RESEARCH ESSAY

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE CANADIAN FORCES: HAS CANADIAN DEFENCE LEADERSHIP BROKEN FAITH?

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INTRODUCTION

> *Contract violation erodes trust. It undermines the employment relationship, yielding both lower employee contributions (i.e. performance and attendance) and lower employer investments (i.e. retention and promotion).*
>
> *Denise Rousseau*[1]

In today's competitive global marketplace, organizations are increasingly in need of employment relationships that induce employees to expend extra effort toward organizational goals, to apply decision making skills strategically, and to use their creativity and innovation to help the organization achieve success.[2] This applies equally to the Canadian Forces.

This employee/employer relationship within the Canadian Forces is particularly significant to Canadians given that "…the Canadian Forces provide the ultimate protection against violent threats to Canada's nationhood. The execution of this important mission is dependent in no small part upon the dedicated and professional men and women who comprise the Canadian Forces. It is therefore, essential that actions and policies impacting upon personnel be based upon sound and reasoned principles to ensure the Canadian Forces continue to function at optimum effectiveness." This statement on the importance of personnel was first published in the Canadian Forces Personnel Concept of 1983 and repeated in subsequent versions in 1987 and 1992. [3]

Despite the noble intent and the often-used phrase that personnel are their most important resource; members of the Canadian Forces have faced significant challenges, particularly over the past 10 years. Large budget cuts, rapid downsizing, an increased operational tempo, problems with leadership, and poor living conditions have left many

members wondering whether they can realistically maintain their commitment to the profession of arms.[4] Personnel have specifically been confronted with economic hardship, inadequate housing, an increase in high-risk operations with equipment that is often old and ill-suited to the task at hand, career stagnation, increased time away from home, multiple moves on short notice, and a perceived lack of public recognition for their efforts. Given that military members function under the conditions of unlimited liability, are deployed at a moment's notice to any theatre of conflict, and are asked to put their lives at risk in the interest of all, the foregoing has made for poor morale and a sense of abandonment.[5] These are symptoms of a problem.

Many have suggested that this is indicative that the so-called social contract has been broken between the Government of Canada and the members of the Canadian Forces. This unwritten contract, as stated in the October 1998 Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs (SCONDVA) Report, has traditionally existed and is an implicit one – guaranteeing military members adequate recognition and benefit for the sacrifices they make and the service they render.[6] This sense of the contract having been broken has been suggested in many ways including by the Acting Chief of Defence Staff, Vice Admiral Larry Murray. In his February 1997 comments to SCONDVA, he stated that the Government had failed to meet its existing contractual obligations to Canadian Forces members in terms of pay and allowances.[7] This concern is further evidenced by the Department of National Defence having conducted a social contract symposium for senior National Defence Headquarters staff and academics in January 1998. Indeed, the October 1998 SCONDVA report indicated that the committee found

throughout their hearings that military personnel felt they had become victims of a broken trust between themselves and their government. The committee did not deny this broken trust but rather reinforced that the trust must be re-established on a firm foundation.[8] However, it may be inappropriate to believe that this breach of the social contract, or trust, is simply limited to one that has occurred between the military and their government.

The aim of this paper is to argue that Canadian defence leadership has broken the social contract with members of the Canadian Forces. This will be accomplished by first examining the nature of the social contract. Then, the social contract will be related to the Canadian Forces and how it fits into the current strategic human resource strategy. Next, it will be shown that the social contract has been broken, and by whom, where, when and why. The future will then be discussed by bringing into context the present situation and challenges of tomorrow.

For the purposes of this paper the term Canadian defence leadership will refer to any senior military officer (Colonel/Naval Captain or higher) of the Canadian Forces or civilian member (Executive Level 2 or higher) of the Department of National Defence (including the Minister of National Defence).

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT EXAMINED

To appreciate the nature of a social contract, one must first understand contracts, types of contracts, the social contract as a concept, the various ideas related to it, and the effects of perceived organizational commitment and trust, or lack thereof, to such a contract.

Contracts. These are fundamental to the behavior of individuals and the actions of organizations. The most general description of a contract is the belief that obligations exist between two or more parties (i.e. employer and employee or Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces and the military member). Obligation is a commitment to some future action. But what that commitment means exactly, when its fulfillment is anticipated, and the extent of mutuality itself opens the contract to contention.[9] Obligations occur because people agree in some way to be obligated. Thus, contracts are voluntary.[10] Agreement often exists in the eye of the beholder and not necessarily in fact.[11] The bottom line is that unless outcomes are seen as beneficial, there is no motivation to make or comply with a contract.[12]

Types of Contracts. Various contractual exchange relationships exist. Those most relevant to this paper are promissory, implied, psychological, normative, and social. Promissory contracts are most often signed documents concerning mutual responsibilities and rights. These are best typified within the Canadian Forces by the terms of engagement documents signed by recruits and military personnel as they progress

through their career. Implied contracts are patterns of obligation that arise from interactions between individuals and organizations over time and which may be inferred as substantive obligations by a third party, such as a court or the general public. An example of this would include the concept of unlimited liability by members of the Canadian Forces or the notion that due diligence will be taken to ensure that aircraft are airworthy. Psychological contracts are personal interpretations of promissory and implied contracts. These interpretations or beliefs that individuals make and then hold are not necessarily shared by the organization but are no less reasonable to, or influential on, members on that account.[13] The notion of a psychological contract implies that there is an unwritten set of expectations operating at all times between every member of an organization and the various managers and others in that organization. The psychological contract implies further that each role player (employee) also has expectations about such things as salary or pay rate, working hours, benefits and privileges that go with a job.[14] Many of these expectations are implicit and involve the person's sense of dignity and worth. Such contracts are characterized by perceptions, interpretations and sense making, and, in their violation, by strong emotions.[15] An example of the psychological contract may be the belief by the individual that Canadian Forces personnel would not be deployed into high risk operations with old equipment that is ill-suited to the task at hand. A normative contract is essentially the shared psychological contract that emerges when members of a social group or work unit (i.e. members of the Canadian Forces) hold common beliefs.[16] The social contract addresses shared, collective beliefs regarding appropriate behavior in a social unit (i.e. to obey laws, to look out for one another, to act responsibly etc.).[17] [18]

While promissory contracts are easily understood, there has been a tendency to use implied, psychological, normative, and social contracts interchangeably due to the interrelationship between them. Given this close relationship, for the purposes of this paper I will use the term social contract in a broad sense to include the characteristics of all four.

The Social Contract As a Concept. The general idea of a social contract has been present for many generations. It was even evident in the days of Plato (4th century B.C.).[19] The theory of the social contract has been advanced by individuals such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and J.J. Rousseau. [20] The concept of the social contract begins with human beings as individuals in a state of nature, who create a society by establishing a contract whereby they agree to live together in harmony for their mutual benefit, after which they are said to live in a state of society. This contract involves the retaining of certain natural rights, an acceptance of restrictions on certain liberties, the assumption of certain duties, and the pooling of certain powers to be exercised collectively. Pooled powers are generally exercised by delegating them to some members of the society to act as agents for the members of the society as a whole. Under the theory of the social contract, those rights which the individual brings to the social contract are natural, and those which arise out of the social contract are contractual. The social contract is transitive: if ***a*** is in a social contract with ***b***, and ***b*** with ***c***, then ***a*** is in a social contract with ***c***. In this way each of us is bound under a social contract with all other members of the society, most of whom we have never met. Further, as a person makes a transition from childhood to adulthood, or from apprentice to professional,

obligations change to match abilities, and the contract gives way to a larger social contract and obligations to larger communities at the local, provincial, national and global level.[21] Rousseau states that every man on coming of age has the right of choosing between acceptance of the social contract and his natural liberty. If he chooses the latter, then he has to leave the community in which the contract is established.[22] Thus, the theory of the social contract concerns the rationale of relationships among persons, and between society and its members.[23]

Related Ideas. Related to the social contract by virtue of their impact on member attitudes are the concepts of social exchange, the norm of reciprocity, and mutual commitment. Social exchanges are social in nature rather than monetary and are based on a trust that gestures of goodwill will be reciprocated at some point in the future. The norm of reciprocity makes two demands: people should help those who have helped them and people should not injure those who have helped them. Mutual commitment presumes that if a social system is to be stable there must always be some mutuality of gratification.[24] These ideas have long been used by organizational researchers to describe the motivational basis behind employee behaviors and the formation of positive attitudes. More recently, the concepts of social exchange and reciprocity have been used to explain why individuals express loyalty to organizations. In general, research findings suggest that positive, beneficial actions directed at employees by the organization or its representatives contribute to the establishment of high-quality exchange relationships that create obligations for employees to reciprocate in positive, beneficial ways.[25]

Organizational Commitment and Trust. The notion of "organizational commitment" is often used to describe the orientation of the individual worker towards his work organization. It is associated with a willingness to exert and expend efforts on its behalf as well as a strong desire to remain within the organization.[26] Studies have found that employees in an organization form global beliefs concerning the extent to which the organization values their contributions and cares about their well being. Indeed, findings support the view that an employee's commitment to the organization is strongly influenced by their perception of the organization's commitment to them.[27] Further, literature on work organizations has made ample references to the importance of "trust" as a determinant of organizational commitment. The social contract entails a variety of expectations that are mutual between the individual and the organization to which he belongs. Often, such expectations not only cover how much work is to be performed for how much pay, but also involve the whole pattern of rights, privileges and obligations between the worker and his organization. The entirety of these expectations is not necessarily written into any formal agreement between the employee and the organization, yet they operate powerfully as determinants of behavior. Such a perspective of the social contract presupposes a degree of unspecified trust at work that goes beyond the letters of the legal contract.[28] The raison d'être of a "high trust" orientation is a belief in the long run that there will be a balance of justice, so that the individual is ready to sacrifice immediate personal interests and convenience, confident that this goodwill will be reciprocated eventually. Long-term dedication, commitment and loyal service are expected to be recognized and rewarded. "High trust" commitment also legitimizes the assignment and acceptance of roles of differential status, discretion,

unpleasantness, and stringency.[29] If trust and commitment become fractionalized and segmental, there are the attendant problems of stipulating, defining, and measuring the individual's obligations and duties vis-à-vis his rights and entitlements.[30]

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Military service within the Canadian Forces is based upon volunteers who are employed at will. Although individuals sign terms of engagement documents (a promissory contract), these documents primarily identify the period of service individuals are contracted for but do not describe the employment relationship. Essentially, their duties and conditions of service are circumscribed only by the requirement that they be lawful (paragraph 33(1) of the National Defence Act refers). That said, the relationship between service members and the Canadian Forces is also founded on an implied contract which consists of obligations arising from interactions over time and a psychological contract based on expectations. Given that many of these expectations are shared throughout the organization, the elements of a normative contract are also present. Furthermore, traditionally the Canadian Forces has emphasized elements of a pure social contract not only in images of the "military family" and a "clan culture" but also as an important element of the professional military ethic such as in the general responsibility leaders have for the well-being of their subordinates.[31] From all of the above, one can deduce that a social contract in its broadest sense does exist between the Canadian Forces and its members.

If, as just deduced, a social contract does exist within the Canadian Forces, how does it fit into a strategic human resource strategy? Currently, within the Canadian Forces, a number of reciprocal-support obligations to military members are embodied within a document entitled **The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept**. It specifies not only a Canadian military ethos, which all members of the Canadian Forces must be aware of and subscribe to, but also articulates those broad principles that are considered to be enduring guidelines for the formulation of Canadian Forces personnel policy.[32] [33] It could be argued that this document is in fact a social contract or covenant between the Canadian Forces and its members. When it was originally promulgated in 1983, Lieutenant-General Carswell, then Assistant Deputy Minister of National Defence for Personnel, made it clear that the personnel policy function had two basic aims: to ensure the effective manning of the Canadian Forces, and to ensure that the expectations of service personnel were met. This latter aspect was clearly an acknowledgment of Canadian Forces' obligations to its members.[34] From this, one can also deduce that it is an obligation of Canadian defence leadership, as part of their stewardship responsibilities, to ensure these aims are met. This is particularly true, given the legal obligation of every superior to "promote the welfare, efficiency, and discipline of all who are subordinate to him (Queen's Regulations and Orders 4.02 and 5.01), and the moral obligation commanders and leaders assume as part of the professional military ethic to show loyalty to their subordinates through due care and consideration for their well-being."[35]

Given that the Personnel Concept provided principles from which personnel policies were to be derived to sustain the Canadian Forces, it can be considered a

cornerstone document within the military's strategic human resource strategy. The Personnel Concept document was subsequently revised in 1987 and, again, in 1992 so as to reflect changes in legislation and society.[36] Thus, personnel policies, doctrine within military publications, and the action of leaders/followers should be consistent with, and reflective of, the military ethos and the 22 principles emanating from this document which are detailed in Annex A.

In summary, this section has determined that there is a social contract within the Canadian Forces; that in a strategic human resource context the Canadian Forces Personnel Policy is a cornerstone document whose ethos and principles provide a comprehensive base for personnel policy development (which should in turn be reflected in personnel policies, doctrine, and the actions of leaders/followers); that the Personnel Concept is akin to a social contract; and, finally, that Canadian defence leadership have a legal and moral obligation to ensure compliance with the social contract.

HAS THE SOCIAL CONTRACT BEEN BROKEN?

General. Karol Wenek, a senior member of the Department of National Defence Human Resource Group, has stated that the maintenance and stability of the social exchange between the Canadian Forces and the military member depend on each party honouring its explicit and implicit obligations to the other. When these conditions are met, organizational justice is preserved and, as a result, members tend to be satisfied with their conditions of service. Thus, their trust and loyalty remain intact. Conversely,

violation of important elements of the social contract by the Canadian Forces may result in member perceptions of unfair treatment.[37] In the strictest sense, violation is a failure to comply with the terms of a contract. Given, however, the subjective nature of social contracts, how people interpret the circumstances of this failure determines whether they experience a violation. If contract terms are in the eye of the beholder, then violation will be as well. Subjectivity might make it easier to feel that violation has occurred, but harder to know if it has. Some contract failures result not from an actual break but from a failure to communicate.[38] When the social contract is breached or violated by the organization, members tend to respond in many forms. Violated contracts promote mistrust, anger, dissatisfaction, attrition and change the way people behave in subsequent interactions. The aftermath of contract violation can also be seen in declining corporate loyalty and increased litigation.[39] One model to determine whether a contract has been breached was first used by the economist Albert Hirschman in 1970 and subsequently elaborated on by the management theorist Dan Farrell in 1983. It has become known as the Exit-Voice-Loyalty-Neglect Model. According to this model, people can respond to dissatisfaction either actively or passively and either constructively or destructively.[40] This model will be used to determine whether the social contract has been broken within the Canadian Forces.

Exit. Voluntary termination of the relationship, or more aptly put, voting with one's feet, is an active destructive response which severs the relationship between the member and the organization. Employers can terminate workers for various reasons such as not meeting standards or simply downsizing, and workers can quit an untrustworthy or

unreliable employer. This may represent a loss of valuable knowledge, skill, and experience – hence, the typical concern shown in organizations with high levels of unscheduled turnover or voluntary attrition.[41] [42]

Within the Canadian Forces, the average annual unforecast personnel attrition has, over many years, been approximately six per cent. Though some individual trades or classifications may be traditionally, or periodically, higher or lower than this, the overall figure has remained reasonably constant.[43] This figure would suggest that people are not voting with their feet. This observation also seems to be supported by the 1995 Phillips Study, which found the level of commitment of military members to be very high.[44] As a cautionary, however, the study also pointed out that 41 % of service members often think about quitting the military - a clear indication that confusion and anxiety were being caused by personal insecurities around job security.[45] It should be noted that within the Canadian Forces, from 1989 to 1999, regular force personnel reductions have occurred in the order of 32%, from approximately 88,800 to 60,000 members.[46] This huge reduction has had implications for its members beyond the mere numbers. The military had long been seen as an organization that provided jobs for life. In return, the individual was expected to work effectively and to provide commitment and loyalty. The loss of fully 1/3 of its members clearly sent a signal that this might no longer be the case.

This situation was further reinforced by the fact that some trades were closed completely (i.e. physical education and recreation instructor) and, in unique situations, individuals involuntarily released (i.e. bandsmen). Although overall this reduction was

accomplished with a very reasonable "Force Reduction Plan" benefits package, a sense seemed to exist that something was perhaps not right. This could explain why members on the whole (at all rank levels, the full range of years of service, and both genders) so willingly left full time employment to take their release. Indeed, in cases where some trades were not offered the "Force Reduction Plan" a great deal of dissention was created.

A sense that perhaps things are not yet right can also be deduced by the fact that in 1998 approximately 14 Colonels took their unforecast release (versus the normal rate of three or four per year),[47] This abnormal trend has continued in the first two months of 1999 with six Colonels having taken their unforecast release. Further, the pilot classification in 1997 was required to initiate a special "get well" program; in 1999 only two medical doctors whose contracts are expected to expire are likely to continue serving; and amongst some technical trades a high release rate continues.

Overall, given the consistency of the six per cent unforecast personnel attrition over the years, it does not appear that members are exiting (or voting with their feet). Despite this, some members are clearly concerned with regard to job security and certain specific ranks and classifications/trades would appear to require special attention.

Voice. This refers to actions taken to revive a relationship that is on the verge of unraveling. These active constructive responses are really attempts to change objectionable features in a situation. Actions would include complaining, suggesting improvements, activism, and whistle blowing.[48] The Canadian Forces in the 1990s have

seen numerous examples of voice coming to the fore. Military members have become increasingly vocal to the chain of command, the number of grievances and harassment complaints have grown dramatically, and the expression of frustration outside the chain of command (including whistle-blowing) has become common place (i.e. to the media, members of parliament etc.). A typical example is the constant wealth of embarrassing Department of National Defence material provided to Scott Taylor, the publisher of Esprit de Corps magazine. Perhaps the preface statement by the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs is most telling. "At the outset of our hearings we were confronted with a considerable degree of cynicism, on the part of Canadian Forces personnel, with respect to what we could accomplish on their behalf. The first question our witnesses confronted us with was 'what exactly can you do for us?' Followed by, 'we are tired of being studied, nothing ever happens as a result so why should we have any confidence in you'?"[49] These types of comments and actions seem to imply a high degree of frustration and a sense that military members have become the victims of a series of broken trusts.[50]

Loyalty. This is a passive constructive response that seeks to maintain the relationship through sufferance, in other words, waiting for things to get better on their own and being the proverbial "good soldier".[51] In general, it is fair to say that personnel have tended to be loyal and maintain a high commitment to the Canadian Forces. This is reflected both in the unchanging attrition rate and the Phillips survey referred to earlier. That having been said, tremendous concerns have been expressed regarding leadership.[52] In the Phillips survey, only 17% of the military expressed confidence in the most senior

levels of the Department to lead them through these difficult times.[53] This is the result of numerous factors. Concerns range from a sense that senior leadership will put their own needs ahead of the well-being of their members (i.e. senior officers not prepared to say no to a proposed mission for fear that this will hurt their careers), that double standards are invariably applied (i.e. not holding senior officers to the same standards of accountability as junior officers and non-commissioned members), and leaders simply not walking the talk. From this, one can gain the sense that loyalty is not being perceived as cascading downward and, therefore, since loyalty upward must be earned, it is not being given. Although senior leadership may have taken the loyalty of members for granted, the actions of Canadian Forces members strongly suggest that leadership has breached loyalty.

Neglect. This is a passive destructive response that allows the relationship to deteriorate to a level of antipathy.[54] It often involves the neglect of one's duties to the detriment of the interests of the other party and reflects erosion of the relationship between the parties.[55] Numerous examples of neglect by defence leadership and Canadian Forces members are apparent. The SCONDVA October 1998 report detailed specific examples related to economic hardship, inadequate housing, the use of old and outdated equipment in high-risk operations, increased time away from home, career stagnation, and lack of adequate care and compensation to those injured in the service of Canada. The report summarized this by stating that "the foregoing has made for poor morale and a sense of abandonment."[56] Examples include: the promise, made in the 1960's, of bringing military pay to public service equivalency, but not properly honoured;[57] private

military quarters (PMQ's) across the country that are in poor condition due to years of neglect by leadership;[58] the lament by military members regarding equipment that "we will take on whatever is required of us, but, give us the needed tools!";[59] and a sense of abandonment, exemplified by Major Bruce Henwood who lost both legs to a land mine in the former Yugoslavia. He had expected to have his and his family's needs taken care of, as he had always been told they would be, but found that matters would be up to him.

Other areas of neglect that have undermined trust, and in turn, the social contract are also evident. The Somalia Affair, the Bachovici Hospital incident in Bosnia, and various hazing/initiation incidents including the Perron incident of the 1990s, triggered a myriad of investigations, inquiries, studies and reports on and by the Canadian Forces. This scrutiny highlighted crucial problems to which the Canadian Forces had been slow to respond leading up to the incidents. Although not all-inclusive, these problems included both deficient discipline and the ethical well being of the military. Indeed, the Somalia Commission Report indicates that discipline at the time of the incident was simply taken for granted. It seems to have been assumed that trained soldiers in a professional military would naturally be well disciplined. Matters were tracked and reported on indifferently and inconsistently, with no central co-ordination or sharp focus at the highest levels. Above all, discipline was the subject of inadequate attention, supervision, guidance, enforcement, or remedy by the senior levels of the chain of command, and it was, shockingly, simply ignored or downplayed.[60] The malaise regarding discipline and ethics called into question the military justice system and military police investigation services. Indeed, the Somalia Commission stated that "the

military justice system is replete with systemic deficiencies that contributed to the problems we investigated. Without substantial change to this system, it will continue to demonstrate shortcomings in promoting discipline, efficiency, and justice."[61] In particular, equity and fairness were not clear and, therefore, issues such as enforcement, fairness, transparency, and public accountability must be addressed to effectively promote discipline.[62]

The 1995 Phillips Study supports the conclusion that a great deal of anxiety exists. Sixty-five per cent of service members agreed that people in their unit are under a great deal of stress, only 20% of personnel agreed that the level of morale in their unit was good, and only 26% agreed that the Department of National Defence recognizes and supports their need to balance family and work life.[63] Clearly, the issues of high stress, poor morale and a perception of a lack of caring can have a debilitating effect on organizational effectiveness. All of the above to say that numerous elements of the social contract related to neglect have been breached.

From this brief discussion of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect it would appear that members do not believe that the implicit and explicit social contract obligations have been honoured. As a result, member trust and loyalty have suffered and there has been a clear dissatisfaction with conditions of service. Thus, a sense of unfair treatment has permeated the Canadian Forces in the 1990s. In sum, the social contract has been broken!

WHERE, WHEN, BY WHOM, AND WHY?

Where. In the Exit-Voice-Loyalty-Neglect model, the social contract has been breached in voice, loyalty, and neglect. Within these broad areas, the primary spheres that have been breached include: leadership (including strategic human resource leadership), conditions of service (e.g. pay and allowances, housing, care of the injured, the military family, human resource planning), adequate operational equipment, discipline (e.g. military justice system and military police investigation services), values and ethics, and communications.

When. It would be overly simplistic to suggest that the social contract was broken in a given year. Rather, it is more plausible to suggest that in most cases the breaches were evolutionary and incremental (e.g. pay being pegged to public service equivalency in the 1960's but never being achieved). The conditions of the 1990s, however, acted as a catalyst to bring matters to a head. These included an increased operational tempo, massive downsizing, continued social change within Canada, significantly reduced departmental budgets, personnel pay freezes and numerous dishonourable legacies which focused a great deal of media attention on the Canadian Forces. Thus, by the mid-1990s, military members were fully exhibiting dissatisfaction and this, to varying degrees, has continued to 1999.

By Whom? Who has broken this contract between the Canadian Forces and its members? This is a complicated issue and one in which perceptions play a major role.

The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs heard many times from military personnel that they have been let down by the public at large, their governments, and their leadership.[64] It could be argued that this criticism of the public at large is not valid. Indeed, in a poll taken in January 1999, the Canadian public was shown to be strongly supportive of the Canadian Forces.[65] Government, in no uncertain terms, has the responsibility at the end of the day; however, this does not diminish the fact that Canadian defence leaders are the key link between government and members of the Canadian Forces. They, therefore, have a particularly important role in the maintenance of the social contract. Indeed, in most cases, the actual decisions or recommendations to Government affecting most Canadian Forces members are made by Canadian defence leaders. Thus, if the social contract has been broken, responsibility for this surely must rest in large part with Canadian defence leaders. This sense is clearly reinforced by the SCONDVA report with the statement, "what is not debatable is the fact that the men and women of the Canadian Forces need support … and they need the support of the Canadian Forces leadership who must never put their own interests ahead of those of the troops they command."[66] Comments by the Committee to defence officials also bring this out in no uncertain terms i.e. "General…I may not be well informed, but it is my impression that there are only two or three people at most who are above you in the chain of command. Indeed, you are so high up that you can practically talk to the Heavenly Father himself…Committee members would like to be able to point the wagon … but I believe you are the man to get right up in front and steer that wagon."[67] From this statement, it is clear that members of the Committee also felt that

defence leadership should be steering (leading) the way to towards resolution of the numerous issues confronting the Canadian Forces.

Why? That the social contract was breached is surprising given that reasonable indicators of warning had been apparent prior to the 1990s. For instance, "The Military Family, Occupational Stress and Emotional Well-being Paper" in February 1987 confirmed in an objective manner a number of key findings. These included: that a majority of respondents felt they gave more to the Canadian Forces than it was giving back; that a significant number of members disagreed with the statement "the Canadian Forces provides good fringe benefits"; that in dealing with the Forces the majority of members and spouses had a sense of depersonalization and 40% indicated a sense of powerlessness; that 62% of service members reported that they found their day-to-day job stressful; and, over 40% of officers reported that they had more work than they could handle. This paper concluded by stating that the symptoms, and the reports upon which they are based, could easily develop into a full-blown disease if not taken seriously and acted upon at the appropriate levels![68] Similarly, the Directorate of Personnel Development Studies published documents in 1986, 1987, and 1989 on current and future trends that could influence personnel policies. Numerous insightful comments were articulated in areas such as the work ethic, compensation and benefits, ethics and accountability, standard of living and dual career couples, motherhood and other options, and personal growth and quality of life.[69] Dealing with member perceptions whether they be related to pay, family, the sense of being a survivor, or simply seeking reward for accepting change were also simply not dealt with. Defence leadership, no doubt, had a

sense that things were not right. This is reflected by comments to SCONDVA by retired officers who said, "Why didn't we do more when we were in? Why didn't we address some of the problems? While we were in service, why did we not help the morale of the military?"[70] Perhaps it was a culture of timidity[71] (not wishing to pursue matters to the point of risk for fear of negative career impact) or simply a lack of experience based on three decades of peace, that led defence leadership to essentially neglect critical areas of the military, but most particularly its people. The tragedy of the situation was reinforced by the then Assistant Deputy Minister of Human Resources, Lieutenant-General Dallaire, who commented that in the human dimension, we are at rust-out.[72] Similarly, the current Chief of Defence Staff, General Baril, reinforced the notion of neglect when he stated, "one thing is clear: we cannot afford to neglect the problem any longer."[73]

FROM THE PRESENT INTO THE FUTURE

While there is no doubt that members of the Canadian Forces have endured hardship that has directly challenged the social contract, there appears to be reason for optimism. The numerous investigations, studies and reports related to the Canadian Forces since 1992, have in themselves allowed a thorough airing of the problems and concerns.[74] As a result, Canadians (including the public, government, and defence leadership) have become much more aware of the Canadian Forces and its needs. Thus, numerous shortfalls have been identified and action to address these has commenced.

Perhaps the primary indicator of this has been the mindset change evident in Canadian defence leadership. The Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Art Eggleton, on 28 October 1997, when articulating his top four priorities to SCONDVA, said they were: restoring the contract of trust; addressing issues that affect quality of life; improving communications so that problems do not fester and concerns are properly addressed; and providing the best equipment affordable.[75] Similarly, the current Chief of Defence Staff, General Baril, has consistently stated that resolving the military's quality of life challenges is the number one priority of the Canadian Forces[76]. Perhaps equally important is the message that has been learned by the officer corps as a whole - that the neglect of subordinates has a definite negative impact on their commitment, loyalty, and trust!

In 1997, in recognition of the seriousness of the problem and the absolute need to change, the Minister of National Defence established the "Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces." Though created with only a two-year mandate, the Committee is producing four semi-annual reports in order that the public can follow progress in implementing the various report recommendations. These recommendations relate to a wide variety of areas including: openness and disclosure, accountability, human resource management, leadership, military justice, operational, the reserves and other issues such as quality of life. Their latest report was published in November 1998.[77]

Further, the Government has officially responded to the Eighteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts in which the Auditor General criticized National Defence for equipment deficiencies and shortages, that in turn limit how well the Canadian Forces can respond to Government objectives. The Department officially responded to this criticism in March 1999 by making a commitment to develop and implement a new financial system, to develop conflict scenarios to help guide the acquisition of equipment, to develop additional performance indicators for better feedback and reporting, to develop a new business planning process to better match resources with defence policy goals, to improve the priority setting exercise to guide the capital acquisition process, and finally, to conduct operational testing of equipment, in particular off-the-shelf items.[78]

The SCONDVA Report on quality of life in the Canadian Forces detailed 89 recommendations, that it believed to be important to re-establishing, on a firm foundation, the trust between military personnel and those to whom they look for leadership and recognition. In the report, while they chose not to make explicit the "social contract," they did articulate five principles on which a commitment to military members must be based. These are: that members be fairly and equitably compensated; that all members and their families be provided with ready access to suitable and affordable accommodation which must conform to modern standards; that military personnel and their families be provided with access to a full and adequate range of support services offered in both official languages; that suitable recognition, care and compensation be provided to veterans and those injured in the service of Canada; and,

that members be assured reasonable career progression and that in their service they be treated with dignity and respect. In addition, they stated that military members must be provided with the appropriate equipment and kit commensurate with their tasking. The Department of National Defence, on 26 March 1999, officially responded to these recommendations in a very positive manner. Fifty-nine recommendations were accepted and are, or will be, acted upon. Twenty-four additional recommendations were accepted in principle, but will be addressed in ways different from that suggested by the committee. The remaining six are not being directly addressed, but their underlying issues will be dealt with in other ways (e.g. non-taxable mess dues). Beyond simple rhetoric, immediate results will be noticeable to the members in areas such as pay (i.e. the 1 April 1999 pay increases when considered with those which have occurred since 1 April 1996 total 25.07% for Privates and 30.59% for Second Lieutenants/Lieutenants).[79]

Other changes are also beginning to occur as a result of the lessons learnt from the tragedies of the recent past. The various notions related to the importance of our military members are starting to be embedded into doctrine so that they are not simply a passing fancy. The Army, for example, in their new publication "Canada's Army" talks of a moral contract based on mutual trust, confidence, support and reciprocity. It further states that in return for what the service soldiers give, they should expect to receive approbation and positive recognition which reflects their professional worth and service, good health care especially for those wounded or injured in the line of duty, opportunities for personal development, and appropriate considerations which recognize the unique exigencies of military life and the sacrifices demanded of military personnel and their

families.[80] As well, within the National Defence Headquarters Assistant Deputy Minister Human Resource Group, recent initiatives are beginning to provide a framework for strategic human resources management as opposed to the current focus on day-to-day exigencies. As this Group's ability to deal with strategic human resource issues increases this should benefit the Canadian Forces and also its members.[81] Ultimately, this is the responsibility of Canadian defence leadership.

Though all of the above are positive indicators, they will only be successful if defence leadership remains committed and engaged. Further, before the social contract is fully repaired it is likely that sensitivities, particularly a lack of trust, will linger for a period of time. Clearly, defence leadership will have to remain much more vigilant to the needs of military members (and their perceptions) in the future. If this does not occur, one can expect a continued lack of trust to be manifested towards defence leadership and perhaps efforts by members to obtain a higher degree of predictability of fairness. Other approaches to the social contract which they may seek could include a staff relations representative system similar to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or creation of a union.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that Canadian defence leadership has broken the social contract with members of the Canadian Forces. Given that contracts are fundamental to the behavior of individuals, the social contract plays an important role in guiding the

organizational commitment and trust of military members. Within a contract is the belief in obligations existing between parties, in this case, the Canadian Forces and its military members. Though defence leadership actively promoted the idea of reciprocal-support obligations and embodied them within a document entitled The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept, they did not live up to them. Further, though defence leadership had a legal and moral obligation to ensure compliance with the social contract, they did not do so. The violations of the contract are clearly evidenced by voice (i.e. increases in grievances, harassment complaints, whistle blowing), loyalty (i.e. 17% of military having confidence in senior levels of Department), and neglect (i.e. economic hardships of military members, and both deficient discipline and ethical well-being of the Canadian Forces). As a result, member trust and loyalty have suffered and there has been clear dissatisfaction with conditions of service.

The breach of the social contract did not occur in one specific year but rather was evolutionary and came to its breaking point in the first half of the 1990s. Though government must at the end of the day accept responsibility for all matters related to national defence, Canadian defence leaders were also responsible. They have a particularly important role in the maintenance of the social contract in that they are the key link between government and members of the Canadian Forces. Further, these leaders were in positions to make decisions or influence substantively decisions being made by the Government. Despite indications in the 1980s that areas related to the social contract were undergoing stress, military leadership largely proceeded with a policy of

neglect vis-a-vis its members. Numerous factors such as an increased operational tempo then acted as a catalyst in the 1990s to bring matters to a head.

In conclusion, though the social contract has been broken, there is reason for optimism in the future. Numerous efforts are underway to re-establish a firm foundation of trust between military personnel and defence leadership. If, however, as a professional military force, the Department of National Defence wishes to avoid creating a similar crisis of confidence then the current interest in issues affecting personnel must simply not be a passing fad. Rather, military leadership must remain committed to, and engaged with, issues impacting on military personnel and their families.

Annex A

THE CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL CONCEPT

THE CANADIAN MILITARY ETHOS

1. All members of the Canadian Forces must be aware of and subscribe to the Canadian Military Ethos. The accepted version of this ethos is:

a. We believe in Canada as a strong and free nation, and accept that the ultimate reason for the existence of the Canadian Armed Forces is the preservation of secure justice and peace for Canada. We believe that this can best be attained through the development and maintenance of a professional military force;

b. We believe that this profession of arms, an integral part of Canadian society, forms a distinct sub-set of the entire Canadian fabric. We are a group who have been charged with a unique mandate: to serve our country through the maintenance of its security and defence of its sovereignty; if necessary, by the application of military force;

c. We accept that the authority to apply such power requires that our profession be properly structured, with adherence to a clearly defined chain of command and obedience to a code of conduct, in our case, the Code of Service Discipline;

d. We believe that the military society is a good society embodying those moral virtues which affect our relations with our comrades in arms and our own selves, of: prudence, justice, patriotism, obedience, veracity, and patience. We believe that these values, derived from a traditional code of ethics, fit into and form part of those of contemporary Canadian society;

e. We accept that it essential for all members to clearly display loyalty, first to the country then to the group, and finally to each member of the chain of command, both senior and junior to them before taking thought for themselves;

f. We accept that teamwork is essential to the survival and success of the military unit and therefore accept the necessity of continuous cycles of training and practice. This ensures not only that the group functions as a disciplined and professional entity, but also that individual members are trained to perform well, both in their assigned role and as members of the team, and that their potential for development as future leaders is recognized and nurtured;

g. We accept that, in volunteering to serve our country, we must endure the restriction of certain freedoms including some rights provided by the democratic process; and

h. We accept these responsibilities in memory of those comrades who died in the service of their country, and must ensure that their memory and ideals are not forgotten.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

2. The 22 statement of principles include: Operational **Effectiveness** – The personnel system of the Canadian Forces will provide well-trained, well-motivated personnel in sufficient numbers to ensure the effective performance of all assigned roles and tasks in peace, time of tension, and war; Mobilization – Personnel policies must enable the Canadian Forces, in time of war or emergency, to move in a rapid and orderly manner to the required posture; **Military Ethos** – Personnel policies will be carefully and accurately formulated to recognize the special role and obligations of Forces personnel; **Human Dignity** – The Canadian nation is founded upon the principle that acknowledges the dignity and worth of the individual. The Canadian Forces, which exists to defend Canada and keep it secure, must always be guided by this principle. In all we do, we must show respect for our servicemen and women, recognizing their individual needs, aspirations, and capabilities; **Force Manning and Geographic Stability** – Personnel mobility is fundamental to the effective manning of the Forces. This need must, however, be balanced by concerns for the stability of units and impact of frequent geographical moves on military members and their dependants; **Attracting Recruits** – While emphasizing the unique challenge and adventure which only military service can

provide, the Canadian Forces will maintain attractive incentives in the form of conditions of service and adequate scales of pay to attract and retain the numbers and calibre of personnel required; **Changing society** – Personnel policy development will recognize and respond to social change in an open and proactive manner, except where it is evident that the adoption of specific moral or social values and attitudes would impact negatively on morale, discipline, or operational effectiveness; **Total Force** – Total Force, the integration of regular and reserve components as a unified organization, brings with it additional responsibility for ADM (Per) as the primary focus for personnel issues. All future policy development will reflect the requirements of all components of the Canadian Forces; **Chain of Command** – The Canadian Forces personnel system will be sensitive and responsive to the needs of operational commands, and personnel policies will be designed to support the execution of command at all levels; **Communications –** the reasons for and the exact nature of all personnel policies will be clearly explained to all levels of the Canadian Forces; **Eligibility to Serve** – Personnel will be selected for enrolment on the basis of assessed merit and potential to serve according to clearly established occupational standards. Membership in the Canadian Forces will not be denied on any grounds of discrimination which are proscribed by federal legislation unless based upon bona fide occupational requirements and reasonable limitations; **Training** – Training will be designed to keep pace with technological advances but will retain those elements of military science which have withstood the test of time. Basic training will initiate new entrants to the military ethos and way of life, and will progressively provide them with the necessary environmental skills. Once personnel are

trained to perform individual tasks, emphasis will be placed on collective training to ensure that they can effectively apply their skills as part of an operational unit/team; **Unit Cohesion and Esprit de Corps** – Canadian Forces personnel policies will be designed to support the exercise of sound leadership at all levels and to promote stability within the Forces; **Personnel Structures** – To enhance effective development and employment, members of the Canadian Forces will, whenever possible, be assigned to occupational groupings which reflect their interests and aspirations; **Health and Fitness** – Canadian Forces personnel policies will promote the development and maintenance of high, recognized standards of health and physical fitness and the development of mental robustness; **Consideration of Members' Expectations** – Personnel policies will be developed to satisfy the members' expectations, the fulfillment of which also meets the requirements of the Forces. However, service requirements will have priority over individual desires; **Career Development** – Selection for advanced training and promotion will be based on merit. Merit will be determined by a fair and accurate system of personnel performance assessment, and by potential for further advancement; **Honours and Awards** – The Canadian Forces will maintain a system of commendations, honours and awards, the significance of which must be clearly recognized. The criteria for honours and awards shall be such that achievement is balanced with credibility; **The Military Family** – Canadian Forces personnel policies will support military families as an essential contribution to operational effectiveness; **Compensation and Benefits** – Members of the Canadian Forces will be provided with pay, allowances and other benefits which will permit them and their families to enjoy a standard of living which

adequately recognizes their service to Canada; **Spiritual, Medical, Dental, Social, and Legal Care** – Members will be provided with adequate spiritual, medical, dental, social and legal care in times of both war and peace. This same care will be provided to dependants when they are exposed to extraordinary conditions due to the exigencies of the member's service; and **Retirement Assistance** – The Canadian Forces will provide assistance to long service members preparing for their retirement; this will include both preparation for the establishment of a second career and the provision of adequate retirement benefits.

[12]Rousseau, "Psychological Contracts in…" 6.

[13]Department of National Defence, "Background Briefing Note prepared for the Standing Committee on Defence and Veterans Affairs," (received from Mr. Karol W. Wenek, Acting DPAD, National Defence Headquarters, Canada, 19 January 1999) 1.

[14]Edgar H. Scheim, Organizational Psychology, 3rd Edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1980) 22.

[15]Rousseau and Parks, "The Contracts of…" 19.

[16]Rousseau, "Psychological Contracts in…" 9.

[17]Rousseau and Parks, "The Contracts of…" 19.

[18]Rousseau, "Psychological Contracts in…" 7 and 9.

[19]Earnest Barker, introduction, Social Contract, Essays by John Locke, David Hume, and J.J. Rousseau (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962) vii.

[20]David Gauthier, Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990) 328.

[21]Jon Roland, The Social Contract and Constitutional Republics, linked from http://www.constitution.org/soc/cont.htm; Internet accessed 19 January 1999.

[22]Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (London: Novello and Co. Ltd, 1964) 62.

[23]Gauthier, "Moral Dealing: Contract…" 329.

[24]Alvin W. Gouldner, "A Norm of Reciprocity: a Preliminary Statement" in American Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 1960) 168 and 171.

[25] Randall Settoon, Nathan Bennett, and Robert Linden, "Social Exchange in Organizations: Perceived Organizational Support, Leader-Member Exchange, and

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[26]Henry S. Kao and Ng Sek-Hong, "Organizational Commitment: from Trust to Altruism at Work" in Psychology and Developing Societies (New Delhi/Newbury Park/London: Sage Publications,5,1,1993) 43.

[27]Robert Eisenberger et al., "Perceived Organizational Support" in Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 71, No. 3 (1986) 500.

[28]Kao and Sek-Hong, "Organizational Commitment: from…" 44.

[29]Ibid 45.

[30]Ibid 51.

[31]Department of National Defence, "Background Briefing Note…" 1/4.

[32]Ibid 3/4.

[33]Department of National Defence, "The Canadian Forces Personnel…" 1-9 to 9/9.

[34]Department of National Defence, "Background Brief To…" 3/4.

[35]Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Personnel Policy Framework, (Ottawa: 5002-2 (DGMP), Received from Acting DPAD Mr. K.W.J. Wenek, 19 January 1999) 2/5. This was a draft document and was never published or distributed as official Canadian Forces policy

[36]Department of National Defence, The Canadian Forces Personnel Concept, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 12 May 1983, 3 November 1987, and June 1992). The forewords of these latter two documents provide insight as to why the documents were being updated. These were essentially due to social change in the intervening years and changes in government legislation.

[37]Department of National Defence, "Background Brief To…" 2/4.

[38]Rousseau, "Psychological Contracts in…" 112.

[39]Ibid 134.

[40]Department of National Defence, "Background Brief To…" 2/4.

[41]Ibid 2/4.

[42]Rousseau, "Psychological Contracts in…" 135.

[43]Major J. Radford, Directorate of Military Human Resource Requirements 2-3, personal telephone interview, 30 March 1999.

[44]Department of National Defence, Military and Civilian Employee Feedback Survey, (Ottawa: The Phillips Group/The Wyatt Company, June 1995) 10-12.

[45]Ibid 12.

[46]M. Douglas Young, "Compendium of Changes in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence" in Report to the Prime Minister, (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 25, 1997) 1.

[47]Colonel J.M.J. LeClerc, Director of Senior Appointments, personal telephone interview, 19 April 1999.

[48]Department of National Defence, "Background Brief To…"3/4.

[49]Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, "Moving Forward – A Strategic…" ix.

[50]Ibid 5.

[51]Department of National Defence, "Background Brief To…" 2/4.

[52] Besides the Phillips Survey concern with regard to Canadian military leadership has been expressed by numerous sources. For example: The Standing Committee on

National Defence and Veteran Affairs indicated that some observers before them argued that the failures in leadership are systemic – so widespread that they are almost beyond solution (see footnote 51 page ix). The former Chief of Defence Staff, General Jean Boyle, stated publicly in 1996 that the rank and file had justifiable concerns about the quality of high command and Lieutenant-General Baril, then Commander of Land Force Command, declared the Army has a significant leadership deficiency (see footnote 58 page ES-12). Further, the Somalia Commission of Inquiry found that systems broke down and organizational discipline crumbled. Such systemic or institutional faults cannot be divorced from leadership responsibility, and the leadership errors in the Somalia mission were manifold and fundamental (see footnote 58 page ES-1).

[53]Department of National Defence, Military and Civilian…" 4 and 5.

[54]Department of National Defence, "Background Brief To…"2/4.

[55]Rousseau, " Psychological Contracts In…" 138.

[56]Standing committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, "Moving Forward – A Strategic…" 1 and 2.

[57]Ibid 3.

[58]Ibid 26.

[59]Ibid 2.

[60]Department of National Defence, Dishonoured Legacy – Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Executive Summary, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997) ES-22.

[61]Ibid ES-38.

[62]M. Douglas Young, "Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces" in Report to the Prime Minister, (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 25, 1997) 1,3, and 8.

[63]Department of National Defence, Military and Civilian Employee Feedback Survey, (Ottawa: The Phillips Group/The Wyatt Company, June 1995) 8 and 9.

[64]Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, "Moving Forward – A Strategic…" 5.

[65]D. Stairs, "Canadian Attitudes and Public Opinion" Presentation given to National Security Studies Course, Toronto, Ontario, 19 January 1999.

[66]Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, "Moving Forward – A Strategic…" ix.

[67]Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, Evidence – LGen Romeo Dallaire, April 21, 1998, 9 of 24, linked from http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/3…A/Meetings/Evidence/NDVAEV48-E.HTM Internet accessed 11 March 1999.

[68]Department of National Defence, The Military Family Study, Occupational Stress and Emotional Well-Being (Executive Summary), (Ottawa: Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis, February 1987) 13-15.

[69]Sue Garrison, Current and Future Trends – Update 1989, (Ottawa: DND Canada, Directorate Personnel Development Studies, June 1989) 1 and Trend 6,7, 8,9,10,11,12, and 15.

[70]Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, "Evidence – LGen Romeo Dallaire…" 10 of 24.

[71]J.L. Granatstein, "For Efficient and Effective Forces" in Report to the Prime

Minister – A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence, (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 25 1997) 15.

[72]Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, "Evidence – LGen Romeo Dallaire…" 11 of 24.

[73]Standing Committee on National Defence and Veteran Affairs, "Evidence – General J.M.G. Baril", April 28, 1998, 3 of 30. Linked from http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/3…A/Meetings/Evidence/NDVAEV48-E.HTM. Internet accessed 11 March 1999.

[74]Amongst the various investigations, studies and reports since 1992 on the Canadian Forces have been: the military's Board of Inquiry (headed by Major General T.F. de Faye), the Somalia Commission, former Defence Minister Doug Young's Blue Ribbon Panel on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces, former Chief Justice Brian Dickson's review of various military justice issues, the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs report entitled "Moving Forward" on quality of life improvements, and numerous other smaller, but never the less important ancillary studies (i.e. discussion papers).

[75]Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, "Evidence – Mr. Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence," October 28, 1997, 2 of 13. Linked from http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/3…A/Meetings/Evidence/NDVAEV05-E.htm. Internet accessed 11 March 1999.

[76]Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, "Evidence – General J.M.G. Baril…" 1 of 30.

[77]John A. Fraser et al., Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, (Ottawa: DND Canada, November 1998) 1-3.

[78]Department of National Defence, Government Response to the Eighteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts: Department of National Defence Equipping and Modernizing the Canadian Forces and Buying Major Capital Equipment, (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 1999) 1-8. Linked from http://131.137.96.10/eng/archive/mar99/17mar99scopa_n_e.htm; Internet accessed 18 March 1999.

[79]Priest. "Speaking Notes for Colonel Priest, The Government Response to the Standing Committee On National Defence and Veterans Affairs Report" Ottawa, Ontario, 25 March 1999. Linked from http://bbs.cfc.dnd.ca/Admin/scondva/scondva_brf.htm; Internet accessed 26 March 1999.

[80]Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada's Army, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 01/04/98) 52.

[81]Department of National Defence, "Towards A Strategic Plan For ADM HR," Ottawa: DND Canada. Received from Mr. Ian Jackson 2 April 1999. This document is a discussion paper developed by National Defence Headquarters.

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