and technological forces that know
no state or international boundaries. These changes are not
taking place at the same time and at the same speed throughout
the world and therefore may require some time before they are
fully realised and understood.

Yet, this is not to say as August de Compte had a decade
after Clausewitz wrote *On War* that mankind will soon witness a
pacific era where the use of war will be abolished by the
international order.[150] Clearly, such heady views fail to
appreciate the fact that the golden ages of mankind were

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[149] Justin Wintle, *The Dictionary of War Quotations* (New York: The
Free Press, 1989), 254.

[150] August de Compte proclaimed around the middle of the nineteenth
century that due to industrialisation, war would disappear altogether from
civilisation. Raymond Aron, *War and Industrial Society* (London: Oxford
University Press, 1958), 3-8.

nothing more than brief episodes in the history of Western civilisation. Nonetheless, the transformation of the international order leading to a culturally integrated and internationally economic interdependent world will transform the way in which the Western world understands and practices the art and science of war in the next millennium leading the Second Horseman to ride again with pestilence and famine through time but at a slow trot.

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