

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES COURSE 4/COURS DES ETUDES DE SECURITE
NATIONALE 4

...

“Fanatical Terrorism: Is Canada prepared for a terrorist attack?”

By / par Colonel Brian W. Akitt

This paper was written by an officer attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfillment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions that the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

La présente étude a été rédigée par un officier du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale

Abstract

For many years, the Canadian national security policy debate was based upon a bipolar world where the Canadian role was directly linked to the strategic requirements of the United States and NATO in maintaining international stability. Within that debate, little attention was devoted to the worldwide resurgence of radical religious movements and their significant effect on contemporary terrorism.

This paper examines the asymmetric threat to Canada from terrorist fanaticism. It outlines the conditions that existed in the West prior to the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the situation as it exists today in Canada. With a look to those issues, which played a role in the attacks on the American homeland and their applicability within the Canadian context, an assessment of the threat to Canada's security is conducted. Lastly, the preparedness of Canada is examined in order to determine if Canada's current posture and defences will serve as a deterrent to the threat.

While there has been much posturing, the Government of Canada has placed a very low priority on protecting the homeland against the terrorist. Within the Department of National Defence, whose Minister is also responsible for the emergency preparedness of Canada, a comprehensive threat assessment addressing the terrorist threat is lacking. Yet, events indicate that the threat is very real and the situation is urgent. The paper concludes that action needs to be taken immediately to complete the threat assessment and develop a comprehensive counter terrorism plan focused on ensuring Canada's preparedness.

Introduction

On 11 September 2001, terrorists unleashed an astonishing air assault on America's military and financial centres, hijacking four commercial jets and then crashing them into the World Trade Centre in New York, the Pentagon and the Pennsylvania countryside. As of 17 January 2002, the official count of terror victims reported by the Associated Press, including airplane passengers, crews and ground casualties, was 3,122.¹ In October 2000, two suicide bombers attacked the destroyer USS Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden, killing 17 American sailors with explosives they detonated on a small boat that drew up alongside the U.S. warship.² Almost 20 years ago in 1983, suicide bombers in Beirut accounted for 241 fatalities amongst U.S. Marines when their barracks were attacked.³ Clearly, recent events have shown that the terrorist threat is real and that the impact on today's economic and political landscapes, as evidenced in the aftermath of 11 September, is significant. To state that the stage has been set for further terrorist acts won't be an overstatement and

Canada to define, never mind counter those threats, were minimal before 11 September.

This paper examines the asymmetric threat to Canada from terrorist fanaticism. Given Canada's dependence on the world economy and its close relationship with the United States, the Canadian Government must take positive steps to address the increased terrorist threat from Islamic fanatics. Otherwise, Canada could become a convenient and easy target for terrorism. To date, the steps taken post 11 September have been purely reactive in nature and in direct support of American initiatives as opposed to providing security in the defence of Canada. Within the Department of National Defence, whose Minister is also responsible for the emergency preparedness of Canada, a comprehensive threat assessment addressing the terrorist threat is lacking. This has raised serious concerns as to the level of Canadian preparedness in countering the fanatical terrorist.

This paper first examines the threat as it has developed. Secondly, an examination of the criteria of how and why the attacks were centred on the American homeland is conducted. After which, the current situation in Canada is assessed in order to measure the possibility of an attack against Canada. Finally, the preparedness of Canada is examined to determine if Canada's current posture and defences will serve as a deterrent to the threat. The sensitivity of much of the material addressing the subject has resulted in classifying many of the sources; hence a limitation to the paper is the reliance on non-classified sources.

An examination of the terrorist or asymmetric threat is an extremely complex problem

3. Laqueur, Walter. "The New Terrorism", Oxford University Press, 1999, pp 3.

and definitions play a key role in understanding the issues. For that reason, on 18 April 2000, Canada's Armed Forces Council adopted from the United States Department of Defence (DoD) Joint Staff, the following definition of the asymmetric threat: "a term used to describe attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses, using methods that differ significantly from the opponent's usual mode of operations."⁴ Further defining this type of warfare and placing these types of threats within the Canadian context, asymmetric threats are categorized according to the hostile use of Information Operations (IO), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and non-conventional operations.⁵ It is from within this last category, non-conventional operations, which includes terrorism, that the threat from Islamic fanatics is largely studied.

Terrorism is not new. Martyrs to some and terrorists to others - different societies view the actions of terrorists significantly different. There is evidence that terrorism has existed from the earliest recordings of history and its impact has been significant. From the early days of the Roman Empire and the Roman occupation of Palestine, there is reference to the "sicari"⁶, an extremist Jewish group from which the term "zealot"⁷ would later be derived. The patriotism and the mass suicide of these patriots would later form an integral part of the defence and subsequent fall of Masada, in the first century. In describing the role of these ultra-patriots in the history of the Jewish state, Laqueur summarizes by stating that

4. Canada. Department of National Defence. DCDS Final Report – Asymmetric Threats and Weapons Of Mass Destruction. Ottawa: NDHQ, Nov 2001. (Currently in Draft Form), 1-2.

5. Ibid, 1-3.

6. Laqueur, 11.

the Romans: “considered them mainly responsible for the national catastrophe of the year 70, when the second temple was destroyed and the Jewish state ceased to exist.”⁸ Similarly from within Islam there was the order of Assassins⁹, an extremist Shiite sect credited with “originating the strategy of the terrorist disguised - taafir, or deception – as a devout missionary but in fact on a suicide mission, in exchange for which he is guaranteed the joys of paradise”.¹⁰ Although these are only two brief snapshots in the history of terrorism, there are discernable constants. When a minority or the weak feel oppressed, the conviction for the cause can become the strength of the movement, which is clearly the case for Islamic fanaticism. Religious militancy is not a new phenomenon and, based upon history, there is every reason to expect that it will continue to be an issue for years to come.

As one reviews the events of 11 September 2001 and the aftermath, events that we are very familiar with today, it is noticeable that the threat is evolving. With the coordination and the intensity of the 11 September attacks, the threat has matured and the acts are becoming more deadly. In addition, it should be noted that even after more than two thousand years of attacks and retaliation, no nation has been successful in eradicating this type of threat. Also of note and further complicating the issue from a western perspective, asymmetric operations are often viewed as being outside the norms of accepted warfare and hence pose a significant “moral dilemma to western societies”¹¹. It is seen as a moral dilemma in the sense that

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. (Draft) DCDS Final Report, 1-2.

western societies have tried to confine and counter terrorism through conventional warfare and the use of professional armies with very limited success; whereas, the reality of terrorism is significantly different. Terrorism knows no bounds and there is no code of conduct by which war is to be waged. Hence, terrorism has been and continues to be a significant threat to the stability and prosperity of this world.

North America Under Attack

As one looks back on 11 September and the attacks on the American homeland, the question arises as to why then and why there? The World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks confirmed a significant change to the modus operandi of the Islamic fanatics. After many

by Islamic fanatics. The threat has matured and its newly acquired sophistication has provided the fanatic a capability worthy of world attention.

So, why was the United States homeland selected to be the target and then subsequently attacked? Clearly, the role of the United States and American foreign policy were major factors. Of significance, the continued American support for Israel and the shoring up of the Saudi royalist regime were actions that ran contrary to the Islamic fundamentalist principles. Yet, for many years, the fanatics had been largely content to attack Americans on foreign soil and had not seen it necessary to carry the Islamic terrorist mission to North America.

Amongst American leaders, there is a notable absence of consensus on the subject of the terrorists' motivation and logic for attacking the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. The discussion is far ranging. From a discussion of irrational behaviour of fanatics to a strategic assessment of the role of a superpower in the 21st century where superpowers inevitably become targets, theories abound. On the emotive side, Attorney General John Ashcroft during his speech to the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, Organization of American States, on 28 January observed: "We are here today because the menace of terrorism knows no borders: political or geographic. Terrorists are motivated not by nationalism or ideology, but by hate -- hatred of everything our nations stand for."¹⁵ Possibly

14. Ibid

15. "Countering Terrorism: A Global Mission", US Department of State, 14 February 2002, 10 February 2002

an over-simplistic view of terrorism, but yet still a measure of the animosity that is seen towards the United States and the west for current policies in the Middle East. In contrast to the emotional appeal of blaming hatred alone, George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, offers another view when he states:

September 11 brought together and brought home—literally—several vital threats to the United States and its interests that we have long been aware of. It is the convergence of these threats that I want to emphasize with you today: the connection between terrorists and other enemies of this country; the weapons of mass destruction they seek to use against us; and the social, economic, and political tensions across the world that they exploit in mobilizing their followers. September 11 demonstrated the dangers that arise when these threats converge.¹⁶

It is within that convergence of the threat that one can more readily see the recurring themes from the viewpoint of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. The United States is synonymous with "infidel" because it was not governed in a manner consistent with Islamic fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The United States provides essential support for other "infidel" governments and institutions, such as Israel. It was also proven by the American actions in the Gulf War in 1991 and Somalia in 1993, which were largely seen as foreign interference in regions dominated by the Islamic faith. Finally, the United States' continued presence in the Islamic sphere of influence, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was seen as an issue. Similarly, the United States' pursuit of individual Islamic fundamentalists, such as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman¹⁷ who was convicted in the first World Trade Centre bombing,

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c4291.htm>

16. Tenet, George, "Worldwide Threat - Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence", *CIA*, 14 February 2002, 6 February 2002, http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_02062002.html

17. Engel, Richard, "Inside Al-Qaeda: A window into the world of militant Islam and the Afghani alumni". *Janes*, 27 February 2002, 28 September 2001, http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/janes010928_1_n.shtml

continued to attract the terrorists' attention. In fact, the over-riding emotion relating to the American role and image is evident in the frequent reference to the United States as the "great Satan"¹⁸ in the Islamic press.

The contempt for the United States by extremists is obvious and even if the specific motives for attacking the WTC are not entirely clear, their themes are relatively consistent. But, why specifically was North America chosen? First and foremost, many of the reasons would be the same whether it was against Americans at home or overseas. The United States, as the world's remaining superpower, provides the most visible targets worldwide. However, with limited defensive measures present at home prior to 11 September and a target rich environment, the selection of the United States homeland offered tremendous potential for success. In addition, other answers can probably be found in the responses to the earlier terrorist actions. Having attacked the United States on foreign soil, in Somalia, the barracks in Beirut and the Embassies in Eastern Africa albeit with limited success, one could still conclude that the Islam fanatics had made limited progress. American forces were no longer deployed in significant numbers in those regions. Possibly disappointing to the al-Qaeda on the one hand, yet encouraging on the other, the earlier attacks had an impact and now there was the opportunity to "raise the stakes". By carrying the war home to the Americans, North America would no longer be considered "safe". Hence, it was conceivable that a "retrenchment" of America would commence, thereby causing American troops to be

18. "9-11 - WAR COVERAGE", Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, 25 March 2002, 9 January 2002, <http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/archives/911war/>

withdrawn from the Middle East. These were all valid reasons for carrying the war to the United States homeland, but there was one consequence that was not foreseen. The intensity and ferocity of the American response against al-Qaeda and Afghanistan was probably not fully anticipated. The impact of this response is expected to play a significant role, as nations supporting Islamic fanatics are considered highly unlikely to accept direct targeting of the United States homeland in the future.

The Canadian Situation

Having examined the terrorist motives and the reasons for selection of the American homeland as the target for attacks, one can now compare the situation of Canada to that of the United States. However before proceeding, one should note that Canada has not historically been in the direct path of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. While Canada has been a source for fund raising, the fanatical movements to date have largely used Canada as a base for recuperation and preparatory phases as evidenced in the actions of Ahmed Ressam¹⁹, caught attempting to smuggle explosives into the United States. Also a perspective that may be worthy of discussion, within the Canadian context, is the absence of critical points for terrorists' attacks. However, the reality is that the attacks to date have not necessarily been centred on critical points but rather highly visible and highly vulnerable targets. Therefore, even within the Canadian context, the issue remains the same, visibility and vulnerability. Also, the perception of the threat is important when one considers the situation within the

19. "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999 North America Overview", US Department of State, 10 February 2002, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/noamer.html#Canada>

United States, as Canada does not necessarily suffer the same image as the United States in the eyes of the terrorist movement. Therefore, one could ask - what would the terrorist have to gain with an attack against Canada?

While as Canadians we often pride ourselves in being different than our much more powerful neighbour to the south, the reality is that there are parallels. In view of the reasons listed for the attacks on the American homeland, the same logic would also apply to the selection of Canada as a target. Canada could be viewed as being a country of “infidels”. It could also be seen as guilty of providing support to other infidel governments, and participating in the struggles against Islamic countries. Similarly, Canada shares a common North American culture with the United States and to a large extent the same economy. From an economic perspective and as a member of the G 8 group of nations, Canada is highly visible amongst the developed nations. Lastly, Canada’s role in the prosecution of the fundamentalist movement is now highly visible with our participation in Afghanistan as a member of the American coalition. Yet, there is one major difference. In contrast to the American reaction, Canada does not possess the military forces to threaten a reprisal on the scale of the American response. Therefore from the terrorist’s perspective, Canada is a candidate to substitute for the United States as a target without the terrorist organization or host nation experiencing the same level of risk of retribution.

Given the possibility of an attack, a look at the most recent studies that address the threat to Canada is revealing. Clearly, the terrorist threat is not totally new. However, a

search of unclassified government reports and correspondence reveals little concern with asymmetric threats to Canada until the late 1990s. In 1999, there is the initial reference to the growing threat, when the Department of National Defence outlined its view of the future in “Shaping the future of the CF: A Strategy for 2020”:

Few will argue with the claim that the world in twenty years will differ markedly from the world we think we know today. While we cannot accurately predict the future, there is much that we can reasonably forecast based on current and emerging trends as well as observable patterns of behaviour. Geo-politically, the United States will in all likelihood remain the dominant global power. Ethnic unrest, religious extremism and resource disputes will likely remain the main sources of conflict, ... Many emerging threats such as cyber and bio-terrorism will tend to be asymmetric.²⁰

Similarly, subsequent to the release of that report and in an analysis of Canada’s five-year plan to confront the emerging threat of asymmetric warfare, Ms. Sharon Hobson’s article; “The Asymmetric Future” published in Jane’s Defence Weekly in August of 2000 reported that an NDHQ team was then studying the asymmetric threat.²¹ Ms. Hobson further quotes Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Morneau of NDHQ/DNBCD Operations as stating that “the risk of a large-scale asymmetric attack on Canadians and Canadian soil is currently viewed as slight but there is a greater risk of terrorist attack against US citizens, property or territory. Consequently, it is in Canada’s vital interest to anticipate, deter and be prepared to counter such attacks against the United States.”²² This view that the risk to Canada and Canadians was slight and Americans would be the targets of any asymmetric attacks, offered in mid-year 2000, was the commonly held view of the Canadian government. Therefore, very little

20. Canada. Department of National Defence. Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. Ottawa: NDHQ, June 1999, pp 4.

21. Hobson, Sharon. “The Asymmetric Future”, Janes Defence Weekly, 23 August 2000, pp. 27.

22. Ibid

initiative was taken in preparing Canada to counter this growing threat, other than exchanging limited data and intelligence with the United States. Interestingly, this view was consistent with the opinions that had developed within the United States as well. In the U.S. State Department's 1999 biannual report on terrorism, the following assessment is provided:

International terrorist attacks in North America are relatively rare. In 1999 the United States and Canada cooperated in investigating a noteworthy incident involving the smuggling of explosives from Canada into Washington State... While a potentially serious incident was avoided with Ressam's (a reference to Ahmed Ressad, the Montreal based terrorist) arrest, at year end both Canada and the United States remained concerned about the possibility of a heightened threat of terrorism in North America, and the two countries were exploring new mechanisms for exchanging information on individuals with links to terrorism.²³

Although there were indications of the changing posture of the terrorist threat as Canada and the United States entered the 21st century, possibly of greater significance, there was a total absence of initiatives or actions by the Government to prepare Canada to counter the threat. It was regrettable that the events of September 11 have since proven the truth of Lieutenant-Colonel Morneault's second supposition that the Americans would be targets. Remembering that there was no sense of urgency in the months proceeding the September attacks, one may now wish to reconsider the first supposition of "the risk of a large-scale asymmetric attack on Canadians and Canadian soil being slight" given some of the more recent reports. As recently as 17 January 2002, it was reported by Stewart Bell and Steven Edwards in their National Post article "Terrorist Plots for Canada Revealed", of a laptop computer found in an al-Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan. The author reports that "the computer files are the latest indication that Islamic terrorists have considered attacks within

23. "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999 North America Overview", US Department of State, 10 February 2002,

Canada, particularly against Jewish targets” and added that “al-Qaeda has a significant presence in Canada”²⁴ Furthermore, Mr. M. Kelly of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) while addressing a counter-terrorism symposium at the Royal Military College has reported that “at least 75 Islamic militants were living in Canada at the time of September 11th” and “The next step will be attacks on Canada itself”²⁵ Perhaps, Mr. Kelly summarizes the situation in Canada best when he reports:

But the truth is, we’re a western society, we’re rich by global standards, and there are folks out there who think that we are part of the problem. The threat is real, it’s immediate, it’s here.²⁶

Given that a threat exists, one measure of determining the seriousness and urgency of an issue to Government is to do a review of the effort devoted by Government to defining the issue. Currently, the most relevant source is the draft DCDS report – Asymmetric Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction. The report was commissioned by the Department of National Defence in 2000 and regrettably remains uncompleted. With regards to homeland preparedness, the report discusses the requirements in terms of “Domestic Consequence Management” where “Consequence Management is the preparation for and response to the consequences of an emergency that may lead to extensive loss of life, hardship, suffering or damage.”²⁷ It then proceeds to advise of the “use of asymmetric means to cause heavy casualties and maximize disruption and damage to Canada.”²⁸ Even as the report was being drafted, it is apparent that the seriousness of the threat was becoming more prominent. Yet,

<http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/noamer.html#Canada>

24. Ibid.

25. Canadian Press. “Terrorist Threat is Here”. Halifax Chronicle Herald. 9 March 2002.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

so little action has been taken and little priority given to identifying the threat from Islamic terrorism that the report lies unfinished today.

Canadian Preparedness

Notwithstanding the lack of priority given to defining the threat, the Government has realized the visibility of the Islamic fanatics on the world stage. With immense pressure on the Government to be seen to be taking action, it has opted to direct the attention towards the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness Canada (OC�PEP) as Canada's lead agency in ensuring Canada's preparedness. Also, OC�PEP as the primary office for domestic consequence management in Canada has the responsibility at the national level to respond to terrorist attacks. Therefore, OC�PEP role is pivotal. By way of background, OC�PEP was the organization formed to succeed Emergency Preparedness Canada and was established with a budget of \$24M (Can)²⁹ on 5 February 2001, at which time Prime Minister Chrétien assigned two far-reaching objectives.³⁰ Firstly, to provide national leadership of a new, modern and comprehensive approach to protecting Canada's critical infrastructure, specifically identifying the key physical and cyber components of the energy and utilities, communications, services, transportation, safety and government sectors. Secondly, OC�PEP was mandated to be the government's primary agency for ensuring national civil emergency preparedness.

28. Ibid.

29. "Speaking Notes for The Honourable Art Eggleton Minister of National Defence before the Standing Committee on Finance", Canada Department of National Defence, 23 January 2002, 5 October 2001, http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/speeches/2001/oct01/05oct01finance_s_e.htm

30. "Speaking Notes for the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence To the Toronto Board of Trade", Canada Department of National Defence, 23 January 2002, 14 December 2001,

At its inception, a pure civilian agency with an all encompassing and extremely broad mandate, OCIPEP is seen as being many things to many people. Therefore, post the Budget 2001, the Government outlined the following descriptors for the OCIPEP mandate.³¹ OCIPEP is “an enabler, a coordinator and a facilitator”³² which “mobilizes and co-ordinates federal expertise and resources in emergencies - whether caused by severe weather, an accident or a terrorist attack. OCIPEP provides leadership and co-ordination to get the right capabilities to the right place at the right time.”³³ From promoting a “culture of preparedness” to “providing funds to stimulate research and development”, the magnitude of the list of responsibilities is almost overwhelming.³⁴ In addition, OCIPEP is responsible for the National Support Plan and the Counter Terrorism Consequence Management Arrangements and maintains the Government Emergency Operations Co-ordination Centre (GEOCC) in Ottawa.”³⁵ Truly an incredible growth in mandate, when one considers the resources allocated to OCIPEP during its humble beginnings. In fact, a review of the responsibilities and the sheer magnitude of the mandate, clearly indicate a department charged with immense responsibilities, yet very limited resources with which to respond.

In fairness, there are other Government Departments and agencies involved in preparing Canada’s defence against the threat. These include the Solicitor General, CSIS,

http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/speeches/2001/dec01/14dec01trade_s_e.htm

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

Immigration Canada, Health Canada and the Department of National Defence. However, a review of the various departments' plans reveals little direct action focused on ensuring the preparedness of Canada against the terrorist threat other than the support provided by the Department of National Defence. Yet the support from DND is not even assured. In an assessment of current capabilities, the DCDS report observes that the CF is restructuring and: "This may reduce its capabilities that in the past have allowed DND to provide specific consequence management resources on short notice."³⁶ Clearly, when one is examining the preparedness Canada to face the threat, there are significant challenges facing the nation. Therefore, given that little was done to prepare the nation prior to 11 September, the issue becomes one of what was done post 11 September.

At first glance, it would appear that the actions Canada has taken since 11 September to counter terrorism have been significant. The Prime Minister established the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism³⁷, chaired by John Manley, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The purpose of the committee is to review policies, legislation, regulations and programs across the Government with the purpose of ensuring public security by "reflecting a recognition of the far-reaching nature of public security issues, and the truly horizontal and multifaceted approach undertaken to safeguard Canadians and to combat the heightened threat of terrorism."³⁸ Further to the work of the Minister, the press releases have

35. (Draft) DCDS Final Report, V-4.

36. Ibid, 3-18.

37. Canada's Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11th – Backgrounder, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2 February 2002, 31 January 2002 <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/canadaactions-e.asp>

38. "Deputy Prime Minister John Manley on Ensuring Security of Canadians does not end at our Borders", The

announced the following successes of the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism: “a 30-point action plan for establishing a secure and efficient border for the 21st century.”³⁹ With these actions taken, which were aimed at ensuring the security of the USA-Canada border, it would appear that the focus of Minister Manley’s work has been economic and ensuring continued trade with the United States, not aimed directly at the security of Canada.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to ensure an overall strategic approach to fighting terrorism within Canada, the Government of Canada announced an Anti-Terrorism Plan⁴⁰, while introducing the following pieces of legislation:

- a. The Anti-Terrorism Act, introduced on 15 October, included measures designed to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists while ensuring that Canadian values of respect and fairness are preserved through stronger laws against hate crimes and propaganda.⁴¹
- b. Canada has ratified 10 of the 12 counter-terrorism conventions of the United Nations while the new Anti-Terrorism Act will allow Canada to ratify the remaining two.⁴²

Hill Times, 21 January 2002, <http://www.thehilltimes.ca/breifs2002/security.html>

39. Ibid.

40. Canada’s Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11th – Backgrounder, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2 February 2002, 31 January 2002 <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/canadaactions-e.asp>

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

- c. The Public Safety Act has amended a further 18 federal laws to strengthen the Government's ability to protect Canadians, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.⁴³
- d. In addition, amendments to the Aeronautics Act are pending.⁴⁴

Looking to the December 2001 Budget, the Government of Canada is advertising expenditures totalling \$7.7 billion to fight terrorism and reinforce public security.⁴⁵ The Government has reportedly spent \$280 million in immediate measures to enhance policing, security and intelligence. In Budget 2001,⁴⁶ \$1.6 billion is being directed towards equipping and deploying more intelligence and front-line investigative personnel, improving coordination among agencies and improving marine security. A further \$1 billion is to be used for new fraud-resistant Permanent Resident Cards and improving of screening immigrants, refugee claimants and visitors for the quicker determination of refugee claims. To improve critical infrastructure protection, emergency preparedness and response and expand anti-terrorism capacity for the military, the Government is directing \$1.6 billion. An additional \$2.2 billion is to be used to create a new air security organization, assign armed undercover police officers on Canadian aircraft, purchase explosives detection equipment and enhance policing. Lastly, \$1.2 billion is directed towards enhancing border security and

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. "The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness", Canada Communications Division Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, 22 February 2002, 12 December 2001, http://www.dnd.ca/menu/budget01/highlight_e.htm

46. Ibid.

improving the infrastructure that supports major border crossings to ensure the legitimate flow of goods and people.

Upon further review of the dollars directly associated with the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness Canada, it is reported that Budget 2001 provides “\$396 million (between now and 2006-07) to expand the capacity of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection for Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP).”⁴⁷ Towards preventing illegal migration, the governments of Canada and the United States signed a Joint Statement of Cooperation on Border Security and Regional Migration Issues on 3 December 2001.⁴⁸ As one reviews the Government initiatives and specifically Budget 2001, the emphasis on Canada-United States relations and economic trade is readily apparent. From assigning undercover police officers on flights to U.S. destinations to the issuance of a joint statement on border security, the links are undeniable and identifies a budget principally aimed at maintaining Canadian economic ties with the United States.

A review of the Governments action post-September 11 is very revealing. Immediately following the 11 September attacks, Canada’s support to the United States was decisive and appropriate. From providing security of North American airspace and humanitarian support to passengers redirected to Canadian airports, the actions by the Government and Canadians were impressive. Since that time, the Government has been

47. Ibid.

48. “Canada’s Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11th – Background”, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2 February 2002, 31 January 2002 <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti->

much more calculating in its response. The Government has initiated a number of actions that have played extremely well in the media; they have worked towards ensuring continued trade and cross border commerce with the United States. However to comprehend the significance of the changes, one would more appropriately ask what has physically changed. Firstly, as described above, a number of laws, statutes and acts have been changed or are pending in order to assist in the identification, prosecution, conviction and punishment of terrorists. Also, Canada is in the midst of ratifying UN conventions. Legislative in nature, these initiatives need to be supported by concrete actions to put in place the physical security to enforce the new measures.

Therefore, Budget 2001 presented an opportunity to take solid steps against terrorism. Regrettably, the Budget was used as a means to distribute funds to departments, organizations and agencies that were already suffering significant shortages of funds in their operations' budgets and with the allocations given, much of these monies will be required to assist the various Departments whose individual budgets had suffered significant financial pressures due to providing responses immediately after 11 September. Also one could argue that the Government has other priorities, deficit reduction, healthcare and education to name three and therefore is unable to dedicate fully the resources necessary to meet the threat. Or more simply put, it becomes a case of priorities for the Government. From the Budget, one can conclude that the security of Canada is important from an optics point of view, but in terms of contributing to the security of Canada beyond those areas directly linked to trade with United

terrorism/canadaactions-e.asp

States, not of sufficient priority to warrant more funding. Therefore, in the current war against terrorism, in a country the size of Canada, with the wide distribution of critical infrastructure that currently exists, OCIPEP will be extremely challenged to achieve its mandate and responsibilities in response to a threat as characterized by the attacks of 11 September.

Also, a comparison of the approach and steps taken by the United States and Canada clearly indicates the contrast taken by the individual Governments in response to the events of 11 September. The President of the United States, through Executive Order, created the Office of Homeland Security.⁴⁹ The Prime Minister of Canada elected to create an Ad Hoc Committee. Subsequently, the President announced \$38B (US)⁵⁰ to fund homeland security and empowered a federal agency: “Federal Emergency Management Agency to be the lead agency on coordinating efforts with the local governments”.⁵¹ Post 11 September, the Prime Minister opted to continue the same governmental structure and the same budgetary approach that was in place prior to the attacks on the World Trade Centre while augmenting existing departmental budgets. Although, one could argue that throwing money at the problem does not make the nation more prepared and besides, elimination of the risk is not possible. However more realistically, as in almost all situations, funding can assist and then risk

49. “Homeland Security”, Homeland Security Archive – Office of the White House, 25 March 2002, 23 March 2002 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/archive.html>

50. “President Announces Substantial Increases in Homeland Security”, Homeland Security Archive – Office of the White House, 25 March 2002, 24 January 2002 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020124-1.html>

51. Ibid.

management becomes the issue. In terms of countering the terrorist threat, the situation is no different. Therefore, understanding the threat takes on even greater importance due to the requirement to risk manage. Today, in the absence of a comprehensive threat assessment within OCIEP and DND, the ability of the Government to risk manage is severely constrained.

Conclusions

With the events of 11 September, it has been proven that the United States was totally unprepared and unsuccessful in keeping the threat offshore. Post 11 September, while the American actions in Afghanistan have been successful in routing the al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership, the likelihood of further terrorist action against western nations remains. As a potential target, the situation that Canada finds itself in today is very similar to where the United States was prior to 11 September.

The issue for Canada then becomes one of preparedness. While the Government has taken many actions, the response has been disjointed and lacks the focus necessary to ensure a comprehensive plan to counter the threat. Therefore, one could ask what were the Government's intentions with proclaiming its "Anti-Terrorism Plan". It was with tremendous fanfare that the Government announced the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, chaired by John Manley, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and an Anti-Terrorism Plan. Yet all indications at this stage are that the work by the Minister has been largely directed at ensuring that the border with the United States remains open for

trade. In fact, a review of the actions to date indicate that the actions would be much more successful in ensuring continued economic ties and trade with the USA than addressing the threat to Canadian security directly.

In summary, the capabilities within Canada to counter the terrorist fanatic have not changed significantly since 11 September. While there has been much government posturing, the lack of even the most basic of tools, in this case the lack of a comprehensive threat assessment is a serious deficiency. Without the threat assessment it is virtually impossible to identify critical vulnerabilities and in turn target the funds to counter terrorism and protect Canadians at home. Until that action is taken, Canada's level of preparedness to deter or withstand a terrorist attack is at question. Immediate action needs to be taken immediately to complete the threat assessment and develop a comprehensive counter terrorism plan focused on the security of Canada. Otherwise, Canada could become a convenient and easy target for terrorist attacks and suffer significant loss of life and damage to the economy.

Bibliography

Barber, Benjamin R. "Jihad vs McWorld", Ballantine Books, 2001

Blanche, E. "Suicide: The Ultimate Asymmetrical Weapon", Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, February 2001.

Daly, John. "Suicide Bombing: The Penultimate Terrorist Act", Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, September 2001.

Gaddis, John Lewis. "And Now This: Lessons From the Old Era For the New One", The Age of Terror, America and the World After September 11, Basic Books and the Yale Centre for the Study of Globalization, 2001.

Hobson, Sharon. "The Asymmetric Future", Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 August 2000.

Laqueur, Walter. "The New Terrorism", Oxford University Press, 1999.

Nuechterlein, Donald E. America Recommitted, A Superpower Assesses Its Role in a Turbulent World, The University Press of Kentucky, 2001.

Nuechterlein, Donald E. America Recommitted – United States National Interests in a Restructured World, The University Press of Kentucky, 1991.

Sirrs, Julie. "September 11: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure", Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, October 2001.

Szayna, Thomas S. Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict – Application of a Process Model, Rand Arroyo Centre, 2000.

Canadian Press. "The Terrorist Threat is Here". Halifax Chronicle Herald. 9 March 2002

"Intelligence Gathering On Asymmetric Threats – Part One", Jane's Intelligence Review, October 2000

"Intelligence Gathering On Asymmetric Threats – Part Two", Jane's Intelligence Review, November 2000.

"The Asymmetric Threat From Maritime Terrorism", Jane's Navy International, October 2001.

"To Secure A Nation: The Case For A New Defence White Paper", Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2001.

Government Documents

Canada. Department of National Defence. Canadian Defence Beyond 2010, Revolution in Military Affairs Concept Paper. Ottawa: NDHQ, 14 July 1999.

Canada. Department of National Defence. DCDS Final Report – Asymmetric Threats and Weapons Of Mass Destruction. Ottawa: NDHQ, Nov 2001. **(Currently in Draft Form)**

Canada. Department of National Defence. 1994 Defence White Paper.

Canada. Department of National Defence. Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. Ottawa: NDHQ, June 1999.

Canada. Jakubow, Dr. Roman et al. Strategic Overview 2000. Ottawa: NDHQ Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Policy Planning Division, September 2000.

Canada. Jakubow, Dr. Roman et al. Strategic Overview 1999. Ottawa: NDHQ Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Policy Planning Division, December 1999.

Canada. Robertson, Dr. Scot. Military Assessment 2000. Ottawa: NDHQ Directorate of Defence Analysis, 2000.

Canada. Sloan, Dr. Elinor. Peace Support Operations and the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Question of Relevancy. Ottawa: NDHQ Directorate of Strategic Analysis, September 1999.

Canada. Sloan, Dr. Elinor. Asymmetric Threats – The Homeland Dimension, Strategic Assessment 2001, September 2001.

Available on Internet

Bell, Stewart and Edwards, Steven. "Terrorist Plots for Canada Revealed". National Post Online. 1 February 2002. 17 January 2002.

<http://www.nationalpost.com/search/story.html?f=/stories/20020117/1156732.html&q=stewart%20bell>

Tenet, George, "Worldwide Threat - Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence", CIA, 14 February 2002, 6 February 2002,

http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/dci_speech_02062002.html

Warren, David. "A Foreign Policy For the Civilized World." National Post Online. 1 February 2002. 31 January 2002.

<http://www.nationalpost.com/commentary/story.html?f=/stories/20020131/1294814.html>

"Canada's Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11th – Background", Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2 February 2002, 31 January 2002 <http://www.dfa-it-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/canadaactions-e.asp>

"Canada-United States Issue Statement on Common Security Priorities", Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 29 January 2002, 3 December 2001

<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/01/0126-pre.html>

"Canada – U.S. Statement on Common Security Priorities", Prime Minister of Canada, 29 January 2002, 3 December 2001

http://pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=FactSheets&Doc=canusa.20011203_e.htm

"Countering Terrorism: A Global Mission", US Department of State, 14 February 2002, 10 February 2002 <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c4291.htm>

"Deputy Prime Minister John Manley on Ensuring Security of Canadians does not end at our Borders", The Hill Times, 21 January 2002,

<http://www.thehilltimes.ca/breifs2002/security.html>

Government of Canada Introduces Anti-Terrorism Act, Department of Justice Canada, 29 January 2002, 15 October 2001

http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27785.html

“Official Count of Terror Victims”, Associated Press Report on the Web, 17 January 2002,
17 January 2002
http://webcenter.newssearch.netscape.com/aolns_display.adp?key=200201111932000143185_aolns.src

“Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999 North America Overview”, US Department of State,
10 February 2002,
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/noamer.html#Canada>

“Speaking Notes for The Honourable Art Eggleton Minister of National Defence before the
Standing Committee on Finance”, Canada Department of National Defence, 23 January 2002,
5 October 2001,
http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/speeches/2001/oct01/05oct01finance_s_e.htm

“Speaking Notes for the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence To the
Toronto Board of Trade”, Canada Department of National Defence, 23 January 2002,
14 December 2001,
http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/speeches/2001/dec01/14dec01trade_s_e.htm

“Significant Terrorist Incidents 1961-2001”, US Department of State, 22 February 2002,
31 October 2001 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm>

“The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness”, Canada
Communications Division Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency
Preparedness, 22 February 2002, 12 December 2001,
http://www.dnd.ca/menu/budget01/highlight_e.htm

“US Cautions Americans in Yemen”, Associated Press Report on the Web, 17 January 2002,
17 January 2002
http://webcenter.newssearch.netscape.com/aolns_display.adp?key=200201141452000196439_aolns.src