Research Essay

PLANTING THE MAPLE LEAF:

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE CULTIVATION OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Captain (N) Dan Murphy

National Securities Studies Course 1

Canadian Forces College

21 March 1999

Ours is not a divine mission to

> mediate...Our hand is strengthened by acknowledged success, but it is weakened if planting the maple leaf becomes the priority.
>
> John Holmes1

Introduction

One reality of the post-Cold war era has been the willingness of Canada to move away from the structural conditions found in a tension-ridden bipolar world, and to move forward internationally with flexibility and a sense of good citizenship. This decade, for example, there has been a propensity to rely on the use of armed forces to provide security and support during humanitarian emergencies. In fact when the delivery of emergency relief assistance has coincided with an unresolved, armed conflict, the Canadian government has been pushed to do more and has responded by offering its military resources in support.2

The public, as recent polls would suggest, are ardent supporters of their military and enthusiastic proponents of 'democratic moralism' in the foreign policy of their government. Yet the public mood is also fickle. Public relations is the instrument, if not the ammunition, in a domestic political battle to secure the 'opinion of publics.' The result is that several particularized niches championed by Minister Axworthy - the campaigns to ban anti-personnel land mines, control the international trade in light weapons, and prohibit the use of child soldiers in combat – are seen to reflect core

---

1 John Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," International Journal, 39 (Spring 1984), p. 384.

2 Prime Minister Chretien opined that enhancing the capacity and improving the management of the international community's use of the military in response to humanitarian crises was a priority at The Lisbon Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2 December, 1996.

Canadian values.3 Indeed, such values have become tantamount to 'planting the maple leaf.'

The volatility in Canadian public opinion is often expressed on defence and foreign affairs relative to cost-resource issues. Of note is that costs and resources are the key linkages between three top domestic issues of the past three decades – Canadian national unity, the economy and, nationalism – and three top issues of Canadian foreign policy during the same period – Canada/U.S. relations, collective/cooperative security and, economic prosperity.

The overwhelming target of domestic politics in the shaping of Canadian foreign policy has been the United States in an epic effort to sustain an alternative continental culture, and to manage American penetration in economic, administrative, informational or philosophical domains. The circumstance of belonging to a North American economy that has been readjusting to changing global realities has made Canadian policy makers shun nationalistic options. They have engaged, instead, in bilateral strategies that have attempted to deal with the considerable effects of American economic structural dominance.

Canada has committed itself to a foreign policy that aims to achieve the promotion of prosperity and employment in concert with the United States as its number one objective. The government has adopted an agenda that places Canadian prosperity through international trade and economic relations at the top, and humanitarian strategies in areas like security, foreign aid, UN reform, human rights, arms control and the

---

3 Fen Osler Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine," International Journal, Vol 53, No. 3 (Summer 98), p.379.

environment, somewhere below. Indeed, the government's engagement in an open process for foreign policy-making in these areas has created multiple pressures and made yet further demands on the public purse. The active nurturing of interest groups such as non-governmental organizations is part of an overall effort to build a domestic political constituency in support of innovation and change. This requires that hard choices and painful tradeoffs be made. As Canada's military knows only too well, resources relative to needs and wants are always scarce and not every public good can be equally well served.4

The public is comfortable to enshrine Canada's economic self-interest as the cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy but, paradoxically, is not willing to adequately fund its simultaneous concerns for costly humanitarian ills found in abundance throughout the world. This paper aims to argue that domestic politics reveal paradoxes and puzzles in Canadian foreign policy which highlight an ambition-credibility gap in Canada's quest to 'plant the maple leaf' beyond its borders. Five themes will capture the essence of the argument: the 'American imperative' in Canadian foreign policy; nationalism; internationalism; the primacy of trade policy in pursuit of prosperity, and; the 'familiar world order.'

The American Imperative

There exists a duality within Canada's political elite that conveys a large measure

---

4 Denis Stairs, "The Policy Process and Dialogues with Demos: Liberal Pluralism with a Transnational Twist," Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership and Dialogue, Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot, eds. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.41.

of contradiction in foreign policy. Opposition Members of Parliament, for example, can publicly decry the humiliation of American corporate dominance over their Canadian partners as Paul Martin did during the latter years of the Mulroney government when his Canada Steamship Lines became a target. On the other hand, politicians who are members of the governing party, and particularly those like Mr. Martin who are now Ministers of the Crown, are never as free with their nationalistic criticisms.

Canada's history is portrayed by its nationalist politicians as an epic struggle to sustain an alternative continental culture to that of the United States. Canadians, at various times, have been asked to support a wide variety of nationalist causes. Most relate to what is euphemistically termed "foreign dominance," otherwise known as "American penetration," in economic, administrative, cultural, informational or philosophical domains. Emotive nationalistic arguments have usually flown in the face of economic rationality, though, and were unpersuasive in times of economic hardship. Nevertheless, the existence of protesting elite Canadian nationalists has been a sure sign that the problem of continentalism has been an occasional preoccupation of anxious Canadians.

From a nationalist's perspective, the wisdom of George Grant and Abraham Rotstein who suggest that the root cause of Canada's significant economic and political "silent surrender" lies in the shortsightedness of liberal theory itself, is unassailable. "Sentimental internationalism," "pussyfooting quiet diplomacy," and a "procrustean view of multinational corporations as ever-friendly market phenomena," have "celebrated the

nation's nonexistence".5

In the 1970s, nationalists asked to have their views reflected in the domestic and foreign policies of the government.6 The response by policy makers to creeping continental integration, for example, attempted to address some of the concerns aired in nationalist schools of protest. However, constrained by geography and a North American economy readjusting to changing global realities, Canadian policy makers began to realize that nationalistic options to circumvent continental integration were few, if any.7 A Canadian-American bilateral strategy, therefore, became unavoidable.

Canada's main strategy in the conduct of its foreign policy generally, and its Canada-U.S. relations in particular, was found in the principle of multilateralism. Canada favoured the institutionalization of international politics, global approaches to international security, and middle-power doctrine, and aimed to reduce the significance for Canadian policy of a powerful United States by networking with other countries to establish new links. As the Canadian economy became more intermeshed with, and dependent on, that of the United States, it made sense to Canadian politicians and diplomats to conduct as much business as possible through organizations like the

---

5 See George Grant, "Canadian Fate and Imperialism," in Technology and Empire (Toronto: Anansi, 1969), and Abraham Rotstein, "Canada: The New Nationalism," in Foreign Affairs, Vol.55, No. 1 (October, 1976).

6 Responding to nationalist domestic political pressures, the Canadian government created the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) in 1973 and the National Energy Programme (NEP) in 1980. The FIRA aimed to ensure maximum benefits from foreign takeovers, with power to permit or block them, while the NEP was designed to achieve the domestic policy goals of security of supply, greater Canadian participation in an American controlled industry and changes in revenue sharing among governments.

7 Canadians were made painfully aware that 58 percent of their manufacturing sector was foreign-owned, as were 61 of the largest 102 corporations in the fields of manufacturing, resources and utilities. Seventy-five percent of the oil and natural gas industrial capital was foreign-controlled as well. Not surprisingly, 'foreign meant 'American.' Worse, capital flowing into Canada between 1950 and 1974 was $20 billion,

International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or GATT. Supportive coalitions could sometimes be formed to counterbalance American power. Despite favourable reviews by domestic audiences, multilateralism as a strategy, could not always serve Canada's bilateral purposes.8 Thus a duality did exist within the political elite relative to Canada-U.S. relations and successive governments have employed similar pragmatic managerial strategies to salve American sensibilities and avoid protectionist retaliation.9

The decks were then cleared for purveyors of the marketplace to make their case for prosperity through free association with Americans. In the words of Anthony Westell,

> the desire to escape from U.S. influence, the desire to put distance between Canada and the United States, arises in large measure from fear of absorption by the U.S. and from jealousy of U.S. wealth, power and vitality. But fear and jealousy…feed the Canadian sense of inferiority, encourage parochial attitudes, and give rise in politics to nationalist policies that are bound to fail. . . . Canadians should be able to see the [continuing integration of the two societies] as an opportunity. ...Canada might at last get the ageing monkey of nationalism off its back...."10

The Canadian ship of state was being prepared for its voyage toward free trade with the United States. Eventually bilateralism would result in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade

---

while there was a $40 billion flood out to cover interest payments, dividends and service charges.

8 Active pursuit of trade diversification with countries other than the United States had been identified as a countervailing factor in the 1968-70 foreign policy review. Therefore, in the wake of Nixon's imposed economic measures in 1971, a fundamental reassessment of Canada's economic relationship, indeed vulnerability, to the United States was undertaken. This resulted in the doctrine of the 'third option' which was proposed in Mitchell Sharp's 1972 document entitled *Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future,* and pursued as a diversification strategy with a view to enhancing Canada's bilateral bargaining power.

9 Of note, backing away from nationalistic policies by modifying both FIRA and NEP effectively buried Sharp's 'Third Option,' which had failed to reduce the Canada's economic vulnerability.

10 Anthony Westall, "Economic Integration with the USA," International Perspectives (November/December 1984), p. 22.

Agreement, and the North American Free Trade Agreement.11

Today cross-border trade is worth over a billion dollars a day and has increased 40 per cent in the five-year period after 1993. Further, 81 per cent of Canadian exports are to the U.S. and account for a staggering 35 per cent of Canadian economic output. This north-south economic integration was abetted by Liberals and Tories alike.12

Such has been the power of American economic influence. Constrained by geography, challenged by new technology, and confronted by a changing global order, Canada became continentally integrated and chose to plant the maple leaf south of the border(s). Domestic politics ebbed and flowed on this issue but policy makers considered it to be the only practical and prudent option under the circumstances. An election was fought and won under the free trade banner. Now, after a decade of Canadian public policy and domestic politics, which conveyed little sense of nationalism, the American imperative in Canadian foreign policy is overwhelmingly trade-oriented. But Canadians themselves have been fickle on the issue of nationalism. Domestically it remains to be seen if today's public opinion galvanizes along nationalist lines on issues like softwood lumber, salmon, steel and pork. However ambitious Canadians may be in resolving such issues in their favour, their politicians may find themselves lacking the necessary clout.

Peacekeeping Retrospective and New Internationalism

Nowhere is paradox in foreign policy more apparent than in peacekeeping and peacebuilding where 'planting the maple leaf' may be favoured, but spending sufficient

---

11 For a concise account of NAFTA's significance for Canada see Andrew F. Cooper, "Discovering the Hemisphere," in Canadian Foreign Policy, Scarborough, 1997, pp. 264-270.

12 Giles Gherson, "Why Canada's Globetrotting Prime Minister Left U.S. Trip to Last," The Vancouver Sun, April 4, 1997, p. A4.

amounts of money in support of these activities is not. Nevertheless, post-Cold War Canadian foreign policy does appear to be 'internationalism revisited' and, trade issues aside, might well have been so.13 This decade the Canadian government confronted issues last addressed while helping to reconstruct world order after 1945 when collective security, Korean aggression, and Suez tension troubled the international scene. Since 1990, the Gulf War, Somalian anarchy, and the civil wars in Bosnia, Rwanda and Zaire were the most dangerous of the regional flashpoints. A discussion of their significance for Canadian foreign policy in Canada's symbolic quest to 'plant the maple leaf' briefly follows.

Gulf War

In 1991, Canada condemned Iraqi aggression, and dispatched naval and air forces to the Persian Gulf and 'planted the maple leaf' as part of a US-led UN coalition in support of internationalist ideals. Highlighted in foreign affairs was "the ability of Canada to design a Gulf policy in accordance with its own traditions and calculations of international requirements, and to implement this policy in concert with the principal powers of the world."14

The aggressor was thwarted at an estimated cost of $60 billion to the coalition, of

13 Some of the evidence and arguments presented can also be found in my 1995 essay to Denis Stairs entitled "The Horror of Rwanda: Back to the Future of Newer Internationalism."

14 John Kirton, "Liberating Kuwait: Canada and the Persian Gulf War, 1990-91,"Canadian Foreign Policy - Selected Cases, Don Munton and John Kirton, eds. (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 392. This article is a detailed analysis of the Canadian government's decision to deploy combat forces in the face of political opposition and divided interest groups, public opinion and media. While parliamentary criticism and societal caution were evident, a Gallup poll taken after the decision indicated that 67% of Canadians approved.

which Canadian costs were approximately three-quarters of a billion dollars.15 Monetarily, the Gulf War was the most expensive foreign and defence foray for Canada in this decade. However, when measured against the improved capabilities that Canadians were able to bring to theatre, not the least of which was enhanced self-defence, the Canadian costs seemed exceedingly small and thoroughly justified. The military contribution was matched by a foreign service effort which, though far less visible, was equally effective and enthusiastic, especially in dealing with the postwar issues. Though some controversy remained concerning the achievement of political and military aims, most analysts agreed that the Gulf War was the clearest example of a UN collective security response to cross-border aggression since the Korean War. Despite strong domestic political support for the operation, this multilateral melding of middle power foreign policy with that of the world's greatest powers demonstrated the need for modern, well-equipped combat capable armed forces in support of Canadian foreign policy objectives. Paradoxically, however, the government chose, in the wake of the Gulf War, to reduce the defence budget by 23 percent, reduce its military personnel by 30 percent, and disregard an important lesson.

Somalia

If the war in the Persian Gulf represented Canada's finest hour in this decade, the 1992 peacemaking enforcement in support of humanitarian objectives in Somalia was

---

15 Gulf War statistics and spending are cited by Douglas Roche, A Bargain for Humanity: Global Security by 2000 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1993), p.11. A former politician and UN diplomat, Mr Roche's informed, though unbalanced, views on the war are based on humanitarian arguments in addition to cost. The manic manifestations of militarism is a continuing theme in an interesting book which, nonetheless, is more revisionist than visionary. As a final point on cost, of tangential interest in this essay, Mr Roche reckons that East and West spent $11 trillion fighting the Cold War.

probably its darkest day. The Canadian government agreed to participate in another US-led coalition (Unified Task Force - UNITAF), this time with a UN Security Council mandate to establish a secure environment for relief operations. Complicating the mission was the collapse of the Somali state amidst civil war and mass starvation. Canadian and international humanitarian relief organizations had worked exhaustively throughout the previous year, but prior to the armed intervention, widespread violence and outright anarchy had made the distribution of relief supplies dangerous, if not impossible.16 During the course of the ensuing peace enforcement, Canada's reputation was called into question. This was not for any failure in the humanitarian relief, which had been quickly restored, but was due to the actions of eight officers and soldiers of the Canadian Airborne Regiment implicated in the cruel and startling death of a Somali teenager. At National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, others much higher in rank and position were alleged to have covered-up investigative information about the wrongdoing.17 In an unprecedented domestic political gesture, arguably to appease the media gods of self-righteous indignation, the regiment was publicly disgraced by

---

16 Nancy Gordon, "Beyond Peacekeeping: Somalia, Peacekeeping and the Canadian Experience," Maureen Appel Molot and Harald von Riekhoff, eds., Canada Among Nations 1994: A Part of the Peace (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), p. 287. Originally the force was called United Nations in Somalia (UNOSOM), a force of 550 soldiers and 79 civilians, that was deployed to protect personnel, supplies and equipment destined for 1.5 million starving Somalis and 3 million in desperate need. Canadians were a part of that force too. With Barbara McDougall's announcement that Canada would participate in the enforcement action but not in subsequent peacekeeping, 1300 military personnel commenced duty in January 1993.

17 This troubling episode is complicated by the fact that the Minister of National Defence was contending for the leadership of the governing party at the time and, based on the convention of ministerial responsibility in a parliamentary government, might well have dealt with the issue administratively in an expeditious manner. The intrigue surrounding what, and if, the minister knew, and when, should have ultimately determined whose judgement erred. The impact on Canadian foreign policy may actually be insignificant as support for the Canadian Forces in the wake of the Manitoba floods in 1997 and the Ice Storm of 1998 continues to poll high.

disbandment. Such a rush to judgement occurred in advance of any public inquiry results, and the collective punishment meted out by government could hardly have been more severe in peacetime.

The domestic politics of this particular episode in Canadian foreign policy were most significant. Actions by the instruments of the policy in Somalia, in this case the Canadian Airborne Regiment and senior officials in Ottawa, highlighted growing concerns about peacekeeping generally. Rather than highlight the hitherto unknown difficulties of peace enforcement missions, politicians, military leaders and foreign policy bureaucrats might well have been criticized for desiring to reap the benefits of good public relations by 'planting the maple leaf.' In addition, errors of judgement made at high levels, if only in Defence, resulted in a public relations nightmare and a media dream, but at the time, exceedingly low army morale. That the public inquiry was shut down when the government of the day became the target of political, bureaucratic and media interests speaks volumes about the impact of domestic politics on what should have evolved into a peacekeeping foreign policy debate about requisite resources. Further, Somalia also highlighted the puzzling fickleness of the public , which strongly supported the mission early on. Public opinion quickly reversed itself when the policy-making process was revealed to be less than transparent and the recoil of moral outrage gripped the nation.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Having highlighted two significant extremes in Canadian military performance on UN missions that the government was encouraged to undertake by the old Department of External Affairs, one other peace enforcement operation in support of humanitarian

objectives was had significant. In 1992-93, a UN Chapter VII mandate was assigned to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, the security and freedom of movement of personnel, and the protection of 'safe areas.'18 The disheartening daily dose of atrocities, ethnic cleansings, and hostage dramas that featured peacekeepers as victims, flooded from civil war-torn Bosnia in media and official reports. Such evidence should have made two issues abundantly clear. First, the importance of setting international standards of behaviour unfettered by issues of sovereignty, "a new internationalism [to] place human rights above the absolute rights of sovereign states" as it were, needed to be recognized and enforced.19 Second, though no less important, the need to reassess and overhaul UN institutions was overdue.20

It is not intended to bog down in endless detail about Canada's peacekeeping challenges. Rather it is to highlight what Gregory Wirick refers to as 'quintessential

---

18 Security Council Resolutions 770, 807, 815, 819, 824, 836 and 844 refer. The Security Council also authorized action to enforce a 'no fly zone' and a naval blockade in support of an arms and economic embargo imposed against the belligerents. My own experience was gained, in part, in a Canadian patrol frigate assigned to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic in the Adriatic Sea, during five months in 1994-95, to help conduct those missions.

19 Gregory Wirick, "Canada, Peacekeeping and the United Nations,"in Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, eds. Canada Among Nations 1992-1993 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), pp. 94-96. Although the first point was made by Opposition Leader Jean Cretien in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, it was no less relevant in a setting where nationalist extremism was operating in the ethnically tight geographical confinement of an artificially created state. Sovereign claims have been frequently invoked in Bosnia-Herzogovina by both sides in attempting to excuse their humanitarian crimes.

20 Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 508. From an operational perspective, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie set the challenge for Canada's foreign policy to help get things fixed. He said, that no democratic country would ever consider deploying its forces if it could not keep proper political control, and could not give its troops competent military direction and the resources they needed to do the job. Unfortunately the UN does; and to make matters worse, when it faces a really serious crisis, it usually subcontracts to the United States, thereby excluding UN members more and more from the decision-making process. MGen Mackenzie suggests that a military mechanism which reports directly to the Security Council, is necessary. More controversial, however, is his wishful notion that the Council's Permanent Five should no longer have the veto in Council decisions.

Canadian performance'- the desire to be helpful, involved and committed to the UN and multilateralism in a way that allows Canada to differentiate itself from the U.S. A paradoxical aspect, however, is that the public remain enthusiastic joiners in American-led 'coalitions of the willing'.

Rwanda and Zaire

Canada has had a long involvement in Rwanda and Zaire dating back to 1960 when the issues of poverty and the needs of French-speaking African civil societies were first addressed. Overall, Canada has spent at least $250 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA) in this area over the last thirty years, and probably more, through multilateral institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.21 22 More recently, for cultural as well as political reasons, the Canadian government became involved in what would eventually be termed 'la francophonie,' which included Rwanda.23

---

21 Cited by Bill Graham, Chairman, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade respecting an examination of the situation in Burundi and Rwanda (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 23-3-1995), Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue No. 20, p. 28.

22 John P. Schlegel, The Deceptive Ash: Bilingualism and Canadian Policy in Africa: 1957 - 1971 (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), p.37. Canada, it must be observed, failed to play a leading and constructive role on African issues early-on in the UN. As a country which advocated moderate policies leading to self-determination and independence from colonial rule, Canada "sought . . . to play an inconspicuous part by seeking refuge in abstentions. ...[T]he accusation of vacillating in the UN remains. It cannot be reasoned away under the guise of a diplomatic logic that counselled flexibility of action through inaction and indifference.

23 Of note, Douglas Anglin observed the policy to have been incoherent, misdirected and sporadic in "Towards a Canadian Policy in Africa," International Journal, XV (Autumn 1960). pp. 290-310. Later, in the wake of the Quiet Revolution, Quebec desired to pursue its own foreign affairs for national purposes, ostensibly taken to mean the preservation of its culture, language and education, in French-speaking Africa which included Rwanda. By 1968, this was causing significant foreign relations problems for Canada. The strain in Canada-France relations became uncomfortable as Quebec pursued an independent international policy by concluding a number of exchanges, cooperative ventures and cultural agreements with France and the francophone nations of Sub-Saharan Africa; all of which was encouraged by Charles DeGaulle. Shortly thereafter, Pierre Trudeau made national unity his government's top priority. See also, Jean-Philippe Therien's essay in Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, John

La francophonie became one of the main vehicles for enhancing Canada's stature abroad through the promotion of Canadian values. One of the principle reasons for its success was the emergence of nationalism in so-called French Africa which highlighted a growing discontent with France's economic and educational hegemony throughout the region. Belgium was similarly ill-regarded.24

The unifying theme in an examination of the modern evolution of Canadian foreign policy toward Rwanda and Zaire might well be found in Canadian unity. The strains in Canadian federalism and its central considerations of bilingualism and biculturalism became domestic sources of nascent foreign policy toward Rwanda and elsewhere in French-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, in addition to national unity, the motivation for Canada's African policy these past 40 years can be found in the way that Canada viewed its role in the world, in traditional foreign policy and in domestic influences.

Having 'planted the maple leaf' and 'assumed responsibilities' for nearly 40 years in Central Africa, Canadian peacekeepers found themselves on another tough mission, but without enforcement provisions in the mandate. This was much to the liking of a

---

English and Norman Hilmer, eds. (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992).

24 Canadian International Development Agency, Annual Report 1992-93 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1994), pp. 8, 11. By 1990, CIDA funding to Africa had grown to $542.09 million, of which Rwanda and Zaire received more than $22 million. In 1991, the last year for which comparative figures are available, Belgium far surpassed Canadian aid to Rwanda by donating $55.8 million as did France, Germany and the USA with donations of $43.1, $40.1, and $27.0 million respectively. Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile-Rwanda Burundi 1993/94 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993), p.18. Then, Canadian domestic realities began to impose considerable financial restraint on overseas development. Three years later, in 1993, Canada's government-to-government assistance to Africa and Rwanda were reduced by nearly half to $300 million and $11.45 million respectively. The limits of responsibility, constrained as they were by the ascendancy of economics over values and trade over aid, were clear enough.

Canadian government that fancied Canada as a principled, helping middle power with no geopolitical ambitions.25 On the score sheet of international praise, the welcoming of Canada to the Rwandan peacekeeping operation in 1994 and the offer to lead a U.N. Multi-national Task Force to Zaire in 1996 was bound to be worth a few points. This, it was hoped, would be true if the world community could continue to be assured that Canada's actions were as selfless and unpretentious as ever. 26

The Zaire mission that was conducted late in 1996, became synonymous with poor government planning and National Defence (DND) frustration. It was intended to be a $100 million humanitarian mission but it was dispatched before the basic facts were known. Further, a withdrawal occurred before sickness and starvation had peaked, and nil follow-up took place in the face of the fact that thousands of Rwandan refugees were dying in Zaire or while returning home.27 In short, this ill-conceived effort was based on meager intelligence and an overwhelming need for logistical support. Eventually the request to the U.S. for that support was approved in Washington.

The DND 'lessons learned' assessment was telling. First, the Canadian Forces (CF) has a limited capability to mount, deploy and employ a Joint Task Force and its

---

25 From the Western Sahara to the jungles of Cambodia, from the outposts on the Golan Heights to war-torn Bosnia, more than 2300 members of the Canadian Forces were on duty at the time, in 16 UN missions. At one point during the year, in fact, one in every ten peacekeepers worldwide was Canadian. Also worthy of note was the later participation of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, not yet disbanded, which served Canada well in Rwanda.

26 As Giles Gherson put it, "When was the last time that a Canadian diplomatic initiative seized the agenda at the White House, made it to the front pages of international newspapers, and put Canada's foreign minister on British television," in "PM's Zaire Action Puts Canada Back in Leadership Role; Chretien Finds His Own Suez Opportunity," The Edmonton Journal, November 18, 1996, p. A9.

27 See Irving Breecher, "Canada Puts Trade Before Human Rights," The Montreal Gazette, July 26, 1997, p. B6.

headquarters. Second, the CF lacks a mission analysis process. Third, movement planning was hampered by a systemic inability to produce timely tables of organization and equipment. Fourth, the CF needs to develop crisis management procedures. Fifth, the CF is not prepared to take on a coalition lead role within current resources. Sixth, there is an inadequate interdepartmental assessment capability which can deploy early to produce strategic assessments.28 Clearly, the ambition-credibility gap was rather large.

Rwanda and Zaire became symbols of worldwide stress in ethnic, societal, demographic and environmental domains. Specifically, genocide, crime, disease, overpopulation, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, erosion of international borders and empowerment of marauding Hutu militias, produced outright anarchy. As Canadians became aware of the mass murder, an ephemeral media presence reported the efforts of the Canadian government which responded by dispatching small numbers of peacekeepers and incremental foreign aid, with the best of humanitarian intentions and the worst of commitment-capability gaps. That gap is largely characterized by on-going tension between 'soft' and 'hard' power advocates in Canadian foreign policy. It is to the moral argument, then, that the discussion now turns.

Democratic Moralism and the Trade Imperative

Democratic Moralism

Does the act of witnessing genocide, or civil war, or international aggression, implicate the West (or any observer for that matter) to the point that inaction constitutes

---

28 J3 memorandum, "OP ASSURANCE – Lessons learned Staff Action Directive," in Access to Information Request No. (A) 97/0706. See also James Appathurai and James Lysyshyn, Lessons Learned

complicity in the crimes being perpetrated? With reference to 'planting the maple leaf' during the Persian Gulf war, the Somalia peace enforcement, the Bosnian civil war and the Rwandan genocide, that question is worth asking because, if the answer is yes, then distinguishing among conflicts poses a moral risk and highlights yet another paradox. In other words, to be moved by affirmations of humanitarian solidarity rather than national interest, one cannot assert such standards elsewhere and ignore genocide without suggesting either racism or some instrumental higher imperative. The Gulf War illustrated a classic defence of threatened national interests of major powers in conjunction with the alteration of sovereign borders by force. Somalia participation showed weak public support in the West for humanitarian military enforcements. Bosnian contributions were more closely tied to proximity and historical ties with the West than with practical and moral issues. The Rwandan and Zairean crises glaringly illuminated the view that nations rarely go to war for altruistic purposes. Notions of international common welfare, charity, mercy, and benevolence in Rwanda, or elsewhere, would require a global standard of values enforced by a global army. Inasmuch as Canadians believe strongly in such notions, major powers want none of that. "And so, we are hewing back to the traditional concept of national interest, incoherently, shamefacedly and hypocritically at obvious cost to our credibility and sense of purpose. There is no moral comfort for our inaction, and few precedents for doing much else. A scandal, yes, and familiar."29

Such an argument was not lost on Canada's domestic political scene. Having

---

From the Zaire Mission, DND/DFAIT, Ottawa, June 1997.

participated in nearly every UN peacekeeping mission in the past four decades, and having contributed $238 million to international security and cooperation in 1998, $54M of which went to UN peacekeeping 30, Canada began to propose publicly that the UN have its own permanent army. In a speech delivered to the UN General Assembly September 29, 1994, Foreign Affairs Minister Ouellet cited Rwanda as an example where the deployment of a UN Security Council standing army would have saved lives. He added that simply authorizing peacekeeping missions and then scrambling to find countries willing to supply armed forces, would continue to be a collective failure. Indeed, Minister Axworthy has suggested an incredible substitute. "Canada," he says, "is putting together a roster of qualified human rights experts available for rapid deployment."31 This was puzzling soft power rhetoric in Canadian foreign policy that gave short shrift to the hard power requirements of DND and DFAIT to protect such experts.

By openly challenging state sovereignty in the wake of the Rwandan experience Canada was reaffirming its belief in internationalism by controversially advocating the internationalization of internal conflicts.32 Ouellet's comment was, perhaps, a

---

29 Ibid, p. A22.

30 Source: DFAIT Estimates 1998-99.

31 Bob Mills, Chris Champion and Roy Rempel, "Soft on Foreign Policy," National Post, February 16, 1999.

32 The concept of internationalism can be described as a special form of the doctrine of the harmony of interests, and it emerged from the notion that politics is made up of two elements, utopia and reality, belonging to two different planes which can never meet. Its difficulty is not one of failing to live up to its principles, but its inability to provide any absolute standard for the conduct of international affairs. See E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (London: MacMillan, 1940), pp.108-118. Carr's own belief was that political thought must be based on elements of both reality and utopia. According to Arnold Wolfers 30 years ago, internationalism in the enforcement of peace assumed the realist's view of counterpower

throwback to the origins of Canadian support for internationalism in one important respect. The UN Charter had been signed by Canada in the new world order of 1945, in the hope that the UN would gradually accumulate powers to enable it to prevent war among its members. Canada had accepted the veto provisions of the Charter with reluctance, and on condition that the veto would only be used in narrowly defined circumstances of international aggression. Thus, Canada was willing to bend and go 'beyond sovereignty' from the beginning. The Cold War and the growth of member states, most of which disliked any ideas that would derogate from their independence, inhibited that development, however.33 Finally, the 'Security Council army' proposal would be a functional approach to match the security function with Western responsibility.

Canada's peacekeeping and foreign aid contributions to the UN in Zaire, Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia and the Persian Gulf were evidence of internationalism. 34 The humanitarian aspect of internationalist interventions, however, has been the most controversial for Canadian foreign policy. If humanitarian principles override the principles of sovereignty or international law, interventions may come to resemble the coercion of powerful states against weaker ones, with certain nations coming to regard

---

through collective means to safeguard peace. Today, a discussion of 'new internationalism' is found in John Holmes and John Kirton eds., Canada and the New Internationalism (Toronto: CIIA, 1988).

33 Geoffrey Pearson ed., Beyond Sovereignty (Ottawa: The Group of 78, 1991), pp. 5,7.

34 Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, Second Edition (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1989), pp. 143-44. Four related elements constitute internationalism: taking responsibility (the hallmark of internationalist statecraft); exercising multilateralism for diffusing the clashes of interests that lead to war; committing to international institutions; and supporting those institutions with meaningful resources.

themselves as both policy makers and executors on behalf of the UN.35 In Rwanda and Zaire, this argument was promoted by nearly all Western nations who wanted no part of the very real risks to their forces engaged in a humanitarian mission taking place in a war zone. Now that Western nations under a NATO flag have shown a willingness to set aside sovereignty and advance humanitarian principles in the Former republic of Yugoslavia, a sea-change may be in the making.

Paradoxically, however, the ability of Canada to engage in military interventions abroad with large public support is certainly not lost on its budget-cut military. Humanitarian interventions are complex, dangerous operations as MGen Dallaire can only too ably attest. Throwing three hundred 'communication specialists' at the Rwandan problem, as Canada did as an afterthought, for example, should be severely discounted as foreign policy currency when the protection of aid workers and refugees is at risk. On the other hand, well-equipped *brigades* of combat-capable soldiers can make a difference. The point to be made is that a Canadian (regular) army which is half the size of the tax department36 and which is constantly being used by Canada's foreign policy makers to deal with the world's problems, has perhaps become a substitute for policy and thought.37 All rhetoric aside, Canada's ability, indeed domestic political will,

---

35 Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, "The 'New Look' in Canada's Foreign Policy," International Journal XLVIII (Autumn 1993), p. 745. The Indian Ambassador to the United Nations was quoted in 1992 as saying that "the principle of independence and sovereignty of states, which is very clearly enshrined in Article 2(7), must remain intact in any exercise in regional peacekeeping and peacemaking."

36 Revenue Canada employees numbered 46,400 on July 1, 1998, as compared to 22,400 army regulars.

37 Jack Granatstein argues that, while Canada has been right to participate in most of the peacekeeping operations in which it has served, the country should retain and enhance the right to consider which operations it should participate in, just as it would consider in which wars to fight. Automatic responses are no substitute for thought. See "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Difference Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?"English and Hillmer, op.cit.

to support future humanitarian interventions can and will diminish precisely for reasons of policy and thought. The evidence is in the foreign policy review.

The matter of 'what policy' and 'what thought' is compelling and significant. In short, the direction of domestic politics and the substance of Canadian foreign policy as reflected in the Review and subsequent Government Response had significance for democratic moralism. The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons which considered Canada's foreign policy, including international trade and assistance, was created 23 March 1994, and worked throughout the period of publicized Rwandan genocide and the government's response to it.

The Committee found a balance between the widely diverging views that had been expressed throughout the consultative process, and whether surprising or not, their report dovetailed well with the results of the Defence Policy Review. There were two subtle messages which the humanitarian community, CIDA and NGOs amongst them, should have hoisted in. The first was that their influence was significantly less than imagined, in comparison to the 'realist' groups represented by the well-organized defence establishment and industries.38 That the Report and subsequent Government Response chose not to transfer large chunks of the defence budget to worthy aid and humanitarian purposes illustrate the second message. The humanitarian community had simply lost the argument on what constitutes security. "Neither the Defence nor the Foreign Policy Committee was persuaded intellectually, for example, that it would be safe to accept -

38 Andrew Cooper assesses that, "the intrusion of domestic actors cut into foreign policy making with a very different level of intensity… As found in the areas of the environment, human rights, and development assistance, non-state actors in general, and non-governmental organizations in particular, were able to move out in front of government in some areas of international activity. The impact of these groups, nevertheless, has remained amorphous," in Canadian Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 284.

without qualifications, at least - the argument that the 'common security' could best be approached through a combination of diverse policy instruments within which the role of the armed forces could be significantly downgraded."39 That would seem to support a domestic political view that necessary resources for the military component of future humanitarian interventions is supported by the government and its public.

The Trade Imperative

The three key objectives in Canada in the World were the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of *our* security, within a stable global framework; and the projection of Canadian values and culture. The substance of Canadian foreign policy, then, has become metaphorically analogous to a jelly donut - a desirable economic centre consisting of the marketplace, technology, globalization and the money markets, surrounded by a sugar-coating of rhetorical peripheral interests. Further, none of the self-centred objectives conveys any sense of a desire to pursue humanitarian enforcement of the sort Canada has participated in with regularity this decade, much less set aside another nation's sovereignty to do it. Why the revision? The answer lies in the new title of the foreign affairs department - *international trade*.40

Evidence of contradictory policy is found in the ascendancy of trade policy over international humanitarian policy. The initial reluctance to commit resources to Rwanda

---

39 Denis Stairs, "The Public Politics of the Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews," Canadian Foreign Policy Vol. III, No. 1, (Spring 1995), p. 115.

40 The conundrum, however, is that trade alone may not be enough to ensure Canada's future economic well-being. Of 38 countries ranked in the World Competitiveness Report, Canada dropped fastest and farthest, in going from fourth in 1990, to fifth in 1991, to eleventh in 1992. It is currently ranked eighth.

where trade interests were minimal, as well as in the declaratory commitment to trade deals in China and Indonesia where human rights violations were well documented. The magnitude of domestic economic problems confronting Canada and its Western allies has reduced the will to create a new world order based on anything other than transnationalized commerce.

Nevertheless, a newer Canadian internationalism is emerging which justifies 'planting the maple leaf' as an investment in prosperity and employment, by connecting the Canadian economy to the world's fastest growing markets in the developing world. This view is influential in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and perhaps disproportionately so. 'Pearsonalities,' as proponents of internationalism and quiet diplomacy, have long since left the scene, and it would now appear that their students have too. The style, if not the substance of Canadian foreign policy has certainly changed and the 'Axworthy doctrine' may be signaling a transitory shift in policy direction. That said, the war in Rwanda and refugee crisis in Zaire were reminders that the moral and internationalist implications of humanitarian issues will remain in the world, in juxtaposition to the government's view that the real threat to Canada's national security is loss of markets.41

Conclusion

Today, Canada's free marketeers have successfully made their case for prosperity through free association with Americans, to a domestic political constituency and to the

---

41 Senator Allan MacEachen and MP Jean-Robert Gauthier, as co-chairmen of the Foreign Review Committee expressed this view, as did Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet. The Senate-Commons Committee actually recommended a shift of federal funds from military spending to trade promotion. Jeff Sallot, "Emphasize Trade in Foreign Policy...," The Globe and Mail, November 12, 1994, p. A1.

makers of Canadian foreign policy. The ascendancy of trade policy over any other type of foreign policy is now well documented. Tight-bound with Americans as we now are, Canadians justify overseas efforts as investments in prosperity and employment for a North American economy that is connected to the fastest growing markets in the developing world. Contradictions arise as Canada finds itself constrained domestically by the primacy of trade over any other values, and constrained internationally by a world of immense inequalities. Canada's political, economic and military power differentials have led to a duality within its political elite and international interactions are made in reference to the United States. Canada is not alone in such matters, of course, but is far more vulnerable than any other nation based on its location and trade dependency. Finally, Canada has recognized that American transnational corporate dominance, strengthened by the structural power of its capital, may enable North America to capitalize on the international liberal economic order, economic interdependence and foreign direct investment.

For Canadian domestic politics, the lessons of internationalism lie in the fact that the nature of power and commitment in world politics has not significantly changed. There is no 'new world order,' there is the 'familiar world order.'42 It is a lesson reinforced time and again. A dangerous world that has reformed itself on the basis of global community, international law, collective security, peacekeeping, the United Nations and true multilateralism have proven to be elusive at best, and illusionary at worst. An untidy

---

42 Lester Pearson once advised that excessive nationalism and an obsession with sovereignty was the strongest obstacle in the way of building world order, and a world community. He also understood that ethnic strife and conflict within nations pose more complex and insidious problems than war between nations. See Editorial, "Revisiting the New World Order," The Globe and Mail, November 30, 1994.

combination of national sovereignty, self-interest, international law and public opinion continue to collide with tragic consequences that are difficult to resolve by global rules enforced by global authorities. A breach of principle in concert with strategic interests does not occur in Africa as it did in the Persian Gulf. The tragedy of Rwanda in 1994 highlighted those concerns as the world struggled with its incapacity to end the genocide. The egregious outcomes in dispute resolution, diplomacy, peacekeeping (when peace collapsed), and the administration of relief aid, shook the Canadian foreign policy community to the core. The scale of the butchery, disease and starvation was staggering despite the heroic efforts of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, human-rights monitoring groups, UN agencies and private relief organizations. Canadians, nevertheless, are reluctant to commit the lives of their youth and increasing numbers of tax dollars to peacemaking. In the marketplace of national public opinion, international involvement is well supported, but increasing the amount of resources for such activities continues to be a tough sell. It is a puzzlement that responsibilities become fenced-off by rules, conventions and resource shortfalls at times when moral imperatives loom large.

That is not to belittle Canada's efforts to 'plant the maple leaf;' it is merely to frame those humanitarian acts in the reality of 'newer internationalism.' Constrained domestically by the primacy of trade over humanitarian values, Canada continues to accept its international responsibilities, moral and otherwise. They are responsibilities Canada imposes upon itself with the best of internationalist intentions. Perhaps the most important message for Canada to emerge from its peacekeeping experiences is that progress toward global standards that would supersede the internal affairs of sovereign states, and a willingness to credibly resource such efforts, needs considerable work.

Newer internationalism is not particularly at variance with older internationalism, which for many years was the cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy. Mr Pearson put it best in 1968 when he said, "If we believe the world is made up of powerful irrational forces, that anarchy and dissolution are always closer than we think, then we have some reason for optimism, not only because we are still here; but because, under the pressure or, if you like, the blackmail of facts, we are moving forward, however slowly."43 The slow progress of 'planting the maple leaf' in support of internationalism under the pressures of economic prosperity and the contradictions of domestic politics will continue to be Canada's foreign policy challenge.

43 John Cruikshank, "The World in 1995," The Globe and Mail, December 30, 1994, p. 18.

Annotated List of Works Cited

Appathurai, James and James Lysyshyn, Lessons Learned From the Zaire Mission, DND/DFAIT, Ottawa, June 1997.

Axworthy, Lloyd and Sarah Taylor. "A Ban For All Seasons," International Journal 53.2, 1998. This detailed account of the 'Ottawa Process' leading to the banning of anti-personnel landmines gives insight into the 'Axworthy doctrine' and 'soft power.'

Anglin, Douglas. "Towards a Canadian Policy in Africa," International Journal XV, Autumn 1960, pp. 290-310. Foreign policy is portrayed as incoherent, misdirected and sporadic at a time when colonial powers fought to retain their interests in Arica.

Canada, Department of National Defence. Access to Information Request Number (A)97/0706: Ref Nos. 6343, 749, 993, 537, "Revisions to Zaire Lessons Learned", "Lessons Learned", "Lessons Learned Zaire", Ottawa, 1997, 45 pages. A useful retrospective about the difficulties for DND/CF in preparing for the mission, there remain significant challenges for any future undertakings of this nature.

Canada, Department of National Defence. Access to Information Request Number (A)96/1168: "Canada's Decision in the Fall Of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as Well as the Subsequent Decision to Withdraw Force", Ottawa, 1996, 1016 pages. A wealth of information about the significant challenges for Canadian leadership of the Zaire mission is contained in this large document.

Canada, Government Statement. Canada in the World. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1995. This is the official policy document on government foreign policy priorities.

Canada, Parliament, House of Commons. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade respecting an examination of the situation in Burundi and Rwanda. Issue No.20, Thursday, March 23, 1995, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. A wide variety of opinions, expert and otherwise, covering the full spectrum political views is contained in this important document.

Canada, Parliament, House of Commons. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade respecting a round table discussion on the Government Statement and Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canada's Foreign Policy. Issue No.15, Thursday 16 February, 1995, Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. A wide variety of opinions, expert and otherwise, covering the full spectrum political

views is contained in this important document.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Annual Report 1992-1993. Ottawa: Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1994. Your tax dollars in action, and where it goes relative to foreign aid, is outlined.

Carr, E.H. The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. London: MacMillan, 1940. The concept of internationalism is described here as a special form of the doctrine of the harmony of interests, and it emerged from the notion that politics is made up of two elements, utopia and reality, belonging to two different planes which can never meet. Carr's own belief was that political thought must be based on elements of both reality and utopia.

Cooper, Andrew F. Canadian Foreign Policy Old Habits and New Directions. Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997. The continuity and changes in foreign policy are examined on a thematic basis in this most useful text that acknowledges both the distinctiveness of past policy and the pressures that are sure to transform future policy.

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Uganda Rwanda Burundi. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th quarter 1994. London: World Microfilms, 1994. Quick facts in all political and economic domains are noted.

English, John and Norman Hillmer, eds. Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order. Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992. As the rhetorically self-conscious question posed in the title of this book might well suggest, the quintessence of Canadian foreign policy since 1931 when the Statute of Westminster made Canada a sovereign state, awaits the reader. Has Canada made a difference? "Of course it has," asserts External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall, "and only a Canadian would ask such a question." Eleven thoughtful essays by well-known Canadian historians and political scientists on Canada's impact in various areas of foreign policy are presented in the book.

Gordon, Nancy. "Beyond Peacekeeping: Somalia, Peacekeeping and the Canadian Experience," Canada Among Nations 1994: A Part of the Peace. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994, pp. 284-300. A balanced article on the mission and its implications is highlighted in this annual compendium of scholarly submissions.

Granatstein, J.L. "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Difference Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?" English and Hillmer, eds., ed.cit., pp. 222-236. Jack Granatstein argues that, while Canada has been right to participate in most of the peacekeeping operations in which it has served, the country should retain and enhance the right to consider which operations it should participate in,

just as it would consider in which wars to fight. Automatic responses are no substitute for thought.

Grant, George. "Canadian Fate and Imperialism," Technology and Empire. Toronto: Anansi, 1969, pp. 63-78. A nationalist's perspective of Canada's place on the continent and its prospects.

Haglund, David G. "Here comes M. Jourdain: A Canadian Grand Strategy Out of Moliere," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Spring 1998, pp. 16-23. The argument that Canada has a grand strategy, however intriguing, is made and that it makes sense conceptually.

Hall, Robert and Peter Felstead, Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 13, "Crisis in Central Africa," Surrey, U.K. 1996, pp. 1-23. The desperate state of economic and political neglect in Central Africa is highlighted here.

Hampson, Fen Osler and Oliver, Dean F. "Pulpit Diplomacy", International Journal, Vol LIII No. 3 Summer 1998, pp. 379-406. This article, ostensibly, is a critical assessment of the Axworthy doctrine.

Holmes, John, and John Kirton. Canada and the New Internationalism. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988. Four related elements constitute internationalism: taking responsibility (the hallmark of internationalist statecraft); exercising multilateralism for diffusing the clashes of interests that lead to war; committing to international institutions; and supporting those institutions with meaningful resources.

Kirton, John. "Liberating Kuwait: Canada and the Persian Gulf War, 1990-91," Canadian Foreign Policy - Selected Cases, Don Kirton and John Kirton, eds. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1992, pp. 382-392. This article is a detailed analysis of the Canadian government's decision to deploy combat forces in the face of political opposition and divided interest groups, public opinion and media.

MacKenzie, Lewis. Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo. Toronto: HarperCollins, 1993. From an operational perspective, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie set the challenge for Canada's foreign policy to help get things fixed.

Norton, Roy. "Posture and Policymaking in Canada-US Relations: The First Two Mulroney and Chretien Years," Canadian Foreign Policy Vol. 5 No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 15-36. This interesting analysis shows that Liberal foreign policy rhetoric promoted 'independence' and was seldom departed from, while Tory rhetoric emphasizing closeness to the US was inconsistent with their actions.

Nossal, Kim Richard. The Patterns of World Politics. Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1998, pp. 13-23, Chapter 7. Making sense of the the world as

it is, and interpreting the facts as they are, have become the hallmark of this political scientist. His latest offering continues his 'realist' approach.

Nossal, Kim Richard. The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy Second Edition. Scarborough, Ont,: Prentice-Hall, 1989. A foreign policy standard text that has largely become outdated after 10 years.

Pearson, Geoffrey. Beyond Sovereignty. Ottawa: The Group of 78, 1991. The UN Charter had been signed by Canada in the new world order of 1945, in the hope that the UN would gradually accumulate powers to enable it to prevent war among its members. Canada had accepted the veto provisions of the Charter with reluctance, and on condition that the veto would only be used in narrowly defined circumstances of international aggression. Thus, Canada was willing to go 'beyond sovereignty' from the beginning.

Redekop, Clarence G. "Commerce Over Conscience," Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 19 No. 4 (1985), pp. 82-105. A study of Canadian foreign policy relative to South Africa and apartheid.

Roche, Douglas. A Bargain For Humanity: Global Security by 2000. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1993. A former politician and UN diplomat, Mr Roche's informed, though unbalanced, views on the war are based on humanitarian arguments in addition to cost. The manic manifestations of militarism is a continuing theme in an interesting book which, nonetheless, is more revisionist than visionary.

Rotstein, Abraham. "Canada: The New Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 1 (October 1976), pp. 97-118. A nationalist's point of view.

Stairs, Denis. "The Policy Process and Dialogues with Demos: Liberal Pluralism with a Transnational Twist", in Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership and Dialogue, pp. 23-53. While NGOs may have a public appeal, they do not necessarily represent the public interest. Their roots in domestic politics are shallow . NGOs are public interest or pressure groups, with a transnational twist.

Stairs, Denis. "The Public Politics of the Defence and Foreign Policy Reviews," Canadian Foreign Policy Vol. III No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 91-116. The humanitarian community lost the argument on what constitutes security. The Committee could not be persuaded by the argument that the 'common security' could best be approached through a combination of policy instruments and so allow the armed forces to be significantly downgraded.

Stairs, Denis. "Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy", International Journal Vol. XXXIII No 1, Winter 1977-78, pp. 128-149. Public opinion comes to affect public policy and the conduct of

Canadian foreign policy in one of five ways: agenda-setting, parameter-setting, policy-setting, administration-setting. Public opinion may be circumvented, but it is not ignored by policy makers.

Westall, Anthony. "Economic Integration with the U.S.A.," International Perspectives (November/December 1984), pp. 2-22. A philosphical pre-cursor on the joys of free trade with Americans.

Wirick, Gregory. "Canada, Peacekeeping and the United Nations," Canada Among Nations 1992-1993, Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, eds. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992. Fifteen essays examine the 'New world order' in the following domains: politics, personalities and places; the new multilateralism; the new regionalism; global competitiveness, and new agendas.

Print Media Sources (Chronology)

April 18, 1994 Editorial, "Where is the World?" The Globe and Mail.

April 19, 1994. Editorial, "Who Will Fight For Altruism," The Globe and Mail.

July 19, 1994. Editorial, "Of Political Will and Rwanda," The Globe and Mail.

November 12, 1994. Jeff Sallot, "Emphasize Trade in Foreign Policy, Ottawa Urged; Cut in Defence Spending Proposed," The Globe and Mail.

November 30, 1994. Editorial, "Revisiting the New World Order," The Globe and Mail.

December 30, 1994. John Cruickshank, "The World in 1995: Our Last, Best Hope," The Globe and Mail.

November 13, 1996. Les Whittington, Elizabeth Aird, and David Smith, " Chretien Cites 'Moral Authority' in proposal to send troops to Zaire," The Vancouver Sun.

November 15, 1996. "Relief Plan For Zaire Under Fire," The Vancouver Sun.

November 18, 1996. Giles Gherson, "PM's Zaire Action Puts Canada Back in leadership Role," The Edmonton Journal.

December 15, 1996. Stephen Handelman, "Did Mere Promise of Peacekeepers Somehow Solve the Africa Crisis?" The Toronto Star.

July 26, 1997. Irving Brecher, "Canada Puts Trade Before Human Rights," The

Montreal Gazette.

April 14, 1998. Daryl Copeland, "Canada's Foreign Policy in Globalization Era," The Toronto Star.

February 16, 1999. Mills, Bob, Chris Champion, and Roy Rempel, "Soft on Foreign Policy," National Post.