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**CANADA IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
A 3D APPROACH WITHOUT COMBAT TROOPS**

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Abstract

The sub-Saharan region is facing a significant crisis. The most affected region is Darfur, where reports indicate that approximately 400,000 people have died, 3 million people have been displaced, and 4.5 million people are clinging to life.

Canadian values and interests as well as the current government's desire to assume leadership roles in the foreign arena all point towards a role for Canada in the sub-Saharan region. This paper reviews the nature and form of Canada's participation through the 3D lens: Diplomacy, Defence and Development.

The analysis of options presented indicates that the government can have some effects on the diplomatic and development front; effects that will fulfill the leadership desires of the current government. However, Canada cannot send troops to participate in current peacekeeping efforts in Sudan.

Despite all the "lessons learned" from Rwanda, there is reason to fear that Canada still doesn't do Africa. – Gerald Caplan¹

Introduction

While the author speaks of Africa in general, the situation affecting the sub-Saharan African region is the one that garners the most attention. It is clear that this region needs help. Home to 34 of the 48 least developed countries in the world, poverty and hunger are on the increase in sub-Saharan Africa. The number of poor people in Africa has risen by 60 million since 1990. Africa is also the only region in the world where the percentage of poor people is still around 40 percent. These are people that earn less than \$2 per day. Some 34 per cent of the population is undernourished – almost double the figure for the rest of the developing world.² According to the United Nation (UN) Population Fund, the population of Africa will reach 1.7 billion people by 2050, approximately 18 percent of the world total. “In such regions, the people’s needs are manifold, complex and extremely urgent: food and sustainable livelihoods; protection against HIV/AIDS and malaria; and resolution of protracted conflict, to name the most obvious.”³ The current trend needs to be reversed.

The economic figures tell the same story. In their report entitled “Overcoming 40 years of failure: a new road map for Sub-Saharan Africa,” the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign

¹ Globe and Mail; Gerald Caplan op-ed; 6 August 2004; pg A-13

² From UN World bank Data. <http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005>

³ Architecture without blueprints opportunities and challenges for the new Prime Minister in International Development Policy. Roy Culpeper, David Emelifeonwu and Luigi Scarpa de Masellis, International Journal 58, no 4 (Autumn 2003), p. 669

Affairs and International Trade estimates that US\$ 570 billion have been spent over the last 45 years in that region alone;⁴ yet, there are very few signs of progress. The Senate report also points out that in 1948, Africa had a 7.5% share of the world trade. However, in 2004 that share had decreased to 2.6%. In today's context, a one percent decrease represents a loss of \$US 70 billion. "With roughly fifty percent of sub-Saharan Africa's 726 million people living in poverty, the situation of that continent is tragic."⁵

The good news is that the world is taking note. Plans to address the situation abound. From the G8's African Action Plan to the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and the Common Interest Report sponsored by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, the world is actively trying to help address the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Canada is engaged in this process. The African Action Plan was adopted in Kananaskis as part of the G8 Forum chaired by former Prime Minister Chrétien. Canada has also agreed to adhere to the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals. Last November, Prime Minister Harper initiated the "Save a Million Lives Initiative," which will provide food in the most afflicted part of the region. This Canadian involvement in Africa is based on many factors, some associated with values, and others based on interests, including those voiced by concerned citizens.

This paper argues that, based on Canadian values and interests, Canada needs to be involved sub-Saharan Africa in the form of a comprehensive 3D approach. However, this commitment cannot extend to include the deployment of troops on the ground. A review of the situation in the region, a look at why Canada should commit resources, an examination of what missions Canada

⁴ Overcoming 40 years of failure: a new road map for Sub-Saharan Africa; Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade Report, February 2007, pg XXI

⁵ Ibid pg **

is currently engaged in, as well as emerging interests in Africa will provide the basic background for determining the potential for a future contribution by Canada. The exact nature of this contribution will be determined using the framework of the 3D approach, with the aim of proposing avenues of intervention in sub-Saharan Africa that will meet the government's desire to assume a leadership role in the world.

Our participation in multi-lateral organizations such as the Commonwealth and La Francophonie gives Canada a privileged window into the region. Our commercial interests in the area, most notably in the mining domain, have also exposed us to the type of security issues with which commercial companies must deal in sub-Saharan Africa. There is no doubt that Canada should play a role in addressing the predicaments facing this part of the world, especially in Darfur. This region of Africa is coping with a crisis very similar to the one that occurred in Rwanda in the not so distant past, a troubling part of history that still generates bad memories for Canadians.

In some ways, Canadians learned valuable lessons from that difficult experience as well as from other, similar types of interventions. The Canadian government now employs a fulsome approach in addressing challenges in failed or failing states using the 3D lens: diplomacy, defence and development. Our government is committed to all three facets of the whole of government approach. As a key sponsor of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Canada clearly understands that there is a role for us to play in the international community in situations of humanitarian crisis. "After many years during which the emphasis was on development aid and, to some extent, good governance, the over-riding message is clearly that without security,

human development is not sustainable.”⁶ The Canadian Forces (CF), a corner stone for providing human security, is presently contributing to various missions in sub-Saharan Africa. On the development front, the government is contributing through various programs that include contributions of food aid, health care, de-mining, access to education and a safer environment for children.⁷

In terms of defence or human security, the UN, in collaboration with the African Union (AU), is deploying a peacekeeping force into Sudan. The delays in the deployment of the ground troops and the difficulties encountered in properly equipping the force are sources of controversy. An analysis of the current situation will allow for a review of possible Canadian options to assist with the situation in Sudan, including the possibility of deploying combat forces.

The world’s most important provider of combat forces, the US, is showing a renewed interest in the region. To better monitor these national interests, the US Government is standing up the newest US Combatant Command, Africa Command (AFRICOM). “The goal is for AFRICOM not to assume a US leadership role on the continent but rather to be supporting the indigenous leadership efforts that are currently going on.”⁸ Considering that AFRICOM is still in its implementation stage, a cursory look at the proposed structure and the possible synergy that could be generated with Canadian objectives will allow for discussion on possible avenues for Canadian engagement in the region.

⁶ Security for Africans; Alvero de Vasconcelos, Director of the EU Institute for Strategic Studies; European Security and Defence policy, Issue 5; December 2007, pg 10.

⁷ Sudan Canada’s commitment. CIDA website, accessed 23 April 2008; <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/sudan>

⁸ US AFRICOM Next step or next stumble? Sean McFate - African Affairs 107/426, pg 116.

Finally, the analysis on options for the region would not be complete without looking at the impact of the recent decision by Canada to maintain combat forces in Afghanistan until 2011. The effect of this decision on the CF, and more specifically the corollary effect on other theatres is significant. But troop availability is not the only factor in determining if Canada should deploy combat troops. Political will is crucial in coming to such a decision. However, the role of the leadership of the CF is to present options to the government when called upon to deploy forces. The final authority rests with the government.

The result of this *tour d'horizon* will allow us to propose an array of options to ensure Canada is actively engaged in the region, according to our interests and our values.

The situation in sub-Saharan Africa

A look at the international headlines on the 2nd of March 2008 indicates that there are many countries facing some type of crisis in sub-Saharan Africa: *Sudan Nomad clashed with ex rebels, dozen killed* (Reuters); *Scorched earth strategy returns to Darfur* (New York Times); *After weeks of unrest, Cameroon appears calmer* (New York Times); *Koffi Annan urges Kenyan to ensure peace* (Associated Press); *Somali troops raid three radio stations* (Reuters). The portrait that emerges based on pure statistics is not much more encouraging.

The life expectancy of someone born in that part of the world is 46 years of age, compared to a world average of 67 years of age. The mortality rate of children under 5 is 163 per thousand births. The world average is 79. Of the 39.5 million people afflicted with HIV/AIDS, 24.7 million

compared to 270 millions in 1990; the only part in the world where that number has risen over that period. According to the World Bank, the number of poor people has climbed by 60 million between 1990 and 2004. While other developing regions such as East and South-East Asia have demonstrated progress in the economic sphere, the sub-Saharan region is still taking in only 2 % of the total global input of US\$61.3 Trillion per year for 2005, the same percentage as in 1995. Finally, the percentage of Official Development Aid (ODA) in relation to GDP is significant in most of these countries, reaching as high as 50% in Burundi⁹. Some countries could not survive economically without ODA.

Other figures also paint a bleak picture. “Africa’s major problem – accounting at least in part for many others, like ethnic tension, civil wars and even declining immunization rates and school enrolments – is that the continent has lost half its share of world market since independence in the 1960s. The annual income Africa has given up is *three* times the foreign aid the continent receives.”¹⁰ Corruption is rampant. “The World Bank has estimated that embezzled funds worldwide could amount to 1 trillion US dollars per year. President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria said that at least 140 billion has been lost to public thievery in his country’s history.”¹¹ The regional instability and ensuing continual conflicts represent a significant financial weight on the region: “Armed conflict costs Africa \$18 billion a year. That’s \$300 billion from 1990 to 2005 – more or less the same amount of money given to the continent in aid

⁹ World Bank data: [sitesources.worldbank.org//datastatistics/resources/wd107](http://datastatistics.worldbank.org//datastatistics/resources/wd107)

¹⁰ A better plan: How Canada can help Africa; Pierre de Bané and Sharon Carstairs; Policy Options; July-August 2007, pg 103.

¹¹ Ibid, pg 104.

in the same period.”¹² The population of the region is growing, basic human needs are not taken care of, the economy is regressing and corruption is present at every corner. Can the government of the region address these facts?

The leaders in power in these countries want the rest of the world to believe so. In a speech to the UN in December 2002 to mark the standing up of the AU, the President of South Africa stated that: “The African Union is Africa’s practical and determined response to its past and present, in favour of peace, stability, democracy, human rights, cooperation, development, prosperity and human dignity. [...] (the AU) will end Africa’s humiliation as an object of charity.”¹³ The interim chairman of the AU Commission went even further, stating that: “Never again will non-Africans define Africa.”¹⁴

The figures mentioned above clearly indicate that the road to recovery will be a long one. Many question the integrity of some of the governments currently in power, and their predisposition to assume that kind of leadership. “Democracy in Africa is not what is understood in the West,” says Catholic bishop Cornelius Korir, whose cathedral in the town of Eldoret, north of Kiambaa in Sudan, has become a refugee camp for 9,000 Kikuyus. “Since their wealth

¹² Africa’s missing billions, Briefing Paper no 107; Hillier, Debbie,; IANSA, OXFAM, Safeworld 2007; http://www.iansa.org/documents/missing_billions_Afr.pdf

¹³ Sustainable development with peace and democracy; Thabo Mbeki, Presidents & Prime Ministers. Glenn Ellyn: Nov/Dec 2002. Vol. 11, Iss 6; pg 17

¹⁴ African Union what next; Pusch Commey. New African. London: Sep 2002, Iss 410, pg 12.

depends on power, our leaders are never ready to admit defeat.”¹⁵ In these situations, personal gains trump the country’s prosperity.

The world stood by as this crisis was unfolding: “Structural changes in the global economy and the end of the Cold War have thus left Africa virtually invisible in economic terms but highly visible as a region suffering from violent conflicts, famine, disease, poverty, environmental degradation and corruption. It is for this reason that some commentators have identified the continent as hopeless or as one of the primary sources of a “coming anarchy.”¹⁶ Some countries took a different route, such as Ghana, hailed as an “African economic recovery success story.”¹⁷ However, in general the current state of the region is still very precarious.

The most volatile country in the region is Sudan. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2006, the country is still in the middle of a civil war. In a statement that contradicts the UN, the US President went as far as labelling the situation in Sudan as genocide, a term rarely used in a UN context.¹⁸ A recent UN report indicates that the death estimates for this conflict could be closer to 400,000 in contrast to the most frequently publicized

¹⁵ The Demons that Still Haunt Africa. Alex Perry, Laura Blue. Time, (Canadian edition). Toronto: Jan 21, 2008. Vol 171, Iss 3, pg 32

¹⁶ The Coming Anarchy, How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet. Robert D Kaplan; Atlantic Monthly v.273, n.2, 1 February 1994. <http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/Anarchy-Coming-Kaplan1feb04.htm>

¹⁷ Ghana country profile. CIDA website, accessed 23 April 2008. <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ghana-e>

¹⁸ In Break With U.N., Bush Calls Sudan Killings Genocide; Jim VandeHei; Washington Post; 2 June 2005; pg A19. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/01/AR2005060101725_pf.html

figure of 200,000.¹⁹ The crisis in Rwanda resulted in close to 800,000 deaths. The Somalia government is another regime on the brink of falling: "...its leaders say that unless they get more help — international peacekeepers, weapons, training and money to pay their soldiers, among other things — this transitional government will fall just like the 13 governments that came before it."²⁰ Many people are affected by the situation in Somalia as well as the one that is unfolding in Kenya. "In Somalia, the situation is worse with 1.4 million facing humanitarian emergency and one million displaced. And a new crisis has emerged in Kenya, killing more than a thousand and displacing 250,000."²¹ Meanwhile, Zimbabwe, still under the rule of President Mugabe, awaits the result of the election with a fear that violence will once again rage in this country.

In light of such an unstable situation, the Canadian government is taking some measures to assist. "The Minister of International Cooperation celebrated International Development Week by announcing nearly \$400 million for development initiatives in Africa that will strengthen economic growth, fight hunger, and help to ensure basic services can be provided."²² On the military side, the CF is involved in four operations in the sub-Saharan region, namely in

¹⁹ Darfur death estimates called too low? Lederer, Edith M.; Associated Press Writer. 29 March 2008. <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2008/03/28/5133161-ap.html>

²⁰ Somalia's Government Teeters on Collapse. Gettleman, Jeffrey; New York Times; 29 March 2008; <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/29somalia.html>

²¹ Peace and Security Africa Briefing March 2008. <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/CfA%20Brief%20March%2003.pdf>

²²The Government of Canada Announces Major Step Towards Fulfilling its Commitment to Africa. News Release; 7 February 2008. <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida/web/acdicida.nsf/En/FRA-2711373-MH8>

Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan. The deployment in Sudan includes troops and equipment. DFAIT, CIDA and the RCMP are also deployed in Sudan.

The Canadian government, like many others, is concerned that these contributions are not reaching the people in need. There is a general consensus that the Sudanese government is intentionally preventing the peace process from following its course. Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister recently visited the country and expressed the concern of his government. "I emphasized that Canada's bilateral relations with the Government of Sudan depend on the willingness and commitment of the Sudanese government to take steps to address the situation in Darfur, to protect the human rights of its citizens, to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, and to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, among other issues."²³

This visit of Minister Bernier and his announcement will resonate well with the general public. After all, there is a humanitarian crisis in the region and Canadian values dictate that the nation should play a role in addressing the crisis. However, if there is such a value-based reason for Canada to play an active role; officially, the current government shows no clear indication that sub-Saharan Africa is a region of interest. Sub-Saharan Africa is not on the priorities list as enunciated on the DFAIT website,²⁴ nor was Africa mentioned in the latest Speech from the Throne; two key indicators that lead Canadians to believe that the government is being reactive vice pro-active in its approach towards the region. Therefore, if not through defined policies, the

²³Minister Bernier Concludes Successful Visit To Sudan; Minister of Foreign Affairs Press release, 28 March 2008;
http://w01.international.gc.ca/MinPub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&Language=E&publication_id=386006&docnumber=68

²⁴ http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_propos/priorities.aspx

reasons for our involvement must be originating from other sources.

Canada in sub-Saharan Africa

These sources include observers with experience on determining what role Canada should play on the international scene. “The large African membership of both the Commonwealth and the Francophonie as well as ongoing preoccupations of the United Nations with the political, security, development, and rights challenges of its African members have compelled Canada, as a dedicated multilateralist, to become much more engaged with African affairs than it would otherwise have been.”²⁵ Former Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Joe Clark believes that there are reasons for Canada to get involved and appeal to the African community and the rest of the world: “We have earned respect as a partner in Africa – we are the only member of the G8 that carries neither an imperial nor colonial taint, and in that and other fora are a natural and practiced bridge.”²⁶ Former Prime Minister Chrétien also deems that we had a partnership role to play in the region. Following his trip in 2002, one of his key advisors indicated that the “partnership (with Africa) stands on three basic principles: democracy, good governance and respect for human rights. These principles are fundamental to the development of Africa into a self-sufficient, globally competitive continent.”²⁷

²⁵ From Kananaskis to Gleneagles: Assessing Canadian “leadership” on Africa. David R. Black, Behind the Headlines, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, May 2005. Vol 62, No 3. <http://www.igloo.org/canadianinternational/publicatio%7E2/behindtheh/volume62>

²⁶ Absent in Africa. Joe Clark, Vanguard, January/February 2008, Pg 18.

²⁷ Canada meeting the African Challenge: the new partnership. Denis Paradis. Canadian speeches Woodville: Jul-Aug 2002. Vol 16, Issue 3; pg 17.

Democracy, good governance and respect for human rights; Canada is at the forefront of developing these three core values within the UN Community. One of the results of this engagement is the promulgation of the R2P principle, which was endorsed by world leaders in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document.²⁸ The report presented to the UN aimed to redefine article 24 of the UN Charter, allowing the UN to intervene “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to international responsibility to protect”²⁹ This approach is part of the human security agenda, which contends that the “international community has an obligation to intervene to protect vulnerable populations in situations of large-scale loss of life and large-scale ethnic cleansing.”³⁰

The R2P reflects Canadian values, and many believe, such as former Prime Minister Martin, that R2P should constitute sufficient justification for the world community to intervene, especially in a situation such as Darfur: “we reject the argument that state sovereignty confers absolute immunity.”³¹ Retired Lieutenant-General, now Senator Dallaire is also a strong advocate of this requirement to intervene: “It's as if the world believes that Africans "don't count." There's been ample advance warning going back months and even years that a crisis was

²⁸ 2005 World Summit Outcome. A/RES/60/1. 24 October 2005.
<http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/r60.htm>

²⁹ The responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; International Development Research Centre, Ottawa; December 2001, pg XI

³⁰ The African Union's standby force: Canadian foreign and defence policy options. Burton C., Powell K., Tiekou T.K., & Akuffo E.A.; Canadian Foreign Policy, 11(1), 47; Fall 2003

³¹ “Notes for an address by Prime Minister Paul Martin on the occasion of the World Economic Forum, ‘The future of global interdependence’; Davos, Switzerland; 23 January 2004.
<http://news.gc.ca/web/view/en/index.jsp?articleid=75739&keyword=Investment&&page=229>

mounting in Darfur, just as there was ample warning that a crisis was coming in Rwanda.”³²

And he is not the only one that displays the human security factor card to try to convince the world to take action.

“Canada’s leadership in articulating and promoting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine puts a special onus on Canada to ensure intervention where a sovereign state consistently violates the rights and freedom of particular groups of people or allows gross crimes against humanity. Since the Darfur crisis first gained international attention in 2003, many have framed the required response by the international community within the R2P doctrine. Darfur is a real test of Canada’s and the world’s resolve to move the Responsibility to Protect from concept to full recognition in international law.”³³

The last time Canada tested that resolve in a humanitarian crisis of this magnitude proved to be a gruesome experience. Approximately 800,000 Rwandans died and 4,000,000 became refugees between April and July 2004. Ten Belgian peacekeepers lost their lives. In their report following the event, an independent inquiry put the blame for this loss of life on the UN system: “The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the UN presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will by the Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness.”³⁴ The Commander of the forces on the ground was Lieutenant-General Dallaire: “If the international community doesn’t

³² World forgetting Darfur crisis, says Dallaire. Updated: CTV Newsnet - Tue. Feb. 8 2005 10:13 AM ET.

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1107873877528_103283077/?hub=CanadaAM

³³ Letter from John Siebert, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares to the Prime Minister dated 29 November 2007. <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Statements/DarfurPMletterNov07.pdf>

³⁴ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (UN, Dec 1999) in The Pearson papers Paper number 7 The 1999 UN and 2000 Organization of African Unity. Formal Inquiries: A retrospective examination of Peacekeeping and the Rwandan Crisis of 994; pg 1.

start soon to begin to take effective action at early stages to head off crises of this sort, then Africa is going to continue to suffer the kind of inattention it's getting now.”³⁵ Somalia and Bosnia tell the same story.

These three failures in UN peacekeeping operations - Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda - each show a lack of political will or national interest to intervene early and assertively when human values are at stakes. There are currently eight UN missions taking place in sub-Saharan Africa, most of them based on the human values concept. Is this a sign that the tide is changing and that human values and national interest are now becoming factors that will incite the world community to take action in this region?

Canada's Interest in sub-Saharan Africa

Natural resources may be one of the catalysts that will change the perspective many countries have on the region and force them to look at the situation with added interest. The US certainly understands that Africa represents an important source of supply of key minerals and oil for the future. Sub-Saharan Africa, which currently provides 18 percent of US oil imports, will see this percentage grow to 25 percent by 2015. This figure is important when you consider that today Persian Gulf oil represent 18 percent of total US imports.³⁶ Sub-Saharan Africa also

³⁵World forgetting Darfur crisis, says Dallaire. Updated: CTW Newsnet - Tue. Feb. 8 2005 10:13 AM ET.
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1107873877528_103283077/?hub=CanadaAM

³⁶McFate Sean. US AFRICA COMMAND: A new strategic paradigm?. Military Review 88, no 1, January/February 2008, pg 2.

holds 48 percent of the world's diamond reserves, 29 percent of the world's gold and 48 percent of the world's supplies of platinum.³⁷ Closer to home, Canadian mining industries have developed a vested interest in the region. Canadian Capital Mining assets in Africa in 2006 were estimated at \$7 billion, and with a forecast to grow to \$22 billion in 2010.³⁸ On the trade side, the statistics are also demonstrating an increase in trade. "In 2005, Canadian merchandise export to sub-Saharan Africa increased almost 14 percent from the previous year (to \$1.3 billion), while trade in services to Africa was 50 percent higher than to China (\$458 million in 2003)."³⁹ In other words, Canada's economic interest in that region is growing.

Canada is also expressing its national interest in sub-Saharan Africa through fora such as the G8 Summit and its commitment to UN MDGs. The African Action Plan that was adopted at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis calls for the countries that belong to this club of prosperous nations to get engaged in Africa. The key aspects of the plan include commitments in the areas of peace and security, governance, resource mobilization and human resources. The money distributed will be principally allocated to "countries that demonstrate a political and financial commitment to good governance and the rule of law, investing in their people, and pursuing

³⁷ Natural Resources Canada source for minerals in Africa:
http://mmsd1.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/efab/docs/2002MMSConference-Africa_e.pdf

³⁸ Koven, Peter. Africa Rush: Choosing between risky politics or risky geology. National Post, Saturday 1 March 2008. pg FP5.

³⁹ A better plan: How Canada can help Africa; Pierre de Bané and Sharon Carstairs; Policy Options; July-August 2007, pg 102.

policies that spur economic growth and alleviate poverty.”⁴⁰ The original commitment is for \$6 billion dollars; of which \$500 million will come from Canada. Considering the importance of the commitment, the G-8 group is eager to know how the money is spent. The organisation in Africa that coordinates this effort is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a group that provides “vision and strategic framework for Africa’s renewal.”⁴¹ The G8 countries intend to review the progress of the plan at every meeting. The implementation of the African Action Plan can be seen as a realisation by the western world that if they do not coordinate their efforts in the area, the result will continue to be merely an expression of their interest in solving the crisis, but one that lacks the necessary effort to make a difference.

Following the original African Action Plan, a more robust plan of action for the African continent was implemented following the results of the 2000 World Summit. Coined the MDGs, these ambitious objectives “range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015. (The objectives) form a blueprint agreed to by all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development institutions. They have galvanized unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world’s poorest.”⁴² Once again, the commitments from the world community are significant. Building on these MDGs, the agreement reached by G-8 countries at the Gleneagles Summit in 2005 calls for “A doubling of aid by 2010 - an extra \$50 billion worldwide and \$25 billion for Africa; Writing-off immediately the debts of 18 of the world's poorest countries, most of which

⁴⁰ G8 African Action Plan website. <http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/afraction-en.asp>. Accessed 13 April 2008

⁴¹ NEPAD website. <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php>. Accessed 13 April 2008

⁴² UN Millennium Development Goals website. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals>. Accessed 13 April 2008

are in Africa. This is currently worth \$40 billion, and could reach as much as \$55 billion as more countries qualify.”⁴³ With such vast sums of money invested in the area, there is certainly an interest for Canada and other G8 countries to get involved to ensure the money is appropriately funnelled towards projects that meet the aim of the MDGs.

These financial commitments by G8 Nations and Canada in particular, speak volumes on how committed governments are towards addressing the situation in sub-Saharan Africa. This Canadian commitment must be based on our interests and values. In the Speech from the Throne of October 2007, Harper’s government expressed core Canadian values and how these would translate in the international arena: “Guided by our shared values of democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law, our Government will continue Canada’s international leadership through concrete actions that bring results.”⁴⁴ Based on this statement, it is relatively easy to conclude that Canada has an interest in getting involved in sub-Saharan Africa even if the region is not specifically singled out in other governmental policies. An absence of democracy, freedom, human rights, and rule of law is the source of many problems in this part of the world. Aside from these fundamental values, Canada’s role as “the world’s leading proponent of the Responsibility to Protect”⁴⁵, along with the economic incentive represented by the projected value of Canadian mining interests in the region and finally and our interest in monitoring the effect of the important aid program that Canada is implementing in the region all point towards a

⁴³ G8 Gleneagle Summit website.

http://www.g8.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&c_id=1094235520151. Accessed 13 April 2008

⁴⁴ Speech from the Throne Strong Leadership, Better Canada. Government of Canada website. <http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1364>. Accessed 13 April 2008

⁴⁵ Canada’s Human Security Agenda: walking the talk? Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon; International Journal, LX(4), 1069.

significant interest for the current government to get involved in Africa. Other stakeholders are also inciting the Canadian government to get engaged in the region.

In a letter to the Prime Minister dated November 29, 2007 the Executive Director of Project Ploughshares, an ecumenical peace centre affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies articulated the main argument: “More than ever Canadians are asking themselves: What do we stand for? Can we live with another Rwanda in the 21st century? Or will we join hands across the world to protect our fellow human beings and thereby leave a proud legacy for our children?”⁴⁶ Former Justice Minister and founder of the Save Darfur Parliamentary Coalition is taking the same approach: “Saving Sudan: If not now, when?”⁴⁷ Other groups such as STAND Canada, the Canadian Council for Africa and the Africa-Canada Forum are all asking for greater involvement from the Canadian government. Their view is that the government is not doing enough.

When it comes to the Darfur situation, David Black makes the following comment about the actions of the current government:

“What, then, has been undone by the current Canadian government? Two points stand out. First, the Harper government disbanded Martin's Special Advisory Team shortly after taking office, and has not replaced it with any source of high-level political/diplomatic leadership on this issue. Second, it has resisted calls to pre-commit substantial forces ('boots on the ground') to the enlarged UN-AU force mandated by last August's Resolution 1706”⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ Re: Canada's Support for Peace in Darfur. Letter to the Right Honourable Stephen Harper; November 29, 2007. <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Statements/DarfurPMletterNov07.pdf>

⁴⁷ Saving Sudan: If not now, when? Irwin Cotler; National Post, 12 April 2008; <http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=440341>

⁴⁸ The Responsibility To Engage: Canada And The Ongoing Crisis In Darfur; David Black; Behind the Headlines; Vol 64 Number 4; July 2007; pg 21. <http://www.igloo.org/canadianinternational/publicatio%7E2/behindtheh/volume64>

The Conservative Government may view these comments from another perspective. The Prime Minister, during his 2007 visit to Africa, launched the *Save a Million Lives* initiative. “The Canadian-led Initiative to Save a Million Lives will deliver basic, cost-effective and life-saving health services to mothers and children in countries where the needs are greatest,” said Prime Minister Harper. “Once fully implemented, the Initiative will save over 500 children’s lives every day.”⁴⁹ He also confirmed, during the same visit, that Canada would double its aid to Africa by 2008 – 2009. In addition, another \$400 million for development initiatives was announced in 2008.

With regard to the Sudan situation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, having recently completed a visit to the region, made it clear that Canada is involved: “Canada has played a leadership role in supporting international efforts to establish sustainable peace and long-term stability in Sudan, and we remain committed to those goals.”⁵⁰ During that same trip, the Minister also confirmed that Canada will continue to contribute funds in the area: “I am proud to announce that Canada is taking another step, as we will invest up to \$275 million in Sudan during 2008-09 in three areas: security, diplomacy and aid. This includes our assessed contributions for UN peacekeeping missions there.”⁵¹ Finally, in his reply to the Ploughshares

⁴⁹ PM launches Initiative to Save a Million Lives; Office of The Prime Minister website; 26 November 2007; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1911>

⁵⁰ Minister Bernier Concludes Successful Visit To Sudan; Press release no 68; 28 March 2008; DFAIT website. http://w01.international.gc.ca/MinPub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&Language=E&publication_id=386005&docnumber=68

⁵¹ Minister Bernier Announces Major Canadian Engagement For Peace In Sudan; Press release no 64; 26 March 2008; DFAIT website.

letter dated 15 February 2008, Minister Bernier indicates that the government has contributed \$149 millions since 2006 to help promote peace and stability throughout Sudan. Furthermore, he indicates that the government has contributed a total of up to \$286 million since 2004 to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); including \$48 million to assist with the transition to the new African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Minister also noted that Canada has already contributed troops and equipment to the region.⁵²

There is certainly a strong argument to be made that the current government is engaged in the sub-Saharan African region, at least monetarily and with a limited number of troops. Still, however, critics are indicating that the effort to date does not meet the challenges ahead. Kim Nossal puts the situation in context: “The manifest willingness of the Canadian government to go beyond token symbolism in addressing the massive killings in Darfur while engaging in inflated and self-congratulatory rhetoric demonstrates clearly that in contemporary Canadian foreign policy, what matters is not what one does, but only what one says.”⁵³

Canadian Involvement: The 3D approach

The approach adopted to confirm what form Canada’s involvement in Darfur should take, and how that could be translated into clear actions, is best modeled using the method currently

http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=385984&Language=E&docnumber=64

⁵² Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs to Executive Director of Ploughshares. 15 February 2008. <http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Build/BernierSudanLetFeb08.pdf>

⁵³ Ear candy: Canadian Policy towards humanitarian intervention and atrocity crimes in Darfur; Nossal, Kim R.; International Journal; Autumn 2005; 60; 4; CBCA; pg 1020.

employed in the most important operation that Canada has been involved in since the Korean War; namely Afghanistan. Basing our analysis on the 3D approach, the aim is to ensure that a whole of government approach, or in more modern terms a “comprehensive approach,” is applied to determine how Canada could best focus its efforts in the sub-Saharan region, and in particular in Darfur.

Diplomacy

On the diplomatic front, Canada’s approach in most crises is to follow its multi-lateralist instinct and lean towards the majority. This country rarely “goes it alone.” In this case, many of the organization to which Canada belongs have an interest in bringing Canada to the table. La Francophonie and The Commonwealth both boast a large number of sub-Saharan African Nations as members which helps to expose Canadian diplomats to some of the many challenges affecting the region. The UN, the most encompassing multi-lateral organization in the world, cannot afford to be impassive in this part of the world. As expected, they are involved as demonstrated by the number of UN peacekeeping operations in this part of the world (8) compared to any other part of the world (3 each in Europe and the Middle East). Canada must also follow through with the R2P principle that it keeps promoting. This region is certainly a prime candidate for the first attempt to implement the concept. Canada is therefore well positioned to play an important diplomatic role in the region. To do so, following the multi-lateral approach, the diplomatic corps is using two main conduits; namely the AU and the UN.

The AU is certainly claiming ownership of the continent. “An African solution to African problems” is the AU approach to all issues related to the future of the region, and

fundamentally it is certainly the preferred option. As a matter of principle, it is well understood that the world community can assist in dealing with any problems faced by this part of the world, but ownership in implementing the solution is the key to success in the long term. The New Partnership for Africa's Development is the framework on which the AU draws to implement development and aid programs in Africa. NEPAD does include a peer review mechanism to provide a level of accountability. It is the primary intermediary for funds allocated through the African Action Plan. But NEPAD is "confined to a review of economic governance, rather than a political performance, which will fall under the AU."⁵⁴ NEPAD cannot therefore address any issues associated to governance in the region. This represents a cause for concern.

The authors of an article in the Canadian Edition of Time magazine identify two *maladies* that plague less stable African States. The first one is poverty, and the second one is corruption. "In Nigeria, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission says the country's rulers stole 400 billion from 1960 to 1999." The article goes on to give a mission to the western world: "So what can be done for the people of Kenya and their 788 million fellow sub-Saharan Africans? For the West, part of the answer lies in holding African governments accountable for the graft and misrule that sow popular disgruntlement. The West largely contents itself with the appearance of democracy in Africa, not the reality, and gives billions of dollars in aid to corrupt governments."⁵⁵ Even the leaders of Africa know that this curse is affecting the way the

⁵⁴ The state they're in An agenda for International Action on Poverty in Africa. Mathew Lockwood. IDTG Publishing; 2005. pg 130.

⁵⁵ The Demons that still haunt Africa Alex Perry, Laura Blue. Time, (Canadian edition). Toronto: Jan 21, 2008. Vol 171, Iss 3, pg 34

continent will progress. The President of the Republic of Congo made the following statement: “Africa’s greatest problem is failed leadership, in a moral not technical.”⁵⁶

Fighting corruption in Africa is not an easy task. The first line of approach should be to recover some of these funds that belong to African States but are now sitting in private bank accounts around the world. Another step would be to work with NEPAD to instil accountability principles within African governments by implementing proper checks and balances along the process. Canada, working with the UN could take the lead and help fight this corruption problem by giving it more visibility around the world. To achieve this aim, Canadian officials should use their leadership capital at the World Bank to push for the implementation of legislation that would allow the financial community to recover the money that rightly belongs to the people of that nation, and to prosecute the perpetrators. Close liaison between the World Bank and the International Criminal Court, another organisation where Canada has a key influential role, may give sufficient weight to this approach to prove enough of a deterrent for leaders contemplating misappropriating funds that rightly belong to their citizens.

The UN, the other main conduit of the diplomatic corps, is certainly very active in the sub-Saharan region, mainly due to the fact that most of the world’s most critical issues are omnipresent in the area. Many of the organizations under the UN umbrella are involved: the World Health Organisation, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Criminal Court of Justice, UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, and several others. Each of these separate organizations is involved in their field of expertise to contribute to the solution. The bedrock of

⁵⁶ Ending African ‘history’; Faure Gnassingbe, Washington Times, 16 March 2008. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20080316/EDITORIAL/394841331>

the UN approach in promoting respect for human rights, protecting the environment, fighting disease, and reducing poverty, is articulated in the MDG. These eight goals are all applicable to the challenges that the sub-Saharan regions face.⁵⁷ With the end date approaching fast, there is good reason to be worried that the world will not get to the goal line on time. The Commission for Africa confirmed, in their report entitled *Our Common Interest*, that achieving the first MDG by the proposed deadline is unachievable unless drastic measures are taken. One of the key conclusions of the report is that the estimate for reducing poverty by half is now 2150 vice 2015, a delay of 135 years.⁵⁸ This delay should be seen as unacceptable by the world community.

In order to provide a much needed boost to the process, the UN Secretary-General is convening a “special High-Level Event on the MDGs on 25 September in New York. This gathering will bring together world leaders, representatives of the private sector and our civil society partners to discuss specific ways to energize our efforts. I expect the meeting will also send a strong message that governments are ready to rise to the financing for development challenge.”⁵⁹ The region where the progress is the slowest is sub-Saharan Africa.

MDGs are the foundation by which the UN is trying to address some of the key issues the world needs to tackle. The meeting convened by the UN Secretary General aims at creating the

⁵⁷ The eight goals are: 1. Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty; 2. Achieve universal primary education; 3. Promote gender equity and empower women; 4. Reduce child mortality; 5. Improve maternal health; 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7. Ensure environmental sustainability and 8. Develop a global partnership for development. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

⁵⁸ *Our Common Interest* Report of the Commission for Africa. March 2005. pg 64 <http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/introduction.html>

⁵⁹ Secretary-General's remarks at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on the Millennium Development Goals; New York, 1 April 2008. UN website. <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=3070>

necessary momentum before the final stretch. Canada, in accordance with their stated objective of assuming leadership in the international arena, could take the initiative and propose to lead in coordinating the advancement of one of the eight MDGs. This would require the creation of a forum with representatives from all types of governmental and non-governmental organisations around the world under Canada's leadership. The task would be to coordinate the efforts of all involved with the aim of reaching the goal line on time. Considering that sub-Saharan Africa is where the progress is the most difficult to achieve, this approach would also support Canada's efforts in the region. This endeavour is not without challenges. However our diplomatic corps has already proven, with the challenges it faced in bringing the R2P concept forward, that they are up to the task.

The other diplomatic tenet Canada needs to bring to a close is the implementation of the R2P principle. The basic consensus of the report "implies that the international community has a responsibility to act decisively when states are unwilling or unable to fulfill these basic responsibilities."⁶⁰ In the case of Darfur, it is clear that Sudan is not prepared to fully collaborate with the AU and the UN to allow peacekeeping troops in the country. "For months after the United Nations Security Council approved the force, Sudan insisted on limits on the force's makeup and independence, demanding the power to dictate which countries contributed troops, to shut down the force's communication systems when the government carried out offensives and to restrict the movements of peacekeepers at night."⁶¹

⁶⁰ The responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; International Development Research Centre, Ottawa; December 2, , page 75

⁶¹ Darfur peacekeeping force at risk of failing, already. Lydia Polgreen; The New York Times; 24 March 2008. <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2008/03/23/africa/darfur.php>

Canada, as one of the key promoters of the R2P, should be at the forefront of the debate and should actively seek a solution to this dilemma. In this case, saving the lives of innocent people faced with a situation that many have labelled genocide should trump the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty. UN Security Council Resolution 1769, which mandates the UN/AU peacekeeping force for Sudan, does address the protection of civilians in armed conflict.⁶² As the key proponent of this concept, Canada should be more active on the diplomatic side to make the UN, and its individual member states take note and implement the concept. Understanding that chances are that there will always be one member of the Permanent Security Council that will veto a unilateral intervention under the R2P principle, Canadian diplomats need to find a way to overcome that obstacle. With Canada poised to return to the UN Council in the near term, this could be an excellent platform to promote, using Rwanda as the image of what can happen as a result of world inertia.

Defence

The foundation of the next pillar, defence, rests at this stage on the shoulders of the UN and the AU. It would be wrong to believe that both organisations are not attempting to address the situation in Sudan. The AU is the first organisation that deployed to the area. With a force of 7,000 troops and with limited support, the force was hampered in what they could accomplish. After arduous negotiations with the Sudanese government, the UN is now in the process of deploying a force of 27,000 troops to the area under a UN/AU flag. But the hurdles facing the

⁶² UN Security Council. 2007a. Resolution 1769. S/RES/1769. 31 July 2007. www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc_resolution07.htm

deployment of this force are significant. “Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's desperate appeal for assistance - a call for troops, military equipment and, most importantly, political support from member states - has generated little positive response.”⁶³ The lack of support from the international community in providing the helicopters to allow the troops to deploy and be effective is perplexing to many, including the UN Secretary General: “The new force still lacks the required aviation and ground transportation – chiefly helicopters,” he noted, adding that “sheer manpower alone is not enough to overcome the equipment deficit.”⁶⁴ Although many countries are aware of the human security situation in Darfur, the will to intervene is, alas, not there.

As the headlines of 22 March 2008 depict, Darfur is not the only part of sub-Saharan Africa facing human security problems. In the region of Abyei, in Sudan, another conflict is boiling. “War is going to take place,” Joseph Dut Paguot, the acting government administrator in the Abyei region, said bluntly.”⁶⁵ The government of the neighbouring Kenya agreed to a power sharing agreement brokered by former UN secretary-general Koffi Annan after more than 1,000 Kenyans died in the violent aftermath that followed the election.⁶⁶ Ethiopia is also faced with indiscriminate killings: “Ever since exiting colonialists arbitrarily stuck a triangle-shaped wedge of

⁶³ Africa: U.N. Peace Missions Falter In Sudan And Somalia; Thalif Deen. Global Information Network. New York: 8 April 2008.

⁶⁴ Secretary-General calls for more resources for Darfur peacekeeping mission; UNAMID website, 5 February 2008.
<http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=55&ctl=Details&mid=376&ItemID=73>

⁶⁵ Africa's next slaughter. Nicholas D. Kristof; New York Times; 2 March 2008;
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/opinion/02kristof.html?scp=1&sq=africa+s+next+slaughter&st=nyt>

⁶⁶ UN role mulled after Kenya election; John Heilprin; Associated Press, 1 March 2008;
<http://www.wtopnews.com/?nid=105&sid=1355536>

land with 4 million ethnic Somalis inside Ethiopia's border, violence and suffering have plagued the region. Now, many of them have been caught up in a war between the Ethiopian government and a separatist group known as the Ogaden National Liberation Front.”⁶⁷ Finally, Somalia is once again in need of assistance: “The secretary-general also is planning to send a new 26,000-member multinational peacekeeping force to Somalia.”⁶⁸

The requirement to deploy combat forces in support of the human security agenda in sub-Saharan Africa is not going to end in the near future. The pressures on the international community to provide the logistical support to enable these troops, in the form of army vehicles and helicopters, will be significant considering that most of the troops originate from African countries that have limited means of mobility for their troops. Canada is currently one of these countries that are providing this kind of support in equipment and personnel.

CF operations in Sudan began in 2005 with the first deployments of Military Observers to serve with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the shipment of 105 “armoured vehicles, general purpose” (AVGPs) to Senegal for use by three AU nations contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Canada’s contribution to peace in Sudan continued with the stand-up of the new hybrid United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1769 under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, UNAMID was created to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Comprising a large military force with formed police units and civilian

⁶⁷Ethiopia war gets little attention; Edmund Sanders, Los Angeles Times; 23 March 2008; <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-survive23mar23,1,5787043.story>

⁶⁸ Africa: U.N. Peace Missions Falter In Sudan And Somalia; Thalif Deen. Global Information Network. New York: 8 April 2008.

support staff, UNAMID will total about 26,000 personnel at full strength. Overall, there are approximately 40 CF members serving in Sudan in support of both operations.⁶⁹ The number of CF members deployed to the area is relatively small considering previous Canada's commitments to UN peacekeeping missions. Maybe the country can do more.

Canada prides itself on the role the country has played in peacekeeping throughout its recent history. From Lester B. Pearson days to General Dallaire, Canada has always been a significant contributor to the idea of peace missions. But today, the nation is involved in a mission that is all encompassing. Afghanistan is stressing all elements of the Canadian government, including the CF. The commitment in Afghanistan is significant for a military force of Canada's size. Mainly an Army deployment, this mission is taxing Canada's Land Forces significantly. This simple statement provides an important perspective: "On any given day, about 8,000 CF members - one third of our deployable force - are preparing for, engaged in or returning from an overseas mission."⁷⁰ With one third of our deployable forces engaged in one form or another at any one time, it is difficult to see how the CF could take on another mission like Sudan. The Chief of Defence Staff confirmed this situation at a Senate hearing in September 2006 when asked about the possibility of sending troops to Africa: "...we cannot go

⁶⁹ Backgrounder - Canadian Forces Operations in Sudan; CF website accessed 15 April 2008. http://www.cfc.com.forces.gc.ca/site/nr-sp/view_news_e.asp?id=2568

⁷⁰ National Defence website. Accessed 15 April 2008. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current_ops_e.asp

somewhere and focus there when we are stretched to the extreme with the use of our resources and, in particular, the men and women in uniform at this point in time.”⁷¹

There are also two other missions on the horizon that will require a significant number of mainly army personnel in 2010: the Winter Olympics in Vancouver and the G-8 Summit in Alberta. The estimate of forces required for the Olympics is in the thousands of troops.⁷² What these numbers mean are that there is no flexibility within the Army to deploy another combat group anywhere in the world until these commitments have ended. The possibility exists to deploy a limited number of personnel in support of some operations in sub-Saharan Africa, but nothing significant. A number close to the 40 CF personnel presently deployed to assist with training and support is the appropriate level of effort the CF can currently sustain.

Defence and AFRICOM

A new entity with greater resources when it comes to troops is currently establishing itself within the African continent. AFRICOM is the newest Combatant Commander in the US Forces and should be established by October 2008. The standing-up of AFRICOM is not surprising considering the US strategic interests in the continent, including a “need to counter terrorism, secure natural resources, contain armed conflict and humanitarian conflicts, retard the

⁷¹ Statement (7ica, buye s2-8 Tmo 4M CID 9 BDC BT/TT2 1 Tf0.0008 Tc -0.0022 Tw 10./dl10./er;)1JJProc3 T0./10./ngT/

spread of HIV/AIDS, reduce international crime and respond to growing Chinese influence.”⁷³

Just in terms of natural resources alone, the US certainly has sufficient motive to closely monitor developments in the region, especially with the involvement of the Chinese government. The mission of AFRICOM is to “promote US strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability and military professionalization.”⁷⁴ This new command is unique in the fact that the deputy commander will be a civilian and that NGOs such as USAID will be integrated within the command. This innovative approach of including civilian personnel as part of the structure aims at maximising the effects of comprehensive approach within AFRICOM.

Although the African community is still sceptical about the intentions of the US in this part of the world, the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation believes that “AFRICOM’s success will ultimately depend on how well the U.S. understands and responds to the security priorities of Africans.”⁷⁵ The discussion paper published by the foundation addresses what is fundamentally the key issue on the continent and in particular in the sub-Saharan region:

“Africa’s principal security challenge is to mobilise sufficient resources to provide a secure, stable, and well governed environment in which civil liberties are enhanced and businesses can

⁷³ US Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm? Sean McFate. Military review. Fort Leavenworth: Jan/Feb 2008. Vol 88, Iss1, pg 11.

⁷⁴ Africa Command: U.S. Strategic interests and the Role of the U.S. military in Africa. Lauren Ploch; CRS Report for Congress; Updated 7 December 2007; pg 1.
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf>. Accessed 3 March 2008

⁷⁵ AFRICOM and African Security The Globalisation of Security or the militarisation of Globalisation? Greg Mills, Terrance McNamee, Mauro De Lorenzo, and Matthew Uttley, Brenthurst discussion paper 4/2007; pg 2.
http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/files/brenthurst_commissioned_reports/bd0704_what_africom_means_for_africa.pdf

thrive.”⁷⁶ The conclusion of the paper illustrates well the challenge faced by AFRICOM: “AFRICOM can only serve the interests of both partners if it is a ‘maximalist’ and genuinely transformational institution that provides what Africa needs most: help in building security institutions that support democratic statehood.”⁷⁷

AFRICOM will be an important player in the region and it is here to stay, based on the strategic interests of the US in the region. Considering our close relationship with the US and our long history in peacekeeping, it is appropriate to see if there are some synergies that Canada could exploit to the benefit of both countries.

In May 2003, the AU established the foundation of the African Standby Force (ASF). “The ASF will be composed of stand-by multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components located in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.”⁷⁸ Due to the numerous peacekeeping missions presently taking place in the region, the ASF is still at the concept stage. However, this is certainly an area where the CF and AFRICOM could contribute. Canadian participation in the standing up of the ASF has already been proposed in an article published in Canadian Foreign Policy:

⁷⁶ Ibid, pg 7.

⁷⁷ Ibid, pg 9.

⁷⁸ Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee; Document adopted by the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff 15-16 May 2003, Addis Ababa. pg 14. [http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/asf/doc/policy%20framework%20main%20document%20\(part%20i\).doc](http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/asf/doc/policy%20framework%20main%20document%20(part%20i).doc)

“An examination of the training, equipment, and financing requirement of the African Standby Force, its accompanying early warning system, [...] identified ways in which Canada can make a meaningful contribution to the Union’s new regime.”⁷⁹

The Brenthurst paper also identifies the ASF as one of the elements that could contribute to both African and US priorities.⁸⁰ Using the experience of both military forces under a multi-national flag, this approach should contribute in the long term to improving the security of the region. This could represent an excellent option for Canada, by allowing the CF to contribute in some meaningful manner while the deployment to Afghanistan is ongoing. There is always a risk of closely associating with the US when trying to maintain a certain distance from a foreign policy perspective. In this particular case, however, where the focus is on training and the aim is to contribute to the “African solution,” the risk is minimal.

Development

The last element of the 3D approach is development through aid. Regrettably, our record in this area is poor, to say the least. The goal for donor countries is to spend 0.7 per cent of their GNP on Official Development Assistance (ODA). That goal was established as part of UN Resolution 2626 in 1970.⁸¹ Canada still has a long way to go before reaching that goal. In 2005,

⁷⁹ Towards a Canadian Support Structure for the African Standby Force; Building on Experience and National Interests. Burton, C., Powell, K., Kwasi, T.K. & Akuffo, E.A.; Canadian Foreign Policy, 11(1), 47, Fall 2003, pg 75.

⁸⁰ AFRICOM and African Security The Globalisation of Security or the militarisation of Globalisation? Greg Mills, Terrance McNamee, Mauro De Lorenzo, and Matthew Uttley, Brenthurst discussion paper 4/2007.

⁸¹ International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), October 24, 1970, para. 43.
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/91/IMG/NR034891.pdf?OpenElement>

Canada contributed 0.34 per cent (or about US\$ 3.7 billion) of its GNI to ODA and ranked 14th among the OECD's 22 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries.⁸² The current government is certainly trying to close the gap. In a press release from the Minister of International Cooperation, the OECD recognized Canada as keeping pace with its commitment to double overall aid by 2010.⁸³ Although this increase would bring the total to approximately \$4.4 billion, it is still shy of the goal. The other important aspect of this process is how this aid money is distributed. Andrew Cohen is very critical of the approach used by the government to distribute aid contribution: "Much of Canada's aid is tied to the purchase of Canadian good and services, which distorts its purpose. Too much goes to too many countries – and many of which don't need it – in too many sectors. And too much goes to illegitimate governments, many with deep-seated corruption."⁸⁴ There may be, however, some much needed changes on the horizon.

to focus traditional bilateral aid on fewer countries where "we will aim to be among the largest five donors in core countries of interest."⁸⁶ At present, the government is focusing their efforts on 25 development partners. The country that presently receives most of the allocated money is Bangladesh, with Vietnam at number 7, and Pakistan at number 11. Paul Collier, the former head of the World Bank's development research arm, recently published a book entitled *The Bottom Billions*. In his book, he states that 70 per cent of the bottom billion's poorest people live in Africa. In a recent interview, he notes the following about aid: "a majority of aid money from countries such as Canada was going not to the very poor, who need the help, but to middle income countries such as India and Brazil, which very much didn't."⁸⁷ One Member of Parliament has taken note and proposed a private bill to focus aid subsidies.

Bill C-293 aims at implementing more rigid guidelines on the allocation of aid money:

Clause 4 of the bill sets out criteria for the disbursement of Canadian official development assistance. Such assistance may be provided only if the competent minister is of the opinion that it: a) contributes to poverty reduction; b) takes into account the perspectives of the poor; and c) is consistent with international human rights standards.⁸⁸

Sponsored by Liberal M.P. John McKay, the "Better Aid Bill" is being lauded by many observers. "Bill C-293 builds on these (United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Luxembourg, Denmark and Belgium) models, and takes Canada from the back of the ODA pack

⁸⁶ Canadian government - Is the Harper government changing the aid game? Robert Sheppard; March 21, 2007. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdngovernment/harper-aid.html>

⁸⁷ Paul Collier - Gelber Prize Winner - *The Bottom Billions*; Saunders, Doug; Globe and Mail; 29 March 2008. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080328.wreckoning0329/EmailBNStory/International/>. Accessed 3 April 2008

⁸⁸ Bill C-293. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0631-e.htm>

to the forefront of global poverty reduction.”⁸⁹ Applying the guidelines of Bill C-293 to distribute aid money will certainly be a positive step for sub-Saharan Africa. Through close liaison with key NGO organisations, the Canadian government can significantly contribute to meeting the first MDG in the region. The current government is already taking the first step via the “Save a Million Life Initiative” announced by Prime Minister Harper. But the government can do more.

The government can go a step further by focusing their efforts on a country such as Sudan and be “one of the largest five donors.” The government also needs to lead the way with regard to increasing the amount of money dedicated to aid in the region. The objective of doubling aid to the region by 2009 is not sufficient. Tough choices are required to reach these goals, but the country should know that these choices must be made if you want to assume a leadership role on the international scene. The ultimate goal, however, must remain to reach 0.7 per cent of GDP allocated towards Official Development Assistance, a commitment dating back to 1970!

The final element of a more comprehensive approach towards the sub-Saharan African region requires the creation of an entity responsible for focusing the resources of all agencies involved under one roof. This committee should report directly to Cabinet and have as a principal task to monitor the situation in the region and propose effective action. People such as former Prime Minister Joe Clark, Senator Romeo Dallaire and Senator Mobina Jaffer, a

⁸⁹ Foreign Aid Bill Would Clean Up Canada's Dirty Development Accounting Practices; By Roméo Dallaire; Embassy, 20 June 2007;

Canadian born in Africa, could form the core of this group. The former government had appointed a consultative group similar to this one but it was short-lived. The idea is not new and it has been praised recently by the Manley Panel in terms of finding a better way to deal with the situation in Afghanistan. Providing the appropriate level of leadership for issues that require a comprehensive governmental approach is certainly a lesson that does not need to be learned again.

The complement to the 3D Approach: The 3Ns

Although the 3D concept is considered the bedrock of the “whole of government” strategy, other views exist on how to approach situations where Canada is contemplating intervening in failed states with the aim of providing a long term solution. Andrew Cooper, in his working paper “*Adding 3Ns to 3Ds: Lessons from the 1996 Zaire Mission for Humanitarian Intervention*”⁹⁰, argues that 3D alone will not achieve the aim. The approach needs to be complemented by three other areas: niches, norms and networks – the 3Ns. The essence of his approach is that although the 3D concept provides the foundation for any intervention, some modifications to the basic principles governing the strategy are required to ensure the success of future interventions.

⁹⁰ Adding 3Ns to 3Ds: Lessons from the 1996 Zaire Mission for Humanitarian Interventions; Cooper, Andrew F.; Centre for International Governance Innovation; Working Paper No.4; December 2005.

http://www.igloo.org/community.igloo?r0=community&r0_script=/scripts/folder/view.script&r0_pathinfo=%2F%7B7caf3d23-023d-494b-865b-84d143de9968%7D%2FPublications%2Fworkingp%2Fadding3n&r0_output=xml

The International Policy Statement of 2005 succinctly identifies the key to success for the whole of government approach: “This requires government departments to work more closely together - from planning to execution, so that contributions [...] combine into one comprehensive approach to capacity building.”⁹¹ That collaboration between Defence, DFAIT and CIDA can at times be challenging. The only way the mission will succeed is if everyone understands their own role, as well as the role that their partner will play in the operation, as well as the limitations of each agency. The lessons learned from Afghanistan are a sober reminder of how important that relationship can be. The implementation of a new Cabinet committee on Afghanistan, whose role it is to “coordinate and ensure the effectiveness of Canada’s activities in Afghanistan,”⁹² is a realisation by the government, following the recommendations of the Manley Panel, that there were some gap in the 3D approach. Any major interventions requiring a whole of government approach will necessitate such high level coordination, with or without a large contingent of combat troops. Any intervention in sub-Saharan Africa would need a similar mechanism for coordination.

Even when this collaboration between the key agencies works, there is still a requirement to look at these types of interventions with a broader lens. Mr Cooper proposes three other factors to consider before committing Canada to intervene in humanitarian type interventions such as Darfur: niches, norms and networks. By initially deciding conceptually where Canada

⁹¹ Canada’s International Policy Statement – A Role of Influence and Impact in the World; pg 20. <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-2107401-GV3>

⁹² Come Minister announces decisive action on Afghanistan Panel recommendations; Government introduces motion on mission, creates new Cabinet Committee and Task Force; Press release, 8 Feb 2008; http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/nr_2008_02_08-en.asp

should intervene in such crises, what would form the motivation for such an intervention, and with which partner this intervention should take place, a more coherent approach could be arrived at:

“...it (Canada) must work to lay out a strategic blueprint for dealing with the challenges of humanitarianism. What is needed to meet this objective is a merger of an inside-out approach giving due consideration to capabilities and coherence, with an outside-in approach allowing the contextual relevance of geography, motivations and partners.”⁹³

A few facts mentioned by the author are worth highlighting. The first observation concerns the selection of a country where Canada should intervene. Although he notes that Haiti may be a logical choice considering our previous involvement in that country and the strong domestic lobby from Haitian-Canadians, he correctly points out that “niches are often chosen out of a sense of political commitment or convenience, not because of their ‘natural’ logic.”⁹⁴ He also correctly reinforces the importance of the media and public opinion in the selection of that niche. On the normative level, he reiterates the important role that Canada has played in the implementation of the R2P principle and how this notion lends “considerable weight to the norm of employing ‘human security’ as the justification for humanitarian intervention.”⁹⁵ Finally, Andrew Cooper recognises the importance of the AU in the region, quoting President Mbeki when he indicates that “any solution must be a ‘made in Africa’ one.”⁹⁶ The conclusion from the author is clear: “...a robust unilateral intervention in a case such as Darfur is not a possibility for

⁹³ Adding 3Ns to 3Ds: Lessons from the 1996 Zaire Mission for Humanitarian Interventions; Cooper, Andrew F.; Centre for International Governance Innovation; Working Paper No.4; December 2005. Pg. 19.

⁹⁴ Ibid pg 15

⁹⁵ Ibid pg 17

⁹⁶ Ibid pg 17

Canada.”⁹⁷ His statement is correct to some extent. Although Canada cannot make a unilateral contribution, it can still make an important contribution; it may not be a robust intervention from a military perspective, but it can certainly be a significant one.

Conclusion

It is clear that Canada has a role to play on the international scene when it comes to humanitarian assistance. The country’s history, its duty as a G8 nation, and the leadership role it has taken on by promoting the R2P principle mean that Canada cannot just watch from the sidelines. The exact nature of that role can, however, take many forms.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region that is facing significant challenges. The world community needs to assume its responsibility. “An Africa populated by many fragile or “failing” states is one that cannot fulfill the elemental requirements of security for many of its people and becomes a locus of insurgency, instability, conflict, illicit trading, and refugees, that can and does provide support and succor to extremism (including terrorism), and can and does spill over into the affairs of the rich countries in Europe and beyond.”⁹⁸ This “beyond” includes Canada. With a population of 770 million and growing at a rate higher than any other continent, the situation in sub-Saharan Africa will get worse unless important changes take place.

The most important crisis in the region is presently taking place in Darfur. The troubling

⁹⁷ Ibid pg 17

⁹⁸ From Kananaskis to Gleneagles: Assessing Canadian “leadership” on Africa. David R. Black, Behind the Headlines, Canadian institute of International Affairs, 2005. pg 3.

fact is that there are other areas that are facing similar humanitarian crises, although of a lesser magnitude. Sub-Saharan Africa is not a stable part of the world, and it will not likely be stable for the foreseeable future. The question is: Why would Canada get involved in sub-Saharan Africa and how can the country contribute?

The answer emerges clearly from the preceding paragraphs. First, as a strong believer in multilateralism, Canada must assume its responsibilities when the call is made for intervention. Arguably the architect of the G8 African Action Plan that was approved at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada must now pursue this activist approach towards the region. In his book talking about his experience in Rwanda entitled "*Shaking Hands With the Devil*,"⁹⁹, retired Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire said "never again." Canada took note, and some of the diplomatic corps embarked on a campaign to amend the rules so that the world could not stand by and watch the next time such an atrocity took place.

The result of that campaign is UN R2P; a new doctrine that promotes the idea that nations should intervene in cases where a state is unable to prevent atrocities from taking place within their borders. Closely linked to the Canadian values of Peace, Order and Good Government, R2P puts the onus on the member nations of the UN to intervene when the situation warrants it. Canada, as one of the architects of the concept, should be a strong proponent of using R2P as the foundation for intervention in Darfur. But there are other compelling reasons why Canada should be involved.

Sub-Saharan Africa is rich in natural resources, including oil. Canadian industries are

⁹⁹ *Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. Dallaire, Romeo. Random House Canada, October 2003; pg 560.

already engaged in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Zambia where they extract \$7 billion worth of natural resources. The value will triple by 2010. These companies will certainly put some pressure on the Canadian government to protect their interest in the region.

Commitments by previous and current governments to the region clearly indicate that Canada wants to play a role. “Governments are both entitled and expected to chart their own foreign policy course. But some priorities require a level of sustained engagement that transcends the life of any Parliament or the partisan priorities of any party. The challenges of advancing African security and development, and of advancing the international community’s capacity to forestall and if necessary respond to large-scale atrocity crimes, surely fall within this category.”¹⁰⁰ Successive government certainly followed that advice, particularly on the G8 front. As a member of the UN, Canada is also committed to the achievement of the MDGs. The UN Secretary-General is well aware that the objective of meeting these goals by 2015 is slipping, and that the main reason for this is the slow progress made in sub-Saharan Africa: “Last September, I convened the MDG Africa Steering Group to mobilize international financial and development organisations in support of achieving the Goals in Africa, which faces some of the toughest challenges to getting on track.”¹⁰¹ The progress of this group will be reviewed at a special High Level Event scheduled for 25 September 2008 in New York. Canada should take

¹⁰⁰ Canada out of Africa? Disappointments around Darfur omens for Canada’s 2010 G-8 Summit. Tim Shaaw and David Black; Darfur Whose Responsibility to Protect, Human Security Bulletin; The Canadian Consortium on Human Security; Vol 5, Issue 3. August 2007; pg 18. <http://www.humansecurity.info/#/vol53shaawblack/4527460575>

¹⁰¹ Secretary-General's remarks at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on the Millennium Development Goals. New York, 1 April 2008. <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=3070>

the lead and guide all stakeholders who understand that they have a role to play in achieving a particular one of the MDGs.

The most efficient process for defining the type of involvement the government should favor in sub-Saharan Africa is through the 3D approach, with the aim of generating a whole of government answer to the situation. On the diplomacy front, one of the ways Canada is expressing its interest is through the UN. With 10 out of the 20 peace operations under a UN flag taking place in sub-Saharan Africa and numerous UN organisations deployed in the region, the UN has no choice but to be involved. The AU, a regional organisation that advocates a strong role for African nations in any measure taken to solve the problems of African countries, is the other key agency. These two organisations are the conduit for any Canadian involvement.

The AU, through its NEPAD arm, wants to coordinate “Africa’s renewal,” including the process used to distribute Official Development Assistance. Canada is an aid contributor to the region, but that contribution is not significant enough. Canada needs to address this fact, not only in the amount of aid given, but also in establishing a strong relationship with NEPAD in order to generate synergies and progress. One of the key criticisms of aid donors is that many countries who receive aid do not have the governance structures to efficiently use the funds allocated. Working with NEPAD to promote good governance is an area in which DFAIT and CIDA can work together to achieve great progress. Internally, the Canadian government must stay the course with the implementation of Bill C-293 and its intentions to double development aid money to the region by 2010. There is also no reason why meeting the objective of allocating 0.7 per cent of our GDP to aid, which would increase the allocation towards sub-Saharan countries, cannot be achieved.

The other D (defence) is the one most commonly associated with human security. The consequence of the approach adopted by the AU in letting only African peacekeepers deploy on their soil, is that the world community is restricted in its ability to react as serious events unfold in some AU nations. The circumstances surrounding what is taking place in Darfur are most pressing. A UN / AU peacekeeping force is being stood up to intervene, but getting troops deployed inside the country is laborious. Canadians could be tempted to believe that the country should provide combat troops to assist. However, before such a commitment is made, a holistic look at the factors affecting this decision is required.

First, Canada is already committed to providing combat troops to Afghanistan until 2011. Other short term commitments include the Olympics in 2010 and the G8 Summit the same year. All these requirements put together mean that the CF is unable to provide combat troops before the end of the Afghanistan commitment in 2011. This represents another three years of crisis in Darfur. The world cannot wait that long. Canada cannot muster the troops to deploy to the area, and even if it could, it is doubtful that the offer would be accepted.

Canada therefore needs to concentrate on the other two Ds, diplomacy and development. The same conclusion is supported by the 3N approach. As a multilateralist, Canada can be an effective and important player in the region by concentrating its efforts on these two pillars. The status quo, however, is not sufficient. Appointing a committee reporting directly to Cabinet with the mandate to generate plans for action where Canada is assuming a leadership role would advertise to Canadians and to the world that Canada is committed and would represent a step in the right direction. Focusing ODA to the region would be another one.

Canadians will not accept that the country is a mere bystander to the bloodletting that is

unfolding in Sudan. Although Canada is unable to send combat troops, its history, its values, and the mission that the current government has given itself in the international arena dictate that Canada assume its rightful responsibilities. The region needs Canada to contribute to the long-term approach required to solve the various problems facing the region. Canada must “do” sub-Saharan Africa.

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