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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE/COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

Cours des études de sécurité nationale CSEN 4/National Security Studies Course - NSSC4

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE/CANADIAN FORCES

STRATEGIC CHANGE:

A PROFESSION OF ARMS FOCUS

By/par

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“Wooden-headedness, the source of self-destruction, is a factor that plays a remarkable role in individuals. It consists in assessing a situation in terms of preconceived fixed notions while ignoring or rejecting any contrary sign. It is acting according to wish while not allowing oneself to be deflected by the facts.”

Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly.

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ABSTRACT

This paper is written to provide a strategic change framework to DND/CF that is focused on the profession of arms. There is “change overload” across the department as each environmental and functional leader attempts to prepare his/her organization for the 21st century. The executive team must manage strategic change if it is to be successful. Strategic change initiatives must be prioritized, resourced, championed and communicated across DND/CF. The Balance Scorecard management system is used to develop a profession of arms focused strategic change matrix with specific measures and timings. If the DND/CF executive team implements a strategic change framework like the one recommended then strategic change success should improve remarkably over the attempts throughout the 1990s. The framework will create awareness for the need for change; ensure understanding of the change initiates across the breath and depth of DND/CF; and demand specific actions with performs measures.

DND/CF STRATEGIC CHANGE: A PROFESSION OF ARMS FOCUS.

Introduction

What is strategic change? There is no broadly accepted definition of strategic change that spans political, military and business disciplines. Carr, Hard and Trahan suggest that strategic change is “the process of aligning people, resources and culture with a shifting organizational direction.” Strategic change can involve a renewal of parts or even the whole organizational culture, structures, processes, and relationships with the external environment. Strategic change can therefore be both a physical as well as psychological phenomenon. Strategic change usually involves identifying priorities, key long-term objectives as well as shorter term goals and targets but it also often includes the realigning of people’s attitudes and behaviour to meet the requirements of the change.¹

There are a huge number of change strategies “published” internal to DND/CF by departmental, environmental and functional leaders. “Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy of 2020” is a “corporate vision for change” published by the Deputy Minister and Chief of Defence Staff which defines where DND/CF will be in 20 years. “Leadmark: the Navy’s Strategy for 2020”; “One Army, One Team, One Vision: The Army Strategy”; “People in Defence Beyond 2020”; “Defence Information Management Strategy”; “Canadian Officership in the 21st Century”; “NCM Professional Development 2020” are examples of environmental and functional change strategies that support/augment the departmental Strategy 2020. In addition, the VCDS is tracking the implementation of over 339 mandated changes demanded by key reports such as the Dickson Reports, Somalia Report, Special Commission on Reserve Restructure and the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Changes in the department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

Strategic change fits into four broad categories: operational; strategic; cultural; and paradigm change according to Dr Richardson at the Queens Business School.² The majority of the current departmental,

environmental and functional strategies include operational change initiatives in areas such as budgeting, business planning, organizational restructure and procurement. In addition, these strategies detail strategic change in areas such as: strategic lift; operational readiness; use of technology (Revolution in Military Affairs); collaborating with Other Government Departments (OGDs); and interoperability with allies. The Army Commander specifically wants the Army to undergo a cultural change. The government, through its budget allocations, is demanding a paradigm change where the DND/CF must expand defence roles and tasks to assume more responsibility within the national security framework (infrastructure protection, cyber protection, etc).

There is a belief within DND/CF that there is a homogenous executive team. The reality here and in most large corporations is very different. “Each senior executive has a different point of view because of his responsibilities. It is therefore hard to develop a “shared understanding” of the complete organisation. In fact the executive team often faces real conflicts of interests because they are all competing for scarce resources, recognition and career advancement.”³ The DND/CF executive team must work very hard to develop a shared understanding by taking “ownership” of strategic change and by creating a process that they all believe in.⁴ This process must: clarify and translate future strategies; set measurable targets; communicate change priorities and successes throughout DND/CF; and educate and train people how to deal with change.

Purpose and Scope.

It would be impossible to deal with all aspects of strategic change in this paper. For example, one can debate that strategic change should be: directive or participatory; evolutionary or revolutionary; and/or individual or team driven. The purpose of this paper is to offer up a strategic change framework that will focus strategic change on the profession of arms. The core “raison d’etre” of DND/CF is to maximize the generation, employment and sustainment of military capabilities to meet the needs of Canada. This

framework will manage strategic change. It should also clarify and communicate a single change strategy that has integrated all of the strategic change initiatives listed earlier.

The Balance Scorecard (BSC) methodology was selected to develop the strategic change framework. This methodology was selected because the new “Defence Planning and Management Framework and Business Model” recently published by the VCDS requires that “performance measure at the DND/CF strategic level will be based on the Balance Scorecard methodology.”⁵ I believe, like the creators of the BSC, that it can be used for more than performance measurement. It is also a management system that provides alignment and focus to long-term strategy.⁶

The BSC translates an organisation’s vision and strategy into a coherent set of performance measures. These performance measures are organized into four different perspectives: financial, customer, internal business processes and learning and growth.⁷ It indicates to employees what is important to drive current operations and what is important to achieve future goals. This clarity is achieved by assigning specific success indicators to each perspective. The BSC methodology has proved to be a very good tool to improve the management of government organizations. The financial perspective of the BSC is a constraint, rather than an objective for government organizations, as these organizations must limit their spending to budgeted amounts.⁸

BSC and the Executive Team.

The executive team must address several key issues before they can successfully implement a BSC that will manage strategic change. Given the complexities of large organizations, no single person at the top can do all that it takes to achieve success for an organization. Success depends on the entire executive team addressing not only their individual responsibilities but also their collective responsibility for the organization as a whole. It is critical that the DND/CF executive team rise above the details of managing the day-to-day business of the department. Day-to-day management is a middle management responsibility. Executive leaders understand the politics and have the authority to make things happen.

They must seek out new ideas rather than wait for bureaucratic processes to deliver vetted ideas to them. They must then take collective decisions on complex issues before directing middle management to implement their decisions. If the executive team does not settle the politics and agree on the risks before assigning tasks to the middle management matrix it will be impossible to implement strategic change.⁹

Today formal leadership within large organisations is viewed with cynicism, indifference or antipathy and where loyalty to the organisation and its leaders is a scarce commodity.¹⁰ DND/CF is a bureaucracy that is obsessed with executive vertical control of all activities, organizational size and structure, adherence to process and the minimization of risk to politicians. The executive team must realize that strategic change is more associated with informal networks that build trust through active participation horizontally across the organization. This same informal approach is also required to achieve external buy-in of strategic change initiatives across the government.

The Balance Scorecard Assumptions

The government constantly tries to provide “just enough” defence. A small defence budget allows more funds to be applied to other programs such as health and education. The military profession wants a “defence team that can generate, employ and sustain high-quality, combat-capable, interoperable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces that exploit leading-edge doctrine and technologies.”¹¹ In a democracy it is the government that decides what risk the nation will take with its defence. The current geopolitical situation is not expected to change significantly in the near to mid term. Most threats to Canada are very low except possibly transnational terrorism.¹² Terrorism threats are likely to be more diffuse, dispersed, multidimensional, and ambiguous which will demand a much more integrated national response to destroy them.¹³ Financial budgets have been a constraining factor for DND/CF. However, small budgets have rarely prevented DND/CF from providing credible force packages to support domestic and international crises in the eyes of the politician or the public. It must therefore be assumed that there will not be any major adjustments to current government defence policy and the DND/CF funding

baseline. In addition, the government will wish to remain as flexible as possible with respect to the size and composition of defence contributions to multi-lateral operations. The Canadian Forces must therefore maintain a range of capabilities to span the potential spectrum of conflict. Lastly, the government will continue to support its stated “early in, early out” policy for the duration of operational commitments.

Proposed DND/CF Balance Scorecard.

The four generic BSC perspectives of customer, internal business processes, learning and growth and financial must be put into language that makes sense for DND/CF. DND/CF’s primary “customers” include the political executive, OGDs, and the Canadian public. Therefore, the “customer” BSC perspective could be customized for DND/CF as follows: “ To provide excellent defence support to the citizens of Canada.” The “internal processes” generic BSC perspective could become “ to continue to improve operational effectiveness of services within a small growth budget by increasing operating efficiencies.” The words “small growth budget” are important to this customized DND/CF perspective because of the stated BSC assumptions. It is easy to improve operational effectiveness if funds are not a constraint. DND/CF is constrained by its budget! Learning and growth is the next generic BSC perspective. Since DND/CF now designs, develops and implements military capabilities which includes equipment, people, training and doctrine, the DND/CF “learning and growth” perspective can be expressed as “ to experiment with new defence capabilities and processes to improve performance in the future.” The last BSC perspective “financial” is captured very well by “to be good stewards of public funds allocated to defence.”

Strategy 2020, the departmental vision for change, has detailed eight objectives: innovative path, decisive leaders, modernization, global deployability, career of choice, interoperability, strategic partnerships and resource stewardship. These eight long-term objectives can be merged into the four DND/CF BSC perspectives as follows:

DND/CF BSC Perspective

Strategy 2020 Objectives

To provide excellent defence support to the citizens of Canada.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Global deployability• Strategic partnerships• Interoperability
To continue to improve operational effectiveness of services within a small growth budget by increasing operating efficiencies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Innovative path• Career of choice• Decisive leaders
To experiment with new military capabilities and processes to improve performance in the future.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Modernization
To be good stewards of the public funds allocated to defence.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Resource stewardship

Each of these DND/CF BSC perspectives must now be assigned major success indicators that will measure strategic change success from a profession of arms perspective.

To provide excellent defence support to the citizens of Canada

Our key stakeholder, the government, has been clear that the roles and tasks of defence must expand to help reduce the risks to national security. The last budget, December 2001, provided millions of dollars to DND/CF for specific non-traditional defence roles and tasks such as the co-ordination of infrastructure and cyber protection across Canada. The Prime Minister has also made it very clear in recent speeches that defence is more than tanks and aircraft. The department already provides national search and rescue, a disaster assistance response team, and counter-terrorism capabilities. In addition, there are a number of standing/on-call tasks with OGDs in areas such as surveillance, cyber-protection, law-enforcement, and environmental protection. Areas where DND/CF can do more include: managing the integration of all federal department/agencies crisis response facilities into a unified command, control, communication,

computers and intelligence (C4I) operations centre; generating rapidly deployable Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) reconnaissance and decontamination capabilities; generating deployable medical facilities; and providing vital point security forces that can assist securing international and national events held in Canada. These capabilities should be generated within 24 months by restructuring current defence capabilities.

DND/CF has lost sight of its core mission; generating and sustaining military capabilities. We continue to misemploy military personnel. The majority of the officer corps is working to ensure that the bureaucracy functions, rather than leading/thinking about the military profession. In the US and UK, non-core military activities are done by public servants or contracted out to the private sector. For example, a \$4 billion UK military communication project had a military staff of 5 military officers, 20 public servants and a prime contractor with a project staff of 250. A similar project office in Canada had a military staff of over 150, about 30 public servants and a prime contractor with a project staff around 50.¹⁴ Designing, installing and managing Information Management (IM) systems to support DND/CF infrastructure is another area best done by the private sector. Today these IM tasks consume hundreds of soldiers, sailors and airmen, which means that they are not available to take their turn deploying with operational units.¹⁵

Many military personnel argue it is essential to maintain non-military positions to ensure “a proper ship-to shore ration”. This argument is seriously flawed! If an individual does not live and practice his or her profession constantly they will quickly become ineffective. There are officers and Non Commissioned Members (NCMs) who have spent over half their careers “flying a desk” in NDHQ. They know little about the new capabilities in their service or their military occupation. When they are posted back to operational units they have little credibility with their peers and subordinates and they require costly training to make them operational. The DND/CF goal should be to maximize the number of operational units and soldiers, sailors and airmen in them. It is up to the executive leadership to control their utilisation by government to ensure an acceptable quality of life. “Utilisation” can be benchmarked against other national forces to provide DND/CF logical arguments for managing government

expectations. Doing what you joined to do will also improve retention across the CF. In the business world, companies are attempting to achieve 100% of their personnel resources working in core business areas. An initial goal for DND/CF should be to go from operational personnel availability of 23,000 out of 60,000 personnel¹⁶, that is 38%, to an operational personnel availability of 60% within three years.

The Canadian Forces has proven tactical command, control, communication, computers, intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance (C4ISR) capabilities based on its experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These capabilities are in high demand by most multi-national coalitions and international institutions like the United Nations. The CF should better develop these capabilities. Within the Army, experimentation with a Command Support Unit with extensive C4ISR capabilities should be made even a higher priority, as should the creation of a reconnaissance brigade group. The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff should expand the satellite communications, integrated intelligence and computer services in the Joint Operations Group to allow Canada to offer these services when new coalition missions are being set up. These improved niche capabilities should be made operational within 24 months, after further piloting of the concepts.

The major success indicators to support this BSC perspective are:

- Provide additional “Homeland” defence capabilities as soon as possible.
- Employ 60% of uniforms in core military positions within 3 years.
- Be capable of providing coalitions with “niche” C4ISR capabilities within 24 months.

Continue to improve operational effectiveness of services within a small growth budget by increasing operating efficiencies

The 1994 Defence White Paper does not define in detail a naval task force, a brigade group, a battle group, a battalion, a wing of fighter aircraft, a squadron of tactical transport aircraft, etc.¹⁷The structure of most CF units has remained unchanged since the end of the Second World War. LGen Jeffery constantly

raises this point when addressing the need for change in the CF. Infantry battalions still consist of 1000 soldiers and tank regiments still have war establishments for 79 tanks. In NATO an infantry battalion is now 400-600 soldiers and a tank regiment consists of 31 tanks. The Canadian Army can almost double the number of operational units within its 20,000 soldier ceiling if it reduces the size of most of its units. With Light Armour Vehicle III (LAV III), Tactical Command Control Communication System (TCCCS), COYOTES (reconnaissance vehicle), Land Force Command and Control Information System (LFC2IS) and modern small arms, it should be possible to design effective infantry battalions of 500 soldiers. Tank squadrons of ten versus 19 tanks will double the number of armoured sub-units available for deployment. Within a coalition, the quality of the unit is more important than the number of soldiers in it. More units will also allow more specialization. The Army could afford to have a mix of infantry units; mechanized, light, urban and mountain. This increases the flexibility of the government as well as the DND/CF when considering participation in a coalition. This capability restructuring should not be difficult for in place units and should be executed within a 24-month timeline. Specialized units may be more difficult because these capabilities do not exist today. They should be given a timeline of 48 months.

There are numerous military capabilities being manned by regular force personnel that are of questionable value in the current strategic security context. High readiness of non-essential capabilities is costly. Lower readiness forces such as the reserve could and should man many of these capabilities. The Army's three regular-force artillery regiments are an excellent example. These regiments could assigned to the reserves because the use of artillery on operations is highly unlikely for legal reasons.¹⁸ Precision strike systems are needed today. The navy's reserve manning of the coastal patrol vessels is an excellent example of assigning capabilities to the reserve based on the strategic security environment. In addition, reserve units who draw their personnel from universities and colleges could best man new "cyber-protection" capabilities because recruiting and retaining full time expertise in this area would be difficult due to the competition for manpower from the private sector. These actions should be incorporated into the Army's Land Force Reserve Restructure project now and implemented over a five-year period.

The major success indicators to support this BSC perspective are:

- Increase the number and specialization of operational units within a 24-48 month time period.
- Assign more military capability generation to reserve forces through the Land Force Reserve Restructure project within five years.

Experiment with new defence capabilities and processes to improve performance in the future.

The Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) will continue to cause major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technology when combined with changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts.¹⁹ The CF has identified the need for better C4ISR, precision-strike weapons and integrated logistics capabilities to include strategic lift to operate within a coalition and allow rapid deployment. Experimentation in all of these areas is essential. DND/CF cannot afford to do these experiments within current and proposed budget allocations if it procures the complete capability for the CF force structure. The CF should switch to a force generation strategy that is based on maximum experimentation, piloting and testing of capabilities combined with the minimum “implementation” of these proven capabilities. This strategy will allow the CF to determine exactly what capabilities it needs but implementation can be put on hold until an operational requirement develops driven by the strategic security environment. For example the CF could have procured only sufficient LAV IIIs to allow the development of the new capability. It did not need to outfit most of the regular force Army with LAV IIIs. The “saved” funds could have been used to experiment with new “urban warfare” capabilities. A major review of the current capital program, a six-month task, should be conducted immediately to determine the minimum equipment requirement to support capabilities.

The cost of professionally developing military personnel in DND/CF owned and operated institutions are almost double that charged by universities and colleges in Canada.²⁰ The CF must better leverage the Canadian academic infrastructure to free resources for operational units. Most of our allies have outsourced large portions of their individual training requirements to academic/private sector organisations.

The uniform savings from their individual training and educational military institutions were put into operational units. Besides the savings in uniforms, the quality of education and training also improves. The current drive to concentrate professional education and training within the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) is shortsighted. It is very costly and contact between the military and society suffers. To succeed on complex international operations the military profession must understand broad social issues and foreign cultures. This learning can only occur by debating with society through contract in academic and training environments. The CDA should be tasked to outsource up to 50% of its education and training requirements to the Canadian academic/ private sector infrastructure as soon as possible. ADM(HR) has numerous studies that offer a variety of implementation plans for this action. This activity should be completed within 36 months.

The DND/CF is experimenting with Alternate Service delivery (ASD). Delays have been encountered in implementing specific programs and it has been difficult to realize the saving targets but overall savings have occurred.²¹ Most ASD efforts have been focused on reducing total operating costs. ASD can also improve core business focus, provide staffing flexibility, provide access to specialized skills and services as well as equipment and materials and reduce risks.²² There are numerous other opportunities to apply ASD within DND/CF. These opportunities should be pursued especially those free uniformed resources to be applied to military tasks. This activity should be driven by a DND/CF executive team plan that sets specific priorities and timelines. The executive should be capable of developing a plan within six months.

The major success indicators to support this BSC perspective are:

- Increase experimentation/piloting of new military capabilities but only implement these capabilities when the strategic security environment demands implementation. To commence after a six month capital program review.
- Transfer military professional development from DND/CF institutions to Canadian academic infrastructure. CDA should commence this activity immediately.

- Accelerate ASD initiatives that focus military personnel on core capabilities as directed by executive team within six months.

To be good stewards of the public funds allocated to defence

Given the current and projected strategic threat assessments facing Canada, defence expenditure above 1.5% of GDP should not be anticipated or demanded. The nation still has serious debt issues as well as growing health and education issues. DND/CF has been able to cope with this level of funding in the past. However, the current 1.1% of GDP, about half of the NATO average, is too low if the government wishes to provide credible forces in support of international security.²³

The DND/CF executive will have to be creative to influence the government to get defence spending back to 1.5% of GDP. Public interest in defence has risen since September 11 2001. The DND/CF executive must turn this public interest into more funds for defence. The UK, with its defence diplomacy concept, generates funds by providing education and training services to other militaries. Providing competitively priced services to Other Government Departments (OGDs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and allies/other militaries that are also of beneficial to DND/CF from a training and knowledge perspective should be a top priority in the near term. Experimentation in fund generation should be possible within 24 months after seeking approval from the government bureaucracy.

DND/CF must develop a different mindset in life cycle management of military capabilities. Within the current security environment context, why is the Army upgrading equipment to maintain a total mechanized force? The M109 and M113 do not need to be upgraded because they will only be used if the nation mobilizes for war. These upgrade funds should be used for experimentation/piloting of new capabilities. Old equipment should be stored and only upgraded if new capabilities are not available in time to meet a critical operational need for mobilization. This action can be done in parallel with the capital program review mentioned earlier.

Buying Canadian is critical for DND/CF within the context of procurement. The Canadian political and bureaucratic elite insists in maximizing value for Canadians when procuring equipment or services. DND/CF must actively engage key government departments/organisations such as Treasury Board, Department of Finance and Privy Council Office to ensure it can influence decision-making external to DND/CF. Senior executives must focus on networking externally to the department, allowing subordinates to run the day-to-day operations. Securing buy-in across government for essential national security expenditures should be the primary role of the executive team. A recent decision by Armed Forces Council to add more “uniform” positions to Privy Council Office, Treasury Broad Secretariat and Department of Finance is already tackling this issue.

The major success indicators to support this BSC perspective are:

- Design defence policy to live within a 1.5% GDP envelope.
- Use “capability storage” versus “capability upgrading” when capabilities are at the end of their life cycle. To have plan developed within six months.
- DND/CF executives must maximize Canadian procurements by influencing government processes. Ongoing now.

Conclusion

Strategic change within DND/CF must be better focused if specific change initiatives are to be successfully implemented and the military profession grow stronger. The setting of priorities and performance measures that focuses on maximizing military capabilities are two areas where DND/CF must improve. The BSC developed in this paper could ensure that DND/CF: meets the expectations of the government and the people of Canada; are good stewards of the resources assigned to the department; continues to improve operational effectiveness with in the context of a small growth budget; and experiments to ensure we are capable of meeting the defence demands of the nation in the future.

The BSC success indicators focus on the profession of arms. Military professionals within the CF will be just that military professionals. They will not be public servants in uniform. Public servants will do those tasks that do not require a uniform but require understanding of government process and politics. In addition, tasks that are best done by experts outside of the department (ie. IM infrastructure and base services) could be delivered through ASD. The “timings” associated with success indicators are critical. Without the stress of a deadline there is little incentive to change at all. The timings do not extend beyond five years because planning beyond five years in an extremely fast changing world has proven to be impossible for most other disciplines such as politics and business.

The implementation of the success indicators and timings will: broaden defence within the context of homeland security; create more units and specialized capabilities; give the CF more credibility within coalitions; provide more meaningful roles for reserve forces; separate modernization from procurement so the profession can continue to evolve; improve the quality of education and training; and significantly improve resource stewardship. These improvements will, however, be difficult to implement because: the number of regular force officers and NCMs in the CF will decrease; timelines are very challenging; and the executive team must lead the effort not manage it.

Below is a summary of the BSC:

BALANCE SCORECARD SUMMARY FOR STRATEGIC CHANGE

<p align="center"><u>EXCELLENT DEFENCE SUPPORT</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide additional homeland defence capabilities; asap. - Employ 60% of uniforms in core military capabilities; 36 months. - Provide coalitions with niche C4ISR capabilities; 24 months. 	<p align="center"><u>IMPROVE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase the number and specialization of units; 24 for current capabilities, 48 months for special capabilities. - Assign more force generation to reserve forces though LFRR project; five years.
<p align="center"><u>EXPERIMENT WITH NEW CAPABILITIES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase experimentation that defines new capabilities but implement these capabilities only when dictated by 	<p align="center"><u>GOOD STEWARDS OF PUBLIC FUNDS</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Plan for defence policy funding of 1.5% of GDP; next federal budget.

<p>strategic security environment; commence in six months after capital program review.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transfer 50% of military professional development capability to Canadian academic infrastructure; 36 months. - Accelerate ASD activities that focus military personnel on core military capabilities; commence within six months as directed by DND/CF executive team. 	<p>federal budget.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use capability storage versus capability upgrading; plan written within six months. - Maximize Canadian procurements by participating actively in external to DND government decision making.; focus of executive team to increase in this area immediately.
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¹ Davies, Murray. Commanding Change: War Winning Military Strategies for Organizational Change. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001. P12-13.

² Richardson, Peter. "Strategic Change Briefing Note." Queen's Executive MBA: Managing Change MBUS 954, 2001.

³ Hout, T. and Carter, J. "Getting it Done: New Roles for Senior Executives." Harvard Business Review. November-December 1995. P41.

⁴ "Ownership" implies creating awareness for the need for change, building an understanding internally and externally to DND/CF why specific change initiatives are being implemented and creating actions to implement and monitor change initiatives.

⁵ National Defence. Defence Planning and Management Framework and Business Model: An Integrated Approach for DND/CF. Ottawa, 2002.

⁶ Kaplan, Robert and Norton, David. The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy Into Action. USA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996. P 19.

⁷ Kaplan, Robert and Norton, David. The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy Into Action. USA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996. P8.

⁸ Kaplan, Robert and Norton, David. The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy Into Action. USA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996. P180-183.

⁹ Hout, T. and Carter, J. "Getting it Done: New Roles for Senior Executives." Harvard Business Review. November-December 1995. P45.

¹⁰ Dunphy, Dexter. "Embracing Paradox: Top-down versus Participate management of Organisational Change" Breaking the Code of Change. Edited by Beer, M. and Norhria, N. USA: Harvard Business School, 2000.P130.

¹¹ National Defence. Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. DND. June 1999. P7.

¹² National Defence. Strategic Assessment 2001. Ottawa; September 2001.

¹³ Jenkins, Michael. "Countering the New Terrorism." Contract for US Air Forces by RAND. RAND, 1999.

¹⁴ This example is based on personal experience of the author who worked on exchange with the British Army Procurement Executive and helped determine the manning of the Tactical Command, Control and Communication System project in the late 1990s.

¹⁵ This assessment is based on authors knowledge of ADM(IM) operations when he was J6 Coord working within ADM(IM) from 1997-2000. The primary reasons for using military personnel are that they cost less and there is no

overtime. However, once IM training costs are considered and the need to constantly re-train because once trained an individual normally accepts employment in the private sector this argument loses its logic.

¹⁶ The personnel availability figure used by DCDS staff planners is 23,000 personnel. The remainder of CF personnel is not available for operations/deployments because they work in departmental headquarters, conduct training in CF schools etc. This staff planning figure was in effect 12 June 2002 and was provide to the author by the DCDS staff.

¹⁷ Canada. 1994 Defence White Paper. Ottawa; Supply and Services Canada, 1994. P38-39.

¹⁸ Hague Rules(IV), Articles 25 and 27 and Geneva Conventions (IV) Article 53 refer.

¹⁹ National Defence. Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. DND. June 1999. P 1.

²⁰ National Defence. “AGRA Report on Individual Education and Training within DND/CF” Sponsored by ADM(HR), 1998.

²¹ Auditor General of Canada. “Chapter 27- National Defence Alternative Service Delivery.” 1999 Report of Auditor General of Canada. November 1999. P 27.25.

²² Cant, M. and Jeynes, L. “What Does Outsourcing Bring You that Innovation Cannot?” Total Quality Management. Vol 9, Nos 2 and 3. 1998. P 193-201.

²³ Little, Bruce. “Economist McCallum well suited to Defence portfolio.” The Globe and Mail: International Business, 30 May 2002. B13.