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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

NSSC 3/ CESN 3

N/SS/SMP/SRM/S-2 FORCE DEVELOPMENT

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By Colonel Guy R. Thibault

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La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

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To meet the long-term military needs of the nation, the Canadian Forces have adopted a new strategic approach for force development. The strength of Strategic Capabilities Planning is that it provides an objective analytical basis for determining priorities and assessing proposed force structure options and capital programmes. The goal is to ensure a coherent, flexible and coordinated departmental response to evolving national security requirements. The major vulnerability of this new approach is that it is dependent on overcoming the "Strong Service Idea" which characterizes the historic inter-service rivalry over limited resources, priorities and capabilities. This paper argues that successful force development for 2020 will only be possible by *killing* the "Strong Service Idea" thus ensuring that Canadians are provided with the military forces and capabilities they need in the future.

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Military leaders are no longer suspected of nurturing Caesarist ambitions. The struggle is not now over power but over priorities; how much of the national wealth should be allotted to defence? And once allotted how is it to be divided between three ruinously expensive and hotly competing services.

(Michael Howard "Soldiers and Governments", 1957)¹

A major criticism of the CF institution relates to an inability to overcome internal conflicts regarding resources, priorities and capabilities. This is attributed to the parochial interests of the three services which author Doug Bland refers to as the “Strong Service Idea”². He characterizes this as a long-standing negative influence on the internal defence management system.

Without a coherent national defence policy and a unifying long term CF strategy, the three services have developed their own naval, land and air requirements in a somewhat isolated manner. These force development decisions have been based on their best service judgement and assessment of the nature and demands of the “general purpose” or more recent “multi-purpose” combat capabilities, called for in the defence white papers of 1987 and 1994.

Over the past decade, in-fighting among the services for resources has been inevitable as they have all faced the increasing commitment-capability gap, continued downward budgetary pressures, new security demands, increasing operational tempo and the need to reform, modernize and transform their services. In response, CF leaders have made a concerted effort over the past few years to establish the strategic planning framework to ensure that the CF remains relevant and ready to serve Canada in the 21st century.

Key to attaining the vision for the CF in 2020 is adopting a new approach to force development known as *Strategic Capability Planning (SCP)*. This approach to force development moves from the traditional “threat-based” force structure planning to a “capability based” approach. In theory, SCP provides a mechanism for outlining priorities and determining the criteria against which proposed force structure options and long term capital programmes can be assessed.³ This would ensure a coherent, flexible and coordinated departmental response to evolving national security requirements.

Notwithstanding all of the good work that has been accomplished at the strategic level, it is contended that the “Strong Service Idea” is the major threat to the success of implementing strategic capability planning and unless it is overcome it will ultimately undermine the successful transformation of the CF. As evidence, one can look to the recent troubles in Canada’s land forces.

The Army Commander has been very public about the critical problem of sustaining the land force while improving operational capabilities and readiness.⁴ Most analysts agree that the army’s challenges are in relative terms the most complex and difficult to overcome of the major components in the CF, yet it

¹ Quoted from Douglas, Bland. *Canada's National Defence Volume 2 - Defence Organization*. (Queen's University Kingston, Ont. School of Policy Studies) 45.

² Douglas Bland, "National Command", Presentation to the National Security Studies Course, CFC, Toronto, ON., 14 Feb 01.

³ DND, “Strategic Capability Planning (SCP) for the Canadian Forces” (Ottawa: Director of Defence Analysis 13 June 2000) 2.

⁴ LGen M.K. Jeffrey "State of the Army", Presentation to the Conference of Defence Associations 9 March 2001.

appears that there is still an internal service view that this is an army problem, not a CF problem. As one very senior NDHQ-based officer stated “The Army will bankrupt the CF”⁵.

If strategic capability planning for 2020 is to be successful, there has to be recognition that it is not the *Army that will bankrupt the CF*, rather it is the *CF that will bankrupt the CF*⁶. In simplistic terms, if the military does not kill the culture of the “Strong Service Idea”, it will limit the CF’s ability to transform, and it will rob Canada of the military capabilities it needs for the future.

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*An ancient cliché holds that strategy is an art, not a science. Specifically, strategy is the linking of ends and means-a 'game plan' that tells how finite resources will be employed to accomplish declared objectives. Coherent strategy is the key to institutional success; it is as important for businesses and universities as it is for countries. Force planning, like strategy, is also an art. It is the process of appraising the security needs of a nation, establishing the military requirements that result from them, and selecting within resource constraints, military forces to meet those requirements.*⁷

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The Post-Cold War, Oka, the Gulf War; Somalia, Shidane Arone and the Airborne Regiment; Bosnia, Kosovo and the Medak pocket; Rwanda, LGen Dallaire and post traumatic stress syndrome; MCCRT, budget and personnel reductions; RMA, the information explosion, the knowledge revolution, learning organizations and the Internet; QOL, public sector reform and the national debt and deficits.

Anyone who has been too critical of the lack of strategic vision of senior leaders in DND during the 1990s was not paying attention! In light of the turmoil of the 1990's the ability of DND's senior leadership to engage in a significant renewal of the strategic planning framework is, all the more remarkable. It will be up to historians to judge the performance of the leadership cadre, but in the meantime, they have set a vision and created the tools to build the new CF for 2020 and beyond. If the CF fails to adapt and transform the military institution, the next generation of leaders will have none to blame but themselves.

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*The CF must develop a single methodology linking requirements, research, and acquisition through to experimentation and fielding. The CF must shorten the programme cycle, break the “one for one” replacement paradigm, and acquire new technologies quickly but with planned product improvements.*⁹

⁵ Privileged Platform NSSC 3.

⁶ Colonel S. Beare, NSSC 3 personal discussion with author.

⁷ Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman Jr. and Timothy E. Somes. "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning", Naval War College Review vol. 48 no 2 (Spring 1995) 114.

⁸ Bob Dylan, album released Feb 10, 1964

⁹ DND, Future Army Capabilities. (Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts Report 01/01 Kingston, ON) 4.

Over the past three years, DND has produced a new doctrinal Strategic Planning Framework known as *The Capstone Manual*, as well as several key components, processes and products. These include Strategy 2020, Strategic Capability Planning as well as a programme for Concept Development and Experimentation. The June 1999 publication of *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020* signalled a new era for the Canadian military. Designed as an institutional strategy, Strategy 2020 provides the conceptual link between defence policy and defence planning.

Almost as soon as the strategy was published it was greeted with some scepticism and speculation that the department was deviating from government defence policy without public debate. In response to these critics, the VCDS explained its purpose as follows:

*Strategy 2020 considers the Defence Mission, the Canadian socio-political mosaic, and the evolving global security environment, and derives a strategy to take the defence establishment into the 21st century. It outlines objectives for strategic change required for Defence to continue as a viable and affordable institution. Strategy 2020 neither contradicts nor reinvents the 1994 Defence White Paper defence policy. It advocates the development of "an adaptable multi-purpose combat capable force structure" to be achieved through appropriate resource allocation, through Defence Planning Guidance. There is no suggestion of creating a "narrow-niche" military expeditionary capability. Allegations that Strategy 2020 attempts to create a new defence policy without debate demonstrate a misunderstanding of its purpose. It is not an operational plan, a budget, or a blueprint for force structure. It is a document designed to guide the development of these and other processes. It provides a common focus for future planning efforts.*¹⁰

The future planning effort referred to by the VCDS is *Strategic Capability Planning or SCP*. Over the years defence planners have used many different conceptual approaches for force development including force structure planning, capabilities planning as well as defence planning programming and budgeting. Each of these approaches may have varied slightly, but effectively they all used the process of strategy and force development as the way of connecting strategic ends (policy objectives) and means (resources and capabilities)¹¹

In selecting an appropriate framework for CF force development for 2020, departmental staff turned to research by Professor Henry Bartlett from the US Naval War College¹². Several possible approaches to force development were considered as shown in Table 1:

¹⁰Vice-Admiral Garnett, "The VCDS Responds to One Shot One Spot Armed Forces... Or Not" Defence Associations National Network, Volume 7, Number 2- Summer, 2000

¹¹ The current definition for force development is "the planning and conceptualising associated with the creation, maintenance and adaptation of military capabilities in the face of changing security and resource circumstances. Ideally, it encompasses the entire range of considerations associated with creating, maintaining and adapting military capability" DND, "SCP" Strategic Capability Planning (SCP) for the Canadian Forces (Director Defence Analysis) 13 June 2000, Glossary. 28.

¹² Bartlett, Holman and Some, 124.

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	!	Interests – Objectives & Strategies	Concentrates on ends. Systemic (macro view). Integrates tools of power.				Ignores constraints too long. Fear higher levels Public awareness of strategy.
9	!	Current military capability	Emphasizes real world. Helps improve current war plans.				Neglects future. Loses big picture.
&	!	Situation and Circumstances	Specific focus Encourages priorities Dynamic – handles time well.				World is unpredictable. Takes on life of its own. Tends to be retrospective.
	!	Opponents	Focus on future Macro and micro balance of power. Emphasizes military capability.				Too simplistic. Adapts poorly to sudden change. Inherently retrospective Biased on quantitative data.
(!	Function	Realistic appraisal of capabilities. Sets priorities.				Tendency toward sub-optimisation. May ignore higher goals.
\$!	Minimising risk	Confronts uncertainty. Assures balance and flexibility.				Understates friendly strengths. Exaggerates rivals' capabilities Worst-case & high cost.
	!	Superior systems	Stresses knowledge and creativity. Saves lives and cuts casualties. Force multiplier.				Often costly for small gain. High risk. Works against balanced forces.
	!	Budget	Supports democratic process. Requires setting priorities.				May not reflect security environment. Worsens cyclical spending. Leads to "fair sharing".

In practice defence planners have used all of these approaches at one time or another, including the "threat-based model" which dominated western militaries during the Cold War. However it is the "fiscal" model that has characterised the CF in the past few decades.

As identified by Bartlett, the fiscal approach is advantageous in that it supports the democratic process that specifies defence resources in light of the overall economy, competing national requirements, and public perceptions of the security environment. And as noted by Henry Mintzberg "the budget is the single most important policy statement of any government, the budget lies at the heart of public policy"¹³. In this sense, although the government may not be directly articulating priorities for National Defence, it has still required defence planners to set internal priorities, constrained thinking and fostering fiscal discipline in the CF.

¹³ Mintzberg quoted from Col M.J. Dumais, "Making the *flat-surface of planning* three dimensional: can force development be more than a paper exercise," (CFC Papers and Publications: NSSC 1 (1999) Papers.) 12.

However the fiscal approach has not adequately matched Canada's internationalist aspirations in a changing global security environment resulting in what some analysts call the increasing *commitment-capability gap*¹⁴. This is especially true in recent years with the government's primary focus on eliminating the federal deficit and reducing the national debt. Without stable funding there has been no foundation upon which to base any rational long-term planning.

As described by Professor Bartlett the fiscal approach can lead to the unwise retention of a traditional "fair share" apportionment of funds among the services and defence agencies as opposed to an integrated and rational allocation based on changes in the security environment. He suggests that this approach to force development adds to inter-service rivalry and sub-optimal defence efficiency. Certainly this seems to be an apt description of the CF during the past 10-15 years of major budget reductions.

Adopting a "capabilities-based" planning approach as the foundation of the new strategic framework allows defence planners to consider CF capabilities irrespective of likely threats across the entire spectrum of conflict. Bartlett describes the advantages and disadvantages of this approach as follows:¹⁵ First, it fosters a realistic and detailed appraisal of the capabilities of various proposed force structures. This is particularly useful with respect to future threats, since it allows friendly forces to maximise their strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses in advance. Second, even if no threat can be identified, this approach allows force planners to set priorities and correct apparent structural imbalances. The primary shortcoming of capabilities-based planning is a tendency toward sub-optimisation. Higher-level goals may be ignored and more creative ways of fighting dismissed, through institutional inertia or infatuation with traditional warfare specialities – in other words the "Strong Service Idea".

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Implementing a capabilities-based planning approach will represent a major change for CF staffs and will necessitate new joint and department-wide processes and decision tools. Most importantly it will need dedicated resources from outside of the traditional services and strong executive sponsorship.

The process starts with developing a Concept of Operations for the CF based upon an assessment of government policy and DND/CF guidance documents. The basic notion in the concept surrounds task-tailored tactical units. To provide common terminology, a Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL) has been created for describing, and relating, the assorted capabilities that may be required by the CF. An assessment of the relative levels of capability that the CF needs to achieve is then made. Shown in the next table are the DND approved capability-goals for 2020.

¹⁴ Dewitt, David d. and Leyton-Brown David, eds. *Canada's International Security Policy*. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995) 10. (A term used first by Rod Byers to describe a chronic problem for effective and efficient national defence planning. It results from not only from the incommensurate interests between the military on one hand and other departments – especially finance and treasury board - on the other over allocation of scarce governmental resources, but also from inadequate independent strategic analysis impeding clear development and articulation of Canadian Security Policy.)

¹⁵ Bartlett, Holman and Some, 118.

Level	Command	Info & Intel	Operations			Sustain	Generate	Coord with OGI's
			Conduct	Mobility	Protect			
Military Strategic	H	H	L	H	L	L	M	H
Operational	M	M	L	L	L	M	L	M
International	H	H	M	M	M	M	M	M
Operational Domestic	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	H
Tactical	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	H

Table 2 – Capability Goals Canadian Joint Task List


Although the CJTL has been accepted as the core task framework for the entire CF, it is not totally evident that the Services are fully supportive or ready to adopt it for their own use. The Services are developing "complementary" task lists in order to address unique and specific aspects. An example is with the Army:

*The Land Forces are developing five operational functions to describe their future doctrinal view of operations. The five operational functions reflect significant conceptual effort on the part of the Land Staff, and are a reasonable approach to the problem of describing military capabilities in the context of land operations. However, the CJTL must aggregate the contributions of all services and elements, and therefore take a functional approach to grouping military capabilities. While the grouping of capabilities by Land Forces and the CJTL may be different, the types of capabilities described should be common. **Where there are distinct differences, a resolution will be needed, which may require adaptation of the CJTL.**¹⁶*

It remains to be seen if the development of separate service task lists will be problematic, however it does however highlight the nature of the continuing problems with the *purple* vs. the *environmental* staffs and the "Strong Service Idea". Without over-stating the subtlety of the message highlighted above, it should be a concern that it is the CF Joint Task List that would be adapted in case of differences with the land force task list. Why would the opposite not be stated as the CF approach? In other words, the task list should be adopted by all elements of the CF, not built to accommodate a bottom-up model. The CJTL must not be dominated, or overly influenced by a strong single service view of the future. This is the shortcoming that Bartlett warns about in adopting of capability-based planning.

The next step in the force development process is to set these capabilities in the context of eleven force planning scenarios as shown in Figure 1. The importance of these scenarios is that they allow for an objective means of assessing capabilities that the CF may require across the spectrum of conflict regardless of threat.

¹⁶ DND, "SCP" 23.



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Accountability for the new force development process has been somewhat ad-hoc for the last several years partially due to the demise of the Force Development Steering Group and the Force Development Working Group in 1994.¹⁸ This has been somewhat rectified with the publication of the most recent "Accountability and Organization" manual.¹⁹ The VCDS is clearly the key player with responsibilities for strategic management and planning and generating planning options and guidance to meet overall defence policy objectives. In addition as NDHQ Chief of Staff, the VCDS co-ordinates and helps resolve differences among Group Principals and Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECS).

The other key stakeholders are the ECS and the DCDS. The service chiefs are responsible for the generation of forces and the provision of advice on maritime, land and air force matters affecting national security. Specifically in support of Strategic Capability Planning they are responsible for providing service inputs to the development of force structure options. The DCDS oversees joint force program development and common doctrine. !

¹⁷ DND, "SCP" 16.

¹⁸ Charles Morrissey, "A CF Strategic Capability Planning Process", (Conference of Defence Associations Institute Second Annual Graduate Student Symposium, 12-13 November 1999) 1.

¹⁹ DND, Organization and Accountability: Guidance for Members of the Canadian Forces and Employees of the Department of National Defence (Ottawa: 2nd Edition dated September 1999.)

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'National Defence' is an independent concept and not simply the aggregate of policies originating in the separate armed services. Defence policy, not service interests, ought to drive defence planning. - Col Maurice Pope, 1937²⁰

The notion of the "Strong Service Idea" will strike a chord to most anyone who has served in uniform, or who has a close association with the military since the mid-1960s. There may be other terms or ideas used to describe this phenomena such as tribalism, the regimental system, rice bowls, inter-service rivalry and parochialism.

Historically, this idea has resulted in an inability of the traditional sea, land and air services to effectively co-operate and promote unified or integrated advice to government regarding military requirements for Canada. Divisive internal conflicts regarding resources, priorities and capabilities detracts from the organization's ability to adapt to changing strategic circumstances, and keeps the CF in a perpetual reactionary state.

The "Strong Service Idea" is the logical result of a traditional, hierarchical, values based system that fosters, preserves and promotes and demands loyalty to a particular service, or a specific element within one of the traditional services, such as the combat arms regiments or submariners. The existence of the strong service idea should not come as a surprise considering the fact that the three traditional services have historically performed very distinct functions and roles. Throughout most of the existence of the Canadian military, the three services have operated in relative isolation from one another, had separate command and organizational structures and as such were never really in competition with one another. The fact that these strong service loyalties existed, never was a significant issue because they rarely came into conflict.

Following World War II this all started to change. The need for greater inter-service co-operation was recognized to avoid repeating some of the war's great disasters. In addition, in the aftermath of the war, there were compelling domestic pressures to exact a greater efficiency and less duplication out of defence expenditures. In the eyes of Canadian political leaders, National Defence was to become a single issue, not divisible into service terms or distinct policy issues.²¹

Viewing the military as one unified force rather than three separate services is one of the "facts of national life"²² that continues to be ignored or outright rejected by many uniformed members of Canadian society. As a result the logic of unification has never been completely accepted even thirty years later. Today, perhaps more than ever before, all of the elements of the CF, the three services, joint, regular, reserve and departmental civilians must pull together in the same direction. There is very little margin for fiscal manoeuvre for the government, and as such, defence spending is up against very popular programmes and other national government priorities. For this reason alone, the military must overcome this profound psychological resistance to unification, integration and jointness and all pull in the same direction if the CF is to be transformed for 2020.!

²⁰ Bland, "Canada's National Defence Volume 2" xv.

²¹ Bland, "National Command"

²² Bland, "National Command" The term "facts of national life" are attributed to Defence Minister Claxton.

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As stated in the introduction, it is argued that the greatest threat to the successful transformation of the CF is the "Strong Service Idea". This is due to a number of critical factors facing the military, all of which overshadow service needs and in some cases diminish the importance of the traditional services.

Among these factors are: First, the absolute need to present an impenetrable, coherent, non-partisan, objective and realistic force structure recommendations with resource implications to meet policy objectives. Second, is the future security environment will demand CF joint primacy as opposed to the traditional service focus on combined operations and allied interoperability. Finally, the exploitation, opportunities and vulnerabilities of space, cyber-space and the threat of asymmetric warfare transcend the traditional services and demand new structures, new interagency capabilities and perhaps even new emerging services. These new capabilities will need to be created at the expense of navy, army or airforce current capabilities and structures that are no longer required.

One of the primary societal roles of military professionals is to serve as advisors to decision-makers. This is based upon a specialised body of knowledge about the organization, uses and limitations of military force. As Bland writes, "*the knowledge is developed through study and experience, neither of which is adequate by itself. That this knowledge is often encased in so-called traditional moulds should not be surprising because, in the absence of recent experience, history often provides the sole basis upon which to plan for the future.*"²³

Although understandable, these traditional moulds have not been aiding the cause of Canada's military in contemporary political and domestic affairs. The credibility and relevance of military advisors within government has dwindled over the years and regaining prominence will be extremely difficult within the power structure. The fundamental pre-requisite in attempting to re-establish a credible advisory role, is the need to have the "collective act together". This starts with a consistent vision of a unified and joint military in the future and reinforced by cohesion and loyalty within the uniformed ranks towards the CF!

Whether or not military professionals have ever been well regarded, or respected in the inner sanctum of government is an open question; however, no one would likely dispute the lack of military influence today. Arguably one of the main contributing factors to the decline of the military advisory role in setting defence policy and planning is the "Strong Service Idea".

Professor Bland presents an interesting, if not somewhat depressing description of the fate that awaits senior military officers working in NDHQ. He refers to them as the "*Marginal Men*".²⁴ In addition to the traditional moulds which frame military advice, Bland notes that "military societies have developed ways of acting and thinking that may be termed the *military way*. This is in response to techniques by which violence is managed and humans respond to the terrors of war. In times of protracted peace, the relevance of the *military way* becomes even more difficult to comprehend because those techniques, values and organizations have been forged in war, and are maintained for war."²⁵

²³ Douglas Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947-1985 (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Co., 1987). 95.

²⁴ Bland, "Defence Policy" 95-97.

²⁵ Bland, "Defence Policy" 96.

It is in this sense that the military professional is at odds with society and within government. If Canadians and their elected representatives believe that the nation will never again go to war, then the whole fundamental underpinning of the military psyche is out of step with society. As a result, it is commonly accepted that Canada's strategic environment and public sector administration have changed so radically that military expertise is unnecessary and perhaps even irrelevant.

Although it may be little comfort for those affected, the decline of the military professional advisory role is not unique to Canada. In 1961, US Secretary of Defense McNamara was concerned about the inability of the military to deal effectively with questions of total force integration. "An organization noted for logrolling, compromise and irrelevant advice, the service chiefs and Joint Staff were unable to dedicate themselves to the greater needs of national defense over traditional service loyalty."²⁶

In response, McNamara established a systems analysis organization to be a counter-weight to military advice. "No military question, assumption or opinion was accepted at face value: *judgements can no longer be intuitive nor can they be based on past experiences alone.*"²⁷ He insisted that defence planners substitute analytical techniques for judgement based on experience. This served to effectively negate military professionalism and it was inevitable that military-civil relations started to decline:

*Many civilian associates viewed the military professional with disregard bordering on contempt. Outside of a narrowly defined expertise in tactics, the professional officers were believed to be irrelevant if not incompetent in matters of national security policy planning...Military requirements are not determined by any immutable military laws, and military officers cannot, simply on the grounds of formal training, speak with any more authority than well-informed civilians when it comes to discussing, understanding and contributing to problems concerning total forces requirements and design.*²⁸

According to Bland, similar reforms had many negative repercussions for the military professional in Canada. "The incursion of scientific, academic and business personnel and concepts into the heart of military administration had a number of effects. First it tended to destroy that special bond that holds military leaders to common values and hence strengthens the profession and the individual. This loss of *raison d'être* has profoundly shaken the basic tenets upon which authority and status rest within the military hierarchy."²⁹

The fact that Ministers often heed the advice of bureaucrats, academics and business leaders over the professional officers is a fundamental problem for the military. And there have been many examples of this in recent years, most notably in dealing with the various reforms in the Canadian Forces and DND. The ongoing military review in the US provides an excellent example of this civil-military tension. There has been great dissatisfaction and negative public commentary about Secretary Rumsfeld's exclusion of the JCS and CINCs from important aspects of the review.³⁰

²⁶ S.V. Fondren "Interoperability: A Case Study for the Joint Force Development Process", (Army War College Carlisle Barracks 1 April 1988)

²⁷ Bland, "Defence Policy" 9.

²⁸ Bland, "Defence Policy" 9-10.

²⁹ Bland, "Defence Policy" 96.

³⁰ William M. Arkin, "Rumsfeld Tumbles," Washington Post 26 Mar 2001

It is in this set of circumstances that Bland identifies the *marginal men*. The dilemma for military officers is that if they try and move into an area of public sector competence, their lack of experience will be exposed and at best they are considered "light-weights" in bureaucratic in-fighting or at worst considered liabilities.³¹ Officers that attempt to learn about the ins and outs of the public sector and government, are perceived within the uniformed ranks as politicised or bureaucrats. Officers belonging to the "purple staff" in the centre are not warriors or bureaucrats. The result is a loss of credibility and influence dwindles commensurately.

The fact that military advice is not solicited or highly regarded, is the first reason for killing the "Strong Service Idea". If the CF is going to achieve a successful transformation, it will be necessary to obtain and sustain the popular support from all sectors of Canadian society, but most importantly within the centre of power in government and among other government stakeholders, the defence lobby, academic circles and business elite.

To this end, the military must present a coherent, unified and most importantly, objective, analysis of the military implications of national security requirements. In particular, any policy or force capability or structure recommendations must be feasible (affordable) within the domestic political environment.

Sending incoherent and mixed messages from within the military services creates ambiguity and leaves the door open for decision makers and politicians to avoid making decisions "until the military gets its act together, and decides what it needs". Worse, it leaves the door open for others to make the decisions for the military. As an example, the internal debates within the army regular force and the militia are now legendary. There can be no doubt that the lack of an agreed restructuring plan and has been extremely divisive and has detracted from the army's ability to improve its current operational situation and significantly delayed focussing on transformation.

As well, the problems of mixed messages are apparent when it comes to the replacement of a major inventory item such as the MHP. The disruption that occurs when the military leadership and the system at large do not present a consistent message is immense. Recent articles in the national press³² clearly portrays the VCDS as the senior departmental resource manager telling the operators that they would have to settle for second best equipment. In effect the message is that the "NDHQ Marginal Men" were compromising operational imperatives for bureaucracy and politics.

The VCDS response in a letter to the Ottawa Citizen³³ was not published although some of his points were acknowledged in a later article³⁴ that still challenged the departmental decisions. The basis of VAdm Garnett's response was as a review of the analysis surrounding MHP, the first project under the Strategic Capabilities Planning framework. His thoughts on this matter, as shown in these extracts from his letter, are most useful as an early test case for the new process:

The defence budget was significantly reduced during the past decade and consequently, we must make hard choices

³¹ Bland, "Defence Policy" 97.

³² Mike Blanchard, "Military told to expect second best," Ottawa Citizen, 30 May 2001. A1.

³³ VAdm Garnett, "VCDS Response to Citizen Article, 'Military Told to Expect Second Best'," 1 June 2001. http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/vcdsorg/speeches/mhp310501_e.asp

³⁴ Mike Blanchard, "Sub-hunting helicopters crucial: Study," Ottawa Citizen, 2 June 2001. A1.

when deciding what to invest in, and we must absolutely ensure that the equipment we buy is clearly linked to Canada's defence needs. To help make these decisions, we identify the capability required (which we set through our force planning scenarios) and then purchase only what is needed to do the job and only in the numbers that are absolutely necessary. To over-invest in any one capability would not only be irresponsible, but would exacerbate potential shortfalls in others. Over-committing funding for the MHP would necessarily mean less investment capital available for other strategic investments, such as strategic lift, CF-18 modernization, and transformation of the Army. The challenge is to manage the defence budget wisely, demonstrate effective resource stewardship, and optimize the capabilities of the Canadian Forces.

...the source of the Citizen article is a two-page memo that expressed understandable concerns that the more rigorous process I have described was being imposed (for the first time) on the MHP program. These concerns should not be surprising. Change is always difficult and it takes time to explain, digest and understand the broader context within which decisions are taken. Effective leadership welcomes discussion and differing views...Ultimately, however, decisions must reflect the broader interests of the Canadian Forces and our nation.

Finally, this supposed story is not new and I have already invested a significant amount of time to explain and put the MHP operational requirement into context. I gladly appeared before SCNDVA this past April and discussed this very issue among others. In short, the world is changing and we must plan to future force requirements, not the past. The MHP statement of operational requirement is derived from the Canadian Forces "force planning scenarios", reflects the capabilities that the Canadian Forces need for the future, and were approved by the Chief of the Air Staff and Chief of the Maritime Staff, as well as myself. While it makes better headlines to suggest that the statement of operational requirement for the MHP has been politicized, this does not reflect reality.

Undoubtedly MHP will be subjected to many case studies, and reviewed for appropriate lessons. However, the undeniable fact is that the CF has not yet been able to replace the Sea King fleet. Although there are many reasons for this, clearly a major problem was the infighting and inability of the stakeholders, particularly between the services and the central staffs, to agree on the need and define the capability required. However, once the project was subjected to the SCP process, the resulting decisions could not be easily countered as they were based on an objective look at capabilities and operational scenarios, in contrast to the threat-based approach that was called for by critics in both Ottawa Citizen articles.

This case nicely highlights the analytical and objective approach that will allow military advisors to regain credibility with their primary stakeholders. It remains to be seen whether the output of the MHP SOR will result in a helicopter that meets or exceeds operational expectations. But it is clear that the problems getting approval for this new capability are what must be avoided in the future.

#

At the heart of the "Strong Service Idea", is a long-standing tension and resistance in the Canadian military regarding unification, integration and today, jointness. Mostly this tension is as a result of a general distrust that has developed over the years between the traditional services in the field and the headquarters, bureaucrats and politicians in Ottawa. This is a favourite subject for discussion and study among academics as well as many retired and stalwart supporters of the traditional Army, Navy and Airforce structures and warrior traditions.³⁵

Strains toward unification and integration started in the post WWII period. In 1947, Minister Claxton identified 14 long-term objectives for the department including his number one objective "Progressively closer co-operation of the armed services, and unification of the department so as to form a

< !See for example, BGen (Ret'd) Jim Hanson , "Killing the Canadian Army", Defence Association National News Volume 7, Number 2- Summer, 2000.!

single defence force in which the three armed services work together as a team."³⁶ His action in this regard was to establish a single NDHQ by amalgamating the three service departments to better co-ordinate the policies and efforts of the three Services.

This idea of centralised policy making in Ottawa and administering within the field command structure was an acknowledgement that the three services were different, based on wide ranging tactical, technical, cultural and environmental factors. In the period immediately following the war this was accepted without question. As the security environment changed however, and in a period of protracted peace, these traditional factors were gradually eroded in favour of assumptions of functional similarities.

In the period between 1946 and 1964, characterised by Bland as the "Command Era", defence planning served to integrate the three services needs and decisions were made predominantly on the subjective professional assessments of military advisors based mostly on their experience. In general, this approach tended towards "hedging" as a management philosophy. As a result the Command Era was characterised as militarily effective but inefficient in the eyes of accountants.³⁷

Despite these questions of efficiency, the "Strong Service Idea" did not really present a problem, as the services were still essentially independent and fairly well respected. Overall they co-operated well as discussed by Bland; "there was a continual focus on operational capabilities and clearly defined objectives within the services. Even with three seemingly divided services at the policy end of the process, there was relatively effective outcome - in military terms at the operational end."³⁸ Canadians, and more importantly politicians, generally accepted military leaders, traditions and values and their concepts were viewed as appropriate in the administration of defence policy. After 1960 this was no longer the case, and the "Strong Service Idea" became a major problem.

In this period defence integration was of great interest to government. The idea was to centralise the Service's command structure, in order to bring about the maximum degree of coordination and to eliminate duplication of functions in the services. Military commanders were adamant about preserving operational functions to be exercised "by those having a commission from the King. It was further argued that it was "advisable to leave certain functions to each service in order that a wartime need for expansion would find ready a larger organizational basis" ³⁹

In the spring of 1962, the size of the three regular force services was at their post-war manning peaks. With new developments in weapons, tactics and strategy the Canadian government started to worry about its ability to finance its commitments for the future.⁴⁰ In response, Minister Hellyer introduced new concepts on military organization and the management of defence resources. He radically restructured the three armed services through a process of integration and subsequent unification into a single armed force - the Canadian Forces. The CF was to be headed by a single Chief of the Defence Staff who commanded a

³⁶ Bland, "Defence Policy" 15.

³⁷ Bland, "Defence Policy" 5.

³⁸ Bland, "Defence Policy" 6.

³⁹ Bland, "Defence Policy" 4.

⁴⁰ Bell, George G. "The Policy Process in National Defence Headquarters" Chapter 14 Dewitt, David d. and Leyton-Brown David, eds. Canada's International Security Policy (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995.) 329.

unified structure composed of a series of functional commands and was supported by a unified CFHQ. As outlined in the report of the Glassco commission, the three services viewed this type of arrangement suspiciously and referred the unified CFHQ as the fourth service concept. "The idea persists that operational effectiveness is endangered where the service loses full administrative control of essential functions"⁴¹.

Although unification may still resonate as an issue, it is much less of a problem today than in the past since the vast majority of CF members have only known the current system. But there are still similar tensions, this time it is the evolution of a Joint CF and how the services fit in this structure.

To relate this issue to the force development debate an understanding of the terms *joint* and *combined* is important. One definition argues that "Jointness is the art of combining capabilities from the different military services to create an effect that is greater than the sum of the parts. In this way not all military functions or capabilities need to be joint."⁴² NATO defines *joint* as activities and operations in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate.

This latter definition aptly describes the integral nature of operations and training that the air force has with both the maritime and land forces. It is much less usual for all three services to operate together. More frequently, CF units are combined with units of another nation of similar capabilities to form larger formations with complementary capabilities. NATO refers to *combined* as the activities, operations, and organizations between two or more allies.

To this end, there is a natural disinclination towards greater jointness in the CF, as the services experience draws them towards closer *combined* ties with allied armies, navies or air forces, rather than within the CF. However, it is anticipated that the future security environment will place increasing importance on well-coordinated operations not only between different countries but also between branches of the military and with government agencies. As an example it is likely that the Canadian Forces will have a greater domestic role to deal with asymmetric threats such as cyber-terrorism. These types of joint tasks will demand greater inter-service cooperation and operational coordination.

As outlined in the Strategic Capabilities Plan, the CF has made progress in some aspects of joint operations, particularly at the support, administrative and logistical levels. However, force generation and force development are still almost exclusively undertaken by the three Services, with minimal guidance from the commander that employs forces in operations, the DCDS. Arguably, this situation places undue emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, and does not foster a more unified approach amongst the services.⁴³ In particular, programs that would benefit the CF as a whole but which are of only marginal utility to single services often find it difficult to gain support.

Doctrine, concepts, programmes, structures and capabilities that support jointness for the CF must lead and where necessary take precedence over single service issues. The current CF staff structure does not support this. In all of these areas, the central strategic and joint staffs are significantly under resourced and lagging in comparison to the three services. The time has come for the "Strong Service Idea" dominance to give way to the pre-eminence of the joint staff so that the CF can derive benefits of unification that have

⁴¹ Bland "National Defence Volume 2" 71.

⁴² DND, "SCP" 18.

⁴³ DND, "SCP" 11.

been long sought since the late 1940's. This will only occur by combining Joint and ECS staffs wherever possible into unified staffs within NDHQ under the DCDS, VCDS or a new Joint Force Development Group as appropriate.

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The final reason why the "Strong Service Idea" must be overcome is that the traditional services will be very different in the future if not all together irrelevant. As such, it is essential that the military does not constrain thinking about the conduct of military operations and the capabilities needed in the future. The following extract from a report on future army capabilities provides some thoughts on this idea:

The 2020 battlespace is projected to be the whole of time, space and activity related to a particular operation. It will be cellular in nature, multi-directional and increasingly determined by what is above it in air and space. The CF must be able to execute operations within an expanded battlespace comprising five physical domains and the electro-magnetic spectrum. The five physical domains are space, air, near-surface, surface and sub-surface. Traditionally, these environments served to demarcate service responsibilities. However, these once distinct boundaries are starting to blur. The integration of maritime, land and air operations will continue, especially in the main area of service overlap: the surface and near-surface envelope.⁴⁴

If this assessment of the future battle-space is accepted, it is clear that our traditional service-oriented thinking must change. To start with, as discussed in the previous section, the departmental strategic and operational organizational structures are not currently well suited to deal with defence planning for a radically different future environment.

This has been recognized and there have been efforts to provide top-down guidance and staff co-ordination to implement SCP. These include new governance structures and committees such as the Joint Requirements Capabilities Board (JCRB) and Joint Capability Assessment Teams (JCAT) as well as the creation of a new permanent matrix staff responsible for Joint Force Development. VCDS Staffs have also developed new processes and tools to augment or modify the existing Defence Management System.

In addition there have been recent studies to improve jointness⁴⁵ by examining DCDS support to operations, the concept of a single centralized operational headquarters (CFJHQ), and discussions around the DCDS taking on a greater role in force generation. Although there have been no major agreements on significant ways to improve jointness, the department appears committed to making changes.


The primary structure for force development is the newly created Joint Capability Requirements Board (JCRB). This board will review proposals, challenge the issues and provide direction for the development of the Long Term Capabilities Plan. For strategic projects, the JCRB will develop a joint understanding of the concepts of employment and operations, debate and reach consensus for Statements of Operational Requirement and resolve issues of project scope at the corporate level. The work of JCRB will be reviewed by the DM/CDS at least twice a year and whenever strategic corporate program decisions are required DM/CDS will co-chair.

⁴⁴ "Future Army Capabilities" 4.

⁴⁵ As outlined in a presentation by BGen Dumais to NSSC 3 "Strategic Level Doctrine" 5 February 2001. The two major studies were: The *Forand Study* "Improving the CF's capability to respond to UN/Multinational deployments" and the *Mason Study* "An investigation of a Single Centralised Operational Headquarters".

As an example of the type of direction being provided, in its first meeting (chaired by the CDS and DM), the JCRB provided the approved Capability Objectives to guide force development as well as agreeing on the current level of the capability gap. In addition, JCRB directed that an interim goal of capital investment of 21.5% be established. (The end goal has been established at 23%) JCRB also determined a pro-active innovation approach for managing the LTCP (E) - Long Term Capabilities Plan (Equipment), as well as selecting the core projects that will be funded.

The second area of importance for the governance of the SCP Process is in developing Joint Capability Assessment Teams (JCAT) that will validate capability goals, review the functional plans submitted by the services and other central staffs, identify gaps and propose remedial options in relation to the CJTL capability area. The following graphic attempts to depict the complexity of integration of staff efforts for Strategic Capability Planning.



Arguably, the complexity of SCP will necessitate a radical re-organization of how the CF generates defence capabilities. The current service-dominated approach will not allow the department to effectively integrate the functional and operational requirements in each capability area. There are at least six critical cross-functional activities that must take place to produce defence capabilities. The operational specialists provide the force employment perspective and generate requirements. Currently defence-planning staffs have identified five operational views corresponding to the three-tier approach envisioned for Concept

⁴⁶ This slide was extracted from a presentation by VAdm G.L. Garnett on "Defence Resource Planning - A Practitioner's View", (National Security Studies Course Toronto, ON) 16 January 2001.

Development and Experimentation (CDE)⁴⁷. Bringing functional and operational views together will be through Joint Capability Assessment Teams (JCAT), grouped according to the capability areas. The JCATs could be headed by a capability champion or a joint warfare authority, with the responsibility of ensuring the effective integration of functional and operational views, and would be accountable to CDS/DM for results.

The approach for the JCAT is as yet to be determined. Wherever possible the intent is to use existing committees or structures for this work, as an example existing Command and Control Oversight Committee (C2OC) co-chaired by DCDS and ADM(IM) would be identified as the JCAT for C2.

Another key change is to the Defence Management System with the introduction of the Long Term Capabilities Plan as a replacement for the Long Term Capital Plan. The entire process for this key component of force development is being revamped to ensure it is fully aligned with SCP. As was the case for MHP, the linkages between programme proposals and the CJTL, 11 Scenarios, Capability Goals and the Capability Initiatives Database are all exposed. This ensures that a long-term corporate view is maintained at all times in a process that is objective, transparent, and is capabilities-based versus service oriented.

The approach to the LTCP now makes the linkage between Ends/Meanings explicit. In addition it provides a very understandable, as well as credible and objective process to explain force development to central agencies, parliament and Canadians. More importantly it will remove some of the traditional strong service rivalry for capital programmes, and allow collective efforts to be directed to other programmes.

Finally there are a number of operational research tools being developed to support SCP in an effort to measure the capability goals and how to best achieve them. The first is 'Scenario Operational Capability Risk Assessment Model' (SOCRAM) which will assist in determining the relative amount of capability that the CF requires in the force planning scenarios. The second tool uses a multi-criteria decision model known as 'Fundamental Investigation of Defence Options' (FIDO) to help develop force development priorities by assessing possible alternatives in the context of defence policy, strategy and the security environment.

Although it remains to be seen if these structures, processes and tools will make a difference, as a minimum they recognize the importance of implementing a new governance structure for force development in DND. The challenge now will be to shift the dominant influence of the three-services that is evident in the imbalance between resources being applied to these efforts at the strategic and joint staff level. Unless the roles and functions of the military strategic staffs are augmented and unless accountability for the JCATs is clearly assigned, Strategic Capability Planning will be sub-optimized as predicted by Dr. Bartlett.

⁴⁷ DND, "CREATING THE CF OF 2020: Concept Development and Experimentation and Modelling and Simulation - A DND/CF Concept Paper", (Ottawa: VCDS, DCDS and ADM(S&T)) 1 November 2000. These views are: Tier 1 high level concerns (military strategic forces). Today this addressed partly by VCDS, partly by DCDS and other NDHQ Group Principals (ADM(IM), ADM(Mat) etc. Tier 2 is Joint Operational Forces, today primarily the responsibility of DCDS. Tier Three are Maritime, Land and Aerospace Forces.

*Currently, space and the electro-magnetic spectrum are the first truly joint domains. In particular, the electro-magnetic spectrum serves to integrate all physical domains through the establishment of a common operational understanding*⁴⁸

*The CF must also prepare for... the much greater prospect of asymmetric threats associated with these conflicts that threaten Canadian interests and/or values. An example of the asymmetric attacks now possible is a cyber-attack by individuals, disaffected groups or even hostile nations or states using the computerized global networking infrastructure, where viruses or computer security breaches could result in dislocation of military command, control and logistics. Countering asymmetric attacks requires a coordinated response by not only the CF but also other national security and commercial agencies, and will require both sophisticated information security and highly agile command and intelligence capabilities.*⁴⁹

Although strategic processes and staff organizations must overcome the "Strong Service Idea" in order to move ahead with force development for 2020, it is equally clear that the output of the force development process must not be a status quo, simple upgrade, of the CF current force structure. Rather, CF doctrine, force structures and technologies must reflect the changing nature of the battlefield.

Security trends highlight the need for capabilities not currently within the CF inventory, nor readily assigned to any particular lead service. Many speculate that it is likely that a new combatant service should be introduced to harness C4ISR as a new offensive and defensive combat capability as the main military response to Information Operations on the future battle-space.

*Twenty years from now, some predict, the Integrated Single Battle-Space will be a reality. This new battle-space will no longer be characterized by sea, land or air operations. It will be a single battle-space in which each element will be directed, targeted and supplemented by a new generation of intelligence, surveillance, information and communications systems offering significantly advanced military capability. Rapidly advancing information, sensor and precision technologies will be key attributes of this new environment.*⁵⁰

No matter what the outcome of the Strategic Capability Planning efforts, the real question is who will lead or sponsor these new capabilities, and what current capabilities will the CF shed, in order to adequately resource the future. By virtue of its limited resource allocations, the government has accepted a certain level of risk in the military force structure. The CDS with his primary advisors must now exercise his own risk assessment, by determining and resourcing those capabilities essential for the successful attainment of long term national policies and objectives. This will necessitate lower levels of funding, reduced readiness or perhaps even dropping capabilities that are not deemed essential. In essence, the CF must "execute a form of uneven force development, accepting risk in some capabilities in order to properly resource critical force components."⁵¹

⁴⁸ "Future Army Capabilities" 4.!

⁴⁹ DND, "SCP" 7-8.

⁵⁰ General Maurice Baril, Chief of the Defence Staff. Presentation to the Symposium on "Creating the Canadian Forces of 2020" Ottawa, Ontario April 26, 2000

⁵¹ "Future Army Capabilities" 4.

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ence has long been described as lacking a rationale basis. The territory is too
l, and the nation shares the world's most open and secure border with the
power. Although there is no foreseeable direct military threat against
xt twenty years, this does not mean that Canada's national interests are
on, Canada has much to gain from globalisation and closer integration of
itical structures, but at the same time will be exposed to new risks and
Canada must remain prepared to assist civil authorities at home, contribute to
y with our allies as well as sharing the burden with it's US partner for North

ities-Based" force development approach and using realistic force planning
o face, the CF is well positioned to commence the transformation of the
strategic capability planning provides the framework and opportunity to
nd unified military solution to a problem that has confounded defence

ogy and a few tools however, will not be sufficient to transform the military.
with the capabilities it needs, Senior Leaders and all serving members of the
ong Service Idea". It is important to reinforce that killing the "Strong
n end of the Army, Airforce or Navy or the traditions, pride and loyalty that is

Although written for the land force the following passage from the Army's
lly applicable for the institution of the CF in 2020:

*... to develop and foster the ethos that has sustained it in war and peace for over a
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