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Research Essay

Canada – Japan:

**Now is the time for Improving Bilateral
Security Ties**

by

**Colonel E.S. Fitch
NSSC 1
Canadian Forces College**

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Canada – Japan: Now is the time for Improving Bilateral Security Ties

I Introduction

This paper will describe Canada's security interests in relation to those of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. Analysis of recent (post-WWII) history will then demonstrate the motivation for and the net advantages of these two, albeit diverse, Pacific nations establishing bilateral security arrangements. While Canada and Japan have enjoyed low-key cooperation in security matters for some time, this paper will argue that in the current Asia-Pacific situation, emerging trends offer an unprecedented opportunity for Canada to advance its international goals by increasing efforts to form close, substantial bilateral security ties with Japan. The paper concludes with a proposal for a policy concept for the development of stronger security ties between Canada and Japan.

A comprehensive study of the implications of these proposals for the whole Asia-Pacific region, an area of a vastness and complexity that defies the search for valid generalities, would be beyond the scope of this paper. To narrow the field, discussion will concentrate on the Northeast Asia sub-region to include the most prominent players involved: Japan, China, Russia, the Koreas, plus Canada and the US.

Northeast Asia Security Environment¹

After the US, the dominant military entity in the sub-region, **China**, is in a stage of development where it is very inward-looking while struggling with the dilemma of modernizing its economy at the same time as maintaining strong central control of the functions of government. Tensions are reduced on its border with **Russia** as the latter has greatly reduced its profile on the geopolitical scene² while concentrating on the survival of its own core. Old enmities with **Vietnam** are dormant as that country is also concentrating on internal economic growth with no immediate imperialist goals. China clearly wishes to avoid any renewal of open conflict in the **Korean** peninsula, as not being in its best interest, during this period of renewal. In addition to the complex territorial disputes over transit routes and oil exploration rights in the South China Sea, the area most sensitive to the Chinese is **Taiwan**. This is one issue that could force China into action, even at the risk of a serious clash with the US. The Chinese forces, while numerically huge, are one or two generations of equipment behind the West and have little capacity for strategic power projection. China is, nonetheless, a nuclear power and is treated with great circumspection by its neighbours.

Japan is, in terms of military power and economic power, the inverse of China. While its military power is thoroughly modern and not insignificant in size, it is required by Japan's post-war constitution to stay close to home. Despite a short-term economic downturn, Japan is a longstanding democracy and is the economic powerhouse of the

¹ Speed, S.E., Northeast Asian Strategic Environment, paper prepared for DND/ADM(Pol), 12 May 98.

entire Asia-Pacific region³. Japan is constitutionally prohibited from imperial ambitions. Its sovereignty is virtually guaranteed by the **US**, which maintains large numbers of forward-stationed troops in Japan and at key points in the Asia-Pacific region. In the post-Cold War world there has been a growing desire by the US and some segments of the Japanese population to re-examine the “lynchpin” US-Japan relationship, although the difficulty of introducing significant change must not be underestimated⁴.

The conflict on the **Korean** peninsula may well be in its last years as there are many indications that the North Korean regime is in a state of imminent collapse. The people of North Korea are inured to hardship but there is always the danger that their repressive government may, out of desperation, be tempted into military misadventure to distract the population from domestic problems. The suspicion that N. Korea may be able to deliver nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) gives an indication of the seriousness of this situation for the populations of Japan and South Korea.

In Asia, **Canada** is all but invisible as a Pacific state. As will be seen below, its presence is ephemeral and its impact virtually unnoticed. The essence of this paper will be to show that there are considerable advantages to be gained if Canada can change that perception by forming a close, substantial bilateral security arrangement with Japan.

² Job, Brian L. and Frank Langdon, “Canada and the Pacific,” *Canada Among Nations 1993-94: Global Jeopardy*, C.J. Maule & F.O. Hampson (eds.), (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993) 266-294 as reproduced in CFC/NSSC document N/SS/NSP/FDA/SG, C-17/32; also Speed.

³ Job and Langdon, C-7/32.

⁴ Job and Langdon, C-18/32.

Security relationships in the Asia-Pacific region have always been “complex and multilayered”⁵ and never as simple as “bipolarity” would have suggested. Throughout the history of the region alliances have been made and broken many times over.

II Canada’s Security Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region

Canada’s national interests can be expressed simply as: prosperity, international security, and the projection of Canadian values⁶. All three, closely intertwined, are based on Canada’s need for a stable world of accessible marketplaces⁷. By far our greatest trading partner has been, and will remain, the USA. We have traditionally viewed Europe, the home of our national fathers and the majority of our founding populations, in second place. In fact, this is no longer the case; Japan is (and has been since 1973) our second trading partner⁸ and the potential for market growth in the Asia-Pacific is far greater than the opportunities that remain for Canada in Europe.

Demographic shifts in Canada emphasize the changes that are occurring. The portion of the Canadian population speaking Oriental languages is growing more quickly than the share whose first language is French. This shift has come about because the source region for the majority of immigration in recent years has been the Asia-Pacific.⁹ In the decade preceding 1991, 50% of immigrants arriving in Canada were from Asia¹⁰, while

⁵ Job and Langdon, C-16/32.

⁶ Caron, Joseph. Canada and Asian Security – Broadening the Agenda, speech for CANCAPS, 5 Dec 98.

⁷ Job and Langdon, C-16/32.

⁸ Author unknown, Canadian Foreign Policy Objectives in Asia-Pacific

⁹ Canada in the World, 1995 pp 28

¹⁰ Chessum, LCol S.H., Canada’s Defence Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region, briefing note prepared for DND/ADM(Pol), 23 Feb 98.

European immigration was down to 20%¹¹. This increasing Asia-Pacific community, with its propensity to settle and generate wealth in the three largest cities (Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal) will have increasing cultural, economic, and political impact in Canada while maintaining strong family and business ties in their countries of origin¹². We can logically anticipate that homeland human security issues will be appearing on the domestic political agenda and that Canada will be expected to be more involved, particularly in the Northeast sub-region¹³.

Not that Canada is uninvolved in Asia-Pacific. Indeed, Canada is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC) the ASEAN (Association of South East Asia) Regional Forum (ARF)¹⁴, and others. Canada also shares a special relationship with Japan as one of the “Quad” of world economic powers (others are US, UK). In addition to memberships in regional fora, Canada has also initiated “one-time” concentrations of Canadian diplomatic and economic effort such as 1997’s Canadian Year of Asia Pacific (CYAP)¹⁵ and on-going bilateral exchanges such as the Canada-Japan Forum¹⁶. APEC, although trade based, is a recognized confidence building tool and a means of keeping the US engaged in the region¹⁷; an engagement which is also crucial to Canada’s own

¹¹ Job and Langdon, C-3/32 endnote 3

¹² Author unknown, Canadian Foreign Policy Objectives in Asia-Pacific

¹³ Job and Langdon, C-5/32

¹⁴ Acharya, Amitav. “A New Frontier in Multiculturalism: Canada and the ASEAN Regional Forum”, Canada Among Nations 1997: Asia-Pacific Face-Off, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), 233-235; also Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1995), 31; Author unknown, Canada - Efforts to Maintain Peace and Stability in Asia, May 1998.

¹⁵ Job, Brian L., “CYAP: A Watershed for Policies of the 1990s”, CANCAPS Bulletin, No 17, (May 98), 7-10

¹⁶ <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ni-ka/relation/agdacoop-e>, Canada and Japan: Agenda for Cooperation, Tokyo, 27 November, 1996.

¹⁷ Minden, Karen and Nicole Grant and Paul Irwin, “Canada’s Role in APEC”, Canada Among Nations 1997: Asia-Pacific Face-Off, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997)

security¹⁸. Other security-based contacts with Japan include exchange of defence attaches and diplomats¹⁹, ship visits²⁰ and combined naval exercises²¹, and annual “staff talks”. More recently there has been substantial Canadian provision, through the Military Training and Assistance Programme (MTAP)²² of advice and training aimed at increasing Japanese participation in peacekeeping²³. These initiatives are all in accordance with the 1994 Defence White paper direction to enhance security relations with Japan²⁴. In addition to these “Track 1”, or governmental linkages, there is also a dynamic and growing “Track 2” series of non-official academic, think-tank and NGO links²⁵ (e.g. Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), and North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD – terminated in 1993)²⁶. Nonetheless, these contacts are minimal and can do no more than maintain the current low level of mutual engagement.

III Japan’s Security Situation

From the end of WWII, the constitution and the security policy of the reborn Japan has been characterized by a strong pacifist and anti-military sentiment. Indeed, recollection of

¹⁸ Caron; also Speed, S.E., Northeast Asian Strategic Environment, paper prepared for DND/ADM(Pol), 12 May 98.

¹⁹ <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ni-ka/relation/agdacoop-e>, Canada and Japan: Agenda for Cooperation, Tokyo, 27 November, 1996.

²⁰ Boisvert, Charles, Les relations de defense entre le Canada et la region de l’Asie-Pacifique, CANCAPS Bulletin, No. 19, (Nov 98)

²¹ Boutilier, James, Westploy 98: Old Seapower Anew, CANCAPS Bulletin, No. 19, (Nov 98)

²² Chessum, LCol S.H., Canada’s Defence Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region, briefing note prepared for DND/ADM(Pol), 23 Feb 98.

²³ Author unknown, Cooperation with Japan on a Peacekeeping Training Course in the ARF, May 1998.

²⁴ Chessum, LCol S.H., Canada-Japan Bilateral Defence Relations, briefing note prepared for DND/ADM(Pol), 03 Jun 98

²⁵ Acharya, 252; also Chan, Raymond Honourable. “Canada and Asia-Pacific”, Canada Among Nations 1997: Asia-Pacific Face-Off, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), 114.

²⁶ Author unknown, Canada - Efforts to Maintain Peace and Stability in Asia, May 1998.

wartime atrocities remains vivid among the Japanese population as well as in China, Korea, and the other nations where the atrocities were committed. The sovereignty of Japan is, in practical terms, guaranteed by the US security umbrella with large numbers of troops and equipment forward positioned on the Japanese homeland and throughout the Pacific region. The Japanese Self -Defense Forces, although large, modern and well equipped²⁷ by Canadian standards (see Fig 1), is a fraction of the size one might expect from a population and economic power the size of Japan's.²⁸ Constitutionally it is prohibited from conducting operations outside the territory of Japan²⁹. The 1990-91 Gulf War reignited the debate when it was perceived (accurately) that even though Japan's vital interests were at stake, Japan sent only money and refrained from risking Japanese troops. Even minor recent forays into peacekeeping, notably to Cambodia and the Golan Heights, were accomplished only after persistent resistance by pacifist factions at home.

	Canada	Japan	USA
Population (millions)	30	126	270
GDP (trillions)	0.4	3.0	8.0
Army (personnel)	30,000	180,000	500,000

Fig 1 Comparison of Three National Parameters³⁰

Japan's "neighbourhood" has its share of security concerns. China, though showing no current intent to threaten Japan, by its sheer mass constitutes a formidable potential. It seems inevitable that these two countries, giants in their own way, must eventually collide on military or economic planes. North Korea (PDRK) constitutes a more

²⁷ Dickson, James, *Japanese Security Policy in Historical Perspective*, circa 1998; also Speed, S.E., *Japanese Defence Policy and Armed Forces*, paper prepared for DND/ADM(Pol), 12 May 98

²⁸ Japan Fact Sheet, compiled by DFAIT, May 98.

²⁹ Dickson.

³⁰ CIA World Fact Book 1998

immediate and frightening threat. The leadership of N. Korea is in a desperate domestic situation as its economy is in collapse and its people starving; at the same time, this is a country that holds WMD. By the recent launch of a rocket over Japan, said to be carrying a communications satellite, N. Korea has demonstrated a worrisome potential to attack Japan virtually without warning. The very real possibility of an aggressive act of desperation, against which there is no reliable defence, has starkly focussed the security debate in Japan.

On a global perspective, Japanese security policy comes under another form of international pressure. As a member of the G-7 and (despite temporary setbacks) one of the economic leaders of the world, Japan is not seen as contributing its share of the burden of international peace support operations. This first came to world attention during the Persian Gulf War. The outcome of that conflict, pivoting as it did on the supply of Persian Gulf oil, was absolutely critical to Japanese national interests, and yet, Japan was not in a position due to aforementioned constitutional prohibitions, to send forces to join the US-led coalition. The burden was balanced in part by a large contribution of cash to the coalition war chest, but the inability to demonstrate national resolve by putting Japanese soldiers at risk when vital national interests are at play remains a significant weakness of Japanese security policy. Latterly, attempts have been made by Japan to start redressing this issue through tentative forays into UN peacekeeping operations. There has been the Japanese participation in the UNTAC (United Nations Transition Assistance Commission) mission in Cambodia and the, now almost three-year old, Japanese transport company in the Canadian logistics battalion on

the Golan Heights³¹. Seen as a good start, the value of these missions is still limited by the benign nature of the operational situations and their small size or short duration.

Contributions to international peacekeeping/peace support can be expected to grow, but change will not occur within a timeframe we are used to in the western democracies.

Japanese society and government depend heavily on establishing broad consensus before implementing change. Consultation takes time³².

Japanese security posture, is defined by two long-term elements: constitutional safeguards against any return to military imperialism; and the complementary binding, not to say suffocating, bilateral security arrangements with the US.

IV Benefits of Improving Canada/Japan Bilateral Security Ties

A significant change in a nation's security relationships is not to be taken lightly.

Security relations, by their very nature, imply a long-term commitment and can be expected to encumber considerable defence expenditures. Clearly both sides contemplating new arrangements must perceive distinct net advantages before committing to such a course of action.

What are the advantages for the sub-region? As stated above, the Northeast Asia sub-region has potential as a flashpoint in part due to the presence of a number of nuclear

³¹ Keyes, Valerie, UNDOF: Canadian and Japanese Participation, paper prepared for DND/ADM(Pol), 01 Jun 98.

³² Speed, S.E., Northeast Asian Strategic Environment, paper prepared for DND/ADM(Pol), 12 May 98

capable states which are arguably more likely than not to use the ultimate weapon in a moment of high crisis³³. The introduction of more balanced and varied bilateral agreements may serve to calm China by providing a negotiating partner that does not perforce bring China into confrontation with the US.³⁴

Another major player in the region is the UN (except for its presence as a figleaf in the Korea DMZ, as a humanitarian rather than security agency). Here too, the combination of a regional economic power and a second G-7 member who are willing to work together in regional preventive diplomacy or for the improvement of regional security, without the sometimes overwhelming presence of the US, should be seen as an enhancement of UN capabilities and a welcome innovation.

What are the advantages for Canada? The core Canadian interest is the promotion of national prosperity through trade. As mentioned above, our overwhelming primary market (80%) is with the US. This can continue to grow as long as the US economy is growing but is already too large a share of the Canadian economy dependent on one source. Diversification is a hedge against financial disaster. Our traditional second market, Europe, has slipped to third place and the potential for growth is stifled by the policy of the EU to favour its own member states. Japan is already our second most important trading partner. Just beyond lies the vast, growing, and as yet virtually

³³ Delvoie, Louis A. "Canadian and Asian Security: Still the Nukes", CANCAPS Bulletin, No 17, (May 98), 5-6.

³⁴ Ambassador Louis Delvoie in discussion with NSSC, CFC Toronto 5 Mar 99

untapped market of China and to the remainder of the Asia-Pacific region³⁵. Japan is a nation with great economic power but is dependent on trade to acquire raw materials. Canada is a country of vast raw materials. With trade and security inseparable, this is a further indication of compatibility between Japan and Canada³⁶

I have already used the word “diversification” with respect to a nation’s economy. It can apply as well to security postures. Both Canada and Japan separately enjoy extremely close security ties with the US; ties which are mutually beneficial in their own right. But over-dependence on one security partner is no wiser than over-dependence on one trading partner. While there is no doubt about the fidelity or efficacy of security relations with the US, too singular a relationship has at least three disadvantages: security thinking can stagnate as fewer new ideas are generated in relationships dominated by one partner; the smaller partner can become over-identified with the larger, reducing the former’s possibilities for independent action; and opportunities will be missed by not exploring new relationships.

For Canada the greatest advantage will be in opening routes into new markets and counterbalancing the weight of US influence in the Asia-Pacific region. In a bilateral arrangement with Japan, Canada would have some room for manoeuvre. Potential bilateral interventions, while not against US interests, could advance common interests without being perceived with the same suspicion of cultural or economic imperialism that

³⁵ Chan, Raymond Honourable. “Canada and Asia-Pacific”, Canada Among Nations 1997: Asia-Pacific Face-Off, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), 105-107.

is rightly or wrongly sometimes identified with US-led initiatives. Together Canada and Japan could undertake programmes of preventive diplomacy where the US is precluded because its presence may be seen as destabilizing or threatening. Canada and Japan can act together as non-threatening intermediaries to defuse a situation where a US presence might have the opposite effect. Thus, while gaining new markets, Canada can also contribute to regional stability and assist in the peaceful containment of China.

What are the advantages for Japan? The benefits to Japan of closer bilateral security arrangements with Canada lie mainly in the diversification of defence thinking; an opportunity to explore other options after a 50+ year “monogamous” relationship that has been stifling in some respects. Over dependence on one partner is intuitively imprudent. Development of a variety of bilateral agreements is a countervailing measure that may sharpen the sometimes wandering attention of the largest traditional partner (US). Bilateral and multilateral relationships have long been recognized as complementary activities³⁷. While retaining the US security guarantee, a second security partner would also allow Japan to increase its forays into the global security scene along new lines.

Another advantage of forming closer security ties with Canada is to gain access to Canada’s widely recognized experience and authority in multilateral relations and

³⁶ Buzan, Barry, “The Interdependence of Security and Economic Issues in the “New World Order,”” *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, Stubbs and Underhill, ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1994) 89-92

³⁷ Job, 7-10; also Acharya, 250.

international peace support operations³⁸. The Canada-Japan cooperation in UN operations in Cambodia and in the Golan is an example of this potential benefit.

For both countries, bilateral or multilateral security arrangements allow matters of mutual interest to be discussed in advance of a crisis allowing decisions to be taken more quickly when mutual interests are at stake.

To summarize this section, aside from the indirect economic potential for Canada, stronger security ties between Canada and Japan would be for their mutual benefit by providing an alternate forum to diversify from the existing strong US/Canada and US/Japan bilateral security arrangements.

V Potential Disadvantages to Improving Canada/Japan Bilateral Security Ties

Any change in long-term security arrangements must be managed carefully to ensure the anticipated advantages are achieved without net countervailing disadvantages. The only party that is likely to feel disadvantaged here is the US which might perceive a weakening on its influence over Canada, Japan or the region³⁹. Having said this, there are indications from US official sources, that a broadening of Japan's security relationships would not be unwelcome⁴⁰ as the US becomes more open to multilaterals. Any strengthening of Canada/Japan bilateral security arrangements is likely to be transparent

³⁸ Job and Langdon, C-24/32.

³⁹ Acharya, 236.

⁴⁰ Job and Langdon, C-21/32.

to most other states in the region or even seen as an improvement. Some states would welcome the opportunity to deal with Japan on security issues in the absence of the US and few would object to Canada. Even the “Trojan horse” effect of expanding economic relations using the door-opener of security or diplomatic discussions would be understood and appreciated.

Clearly the significant diplomatic challenge to establishing bilateral security ties between Canada and Japan will be in how such an initiative is perceived by the US. This need not be an insurmountable hurdle. The key is in demonstrating net benefit to the US as well. Both proposed partners would have to convince the US that this is not an attempt to supplant legitimate US interests in the region, or to strengthen regional opponents of the US. Neither Canada nor Japan is a credible rival to the US on the military front, but together they offer the potential for a non-threatening, US-independent voice for stability, democracy and liberal commerce in the Asia-Pacific region. With a renewed US interest in multilateralism, a Canadian initiative should be seen by the US as complementary to its own efforts. Perhaps the greatest hurdle for the US would be in accepting that allies are holding discussions on security issues to which the US is not privy. Rather than as a publicly contemplated infidelity in a long marriage, this should be seen more in the light of the process of (militarily) late-adolescent children making their first forays away from the home of an over-protective parent.

VI How to Achieve Canada/Japan Bilateral Security Ties

From the Canadian side, we will first have to deal with Canada's natural Atlantic bias and come around to the notion that our long-term future is in the Asia-Pacific, even at some relative expense to our ties with Europe. Over time this change of thinking will occur naturally, as our population becomes more and more of Asian origins and proportionately less European.

A far more difficult problem for Canada will be just getting noticed in the region. After extensive neglect and half-measures, only consistent effort over the long term will facilitate Canadian membership as a serious Asia-Pacific player. That the need to make the effort is recognized can be seen from published calls for increased Canadian diplomatic and security input to the Asia-Pacific region⁴¹.

It is more difficult to read Japanese intent and capacity for change. At the "Canada-Japan Symposium on Bilateral Peace and Security" held in Vancouver, 10-12 Sep 98, where the important Job-Nishahara "Canada-Japan Security Cooperation Study: Broadening the Agenda" was tabled, the Canadian participants were advised that this was the first time (since 1945) that Japan had come to a table to discuss security matters without the presence of a representative of the US. The significance of this statement cannot be over-emphasized. Any consideration of new security arrangements, not including the US, will enter the complex on-going debate in Japan of its imperialist history and its disastrous military exploits of a half-century ago.

At the same time, there has been a long growing pressure on Japan to shoulder more of the world's peace and security responsibilities commensurate with Japan's enormous economic power. The first tentative forays into the global arena have been made under UN auspices (Cambodia 1992, Golan Heights 1996) with commendable success. That there has not been more or faster progress towards expansion of this effort is an indication of the difficulty of the debate within Japan and the laboriousness of the consensus-building process so essential to Japanese society.

Let us say that over time Canada and Japan do establish formal and substantive bilateral security ties – what is the next step? The Asia-Pacific, by its diversity and history does not take easily to multilateral security regimes. The short life of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) would indicate some of the challenges. But times and conditions are changing dramatically. In existence only since 1994, ARF shows the potential to become a viable cooperative (vice collective) multilateral security forum⁴².

The potential of ARF may be better, but less diplomatically, understood if it were called the Asia-Pacific Treaty Organization (APTO). In parallel to the mildly derogatory or tongue-in-cheek explanation of the motivation for NATO (“keep the US in, keep the Soviet Union/Russia out, keep Germany down”), one could imagine an APTO designed to “keep the US in⁴³, keep China out, keep Japan down”. To carry the analogy a step further, it is useful to reflect on the differences between NATO of 1949 and NATO of 1999. Because China has not been overtly aggressive, rather than exclusion, China could

⁴¹ Job and Langdon, C-1/32.

⁴² Acharya, 240.

be offered a “partnership for peace” sort of arrangement with an APTO, which would help keep China engaged⁴⁴.

While the full potential of ARF may yet be realized, there are good reasons to advance Canada/Japan bilateral security ties now. Keeping in mind the extended timeframes involved with demographic change, economic growth, and a nation’s perception of itself, the following propitious conditions are in place or emerging:

- Canada’s changing demography makes it inevitable that Canadians will become more aware of the Asia-Pacific⁴⁵
- Japan is feeling the pressure to contribute more to global peace and security
- China is looking inward, for now, while building its economic strength.
- Issues in other parts of the globe, notably Balkans, India-Pakistan, Russia, terrorism, Monica and the international drug trade, are distracting the US. It feels secure in Asia-Pacific and shows interest only when there is a crisis.
- The Asia-Pacific region suffers many instances of compromised human security where the economic resources of Japan combined with the peace support and diplomatic skills of Canada could make a real difference.
- China and US favour bilateral over multilateral fora⁴⁶.
- The sub-region strategic environment is “benign” for now but cannot be expected to remain so indefinitely⁴⁷.

⁴³ Caron, 7.

⁴⁴ It is intriguing to contemplate the nature of such a broad multilateral security arrangement and what its specific goals would be; space anbe; s

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These opportunities are transitory. If not exploited before post-Cold War adjustments to relationships have solidified⁴⁸, Canada will see itself with only a small piece of the vast future Asia-Pacific market⁴⁹ (and little opportunity for growth elsewhere), a dissatisfied domestic ethnic Asian community, no influence with the economic and military powers that will rival the US, and little ability to influence human security issues in densely populated part of the globe.

VII Conclusion

This paper has shown how the strategic situation of the Northeast Asia-Pacific sub-region offers opportunities and partners for Canada to reorient its peace and security efforts to a part of the world where there is a great need for Canadian skills and the potential of earning a share of the immense economic prosperity to come. Japan, a country with an established democratic ethic and vast economic power is a natural partner for Canada in advancing the ideals of human security in the sub-region. There is a need to move quickly, to establish relationships and influence before the opportunities represented by a disinterested US and a dormant China have gone by.

⁴⁶ Acharya, 245.

⁴⁷ Speed, S.E., Northeast Asian Strategic Environment, paper prepared for DND/ADM(Pol), 12 May 98.

⁴⁸ Job and Langdon, C-2/32.

⁴⁹ Job and Langdon, C-8/32 and C-14&15/32.

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