Research essay

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND HUMAN SECURITY-
UN INTERVENTIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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The dust had barely settled from the collapsed Berlin wall, when President George Bush

proclaimed the dawning of a "new world order". After some forty years of going about

their daily lives under the constant threat of a mutually assured nuclear holocaust, and

watching the clock forever on the brink of midnight, world citizens were now told things

would be different. Freed from the restraints imposed by the bipolar world, nations, and

most importantly the United Nations, would now have the manouevering room to address

other pressing issues which had in the past been relegated to the "back burner".

To its credit, the United Nations quickly took on the world leadership role for

which it had been designed and which it has been prevented from exercising due to the

grid-locked Security Council. Passing a series of resolutions, the international

organization found itself immersed in multiple and concurrent activities. Consequently,

the issue of multilateral intervention became increasingly critical in global politics and

national and international foreign policies of the UN and its member nations.

There are those who would argue that adherence to the concept of state

sovereignty is outmoded due to a myriad of factors and serves to only impede and stymie

quick and justified action. Supporters of this view believe that sovereignty has been

replaced by a broader collective decision-making framework based on "human security".

In other words, an international system founded on the primacy of the state has been

replaced by one representing a "community of citizenries."[1] It might appear, based on

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[1] Robert H. Jackson, "International Community Beyond the Cold War," Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention, eds. Gene M. Lyons and Micheal Mastanduno (Baltimore, John Hopkins UP:1995) 69.

the increase in UN activity in the post-cold war environment, that foreign policies of member states have been elevated to a higher moral plane.

UN interventions in intra-state conflicts based on humanitarian concerns have led to difficult and complex situations on the ground. Conversely, UN intervention has also on occasion been conspicuous by its absence. Basing foreign policy and intervention on the concept of "human security" unquestionably has significant appeal. Given the number of intra-state conflicts the world is experiencing, can the UN realistically implement such a policy? Has the UN created heightened expectations for itself and is it making unrealistic demands of major powers, primarily the Unites States?

This paper will explore the validity of "human security" as a motive for intervention relative to the sovereignty of nation-states. The argument will be made that this approach, although founded in good intentions, has not been applied with consistency. The prime reason is that sovereignty has not yet been supplanted by a global citizenry and the national interests of sovereign nations remain the most important factor in implementing foreign policy.

To develop this argument, the legal framework for sovereignty and humanitarian intervention in intra-state conflict will first be examined. UN interventions in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda will then be reviewed to identify complications and contradictions. Finally, human security will be discussed from a Canadian perspective.

Human Security and Intervention

It is perhaps useful to begin with a review of the definition of intervention. Interventions can take various forms and can be placed on a scale of magnitude, as some forms of intervention are less intrusive to state sovereignty than others. For example, initiating an arms embargo is a relatively more benign form of intervention than a peace enforcement operation imposed on a state experiencing civil war.[2] The types of intervention implied in this paper are as described by William Durch. He defines the purpose of humanitarian intervention to "…relieve suffering in the midst of an ongoing conflict…" and peace enforcement operations as "…coercive means to suppress conflict and create a…cease-fire and facilitate negotiations among local belligerents, or to protect non-combatant populations facing a general collapse of governance...".[3]

The past decade has witnessed a significant debate on the issue of intervention in the post-cold war context. This debate has been engaged on many levels: legal versus moral, international law versus civil rights, realism versus Wilsonianism, sovereignty versus humanitarian intervention. One of the main reasons this debate has gained prominence is that the concept underlying "security" has changed.[4] During the cold war, security was defined in terms of maintaining bipolar stability. The superpowers' involvement in international situations was assessed as being either stabilizing or

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[2] For a comprehensive list of various forms of interventions, see Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, eds. Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (Cambridge, American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 1993) 66-68.
[3] William J. Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s," UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch. (New York, St Martin's Press: 1996) 4,6.
[4] Andrew F. Cooper, "Questions of Sovereignty: Canada and the Widening International Agenda," Behind the Headlines, 50.3 (Spring 1993): 2. A second major reason is the enhanced involvement of the UN in world affairs, which is explored later in the paper.

destabilizing. In Canadian terms, our involvement in UN efforts was with the intent of precluding increased superpower tension or escalation.[5]

In today's environment, other complex areas not previously associated with international peace and stability are now included under the umbrella of security: nonproliferation, environmental degradation, human rights, elections, social justice and economic development.[6] In other words, the term 'security' in today's context "is as much about the protection of individuals as it is about the defense of the territorial integrity of states. 'Human security,' thus understood, is at least as much prejudiced by major intrastate conflict as it is by interstate conflict."[7] In a Canadian context, Mr Axworthy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, described human security as:

> Much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights. This concept of human security recognizes the complexity of the human environment and accepts that forces influencing human security are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.[8]

This new perspective on security would then seem to provide a window of justification for military intervention on grounds other than purely national interest. This new approach, built on the recognition of the primacy of the rights of individuals rather states, could open the door to greater peacekeeping and peacemaking operations on humanitarian grounds: "The assumptions contained in the soft power suite are mutually

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[5] Louis A. Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales," unpublished paper, CFCSC, 1998, 5-6.

[6] Robert A. Pastor, "Forward to the Beginning: Widening the Scope for Global Collective Action," Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, eds. Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (Cambridge, American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 1993) 138.

[7] Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and intra-state Conflict," Foreign Policy, 96 (1994): 9.

[8] Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: the need for Leadership," International Journal, 52.2 (Spring, 1997) 184.

overlapping and mutually supporting: human security is a global mandate with almost limitless potential for military commitment."[9]

A review of the literature leads to the conclusion that intervention is rather a political question more so than a purely legal question.[10] However, discussions about the merits and validity of intervention can not be made without a grasp of the concept of sovereignty.

Although sovereignty began in the feudal period, the 1648 treaty of Westphalia is identified as a major milestone in the development of the notion of supremacy of the nation-state:

> That international system was initially centered in Europe and was premised on the idea that states were the central actors. All member states were to be regarded as juridically equal, and their sovereignty was to be regarded as absolute. The assumption was that states would maintain domestic order within their borders and command the resources necessary to conduct effective relations with other states outside their own jurisdiction.[11]

In assessing the endurance of sovereignty in the modern context, Schachter discusses sovereignty in relativist rather than absolutist terms in four key areas of self-rule.[12] One is the relation between the state and the individual. Whereas states have significant jurisdiction in the area of human rights, an obligation to meet international expectations in terms of norms does exist. Notwithstanding, human rights continue to derive from the state.

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[9] Dean Oliver, "Soft Power and Canadian Defence," <u>The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Strategic Datalink</u>, Strategic Datalink # 76 (February, 1999) 3.
[10] Marc Trachtenberg, "Intervention in Historical Perspective," <u>Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention,</u> eds. Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (Cambridge, American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 1993) 29.
[11] Gene M. Lyons and Micheal Mastanduno, "Introduction: International Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Future of International Society," <u>Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention</u>, eds. Gene M. Lyons and Micheal Mastanduno (Baltimore, John Hopkins UP:1995) 5-6.
[12] Oscar Schachter, "Sovereignty and Threats to Peace," <u>Collective Security in a Changing world</u>, ed. Thomas G. Weiss (Boulder, Lynne Rienner: 1993) 25-26.

Consequently, although human beings are prior to states in theory and in history, whatever standing the community of humankind enjoys in practice and thus in reality nowadays usually depends on the willingness and ability of state leaders to recognize and respect human rights.[13]

Second is the choice of government system and leadership. Nation-states have sole jurisdiction as to their internal type of government structure. A third aspect of sovereignty is the right to exploit natural resources. With the exception of environmental impact on neighbouring regions, this area remains a principle of sovereignty. Finally, national security and arms remains within the jurisdiction of sovereign states. Schachter concludes:

> These comments on the relativity of sovereignty confirm that the…notions of absolute sovereignty are remote from present conceptions and practice. But they do not show that sovereignty has lost its political and legal significance…Obviously, changing conditions and values affect its application, but it would be a mistake to conclude that they have removed its strong hold on the international system.[14]

Given this position on state sovereignty, another argument takes on relevance, although it may appear rather self-evident. States are ultimately sovereign by default. That is, they are "not part of a larger constitutional arrangement", and hence are the ultimate unit of sovereignty.[15] As for the UN, it remains an international organization rather than a supra-national organization.

Having examined the current state of sovereignty, the countervailing view highlighting the diminishing relevance of sovereignty and emphasizing the increasing weight of human security will be explored. In the words of Chopra and Weiss,

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[13] Jackson, 63.

[14] Schachter, 27.

[15] Nicholas Onuf, "Intervention for the Common Good," Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention, eds. Gene M. Lyons and Micheal Mastanduno (Baltimore, John Hopkins UP:1995) 61.

"sovereignty is a legal fiction that continues to evolve."[16] The main objections bringing into question the continued value in recognizing the sanctity of sovereignty is the emerging constituency of humanity, principally as individual human beings. Jackson highlights the growing list of achievements in the realm of declarations and conventions providing a legal basis for recognition and enforcement of fundamental rights.[17] The ultimate argument brought forward is that "natural law" has precedence over "positivism". Whereas a positivist view asserts that, as stated earlier, human rights derive their authority from the state itself, hence confirming the supremacy of the state, the view of natural law is that the status of human rights is superior to sovereignty.[18]

Reinforcing this approach, technological advances are cited as the main thrust behind the rapidly evolving view of the shared and common interests of mankind. "The exclusivity and inviolability of state sovereignty are increasingly mocked by global interdependence."[19] As examples of the transformation of the world into a global community are listed transportation, the world-wide threat of the nuclear proliferation, satellite communication and sensors, interconnectedness, a global economy and shared concerns over areas such as health, the environment and human rights.[20]

Increasingly, and aided by technology, non-state actors have imposed themselves upon the concept of sovereignty, or simply disregarded it. Non-Government Organizations (NGO) have increasingly injected themselves into emergency relief

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[16] Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Sovereignty is no Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention," Ethics and International Affairs, 6 (1992): 102.
[17] Jackson, 68. Jackson includes in his list of the codification of human rights: the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal (1946), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Geneva Conventions (1949), the European Conventions on Human Rights (1950), the UN Human Rights Covenants (1966), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), and the Helsinki Final Act (1975).
[18] Chopra, 111.
[19] Chopra, 104.
[20] Chopra, 104.

situations, sometimes without the consent of the recipient nation.[21] Emphasizing this

point, The International Committee of the Red Cross was given observer status at the UN

General Assembly in October, 1990.[22]

However, one failure of the transnational model is that it requires an overarching

global construct to control and enforce the multilateral environment. This would require

nations to divest themselves of an important level of state sovereignty to a higher

authority.[23] How such an organization could ensure enforcement remains a major

dilemma.

Those who argue against the continued relevance of sovereignty and who trumpet

the emergence of human security as the increasingly dominant factor, strongly advocate

for increased intervention, particularly in intra-state conflicts, on the grounds of

providing humanitarian assistance. Hence, according to Chopra and Weiss, this issue is

not whether it is legally appropriate to violate sovereignty on humanitarian grounds, but

rather, of providing safeguards so that states do not intervene on such grounds while

hiding ulterior motives.[24] This is certainly the concern of nations in the third world, who

view such actions on the part of the UN could be a pretext for "Trojan horse" intervention

by the Western powers.[25]

> One can forgive the developing world for looking askance at the debate over the
> legitimacy of intervention. For many, this conjures up the still fresh ghosts of
> colonialism. The unequal power distribution within the UN Security Council
> remains an issue of contention, particularly with respect to matters of

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[21] Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra, "Sovereignty Under Siege: From Intervention to Humanitarian Space," Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention, eds. Gene M. Lyons and Micheal Mastanduno (Baltimore, John Hopkins UP:1995) 112.
[22] Chopra, 105.
[23] Justin Cooper, "The State, Transnational Relations, and Justice: A Critical Assessment of Competing Paradigms of World Order," Sovereignty at the Crossroads? Morality and International Politics in the Post-Cold War era, ed. Luis E. Lugo (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield: 1996) 12.
[24] Chopra, 97.
[25] Weiss, 87.

intervention, which could understandably be perceived as meddling in the internal affairs of the recipient country.[26]

Another difficulty with the notion of human security is its inconsistent application. Foreign policy or UN intervention based on moral principles would require uniformity of resolve, irrespective of national interests.[27] This approach poses a significant challenge for the international community. As will be seen in the cases which will be reviewed below, consistent international enthusiasm for contribution and involvement has certainly not been in evidence in the post-cold war era.

The wariness expressed by the third world and the inconsistent performance of the UN are simply manifestations of the inherent contradiction within the international organization. The fact that the UN is constructed of nation-states with self-interests can be at odds with the broader humanitarian intentions of the UN. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the area of intervention.

 The Charter is fairly direct in addressing nation sovereignty in Articles 2(4) and 2(7). In the case of the former Article: "[I]f acts are hostile in intention and substantial in scale - enough to affect a state's "territorial integrity and political independence," and thus its sovereignty - they are proscribed." There are no specific references to intervention in the Charter. However Article 2(7) specifically precludes intervention in a

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[26] Virginia Gamba, "Justified Intervention? A View From the South," Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, eds. Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (Cambridge, American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 1993) 118-119. The UN intervention on the heels of the Gulf War to save the Kurds from Iraqi attacks is a case in point. Even this intervention, for legitimate humanitarian purposes, appears to have been less than ardently embraced by the world community, reflecting the third-world malaise with the concept of intra-state intervention. The resolution was passed by a margin of ten votes, with China and India abstaining. Arguably, the impetus for international involvement was to some extent the result of the momentum garnered as a result of the unequivocal Gulf War victory and the terms of the cease-fire which had created safe areas and no-fly zones in Iraq. The question must be asked whether this massive intervention into Iraq on behalf of the Kurds, who had been suffering at the hands of Turkey and Iraq for some time, would have occurred were it not for the Gulf War victory. See Chopra, 95.
[27] Chopra, 113.

member's domestic affairs.[28] To summarize the Charter position on intervention, "[I]n the jurisprudential logic of the UN Charter, nonintervention is the norm, and intervention is what must be justified."[29]

Countervailing the primacy of sovereignty in the Charter, the Secretary General's view on intervention as a result of the perception of greater opportunities for involvement following the end of the cold war clearly shows the difficulty and the rationale for increased intervention. In his 1992 report to the Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace,* Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali highlighted his expectations for the future purpose of the UN. Reference is made to the issue of human security and the wider mission for the organization. One of the major roles identified is peacemaking, to resolve issues which have led to conflict.[30] It is noteworthy that the state is identified as the "foundation-stone" of the UN, and the need for respect of sovereignty and integrity is emphasized, with the caveat that absolute and exclusive sovereignty is no longer appro32.Tm8no loeo2Tmt4and2 39olv3iteworthy31T0 1 Tf0.0038 Tc 0 Tw 898 0 0 7.98 215.64 659.27997

intervention, "humanitarian assistance shifts from being a potential violation of sovereign rights to being a safeguard for fundamental human rights."[33]

The UN has been able to circumvent the Charter's objective of upholding state sovereignty, when in the interest of humanitarian intervention. This has been done by describing a desired intervention in terms of " a threat to international peace and security", thus triggering article 42 of the Charter.[34]

Exercising her newfound flexibility, the United Nations undertook an unprecedented level of activity in the early period of the post-cold war period. Between January, 1987, and January, 1996, the United Nations passed one hundred and five resolutions under Chapter VII.[35] Of even greater significance, a large number of the more recent UN interventions have dealt with intra-state conflicts. Between 1988 and 1994, thirteen of twenty-one interventions involved such internal conflicts.[36]

In reading the foregoing, one might deduce that the current trend is towards greater emphasis on human security. However, viewing the range of possible

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[33] Weiss, 88.

[34] William J. Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s," UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch. (New York, St Martin's Press: 1996) 5. This was the case, for example in S.C. Resolution 770 adopted in August, 1992, regarding Bosnia Herzegovina. The resolution stated "*Recognizing* that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a threat to international peace and security…" with the motive being humanitarian intervention. The resolution invokes Chapter VII and requests, among other actions: "2. *Calls upon* States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina;…". See The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, ed James mayall (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1996) 185-186. Article 42 states: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."

[35] Jerzy Ciechanski, "Enforcement Measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: UN Practice after the Cold War," The UN, Peace and Force, ed. Micheal Pugh (London, Frank Cass: 1997) 82. This is in direct contrast to the cold war track record of the UN. Between 1946 and 1986, only eight Chapter VII resolutions were passed.

[36] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace 1995 (New York, United Nations: 1995) 7.

intervention responses as a continuum between full respect for a nation-states'

sovereignty and total disregard for sovereignty in a humanitarian intervention is perhaps

more appropriate.   Nation-states will respond based on their national interest, the extent

the situation affects their human security values and the extent they view their own

sovereignty as being sacrosanct.

Where then, has this surge of post-cold war activity taken the UN?   To gain an

appreciation for the variety of UN sanctioned interventions since 1990 and to assess the

extent to which concerns over sovereignty or human security have dominated the

decision-making process, three cases will be examined: the Gulf War, the former

Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.

Case studies: the Gulf War, Yugoslavia and Rwanda

The Gulf war was not a UN response to an intra-state conflict, but rather was a

response to the flagrant violation of Kuwait's sovereignty by Iraq. A clear-cut violation

of Article 2 of the UN Charter, the Iraq aggression would appear to have constituted, on

the surface, an unquestionable circumstance for UN intervention. Iraq's invasion

presented the first situation in the post-cold war era where the UN was challenged to

respond to naked aggression, and indeed resulted in the first such intervention since the

Korean War. [37]   However, closer examination is warranted to discern the true

motivations behind this monumental coalition effort.

The Gulf War was a resounding success for only one reason: the U.S. perceived a

significant threat to its national interests and reacted accordingly. U.S. involvement in

the Gulf War was unparalleled for its size and rapidity. The U.S. contributed some

500,000 troops, deployed in a six-month period, compared to approximately 240,000 for the remainder of the many coalition partners.[38]

Although viewed as a U.N.-sanctioned intervention founded on a formidable coalition, the resolve was the result of major lobbying and pressure from the U.S. for the four months following the Iraq invasion. While President Bush carried out his "telephone diplomacy", Secretary of State baker personally visited world leaders. The resolutions passed by the Security Council gave international legitimacy to an American-driven policy, while the coalition, which included major Arab states, allowed the American buildup on Arab territory and eventual attack of Iraq. UN resolutions were deemed critical, as they would legitimize any military action contemplated by the US, would help keep the coalition together, and perhaps most importantly, would provide justification for American involvement in the Gulf in the eyes of the U.S. public.[39]

That the U.S. response was based on self-interest, as opposed to concerns of Kuwait sovereignty, is beyond doubt. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August, 1990, the U.S. concern was not so much with violation of Kuwait's sovereignty as with the growing fear due to Iraqi signals that Saudi Arabia could rapidly face the same fate.[40] Saudi Arabia was of strategic importance to the U.S., being its main conduit

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[37] Jackson, 71.

[38] William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains (Boston, Harvard Business School: 1992) 11-12. The United States deployed approximately 560,000 personnel compared to Saudi Arabia's contribution of 110,000, for example.

[39] Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis (New York, John Wiley and Sons: 1991) 237-239. As a result of intense lobbying, an initial Security Council resolution was unanimously passed a few weeks after the Iraqi invasion imposing a worldwide embargo on Iraq. See Sciolino, 223. This was followed with the first UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force since the Korean War which was passed by a vote of 12 to 2 on 29 November, 1990, with only Yemen and Cuba voting against, and China abstaining. In the aftermath, Baker intimated this would be the "most expensive vote [Yemen] ever cast." A program of over $70 million dollars in foreign aid to Yemen was immediately cancelled and was subsequently omitted from the 1992 budget.

[40] Sciolino, 217-218. In the weeks immediately preceding the invasion, State Department spokespersons were evasive about whether the United States would assist Kuwait if attacked, noting instead the lack of

to the Arab world. A second and equally critical aspect of national interest was oil.

Strategically, the potential control of a significant amount of the world's oil supply by

such an unstable dictator as Saddam Hussein could not be tolerated. Shortly after the

invasion, President Bush was quoted as saying to Defense Department staff that "our

jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the

world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of

that one man, Saddam Hussein."[41]

Undoubtedly, issues other than national interest came into play for some nations.

Were the UN not able to respond effectively to such a blatant disregard for international

conventions now that it had unfettered ability to do so, the worth of the UN Charter

would certainly come into question. Hence, this crisis presented a challenge for the

multilateral organization in which middle powers such as Canada had invested a

significant amount of hope and effort. Was collective security, as defined within the UN

Charter, just a whimsical ideal?

Despite this additional concern, it is suggested that U.S. resolve in the face of its

national interest being jeopardized was the only factor which allowed the success of the

Gulf War to occur. Cloaked in the legitimacy of the UN resolutions, the U.S. was able to

proceed with its agenda. In the final analysis, neither concern for the sovereignty nor

human security of the Kuwaitis proved a significant factor for the U.S. The magnitude

of the effort in terms of cost and military capability clearly shows what can be done in

response to threats to national interest.

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defense or security treaties or commitments with that country. See Sciolino, 179. Further evidence
suggests that it was only when Saddam Hussain turned his eyes towards Saudi Arabia that the U.S. became
nervous. Even as late as January, 1990, a mere six months before the invasion of Kuwait, a presidential

As the second case to be examined, the situation which evolved in the Balkan crisis stands in stark contrast to the Gulf War. Whereas UN intervention, and in particular the U.S. response, were decisive, swift and massive in dealing with Iraq, the complete opposite was evidenced in the case of the former Yugoslavia.

In a very palpable and tragic sense, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is the embodiment of the classic intellectual debate between the supremacy of sovereign states or the rights of a people to self-determination. That is, should the authority of the nation of Yugoslavia take precedence, or should the rights of the ethnic minorities within the country be legitimized. Misconceptions of this extremely complex situation, coupled with incessantly conflicting signals and policies from all actors, caused the escalation of the conflict into a civil war or an inter-state war, depending on one's perspective and agenda.

The events that unfolded in the early 1990s were neither unpredictable nor unexpected. In general terms, the developments which escalated to all-out war can be attributed to three elements: U.S. lack of commitment in the critical early stage, the European Union's (EU) miscalculation of the crucial issues involved, and UN impotence in implementing both a more comprehensive policy and the resolutions it passed. Each of these elements will be explored.

Clearly, the U.S. position in the 1990 to 1992 period and beyond was to avoid commitment to the Balkan crisis. Put simply, the national interests of the major western powers were not at stake:

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order was signed by George Bush advocating increased trade with Iraq couched in terms of "national interest". This, despite worrisome signals of Hussein's erratic and disturbing behaviour. See Sciolino, 173.

…the progress of arms reductions talks, achievement of parity, and Soviet leader Gorbachev's "new thinking" on foreign policy had rendered Yugoslavia's independence of Moscow, heavily armed neutrality, and political stability - key elements in NATO's containment policy since 1949 - irrelevant to U.S. vital national interests.[42]

In the summer of 1990, ambivalent signals were sent by the U.S. which supported maintaining Yugoslavian integrity but not by use of force.[43] Further, the policy of not committing troops on the ground until a political settlement was obtained limited the U.S. role to that of negotiator.[44]

The European approach to the deteriorating situation led to ambiguity, mixed signals and major contradiction with the U.S. Prior to hostilities in the summer of 1990, a window of opportunity presented itself for leadership and intervention in support of more moderate voices in Yugoslavia.[45] Moreover, lack of European financial support compounded the problem:

> The EC had ignored the origins of the conflict - the economic decline, market reforms, and quarrels over the political reform necessary to them - and had accepted the representation of the conflict and possible solutions posed by nationalist governments in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia.[46]

In the area of sovereignty, standard conventions were discarded in the face of national interests of the various European actors. Rather than provide strong support to the nation-state of Yugoslavia, Germany's determination to promptly, and some would

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[41] Scioliono, 234.

[42] Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, The Brookings Institute: 1995) 150.

[43] William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Faultines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, ed. William J. Durch. (New York, St Martin's Press: 1996) 200.

[44] Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, "Former Yugoslavia," The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, ed James mayall (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1996) 81.

[45] Woodward, 152.

[46] Woodward, 169. As an example, following Yugoslav army (JNA) action in Slovenia in July, 1991, the EC suspended close to $1 billion in economic aid and initiated an arms embargo against Yugoslavia, with the concurrence of the U.S. See Woodward, 168.

say prematurely, recognize Slovenia and Croatia significantly complicated the situation and markedly reduced the available options and flexibility for resolution of the conflict. The position of Germany was in direct contrast to that of the U.S., further confusing the issue.[47]

The German position on the Balkan situation was also determined based on issues of national interest. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's pre-emptive announcement of German support for the sovereignties of Slovenia and Croatia were calculated to garner public support at home. Itself in the midst of unification based on the principle of self-determination, Germany could not do otherwise than support the same principle with regard to the Slovenians and Croatians.[48]

The UN effort was separate and disjointed from the EC initiatives, and also fell far short of the requirement. It became evident early on in the crisis that the UN had concluded this was a European problem, and had deferred its responsibility to the EC. This was in fact promoted by France and Germany, who were keen that the new Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) concept of the EC could be put in action in resolving this crisis. [49] This stood in glaring contrast to the leadership role the Security Council, prompted by the U.S., had shown in the Gulf War.

 A comparison of the Security Council resolutions for the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis leads to the conclusion that national interests dictated different responses.

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[47] Durch & Schear, 205. By insisting on recognition of the internal boundaries of the former Yugoslavia as new inter-state boundaries, the ethnic realities on the ground were disregarded, thus assuring further instability. In other words, between reinforcing the Yugoslav federation as a sovereign entity or supporting the right to self-determination of the ethnic minorities within the country, Germany chose neither, instead legitimizing former state boundaries. Of course, legitimizing ethnic groups as internationally-recognized sovereign entities posed a major concern for the Western powers. Endorsing such an approach, if applied with consistency to other nations, could lead to secession of the Scots, the Basques, and could even find application to the Quebec question. See Woodward, 187-189. See also Durch & Schear, 204.
[48] Woodward, 184-185.

The Gulf resolution 678 of 29 November, 1990, employed the phrase "all necessary means", and was considered sufficient to legitimize coalition liberation of Kuwait. In contrast, Bosnia-Herzegovina resolution 770 of 13 August, 1992, included the phrase "all measures necessary", resulted in nothing more than a hollow threat, unsupported by any actual application of force.[50]

The UN policy approach can be summed up as one of "containment with charity."[51] However, the neutrality of the UN humanitarian aid could not be upheld. Given the nature of the conflict, any assistance provided to victims was perceived as favoritism by the other side.[52] Adding to the frustration and the ineffectiveness of the UN mandate, more than half of the aid went to the support of soldiers.[53] Basing the UN response on humanitarian grounds alone could not work:

> …humanitarianism is rarely sufficient motive for sustained political action or effective policy…Moreover, this was false humanitarianism. Channeling moral concerns into humanitarian relief while refusing to confront the political causes of the conflict (both within the country and among foreign powers) was creating more war, more casualties, and more need for humanitarian assistance.[54]

To conclude, the policies of the U.S. and the E.U. with regards to the Balkans were based primarily upon concerns of national interest, or the lack of it. The absence`of concerted political resolve inevitably impacted on the success of the operation: "[a] weak

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[49] Economides, 65.

[50] Economides, 72. As the crisis wore on, and the UN undertook a greater role, increased use of force was unquestionably called for. However, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia was not authorized to implement the peace plan by force. The nations interpreted resolution 770 to imply use of force for self-protection and protection of humanitarian relief convoys only. It was only in end-March, 1993, that the UN finally passed a resolution endorsing use of force to impose compliance in the no-fly zones over Bosnia. See Economides, 72,75, and Durch & Schear, 222. For more detail on the Resolution 770, see footnote 33 above.

[51] Woodward, 320.

[52] As but one example, "…Croatia was extremely unhappy about what seemed like international validation of the enclaves captured by Serb forces in Croatia as a result of the positioning of the UNPROFOR forces around those specific enclaves." See Economides, 75-76. Other manipulations included taking of UN hostages and drawing the UN into the line of fire. See Durch & Schear, 253.

[53] Woodward, 319.

and divided international response to a conflict will always breed a cautious, risk-averse field operation."[55] The notion of sovereignty, as it should have applied to the Yugoslav Federation, was set aside. Intervention on the basis of human security was insufficient to positively affect the outcome. Falling back on humanitarian assistance, the UN fuelled the problems, prolonging the conflict. Dealing uni-dimensionally with the humanitarian issue could not hope to resolve the larger political, economic and ethnic problems. The UN effort in the Balkans had become the costliest peacekeeping mission in history.[56] This prompted Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to complain that the UN Security Council was concerned in disproportionate fashion with problems of the western world, to the detriment of major crises in the third world – notably Africa.[57]

The Gulf War stands as an example of what can be done when national interests, notably that of the U.S., converge in the UN forum. The UN / EU response to the Yugoslavia disintegration demonstrated how conflicting national interests, and disinterest on the part of the U.S., resulted in mediocre and unsatisfactory results. The following case, the Rwanda crisis, remains the most poignant example of international apathy and the complete failure of the concept of human security in deference of national interests.

UNAMIR, the UN Assistance Mission In Rwanda, deployed beginning in October, 1993, under the command of a Canadian, Major-General Dallaire. With an eventual force size of 2500 troops, their mission was to ensure implementation of the

[54] Woodward, 325.
[55] William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Faultines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," <u>UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s</u>, ed. William J. Durch. (New York, St Martin's Press: 1996) 254.
[56] Woodward, 329.
[57] Economides, 76.

August, 1993, Arusha peace accord signed between the Rwandan Government Army

(RGA), comprised of Hutu, and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), comprised of Tutsi.[58]

In January, 1994, the Force Commander advised UN Headquarters in New York

of information indicating the Hutu were planning a massive slaughter of Tutsi in Kigali,

the nation's capital, that caches of weapons were being stockpiled, and requested

authority to use force to confiscate the weapons.[59]   The response highlights the UN's

strong determination to remain impartial at all costs, in deference to sovereignty:

> …such action went beyond the UNAMIR mandate…that the responsibility for the
> maintenance of law and order must remain with the local authorities and that,
> while UNAMIR could assist in arms recovery operations, it should avoid entering
> into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and to unanticipated
> repercussions.[60]

Within hours of the shooting down of an aircraft with the Presidents of Rwanda

and Burundi aboard on 6 April, 1994, a well-orchestrated slaughter of Tutsis and Hutu

moderates began in Kigali.[61]   Unchecked, the genocide which rapidly unfolded in April,

May and June, 1994, resulted in between 500,000 and one million deaths.   With its lack

of mandate and authority as well as low numbers, UNAMIR could do little other than

watch and attempt to protect a few civilians.

 By 20 April, the UNAMIR contingent had been reduced from over 2100 to 1500

troops due to the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent and others.[62]   The situation was

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[58] The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996 (New York, UN Dept of Information: 1996) 25,28. Of note, the largest troop-contributing nation to the force was Bangladesh, with well over 900 soldiers.   See The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, 42.
[59] This was not an idle threat, as the Hutu had on previous occasions in 1962 and 1973 massacred large numbers of Tutsi. See Steven Metz, Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Learning From Rwanda (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute: 1994) 4-5.
[60] The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, 32.
[61] The aircraft was near Kigali airport when downed. It is suspected that a shoulder-fired missile from Kigali was the weapon used. Hutu radicals dissatisfied with the Rwandan President's moderate approach likely were responsible. Both Presidents were killed. See Steven Metz, 7.
[62] Shortly after the killings had begun, on 7 April, ten Belgian peacekeepers and the incumbent Prime Minister they were assigned to protect were murdered by the Hutu RGA. Reminiscent of the American

getting desperate. Within one month of the beginning of the killings, some 200,000

people had been killed, mostly Tutsi. Further, approximately one and one half million

people had been displaced.[63] Previous requests for Security Council intervention by the

Secretary General had gone unheeded.[64]

The Secretary-General developed three options for the Security Council's

consideration: the first was a massive increase of several thousand troops to the

UNAMIR contingent and a more robust mandate under Chapter VII, the second would

entail a UNAMIR reduction to some 270 personnel with the only objective of attempting

to broker a cease-fire, and the third was an outright termination of the UNAMIR

mandate.   The options presented by the Secretary General on 20 April provided a clear

window of opportunity for action. Faced with the proposition to intervene in the context

of human security, the Council backed away and chose the second option. Presiding over

the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on

Africa, Honourable Harry Johnston explained the decision from an American

perspective: "[t]he vote at the United Nations Security Council to reduce the number of

UN peacekeepers from 2,500 to 270 demonstrates the urgent need for Africans to find an

African solution to their problems."[65]

Following further efforts by the Secretary-General, the Security Council

eventually approved a resolution on 17 May authorizing a new UNAMIR II consisting of

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reaction to the deaths of their military personnel in Somalia, the Belgian government decided to withdraw
on 12 April. See The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, 40-41.
[63] The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, 44-45.
[64] The Secretary General had kept the Security Council informed on a daily basis. On 8 April, less than two
days after the genocide had begun, the Force Commander's request for three additional battalions was
relayed. On 12 April, the Council was again urged to increase the size and mandate of the mission. See
The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, 39-40.

5500 troops and a new mandate, although surprisingly this would also be under Chapter VI. Incredibly, two months after the approval of the resolution in support of UNAMIR II, only 59 of the promised 5500 troops had been deployed.[66]

The position of the French government presents an interesting twist to the difficulty in obtaining commitment from the international community in this grim situation. On 20 June, the French government advised the Security Council they were prepared, along with Senegal, to contribute troops to assist in the crisis. This was swiftly approved[67] and troops were in theatre two days later. Operation Turquoise received a mandate under Chapter VII, although it was clear the mission was not under the command of the UN. Within little more than a week, some 2400 troops had been deployed by the French. While this shows what a greater power can accomplish when political will is present, the question arises as to why the French waited until the end of June to volunteer this rapid reaction force. By this time, the genocide of the Tutsi was ending, and the RPF Tutsi had made large gains, driving the Hutu towards Zaire. Historically, the French had been aligned with the Hutu majority, and had trained and armed the RGA.[68] Presumably, the French government had stood in the sidelines while the Tutsi genocide was ongoing, only to intervene when the Hutu were losing ground, to establish a protected area for their safety. This can only be perceived as taking national

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[65] United States of America, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives One Hundred Third Congress Second Session May 4, 1994, The Crisis in Rwanda (Washington, U.S. Gov't Printing Office: 1995) 1.
[66] The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, 58. Of these 5500 troops, 4400 were from eight African countries, 3000 of whom did not have equipment.
[67] Interestingly, the Security Council vote was 10 in favour, with 5 abstentions. See The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, 54.
[68] Patrick J. O'Halloran, Humanitarian Intervention and the Genocide in Rwanda (London: The Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism: 1995) 4.

interest to the extreme, and is only surpassed by the indifference of the international community.

Notwithstanding the paralysis within the UN, Canada made an important contribution to UNAMIR. In addition to providing the Force Commander and other personnel, a Canadian CC-130 Hercules was deployed in support to the UNAMIR force. Flying into Kigali daily, the CC-130 was for several months the only support for the UNAMIR troops. In two instances, Canadian aircraft were shot at. Once, small arms fire hit the tail of the aircraft on departure from Kigali. In the second, the Hercules made a hastened departure as it was being targeted by mortar fire on the Kigali ramp. In both these cases, CC-130 crews narrowly escaped. The loss of a Canadian CC-130 crew would likely have had the same negative effect in Canada as the death of American soldiers in Somalia did in the U.S., particularly given the ineffectiveness of the UN response to the overall crisis.

How could the international community have reacted with such aloofness in the face of a blatant human tragedy of unimaginable proportions?

Boutros-Ghali explains that "general fatigue" was in part the reason for the lack of action. He indicates that a total of 17 UN operations were ongoing in 1994.[69] This could certainly have been a contributing factor, but what then does this imply for the new international morality and human security? The previous discussion has suggested that Belgium and France acted primarily out of national interest. The same can be said for the U.S. Notwithstanding the freedom of action which the post-cold war era now provided,

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[69] The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, 50.

the U.S. had concluded it had no national interests in Africa.[70] Further, the U.S. had

learned a lesson in Somalia, which they were not likely to soon repeat.[71] In the House of

Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, things are clearly explained from an American

perspective by Congressman Engel:

> We look at the tragedy in Bosnia, and I have for a year and a half been trying to
> call attention to that tragedy, and we find 200,000 Bosnians have been killed
> during that conflict, over a year and a half. Sadly in Rwanda, we have nearly the
> same amount killed in just a month. A life is a life, and I think that the world
> community needs to engage…I believe that while the United States should not
> contribute ground troops to this unit, we should provide logistics and planning
> support.[72]

The U.S., and indeed the world community, was so concerned about being

embroiled in the Rwanda crisis, that officials went to great pains not to use the term

"genocide". Referring to the Rwanda massacre using that terminology would have

invoked the Genocide Convention, and required signatory states to intervene.[73]

Unquestionably, the lack of national interest and political will on the part of the

international community had devastating results in Rwanda. Where some interest was

shown, as on the part of France, the self-interest was incompatible with the concept of

human security. The Rwanda genocide stands as a stark example which serves to

highlight the inconsistency in the international community's view of human security as a

valid motive for intervention.

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[70] Walter LaFeber, <u>The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad – 1750 to the Present</u>, 2nd
ed. (New York, W.W. Norton & Co.: 1994) 772.
[71] In October, 1993, the armed gang of warlord Mohamed Fasar Aideed had downed an American
helicopter and killed several soldiers. The TV images of the U.S. soldiers' corpses being dragged in the
streets of Mogadishu precipitated the withdrawal of the 21,000 soldier force by March, 1994.
[72] United States of America, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs House of Representatives One Hundred Third Congress Second Session May 4, 1994, 10.
[73] Alain Destexhe, <u>Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century</u> (New York, N. Y. Univ. P.: 1995) 75-

The Canadian Perspective on Human Security and Intervention

Canada has a long-standing multilateralist tradition and depends fully on the

concept of collective security. The UN is unquestionably an extremely important

organization for Canada, which prides itself in having been involved in every

peacekeeping operation since the inception of the UN. The Pearsonian-inspired notion of

peacekeeping is very much ingrained in the Canadian self-identity. The end of the cold

war has, in the view of some policy makers and academics, provided an opportunity to

enhance the effectiveness of the UN and by extension, Canada's role in inter-state and

increasingly intra-state interventions, in the name of human security.

The 1994 White paper on Defense provides some insight on the potentially

broader implications for the Canadian Forces. The greater emphasis on involvement-

through the auspices of the UN is a reaction in some part to the media effect, and the

impact of public opinion:

> Even when Canada's interests are not directly engaged the values of Canadian
> society lead Canadians to expect their government to respond when modern
> communications technologies make us real-time witnesses to violence, suffering
> and even genocide in many parts of the world.[74]

This statement is tempered with the precondition that "[t]he design of all missions

should reflect certain key principles…in missions that involve Canadian personnel,

Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict."[75]

As mentioned earlier, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

has embraced the notion of human security. In the 1995 document "Canada in the

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states: "Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such
action…as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide."
[74] 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada: 1994) 6.

World", the three key objectives for Canadian foreign policy are cited as: "the promotion

of prosperity and employment, the protection of our security, within a stable global

framework, and the projection of Canadian values and cultures."[76] In further amplifying

the second objective, the protection of our security, it is clearly explained that security

must take on a larger connotation, with global reach. Describing shared human security,

one section concludes:

> All of this demands a broadening of the focus of security policy from its narrow
> orientation of managing state-to-state relationships, to one that recognizes the
> importance of the individual and society for our shared security.[77]

As explored earlier, the emphasis has shifted from the sovereign state to the

individual. Actively promoting this humanitarian agenda, the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy is advocating a new group of like-minded nations such as

Ireland, Switzerland and South Africa, which he proposes to call the H-8.[78] Explaining

his view of Canada's role in promoting human security, Minister Axworthy states:

> Canada has both the capacity and the credibility to play a leadership role in
> support of human security in the developing world…Canada must shape that debate if it
> wishes to continue to play an active role on the international stage. It is already actively
> engaged in this process in a number of key areas: peacebuilding; peacekeeping;
> disarmament, particularly the campaign against anti-personnel landmines; protecting the
> rights of children internationally; and promoting economic development through, in part,
> rules-based trade.[79]

The 1996 Canadian Forces deployment to Uganda in support of the Rwandan

refugees displaced in Zaire following the genocide is a case in point. Based on well-

intentioned determination not to allow a repetition of the 1994 Rwanda disaster, the

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[75] 1994 Defence White Paper , 29.
[76] Canada in the World: Government Statement (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995) 10.
[77] Canada in the World, 25.
[78] Bruce Wallace, "Axworthy's 'Soft Power'," Maclean's 13 Jul. 1998: 29.
[79] Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership," International Journal, 52.2 (Spring, 1997): 184-185.

Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, nominated Canada to act as lead contributing nation of a multinational force to alleviate the suffering in the Zairian refugee camps. With notice of less than one week, vanguard elements of the Joint Force Headquarters and reconnaissance parties deployed to Africa. Although the initial destination was Kigali, in Rwanda, the contingent had to settle for Kampala and Entebbe, in Uganda, as Rwanda Officials refused to cooperate with the UN force. The multi-national force could potentially have reached 13,000 in strength, including airlift elements. Ultimately, a large majority of the refugees returned to Rwanda shortly after the deployment began and the need for the mission had faded away.

Minister Axworthy cites this deployment to Uganda as an example of a peace building effort:

> Prime Minister Chrétien's intervention into the humanitarian emergency in the Great Lakes region of Africa demonstrated one of the most important prerequisites for effective peace building: the political will to move quickly to address situations of urgency.[80]

Several lessons were learned in this attempt to rapidly intervene in a crisis situation. The approval and support of the host nation, in this case Rwanda, was critical but could not be obtained. Second, deployments of a strategic nature require massive airlift and sea lift capability, which Canada does not possess. Other critical elements of major operations, such as intelligence and communications, can easily exceed Canada's capability, particularly in a leadership role. Finally, such operations require troops on the ground, which the international community will be reluctant to provide without first assessing the problem.

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[80] Lloyd Axworthy, 186-187.

For Canada, this attempt to implement our policy of human security without the explicit support of the U.S. proved almost impossible, and certainly would have been of questionable effectiveness. Ultimately, the concurrence and commitment of the world community, and specifically of the greater powers, is critical to allow such complex operations to be effective.

Conclusion

The concept of 'human security' has gained significant momentum since the end of the cold war. The imagined freedom afforded by the end of the bipolar stalemate has fuelled hopes that the UN could now get on with the job of making the world a more secure place. With the ability to intervene on humanitarian grounds, the UN could now at least mitigate the impact of, if not prevent, civil wars.

As it is derived from a moral basis, the validity of human security as a motive requires that humanitarian intervention be applied with a certain level of consistency or at the very least a genuine attempt to do so. The case studies reviewed have determined that this has certainly not occurred.

In the Gulf War, although reestablishing Kuwait's sovereignty was one major pretext for the massive UN response, it has been determined that the significant threat posed to U.S. national interests was the primary trigger. The response was swift, unambiguous and highly effective. Without the unequivocal will and effort of the U.S. such a deployment would not have been possible.

The response to the Yugoslavian crisis was significantly more muted and ambiguous and emanated primarily from national interests. Clearly, the U.S. saw this as a European problem, to which Germany and France did not object. German national

interest was served by recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in lieu of upholding the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. As the crisis developed, the positioning of the Western powers fuelled, rather than quelled, the tensions of the nationalist forces at play. Here, sovereignty, in its misguided application, complicated matters on the ground and virtually ensured a civil war. The UN was content to pursue only the humanitarian dimension of the complex problem. Clearly, attacking a nation-state's humanitarian problems without addressing the larger questions will not present any long-term solutions.

Rwanda will remain a large blemish on the U.N.'s already spotty record for some time. Demonstrating the ultimate in national interest, or the absence of it, the major powers were noticeable by their silence. If ever there was an opportunity for the UN to take advantage of her newfound strength and a need to address critical human security issues, this was it. The world community failed miserably. France's measured and partisan response could be described as self-serving – as an understatement.

With respect to interventions based on values of human security, the UN's track record has been inconsistent. Without the implicit support of great powers, notably the U.S., the complexity of today's interventions causes them to be extremely risky ventures of questionable effectiveness. Perhaps more now than in the earlier, more optimistic post-cold war period, the pendulum has swayed back more towards reinforcing sovereignty. In the 1995 update to his report *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros Boutros-Ghali appears to have significantly readjusted the intervention framework for the UN. He states: "Clearly the United Nations cannot impose its preventive and peacemaking

services on member states who do not want them. Legally and politically their request for, or at least acqiescence in, United Nations action is a *sine qua non*."[81]

Canada's emphasis on human security as a rationale for intervention may place it in an undesirable situation, as occurred in the Zaire mission. Rather than continuing the previous approach of defaulting to the 'participation mode' for UN missions, each international crisis should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and a determination to participate must be based on collective national interests of several nations.   In cases where national interests converge, the deployment of troops into civil wars requires a robust capability with the necessary mandate to allow effective execution of the mission. To do otherwise and to act where no clear national interest is served could be at best a recipe for failure and at worst could lead to deaths of Canadian personnel without reason.

This is not to say that humanitarian intervention, including significant military participation, is not warranted in situations of natural disasters or in clear-cut cease-fire situations where stability exists.

In conclusion, the concept of human security is a useful construct to assist in assessing whether intervention is justified in a given case. However, the uneven application of this concept in the cases examined would tend to show that human security, as a moral imperative, will alone not compel states to act. In the post-cold war era, national self-interest continues to ultimately determine the final course of action, and human security remains a bystander to the events.

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[81] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, <u>An Agenda for Peace 1995</u> (New York, United Nations: 1995) 13.

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