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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES COURSE 4/COURS DES ETUDES DE SECURITE  
NATIONALE 4

**Canadian National Security : Searching for Contents and Direction**

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## CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY: SEARCHING FOR CONTENTS & DIRECTION

### **Introduction**

When a complete stranger broke into the Prime Minister's residence, Canadians did not consider the issue a National Security concern, but rather a simple embarrassment. On the other hand, the security concerns associated with the cowardly attack of September 11<sup>th</sup>, suddenly became a security obsession for Canadians. The hit was very close to home. To everybody's surprise however, it did not take the form of the traditional military force application, that most Canadians narrowly associate with the concept of national security. However tragic it was, September 11<sup>th</sup> created an opportunity for Canadians to realize that they have been living in a security vacuum. Even their traditional lack of concern for military matters was now being put to the test. Most importantly, September 11<sup>th</sup> provided the necessary bridge towards a more enhanced and dynamic appreciation of national security issues, along with a sharply increased awareness of them by Canadians.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that: "*Canadian security expectations, can be best achieved through a broader acceptance of the complex multi-dimensionality of national security, based on overtly stated but dynamic national interests, and a strongly acknowledged and supported rationalized<sup>1</sup>, military component of the national security strategy.*" This essay will first establish that despite the end of the Cold War, the international environment is anything but a place for democracies to expect to live in lasting peace. It will demonstrate the unfortunate narrow understanding and limited acknowledgement by Canadians of the multiple dimensions of a solid national security framework, and will argue the necessity and usefulness of overtly stated and understood Canadian national security interests within a dynamic security framework. It will show that Canadians, led by their political masters, have historically adopted a singular "Laissez Faire" and passive attitude towards security matters.

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<sup>1</sup> In terms of being able to show to Canadians why their military are being deployed in operations and in support of which Canadian National interest.

After all, as Desmond Morton has claimed, Canadians have been providers and not consumers of security<sup>2</sup>. Selected contemporary observations will point out the necessary non-traditional elements of national security that must be considered within a proposed dynamic security framework. A closer examination of recent military commitments in the world, will demonstrate a lack of transparency and coherence in the reasoning behind the utilization of that major dimension of national security. The conclusion will be that despite our historical pattern of neglect, the necessary broadening of the security concept must be actively pursued, along with efforts towards the overt enunciation of Canadian national security interests, as the necessary basis of a proposed dynamic and transparent framework. The end result would be the reasoning process from which future military commitments, can be truly rationalized. Possible alternatives to the historical, and current “*ad hoc*” approaches are suggested, not as final solutions, but rather as initial thoughts for ongoing debate and further development.

The intent of this paper is not to minimize the military dimension of the Canadian security concept, or to simply show the reluctant Canadian attitude towards military issues. Instead, the aim is to argue the need for a broader understanding of the concept of security, and to demonstrate the usefulness of properly and overtly stated national security interests as the basis for developing its inherent multi-dimensionality. As a second aim, it will provide focus on the military dimension that must continue to play a major role within the Canadian national security strategy concept.

### **NEW GLOBAL ORDER AND TRENDS: CANADA’S PLACE**

While the 1994 Canadian Defence White Paper acknowledged that the Cold War was over<sup>3</sup>, such a statement inevitably leads to a certain level of complacency. As far back as 1991, Donald Nuechterlein was already suggesting that American public

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<sup>2</sup> Desmond Morton, *Providing and Consuming Security in Canada’s Century*, Canadian Historical Review, March 2000, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Canada Defence White Paper 1994, (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1994), p. 3.

attention needed to start focusing on threats outside the traditional military paradigm. He predicted that we could anticipate a growth in international terrorism in the future<sup>4</sup>. During the same period, Charles Krauthammer, in his “Unipolar Moment”, convincingly argued that the three main assumptions advanced by “new world order” supporters that is, growing multi-polarity, world order and the declining utility of force, were illusory:

*“...The immediate Post-Cold War is not multi-polar, it is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its western allies. The internationalist consensus is under renewed assault... and the emergence of a new strategic environment, marked by the rise of small aggressive states armed with weapons of mass destruction and possessing the means of delivering them, makes the coming decades a time of heightened, not diminished, threat of war”<sup>5</sup>*

In fact, the demise of the USSR did not lead to world peace. To the contrary, we must now take into consideration non-military dimensions such as threats to political stability, environmental degradation, regional economic disparities and declining social cohesion, just to name a few of the critical new elements that must be part of today’s security vocabulary. In addition to conventional concerns, the world has to deal with non military threats from sectors such as drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal mass migration, overpopulation and the arms trade. All of those, could have a significant impact on Canada’s security, whether Canadians acknowledge it, or not<sup>6</sup>.

Contemporary world events continue to remind us of future threats, and to awaken a fear that sits quietly within us. Events such as the Air India bombing, the Tokyo subway gas attack, the Alaskan pipeline sabotage, the first World Trade Centre (WTC) bombing, and certainly the most recent terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, serve to reinforce the notion of unpredictability raised by many analysts. If

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<sup>4</sup> Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted – United States National Interests in a Restructured World*, Kentucky: University Press, 1991, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Charles Krauthammer, *The Unipolar Moment*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 70, No 1, 1991, p. 23.

<sup>6</sup> Canada, Special Joint Committee reviewing Canadian Foreign policy: *Principles and Priorities for the Future*, (Ottawa: Communication Group, Nov 1994), p. 4.

anything, the threat has gone from being relatively clear, to ambiguous, and now nebulous<sup>7</sup>.

*“... some threats to the peace of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are as visible today as was, say, Nazism in 1920. They will make themselves known soon enough. Only a hopeless utopian can believe otherwise”<sup>8</sup>*

This very brief “portrait” highlighted some of the concerns humankind should prepare for in the future. A natural conclusion is that many more new trends must be taken into consideration, compared to the Cold War conditions of mutually assured destruction (MAD) that we had learned to become so complacent about. Based on strong evidence that the threat is no longer clear and predictable, and that it will affect much more than just the military dimension of a nation security strategy, the multi-dimensionality paradigm appears. Exploring the unfortunately narrow historical understanding of a nation’s security concept will be the next step, keeping this new paradigm in focus.

## **NATIONAL SECURITY FOR CANADIANS**

It would be an under-statement to say that Canadians are not generally knowledgeable about their security<sup>9</sup>. When they do speak of it, it is mainly in terms of military matters. The expanding and broadening of Canadian’s notions of national security remains a challenge. The concept is mentioned ambiguously in one of Canada’s Foreign Policy main objectives, namely: the protection of our security, within a stable global framework. A closer examination of the concept reveals that security could essentially be defined as:

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<sup>7</sup> Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, *The Future Security Environment*, Kingston, ONT, Aug 1999, p. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Krauthammer, p. 33.

<sup>9</sup> In David B. Dewitt, David Leyton-Brown, *Canada’s International Security Policy*, Scarborough, Prentice Hall, 1995, p. 1, they quote “Canadians are not accustomed to speak of security policy”

*The preservation of a way of life acceptable to the Canadian people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attacks or coercion, freedom from internal subversion, and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values, which are essential for the quality of life in Canada.*<sup>10</sup>

This is already a major step forward from the more conventional Harvard Periodical definition of national security as "...all matters pertinent to the use, threat, and control of force..."<sup>11</sup>.

Canadians are not the only ones struggling with this issue. For decades, analysts have attempted to reduce the overly militarized aspect of the concept of national security. Lester R. Brown considered that the concept of national security had taken an "overwhelmingly" military character, while others such as Adbul-Monem M. Al-Masat, considered that the concept had become obsessed with elements of military, strategy and tactical violence, and the American Richard Ullman, expressed the national security of his nation as excessively narrow, and described only in military terms<sup>12</sup>.

*"Environmental threats with the potential to erode the habitability of the planet are forcing humanity to consider national security in far broader terms than that guaranteed solely by force of arms"*<sup>13</sup>

The chiseling at the overarching concept of security being too directly and entirely related to military matters must continue to make progress. It is leading towards a much more realistic understanding of the concept, which eventually will acknowledge all possible dimensions of a nation's security elements. The term chiseling was used to

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<sup>10</sup> Ronald Haycock, *The Evolution of Canadian National Security Policy*, Center for national security Studies, Kingston, 1994, p. 1

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>13</sup> Michael Renner, *National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions*, Worldwatch Institute, 1989, p 7.

indicate that the process of broadening the concept of security has far from unanimous support<sup>14</sup>

*“...the perceived requirements of national security dictates that nations maintain military forces adequate to the dangers posed to their security – dangers from within and from without. But the realities are such that military strength alone cannot provide real security... Yet, judging by the increasingly strident tone of international and domestic debates about these issues, it is also clear that greater national military might has not led to a greater sense of national security...if the world is to approach even the possibility of achieving true security- ending the danger of nuclear war, reducing the frequency and destructiveness of conventional conflicts, easing the social and economic burdens of armaments – important changes are necessary in the way that nations look at questions of armaments and security”<sup>15</sup>*

A somewhat unexpected, but welcome insight supporting the advancing of openness towards national elements other than military, was the statement by the Co-Chairman of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Professor Jack Granatstein, when he indicated to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs that indeed, the Council position was that “... *having a security review that would bring together Defence and Foreign Policy, and other areas where they intersect...might be the proper way to go*”<sup>16</sup>. A supporting interpretation could be that of the possible “seeding” towards a full Canadian Security Strategy Review that would indeed go well beyond the usual narrow military view only, something never yet done within the Canadian context.

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<sup>14</sup> The end of the Cold war has seen the emergence of an extended debate on the division within the security studies scholars with respect to this broadening concept of national security. On one hand the traditionalists who continue to maintain that security should focus on military issues only and the “wideners” who support the point of view that today’s security includes economic, environmental, geographic and social issues as well. Those wideners believe that indeed, the nature of security is changing and concerns such as transnational threats, organized crime, demographic crisis and environmental degradation must now be considered. All those additional concerns are not supported by traditionalists and are the subject of a detailed debate in Bernard I Finel, *What is security? Why the debate matters*, National security Studies Quarterly, Autumn 1998, pp. 1-15. Also in Buzan, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 1998.

<sup>15</sup> Thom Workman, *Amplifying the Social Dimension of security*, Center for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional paper Number 17, Nov 1993, p.7.

<sup>16</sup> Unedited transcript of the testimony by Professor J Granatstein to the Standing Ctee on National defence and Veteran affairs, 22 November 2001. (quote underlined by author for emphasis)



The terminology of Foreign and Defence policies has been used here in the midst of defining the concept of national security. The necessary correlation is established through the linkage between the three (Foreign, Defence and Security Policy). Dewitt and Leyton-Brown first define Canadian security policy as “...*those political strategic objectives and instruments which have been identified and established by the government as central to national security interests*”...in theory, security policy serves as the bridge between foreign and defence policies<sup>17</sup>. Addressing the domestic versus international dilemma, the Special Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1995 concluded, that in today’s world, there is very little distinction between Domestic and Foreign policies. In a sense, “Domestic Policy is Foreign Policy, and Foreign Policy is Domestic Policy”, affecting Canadian daily lives and standard of living.<sup>18</sup> Sun Tzu had long before suggested the close linkage between successful state’s foreign relations, and favorable domestic relationships between state sovereign (government) and the people<sup>19</sup>.

Canada, like many other countries, needs to engage in a critical task in the domain of contemporary politics. As a nation, it has to clearly identify and acknowledge its own national security interests. Further, it must demonstrate the use of a proven and transparent method of establishing relative priorities among them, both domestically and internationally, keeping in mind the dynamic nature of the unpredictable new world<sup>20</sup>. It is time for Canadians to start embracing national security matters broadly and seriously. To support this position, there must be a clear understanding of their national interests, along with the associated security concerns. The next section of this paper will explore the latency of properly enunciated Canadian national interests, and argue their importance through suggested possible ways to correct the situation.

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<sup>17</sup> Quoted in David B. Dewitt and David Leyton Brown, *Canada’s International Security Policy*, Prentice hall, 1995, p. 2, from R.B. Byers, Canadian security and Defence Adelphi Paper No 214, 1986, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> Canada, Special Joint Committee reviewing Canadian Foreign policy: *Principles and Priorities for the Future*, (Ottawa: Communication Group, Nov 1994), p. 6.

<sup>19</sup> Kim R. Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, Scarborough: Prentice hall, 1997, p 95.

<sup>20</sup> James S. Finan, William J. Hurley, *Canada and Basic National Interests*, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995, p. 1.

## **“OUR” NATIONAL INTERESTS: OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND**

*...”military force is still too often the final arbiter of human affairs, but non military factors , such as political stability, economic strength, environmental sustainability and societal cohesion are increasingly important in the strategic equation”<sup>21</sup>*

Strong support has been clearly demonstrated for the broadening of national security concept beyond the “old” overarching military elements only. A new agenda must be considered. That approach has also been generally supported by the Canadian government in its attempts to embrace a broader concept of national security, while making sure that the military dimension remains a major player in the security equation. In doing so, the government indicated a perceived acknowledgement of the fact that serious threats to national security can now be derived from many other factors, such as global environment degradation, demographic crisis, mass migration, ethnic conflicts, health epidemics spread (e.g. AIDS), as well as the ever present global threat to any nation’s sovereignty through the instrument of war.<sup>22</sup>

The term “national interest” has been, and is still being used by political and military analysts as well as scholars, as a means to further define the nation’s security strategy. Despite our rich history however, Canadian “national interests” have never been overtly defined, and the concept too often purposely avoided, or in many cases, taken for granted. The renowned strategist Donald E. Nuechterlein was one of the few to advance the necessity of defining, and formally enunciating national interests. This was not a new concept, but there has always been a very high level of ambiguity associated with the terminology<sup>23</sup>. It should be no secret to anybody, that Canada as a nation, has always demonstrated a strong level of indifference towards the development of a national grand strategy. When one observes a demonstrated reluctance to initiate, develop, enunciate and use in policy or decision-making our national interests, then one easily

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<sup>21</sup> *Principles and Priorities for the Future*, p. 4.

<sup>22</sup> *Response to the Special Joint Committee Report on Foreign Affairs*, Ottawa, February 1995, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Nuechterlein, p. 13.

concludes that you cannot do one without the other<sup>24</sup>. Maybe the reluctance of politicians and public alike, stems from the perceived advantages associated with its ambiguity as noted by Buzan that, "...any definitiveness around the idea of security would undermine the utility derived from its symbolic ambiguity"<sup>25</sup>, and further supported by David Haglund when he stated:

*"...what can be considered at best, a grudging acceptance of the utility of the national interest as a means of analyzing Canadian foreign and defence policies, the coordination of which, be it reiterated, is the hallmark of grand strategy. In fact, grudging acceptance may be a wildly overstated appreciation of the role of the national interest in Canadian policy; widespread disdain might be a better way of putting the matter..."*<sup>26</sup>

Nuechterlein's attempts to define national Interests are worth examining in a Canadian context. After all, we Canadians have little to show on that subject. When attempting to define, or use national interests in assessing national objectives, it is also useful to understand the basic theoretical approach chosen for the analysis. As strategist Stephen Krasner defines, it can be done from a logical-deductive path, where national interests are assumed to objectively exist, and should be without a doubt discernable. On the other hand, an empirical-inductive analyst would not assume such interests exist, but must be induced from statements and behavior of decision-makers (politicians). For the purpose of this paper, the logical-deductive path is chosen, and national interests are assumed to be inherent to the nation<sup>27</sup>. While not a departure from studies of international relations where the national interests have been considered as a basic assumption when constructing a model<sup>28</sup>, the reader must be made aware that the field of

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<sup>24</sup> David G. Haglund, *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited*, Irwin Publishing Ltd, 2000, p. 8.

<sup>25</sup> Workman, p.2.

<sup>26</sup> Haglund, p.8.

<sup>27</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, Princeton University, New Jersey, 1978, p 35.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13.

security studies theorists remains divided on whether or not national interests can be objectively defined, vice only subjectively understood and interpreted<sup>29</sup>.

Nuechterlein defined the main national interests while acknowledging the dynamic nature of theoretically developed interests. Any nation would have a level of dynamism in the development of respective interests, but as a rule some lasting and enduring elements would emerge. For example he claims the following long-term interests for the US<sup>30</sup>:

- Defence of the United States, and its constitutional system
- Enhancement of the nation's economic well being and promotion of their products abroad
- Creation of a favorable world order; and
- Promotion of United States democratic values and the free market system.

He also proposes the development of the “National Interest matrix”, as an instrument for foreign and security policy decision-making. The use of the defined basic national interests, along with an associated level of intensity for each, becomes the key for a very powerful but most importantly transparent strategic decision-making tool. Defining the intensity levels becomes very useful when applied to specific cases and/or crisis scenarios (Survival, Vital, Major and Peripheral)<sup>31</sup>. The debate of who will, and

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<sup>29</sup> Indeed, while theorists such as Krasner and Nuechterlein are advancing the development of theories and models from the logico-deductive approach. Others such as Trubowitz and Brodie have supported the subjectivity of national interests, or as Brodie noted when defining national interests as “*pregnant with meaning but nevertheless obscure*”. Brodie continues by insisting that despite much glib talk, national interests are neither fixed by nature nor identifiable by overtly accepted notion of objective standard and therefore insist on their objective nature. This paper however, establishes its support in the argument from Nuechterlein and Krasner that indeed there are lasting and enduring elements on which a nation can objectively state national interests from which a method of prioritizing can be developed as will be described next when discussing the “National Interests matrix” and how it can be applied in a Canadian context. Further in depth analysis of the subjectivity supporting debate can be found in B. Brodie, *War and Politics*, Macmillan Co, New York, Collier-Macmillan Publisher, 1973, and in Joseph S. Nye, *Redefining the national Interest*, Foreign Affairs, July-Aug 1999, pp. 22-35.

<sup>30</sup> Interestingly, his four statements are exempt of explicit security terminology as if he implies that there are elements of national security within them. The article by Macnamara and Finan in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Autumn 2001 provides a detailed example of what security elements can be derived from national interests and how they can be utilized within the decision making process.

<sup>31</sup> Nuechterlein, pp. 19-25.

how to, assign specific levels of intensity continues, and will remain the necessary human input along with elements of subjectivity and judgment, regardless of the nation attempting to make use of the system.

<i>National Interests</i>	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defence of Homeland				
Economic Well being				
Favorable world order				
Promotion of values				

Table 1.

For a specific crisis or situation, the assignment of levels of intensity to each of the previously defined national interests (what we are missing in Canada!), will lead to the best possible approach, or at least a concrete method to identify and justify the necessary national commitments<sup>32</sup>. Such a powerful tool would prove highly useful in clarifying the interests and objectives of the Canadian state from their present vague generalities, from existing Canadian government policy direction<sup>33</sup>.

Notwithstanding the lack of direction and guidance from political leadership, significant advances in the formalization of Canadian national interests and the development of decision-making instruments, have already been proposed. Researchers at the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies suggested the adaptation of the Nuechterlein model to the Canadian context:

*“... we note from our own experience in both foreign and security policy-making in Canada the strong attachment of many policymakers to the concept of national interests. The most recent evidence of this is to be found in Canada’s latest statement of its foreign policy agenda. Chapters one and two are firmly based on the concept of national interest. At the same time, there is a strong attachment to the notions of priorities in interests without it being made clear how they are systematically derived.”<sup>34</sup>*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 19-22.

<sup>33</sup> Response by the Government to *Principles and Priorities for the Future*, p. 6.

<sup>34</sup> Finan, & Hurley, 1995, p. 1. (underlined by author for emphasis)

Finan and Hurley reviewed the contents of the Canadian government's last statement on "Principles and Priorities of the Future", published as a report from a Special Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs. The result of their review confirmed that the latent and fragmented interests within the report could be made more explicit along the lines of the Nuechterlein model. Their proposed version of the broad Canadian national interests, overtly stated, was as follows:

- Maintenance of Canadian Land, Sea and Air Sovereignty
- Maintenance of Canadian Economic well being
- Promotion of Canadian Values Internationally
- Maintenance of what Canadians deemed to be a stable world order<sup>35</sup>

In comparing the Nuechterlein National Interest matrix with the theoretical Analytic Hierarchic Process (AHP)<sup>36</sup>, they developed a system that could provide politicians with a tool capable of prioritizing Canadian national interests, as long as they were properly defined. The AHP process was therefore proposed as a tool to provide priorities among declared national interests (and their associated security elements), as well as to establish the priority between foreign and security policy instruments, such as collective defence, economic assistance, humanitarian assistance, and military assistance just to name a few. In addition, the process could provide systematic ranking of regions and countries, where Canada could decide to get committed, depending on the national interests, assuming they exist<sup>37</sup>. From the too often generic and ambiguous statements of government policy, Finan and Hurley succeeded in providing rigor to the necessary security policy decision-making, keeping in mind the ever-diminishing resources available to accomplish the task of providing national security for Canadians. The usual caution to the reader regarding

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6.

<sup>36</sup> A process whereby numerical values are associated with respective national interests based on their relative importance. The continuum of both this AHP process and/or the Nuechterlein National Interests Matrix is that the decision-makers judgment is still at the center of the processes and that the results is fully retrievable and subject to changes of circumstances to reflect the dynamic aspect of the new world order.

<sup>37</sup> Finan & Hurley, pp. 15-27.

differing opinions on the applicability of the AHP model must also be considered<sup>38</sup>, keeping in mind the fact that the proposed approach is dangerously approaching practicality, transparency and usefulness.

*“We should therefore like to emphasize the need to ensure that the resources for the instruments of foreign (also read security) policy...be appropriately allocated and commensurate with the objectives of the policy that will emerge from this report.”<sup>39</sup>*

### **WHAT MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY?**

Having argued the necessity to address the latency of national interests for Canada, it would be timely to further the concept by exploring the multi-dimensionality of the security elements of those newly enunciated interests, beyond the strict military component. Before proceeding however, the reader is reminded of the lack of total consensus on this broadening of the security concept as was earlier discussed<sup>40</sup>. Not explicitly enunciated in the proposed broad national interests, are security concerns of non-military nature, threatening Canada. It is those security concerns that generate the multi-dimensionality that must be better understood and acknowledged by Canadians, and their politicians alike. They represent the other side of the balance in the truly holistic approach that must be adopted, in order to prevent returning to the narrow and too simplistic purely military notion of national security. A very brief review of

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<sup>38</sup> Despite encouraging progress towards better definition and use of this analytical tool for decision-making, it would be an omission not to raise the caution recently expressed by Dr. J. Adamson following the publication of the Macnamara and Finan article in the Canadian Military Journal demonstrating the use of the AHP as a strategic decision-making tool. Adamson cautioned against some possible problems and restrictions associated with the use of the AHP modeling. First, the process utilizes numerical values as a comparative tool and therefore quantifies subjective data, a task rather challenging to rationalize logically. His second caution rests with the very acute sensitive output to small input variable causing some levels of inconsistency. He is not advocating the elimination of AHP as a decision-making tool, but wanted to warn readers and practitioners alike of its possible limitations if the process is not properly understood by the analysts making use of it.

<sup>39</sup> *Principles and Priorities for the future*, p. 9.

<sup>40</sup> The divide between “wideners” and traditionalists continues to be debated and strategists such as Stephen M. Walt continues to advance that the widening of the security concept from its traditional military understanding will undoubtedly lead to the possible destruction of the “intellectual coherence of this particular field of studies. The special issue of Security Studies dedicated to the origins of national interests contains numerous articles and opinions related to the subject, mostly from a theoretical point of view. Security Studies, Winter 98/99- Spring 99, Vol 8, Numbers 2/3.

contemporary and historical examples will clearly illustrate the direct, and significant impact on Canadians at large, and therefore a need for increased awareness, and inclusion efforts from a national security point of view.

### **THE NEW AGENDA THROUGH CONTEMPORARY LENSES**

*“The most important global requirements for the 90s and beyond are for shared security, shared prosperity and shared custody of the environment”<sup>41</sup>*

The end of the Cold War changed the perception of threats in the world. Preventing a nuclear holocaust between two super-powers was no longer the priority concern of nations, including Canada. From a security point of view, maintaining our collective security through existing alliances continued to be a solid basis of our security policy. What must now be addressed with increasing importance is the impact on Canada caused by existing and/or emerging security concerns, not associated with conventional military patterns. The purpose of this examination is simply to show the necessity to identify them as having a security component, and treat them accordingly in a holistic and pragmatic approach, as proposed earlier through the national interests matrix and/or as major variables in the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).

Geographical. The geographical security aspect may appear obvious to Canadians, but just our proximity (in many senses of the word) to the world superpower to the south has generated much heated debate in the recent past. There will be a need for intensified presence and right of ownership in the Canadian north, yet another national security crisis looming ahead that the Canadian Government seems complacent about. It is well known that global warming is slowly but surely making the Canadian northern Arctic passages navigable, and will soon raise fundamental issues for the sovereignty of those waters, as multiple nations are likely to claim right of international passage, in a challenge to our national sovereignty position. The US raised their level of acceptance of our claim in 1955 using the construction of the DEW line as the instrument of rationale,

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<sup>41</sup> *Principles and Priorities for the Future*, 1994.



but later returned opposing it<sup>42</sup>. It is openly and now frequently argued that the Canadian North could become a possible easy access route for terrorists and criminal alike<sup>43</sup>. Unfortunately, those questions are only being raised now as a result of September 11<sup>th</sup>, and not as a measured and pro-active security action plan from the Canadian government.

Environmental. The environmental security concerns are becoming critical not only from a global, but also from a national point of view. It can be said that indeed, military capabilities are very limited to adequately deal with environmental devastation, and that such capabilities would likely obstruct the efforts and/or simply be a factor in causing the damage<sup>44</sup>.

*“Spurred by new scientific evidence, attention is now shifting to those aspects of environmental degradation that have a global effect, from which no nation can insulate itself”... Because environmental degradation and pollution respect no human-drawn borders, they jeopardize not only the security of the country in which they occur, but also that of others near and far”<sup>45</sup>*

Canada is not immune to any of those threats. Fear of global climate change and adverse effects on the Arctic ecosystem have been expressed, as well as the devastating impact it will have on our Canadian forestry and agricultural landscape. Canada continues to be one of the largest contributors to ozone depletion, and Canadian provinces are now challenging the proudly acclaimed Canadian support of the Kyoto accord. Some of Canada’s natural resources are increasingly subjected to unacceptable pressures, both from within, and external sources. If there was any doubt as to the security impact from an environmental point of view, the case of the East Coast fishery, and the devastation on a Canadian way of life is a telling testimony. The past turbot crisis and the looming possible shrimp dilemma are also clear indications of a need for direction, and action. Are we going to wait for the United States to propose draining

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<sup>42</sup> Desmond Morton, Globe and Mail, December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2001, p. A9.

<sup>43</sup> The Ottawa Citizen, Saturday January 26, 2002, p. A3.

<sup>44</sup> Michael Renner, p 6.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p. 31.

and/or diverting fresh water from the Great Lakes area for use and irrigation, and address the irreversible damage caused by such action, after the fact? Canada's image has indeed been tarnished by the way it has been treating its own environment<sup>46</sup>. We have no choice but to address the situation in cooperation with the rest of the world, or to accept the security consequences if we choose not to do so.

*... The committee received disturbing evidence on the rise of health problems from trans-boundary pollution, wrenching testimony on the state of the oceans and high seas fisheries...environment impacts were reaching global scale and affecting lifestyles, well-being and future prospects of all Canadians...*<sup>47</sup>

Economy. One could state that the obvious trading nature of the nation is strong enough rationale for inclusion as a national security element. What about concerns linked to the nation's debt? The Canadian overall national debt reached 105% of GDP before government reacted to the very serious situation. Canadians are still paying over \$40 billions just to finance the debt today! The experience of New Zealand having to cut back on so many basic public programs, should serve as a reminder to our elected officials. Despite the recent actions taken to address this national concern, the fact remains that the debt will continue to be a major concern for Canadians today and future generations alike. For those who believe that the recent balanced budgets by the government will be the solution of all problems, let's remind ourselves of the renewed possibility of deficit budgeting. The recent Argentina crisis in late 2001/2002 must also serve as a reminder to us all about the impact the economical factor can have in the overall national security strategy. The impact for Canada was clear enough to have the concern clearly identified in the last Defence White Paper.

*“ The government's broad program for political, social and economic renewal is focused on preserving the values that make Canada one of the most fortunate countries in the world. At the present time, our prosperity, and with it our quality of life – is threatened by the steady growth of public sector debt. This situation limits government freedom of*

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<sup>46</sup> *Principles and Priorities for the future*, p. 7.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p 41.

*action in responding to the needs of Canadians and constrains the ability of government of all levels to deliver essential services”<sup>48</sup>*

Demographic. The growth of world population continues to be a major concern from a global and national point of view. From the 2 billions in the early 1930s the world population has grown to beyond 6 billions in the year 2000. If the lack of attention to the issue is related to the distance between the average Canadian and the concern itself, it was certainly brought home when refugees started showing up on Canadian shores. Canada was no longer untouchable by this global concern. Given our current low birth rate, it must also be acknowledged that immigration has become our primary source of population growth for the foreseeable future. According to recent public debate on immigration issues, the government policies and related programs have become questionable at best when it comes to ensuring adequate security controls<sup>49</sup>.

Industrial Capability. All domains of Canadian industrial capacity play a role in national security strategy through direct, or indirect support to any of its various dimensions. Of particular, but not singular interest, is the defence industrial base in Canada. Should it be a Canadian security concern? If one looks at the fact that we have more Canadians put in harm’s way than ever before, being ready ourselves instead of relying on foreign capabilities to provide the necessary material and equipment should sound an alarm. Unfortunately, this matter is caught in the long lasting expectation of Canadians to have the best possible armed forces but still reluctant to pay the necessary price to afford such a force<sup>50</sup>. Alistair Edgar makes the case that the sustainment of the Canadian defence industrial base is as much to preserve and/or generate high tech jobs, as it is to support Canadian security<sup>51</sup>. Migration of talented Canadians to other countries for economic or other reasons must be addressed as a security issue. It has already been

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<sup>48</sup> Canada Defence White Paper 1994, p. 9.

<sup>49</sup> Martin Collacott, The National Post, January 17, 2002.

<sup>50</sup> Paul, D. Manson, *Who Defends the Defence Industry, Security strategy and the Global Economics of Defence Production*, pp. 85-92.

<sup>51</sup> Alistair Edgar, *Defence Export regulations: Sustaining a viable Defence Industry*, Wilfrid Laurier university, 2001, p 1.

felt in both the technological and health national capacities. Readers need only to be reminded of the AVRO ARROW and the BRADOR project cancellations, to realize the impacts of losing significant technical expertise abroad.

Interestingly enough, this broadening of the security concept for Canada is supported by an increasing level of interest by Canadians as shown in recent polling results<sup>52</sup>. The list of national security concerns could go on and on, with numerous issues where the Canadian government must acknowledge the holistic nature of national security interests. When dealing with the above listed issues, and those of terrorism, criminality, nationalism, and aboriginal concerns to further add to the complication, the approach must be overarching, and the security elements within each, properly identified and addressed as necessary. It cannot be left to others, or even worst, to the next generation to handle. Of critical importance is the need for the reader to acknowledge that each of these multi-dimensional security interests will compete against each other for the necessary attention and resource allocation, another indication for the need of an overarching framework to consolidate and prioritize as necessary<sup>53</sup>. In keeping with the stated intent of this paper to demonstrate the need for re-balancing between non-military national security elements, and the actual military factors, the next step will be to examine the historical neglect and the urgent need for policy direction and rationalization in military matters: the other side of the neglected national security balance.

### **HISTORICAL NEGLECT OVER TIME: CANADIAN LEGACY**

*“... the crux for the government is to provide both itself and its civilian and military populations with enough higher education in National security and in policy to*

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<sup>52</sup> DGSP Briefing to NSSC 04, 26 Feb 2002, CFC Toronto

<sup>53</sup> Barry Buzan, in *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1998, eloquently discusses and present a new approach of security concept which provides a detailed study of the various levels of study, including the impact on what is known to security analysts as Classical security Complexes as well as a discussion on the debate between wideners and traditionalists and how the two camps can be brought closer together. Interestingly enough, Buzan uses 5 sectors, namely Military, Political, Economic, Societal and Environmental, all of which includes the various dimensions discussed in this paper. A very good source for detailed study and analysis within the field of securities studies.

*be able to comprehend that all of these accumulative historical phenomena operate continuously so that consequently we may make the most intelligent choices”<sup>54</sup>*

Canadians have demonstrated a somewhat casual attitude towards security matters. Of course in the early years of the nation’s history, security simply meant military concerns, and after all Canadians were living in “a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials”<sup>55</sup>. Economic issues had total primacy for the political elite in those early years, and very little on anything else. In addition, Canadians were renowned for their mistrust towards military professionals, and their demonstrated preferences towards the militia of citizen soldiers<sup>56</sup>. A truly Canadian historical position, showing little interest towards security affairs, while displaying a clear disdain towards military concerns. Canadians seem to care about military and security matters only when they have been hurt.

*“ Few nations have shown more profound antipathy to the idea of military preparations in time of peace, or less interests in military affairs except in times of emergency...”<sup>57</sup>*

*“As soon as the armistice came in 1918, Canadians and their government turned their minds elsewhere. The world was now safe for democracy”<sup>58</sup>.*

It was under those identical conditions that Canada made its way into World Wars, and all other conflicts thereafter. Canada participated to two World Wars, with so many casualties caused by the lack of necessary preparations, not to mention the state of the Canadian Forces leading to the Korean War<sup>59</sup>. A nation seemingly always reacting to crisis, trying to make the best of the situation. Professor Granatstein concluded during his recent testimony at the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs that;

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<sup>54</sup> Ronald Haycock, p. 12.

<sup>55</sup> Morton, Desmond, *Providing and Consuming Security in Canada’s century*, Canadian Historical Review, March 2000, p 1.

<sup>56</sup> Transcript of evidence by Professor J. Granatstein

<sup>57</sup> Hackock, p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> Transcript of evidence by Professor J. Granatstein.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

*“... we (Canadians) are people who ordinarily expect someone else to do the fighting for us, first France, then Britain and now the United states...it is an attitude that reflects a weak sense of sovereignty, a weak sense of nationhood”<sup>60</sup>*

On the opposite side of the coin, it can be said that the only real post World Wars Canadian surge of interests towards military concerns took place during the period of the “National Survival concept” of the 50’s. Then Prime Minister Diefenbaker energized the security agenda, and indeed provided significant funding for military related security matters such as NORAD, and civil defence.<sup>61</sup> It was bound not to last very long<sup>62</sup>. To some extent one could easily argue that Canadian history demonstrates that Canadians have maintained their traditional primacy of concerns away from security matters over time.

Was Dr. Haycock too harsh and critical when he noted that:

*“... that the character of Canadian National Security Policy has withstood the passage of time and the dynamics of international affairs virtually unchanged. There is little difference between the situation reported by an Imperial Inspector General in 1913 and the commitment-capability gap of the 70s and 80s... Canada the indefensible and invulnerable, has chosen to accept security umbrellas held by others”<sup>63</sup>*

One would easily conclude, not.

### **DEFENCE: A MAJOR PLAYER AT A CROSSROADS**

It could be tempting to assume that given the major security role played by the defence components of the strategy, that clearer guidance, direction and policies would

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* (also in his recent National Post Article, “Defence Freeloading Imperils Sovereignty”, 22 February, 2002, A18)

<sup>61</sup> Desmond Morton, *The illustrated History of Canada, “Strains of Affluence”*, p. 28.

<sup>62</sup> While concerns related to our level of spending on military capability has been raised by alliance members as well as our neighbor to the south on a routine basis, in pure numbers comparison, Canada proudly stands in the top 20 of all United nations states on that issue.

<sup>63</sup> Haycock, p. 1.

be forthcoming. Not so, according to Ambassador Delvoie, when he points out that the lack of clearly defined national security interests is the direct cause of the not surprising governmental panoply of security policies, begging for contents and consistency<sup>64</sup>. Limiting the possible spread of Soviet influence was a major Cold War “national interest” for Canada. For most of the Cold War involvements, (1948-1989) “think tanks” provided many rationales for Canadian operational participation<sup>65</sup>. During that same period, Canada had three distinct Defence White Papers, namely in 1964, 1971 and 1987, and all three suffered the same fate, in the failure of the government to firmly establish a stable and sustainable defence policy framework. The current 1994 White paper has also come under sustained and intense criticism recently, re-opening the debate related to the need for a new revised policy to replace the current version<sup>66</sup>.

In reviewing the Post Cold War period however, strategists, scholars and military practitioners alike, are all looking for guidance, rationale, and consistency in the government decisions to involve the Canadian Forces. Is the nation getting involved because of ...”inherently useful, good public relations in Canada and abroad...is the nation involved to preserve Canada’s “International image and reputation, vice solid reasoning for heavy and intense participation during the recent decades”<sup>67</sup>. Or was it for maintaining the excellent and popular domestic and international recognition they had acquired over the years<sup>68</sup>. Both Bashow and Delvoie are among many analysts and scholars looking for the “*raison d’etre*” for employment of Canadian military personnel in the world operations during the last decade. The overtly stated “SHARP” principles that had been so clearly enunciated as policy criteria for military commitments decision-

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<sup>64</sup> Louis A. Delvoie, *Curious Ambiguities: Reflections on Canada’s International Security Policy*, Unpublished paper for IRPP Conference Montreal, Nov 2000, p. 2.

<sup>65</sup> Louis A Delvoie, *Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales*, Canadian Military Journal, Summer 2000, p. 1.

<sup>66</sup> *To Secure a Nation: The Case for a new Defence White Paper*, Report for the Council for Canadian security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Center for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2001

<sup>67</sup> J.L. Granatstein, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, Copp Clark Pitman, 1986, pp 232-237.

<sup>68</sup> Andrew F. Cooper, pp. 173-177.

making, are no longer used as the basis of explanation, or at least their use in the decision-making is not discernable<sup>69</sup>. It is one thing to claim that Canada has been involved, and participated in every United Nations peace keeping missions, but one must also be able to explain to all Canadians “Why”. This is where our political apparatus finds itself unable to provide the necessary rationale.

The last decade of Canadian military involvements is indeed very problematic, as not only are our elected officials at a loss to explain, but our think-tanks of scholars and historians also find themselves unable to provide the answers for Canadians. What possible Canadian national interests were we preserving, or protecting by getting involved in Haiti? It has always been easy to conclude that the overthrow of



He was further supported by Ambassador Delvoie who also provided his strong opinion on the issue of policy ambiguity when he noted:

*“In the midst of vast transformation to the international system and security environment, the Canadian Government has failed to develop a new policy framework and criteria to determine why, where and when Canada should engage its Armed Forces in what are now referred to as International Security Operations. There is in fact a policy vacuum which must be filled if the Canadian Government is to avoid unproductive and unnecessarily dangerous undertaking which are of questionable value to the country, and may be inconsistent with its interests”*<sup>73</sup>

Is it just because Canada wants to participate, regardless of the fact that the conflicts are neither indirectly nor directly affecting any of Canada’s national interests (assuming they were defined), is Ottawa simply looking to play in the arena of global affairs<sup>74</sup>? Or, maybe it is that Ottawa is more interested in providing “*a triumph of good intentions and image building over coherent policy and rational decision-making*”<sup>75</sup>

### **OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS**

*“Protecting our security must go beyond military preparedness. New approaches, new instruments, new institutional roles and political responsibilities in the maintenance of international security must be developed... shape the broader framework that responds to the demands of a changing security environment”*<sup>76</sup>.

Despite the horrific nature of the September 11<sup>th</sup> events, they provided the necessary urgency and momentum to embark on the process of formally addressing the Canadian national security vacuum, from a truly holistic approach. Ambassador Delvoie is only partially correct when he identified the need for an in-depth review to rationalize

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<sup>73</sup> Delvoie, p. 1.

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Canadian participation in global security operations<sup>77</sup>. His view is still very narrowly focused on the military dimension only. There is a need for an overall and properly balanced national security review, that would recognize all commitments/capabilities gaps, that to date, neither the Canadian government, nor the public has seen fit to address adequately<sup>78</sup>. Needless to say, in order to accomplish such a holistic review, the national interests, and their security elements must be clearly stated and discernable. If one thing can be said to express the importance of properly defining the national interests for Canada, it is that: "... *however difficult it is to do with it as a guide to analyzing (and making) policy, it is even more difficult to do without it*"<sup>79</sup>.

Strategists have already attempted to address the vacuum by proposing innovative tools for political masters to better rationalize their decisions and most importantly, be able to show Canadians why. The work by Finan and Hurley on establishing clear national interests, and a method for prioritizing their various elements through the AHP process, has been supported and furthered by strategy analysts such as Richmond M. Loyd, and his Strategy and Force Planning model<sup>80</sup>. James S. Finan and W.D. Macnamara took the process one step further, when they recently demonstrated the use of the AHP process in a truly Canadian, but most importantly holistic framework of Canadian national interests and security elements<sup>81</sup>. To some extent, it can be argued that J.L. Granatstein supported the need for some form of rationalization process, when insisting that national decisions must be made through the use of a "*national interests calculus*", instead of proceeding on irrational and emotional reasoning...<sup>82</sup>.

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<sup>77</sup> Delvoie, p 10.

<sup>78</sup> Alistair Edgar, p1.

<sup>79</sup> David G. Haglund, *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited*, p. 9.

<sup>80</sup> Richmond L. Lloyd, *Strategy and Force Planning Framework, Strategy and Force Planning*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, pp. 1-17. A process by which a clearly defined national interest is run through a modeling tool to produce the necessary forces to preserve and/or protect it.

<sup>81</sup> James S. Finan, W.D. Macnamara, "*An illustrative Canadian Strategic Risk assessment*", Canadian Military Journal, Autumn 2001, pp. 29-34.

<sup>82</sup> J.L. Granatstein, *Defence freeloading Imperils Sovereignty*, A18.

While enjoying a strong Canadian public desire to get involved, and understand their national interests as complex as they may be due to their multi-dimensionality, one must re-consider the proposals made by analysts like Jane Boulden, Albert Legault, David Bercuson and Peter Haydon to name a few, who suggested the creation of an overarching framework to consolidate and address the nation's security needs and requirements<sup>83</sup>. The Special Joint Committee on Foreign Policy also recommended the establishment of a cabinet level committee as a necessary oversight mechanism. The complexity of the holistic dimension of the Canadian security concerns demands the re-opening of that debate. It is no longer acceptable for Canadians to see their politicians setting-up special committees to look after the nation's security only when a crisis occurs. They demand to be ready.

*The committee is convinced of the need to adopt a broader concept of security, encompassing both military and non-military factors This committee further recommends that this concept be reflected both in the establishment of a high level government mechanism, such as a cabinet committee and in the restructuring of the relevant Standing committees of Parliament in order to ensure that the various elements of security are addressed in an integrated manner*<sup>84</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The necessary end state is a multi-dimensional National Security Policy framework, solidly anchored on well defined, and overtly enunciated national interests, subject to variable prioritization, and flexible enough to adapt to today's dynamic global environment and challenges. Through the results of government surveys, Canadians have shown signs of coming out of their "security" hibernation, and are likely to continue to show increased awareness along with a broader understanding of the Canadian security concept. They will demand to be heard on those issues. The process of further defining and acknowledging our national interests must continue, and must be multi-dimensional,

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<sup>83</sup> Richard Giguère, LCol, *Doit-on créer un ministère de la sécurité au Canada*, Le Maintien de la Paix, Bulletin 57, Février 2002

<sup>84</sup> *Principles and Priorities for the Future*, p 13.

treating national security strategy as a holistic entity. The enemy, in whatever form, even as the “evil itself”, has knocked at our door, right here at home, where we were so confident and invulnerable for so long in our fireproof house, providing security rather than consuming it... at least until now.

From a military security perspective, our government must acknowledge their neglect. They are now sending more and more Canadian personnel in harm’s way, and it behooves them to develop the necessary policies and framework, to ensure that the right decisions are taken for the right reasons, in order to do the right thing.

*“...The capabilities of the Canadian Forces have been dramatically reduced in recent years, as a result of a long succession of budgetary and personnel cuts; their ability to undertake new and more complex mandates is thus severely constrained. ... the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces are sworn to lay down their lives if necessary in defence of Canada, Canadians and their interests. Is it legitimate to ask them to do the same in defence of others to whom they have no such obligation, in situations where there are no evident or important Canadian interests at stake? ... decisions to deploy forces, to engage in military operations and to put troops in harm’s way are among the gravest which any government is required to make. They should never be taken casually, and should certainly not be based on the spontaneous reactions of politicians, or public to media images, no matter how dismal....”<sup>85</sup>*

We cannot continue with our historical “Laissez-Faire” attitude. That would mean accepting the current political vacuum, and avoiding a necessary change on today’s political desires for ambiguity and limitless freedom of interpretation that can only be done from a subjective basis only. In order to achieve the necessary end state for the nation, it is recommended that:

- ◁ Formal governmental efforts be made to advance the development of clearly and overtly stated national interests from which security interests can be derived;
- ◁ Increased formal governmental support be provided to enhance the “wideners” view of broadening and understanding of the multi-dimensional aspects of the nation’s security concept;

- ◁ Formal government commitments be extended to further advance the development and use of new and innovative decision-making systems such as the application of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to the prioritization of national security strategic decision-making, to address the current latent process transparency;
- ◁ The Canadian government formally engage in the debate related to the need and establishment of an overarching national security body to address the nation's emerging multi-dimensional security complexity; and
- ◁ The rationalization process for Canadian military commitments be reviewed and clearly enunciated, based on clear national interests, in order to provide unmistakable reasoning and sound decision-making given the seriousness of the matter of sending increasingly more Canadians in harm's way.

While a very strict and stringent system is not what is being sought, as eloquently stated by Denis Stairs in his submission to the Special Joint Committee reviewing Foreign Policy in 1994, the least we must produce is a solid foundation, covering all dimensions of Canadian national security, upon which we can deviate, and be able to explain to Canadians why, and based on what, a deviation might be necessary, given the circumstances. Canadians deserve nothing less than that... A Canadian Security Policy Framework.

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<sup>85</sup> Delvoie, p. 38.

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