Research essay

MAKING THE "FLAT SURFACE OF PLANNING" THREE DIMENSIONAL– CAN FORCE DEVELOPMENT BE MORE THAN JUST A PAPER EXERCISE ?

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"Military officers cannot – simply on the grounds of formal training – speak with any more authority than well-informed civilians when it comes to discussing, understanding and contributing to problems concerning total forces requirements and design."

A.C. Enthoven and K.W. Smith[1]

"There is no rigorous and objective means for judging how much insurance is enough when there are competing demands for the same public money."

Paul K. Davis[2]

A nation's military force exists to defend it. In times of war the military's ultimate responsibility is to mobilize, equip and train a force to protect the country. In Canada, this fundamental role of the military has been overshadowed by the increasingly visible and important roles of peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian intervention. Further, the notion of a lack of perceived direct threat to our nation now or in the foreseeable future has conspired with the need to reduce the nation's deficit, resulting in dramatic budgetary reductions. It is in this context of evolving purpose and diminishing resources that the Canadian Forces must carry out force development.

From a military perspective, we are experiencing an age of significant irony. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has heralded a new period of international stability at the macro level. A new and improved uni-polar world should have led to a resurgence of international cooperation and a more benign world environment. Many nations were quick to cash in their peace dividends, with the result that defence establishments

[1] A.C. Enthoven and K.W. Smith, How much is enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) 90-91.
[2] Paul K. Davis, "Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging," New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough, ed. Paul K. Davis (Santa Monica: Rand, 1994) 18-19.

throughout the world have experienced significant budgetary reductions. In an environment where Canada now faces the least direct threat to its sovereignty since the end of World War II, the reality that Canadian Forces personnel have recently been more active in war situations than at any time since the Korean War drips with irony.

Given the major contradiction between the dramatic budgetary reductions and significant operational tempo, force development and long range planning are more critical than ever. One could be excused for looking askance and criticizing the decisions and lack of foresight that have led to such substantial erosion of defence capability at a time of such obvious need. More important of course, and germane to the objective of this paper, is to review the force development process to identify how best to provide the military capabilities which will be needed in the coming decades.

One would assume that a highly disciplined and structured department such as National Defense would have a thoroughly defined and controlled process where requirements were clearly laid out and execution of concrete plans to achieve the desired results was a matter of routine. A review of past practice and eroding military capability leads to the conclusion that this is unfortunately not the case. The long-term management of the CF can best be described as “random”.

Critical questions must be asked of the force development process. What forces exert influence over critical, strategic-level decision-making processes? Is the process a logical one with predictable results, and if not, why not? More importantly, what, if any, improvements can be made to enhance the long-term effectiveness of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces?

The thesis of this paper is that provision of strategic long-term vision and guidance, combined with a flexible and visible scenario-based force development process, together offer a realistic and achievable methodology to mitigate the random nature of force planning at the strategic level.

To arrive at this assertion, a historical analysis will first be conducted to confirm the randomness of force development and identify the pressures leading inevitably to this reality. The current post-cold war context, as well as the recent experiences of other nations in dealing with this problem, will be explored. Finally, the paper will conclude with a discussion of made-in-Canada solutions.

Randomness in the Canadian Force Development Process

Before delving into force development in a historical context, an understanding of what is meant by the term is required. Other words are used interchangeably in the literature to describe various aspects of the process and the terminology is perhaps chosen depending on the author's perspective. Other terms such as "force planning", "defense planning", and "policy planning", while perhaps having some subtle interpretational variance, essentially refer to the same process. The issue at heart which will be dealt with here is the interface between the government and the Department of National Defence. The Office of the Auditor General clearly elaborates on the process which will be examined in this paper as follows:

> Policy planning is the foundation of the management system of any government department. It is where the political process and departmental administration meet. Government departments must translate legislation and political direction into departmental policies and plans to ensure that such direction is

> implemented…Force development is the planning process used to translate government policy into military forces.[3]

Put more succinctly but with the same thrust, Douglas Bland encapsulates the entire process with the notion that "policy is ideas in action."[4]

What, then, is the problem with the way defence-related ideas are actioned? Some glaring criticisms are contained in various Auditor General reports through the past two decades. In the 1984 report, the lack of current policy direction was highlighted: "The elements endorsed by Cabinet in 1975 are not consistent with resources now in place or planned and are, in some cases, no longer relevant."[5] The 1987 report criticized aircraft purchases such as the Dash-8 and the Challenger, which were not in keeping with the department's own priorities.[6] The 1994 review reported:

> …senior force development planners found that the existing policy development system did not provide sufficient guidance on the types of conflict the Canadian Forces should be prepared for. Hence they had difficulty in defining the forces that would meet Canada's needs.[7]

Many influences converge to impact directly on security policy and force development, leading to what Bland has labeled the "random management system."[8] These range from the strong politicization of policy development, to the inherent

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[3] 1994 Report of the Auditor General (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1995) 24-12.
[4] Douglas Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947-1985 (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Co., 1987) ix.
[5] 1984 Report of the Auditor General (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1984) 12-3.
[6] 1987 Report of the Auditor General (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1987) 9.138, 9.153. Regarding the DeHavilland Dash-8, the report states: "The normal review procedures in the Defence Program Management System for establishing departmental priorities were not followed…These aircraft were bought contrary to the department's planned priorities for equipment acquisition. Similarly, regarding the Canadair Challenger: "Most of the aircraft were bought contrary to the Department's planned priorities of equipment acquisition. Although eight aircraft can be linked to Department of National Defence broad roles and objectives, the decision to acquire them in February 1985 was made primarily to provide financial assistance to the manufacturer prior to 31 March 1985. As we reported in 1984, because DND does not have an approved force structure, it is not possible to assess the extent to which projects such as this satisfy clearly defined needs."
[7] 1994 Report of the Auditor General 24-13.
[8] Bland, 175.

complexity of the process, the lack of political will or interest in defence matters, domestic pressures, and factors external to the DND and the Canadian government. Ultimately, these factors conspire to render the prospect of intentional and meaningful planning force development a daunting proposition. These factors will now be explored in turn.

Evolution of the management of the Forces from the Command era to the Management era was of significant import to the force development process.[9] This was clearly evident following the election of Prime Minister Trudeau in 1968. As a result of his insistence on centralizing the control and management of national affairs, he proceeded with a foreign policy review ultimately resulting in significant changes to Canada's NATO commitment.[10] The assertion that the "…process leading to that decision…was almost entirely a product of the Prime Minister's Office" certainly epitomizes the dramatic politicization which had overtaken the interface process between the political and military environments.[11]

When individual Ministers did impose themselves in a forceful way, it was with the intent to restructure to increase civilian control. In 1964, Paul Hellyer wanted "coordinated civil, military, and scientific advice", and restructured the Defence Council to include a newly created Chief of the Defence Staff, a defence scientist, and a

[9] Bland, 1. The Command era is described by Bland as the period from the end of WW II until 1964, when "…each Service Chief…developed policies to maintain and modernize their individual specialties" and was characterized by reliance on military judgement such that "…concepts developed from military theories were appropriate to the administration of defence policy." See Bland, 4-6.
[10] Ivan L. Head and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy 1968-1984 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995) 79-80. Trudeau rejected the traditional NATO oriented view of foreign policy and defence, which eventually resulted in reduced forces in Europe and the elimination of the NATO nuclear-strike role for Canada.
[11] Head, 87.

traditional Deputy Minister, while eliminating the all-powerful service chiefs positions.[12] Donald Macdonald's Management Review Group study resulted in a complete change in the distribution of power in NDHQ. As Bland comments, "…leadership of the system passed definitely to the DM and the civilian members of DND."[13] This "civilianized" the policy program, importing managerial concepts into what was once a process built on military concepts. The unification of CFHQ with the Deputy Minister's staff of DND could only lead to greater political influence and imposition on force development.

The complexities of the defence policy process are in large part ultimately due to the high cost of national defence, and the political and bureaucratic determination to minimize this cost. This ensures a system intent on scrutinizing and overseeing defence issues. Consequently:

> …the very process of large numbers of officials interacting on a policy issue tends to produce policy outcomes that are not necessarily as rational as we would like to assume. In other words, the mix of motives, interests and perspectives at play in a policy area will mean that policy outcomes may not reflect the motives, interests, and perspectives of the primary actor in the policy field. In the case of defence policy, this suggests the possibility that the assumptions of the rational model noted above are largely incorrect, and that in fact Canadian defence policy serves purposes other than the strategic purpose of "defending the nation".[14]

Examples of these purposes other than "defending the nation" abound. In addition to the already-mentioned purchase of the Challenger to assist Canadair, the purchase of the Airbus 310 passenger aircraft from Canadian Air International is a similar

[12] Bland, 158.
[13] Bland, 164.
[14] Kim Richard Nossal, "Rationality and Non-rationality in Canadian Defence Policy," Canada's International Security Policy, eds. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1995) 355.

case.[15] The Airbus, although a modern and efficient long-range passenger transport, has no refueling capability and can not carry vehicles.[16]

Various complex methodologies have been implemented over time to manage the force development process, such as the Program Planning Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Capability Planning Process (CPP). The former was initially introduced in the US by Defence Secretary McNamara in 1968 and imported into Canada.

The objective of the PPBS was to ensure "…centralization and precise management or rationalization of operational capabilities as drawn from stated government policy."[17] As a top-down process, force development was therefore intended to flow logically from defence policy. As Major-General Loomis explained, the complexity of the process was intended to be able to cope with the various political, military, social and environmental factors, presumably in the sense of being able to deflect some of these.[18]

The PPBS was transformed into the CPP, intended to provide a "semblance of rational decision making."[19] However complex and rational these systems purport to be,

> …outside influences beyond the control of politicians and bureaucrats often supplant agendas, priorities, and goals…these [defence and foreign] policy areas

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[15] The 26 August, 1992 edition of The Ottawa Citizen, carried the headline: "Troubled Airlines: Airbus deal gives PWA $150M Boost." The article went on to quote PWA president Rhys Eton: "This transaction was important to PWA Corp. as it provides us with immediate cash and allows us to repay some long-term debt…We are appreciative that the federal government has proceeded with this transaction in such a timely fashion." See "Troubled Airlines: Airbus deal gives PWA $150M Boost," The Ottawa Citizen 26 August 1992: B3.

[16] Peter Kasurak and Nicholas Swales, "Reforming the Department of National Defence," Canadian Defence Quarterly Spring 1998: 28. An audit note in 1996 stated: "…$400 million was reallocated to acquire Airbus 310 (i.e., CC-150) aircraft to replace the Boeing CC-137s. As a result, the Department bought aircraft which required extensive modification for three of their roles, and are incapable of meeting the fourth."

[17] Bland, 161. PPBS was intended to centralize the process: that is, remove it from being a service-oriented process, with firmer financial controls.

[18] D.G. Loomis, "Managing the Defence Services Program," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol 7, No 4 (Spring, 1978) 30.

[19] Bland, 167.

> cannot be isolated from international events or from the activities of other departments and agencies. Even at home, other domestic issues from different policy fields have always had an influence over particular DND policies. It is the development of consensus on particular and definite issues unamenable to the structure and assumptions that underlying (sic) the present formal policy process that so often captures the attention of senior policy actors. It is the contradictions between this reality and the control required of the declared system that call everything into question.[20]

General Bell had similar concerns, criticizing the process for being simultaneously too simple as a concept and too complex to execute. The process:

> …tends to assume away factors such as political inconsistencies and international instability. It does not include "failsafe" mechanisms to protect the users by preventing the process being destabilized by the irrational short-term decisions which seem to have been endemic to the Canadian political system for at least three decades….[Its] complexity stems from its central aim, which is to find the right answer for the future…decision makers seldom react positively to proposals which involve their long-term commitment and reduce their flexibility. Their tendency, more often than not, is to defer orderly long-term solutions in favour of what seem to be acceptable answers for current, short-term problems.[21]

Clearly, political realities will override any methodical and deliberate planning process.

Another factor detrimental to the force development process was the demonstrated lack of political interest. Several manifestations of this abound in Canadian history. The government's reluctance to revisit defence policy in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in unrevised government direction between the 1971 and 1987 White Papers, with the exception of the 1975 Defence Review, is a case in point.[22] Similarly, the all-too-frequent changes in ministers of national defence may reflect the lack of priority and unattractiveness of this portfolio. Between 1968 and 1988, Canada witnessed fourteen

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[20] Bland, 167.
[21] George G. Bell, "The Policy Process in National Defence Headquarters," Canada's International Security Policy, eds. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995) 337.
[22] J.S. Finan and S.B. Fleming, "Public Attitudes Toward Defence and Security in Canada," Canada's International Security Policy, eds. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995) 326.

different ministers, with four individuals occupying the post in the three-year period between 1985 and 1988.[23] One can be forgiven for concluding that defence matters were not a government priority requiring consistent political direction and support.

External factors can also significantly affect force development. For example, the largely unpredicted collapse of the Soviet Union has significantly altered the world power balance, with direct consequences in force planning and force structure. As another example, fluctuations in the value of the Canadian dollar can have major impact on the capital program.[24]

One can thus conclude that many factors beyond the control of the DM and the CDS affect the force planning process. Having reviewed the various forces that have historically exerted pressure on the system, it is appropriate to examine the further effects of the post-cold war era.

The Post-Cold War era

While the Canadian Forces budgets have been in steady decline for most of the period since the Korean War, the situation has been exacerbated in this past decade by two factors: government decision to eliminate the deficit and reduce the overall debt and the perceived increase in global security building to an expectation of a return on investment, the peace dividend. Looking at budget allocation to National Defence going back to 1950, a comparison in constant dollars shows that, with the exception of the period from 1984 to 1994, budgets have been below the amount allocated at the peak of

[23] D.W. Middlemiss and J.J. Sokolsky, Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants (Toronto:Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1989) 64.
[24] Bland, 180.

the Korean War in 1953.[25] The precipitous decline in budget allocation since 1994 has been alarming to all who have interest in defence issues.

In a recent article, John Treddenick highlights the extreme difficulties in long-term planning and prioritization of defence allocation between the three categories of personnel, operations and maintenance (O&M) and capital.[26] Discussing the debate in terms of two options, "manning the arm" or "arming the man", the issue comes down to whether it is more appropriate, in the long term, to invest more heavily in human capital or equipment. Given the significant budgetary reductions, decisions made now will have significant impact in the foreseeable future. The debate begs for a long-term plan with predetermined desired end states. More than ever, this calls for an unwavering, realistic and sustained approach to force development if an effective Canadian military capability is to be maintained into an uncertain future.

In reality, indicators are that the force development process remains random. Without a robust process in place, it is impossible to determine priorities within the department if the end state is not clear. The 1998 Auditor General's report concludes that this indeed remains the status of force development. The lack of long term planning is underlined by the following comments:

> Setting overall departmental priorities is the responsibility of the Defence Management Committee. We found no evidence to indicate what criteria the

[25] John M. Treddenick, "Distributing the Defence Budget: Choosing between Capital and Manpower," Issues in Defence Management, Douglas L. Bland, ed. (Kingston: Queen's University, 1998) 66. In 1986 dollars, the defence budget decreased steadily from 1953 to its lowest amount since 1950 in 1973. At that point the budget allocation began increasing, surpassing the 1953 total (in 86 dollars) in 1984 and reached an all-time high of $12 billion in current-year d0.02 0 0 10.02 205.349 10.02 153.3652 131.8200r02 2 154.80006 Tm(d)Tj10.7 131

> Department uses, other than statements in the White Paper that the Department is to emphasize equipment life extension and maintenance of "core capabilities.[27]

This lack of guidance was reflected in comments made at the Command level in their level one business plans:

> Without both a defence task priority model and activity based costing of all processes and sub-processes, we will continue to allocate departmental resources to capability components more on 'gut feel' than 'good management'.[28]

The lack of coordinated policy at the top not only causes difficulties for force development but, as a further by-product, can foment alternatives significantly diverging from current policy, which can further confuse the debate. The publication by a distinguished group of Canadians, calling themselves the Canada 21 Council, of a suggested defence policy before the publication of the 1994 White Paper is a recent example of this.[29, 30]

Central to the Council's alternative defence posture is the idea that Canada would decline to participate in high-intensity conflicts above a pre-determined threshold.

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[27] 1998 Report of the Auditor General (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998) 3-19.

[28] 1998 Report of the Auditor General, 3-18.

[29] Michael Bryans, ed., Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the 21st Century (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, U of Toronto, 1984) 56-64. This particular document provides insightful and well-articulated arguments that, if accepted, would dramatically alter the nature of Canadian defence. Given the lack of "plausible *military* threats to Canadian security either here-and-now or on the horizon" and the "reality of financial stringency", the Council proposes progressive elimination of "…heavy armoured formations, heavy artillery, air-to-ground fighter support, and anti-submarine warfare techniques." As an alternative, the Council argues for more robust peacekeeping and peacemaking forces and light forces to maintain sovereignty.

[30] Several other diverse proposals have been published. In a paper to the MND, Dr. Bercuson reviewed four war options: general nuclear war, general conventional war, limited conventional war, and low intensity conflict. He concluded that the mission of the CF should be to fight a limited conventional war. See M. Douglas Young, Report to the Prime Minister: A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence by D.J. Bercuson, PhD, FRSC University of Calgary (Ottawa: PWGSC, 1997) 4

Hence, following on from this position, Canada would not at this time be participating in the NATO air bombardment of Yugoslavia.

That a need has been articulated for Canada to in fact be involved in this important mission does not weaken the strength of the Canada 21 proposal. Clearly, this well-meaning and rational attempt at reorienting defence priorities is borne of a different interpretation of the world situation and Canada's place in it. It raises fundamental questions about the purpose of Canada's military, and attempts to come to grips with the dire outlook for defence budgets. To quote a former Minister of National Defence, Don Macdonald, "there is no obvious level for defence expenditures…[and]…that the defence budget could be determined from domestic social imperatives rather than by an assessment of uncontrollable external factors."[31]

Just how much defence is enough? With a view to assessing a rough order of magnitude budget that would be adequate for the U.S. forces given the current world situation, Paul Davis steps back and uses the big-hand little-map approach. Drawing a parallel between the current post-cold war situation and the era just prior to the Korean War, the suggestion is made that budget levels roughly equal to that for 1951 could arguably seem in line. Using constant-year dollars, FY99 dollars for the U.S. military would in fact be about ten percent higher than in 1951.[32] Extrapolating this comparison to Canada, using Treddenick's figures, leads to the conclusion that the current budget

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groups/wings supported by a deployable tactical joint HQ. See Canadian Security: A Force Model for the 21st Century, Conference of Defence Associations (Ottawa: ORCA-MAC Inc, 1994) 4-18.

[31] Bland, 164.

[32] Paul K. Davis, "Planning under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging," New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough, ed. Paul K. Davis (Santa Monica: Rand, 1994) 33-34.

(again using constant-year dollars) allocation for the CF would be only slightly higher than the 1951 period.[33]

Although this is admittedly a rather unorthodox and unsophisticated approach, this could lead one to the conclusion that current budgets are not terribly out of line. Clearly, this lends additional urgency to the need for a robust and justifyable defence policy that could stand up to the types of pressures discussed above, whether from a concerned public or from the political realm.

Prior to focusing on a future Canadian approach to our unique situation, it is worthwhile to review how other defence establishments have coped with the difficulties and vagaries to which force development has been subjected. In the 1998 Auditor General report, comparisons are made between Canada and several countries in terms of the effectiveness of the strategic level force development processes.[34] Two of these countries will now be examined: the Unites States and Australia.

United States Bottom-up Review and Quadrennial Defence Review

The US has a distinct advantage over many nations in that its military enjoys substantial government and national support. This is emphasized by some of the legislation which has been passed by Congress, notably the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which gave "…the force of public law to several procedures it believed important for improved defence spending."[35] This act requires the President to annually submit a report to Congress detailing the national security strategy of the US. Further, it requires

[33] Treddenick, 66.
[34] 1998 Report of the Auditor General, 3-20-22.

the Secretary of Defence to prepare an annual report explaining the relationship between the military force structure and national strategy.[36] The intent of this legislation is to ensure a more direct link between national objectives and defence requirements. The President is of necessity forced to issue crucial strategic direction, and the defence department must legally respond to this direction.

The "Bottom-Up Review" (BUR) formed a preliminary stage in the difficult quest to specify future strategic direction in a changing post-cold war era. Key to the BUR was the process used, which began from an assessment of the world situation, followed by a defence strategy, which was then evolved into force building blocks, structure, and modernization requirements.[37]

Scenario-based baseline assumptions were an essential part of the review. The BUR determined that a reasonable scenario on which to predicate forces was that the US must be able to "…fight and win two major regional conflicts."[38] The final step in the review, once force structure and modernization options were decided, was to match required capability against budget allocation to determine deficiencies.[39] It is important to underline that this process was not intended to be budget driven, but rather to identify requirements based independently, and hopefully objectively, relative to current funding limitations.

However, the BUR has been criticized by some for remaining too orthodox and focusing extensively on requirements-based planning, using scenarios which are too

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[35] Glenn A. Kent and William E. Simons, "Objective-Based Planning," New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough, ed. Paul K. Davis (Santa Monica: Rand, 1994) 60. The act is officially called the Department of Defence Reorganization Act.
[36] Kent, 60-61.
[37] Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington: Dept of Defense, 1993) 4.
[38] Aspin, 19.
[39] Aspin, 107.

specific.[40] The concern is that the PPBS planning process "…has become comfortable with existing organizational structures and has not effectively stimulated consideration of radical force considerations."[41] Nonetheless, the process was a step in the direction towards consistent and objective force development.

The BUR was followed up by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)[42], which served as a strategic document to ensure adequate readiness while concurrently addressing the needs of the future: "The Department of Defense designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs from 1997 to 2015…The QDR is intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program."[43]

Again, the document provides a strategic overview. This, coupled with an evaluation of funding trends, provides the basis for determining the best future course of action. Concerned that the current course did not advocate enough emphasis on investing for the future, the QDR recommended increasing the procurement portion of the defense spending envelope to ensure future capability against the potential of an emerging regional threat. The QDR made very specific decisions regarding force structures for all arms of the US military.

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[40] For a counter-argument supporting the two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) approach, see John F. Troxell, Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework (Washington: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997). Critics of the BUR and the two MRC threat-based planning approach are concerned that it can not meet the challenge of future likely conflicts, and may cost more than a capabilities-based planning approach. Troxell argues that all force planning has elements of threat-based and capabilities-based planning, and views the distinction as academic and counter-productive. He suggests that a two MRC scenario-based assumption, with some modifications, in fact does provide sufficient flexibility to deal with lower-intensity operations.

[41] Davis, 47-48.

[42] William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington: Dept of Defense, 1997) 1. The report was required by the Military Force Structure Review Act, a subset of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997.

[43] Cohen, 1.

As for the BUR, the QDR met with some significant criticisms.[44] While it was viewed as being broader in scope of missions than the BUR, concern was expressed that service sensitivities drove the planning process excessively. Concerns over service reaction to unilateral reductions led to proportional reduction options for all services, rather than exploring the potentials of future technology or addressing service procurement plans from a joint mission approach. Similarly, some have recommended that in future such efforts "…DOD can take other steps to improve its analytical tools so it can better evaluate the impact of force structure and modernization alternatives on future warfare and smaller-scale contingency operations."[45]

Notwithstanding the still imperfect approaches reflected in both the BUR and the QDR, several conclusions can be made related to strategic planning and force development in the US. Notably, it can be inferred that Congress takes a very active role in the strategic and force development issues of the nation's military capability. This leads to significant public scrutiny and critical oversight. Ultimately, this ensures a body of elected officials who are educated and well-versed in military matters. Secondly, these reviews, notably the QDR, attempt to project defense needs out 15 years and more, providing some form of strategic planning stability. Finally, these processes are solidly footed on scenario-based current and future military requirements. Arguably, as demonstrated, the scenario process has come under question for its limited applicability, rigidity, and exclusion of other lesser scenarios.

Having reviewed the US approach to long term planning and force development, an eye will be cast towards Australia.

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[44] Quadrennial Defense Review: Opportunities to Improve the Next Review, (Norfolk: Office of the General Counsel – National Security and International Affairs Division, 1998) 6-7.

Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development

Examining Australia's defence policy process is important because it has a military the size of Canada's supported by approximately the same population base, and hence faces virtually identical strategic defence difficulties. The only glaring difference is that Canada enjoys the reality of the world's only superpower and its major trading partner as a neighbour. Notwithstanding, the same dilemma in rationalizing the raison d'être for the military exists and examining the Australian approach to force development issues offers some insights.

In Australia's case, given the lack of a direct threat, force development is predicated on the "…need to give priority to the defence of Australia in credible contingencies."[46] The central theme of strategic planning revolves around the concept of maintaining some core skills, not necessarily at a high level of readiness, which are applicable at higher levels of conflict and which can be used as a basis for timely expansion.[47]

While the preceding is still generally true, the fact that other nations in the region have recently been developing economic and military capabilities at a rapid rate has significantly altered the landscape. Hence, the critical document Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence explains that force development is not driven uniquely by budgetary considerations.

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[45] Quadrennial Defence Review: Opportunities, 6.
[46] Paul Dibb, The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure development (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1992) 16.

[47] Dibb, 16-17.

> The need for Australia's Defence Organization to derive the maximum capability for each dollar does not arise only from the normal demands of fiscal responsibility. It arises from a more fundamental strategic imperative to maintain our relative strategic standing in a region which is rapidly catching up with us economically. Better planning and better management are thus essential to our future defence capability.[48]

Further, indications are that the Australian government demonstrates some level of interest in defence matters. Under the present government, a National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC), supported by meetings of the Secretaries Committee of National Security (SCNS) is chaired by the Secretary to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. These committees include the CDF and the Secretary of Defence, thus ensuring that strategic-level information of military relevance is discussed at the highest levels.[49] As is the case in the US, such public awareness of defence issues is considered beneficial.

In December, 1997, the Australian Minister of Defence tabled in the House of Representatives a new defence policy document entitled Australia's Strategic Policy.[50] This document was notable for several reasons. First, it came on the heels of the 1994 Defence White Paper. The Australian Government determined that strategic change was occurring with sufficient rapidity to warrant a revised policy. Secondly, the paper was designed to follow from the Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, entitled In the National Interest, and "…takes as its basis the regional security environment as characterized in the White Paper, developing the implications of that analysis for strategic policy."[51] Thirdly, the assessment deviates from the previously discussed position of considering low-level contingency scenarios to preparing for a wide range of

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[48] "Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence": Report of the Defence Efficiency Review (Canberra: Department of defence, 1997) 6.
[49] Future Directions, 15.
[50] Australia's Strategic Policy (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1997) http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/sr97/s971202.html 26/4/99.
[51] Australia's Strategic Policy

circumstances. Hence, a more robust and flexible capability is advocated, rather than limiting capability to set-piece scenarios. Finally, the policy goes further than simply analyzing the strategic environment and details a rigorous set of priorities for force development. The policy extends to the year 2020, hence is a long-term planning document which prioritizes future force capability requirements.

Having assessed the strategic aspects of the highly effective force development process for both the US and Australia, it is useful to identify features of commonality between them. First, the departure from the strictly threat-based cold war force planning methodology in favour of a more flexible combination of scenario- and capability-based approaches was a marked improvement. Second, involvement of the respective governments in the affairs of their defence departments was clearly evident. Third, the defence policy guidance and force development process emanate from strong and explicit expressions of national interest and national strategy. Finally, these defence strategies are long-term exercises, extending to the 20-year range. On the negative side, these processes are still criticized for being excessively parochial and service oriented, precluding development of more efficient and truly joint capabilities.

Force development in the Canadian Forces of the future will now be examined to determine ways to enhance the process and potentially reduce, to the extent possible, the "random factor".

Reducing the "Random Factor": The Way Ahead for the Canadian Forces

The random elements in the force development process can never be entirely eliminated but perhaps the effects can be controlled to some degree. Political influence,

imperatives and expediencies are a fundamental reality in a democracy. Similarly, no control can be exercised over external factors such as economic variables or a rapidly changing strategic environment. The dilemma is succinctly and accurately identified by Douglas Bland:

> The dilemma of defence planners – and their nightmare – is to develop a planning, programming, budgeting and operational process that is responsive to the shocks of political realities in Canada and abroad but that takes decisions about resources allocations in the long term on more than changing contingencies.[52]

Notwithstanding, there are specific characteristics which can be incorporated into a force development process to minimize, anticipate, and perhaps compensate for such uncontrollable factors. CF force development is currently undergoing notable transformation, which will undoubtedly enhance the process. Improvements which hold promise include: longer term strategic direction, flexible and future-oriented scenario- and capability-based planning, increased public awareness of defence issues, and the development of a national security strategy.

The force development process, as currently evolved, ostensibly flows from government policy.[53] The Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) takes its direction from the most recent government direction, the 1994 White Paper. From the three broad defence missions, defending Canada, defending North America and contributing to International security, are derived 16 objectives with specified key results.[54] The document provides

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[52] Bland, 163.

[53] It must be understood that force development harbours a "bottom-up" aspect where new concepts and deficiency rectifications are identified and staffed up the chain for inclusion in the long-term capital plan. However, it is argued that the bottom-up process would be enhanced and better coordinated in an environment of clear strategic direction.

[54] Defence Planning Guidance 1999 (Ottawa: Minister of National defence, 1999) Ch3, 1-28. The guidance provides direction on objectives to be achieved by each of 17 environmental Chiefs of staff, Group Principals and other organizations. The organizations which have specific objectives related to the three

key direction, identifies capabilities required and allocates resources. From this key document flows the Business Plans, from level zero to four, which provide increasingly detailed information as to how each organization is to implement the direction emanating from the DPG.

One critical flaw of the DPG is the fact that its scope is limited to a rolling five-year period. This is a significant drawback given that the Defense Services Program projects out capital projects to 15 years. Clearly, if strategic direction is to drive force development, a more encompassing process is required.

The recent introduction of the first long-term defence strategy document may serve to significantly alleviate this problem. Entitled Defence Strategy 2020[55], the cornerstone guidance holds promise as a means to help provide long-term vision, stability and focus in force development. Several critical aspects are addressed:

> These analyses show that to succeed in the emerging battlespace of the 21st century, and ensure the CF possess the flexibility they need to adapt to ongoing changes in technology, operations, and the international system, Defence must conduct its affairs and operations much differently than it does today. Defence must be more strategically focused, engaged with Canadians, innovative, dynamic and adaptable.[56]

If effected, this has the potential to alleviate randomness. Eight key strategic objectives, described as the "essence" of the strategic document and intended to ensure the vision is translated into action, are listed. These strategic objectives are: path to 2020, decisive leadership, modernize, globally deployable, inter-operable, employer of choice, valued partnership and effective stewardship.[57] Each strategic objective encompasses

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missions are: CMS, CLS, CAS, DCDS, NORAD, CFNA, DISO, ADM (Per), ADM (Mat), ADM (Fin CS), ADM (Pol), ADM (IE), VCDS, CRS, JAG, DND/CF LA, and Dir PA.

[55] Defence Strategy 2020 (draft) (Ottawa: Minister of Defence, 1999).

[56] Defence Strategy 2020, 5.

[57] Defence Strategy 2020, 8-10.

several five-year objectives, three of which are: increase and maintain understanding of National Defence and its contribution, encourage the development of a national security strategy, and develop and implement an integrated defence management environment.[58]

The basis on which force development is predicated is of significance. In reviewing the US improvements, it was noted that the scenario-based approach remained too restrictive. This general concern is corroborated in the current force planning literature. Davis recommends "…multi-scenario, multi-dimentional capabilities analysis rather than the traditional 'requirements' analysis, and emphasizing planning for adaptiveness …rather than planning around specific scenarios."[59] Similarly, Mintzberg states:

> Scenario building followed by contingency planning may work fine when the uncertainties of the world are few and certain, in other words, when they reduce to an inability to predict only which of several well-defined options will in fact happen…Otherwise - and this encompasses a great deal of behaviour - the predetermination assumption of planning proves to be a fallacy.[60]

It is important that such rigidity not be incorporated in the implementation of scenario-based planning in the DPG process. Though still under development, the DPG has introduced eleven force planning scenarios, which are intended to "…promote capability-based analyses to be conducted within a scenario framework, providing a methodology which will assist in the conduct of comprehensive force planning."[61] Such scenarios will be of great assistance in future force development, providing they do not stifle the flexibility identified in the strategy 2020 document as part of the key strategic

[58] Defence Strategy 2020, 8-10.
[59] Davis, 49.
[60] Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (Toronto: The Free Press, 1994) 254.
[61] DPG 99, 3A-1 to 3A-2.

objective "Path to 2020." In fact, the scenarios as envisaged in the 2020 document are future scenarios:

> It is for this reason that Defence planners did not rely solely on an extrapolation of trends in building Strategy 2020. Indeed, a key part of the strategic assessment was to evaluate strategic options for the future against different future scenarios. By combining strategy formulation with scenario-based planning, Strategy 2020 provides Defense with a much more powerful and dynamic roadmap for the future than one that follows from more linear projections of current trends.[62]

Scenario-based planning provides a by-product which can also serve to reduce randomness in force development. The introduction of scenarios which can be readily comprehended is conducive to better understanding of the CF mission by the public. Using specific scenarios as a basis for capability planning brings the methodology behind military strategy within the grasp of the general public, the value of which is noteworthy in this era lacking in direct threat. The issue of increased public debate and interest in defence matters is not lost on the DND. DPG 99 states in the section on strategic direction: "Further efforts are being made to improve communications within Canada's defence establishment and with the public. Greater openness and transparency will continue to be a priority."[63]

This is also clearly identified as one of the eight previously-mentioned objectives of Defence Strategy 2020. "Valued Partnerships" is explained as to: "Foster greater consensus on defence and security challenges with a view to developing a strong collaborative approach and sense of relevance with the people of Canada, other Government departments, and private industry."[64]

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[62] Defence Strategy 2020, 5.
[63] DPG 99, 2-1.
[64] Defence Strategy 2020, 9.

The inference is that greater public understanding of the relevance of defence could provide a buffer against political expediencies. Echoing the concern that the defence policy process is too closed, George Bell states:

> [The policy process] needs to be opened up, not to change the essential responsibilities of the government, but to ensure that those Canadians who are being protected understand the basis of our policies and the essential composition and capabilities of our armed forces. This will require the initiation of a steady dialogue on issues and ideas with the various publics, politicians, academics, business, labour, and institutional leaders. The issues and implications of technological developments for equipment inventories and requirements for trained human resources have to be made clear in a professional and apolitical manner.[65]

This leads to the final and perhaps most important improvement which could ostensibly result in a less random process: the better definition of an overarching security strategy for Canada, with the implication that this would involve the government and Parliament to a greater extent in defence policy and consequently force development matters.

As previously seen, the US and Australian governments are taking an active role in determining security strategy. This was viewed as critical to a viable force development process, a conclusion corroborated by the 1998 Auditor General's report.[66]

Canada does not have a clearly enunciated national strategy or security strategy.[67] Other than the 1994 White Paper, the only documents where such statements can be found are in the Report of the Special Joint committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign

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[65] George G. Bell, "The Policy Process in National Defence Headquarters," Canada's International Security Policy, eds. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada, 1995) 345.
[66] 1998 Auditor General's report, 3-21. The report states: "One commonality evident in the countries we examined [US, UK, Australia and New Zealand] was the high level at which outputs and the resources needed to achieve them are reviewed."
[67] In a paper to the MND, Desmond Morton states as part of his second recommendation: "To meet defence equipment needs, Canada needs the capability to develop a long-term strategic vision…". See M. Douglas Young, Report to the Prime Minister: A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Desmond Morton McGill Institute for the Study of Canada (Ottawa: PWGSC, 1997) 9-10.

Policy and in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) publication Canada in the World. By way of a new foreign policy agenda the former document states: "The most important global requirements for the 1990s and beyond are for shared security, shared prosperity and shared custody of the environment."[68] Each of these areas are explored in a separate chapter and also makes some brief recommendations regarding future defence posture.

Similarly the latter document states the following as Canada's three key objectives for Canadian foreign policy: "the promotion of prosperity and employment, the protection of our security, within a stable global framework, and the projection of Canadian values and cultures."[69] The fact that the defence White Paper of 1994 was prepared prior to the DFAIT document reflects the lack of a coherent national approach, unlike that of Australia, for example.

It can be argued that national strategy can be articulated through action rather than being committed to paper. For example, the way a nation applies its budget expenditures is a clear indicator of its priorities. Henry Mintzberg reveals: "The budget is the single most important policy statement of any government…the budget lies at the heart of public policy."[70] Notwithstanding, the objective is to engage the government to the greatest extent possible to minimize short-term political aberrations. If a government supports a twenty-year strategic statement, it may then have less appetite to change course for purely political expedients or based on the views of a single actor.

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[68] Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future - Report of the Special Joint committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Publication Service Parliamentary Publications directorate, 1994) 9.
[69] Canada in the World: Government Statement (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995) 10.
[70] Mintzberg, 72-73.

This is one of the clearly articulated goals embedded within the "valued partnerships" objective of the Defence Strategy 2020, which is to "encourage the development of a national security strategy."

The Planning, Reporting and Accountability Structure (PRAS) of the Defence management Model currently under development will provide an accountability framework which will unquestionably draw the government more into the security strategy realm. The annual budget will be responded to by two submissions: the DND Departmental Plans and Priorities Report and the Performance Report. The first is "…to facilitate an understanding by parliamentarians of the Defence program so that they can influence the development of public policy and future year spending. The report is tabled in Parliament and considered in some detail by its Standing Committees." The Performance Report will likewise be submitted to Parliament and the Standing Committees each fall.[71]

The Department has unquestionably identified the requirement to engage the government in force development issues. The specific goals of the eight key objectives, if implemented, will undoubtedly increase the likelihood of this being achieved.

Conclusion

Randomness can never be completely eliminated from the force development process. Ultimately, the issue is not simply "how much is enough?" but more precisely, "who decides how much is enough?". The Canadian Forces must ultimately respond to the directives of the democratically elected political masters. Notwithstanding, some

[71] CDS Issues Seminar, extracted from http://www.cfc.dnd.ca/CDS_issues/contents/descript_e.html, 8 April, 1999.

drivers of randomness are counterproductive and undesirable, and means to dampen their effects are welcomed.

Long-term strategic guidance can be a key element of stability in force planning. The Defence Strategy 2020 document may fill the void and provide this long-sought-after forward-looking guidance. The broad-based scenario approach embraced by this strategic document may erect the framework within which force planning can build for the future. A scenario approach may also serve to better acquaint the political level regarding the reasoning behind the capability requirements and deficiencies. Similarly, potential is created to provide a more readily understandable context, thus fostering wider public dialogue. A note of caution is raised in that the scenarios must provide sufficient flexibility to allow planning for the unantic

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