CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMME 2 / PROGRAMME DE SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE 2

PR 500
DIRECTED RESEARCH PROJECT

Whole-of-Government Approach: An Interdepartmental Planning Process Would be Useful

By / par Capt (N) Daniel Sing

01 June 2010

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

Much has and continues to be written about doing things better, in all manner of human endeavour. Normally, better means more effectively and more efficiently. In terms of doing things better, the concepts of "joined-up government", "whole-of-government", "integrated" and "comprehensive" approaches have blossomed of late in government. The Canadian Government appears to have embraced a whole-of-government approach in dealing with a variety of issues. As two of many components of government, defence departments and militaries have joined the call for doing things better by actively supporting and pursuing whole-of-government approaches in the defence and security domains, both at home and abroad. One of the Canadian Government's recent perspectives in this regard was publicized in the 2005 International Policy Statement. The whole-of-government concept was introduced in relation to stabilization and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. But the concept also applies to domestic endeavours.

Since the early 1990s, the Canadian Forces have implemented a joint operational planning process which enables navy, army and air force officers, working in a joint environment, to better collaborate and cooperate in achieving national objectives. Recently, the joint operational planning process has been adapted, in the Canadian Forces, to strategic-level planning. Since the joint operational planning process enables the three military services to effectively and efficiently develop joint operational plans, a common, structured interdepartmental planning process should similarly enable more effective and efficient whole-of-government policies, strategies, and plans.

This paper examines: the modern management concepts and means, and the nuances thereof, by which democratic governments and bureaucracies, Canada's in particular, get things done; the origins and meanings of the whole-of-government approach; the recent experiences of certain Western countries and international organizations in considering and using the whole-of-government approach; the mindset and experiences of Canada in doing the same; and the benefits and challenges of adopting a common, structured, interdepartmental planning process. The analysis focuses on whole-of-government approaches which involve military activity in the domestic and international environments, mostly, but not solely, from the Canadian perspective.

Given the Government's desire to develop better whole-of-government solutions to problems or issues, at home or abroad, the paper concludes Canada's federal government would benefit from the adoption of a common, structured interdepartmental planning process. Such a planning process would be more effective and efficient than the current, undocumented and *ad hoc* planning processes. Such a process would ensure that, in dealing with complex problems which require the attention of and action by more than one government department or agency, interdepartmental decision-makers and planners would come together to develop the requisite whole-of-government response within a framework of common language, intent and problem-solving process

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

"Plans are nothing; planning is everything." - Dwight D. Eisenhower

General

Much has and continues to be written about doing things better, in all manner of human endeavour. Normally, better means more effectively and more efficiently.[1] The desire for greater efficiency, however, often overshadows the desire for greater effectiveness.

Doing things better applies to private-sector and public-sector organizations alike. Many organizations, especially businesses, are driven by profit. Other organizations, such as governments, are not driven by profit, but by effective and responsible consumption of public resources. "The distinct difference between the private sector and the federal government hinges on resource allocation and regulatory oversight …"[2] Whatever the motivation, every leader of every organization wants to do things better, especially more efficiently.

In terms of doing things better, the concepts of "joined-up government", "whole-of-government", "integrated" and "comprehensive" approaches have blossomed of late in government. These expressions, while synonymous, mean different things to different

---

[1] Effectiveness is defined as completing activities so that organizational goals are achieved; referred to as 'doing the right things'. Efficiency is defined as getting the most output from the least amount of inputs; referred as 'doing things right'. See Stephen P. Robbins, Mary Coulter and Nancy Langton, *Management,* 9th Canadian ed. (Toronto: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009), 8.

[2] Tim E. Winchell, "Managing Change in the Federal Government - Part I," *Public Manager*, 38, no. 1 (1 April 2009): 37; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1708121531&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

people. They are used in different areas, in domestic and international affairs, and at different levels of government. In 1994, Bill Richardson, of the Sheffield Business School, argued: "Modern organizations need to operate at all times from a comprehensive strategic management basis."[3] In his article entitled "A Comprehensive Approach to Security," David Wagner argued the need for a comprehensive approach to counter criminal identity theft.[4] In his article entitled "If I Were President...Up to the Challenge," John Edwards argued for a comprehensive approach to domestic security.[5] Such approaches are being invoked to deal with a myriad of other issues, including suicide prevention,[6] water cleanliness,[7] and cyber security.[8] Whole-of-government, as will be discussed later, is about better collaboration and cooperation between government departments in achieving government-established objectives.

---

[3] Bill Richardson, "Comprehensive Approach to Strategic Management: Leading across the Strategic Management Domain," *Management Decision*, Vol 32, Issue 8 (1994): 27.

[4] David Wagner, "A Comprehensive Approach to Security," *MIT Sloan Management Review 48*, no. 4 (1 July 2007): 8; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1360146031&Fmt=6&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

[5] John Edwards, "If I Were President...Up To the Challenge," *Foreign Policy* no. 135 (1 March 2003): 52; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=298026491&Fmt=4&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

[6] Province of British Columbia, "[Suicide Prevention:] A Comprehensive Approach," http://www.mcf.gov.bc.ca/suicide_prevention/approach.htm; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

[7] Environment Canada, "Comprehensive Approach to Clean Water," http://www.ec.gc.ca/eau-water/default.asp?lang=En&n=B1128A3D-1; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

[8] Government Technology Blogs, "President Obama and Cybersecurity, A New Comprehensive Approach," http://www.govtechblogs.com/securing_govspace/2009/06/president-obama-and-cybersecur.php; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

One of the Canadian Government's recent perspectives in this regard was publicized in the 2005 International Policy Statement.[9] The concept of whole-of-government was introduced in relation to stabilization and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. This perspective refers to Canada's holistic implementation of the "3D" policy of defence, diplomacy and development. "In the view of the Canadian government, an integrated response - the 3D approach - is the most appropriate mechanism to ensure policy coherence when dealing with failed states."[10] In February 2007, the Canadian departments of Foreign Affairs, International Development and Immigration stood up an Interdepartmental Working Group on Protracted Refugee Situations to develop a "broad-based, whole-of-government approach to inform Canada's response to protracted refugee situations."[11] The Canadian Government appears to have embraced a whole-of-government approach to dealing with issues and problems, especially complex ones; however, it has yet to publish an explicit, overarching policy

[9] The Policy Statement consists of four documents. In the one sub-titled *Overview*, there is mention only of "integrated approach" and "integrated '3D' approach." In the one sub-titled *Diplomacy*, there is mention of "whole-of-government strategies" and "whole-of-Canada approaches." In the one sub-titled *Defence*, there is mention of "whole-of-government approach." See Canada. *Canada's International Policy Statement - A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*, 2005, http://publications.gc.ca/pub?id=267657&sl=0; Internet; accessed 6 May 2010.

[10] Heather Hrychuk, "Combating the Security Development Nexus? Lessons Learned from Afghanistan," *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (July 1, 2009): 829; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1885117361&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

[11] Adèle Dion, "Comprehensive Solutions: A 'Whole-Of-Government' Approach," *Forced Migration Review* no. 33 (1 September 2009): 28; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1922479871&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed February 19, 2010.

statement to this effect. As a result, an inconsistent whole-of-government language is being used by its many departments and agencies.[12]

Whole-of-government approaches are not new. As will be discussed later, they have been pursued by governments since Roman times. Modern governments continue to demand better collaboration, coordination and cooperation between their departments and agencies. If the concept has been around for such a long time, however, why are governments still fretting about them?

Militaries, which are sub-organizations of democratic governments, crave efficiency. So do most organizations, profit and not-for-profit alike. But militaries crave it even more. This is because military inefficiency has the most tragic of human consequences, the loss of many lives and the possible loss of a nation's freedom. Political scientist Eliot Cohen and historian John Gooch examine several military failures in their book *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*.[13] Analysis of such failures normally drives militaries to do things better, especially more efficiently.

In the military, the principal mechanism for doing things better is planning. Planning and the output of the planning process, a plan, are recognized as being the key to success.[14] While plans may change with changing circumstances, the absence of a

---

[12] The many expressions previously cited in the four documents which make up the 2005 International Policy Statement all relate to a generic, but not formally defined, 'whole-of-government' approach; all of the expressions are essentially synonymous in concept. Any suggestion or impression, however, that 'whole-of-government' represents a deliberate evolution in expressions such as '3D approach' is not grounded in fact or policy.

[13] Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: The Free Press, 1990).

[14] As will be discussed later, there are many types of plan, ranging from grand strategy at the strategic level to a plan to attack a specified target at the tactical level.

coherent, well-considered plan is a sure recipe for failure. Militaries are said to plan more than any other organization in either government or business.

The quest for military efficiency has existed since the beginning of time. The modern quest was significantly exemplified by the Prussian Army's success against the French in 1870. This success was attributed, in large part, to the development of the General Staff system and a structured planning process. The World Wars saw militaries on all sides seek to perfect their ability to be more efficient than their adversaries. At the conclusion of the first Gulf War in 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf declared Saddam Hussein had no appreciation of the operational art,[15] also called the art of the general, which is anchored in a structured planning process. Improved efficiency, as enabled by a robust staff system, operational art, and a structured planning process contribute to victory on the battlefield. A structured planning process is very important to militaries.

At the heart of the planning process is a structured methodology for solving problems, the estimate process.[16] For all intents and purposes, it is a militarized version of the scientific method which is taught in most elementary and high schools. The estimate process is taught to military officers from the moment they go through basic training. It is re-emphasized in greater detail to officers, as they advance through the ranks from Captain to Major, at staff schools and colleges. At the tactical level, it remains a simple estimate i.e. what is the problem, what needs to be done about the

---

[15] R. W. Apple, "Allies Destroy Iraqis' Main Force; Kuwait is Retaken after 7 Months," *The New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/28/international/worldspecial/28IRAQ.html; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

[16] The Canadian military speaks of an "estimate" of the situation. The American military speaks of an "appreciation" of the situation. The concept and the process are the same. The American process is articulated at: The United States Army, *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, Version 1.0, 28 January 2008; http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-5-500.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 May 2010.

problem, what is the aim, what assumptions and factors would affect achievement of the aim, what are the possible options, and which of these options best satisfies the aim? At the operational level, this problem solving methodology has further been developed and incorporated into a structured operational planning process. Until recently, navies, armies and air forces used separate, service-specific planning processes. Since the early 1990s, an inter-service or joint[17] operational planning process has been taught, so that navy, army and air force officers, working in a joint environment, understand and use a common planning process. Of late, the joint operational planning process has been adapted, in the Canadian Forces, for strategic-level planning.[18]

Planning should not be and is not the sole purview of the military. While the context, emphasis and level of planning may be different, bureaucrats, and their political masters, also plan; but, the principal outputs of their efforts, as will be discussed later, are usually the intentions, objectives and ways of high-level plans, which are often referred to as policies and strategies. As militaries often say, time spent planning is seldom wasted. While planning is important at all levels, it is most important at the strategic level where complex problems are analyzed and decisions are made to do something about them. As militaries have discovered, selection and maintenance of the aim are critical to effective and efficient application of military power. The best way to plan, as discovered over time, is to fully engage the requisite decision-makers, along with their planners, from the moment a problem is discussed and a desire to do something is

---

[17] In the military, joint is used to describe activities involving two or more of the military services, comprised of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and, in the United States, the Marine Corps.

[18] Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2008), 1-9.

contemplated. As militaries have discovered, a common, structured planning process offers the best means of properly defining the problem at hand, determining what is to be done about it, and considering the best options for addressing it. Such a common, structured process, which is enshrined in doctrine and taught, practised and used routinely by decision-makers and their supporting staff, would ensure the formulation and implementation of the best possible policies, strategies and operational plans.

If the joint operational planning process enables the three military services to effectively and efficiently develop joint operational plans, what planning process is used to enable effective and efficient development of interdepartmental policies, strategies, and subordinate plans? In the wake of Canada's whole-of-government approach to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the provision of security for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and humanitarian assistance to earthquake-stricken Haiti, a structured, interdepartmental planning process does not yet exist.[19] Could this lack of a common planning process explain why governments continue to search for better collaboration, coordination and cooperation between their departments and agencies?

Purpose

Given the Government's desire to develop better whole-of-government solutions to problems or issues, at home or abroad, this paper will argue Canada's federal government would benefit from the adoption of a common, structured, interdepartmental planning process. Such a process would ensure that, in dealing with complex problems which require the attention of and action by more than one government department or

[19] This assessment is based on the opinions of senior commanders and staff in National Defence Headquarters, Canadian Forces Expeditionary Command and Canada Command, as collected in May 2010.

agency, interdepartmental decision-makers and planners would come together to develop the requisite whole-of-government response within a framework of common language, intent and problem-solving process. Such a common, structured, interdepartmental planning process would be more effective and efficient than the current, undocumented and *ad hoc* planning processes.

To this end, this paper will examine, in the next five chapters: the modern management concepts and means, and the nuances thereof, by which democratic governments and bureaucracies, Canada's in particular, get things done; the origins and meanings of the concept of the whole-of-government approach; the recent experiences of certain Western countries and international organizations in considering and using the whole-of-government approach; the mindset and experience of Canada in doing the same; and the benefits and challenges of adopting a common, structured, interdepartmental planning process.

This paper will focus on whole-of-government approaches which involve military activities in the domestic and international environments, mostly, but not solely, from the Canadian perspective. The argument for a common planning process will assume, in the case of Canada, the existence of an over-arching policy which describes what exactly is meant and desired by the Government when its speak of a whole-of-government approach; the argument for such a policy is outside the scope of this paper. The argument will also assume the common planning process would subsequently and logically be enshrined in formal government doctrine, and the process would be taught to all civil servants and military officers who are tasked to consider, plan and implement whole-of-government action; these two points are also outside the scope of this paper.

CHAPTER 2 - GETTING THINGS DONE IN GOVERNMENT

General

The concept of a whole-of-government approach originates from a democratic government's desire to do things better. As a result, it is important for senior civil servants and military officers, who will be called upon to contribute to such an approach, to understand how their governments, bureaucracies and militaries think and operate. This chapter will examine the similarities, nuances and differences of management concepts, language and *modus operandi* used by politicians and public servants on one hand and military officers on the other.

Modern military doctrine traditionally recognizes three levels of war, namely strategic, operational and tactical, and by extension, three levels of organization and function. While they may not use the same terms, civilian bureaucracies also recognize similar levels of organization and function. The Canadian federal government and its bureaucracy speak in terms of national, regional and local levels. Notwithstanding the differences in terminology, officials at the top of the organization, be they politicians, civil servants, or military officers, normally establish policy and strategy, officials in the middle of the organization, or at the top of the organization if no middle exists, normally translate this policy and strategy into operational plans, and personnel at the bottom of the organization implement the plans and achieve the desired objectives or deliver the desired programme.

All organizations do things differently. All organizations manage differently. The military's traditional view of management, which focuses on the conduct of

operations, includes planning, organizing, coordinating, directing and controlling.[20] As was discussed in the Introduction, the military places tremendous importance on planning because of the consequences of failure; military failures result in loss of lives, and, in the worst case scenario, loss of a nation's freedom. While many of these discrete management functions are also found elsewhere, governments, bureaucracies and businesses view and value them differently.[21]

Management Simplified

Humans do things. When a human wants to get things done, he or she is commonly said to get "organized". When more than one human comes together to get one or more things done, the subsequent grouping becomes an organization. In order to get things done, the organization needs at least one decision-making process and at least one action-implementation process. The larger the number of things to get done, the larger the organization and the larger the number of decision-making and action-implementation processes.

All organizations produce either a good or a service, otherwise known as an output. An output is called for by way of an objective (synonymous with goal, end,

---

[20] Samuel H. Hays and William N. Thomas, *Taking Command: The Art and Science of Military Leadership* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Company, 1967), 94.

[21] It is not clear why governments, bureaucracies and businesses have not traditionally put as much emphasis on planning as has the military. As will be discussed shortly in this chapter, management gurus Robert Kaplan and David Norton felt so concerned about this problem in business that they have written several management books to persuade business to adopt a more structured process for developing strategy, business' highest level of plan. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat is struggling to get the Canadian Government and its bureaucracy to develop better, integrated performance reports; however, this author believes the lack of a common planning process and the resultant lack of coherent plans will continue to hamper its efforts. Perhaps business and democratic governments are all-to-often driven respectively by short-term profit and re-election. In the end, the reasons for the different perspectives on planning would require further investigation, which is outside the intent of this paper.

target and milestone). Management can be defined as the act of initiating, sustaining and controlling the processes which see an organization take resources (or inputs) and produce goods and services (or outputs) to achieve desired objectives and associated outcomes (synonymous with results and effects).

The management process essentially consists of four cyclical steps: develop a plan, execute the plan, measure the plan, and adjust the plan.[22] The key object in the process is the plan. Without a plan, there is little of consequence to manage. The first three steps of the management process, and the key elements of a plan, which will be described in turn, are presented graphically at Figure 1.

[22] This simplified view of the management process is the result of five years of the author's personal experience leading or supervising the production of the Canadian Navy's annual Strategic Assessment and Business Plan. The purpose of the Strategic Assessment, previously called the Impact Assessment, was to indentify to the Chief of the Defence Staff, via the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, those strategic-level challenges which would prevent the Chief of the Maritime Staff from achieving his assigned mission and desired vision. In addition to producing the Strategic Assessment and the Business Plan, the author contributed to the Department of Defence's annual Report on Plans and Priorities (the plan) and Departmental Performance Report (measurement of the plan). Over the years in question, the author witnessed the influence of many management fads and the introduction of many management buzz words and expressions, championed by numerous business schools and management consultants and taken up by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat or the Department of National Defence. The author's simplified view of the management process satisfied a need to describe the essence of the process for rank and file managers in the Canadian Navy.



Figure 1 – Simplified Management Process

Plan development (or formulation) starts at the top of Figure 1 and follows the downward "planning" arrow. In developing a plan, the leader of an organization, or work unit, must articulate the organization's mission (synonymous with purpose and mandate), vision (synonymous with way ahead and aim), and measurable objectives which flow from each. The mission describes the organization's purpose or mandate over a given period of time.[23] The vision describes how the leader sees the organization evolving over time.[24] The leader's vision is critical.[25] Some leaders have vision; others do not. In

[23] The mission is constant over time, until it is changed, and subtends the organization's "sustain" agenda.

[24] The vision subtends the leader's "change" agenda. The vision is meant to represent a destination which is just beyond the organization's reach. Should, however, the organization actually achieve the vision, its leader should generate another, so that the organization is constantly moving forward.

some organizations, mission and vision are blurred into a single mission or vision statement. Objectives can span several time horizons, depending on the nature of the organization.[26] Each objective has an associated outcome. Objectives describe what is to be achieved.[27] Outcomes are the result of having achieved the associated objective.[28] In those organizations which articulate separate mission and vision statements, vision is the most important statement. A vision statement normally needs to be broken down into long, medium and short term, measurable "change" objectives.[29] Of all these elements, long-term change objectives, and their associated outcomes, are the most important.[30] It is critical for the leader to personally articulate the mission, vision and long-term objectives, and associated outcomes, of his organization. Once they have been clearly articulated by the leader, subordinates can determine the remaining elements of the plan. The plan should clearly show the relationship between: the organization's mission and

---

[25] John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 7. Kotter speaks of the importance of vision in implementing transformational change; however, vision is just as important when implementing incremental or evolutionary change.

[26] For simplicity, time horizons can be categorized as long, medium and short term. In some organizations, such as large government departments or large businesses, these horizons can span 30, 10 and 3 years respectively. In other organizations, such as a sub-organization within a government department or a small enterprise, these horizons can span 5, 2 and 1 years.

[27] The syntax of an objective consists, at a minimum, of an action verb and an object, in the form of a noun. For instance: increase profit, reduce costs, build a school, and provide security.

[28] The syntax of an outcome consists, at a minimum, of an adjective and a noun. For instance: increased profit, reduced cost, built school, and provided security.

[29] Since the mission of an organization does not change over a given period of time, its "sustain" objectives, which support the "change" agenda, will remain constant and not change over the long, medium and short terms.

[30] Objectives, whether long, medium or short, should be expressed in a measurable format. SMART is a mnemonic used to assist in the development of measurable objectives. SMART stands for: Specific – objectives should specify what they want to achieve; Measurable – you should be able to measure whether you are meeting the objectives or not; Achievable - are the objectives you set, achievable and attainable? Realistic – Can you realistically achieve the objectives with the resources you have? and, Time – When do you want to achieve the set objectives? See LearnMarketing.net, "SMART Objectives," http://www.learnmarketing.net/smart.htm; Internet; accessed 3 May 2010.

the leader's vision; the objectives, and associated outcomes, as they span multiple time horizons; the outputs (goods or services) that need to be produced, normally during a given operating period; the activities that need to be conducted in order to produce the desired outputs, grouped into processes; and, the inputs (resources) needed to conduct the activities. In the end, the plan reveals the who, what, where, when, why and how of an organization, as envisioned and championed by its leader. A plan can be good or bad. It can be clearly articulated or not. Regardless, responsibility for the plan belongs solely with the organization's leader.[31]

Plan execution (or implementation) starts at the bottom of Figure 1 and follows the upward "execution" arrow. Once the plan has been developed and communicated, it can be executed as designed. Employees, as directed by supervisors and managers, use the assigned resources to conduct the requisite activities, following prescribed processes, to produce the goods and services which either are used by other sub-organizations or constitute the parent organization's ultimate outputs. The ultimate outputs satisfy the articulated short-term objectives, and associated outcomes, which then satisfy the medium and long term objectives, and associated outcomes. When objectives and associated outcomes are achieved, the mission and vision are subsequently satisfied, as intended by the leader of the parent or supreme organization.

Plan measurement is represented by magnifying glass symbols in Figure 1. As the plan is being executed, management measures the organization's performance against the plan. If activities, outputs, objectives and outcomes are not being conducted,

---

[31] George A. Steiner, *Strategic Planning - What Every Manager Must Know* (New York: The Free Press: 1979), 82.

produced, satisfied, or achieved in the intended manner, then the plan is adjusted accordingly, to bring the organization's performance back on track with respect to its intended path. While performance measurement can take place at any level of plan execution, it is preferable to measure outcomes over outputs, outputs over activities, and activities over inputs. After all, achievement of intended outcomes is most important, not the production of outputs or the consumption of inputs; in many cases, organizations are great at spending money and producing goods and services, but sometimes there is no link between the outputs and the intended outcomes.[32] Regrettably, most organizations do a better job at measuring their inputs than measuring their outcomes. Sometimes, it is not easy to measure outcomes, in which case outputs, acting as proxies for outcomes, should be measured.

This simplified view of the management process is applicable to all organized human endeavours. It applies to all government activities, including policy and strategy formulation and implementation, and subordinate plan development. It also applies to the management of routine and crisis issues, both domestically and internationally.

The Nature of Problems

The need for action by Government and its bureaucracy of subordinate departments and agencies is motivated by the existence of problems, often called, in politically-correct language, issues or challenges. Many academics have categorized and

[32] The importance of measuring outcomes was championed by the government "reinvention movement." "This rhetoric style employs a vocabulary that highlights outcomes rather than inputs, processes, or even outputs." See Beryl Radin, "The Instruments of Intergovernmental Management," *Handbook of Public Administration* (SAGE Publications. 2003); http://www.sage-ereference.com/hdbk_pubadmin/Article_n48.html; Internet; accessed 18 May. 2010. Also, see Robert Kaplan and David Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 180.

defined different types of contexts, environments and systems in which problems gravitate. Knowledge management researcher David Snowden and organizational communication consultant Mary Boone categorize and define four contexts, which can be transposed to problems:

> Simple contexts [or problems] are characterized by stability and clear cause-and-effect relationships that are easily discernable … Complicated contexts [or problems]… may contain multiple right answers, and though there is a clear relationship between cause and effect, not everyone can see it. In a complex context [or problem] … right answers can't be ferreted out. In a chaotic context [or problem], searching for right answers would be pointless: The relationships between cause and effect are impossible to determine because they shift constantly and no manageable patterns exist…[33]

Defence scientist and sociologist Ross Pigeau does not speak of problems or contexts but of systems, and categorizes them similarly as simple, complicated and complex. For Pigeau, a complex system is non-linear and unpredictable.[34] Again, the categorization of systems in this fashion can be transposed to problems.

In addition to being categorized as simple, complicated, complex, or chaotic, problems are also called wicked, and structured and unstructured. Design theorist Horst Rittel and urban designer and theorist Melvin Webber were the first to speak of wicked problems. "The kinds of problems that planners deal with - societal problems, are inherently different from the problems that scientists and some classes of engineers deal with. Planning problems are inherently wicked."[35] Some analysts use wicked and

---

[33] David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, "A Leader's Framework for Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review* (Nov 2007): 70, 71 and 74.

[34] Ross Pigeau, "The Exercise of High Command: Theories of Command and Control," presentation to the National Security Programme on 24 March 2010, slide 14, with permission.

[35] Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973): 160.

complex interchangeably. Huba Wass de Czege, founder and first director of the United States School of Advanced Military Studies, distinguishes complicated systems, "made up of numerous parts and structures, all logically separable," from complex systems, "made up of dynamic, interactive, and adaptive elements that cannot be separated."[36] De Czege also speaks of unstructured problems, in opposition to structured ones, and observes that some military leaders are "excellent at analyzing a structured problem … but lousy at synthesis – creating a construct that explains how parts [of the unstructured problem] relate." He further suggests operational art "is really the art of taking an unstructured problem and giving it enough structure so that planning can lead to useful action."[37]

Some analysts suggest that complex or wicked or unstructured problems, the ones which most often confront governments and their bureaucracies, are, at the very least, very difficult to solve, and in the worst case, impossible to solve. In many cases, the resolution of such problems extends beyond the mandate of a single government department or agency. Some analysts suggest that traditional problem solving methods, sometimes qualified as linear, are inadequate to the task, and that new, non-linear, and as-of-yet undefined methods need to be used. In his analysis of "complex decision problems", administrative studies Professor Jim Radford appears to suggest there is little

---

[36] Huba Wass de Czege, "Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in Complex Missions," *Military Review* (January-February 2009): 2.

[37] Huba Wass de Czege, "Of "Intellectual and Moral" Failures," *Small Wars Journal* (Blog: 24 June 2007) [journal on-line]; available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/05/print/of-intellectual-and-moral-fail/; Internet; accessed 3 May 2010.

value in trying to define complex problems.[38] Military consultant and writer John Schmitt suggests the normal, time-validated problem solving methods need simply be preceded with an "iterative, conversational design process based on systems think," called operational design, whereby the commander develops a systemic[39] understanding of the situation.[40] It is not clear if existing methods, old or new, are lacking, or if leaders simply do not take the time to properly think about and carefully describe the problem.

From a planning perspective, if the problem, regardless of its nature or how it is categorized, is not accurately and clearly defined, any subsequent effort to resolve it may not address the correct problem or problem elements. In the case of complex problems, which require the attention of more than one department to resolve, it is most important that a common understanding of the problem and of the potential solution sets be developed collaboratively between all participants. From a management perspective, correct definition of a problem, challenge or issue, regardless of its complexity or lack of structure, is the purview and one of the key responsibilities of the leader of the organization. This notion is central to the military's estimate process, or structured problem solving methodology; the decision-maker must be involved in the planning process. At the national or strategic level in government, the Government Leader is responsible for approving policy and strategy, to deal with complex problems, or issues.

---

[38] K. Jim Radford, *Complex Decision Problems - An Integrated Strategy for Resolution* (Reston: Reston Publishing Company, 1977).

[39] Systemic relates to the systems-based approach of inquiry. See Bob Williams, "Systems and Systems Thinking," *Encyclopedia of Evaluation* (SAGE Publications: 2004); http://www.sage-ereference.com/evaluation/Article_n537.html; Internet; accessed 17 May. 2010.

[40] John F. Schmitt, "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design," Marine Corps Combat Development Command; http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/mcwl_schmitt_op_design.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 May 2010.

Policy and Strategy

Policy and strategy are two words which are often used in government. Policy is more often used in civil servant circles and strategy is more often used in military circles. Policy and strategy are sometimes used interchangeably in both communities.

International security affairs and strategic analyst Don Macnamara supports the following definition of policy: "a statement of action or direction by a government or organization in response to a perceived trend, issue or event which may affect its interests." He also supports "plan or policy statement as a statement of the means by which policy or strategy will be implemented…"[41] Public policy is defined by Leslie Pal, professor of public policy and administration, as "a course of action or inaction chosen by public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems." Pal adds that "every policy has three key elements: the definition of the problem, the goals to be achieved, and the instruments or means chosen to address the problem and to achieve the goals."[42] Rand Dyck, professor of political science, describes a circular and ongoing policymaking process which consists of six steps: initiation, priority-setting, policy formulation, legitimation, implementation, and interpretation.[43]

---

[41] Don Macnamara, "Strategic Thinking and Strategic Management," presentation to the National Security Programme on 27 November 2010, slide 2, with permission.

[42] Rand Dyck, "The Policymaking Process and Policy Instruments," in *Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches* (Toronto: Thompson-Nelson, 2008), 506.

[43] *Ibid.*, 506.

Strategy comes from the Greek word *strategos* which means "art of the general."[44] Some, such as strategy professor Thomas Mahnken, use strategy solely in the context of war, citing Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz.[45] When most people speak of strategy, however, they do not think of it or use it in terms of "art." The military officer's view of strategy and the civil servant's view of it are not always the same. Some people use the word strategy as a synonym of the word plan.[46] But to these people, strategy is no ordinary plan; it is a super plan. Some people protect the use of the word strategy for an organization's highest level plan. Some use the word strategy to mean any plan, regardless of the organizational level. Some of these same people, however, think of strategy as consisting solely of the most important or foundational elements of a plan.[47] These can be considered the leader's vision and objectives. Many military officers would consider these elements part of Commander's intent. Some civil servants might think of them in terms of policy. In the end, strategy is often used in reference to a high-level plan, and consists of the same elements as a plan, that is ends, ways and means.[48] Like a

---

[44] Daniel Moss, "Strategies," *Encyclopedia of Public Relations* (SAGE Publications: 2004); http://www.sage-ereference.com/publicrelations/Article_n415.html; Internet; accessed 17 May 2010.

[45] Thomas G. Mahnken, "Strategic Theory," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, ed. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen, 67-80 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 67.

[46] There are numerous perspectives on what constitutes a strategy and what constitutes a plan. Some perspectives are circular. For instance, the Canadian Forces state "[p]olicy defines the end state, strategy outlines the plan." See *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)*, 1-3.

[47] John G. Heidenrich suggests: "A strategy is not really a plan but the logic driving the plan." See , John G Heidenrich, "The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community's Neglect of Strategic Intelligence," Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2 (2007); https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/the-state-of-strategic-intelligence.html; Internet; accessed 19 April 2010.

[48] Carpenter and Sanders define strategy as "the coordinated means by which an organization pursues its goals and objectives," and suggest strategy "encompasses the pattern of actions that have been taken and that are planned to be taken by an organization in pursuing its objectives." See Mason Carpenter and Wm Gerard Sanders. *Strategic Management: A Dynamic Perspective Concepts and Cases* (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009), 10.

plan, the responsibility for an organization's strategy, whether good or bad, well articulated or not, rests squarely with the leader of the organization.[49]

Gradations of policy exist, diminishing in scope and importance as it cascades down organizational levels. The most important policy, the one at the highest level of government organization, is that which is established by the Government Leader. It provides direction, guidance or a way ahead for all to follow. Such high-level policy sometimes takes the shape of a strategy, a white paper, or legislation. More often than not, it is simply referred to as policy. Government departments can establish mid-level implementation policy, which may or may not impact the public but which should always be in keeping with the Government's prescribed directional policy. The least important policy, the one at the lowest level of government organization, is office policy, which rarely impacts the public.

Similarly, military officers recognize gradations of strategy. A state's strategy or supreme plan is called a grand strategy[50]. It contains, or should contain, the national leader's vision, over the long term, for the country. Such a strategy should be based on the state's values and interests. Political Science Professor Steven Kendall-Holloway reminds us of International Relations Professor Stephen Krasner's contention that

---

[49] Robert F. Grattan, *The Strategy Process – A Military Business Comparison* (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 197.

[50] Grand strategy is defined as "[a] state's most complex form of planning toward the fulfillment of a long-term objective. The formulation and implementation of a grand strategy require the identification of a national goal, a thorough assessment of the state's resources, and, ultimately, the marshalling of those resources in a highly organized manner to achieve the set goal. Although a grand strategy is concerned with national affairs both in times of war and peace, national strategies historically have operated under the assumption of the existence of an enemy that needs to be overcome. To that end, policymakers attempt to develop the best possible way of coordinating military prowess, political leverage, diplomatic ability, and economic might to achieve a cohesive national strategy." See Razvan Sibii, "Grand Strategy," *Encyclopedia of United States National Security,* SAGE Publications: 2005; http://www.sage-ereference.com/nationalsecurity/Article_n250.html; Internet; accessed 13 May. 2010.

national interests should not vary in time from government to government, and that most states share similar interests of sovereignty, peace and security, and economic prosperity.[51] These interests constitute the principal themes of grand strategy, namely national security and economic prosperity. In the United States, grand strategy begets national security strategy which begets defence strategy which begets military strategy, and so on down the chain of command.[52] No similar cascading construct currently exists in Canada.

In many ways, policy and strategy are similar.[53] In some ways, one is a subset of the other. If policy represents a leader's intent or direction and strategy articulates the ways and means of achieving the desired ends, then policy is the pre-amble or introduction of the strategy. Their formulation both require: identification of a problem; initiation, preferably from the top, by way of the articulation of an objective; and determination, after options are investigated, of the preferred means of achieving the objective and resolving the problem. They are used at many levels within cascading organizations, but they are of most importance at the highest level of large organizations. In the case of government, it is national-level policy and strategy, which is established by the Government Leader, or Government Ministers, and with or without the advice of

---

[51] Steven Kendall-Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 12, 14.

[52] Grand strategy is approved by the President, national security strategy is approved by the National Security Advisor, defense strategy is approved by the Secretary of Defense, military strategy is approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and theatre strategy is approved by the Unified Combatant Commander.

[53] This is the perspective of the Canadian Forces. See *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)*, 1-12. Also, Mason Carpenter and Gerard Sanders state that, in the corporate world, strategy is "sometimes referred to as *business policy*." See *Strategic Management: A Dynamic Perspective Concepts and Cases* (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009), 7.

senior-most departmental bureaucrats and military commanders, which are of most importance.

Regardless of the relationship between and different perspectives of policy and strategy, it is important that policy and strategy be coherent. Coherence is about two things, at least. Firstly, it is about ensuring linkage between ends, ways and means within a given policy or strategy. Secondly, it is about ensuring individual policies and strategies do not negatively impact other policies and strategies. Top-level, coherent direction on national-level objectives and desired outcomes is critical if whole-of-government action is to be effective and efficient.

The quest for "policy coherence" is not new, and has manifested itself in many ways and areas. The 1968 unification of Canada's armed forces by Defence Minister Paul Hellyer, for instance, was intended to eliminate stove-piped, inter-service rivalry and competition so as to obtain greater defence policy coherence.[54] The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act was similarly intended to bring greater coordination among the different branches of the United States military.[55]

Militaries do not speak in terms of policy and policy coherence. Rather, they speak in terms of strategy, selection and maintenance of the aim, and unity of effort and command. The concepts of unity of effort and command, which are partially equivalent to policy coherence, are not new. The United States, in particular, advocates unity of

---

[54] Michael Rostek, "Managing Change within DND," in *The Public Management of Defence*, ed. Craig Stone, 213-236 (Toronto: Breakout Education, 2009), 222.

[55] "Goldwater-Nichols Act," in *Encyclopedia of United States National Security* (SAGE Publications: 2005); http://www.sage-ereference.com/nationalsecurity/Article_n247.html; Internet; accessed 13 May. 2010.

command as one its key principles of war, going back to the Civil War when it was exercised by General Grant.[56]

Canadian military officers and observers have long pined for more collaborative, pan-government, policy and strategy formulation. In 1937, Colonel Maurice Pope, working for the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa, wrote:

> … what is required is not three separate and more or less independent Service policies, but a single concentric policy of National Defence, embracing, not only the activities of the three services, but, to some extent in peace and certainly in war those of many civil Departments of State as well.[57]

Later, Queen's University Professor of Defence Management Studies Douglas Bland observed that in 1996:

> … officers who tried to deploy the Armed Forces to Zaire complained that '[Department of National Defence/ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade] meetings held to develop the Canadian response to the developing crisis [in the Great Lakes region of Africa] were unproductive. This was due to the fact that there was a lack of senior leadership direction on the government's intent, the priority of the mission, and the general level of commitment required. The only result of the meetings was frustration.'[58]

Governing and managing at the strategic level is about policy and strategy formulation and implementation. This is the crux of what has become known as strategic

---

[56] Ian Hope, "Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War," Carlisle Papers in Strategic Studies, US Army Strategic Studies Institute, November 2008, 1.

[57] Maurice A. Pope, "Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence: 8 March 1937," in *Canada's National Defence Volume 2: Defence Organization*, ed. Douglas L. Bland, 7-20 (Kingston: Queen's University, School of Policy Studies, 1998), 9.

[58] Bland, Douglas, "Canada's Officer Corps: New Times, New Ideas," Conference of Defence Associations Institute Annual Seminar, Ottawa, 29 January 1999; http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/03/seminar1999.pdf#page=28; Internet; accessed 12 February 2010.

management, which includes strategic thinking, strategic planning, and strategic decision-making.[59]

Governance, Management, Command, Control and Leadership

The Canadian Forces and its parent Department of National Defence are but two sub-organizations of Canada's federal Government. In terms of ensuring Canada's national security in the 21st century, principally but not solely from external threats, the Canadian Forces have come to collaborate and cooperate with other federal departments and agencies. Collaboration and cooperation take place at all levels, but most importantly at the strategic or national level where political masters, senior bureaucrats and senior military officers formulate policy and strategy. However, politicians, bureaucrats and military officers evolve in different cultures.[60] These cultures manifest themselves by different ways of thinking, communicating and acting. In seeking to do things better, there have been attempts to develop common ways of thinking and acting. Politicians have clamoured for more effectiveness, more efficiency and greater accountability.[61] Bureaucrats have tried to respond by studying and implementing

---

[59] Strategic management can be defined, from an economics perspective, as "the process by which a firm manages the formulation and implementation of strategy." See Carpenter and Sanders, *Strategic Management*…, 8. For an overview of the evolution of strategic management, see Edward Bowman, Harbir Singh and Howard Thomas, "The Domain of Strategic Management: History and Evolution." Chap. 2 in *Handbook of Strategy and Management*, edited by Andrew Pettigrew, Howard Thomas and Richard Whittington, 31-51. London: Sage publications, 2006.

[60] Some in the Canadian military opine the culture of the civil service is one of consultation and consensus. It is not clear if this opinion is meant in a positive or negative way. The Canadian military may be said to have a culture of structure and ideal solutions. The previous comment also applies. None of these opinions are yet expressed in literature. A non-comparative perspective of culture in the Canadian Forces is provided by Karen Davis and Brian McKee in their article "Culture in the Canadian Forces: Issues and Challenges for Institutional Leaders," in *Institutional Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Contemporary Issues* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007).

[61] As exemplified, for instance, by the 1960 Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organization and the 1976 Lambert Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability.

various management reforms.[62] Military officers have attempted to adapt their ways to the needs of politicians and bureaucrats.[63]

Language and terminology differ in all three groups. Politicians and bureaucrats speak of governance and management. Military officers speak of command and control. All speak of leadership, but it is viewed and valued differently in each group. Many use one another's preferred words without knowing if their sense is truly understood by all. In many ways, the concepts evoked by these words are similar, but few understand the similarities, nuances and differences. All groups share a common understanding of leadership, the art of getting someone, normally a subordinate, to do something willingly. Governance, a bureaucratic expression, refers to the authorities, structures and processes for lawful decision-making. In the Canadian federal government, this refers to the means by which the Prime Minister, Ministers and senior bureaucrats make lawful decisions on behalf of the people of Canada. The military does not speak in terms of governance. Rather, it speaks in terms of command. Defence management analysts Peter Gray and Jonathan Harvey offer a United Kingdom Ministry of Defence definition of command: "…a position of authority and responsibility to which military men and women are

---

[62] As exemplified, for instance, by the 1989 Public Service 2000 initiative, which resulted in the 1991 Public Service Reform Act.

[63] One example, organizational in nature, was the stand-up of the Management, Command and Control Reengineering Team in 1995 to "propose a new headquarters' structure, and to coordinate reengineering across the Department." See Department of National Defence, "Backgrounder: Renewal and Change," 22 February 1996, 3. A second example, operational in nature, is the Canadian Forces examination of the emerging concept of effects-based approaches to operations, as a means of pursuing "an integrated approach" to security and defence. See Allan English and Howard Coombs, editors, *Effects-Based Approaches to Operations: Canadian Perspectives* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008).

legally appointed."[64] Pigeau defines command as "the creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish the mission."[65] This definition likely resonates well with leaders in both the private and public sectors of civil society. But there is no single word that readily equates, in civil society, to this definition. The notion is most closely imbedded in the word governance. Management can be defined as "coordinating work activities so that they are completed efficiently and effectively with and through other people."[66] Control can be defined as "the process of monitoring activities to ensure that they are being accomplished as planned…"[67]

In essence, management is to governance what control is to command. Management is a sub-set of governance; one cannot govern well unless one knows how to manage properly. Similarly, control is a sub-set of command; one cannot command well unless one knows how to control properly. Both governance and command require leadership.

If a whole-of-government approach is to result in greater effectiveness and efficiency, then the cultural and terminology differences of politicians, bureaucrats and military officers will have to find a common ground of understanding and compromise. A common planning process, which would be the principal pan-government mechanism for defining complex problems, deciding what to do about them, and considering whole-

---

[64] Peter W. Gray and Jonathan Harvey, "Strategic Leadership Education," in *In Pursuit of Excellence: International Perspectives of Military Leadership* (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 91.

[65] Pigeau, "The Exercise of High Command: Theories of Command and Control," slide 50.

[66] Robbins, Coulter and Langton, *Management*, 8.

[67] *Ibid.*, 468.

of-government options for solving them, would provide the necessary framework for greater understanding, compromise, and collaboration.

Collaboration, Coordination, Cooperation, Integration and Alignment

In terms of maximizing organizational efficiency, many academics and management consultants emphasize the need for better collaboration, coordination and cooperation. The need for better integration and alignment is also raised. All of these words are often used in discussing and describing public management reforms including whole-of-government approaches, so it is important to understand their intended meanings and distinctions. Unfortunately, there is little clarity in popular literature and only limited clarity in professional literature, as to the distinction and nuance between these words and the concepts they represent. Many of these words are often used interchangeably. In the case of the distinction between collaboration and cooperation, for instance, several dictionaries and encyclopedias offer circular or similar definitions. The same is true with the other words.

In the end, collaboration, coordination and cooperation are related and speak to the concept of people working together, toward a common objective. Collaboration and cooperation are similar, and are often used interchangeably. For some, cooperating might mean not getting in the way or not interfering whereas collaborating might mean working actively to the same purpose.[68] For others, collaboration seems to speak to that part of the process of working together which takes place at the beginning of a mutual endeavour, when a given issue or problem is considered and a common objective to guide

[68] Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire, *Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies For Local Governments* (Washington, Georgetown University Press, 2003), 4.

work is selected. In the same vain, cooperation seems to speak to that part of the process which takes place once a mutual endeavour has been launched and work is undertaken. This distinction between collaboration and cooperation is supported by the International Encyclopaedia of Organization Studies which offers: "… collaboration is conceptualized as a higher degree of integration of means and ends than cooperation."[69] Coordination is somewhat distinct from collaborating and cooperation and refers to the act or process of making or ensuring people work together. Finally, integration and alignment appear to be related to the concept of ensuring coherence of objectives and efforts throughout cascading sub-organizations within a large organization, so that sub-organization objectives and efforts are complementary and not at odds with one another or with the objectives and efforts of the parent organization. The meaning and nuance of integration and alignment, as used in the public management context, remain elusive.[70] Even management gurus Robert Kaplan and David Norton seem to speak of alignment and integration interchangeably.[71]

These words and the concepts they represent are important factors in maximizing organizational effectiveness and efficiency, which is what is desired by the whole-of-government approach. Regardless of how one views or defines them, what is clear is that all imply using a common planning process to achieve a desired pan-government objective. It remains to be seen whether collaboration, coordination, cooperation,

---

[69] Kristian Kreiner, "Collaboration and Cooperation," *International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies*. 2007. SAGE Publications: 2007. http://www.sage-ereference.com/organization/Article_n69.htm; Internet; accessed 12 May. 2010.

[70] Research has revealed little clarity on the meaning of the word integration in the context of whole-of-government approaches. Sometimes, however, it appears to be used synonymously with comprehensive.

[71] Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *Alignment: Using the Balanced Scorecard to Create Corporate Synergies* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006), 3.

integration and alignment, regardless of exact meaning, can be generated from within the organization or whether they need to be top-down driven by the will and example of strong leadership, in this case, that of the Government Leader.

Role of Leadership

Organizations normally consist of persons who decide, persons who assist those who decide and persons who execute. This construct exists in all organizations, including government. For military officers, this is the distinction between line and staff.[72] Militaries normally consist of several cascading, subordinate, line organizations. Each of the subordinate line organizations is headed by a person who has the delegated, legal authority to make decisions in line with his superior's intent and within the mission of his organization. The leaders of each of the cascading, line organizations may be assisted by staff. Staffs can also consist of several cascading subordinate organizations. In the end, line officers make decisions and staff officers assist their respective line officers in making decisions. Sometimes, a line officer will allow a staff officer to make decisions on his behalf, but the authority to make those decisions, even though it has been delegated, still rests with the responsible line officer.

The personalities of senior leaders have a significant impact on how well or not collaboration and cooperation take place. The American response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in August 2005 contains two examples, one bad and one good, of the importance of the personalities of leaders. On one hand, the difficult relationship between Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and his

[72] Samuel H. Hays and William N. Thomas, *Taking Command: The Art and Science of Military Leadership* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Company, 1967), 121.

Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Michael Brown, was a contributing factor to the highly criticized relief effort. On the other hand, the positive relationship and "sheer force of personality" between the Commander of federal active-duty troops, Lieutenant-General Russell Honoré, and the Commander of state national guardsmen, Major-General Bennett Landreneau, ensured cooperation, despite a command structure that was not unified.[73] When there is a will, there is a way. And will comes from leadership.

While large organizations consist of several cascading levels, each with its own line authority, each organization has a supreme leader. At the very top of any organization is a supreme or strategic leader. In business, the supreme or strategic leader is normally called the Chief Executive Officer, or CEO. In parliamentary democracies, the supreme leader is normally called the Prime Minister. The role of the supreme leader is most important. It is he who must set the mission of his organization and envision where the organization needs to go in time against the backdrop of a dynamic or changing competitive environment. It is he, and only he, who must formulate and set in motion implementation of the organization's strategy. This is the most important role of the strategic leader.[74]

Summary

Politicians, civil servants and military officers possess different understandings and views of some of the key concepts, expressions and words used in modern Western

---

[73] Kennedy School of Government, "Hurricane Katrina (B): Responding to an "Ultra-Catastrophe" in New Orleans," Case Study C15-06-1844.0 (Harvard University: 2006), 31.

[74] Carpenter and Sanders. *Strategic Management* …, 8.

democratic governance and management. These differences are contextual and cultural in nature. Understanding the similarities, nuances and differences of management concepts, language and *modus operandi* used by politicians and public servants on one hand and military officers on the other is important if a whole-of-government approach is to be truly successful. One way to attenuate these differences would be to create shared understanding and ownership of policies and programmes by adopting a common planning process.[75]

[75] This does not mean necessarily a military planning process, but a process which all can share and understand.

CHAPTER 3 - WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH

General

Whole-of-government is the latest label for an old concept, that of doing things better through interdepartmental collaboration, coordination and cooperation. The next sections will briefly describe the recent antecedents of the concept of a whole-of-government approach, the broad and narrow perspectives of the approach, and the roles of militaries therein.

Origins

In the 1980s and 1990s, several governments embraced the New Public Management (NPM) agenda, which sought to "apply the disciplines of the market to the public sector."[76] This agenda had produced "structural devolution", "disaggregation", and "single-purpose organizations."[77] American management consultants David Osborne and Ted Gaebler summarized many of these trends and concepts in their 1992 book *Reinventing Government*.[78] By the late 1990s, however, many of these earlier reforms began to loose favour. The movement toward what would eventually be called "joined-up government" and then "whole-of-government" was led by the United Kingdom,

---

[76] Vernon Bogdanor, "Introduction," in *Joined –Up Government*, ed. Vernon Bogdanor, 1-17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1.

[77] Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, "The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform," *Public Administration Review* 67, no. 6 (1 November 2007): 1059.

[78] Osborne and Gaebler described ten principles which promote entrepreneurial public organizations. The most market-oriented of these principles see public organizations compete service delivery, fund outcomes and not inputs, focus on the customer, decentralize authority, and leverage marketplace solutions. See Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming America* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1992), 80, 138, 166, 250, 282.

Australia, and New Zealand, the original champions of NPM. "As a response to the increased fragmentation caused by NPM reform programs, these countries adopted coordination and integration strategies." While not abandoning NPM altogether, the United States moved in a similar direction under the heading of "collaborative public management."[79] There was much talk in the United States of "new ways of doing the public's business," especially at the state and local government level. In 1994, it was said that President Clinton, the former Governor of Arkansas, was keen to put new governance ideas to the test in Washington.[80] Environmentalist DeWitt John, *et al* wrote:

> …advocates of new governance see the process of redesigning government as involving much more than simply adopting the best of old ideas about management, or making current programs function more efficiently. New governance seeks to combine new and old ideas into a comprehensive approach, centered on collaboration, flexibility, results, and engaging citizens …[81]

In 1997, Tony Blair and his government introduced the slogan "joined-up government". The concept of "joined up government" was an attempt, arising out of criticism of the market discipline approach, to "apply not only the logic of economics, but also the insights of other social sciences, and especially sociology and cultural theory, to the reform of public services."[82] It was intended to deal with "wicked issues such as

---

[79] Collaborative public management is "a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multiorganizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations." See Agranoff and McGuire, *Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Governments*, 4.

[80] DeWitt John, *et al*, "What Will New Governance Mean for the Federal Government," *Public Administration Review* 54, no. 2 (1 March 1994): 170; http://www.jstor.org/stable/976526; Internet; accessed February 19, 2010.

[81] John, *et al*, "What Will New Governance Mean for the Federal Government," 175.

[82] Bogdanor, "Introduction," in *Joined –Up Government*, 1.

social exclusion, drug addiction and crime" which could not be handled by a single government department.[83]

The concepts of joined-up government and now whole-of-government approaches are not new ones. Professor of Government Christopher Hood advances joined-up government was a new term for the old management and public administration doctrine of coordination.[84] The former director of the United Kingdom's Government Strategy Unit, Geoff Mulgan, offers joined-up government was intended to deal with the traditional problems of coordination, organization and integration, problems which confronted "all big imperial bureaucracies, whether Roman, Ottoman, or Chinese and every military command attempting to coordinate complex forces."[85] Such observations have naturally led some citizens to wonder why, if whole-of-government is not a new concept, government departments do not yet work better together. There are reasons for this apparent inefficiency, which will be exposed in Chapter 6.

Tom Christensen and Per Laegreid, professors of administration and organization theory, suggest two reasons for the emergence and growth of the whole-of-government approach.[86] The first, which explains its emergence, was a desire to resurrect horizontal coordination which had been lost with the vertical coordination focus of many NPM

---

[83] Vernon Bogdanor, editor, *Joined –Up Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 8, back cover.

[84] Christopher Hood, "The Idea of Joined-Up Government: A Historical Perspective," in *Joined-Up Government*, ed. Vernon Bogdanor, 19-42 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 19.

[85] Geoff Mulgan, "Joined-Up Government: Past, Present, and Future," in *Joined-Up Government*, ed. Vernon Bogdanor, 175-187 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 175.

[86] Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid, "The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform," *Public Administration Review* 67, no. 6 (1 November 2007): 1060; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1404881121&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

reforms. The second, which explains the growth, is the perception of greater insecurity and danger in the world, arising from natural disasters, pandemics and terrorism.

Fundamentally, whole-of-government is about collaboration and cooperation, between government departments, to obtain more effective and efficient satisfaction of government objectives.

Broad and Narrow Views

The newly-branded concept of a whole-of-government approach can be applied broadly or narrowly. On one hand, it can have a broad meaning and intent. As will be seen later, this is the case in the Australian Government's call for "whole-of-government" consideration of all public policy and action endeavours, both within and without the state. It is also the case with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat's use of "whole-of-government" in terms of demanding pan-Government, cohesive resources-to-results management, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. On the other hand, it can have a narrow meaning or intent. It has been used by countries to attempt to develop a cohesive solution to the problem of fragile states. In Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) responses to Haiti in 2004[87] were couched in "whole-of-government" terms. This expression is used in the Department of National Defence (DND), DFAIT and CIDA responses to Afghanistan, as announced in Canada's 2005 International Policy Statement. The Government of the Province of British Columbia refers to the concept in terms of

[87] This should not be confused with Canada's whole-of-government response to the Haiti earthquake of 2010.

dealing with domestic violence: "…work is now under way to integrate the government's criminal justice, family law and child protection services."[88]

The concept of a whole-of-government approach is applicable in both domestic and international endeavours. From an organizational perspective, government is divided into departments and agencies so as to provide issue focus and to avoid duplication of effort. Logically, a Government Leader should be interested in ensuring that his or her ministers and their respective departments and agencies collaborate with one another in formulating policy and plans and in implementing them. In theory and in practice, coordination starts at the top with the Government Leader, and flows down through cabinet and cabinet support mechanisms to government departments and agencies. The coordination of external action is normally simpler than the coordination of internal action because of the reduced number of players. In so far as endeavours which involve the military, the whole-of-government approach is easier in the international arena than in the domestic arena. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, international endeavours are normally pursued solely by federal government departments and agencies. Domestic endeavours, however, normally involve numerous departments and agencies at the national, regional and local levels of government.[89] Secondly, the military rarely has a lead role in domestic endeavours, as it normally operates in support of the provincial authority.

---

[88] Justine Hunter and Ian Bailey, "Lack of comprehensive approach to domestic violence is the rule in B.C.," Globe and Mail, 2 October 2009, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/lack-of-comprehensive-approach-to-domestic-violence-is-the-rule-in-bc/article1310776/; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009.

[89] Whether few or many departments and agencies are involved in solving a common problem, they need to work it from the same understanding and process in order to achieve the desired effects as efficiently as possible.

The broad and narrow views of the whole-of-government approach are different points on the same spectrum of the quest to do things better. One cannot look at whole-of-government action in isolation. If one desires to correct what ails a fragile state, the scarce resources of the involved government departments, and therefore of the donor country, need to be expended as efficiently as possible. But efficient resource consumption need not be limited to those departments that have an explicit mandate abroad. It is required of all government departments. If not, then there are fewer resources available to tackle the problems of fragile states. A whole-of-government approach is needed throughout government. The activities of the government as a whole need to be geared towards solving all complex problems holistically.

Militaries, Civil Control and Whole-of-government Approaches

The purpose and utility of militaries, and their constituent naval, land and air forces, have evolved in recent times. After the demise of the Soviet Union, many militaries have either chosen or been driven to extend their mandate beyond simple defence and into the realm of security and humanitarian assistance. Most countries' militaries shy away from being engaged in domestic affairs. Some countries' militaries are prevented by law from doing so. Navies and air forces tend to be used closer to home than do armies. Ken Booth, a British International Relations theorist, spoke of the three roles of navies as being war fighting, diplomacy and constabulary.[90] As time has evolved and in a bid to maintain relevance, some western navies are considering and accepting an

[90] Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 15.

increasing constabulary role.[91] Armies, such as Canada's, have recently been solicited to fight forest fires and to clear snow, as will discussed in Chapter 5.

The concept of civilian control of the military has been a subject of discussion and debate since time immemorial. What relationship, if any, exists between this long-standing concept of civilian control of the military and the apparently new notion of whole-of-government approach to action?

Civil-military relations in Western democratic states are well-established. These relations are characterized by two notions. First is the notion that in a democracy the military is subordinate to civilian control. Much has been written about civilian control of the military.[92] In fact, the issue is not one of civilian control but rather of government control. It just so happens that Western democratic governments are civilian. In the end, it is not the military commander who decides whether to conduct military operations in furtherance of national objectives, but the duly-elected Government Leader. Military officers must collaborate and cooperate with the political masters who govern and manage. Second is the notion is that the military should collaborate and cooperate with civil servants, within the defence department and within other departments. The defence department in a government organization is but one of many departments and agencies targeted by the whole-of-government approach. Whole-of-government speaks to interdepartmental coordination, in the Canadian government vernacular, and interagency coordination, in the American government vernacular. Civil-military relations are about

---

[91] See Kenneth P. Hansen, editor, *Breaking the Box: The Increasing Demands of Non-combat Roles on Maritime Forces* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2009).

[92] Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23 (1996), 149.

subordination, collaboration, coordination and cooperation either with civilian politicians or with civil servants. Civil-military relations are also characterized by understandable differences, minor and major, in values, language, culture, mindset, and *modus operandi*.

If one wants to maximize whole-of-government approaches, it is important that these notions be well understood by all involved. Ionut C. Popescu, a doctoral candidate in international relations at Duke University, wrote: "An improvement in the conduct of civil-military relations - understood as an improvement in strategic performance rather than simply in better civilian control - is essential to a more successful strategy-making process."[93]

Summary

The whole-of-government approach is about better collaboration, coordination and cooperation between government departments, in satisfaction of government objectives. The concept is not new. There are several ways and areas to apply the concept, broadly and narrowly, domestically and internationally. The degree to which it is applied depends on the will of the Government Leader. Militaries, which are subordinate to government leadership, will naturally want to bring all of their skill and tools to the table when formulating and implementing whole-of-government actions. Militaries have, out of necessity, developed a common planning process to ensure its individual services can easily and routinely come together and solve complex military problems. The planning process engages planners and decision-makers in an iterative fashion in defining the problem at hand, in deciding what to do about it, and in examining

[93] Ionut C Popescu, "Strategic Theory and Practice: A Critical Analysis of the Planning Process for the Long War on Terror," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, Iss. 1: 100, (Abingdon: April 2009).

options for solving it. Militaries have become very good at planning. Planning is important at all levels, especially at the strategic level of government. Militaries naturally wish to employ a similar process when working with civil servants in other departments. A common planning process, which need not be a military process, would enable politicians, civil servants and military officers to better work together towards a whole-of-government objective.

CHAPTER 4 –

WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS ARE DOING

General

This chapter examines the policies, activities, successes and implementation challenges of whole-of-government approaches in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. It also examines how the whole-of-government approach is advocated by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, and adapted and used in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and the United Nations. The examination focuses mainly but not solely on fragile state handling policy.

United Kingdom

Tony Blair was the original advocate of the "joined-up government" approach in dealing with both domestic and international issues, and well before the "whole-of-government" approach became a popular means of dealing with weak and failing states post September 2001.

In the opinion of Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Research Fellow and Programme Associate respectively at the Center [sic] for Global Development, the United Kingdom "has been at the forefront of conceiving and adopting integrated policy responses to weak and failing states."[94] Notwithstanding Blair's initiating leadership, however, separate, stove-piped ministerial mandates and the traditional, vertical resource allocation paradigm continue to challenge implementation of the approach. "Effective

[94] Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole-of-government' Approaches to Fragile States*, (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 9.

cross-Whitehall approaches remain elusive, hampered not only by conflicting mandates and culture, but also by a lack of underlying consensus among departments on national objectives and the means to achieve them."[95]

Interdepartmental differences in culture and perspective continue to weigh on greater collaboration. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is assessed as having the least favourable view of a whole-of-government approach because "it lacks an operational culture and fears encroachment on its traditional leadership in foreign affairs."[96] Meanwhile the Ministry of Defence is "frustrated by what it perceives as the lack of a coherent United Kingdom vision of national security priorities - or even a document similar to the *US National Security Strategy*…"[97] Interestingly, these observations and challenges, as highlighted by Patrick and Brown, are fully consistent with the institutional perspective of organizations and command systems as theorized by US sociologist Richard Scott.[98]

Patrick and Brown opine that British interdepartmental cooperation is less problematic than in the United States, citing more collegial collaboration at senior levels. However, "[a] major structural impediment to joined-up approach is the lack of a strong, central coordinating entity with directive authority over the individual departments."[99] Surprisingly, the Cabinet Office, which appears to be equivalent to Canada's Privy

---

[95] Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?*, 10.

[96] *Ibid.,* 14.

[97] *Ibid.,* 15.

[98] Richard Scott, "Constructing an Analytic Framework I: Three Pillars of Institution." in *Institutions and Organizations*, (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2001), 47-70.

[99] Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?,* 15.

Council Office, is said to be "generally incapable of pushing departments toward the pursuit of common strategic goals."[100]

While much progress has been made in using the joined-up approach for dealing with weak and failing states, Patrick and Brown conclude, among other issues, that such approaches "must be institutionalized, or else it will remain periodic and ad hoc."[101]

One of the more innovative mechanisms to facilitate the joined-up government approach was the introduction in 2001 of Conflict Prevention Pools, one for Africa and another for the rest of the world. The purpose of these pools was to "develop a common strategic approach to resolving conflicts and rationalizing the allocation of financial resources."[102] The pools consist of pooled resources from the Department for International Development, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Common Office. Supervised by a committee of ministers and governed by a Public Service Agreement, the pooled funds are disbursed using common criteria. While well regarded, management-by-pool is not without interdepartmental challenges, and the Cabinet Office has rejected attempts to have them placed under its control.[103]

In 2004, the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit published a report on managing international risks and improving crisis response which, among other issues, recommended a strategic planning process for developing comprehensive actions

---

[100] *Ibid.,* 15.

[101] *Ibid.*, 19.

[102] *Ibid.,* 19.

[103] *Ibid.,* 23.

abroad.[104] Also, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, which was established in the same year, was mandated, among other issues, to develop "joint … doctrine that will bring civilian departments … into comprehensive campaign planning for UK military interventions and post-conflict … efforts."[105] It is not clear, however, if either initiative has been effectively implemented.

Australia

In 2004, the Management Advisory Committee of the Australian Public Service (APS) Commission published *Connecting Government: Whole-of-government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*.[106] This report defined "whole-of-government" as:

> … public service agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can focus on policy development, program management and service delivery.

The purpose of the report was to formally and publically advocate a better way of doing government business. This better way involved working horizontally, not just vertically, within traditional stove-piped silos of ministry and agency responsibility and accountability. The plea to work horizontally was general in nature, and not limited to a particular area, such as international crisis management. In a quest to do things better, or more efficiently, it calls on all public servants, regardless of their organizational role and

---

[104] *Ibid.,* 11.

[105] *Ibid.,* 28.

[106] Australia, Management Advisory Committee of the Australian Public Service Commission, *Connecting Government: Whole-of-government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*, V, http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment.htm; Internet; accessed 7 March 2010.

position, to consider the benefits of engaging other public servants horizontally in achievement of government objectives:

> The Cabinet, under the prime minister's leadership, is the principal coordination forum of the executive arm of the Australian Government, but most day-to-day decisions are made by ministers and the agencies that comprise their portfolios. This is efficient. It allows specialisation and reduces the load placed on the prime minister and the Cabinet process so that they can focus on the key strategic issues. It does, however, mean special thought has to be given to the handling of problems that cross portfolio boundaries.[107]

In producing its report, the Management Advisory Committee was asked to investigate six areas of potential whole-of-government improvement, namely: budget and accountability framework; structure and processes; client and community-based approaches; crisis management; information infrastructure; and, culture and training.[108] The report cautions against "moving around the deckchairs of bureaucratic endeavour" and calls for an attitudinal change of culture which is predicated on collegiality, especially at the most senior levels of public service.[109] The report was careful not to give the impression it was a call for "group think." It was also careful not to give the impression this was a new notion.[110]

On the issue of dealing with weak and failing states, Australia has been one of the leaders, along with the United Kingdom and Canada, in advancing whole-of-government policies and collaboration. Australia's interest in better weak-and-failing-state policy and

---

[107] Management Advisory Committee of the Australian Public Service Commission, *Connecting Government: Whole-of-government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*, 19.

[108] *Ibid.*, 127.

[109] *Ibid.*, V.

[110] *Ibid.*, 1.

action coherence abroad was stimulated in the 1990s, before September 2001 and the 2002 Bali bombing, by recognition of the links between poverty, poor governance and violence in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and East Timor. Some of several initiatives to flow from a whole-of-government approach in this area include the establishment of the Fragile States Unit, housing representatives from other federal agencies, within the Australian Agency for International Development and the establishment of a standing police force for international peace and stability operations. Notwithstanding these positive steps, Australia still lacks, according to Patrick and Brown, a "unified concept of state fragility", a "government-wide fragile states strategy", and "support at the highest levels … to invest common financial resources in whole-of-government approaches."[111] Patrick and Brown observe that, while national security policies are coordinated by the National Security Committee of the Cabinet and interdepartmental coordination takes place through interdepartmental committees, both mechanisms operate on an *ad hoc* basis and tend to be more reactive than preventive in their approach.[112]

The 2004 *Connecting Government* Report made no explicit reference to the need for a common planning process, except to state "whole of government experience[s]… offer opportunities to design better ways of planning and operating into the future."[113] Likewise, Patrick and Stewart's description of Australian whole-of-government efforts in dealing with fragile states is void of any mention of the role of or need for common

---

[111] Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?,* 77.

[112] *Ibid.,* 83.

[113] Management Advisory Committee of the Australian Public Service Commission, *Connecting Government: Whole-of-government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*, 125.

planning between government departments. This is not to say, however, that Australia would not benefit from a common planning process.

United States

Given its relative importance, size and budget, the Department of Defense continues to be a driving force of innovative thinking in the US federal government, especially in terms of whole-of-government activities abroad. Whereas the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development had suggested that foreign departments take the lead in coordinating whole-of-government approaches to solving the problems of weak and failed states, national security concerns and the Department of Defense seem to dominate thinking and action in this regard, especially during the recent Bush years.[114]

The Department of Defense has long recognized and been advocating interagency cooperation as a more effective and efficient means of dealing with defence and security issues. "… we will support efforts to coordinate national security planning more effectively, both within DoD and across other [US] Departments and Agencies."[115] Much of the US military's latest doctrine, as it applies to the application of military power abroad, speaks to the need and benefits of interagency cooperation.[116] One of the

---

[114] Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?,* 32.

[115] United States, Department of Defense, *National Defence Strategy* (June 2008), 18, http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

[116] There are three examples in this regard. Firstly, see United States Marine Corps, "A Concept For Countering Irregular Threats - A Comprehensive Approach," 14 June 2006; found at the Internet site of the Federation of American Scientists, under Marine Corps Intelligence and Security Doctrine; http://fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/irreg.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009. Secondly, see United States, Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stabilization, Military Support to Stabilization, Security,*

most striking testimonies of conviction, determination and leadership in this regard was the 2007 stand-up of the US Africa Command. This new unified geographic command is unlike any of its predecessors in that the headquarters is intended to consist mostly of civil servants from other government departments and agencies and one of the two deputy commanders is a senior State Department ambassador.[117] The enhanced interagency focus of Africa Command has since influenced Southern Command where a senior State Department ambassador has also been appointed as a deputy commander. US military doctrine on interagency cooperation was originally established to deal with post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, but there appears to be a growing desire and trend to apply the same concepts to conflict prevention.[118]

The National Security Council, established in 1947, continues to coordinate national security strategy formulation. The Council meets regularly and is often chaired by the President. Post September 2001, the US centralized domestic national security coordination under the Department of Homeland Security, and mandated collaboration and cooperation between all departments and agencies which contribute in one way or another to domestic security. On the military front, Northern Command, headquartered in Colorado Springs, was established to provide necessary focus and support to continental security. In the US, interagency (vice interdepartmental) collaboration and

---

Transition, and Reconstruction Operations: Joint Operating Concept (Norfolk: United States Joint Forces Command, December 2006), v. Thirdly, see William E (Kip) Ward, "Operationalizing FM 3-07 Stability Operations in U.S. Africa Command," *Army* Vol. 59, Iss. 2 (Arlington: February 2009): 28-30, 32, 34.

[117] See United States, United States Africa Command, "Fact Sheet: United States Africa Command," http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1644; Internet; accessed 22 May 2010.

[118] James R. Locher, who helped draft the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, feels strongly that "[o]ur goal should be not just to deal with the aftermath of wars (Phase IV, in military parlance) but to solve problems before they grow into full-blown wars. In other words, to win Phase Zero." See Max Boot, "Send the State Department to War [Op-Ed]," *New York Times,* 14 November 2007, A-23.

cooperation is *de rigueur*. Southern Command, headquartered in Miami and responsible for all US military activities in Central and South America, actively supports "whole-of-government efforts to enhance regional security" and envisions a "joint and interagency organization."[119] Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, one of three subordinate Southern Command Task Forces, has been in service for 20 years and "serves as the catalyst for integrated and synchronized interagency counter-drug operations,"[120] and "is repeatedly hailed as the epitome of interagency cooperation."[121] While interagency collaboration and cooperation is taking place everywhere, it has not always been smooth sailing. The US federal government response to Hurricane Katrina was problematic and suffered, among other challenges, from an embarrassing lack of coordination.

Opinions differ as to whether the United States has done a good job at putting theory into practice in terms of strategic thinking and planning in a whole-of-government manner. On one hand, Patrick and Brown wonder if the United States could do a better job at developing a government-wide strategy to "help ameliorate underlying causes for fragility, instability, and conflict in the developing world."[122] While much interagency activity is going on at the operational and tactical levels, Patrick and Brown opine that "the US Government has yet to forge interagency consensus on the rational for US

---

[119] United States Southern Command, "Our Missions," http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/ourMission.php; Internet; accessed 31 March 2010.

[120] United States Southern Command, "United States Southern Command - Command Strategy 2018," December 2008; http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/files/0UI0I1177092386.pdf; Internet; accessed 31 March 2010.

[121] United States Southern Command, "Interagency," http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/interagency.php; Internet; accessed 31 March 2010.

[122] Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?,* 31.

engagement..."[123] They observe the State Department's Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization, created in 2004, "has rarely succeeded in doing any actual coordination among the different offices,"[124] and suffers from a lack of clear White House support and adequate resources.[125] They also observe the State Department's planning process is *ad hoc* and conceptual, and does not lead to executable roadmaps.[126] They conclude that the US approach is a "messy amalgam of the dominant preoccupations of the Department Defense, State Department, and USAID, oftentimes in that order."[127] These laments are supported by other observers. For instance, Security Studies Professor Phil Williams muses: "… in the United States war on terror, the strategy for the war of ideas was very slow to develop, not least because of inter-agency differences."[128] On the other hand, one could argue that the National Security Council, led by the President, has done a good job at developing and articulating grand and national security strategies, allowing the Department of Defense, and other departments, to articulate subordinate, cascading strategies, a construct legislated by the 1986 Goldwater- Nichols Act. President Obama's comprehensive fall 2009 update to the Afghanistan Strategy is an excellent example of leadership driving interagency collaboration, coordination and cooperation.

---

[123] *Ibid.*, 35.

[124] *Ibid.*, 39.

[125] Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?,* 40.

[126] *Ibid.*, 45.

[127] *Ibid.*, 35.

[128] Phil Williams, "Strategy for a New World: Combating Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, ed. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 206.

While it appears to have embraced whole-of-government approaches to issue resolution, the US Government does not appear to place any special importance on whole-of-government, or common, leadership and management training for public service executives. Rather, each department and agency appears to be responsible for its own professional development programmes.[129]

The US military's professional development programme is familiar to Canadian military officers. There are two important levels of development. Staff Colleges focus on planning and executing joint, interagency and combined operations, targeting mid-ranking officers and civilian equivalents, and War Colleges focus on interagency and combined strategy formulation, targeting executive-level officers and civilian equivalents. All colleges offer inter-service, interagency and international cross-pollination opportunities. The US National War College in Washington, the senior military professional development institute, dispenses a 10-month, in-residence academic programme leading to a Master of Science in National Security Strategy. Forty percent of the 220 slots are allotted to civilian students, most of whom are executive-level civil servants from security-related departments and agencies. The College's programme "stresses the interrelationship of domestic, foreign, and defense [sic] policies, and the necessity of inclusion and coordination of Service, interagency, and multinational capabilities, perspectives…"[130]

---

[129] There are two Internet sites of interest in this regard. See United States Office of Personnel Management, "FED LP – Catalogue of Federal Leadership Development Programs," http://www.opm.gov/FedLDP/index.aspx; Internet; accessed 27 April 2010. Also, see GovLeaders.com, "Agency-Specific Leadership Development Programs," http://govleaders.org/training3.htm; Internet; accessed 27 April 2010.

[130] United States National War College, "Student Handbook," http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/; Internet; accessed 27 April 2010.

While the Department of Defense has and continues to champion interservice and interagency collaboration and cooperation through the development of appropriate doctrine and the delivery of commensurate training, not only to military officers but also to senior civil servants, the lack of a similar effort across the public service likely dampens whole-of-government efforts.

On the issue of planning for whole-of-government actions abroad, President Clinton had attempted to introduce a comprehensive political-military planning process via Presidential Directive 56, but this initiative was abandoned by President Bush, just before the US went to war with Iraq. One of the most important lessons of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, however, was that civilian agencies needed to develop new ways of planning, especially joint civil-military planning.[131]

OECD, NATO, EU and UN

The discussion of the concept of a whole-of-government approach for dealing with internal and external issues has so far been limited to the considerations of individual states. If the whole-of-government approach is designed to foster greater collaboration and cooperation between departments and agencies within a given state, then a parallel construct can be envisaged for greater external cooperation between states that are members of international alliances and organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). These alliances and organizations, however, generally prefer to speak in terms of a

[131] Patrick and Brown, *Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?,* 37, 44.

comprehensive approach as opposed to a whole-of-government approach, but the concept is the same. The comprehensive approach is meant to be used in dealing with weak, failing or failing states.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on behalf of its member states, advocates the need for donor countries to adopt a "whole-of-government approach", or WGA, for engaging in fragile states based "on well-sequenced and coherent [work] across the political, security, economic and administrative domains".[132] The OECD's Development Assistance Committee held a Forum on Fragile States in 2005 and subsequently established the *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*[133] which guides whole-of-government approaches in this regard. The OECD advises on policy, but does not actively implement such approaches.

Since its creation in 1949, NATO, the world's premiere military alliance, has been exercising the humility and patience of a whole-of-government approach in two ways, at least. Firstly, as a principally military organization, it recognizes the need for deliberate strategic thinking and planning, using an Alliance accepted planning process. Secondly, it appreciates the challenges of seeking and maintaining consensus against the backdrop of divergent national objectives, languages, and cultures. While some would

---

[132] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Part 3: Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States," *OECD Journal on Development*, 8, no. 3 (1 January 2008): 179,181,183,185-189,191-193,195-223,225,227-232, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1613824851&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

[133] See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations*, April 2007, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 May 2010.

argue the Alliance is not efficient, it is perhaps as efficient as it can be given all of its organizational challenges.

NATO is well regarded for the standardization of processes and procedures, and the coherence of its plans. While member nations and observers may sometimes complain of the challenge of achieving consensus, once it is achieved, NATO's common planning process, which has been enshrined in doctrine and taught to military officers and civil servants of member states, produces effective and efficient plans.

NATO speaks of a "comprehensive approach" to stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. "[A] strategy that better integrates the political, economic, and military dimensions of post conflict reconstruction" was endorsed at the 2008 Bucharest Summit.[134]

International Relations Professor Christopher Coker argues NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is an example of "true multinational cooperation in the security field."[135] Over 40 countries and 150,000 troops are waging war against the Taliban in support of United Nations Security Council Resolutions[136]. While armies within the Alliance are also confronted with the same challenges which affect whole-of-government cooperation between departments of a same government,

---

[134] See Markus Kaim, "Germany, Afghanistan, and the future of NATO," *International Journal* 63, no. 3 (1 July 2008): 607-623, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1658980961&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010. Also, see NATO Internet Site, "A Comprehensive Approach," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009.

[135] Christopher Coker, "Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Multinational Co-operation, Afghanistan and Strategic Culture," *RUSI Journal* 151, no. 5 (October 2006): 14.

[136] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001 was the first to authorize the establishment of ISAF. See http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1386.pdf.

NATO standardization, doctrine and training have managed nonetheless to facilitate collaborative and cooperative effort.

In the years leading to NATO's current consideration of an updated Strategic Concept, there has been much discussion[137], if not debate, especially among Europeans, as to the role NATO should play in supporting a comprehensive approach to crisis management abroad. Some analysts and the EU have suggested NATO's role should be limited to collective defence and military capabilities, allowing the EU to take a leading role in crisis management and to provide the bulk of economic and civilian capabilities.[138]

In keeping with advances in member states and other international organizations, especially Western ones, the UN also appears to have adopted a whole-of-government or comprehensive-like approach which it calls an integrated approach.[139] The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations interacts with NATO and its comprehensive approach via the Integrated Planning Process.[140] The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) maintains a learning website dedicated to

---

[137] Hans Binnendijk and Friis Arne Petersen, "The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: Future Options for NATO," *Defense Horizons*, Number 58, September 2007, 1; http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons/DH_58.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009.

[138] European Union Military Staff, "CSDP, EU Military Structures, EUMS Capabilities and Operations," presentation to the National Security Programme during a Field Study Exercise to Brussels on 2 March 2010, slide 26.

[139] Cedric de Coning, *The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach*, Danish Institute for International Studies Report 2008:14, http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports%202008/Report-2008-14_The_United_Nations_and_the_Comprehensive_Approach.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 May 2010.

[140] United Nations, *Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)*, Guidelines endorsed by the Secretary-General on 13 June 2006; http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/Multidimensional%20and%20Integrated/06_DPKO_IMPP_final_.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 May 2010.

Comprehensive and Whole-of-Government Approaches to Post-Conflict Situations, and proclaims: "The need for increased integration, harmonization and coordination has been a recurring theme in international responses to post-conflict situations in recent years. Within the United Nations system… efforts towards greater coherence at headquarters and in the field are underway."[141]

Summary

The United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, as well as NATO and the UN, have embraced a whole-of-government, or comprehensive, approach in an attempt to achieve better outcomes. While there is much emphasis today on activities abroad, the whole-of-government approach also applies on the domestic front. The aspiration is both logical and sensible. The concept is simple: to ensure problems, issues or challenges are tackled in a collaborative, coordinated and cooperative fashion with all of the tools and expertise available to governments, and international organizations. While there has been much progress, there remain several challenges. Only one country, Australia, has published an over-arching policy or doctrine on the intent of its whole-of-government approach. None of the examined countries seems to have embarked on any type of whole-of-government training for government-wide employees. Lastly, evidence suggests that both the United Kingdom and the United States recognize the benefit of adopting a common planning process as a means of increasing whole-of-government effectiveness and efficiency. It is suspected Australia does as well.

---

[141] United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), "Comprehensive and Whole-of-Government Approaches to Post-Conflict Situations," http://www.unitar.org/ny/international-law-and-policy/peace-and-security-series/comprehensive-whole-government-approaches-post-conflict-situations; Internet; accessed 28 March 2010.

CHAPTER 5 - WHAT CANADA IS DOING

This chapter looks at Canada's perspectives of and experiences with the whole-of-government approach. It examines the influence of the Treasury Board, the efforts of the military, domestically and abroad, and the professional development of civil servants.

Focussing on Results and Accountability

Unlike Australia and notwithstanding the mention of "integrated", "integrated 3D", and "whole-of-government" in the various documents which constitute its 2005 International Policy Statement, Canada has yet to articulate an explicit policy or philosophy of whole-of-government collaboration and cooperation. In the beginning, Canada's Government focused mostly on whole-of-government performance and resource management.

The Government of Canada has long been trying to improve the way it conducts its business. The quest for doing things better involves all manner of federal government endeavour, from the provision of social services to the provision of security and defence. The recent quest for greater effectiveness and efficiency goes back to the early 1960s, starting with the Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organization. In 1994, Brian O'Neal, a researcher with Canada's Parliamentary Information and Research Service, reviewed Canadian public service reform attempts over the previous 30 years, and remarked:

> …while terms such as 'reinventing,' 'rethinking,' and 'renewing' government have recently become a staple of public administration discourse, in fact they describe a process that has been taking place in Canada for quite some time … Over the past 30 years, the focus of

> government reform in Canada has been an ongoing search for improved efficiencies … at the federal level.[142]

The Treasury Board Secretariat[143], a government department, supports the Treasury Board, a standing committee of Cabinet. In June 1997, the Treasury Board, and its Secretariat, was designated as the Government's management board.[144] The Secretariat's mandate is to ensure "the government is well managed and accountable."[145] In this respect, it provides advice to Government and subsequent direction to all government departments and agencies on governance, management, and "efficiency and effectiveness with which government programs and services are delivered."[146]

Recently, the Treasury Board Secretariat has been trying to get government departments and agencies to focus on delivering measurable "results", synonymous with outcomes, for Canadians. In 1996, the Secretariat introduced the Planning, Reporting and Accountability Structure (PRAS), an attempt to prescribe a common manner for planning and reporting to Parliament by individual government departments and agencies. In 1999, the Treasury Board President published *Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for the Government of Canada*. In this document, the expression "whole-of-

---

[142] Brian O'Neal, "Reorganizing Government: New Approaches to Public Service Reform," January 1994, http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp375-e.htm#INTRO; Internet; accessed 4 December 2009.

[143] It is officially called 'Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat'. See its Internet website at: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/index-eng.asp.

[144] Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, "Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for the Government of Canada," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/res_can/rc_2-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

[145] Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, "Treasury Board Secretariat," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/tbs-sct/index-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

[146] *Ibid.*

government" was mentioned six times. The focus was on "whole-of-government" resource management. The document stated: "as an integrating principle, management in all departments, agencies and functions must be focused on the achievement of results and on reporting them in simple and understandable ways to elected officials and to Canadians."[147] It further stated: "As a Cabinet committee, the Treasury Board analyzes resource and results information on a whole-of-government basis, ensuring that the cumulative impacts of existing programs are assessed across organizational boundaries."[148] In the 2000s, the Programme Activity Architecture (PAA) was introduced.

In 2001, the Secretariat established a Centre for Excellence in Evaluation[149], which in turn developed a Results-based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF)[150]. The framework was published as one of two elements, the other dealing with Audit, of a new Evaluation Policy, the purpose of which was "to ensure that the government has timely, strategically focused, objective and evidence based information on the performance of its policies, programs and initiatives to produce better results for Canadians."

---

[147] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, *Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for the Government of Canada*, 5, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/res_can/rc_e_pdf.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 March 2010.

[148] *Ibid.*, 20.

[149] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. "Evaluation Policy - Results-based Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF),"Modified 25 February 2010. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/tools-outils/polrmaf-polcgrr-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 27 April 2010.

[150] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Preparing and Using Results-based Management and Accountability Frameworks (RMAFs)," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12312; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

Beginning in 2002, a new, complementary "whole-of-government framework" was added to the mix. The purpose of this framework was to permit integration of individual Departmental Performance Reports into a single Canada Performance Report for reporting "progress made as a nation" to Parliament. As of today, the whole-of-government framework:

> … maps the financial and non-financial contributions of departments, agencies, and Crown corporations receiving appropriations to a set of 13 high-level Government of Canada outcome areas within four Government of Canada spending areas - Economic, Social, International, and Government Affairs.[151]

In April 2005, the PRAS was replaced by the Management, Resources and Results Structure (MRRS). While the latter was intended to improve the manner with which information is presented to the Treasury Board Secretariat and to Parliamentarians, the Parliamentary Information and Research Service mused "[t]here is a risk that the MRRS Policy will be no more effective than the PRAS Policy."[152] The MRRS was updated in December 2008.

Separate from the ambition of reporting to Parliament in a consistent and results-based fashion is the concept of holding high-level public service managers accountable. The oft-mentioned, 2003-initiated Management Accountability Framework (MAF) sets out "expectations of senior public service managers for good public service

---

[151] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Whole-of-government framework: Background," modified 8 June 2009; http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-cpr/frame-cadre-eng.aspx; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009.

[152] Lydia Scratch, "Management, Resources and Results Structure Policy," Parliamentary Information and Research Service: 23 August 2005; http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0523-e.htm; Internet; accessed 11 March 2010.

management."[153] The MAF should not be confused with the 2006 Federal Accountability Act which is a compendium of new and amended acts dealing with "conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability."[154] While it is concerned with the achievement of desired outcomes, the MAF focuses on how senior public servants manage, with particular emphasis on ensuring public funds are properly spent as per the Financial Administration Act.

In its capacity as the lead agent for governance and management, the Treasury Board Secretariat establishes a variety of policies. Most of these policies are published alphabetically at its Internet website. As of 29 March 2010, there were 327 published policies. Many of these deal with financial management. Of the 327 policies, only eight deal, in one way or another, with governance or management.[155] Of these eight policies, only two speak, indirectly, to the concept of whole-of-government collaboration and cooperation. While the expression "whole-of-government" is used once, *Guidance for Deputy Ministers* speaks mostly of Deputy Minister obligations from a "government as a whole" perspective, and not in terms of a "whole-of-government" approach. The other

---

[153] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "TB Management Accountability Framework," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/index-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

[154] Canada, *Federal Accountability Act,* 2006, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=3294507&file=4; Internet; accessed 28 April 2010.

[155] The eight policies are: Foundation Framework for Treasury Board Policies; Policies and Guidelines for Ministers' Offices; Guidance for Deputy Ministers; Guiding Principles for the Management of Crown Corporations; Guidelines for Portfolio Coordination: Management Accountability Framework Considerations and Overview of Practices; Integrated Risk Management Framework; A Guide to Preparing Treasury Board Submissions; and Directive on the Administration of Leadership Development Programs - Management Trainee Program and Career Assignment Program.

policy, *Guidelines for Portfolio Coordination*, only speaks to the requirement of coordination within a single minister's portfolio.[156]

While there have been several attempts to establish common planning and reporting structure in Government, little if no emphasis has been placed on adopting a common planning process.

Canada's Military and Whole-of-government Approaches to Domestic and International Affairs

Canada's National Defence Act provides the legislative mandate of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. Unlike the United States, Canada does not purposefully produce cohesive, cascading grand, national security, defence and military strategies.[157] The Government of Canada does not have a process nor has it seriously considered the need to develop or publish such cascading strategies. The position of National Security Advisor was only recently created, in the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001. The mission and roles of the Canadian Forces are essentially developed from within the Department of National Defence, and then approved, explicitly or implicitly, by Government. The current mission of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada and its interests, at home and abroad. The current roles of the Canadian Forces are to defend Canada, defend North America and contribute

---

[156] Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, "Guidelines for Portfolio Coordination: Management Accountability Framework Considerations and Overview of Practices," http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=17747&section=text; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

[157] In fairness, some observers could argue that some of these documents exist, but in various forms. While there is no grand or national strategy, beyond the annual Speech from the Throne, there are the 2004 National Security Policy and the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy. However, the latter is viewed by many observers as a simple shopping list of desired capabilities, and there is no explicit link between the two documents.

to international peace and security abroad. While the exact words and the relative priority of roles have changed from time to time, the mission and the roles have been relatively consistent over time.

Interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation involving the Canadian Forces, in domestic and international affairs, has been taking place in one way or another, for quite some time. While the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* explicitly mandates the Canadian Forces to be prepared to assist domestic civil authorities in responding to security and natural disaster challenges, collaboration in these areas has long existed. The National Defence Act explicitly mandates the Canadian Forces to respond to provincial attorney general requests for Aid of the Civil Power, to quell riots and disturbances of the peace.[158] Besides this obligation, the Canadian Forces have long agreed to provide support to other federal government departments in discharging their respective mandates. In the 1990s, two manuals described such support. *Assistance to Civil Authorities* dealt principally with humanitarian and natural disaster relief and *Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies* dealt with support to police. Today, these support arrangements have been integrated into *Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations*.[159] The Canadian Forces has also had Memorandums of Understanding with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for counter-drug operations and with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans for fishery protection since 1987 and 1990

[158] Part VI, Aid of the Civil Power, of the National Defence Act refers. See Justice Canada, *National Defence Act*, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/N-5/index.html; Internet; accessed 17 May 2010.

[159] Canada Command, *Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations,* Interim Version 1, 1 February 2006.

respectively.[160] Furthermore, the Canadian Forces have put in place other mechanisms, such as *Provision of Services*, by which other levels of government can seek assistance for non law enforcement and other issues.[161] As a result of these mechanisms, past and present, the Canadian Forces have supported civil authorities during the 1976 Montreal Olympics, the 1996 Saguenay River Flood, the 1997 Manitoba Flood, the 1998 Ice Storm in Eastern Ontario and Western Quebec, the 1999 Toronto Snow Storm, the 2002 Kananaskis Group of Eight (G8) Summit[162], the 2003 forest fires in British Columbia, and the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games, among others.

While it has always existed, the level of collaboration (in planning) and cooperation (in implementation) between the Canadian Forces and other government departments and agencies, at all levels of government, has been steadily increasing and improving, at least at the operational level. The 2004 National Security Policy, which was motivated by the Al Qaeda attack on New York, directed the creation of Maritime Security Operations Centre, one on each of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and one in the Great Lakes region, to facilitate maritime security collaboration between five federal government departments and agencies, namely the departments of Transport, Fisheries and Oceans, RCMP, Coast Guard and the Canadian Forces. The creation of Canada Command in 2006[163], and the resultant increase in domestic planning capability and

---

[160] Dates were provided by Lieutenant-Commander Rob Justice, Canada Command Liaison Officer to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, by e-mail on 7 May 2010.

[161] Department of National Defence, B-GS-055-000/AG-001, *DND Provision of Services Manual* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999).

[162] David Barr, "The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation." *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004): 39-46.

[163] Department of National Defence, "Canada Command Backgrounder," BG #09.00301 June 2009, http://www.canadacom.forces.gc.ca/nr-sp/bg-do/09-003-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 28 April 2010.

focus, has increased the desire and means to achieve even greater collaboration and cooperation.

In Canada, international activities are principally conducted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Department of National Defence. A whole-of-government approach in international affairs was only recently introduced by the Martin Government in its 2005 *International Policy Statement*; the approach was focused on external crisis management, and in particular resolution of the Afghanistan situation. While the concept of having several government departments collaborate and cooperate in order to achieve a national objective is not new, at least not in the domestic arena, its implementation in Afghanistan was.

The concept of whole-of-government approaches for getting things done is slowly being recognized by a wider audience. References to whole-of-government approaches, especially in relation to international affairs, are being made by Canadian observers, including a journalist who wrote:

> … during Hu Jintao's visit to Canada in September 2005, the prime minister instructed all of his cabinet ministers to come up with policy measures and practical steps to connect more closely to China. The so-called 'whole-of-government' approach is quite extraordinary.[164]

It is not clear, however, that such recognition is meaningful, since the Government has yet to clearly define what is intended by the whole-of-government approach.

While the Canadian Government and its subordinate departments have embraced the concept of a whole-of-government approach to solving international challenges, the

[164] Paul Evans, "Canada, Meet Global China," *International Journal* 61, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 283-297.

liberal use of the expression does not necessarily lead to better and faster decision-making or results. At its 34th Meeting of 5 December 2006, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE) decided to recommend to the House "that the government present [its] whole-of-government strategy for failed states to the committee, and that relevant departments appear before the committee to discuss the strategy …"[165] Such a presentation has yet to take place.

In concert with Government calls for integrated or whole-of-government approaches, especially in the international arena, the land component of the Canadian Forces is considering enhancements to existing efforts of collaboration, coordination and cooperation. One such enhancement involves the doctrine of JIMP which stands for joint, interagency, multinational and public. It represents an Army of Tomorrow aspiration for diplomatic, defence, development and commercial capabilities to work collectively, at the operational level, in satisfaction of a common stability objective.[166] It would essentially build on the past practise of civil military cooperation or CIMIC.[167] Also, in 2007, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute examined how the Canadian Forces might better contribute to future coalition operations. One of the many recommendation was that a Centre of Excellence be stood up to "ensure an integrated

---

[165] House of Commons, "Report 5 - Whole-of-government Strategy," adopted by the Committee on 5 December 2006 and presented to the House on 13 December 2006, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2573800&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1; Internet; accessed 11 March 2010.

[166] Peter Gizewski and Michael Rostek, "Towards a JIMP Capable Land Force," *Canadian Army Journal* 10, no. 1 (March 2007): 55.

[167] *Ibid.*, 62.

approach to developing doctrine, training and education" for whole-of-government operations.[168]

Throughout all of this activity, past and current, Canada's military continues to use a structured planning process which involves the commander and his staff in the formulation and implementation of plans at all levels. While such a process is attempted when pursuing whole-of-government initiatives, the lack of a planning culture in other government departments and agencies, the reason for which will be discussed in Chapter 6, hampers greater interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation.

Professional Development in the Public Service

The Treasury Board Secretariat's *Directive on the Administration of Leadership Development Programs* states:

> Leadership development is key to ensuring that the public service is equipped to meet the challenges of the 21st century. … To assist in the realization of this goal, the Public service Human Resources Management Agency of Canada (PSHRMAC) provides support to organizations in the core public administration in meeting their current and future human resources and leadership needs …, through a continuum of leadership development programs. This is achieved in partnership with the Canada School of Public Service (CSPS).[169]

The Canada School of Public Service offers courses to six different employee categories, including Managers, Senior Managers and Senior Leaders. Orientation to the Public Service is mandatory for all employees, except Senior Leaders are expected to

---

[168] Department of National Defence, Broadsword or Rapier? The Canadian Forces' Involvement in 21 Century Coalition Operations (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2008). 5.

[169] Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, "Directive on the Administration of Leadership Development Programs - Management Trainee Program and Career Assignment Program," 2 April 2006, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12408; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

take Orientation for Assistant Deputy Ministers instead. The latter is a two-day course, and focuses on acquiring the necessary knowledge to effectively exercise *Financial Administration Act* delegated signing authorities. While the course also offers an opportunity to "strengthen leadership abilities" and to "develop best practices … to model exemplary behaviour and to achieve excellence in leading their organizations", there is no mention of the concept of or methodologies for implementing whole-of-government solutions.[170]

Only a couple of courses touch on elements of governance, non-financial management, and planning. Three of them target lower level management or issues.[171] Three of them target upper management or issues. Course G127, Essentials of Executive Management, last two days, targets Senior Managers at the EX-02 and EX-03 level[172],

---

[170] Canada School of Public Service, "Courses," http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/cat/rtr-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 22 March 2010.

[171] First, Course T188, Integrated Planning, lasts two days, is designed for Supervisors and Managers, "is about maximizing the benefits that arise out of the planning process and using plans to better manage established priorities throughout the fiscal year," and topics includes "making integrated planning more than just filling out templates once a year." See Canada School of Public Service, "Integrated Planning (T188)," http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/cat/det-eng.asp?courseno=T188; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010. Second, Course G305, Leadership: Reflection and Action (G305), lasts five days, targets Managers and Senior Managers, "offers a comprehensive program aimed at reflecting on and developing the practice of leadership so that executives and senior managers can achieve their leadership goals more effectively," and topics include "influencing the organizational culture of units to sustain corporate goals," and "understanding the evolution of governance processes in the Public Service of Canada and its impact on individuals and their teams." See Canada School of Public Service, "Leadership: Reflection and Action (G305)," http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/cat/det-eng.asp?courseno=G305, Internet; accessed 29 March 2010. Third, Leading Strategically: Shaping the Future of a Modernized Public Service, Course P113, lasts three days, targets Managers, recognizes that "leading strategic change within a modern public service demands an understanding of the complexities and challenges regarding renewal, reform and culture change," and topics include "the importance of strategic leadership in modernizing the public service workforce; the strategic leadership competencies: thinking, acting, and influencing; and the strategic leadership process: core ideology (values and mission); vision; SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats), strategic priorities; action planning and implementation." See Canada School of Public Service, "Leading Strategically: Shaping the Future of a Modernized Public Service (P113)," http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/cat/det-eng.asp?courseno=P113; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

[172] These are Canadian Public Service Executive Group classifications. Normally, EX-02 is a junior-level Director General and EX-03 is a senior-level Director General.

and topics include "the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) and the government governance framework."[173] The other two courses stand out in terms of their potential impact on enabling greater interdepartmental collaboration. Course G106, Leading Policy, lasts five days, targets Senior Managers, and has participants explore "competency management, engagement and strategic thinking to effectively transition organizations towards finding strategic solutions in policy development"[174]. Course R902, Strategic and Operational Planning, lasts two days, targets Functional Specialists (Policy), Managers and Senior Managers, and "explores the strategic and operational planning process in federal departments and agencies, its impact and its linkage to operational objectives."[175]

While the three latter courses appear to touch on the basics of planning at the strategic level, none of the courses appear to cover the concept and process of developing cooperative, whole-of-government solutions to problems, and there appears to be no doctrine or instruction concerning a common, structured, interdepartmental planning process.

Summary

Canada's experience with the whole-of-government approach is dominated, on one hand, by the Treasury Board Secretariat's focus on holistic performance

---

[173] Canada School of Public Service, "Essentials of Executive Management (G127)," http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/cat/det-eng.asp?courseno=G127; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

[174] Canada School of Public Service, "Leading Policy (G106)," http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/cat/det-eng.asp?courseno=G106; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

[175] Canada School of Public Service, "Strategic and Operational Planning (R902)," http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/cat/det-eng.asp?courseno=R902; Internet; accessed 29 March 2010.

management, and, on the other hand, by the post September 2001 focus on resolving fragile state issues and providing enhanced domestic security and disaster relief coordination. Given there is no over-arching Government of Canada policy or doctrine on what is intended by the whole-of-government approach, none of these foci is necessarily wrong.

The Treasury Board Secretariat continues to struggle with finding the correct planning and reporting framework with which to report intended plans and subsequent results to Parliamentarians and Canadians. Neither the 1996 Planning, Reporting and Accounting Structure nor the follow-on 2005 Management, Resources and Results Structure, which are focussed on structure, speak of a common, planning process.

In the area of whole-of-government collaboration and cooperation for resolving fragile state issues and dealing with the above-mentioned domestic issues, progress has been made, but further progress would be made by the adoption of a common, structured planning process which would facilitate problem solving and solution formulation.

Lastly, there is little talk of whole-of-government in the professional development curriculum of the public service.

CHAPTER 6

THE NEED FOR AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL PLANNING PROCESS

This chapter discusses: the importance of planning, especially at the strategic level; the advances of interdepartmental planning within Canada, especially in crisis management; the nature of the Canadian Forces planning processes; the benefits and challenges of adopting a similar, structured, interdepartmental planning process; and, the inevitable need for compromise in pursuing such a *modus operandi*.

General

According to management professors Stephen Robbins *et al*, planning involves "defining goals [synonymous with objectives], establishing an overall strategy for achieving these goals, and developing a comprehensive set of plans to integrate and coordinate the work needed to achieve the goals."[176] The Canadian Forces define military planning as "a logical, systematic problem solving [sic] and decision making [sic] process that involves creating and continuously refining … plans."[177]

While planning is important at all levels in government, planning is most important at the strategic or national level. A planning process is not only useful for developing plans at the tactical and operational levels, but also for formulating and implementing policy and strategy at the strategic or national level, which is the essence of strategic management. In Canada, strategic planning, a part of strategic management, takes place in Ottawa. Because most of the senior civil servant and military officers of

---

[176] Robbins, Coulter and Langton, *Management,* 170.

[177] *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)*, 1-8, 1-9.

Ottawa-based departments and agencies work at the strategic or national level in support of their respective Ministers, interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation in Ottawa is all about strategic management in general and strategic planning in particular.

There are at least three different contexts for planning and decision-making at all levels, including the strategic level. The first is associated with expected, predictable, recurring and routine issues or problems. The second is associated with expected, less predictable, non-recurring and non-routine issues or problems. The third is associated with crises.[178] Crisis management is reserved for the latter.[179] In all cases, issues or problems can be anticipated, and their risk can be mitigated either through avoidance, reduction, sharing or retention.[180] If anticipated, policies, strategies and plans, particularly contingency plans, can be drawn up in advance, which make the issue or problem less of a crisis when it arises. Policy and strategy formulation and implementation, and subordinate plan development, are required and used in all contexts.[181]

---

[178] Crisis is synonymous with incident and emergency. Communications Professor Matthew, *et al*, define crisis as "a specific, unexpected and non-routine organizational based event or series of events which creates high levels of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization's high priority goals." See Matthew Wayne Seeger, Timothy Lester Sellnow, and Robert R. Ulmer, *Communication and Organizational Crisis,* (Westport: Praeger Publishers: 2003), 7.

[179] Crisis management refers to "all activities aimed at preventing, mitigating, and terminating crises." See Arjen Boin, "Crisis Management," *Encyclopedia of Governance* (SAGE Publications: 2006); http://www.sage-ereference.com/governance/Article_n115.html; Internet; accessed 17 May. 2010.

[180] Robin Holt, "Risk Management," *International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies* (SAGE Publications: 2007); http://www.sage-ereference.com/organization/Article_n475.html; Internet; accessed 17 May. 2010.

[181] The Canadian Forces recognize two planning methods: deliberate, to deal with expected issues or problems, and rapid response, to deal with crises. The steps in each method are essentially the same; however, short-cuts are suggested when time is of the essence. See *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)*, 3-5.

Policy and strategy formulation needs to be done and it needs to be done at the highest level in any organization, regardless of the context. Assuming it is done well, development of implementation plans, by which the policy and strategy are put into action, can be left to the next subordinate levels in the organization. Ideally, policy and strategy should be formulated in open, consultative, iterative, and whole-of-government fashion.[182] Implementation plans are developed in similar fashion.

Issue or problem management in Canada, especially crisis management, has until recently tended to be handled on a case-by-case, *ad hoc,* cascading committee and working group basis.[183] Of late, the first steps are being taken to move away from *ad hoc*, impromptu planning to structured, anticipatory planning, especially in the area of crisis management. Public Safety Canada's 2008 Federal Emergency Response Plan, affirms: "[d]uring an integrated … response, all involved departments … contribute to the federal response process by mutually determining overall objectives, contributing to joint [interdepartmental] plans, and maximizing the use ... resources."[184]

In recent years, there has been growing recognition in Canada's federal government of the need to approach crisis management in a more deliberate,

---

[182] In the fall of 2005, the US Government Accountability Office conducted a review of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) using "six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy." One of these includes "a detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address." See United States, Government Accountability Office, *Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006), 2; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06788.pdf; Internet; accessed 21 May 2010.

[183] Douglas Bland, "National Security is an Orphan in the Cabinet," *National Post*, 2 October 2001, A16.

[184] See Public Safety Canada, "Federal Emergency Response Plan," June 2008. In his forward, the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Emergency Management and National Security Branch, states: "This plan is the culmination of extensive work conducted by Public Safety Canada in collaboration with federal departments and agencies and serves as the building block to guide an integrated Government of Canada response to emergencies."

collaborative and cooperative fashion. This recognition grew as a result of the Government's experiences in dealing in an *ad hoc* fashion with numerous crises, such as the 1995 Turbot War with Spain, the natural disasters discussed in the previous chapter, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and the September 2001 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks. The 2004 National Security Policy[185] announced the establishment of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada[186], later renamed Public Safety Canada, the National Security Advisor and the National Security Advisory Council[187], the Government Operations Centre, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, and the Maritime Security Operations Centres, among others. These were good first steps. In principle and in practise, the establishment of these new, standing vice *ad hoc* organizations and mechanisms encourages and causes public servants from different departments to work collectively to formulate policy and strategy, and to develop, as required, implementation plans, contingency and others. Policy, strategy and plans should be developed using a common planning process. While collaboration, coordination, and cooperation are improving, a common planning process, which would facilitate such efforts, does not yet exist. While the establishment of standing organizations and mechanisms and the formulation of contingency plans are designed with crisis management in mind, the concepts, principles and benefits of common,

---

[185] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, April 2004, http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/information/Publications/natsec-secnat/natsec-secnat-eng.pdf; Internet; accessed 6 May 2010.

[186] This department was created in 2003 to "ensure coordination across all federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and the safety of Canadians." Public Safety Canada, "About Us," http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/abt/index-eng.aspx; Internet; accessed 6 May 2010.

[187] See Privy Council Office, "Advisory Council on National Security," http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=secretariats&sub=si-sr&doc=acns-ccsn-eng.htm; Internet; accessed 22 May 2010.

systemic and structured vice *ad hoc* department-specific planning also apply to the formulation and implementation of non-crisis management policy, strategy, and subordinate plans.

The world was surprised when the French were defeated by the Prussians in 1870. Analysis revealed that adoption by its General Staff of a regimented, systemic, structured planning process based on logical problem solving methodology was at the heart of Prussia's success. Most of the world's militaries rushed to adopt similar processes, especially the United States military.

The concepts and planning processes used by the US military during its successful Second World War victories against its German, Italian and Japanese counterparts have likely influenced numerous American business and management school theories, especially in the area of strategy.[188] Business schools speak more of strategy formulation than plan development, but the fundamental concepts and processes are similar, if not the same. Numerous management and planning methodologies have been advocated. Earlier methodologies included activity-based management, management by objectives,[189] and results-based management.[190] They were first used in the private sector. The aim was to achieve economic efficiency in the form of maximum profit. They were eventually adopted in the public sector. Modern management theology is now focused on

---

[188] Gary F. Keller, "The Influence of Military Strategies on Business Planning," *International Journal of Business and Management* 3, no.5 (May 2008): 130; http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijbm/article/viewFile/1531/1456; Internet; accessed 10 May 2010.

[189] This methodology focussed on proper selection and articulation of objectives. See William J. Reddin, *Effective Management by Objectives: The 3-D Method of MBO* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.

[190] This methodology focussed on proper selection and articulation of outcomes. See Dale D. McConkey, *How to Manage by Results* (New York: American Management Associations, 1983.

performance management. Kaplan and Norton introduced the Balanced Score Card (BSC)[191] as a method to measure successful strategy implementation, an area where many businesses were experiencing difficulty. In studying companies which attempted to implement their BSC methodology, Kaplan and Norton subsequently realized that many companies were attempting to measure performance without having properly formulated a strategy, or a plan, beforehand. They subsequently advocated the Strategy Map methodology for strategy formulation and visualization.[192] In an era of heightened sensitivity about fiscal responsibility and accountability, Governments, especially the Canadian one, are obliging subordinate departments and agencies to implement modern management theology, some of it likely borrowed from earlier military planning theology.

The Joint Operational Planning Process

The military's joint operational planning process instructs navy, army and air force officers how to best work together to develop a plan for achieving a given aim. As in all walks of life, team work is the key to effective and efficient planning and execution. Team work usually flourishes among individuals who are used to working together, especially when working for the same boss. When individuals of different work groups or organizations are thrown together to achieve a common objective, team work will take longer to achieve, as lack of familiarity with one another and differences in understanding, approach and work ethic need to be overcome. In the military, the joint

[191] Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action* (*Boston*: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 15.

[192] Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *Strategy Maps: Converting Intangible Assets into Tangible Outcomes* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2004), xii.

operational planning process has become the *de facto* way of doing business, not just at the operational level but also at the strategic level. It has become accepted doctrine in each of the services, and the Canadian Forces. With doctrine firmly established, all Canadian Forces officers are trained to recognize the same terminology and problem solving approach. When they get together to tackle a common problem, their actions are instinctive, and are based on a common knowledge of and training in the process. The result is a joint operational plan which is effective and efficient both in its development and in its execution.

The Canadian Forces Joint Operational Planning Process has evolved over time. In the beginning, it copied unabashedly from the United States Joint Operation Planning Process.[193] The Canadian planning process is currently laid down in Canadian Forces Joint Publication 5.0, entitled *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)*. The process now involves five versus the original six steps, namely Initiation, Orientation, Courses of Action Development, Plan Development and Plan Review.[194] This process has been taught to successive Command and Staff Courses, now called the Joint Command and Staff Programme, at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto since the early 1990s. While the College focuses on preparing Majors and Lieutenant-Commanders for future assignments as staff officers in joint Canadian and international military staffs, a few civil servants have also benefited from this year-long course. Graduates of the Joint Command and Staff Programme are able to more easily work with one another. They share a common understanding of the concepts and terminology

---

[193] United States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-0 – Joint Operation Planning*, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 March 2010.

[194] *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)*, 3-9.

necessary to developing a joint or integrated plan at the operational level of conflict. The Canadian process is similar to that of our closest allies. As a result, Canadian staff officers can easily integrate into multinational staffs.[195] In the end, a growing number of Canadian Forces officers, and a few civil servants, have been indoctrinated into a joint planning process which allows staff of different backgrounds to easily come together to develop operational plans which address complex problems.

In time, the Strategic Joint Staff of the Chief of Defence Staff came to realize the benefit of the Joint Operational Planning Process as a means of assisting planning at the strategic level. As a result, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 5.0 now contains a section on Strategic Level Planning.[196] The stages or steps in the process parallel those of Operational Level Planning.[197]

Benefits of Common Planning

The value and benefits of formal planning, at any level, but especially at the strategic or national level, has been known for quite some time. In his 1979 analysis of strategic planning, economics and management professor George A. Steiner wrote:

> …whereas plans are crucial in producing certain types of results, the planning process is important in other ways. Which outweighs the other is not clear but more and more managers agree with the old military saying

[195] This is a staff composed of officers from different nations participating in a either an alliance or a coalition operation. A coalition is organized on an *ad hoc* basis whereas an alliance is the result of a standing agreement or treaty.

[196] *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process*, 1-9.

[197] *Ibid.*, 1-11.

> that 'Plans sometimes may be useless but the planning process is always indispensable'.[198]

The benefits of adopting a common interdepartmental planning method or process, at all levels but especially at the strategic level, are many. The process facilitates policy and strategy formulation as well as development of operational or implementation plans. In the long run, it enables: greater socialization among public servants and military officers, thereby increasing understanding, trust and buy-in; consultative understanding and discussion of the problem space; consultative discussion and analysis of the factors affecting the achievement of a possible solution; and, the initiation and development of more creative courses of action. It ensures all facts, as presented by the perspectives of different departments, are considered early in the development of potential solution space to the problem. It delivers results more quickly and more efficiently, which allows Government to respond more nimbly and competently. Owing to increased efficiency and reduced production times, it allows Government flexibility to pursue other issues. Finally, it increases the likelihood that a more comprehensive solution space is considered, which in turn increases the likelihood that better policies, strategies and plans are developed.

The principal purpose of a common planning methodology is not to derive the same solution to all problems or to always solve problems in the same manner, but to consistently approach problem resolution in a systemic, comprehensive fashion. This will ensure the nature of the problem is fully grasped, as much as possible, and all factors and considerations, which might contribute to its successful resolution, are properly taken

---

[198] George A. Steiner, *Strategic Planning - What Every Manager Must Know*, (New York: The Free Press: 1979), 43.

into account by ultimate decision-makers. The key to a successful problem solving methodology, especially in complex or wicked problems, is to begin the process with an open, informed, fulsome discussion and analysis of the many parts of the problem and the potential solution space. The military refers to this as the Commander's Initial Assessment.[199]

Some civil servants argue a planning process of sorts is followed, albeit not in a structured way, during cascading, sometimes regular, often *ad hoc*, interdepartmental committee and working group meetings. Depending on their relative importance, issues either start of the top of the system and work their way down or start at the bottom of the system and work their way up. Committees are normally the preserve of upper echelon bureaucrats.[200] Working groups are normally left to lower echelon civil servants. Deputy Ministers, Associate Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Ministers, Directors-General, Directors and desk officers participate, in one way, shape or form, as required, formally or informally. Besides records of discussion or decision, the most important outputs of these meetings are escalating Briefing Notes up respective chains of authority, culminating, ultimately, in a Memorandum to Cabinet. There is no systemic process for

---

[199] *The Canadian Force Operational Planning Process*, 4-2.

[200] In this regard and from the perspective of the Department of National Defence, the Deputy Minister Committees on Global Trends, Foreign Affairs and Defence Issues (GTFAD) and on Security and Intelligence (S&I) are most germane. See Privy Council Office, "Deputy Minister Committees," http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=secretariats&sub=spsp-psps&doc=dmc-csm/index-eng.htm; Internet; accessed 22 May 2010.

generating a Memorandum to Cabinet, other than to fill in the templates provided by the Privy Council Office.[201]

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has recently constituted a Standing Interdepartmental Task Force for dealing with natural disasters. This Task Force was most recently used to organize and execute Canada's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which by public accounts appears to have been highly successful. DFAIT is attempting to put in place a Standing Interdepartmental Task Force for dealing with external conflict; Haiti, Sudan, Afghanistan are currently managed by independent task forces.[202] In July 2009, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) produced a draft report entitled *Sustaining Canada's Engagement in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations*. One of the three objectives of the report was to "augment coherence of efforts which involve multiple departments while respecting ministerial responsibility."[203] It also lists ten considerations for engagement in foreign states, which can be considered as the beginning of a planning process. Many lessons have been learned, and continue to be learned from the challenges of producing such an interdepartmental coordination document.

---

[201] See Privy Council of Canada, "Memoranda to Cabinet (Templates)," http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=mc/mc-eng.htm; Internet; accessed 22 May 2010.

[202] As mentioned by Elissa Golberg, Director General Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), during her presentation to the National Security Programme on 8 April 2010. See "The New Normal: Canadian Whole-of-Government Operations in Fragile States," slide 5.

[203] Canadian International Development Agency and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Sustaining Canada's Engagement in Acutely Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Situations* (Draft), 1.

The common planning process or method need not be that developed by the military. It need not be the Canadian Forces Joint Operational Planning Process. In the end, it matters not which process or method is chosen, as long as a common method is adopted, enshrined in interdepartmental or whole-of-government doctrine, and taught and used across the public service. While such a process or method can be, and is being, championed from within the lower levels of the bureaucracy and like many other things in organizational life, executive management must understand the value and benefit of the concept of a common planning process and actively champion its adoption through their own will, advocacy and example. Adoption of a common planning process requires buy in and engagement from highest levels of governance and management.

Implementation Challenges

In the case of Canada, there are several challenges, some of which have already been mentioned in the examination of other country experiences, which conspire to impede collaboration, coordination and cooperation. First, the Privy Council Office, which generally prefers to exercise a challenge function over departments and agencies than to exercise a coordination function,[204] does not see the need to champion the issue. Second, there is a tradition of *ad hoc* resolution of issues which apparently has not met with the displeasure of the Prime Minister or the Clerk of the Privy Council; otherwise, either one of them would have taken more steps than are currently underway to improve interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation. The tradition consists generally of

[204] "…the PCO is not responsible for ensuring coordination and collaboration among the many related government programs, unless it is directed to become involved by Cabinet or the Prime Minister." See Alex Smith, "The Roles and Responsibilities of Central Agencies," Parliamentary Information and Research Service, PRB 09-01E, 23 April 2009; http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0901-e.htm; Internet; accessed 17 May 2010.

assigning issue responsibility to a lead department, agency, or individual. On some occasions, a special Cabinet Committee may be established, as was the case with February 2008 creation of the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan.[205] On some occasions, a task force, with or without top cover from a cabinet committee, may be established, either within a lead department or agency, or within the Privy Council Office.[206] The person assigned the lead for such task forces can vary from a senior Deputy Minister, as was the case with the PCO-based Task Force for the 2010 Vancouver Olympics and the G8 Summit, or a Director General, as is the case for DFAIT-based Stability and Reconstruction Task Force (START). Depending on who leads the task force, committee or working group, a different mostly unstructured process is used. Third, the principle of ministerial responsibility still exists and is not likely to change any time soon. This principle sometimes results in an understandable pride of issue ownership.[207] Fourth, the resource allocation and accountability paradigm is still very much vertically oriented. There are, however, some examples of the provision of resources for horizontal or interdepartmental programmes or activities. For instance, the Government's Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism or PSAT Initiative saw $7.7 billion set aside, as a special purpose allotment, over the period 2002 to 2006 so that a number of federal departments and agencies could pursue security-related programmes. These

---

[205] Prime Minister of Canada, "Prime Minister announces decisive action on Afghanistan Panel recommendations," http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1985; Internet; accessed 10 May 2010.

[206] In addition to the Cabinet Committee of Afghanistan, the Prime Minister also created the Afghanistan Task Force within the Privy Council Office.

[207] This challenge is exemplified in the Government of Canada Marine Event Response Protocol (MERP), Version 7.0, dated 27 September 2008, which states: "Generally, there are sufficient authorities, vested in Ministers of Federal Departments and Agencies, to carry out the response required to deal with any significant marine event through collective and coordinated efforts. However, there are situations when a whole-of-government response is required due to scope complexity and/ or political sensitivity."

funds have "strings attached" and can only be consumed in satisfaction of specified objectives.[208] It is not clear if this is a growing trend. Fifth, there remains lack of ease, inability, or unwillingness to share information.[209] Sixth, differences in the nature, size, funding, culture, language, and *modus operandi* of departments do not always permit easy collaboration and cooperation. On the size issue, for instance, National Defence has many more staff officers to deal with a number of different issues simultaneously whereas smaller departments, such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), do not have as much depth and flexibility. On the language issue, Canadian military officers are continuously reminded in Ottawa about the use of military acronyms in public and interdepartmental speaking engagements. During a recent "whole-of-government" exercise, CIDA officials admitted that humanitarian assistance doctrine and terminology differed between CIDA and DFAIT, and between divisions within each of these departments.[210] One should not underestimate the challenges of organizational culture and language in pursuing "whole-of-government" solutions to complex problems, either abroad or at home.

---

[208] See Department of Justice, "Public Safety and Anti-terrorism (PSAT) Initiative, Summative Evaluation," http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/eval/rep-rap/07/psat-spat/sum-som/p0.html; Internet; accessed 6 May 2010.

[209] Based on the author's personal experience as Director Maritime Requirements (Sea) at National Defence Headquarters from 2006 to 2008, this challenge manifested itself in 2003 when staff tried to implement information sharing between the five governments departments involved in the Maritime Security Operations Centres.

[210] National Security Programme Exercise STRATEGIC POWER took place in Ottawa during the week of 8 March 2010, and involved representatives of the Department of National Defence and of the above-mentioned departments.

Elissa Golberg, Director General Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, addressed the National Security Programme on 8 April 2010 about her experience in dealing with fragile states. In her presentation, she opined joint planning is critical to whole-of-government success. She also listed several challenges to whole-of-government action, namely: interdepartmental cultural barriers, in particular between civilian and military colleagues, including in terms of language and timelines; public service bridging of perspectives between the national-level in Ottawa and the local-level in the field; horizontal consultation among all partners, in particular in a vertically-oriented system; and information management and sharing.[211]

The Need for Compromise

Everyone in government, from the Prime Minister on down, wishes to deliver public services in the most effective and efficient manners possible. Strong leadership and organization are key factors in doing so. It is up to the leader to create and maintain the organizational structures and processes that best allow his or her mission, vision and objectives to be satisfied in the most effective and efficient manners. With respect to interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation on issues which involve the military, or any other department or agency, a common, structured planning process is highly desirable.

---

[211] As presented during her presentation entitled *The New Normal: Canadian Whole-of-Government Operations in Fragile States*; with permission. From the military perspective, retired Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, former Commander of Canada Expeditionary Command, spoke, during his 20 May 2010 presentation to the National Security Programme, of the importance of aligning ends, ways and means, and of the reality that planning is not intuitive in the Canadian whole-of-government context; with permission.

Ongoing management attempts to squeeze out greater organizational efficiency is analogous to engineering attempts to squeeze out greater engine efficiency. In both cases, managers and engineers wish their respective organizational and mechanical output to reflect the full value of their input. Mathematically, efficiency is the ratio of output to input. Perfect efficiency is a ratio of 1, or 100%. In engineering, an efficiency of 100% is never achieved owing to various inefficiencies, the most important and well known being friction between the moving parts. Friction exists within organizations as well. As a result, an organization will be challenged to be 100% efficient.[212] In both cases, managers and engineers, attempt to reduce inefficiency arising from friction. To this end, engineers use lubricating oil. Managers can use many means, the most important being the establishment of the proper linkage between ends, ways and means; the use compromise; the establishment of common doctrine; and the use of common training.

As militaries around the world sensed the need for greater collaboration and cooperation in the battlespace, they introduced the notion of jointness. The latter speaks to the notion of individual services, usually the navy, air force and army, working together to achieve a particular strategic objective. Jointness was emphasized by the leaders of the individual services as the recognized means of getting the job done more efficiently. The tenets and principles of jointness were enshrined, with senior leadership blessing and championship, into joint doctrine. This doctrine is used and taught to

---

[212] "…inherent constraints on interagency coordination will keep the logically desired outcome from becoming reality. What is logically possible is not always practically possible and almost never bureaucratically possible. … A certain humility is called for and greater patience." See William J. Olson, "Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or the Essence of Indecision," in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, ed. Gabriel Marcella, 215-254 (Carlisle: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 251.

military officers. It provides a common lexicon, way of thinking, and *modus operandi*. Without shared doctrine and without subsequent training, collaboration and cooperation would be left to good will and time-consuming discussion and debate, none of which is very efficient in the heat of battle. Should the political leadership of the country feel the need to generate maximum efficiency from its subordinate bureaucracy and military, whole-of-government doctrine, planning process and training would be most useful.

Compromise, as with many other issues discussed previously, is not new. It is perhaps the most useful tool of the upper-echelon leader to get subordinate leaders and organizations to collaborate and cooperate. Compromise is required in any size organization, at any level in the organization, and regardless of the organizational mandate. Even military organizations, notwithstanding rank, hierarchy, and discipline, use compromise. Compromise is most important at the top of the organization. If the senior leaders are unable to compromise, it is very difficult for it to happen at lower levels. In dealing with service rivalries during the Second World War, General Marshall agreed to divide the Pacific theatre into service-oriented sub-theatres. In return, Admiral Nimitz, Supreme Commander Pacific Ocean, and General MacArthur, Supreme Commander South West Pacific, acquiesced to the "overall global unified command structure."[213]

Douglas Bland, while recognizing the desire and benefits of interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation, especially in terms of planning, concludes:

> One of the limits to defence organization is the preferences of the government of the day. There is no use insisting on methods for planning,

[213] Ian Hope, "Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War," A Carlisle Paper (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, November 2008), 4.

> controlling, and managing defence policy if political leaders refuse them. Officers and public servants have a right and duty to explain the supposed advantages of various command and management schemes, but eventually, they, and not the politicians, must adjust to the reality and consequences of the government's way of doing business.[214]

As a result, some within the Canadian Forces advocate the concept of "leading from the rear" as a form of compromise in collaborating and cooperating with other government departments.

Summary

A structured planning process forces decision-makers and their staffs to follow a systemic approach to complex issues or problems. It ensures the problem is well understood and well defined, as much as possible. It allows a fulsome and comprehensive consideration of the factors and the options which orbit the solution space. A structured process benefits all levels of decision-making, and especially the strategic level. It does not matter which process is used, but one should be used.

[214] Pope, "Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence: 8 March 1937," 2.

CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION

> As issues became more complex and interconnected, it became apparent that no single department had all the necessary policy tools and programme instruments. The result is that each department now comes to the table with only part of the solution in hand, unable to impose a comprehensive solution.[215]

From the beginning of time, humans have found benefit in establishing governments which provide services for the common good. Modern democratic governments seek to provide public services in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Better collaboration and cooperation between government departments is one way of doing things better. The concept of interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation within government makes much sense, but it is not new. It was reinvigorated by Tony Blair in the United Kingdom in 1997 under the rubric of "joined-up government." Of late, such collaboration and cooperation has been rebranded the "whole-of-government" approach. In international organizations such as NATO, the EU and the UN, comprehensive or integrated approach is practised. These expressions all refer to the same concept of better collaboration and cooperation between organizations, government or otherwise, in achieving shared objectives.

As two of many components of government, defence departments and their militaries have joined the call for doing things better by actively supporting and pursuing whole-of-government approaches in the defence and security domains, both at home and abroad. This is certainly the case in Canada.

---

[215] Donald J. Savoie, "Searching For Accountability In A Government Without Boundaries," *Canadian Public Administration* 47 no. 1 (Spring 2004): 7.

Politicians and bureaucrats use the governance and management systems which are best suited to their country's particular form of government and to their traditions, practices and desires. There are differences in the way politicians, bureaucrats and military officers view, discuss and discharge their respective governance and management functions. Notwithstanding the many words, expressions, concepts and ways, management essentially consists of four basic steps: develop a plan, execute the plan, measure the plan, and adjust the plan. The key object of management remains the plan. The key elements of a plan are the organization's mission, the leader's vision, and the leader's objectives, preferably long-term. At the strategic or national level, these elements need to be established by the Government Leader with the assistance of his or her closest advisors. From the military perspective, a formalized, structured planning process would facilitate the formulation and implementation of policy and strategy, otherwise known as strategic management, and subsequent subordinate plans. In the Canadian context, military officers prefer a structured process; but, politicians and bureaucrats appear content with a less structured, seemingly *ad hoc* process.

Some countries have different views as to the nature and extent of collaboration and cooperation under the whole-of-government approach. Australia doctrinally and publically advocates whole-of-government approaches in every government endeavour. Canada has not enshrined the concept in an overarching policy statement and uses the expression in a variety of different ways. In the case of the Government of Canada, significant importance is placed on whole-of-government performance management, with particular emphasis on the public reporting of results to Canadians and responsible resource stewardship. Canada also uses the whole-of-government approach to seek

multidepartment solutions to fragile states on one hand and to domestic security and disaster relief on the other.

In their seminal comparison of whole-of-government approaches to fragile states, Patrick and Brown uncovered many of the challenges confronting democratic governments. While many governments have stood up fragile state policy and action coordinating bodies, which greatly improve whole-of-government efforts, lack of government will, leadership and direction, lack of ministerial consensus, lack of delegated authority, lack of dedicated, pooled resources, lack of common doctrine, and lack of common training all conspire, in one way or another and to one degree or another, to impede greater progress. While progress has been made, there remains room for improvement.

Interestingly, neither the supporting concepts of collaboration, coordination, cooperation, integration and alignment nor the main concept of the whole-of-government approach are observed to be new. In other words, lessons have been identified and learned in the past; however, they continue to be re-identified and re-learned again and again. Individual and organizational memories are short. These are knowledge management and learning problems. One way to deal with these problems is to develop a common, structured, interdepartmental planning process, to enshrine it in doctrine and to teach it, so that it leads to routine vice *ad hoc* policy and strategy formulation and implementation, as well as subordinate plan development. National security epistemologist Richard Maltz argues: "...taking a systemic, epistemological approach to

problem-solving is much more effective, efficient, and economical than are any alternative approaches. This, I maintain, is the essence of strategizing."[216]

A common planning methodology is not intended to derive the same solution to all problems, but to consistently approach problem resolution in a systemic, comprehensive fashion. Using a common planning process, which is understood and shared by all, will ensure the nature of the problem is fully grasped and all factors and considerations are properly taken into account by ultimate decision-makers. The key to dealing successfully with complex problems is to begin the process with an open, informed, fulsome discussion and analysis of the many parts of the problem and the potential solution space.

A common interdepartmental planning is useful at all levels, but especially at the strategic level. The process facilitates policy and strategy formulation as well as development of operational or implementation plans. It enables socialization between politicians, public servants and military officers. It leads to increased understanding, trust and buy-in. It ensures all facts, as presented by the perspectives of different departments, are considered early in the development of potential solution space to the problem. It delivers results more quickly and more efficiently. It allows Government flexibility to pursue other issues. Finally, it increases the likelihood that a more comprehensive solution space is considered, which in turn increases the likelihood that better policies, strategies and plans are developed.

---

[216] Richard Maltz, "The Epistemology of Strategy," unpublished paper presented at the 20th Annual Strategy Conference (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 17 April 2009).

In the end, better governance and management and better whole-of-government actions are all about will and leadership. In many human endeavours, collaboration and cooperation are hard to achieve if they are not driven from the top. If the leader wants it, he or she will get it, but only if he or she asks for or demands it. But a leader who does not know what he or she is missing, will not understand the opportunity that is being missed. Intermediate leaders can attempt to secure interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation, but the challenges of culture, language, personalities, resource allocations and vertical accountability will likely conspire to make it more arduous than it need be. Adoption of a common, structured, interdepartmental planning process, as ordered by the Government Leader, would attenuate many of these challenges.

A complete generation of Canadian military officers and a handful of civil servants from other government departments have been schooled in the Joint Operational Planning Process at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. While originally designed for the operational level, its principles, concepts, terminology, embedded problem solving methodology and structure are easily adaptable to the strategic or national level of decision-making, governance and management. The use, in Canada and especially at the strategic level, of a similar, common, structured, interdepartmental planning process by well schooled, senior civil servants and military officers would logically be more useful than the current, undocumented and *ad hoc* planning processes. In dealing with complex problems which require the attention of and action by more than one government department or agency, a common, structured, interdepartmental planning process would see decision-makers and planners come together to develop the requisite whole-of-government response within a framework of common language, intent and problem-solving process. It matters not which process is used, but one should be used.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agranoff, Robert and Michael McGuire. *Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Governments*. Washington, Georgetown University Press, 2003.

Australia. Management Advisory Committee of the Australian Public Service Commission. *Connecting Government: Whole-of-government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*. http://www.apsc.gov.au/mac/connectinggovernment.htm; Internet; accessed 7 March 2010.

Australia. State Government of Victoria State Services Authority. *Joined Up Government: A Review of National and International Experiences*, 2007.

Barr, David. "The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation." *Canadian Military Journal* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004): 39-46.

Binnendijk, Hans and Petersen, Friis Arne. "The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: Future Options for NATO." *Defense Horizons*, Number 58, September 2007, 1-5. http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons/DH_58.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009.

Bland, Douglas. "Canada's Officer Corps: New Times, New Ideas." Conference of Defence Associations Institute Annual Seminar, Ottawa, 29 January 1999. http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/03/seminar1999.pdf#page=28; Internet; accessed 12 February 2010.

Bogdanor, Vernon, ed. *Joined -Up Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Boin, Arjen. "Crisis Management." *Encyclopedia of Governance*. SAGE Publications: 2006; http://www.sage-ereference.com/governance/Article_n115.html; Internet; accessed 17 May 2010.

Boot, Max. "Send the State Department to War [Op-Ed]." *New York Times*, 14 November 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1382335251&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 11 December 2009.

Booth, Ken. *Navies and Foreign Policy*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979.

Bowman, Edward H., Harbir Singh and Howard Thomas. "The Domain of Strategic Management: History and Evolution." Chap. 2 in *Handbook of Strategy and Management*, edited by Andrew Pettigrew, Howard Thomas and Richard Whittington, 31-51. London: Sage publications, 2006.

Canada. Department of National Defence. *Broadsword or Rapier? The Canadian Forces' Involvement in 21 Century Coalition Operations*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2008.

Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000. *The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP)*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008.

Canada. Public Safety Canada. *Federal Emergency Response Plan*. June 2008.

Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. *Results for Canadians: A Management Framework for the Government of Canada*. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/res_can/rc_e_pdf.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 March 2010.

Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. "Whole-of-government framework: Background." Modified 8 June 2009. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-cpr/frame-cadre-eng.aspx; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009.

Carpenter, Mason, and Wm Gerard Sanders. *Strategic Management: A Dynamic Perspective Concepts and Cases.* Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009.

Chiafullo, Marilyn S. "Stability Operations: The 'Whole-of-government' Approach Using A Fraction Of The Team Can No Longer Succeed." USAWC Class of 2009. 1 April 2009. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510874&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; Internet; accessed 12 February 2009.

Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid. *The Whole-of-Government Approach – Regulation, Performance, and Public-Sector Reform*. Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies: August 2006, https://bora.uib.no/bitstream/1956/1893/1/N06-06%20Christensen-L%C3%A6greid.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009.

Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid. "The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform." *Public Administration Review* 67, no. 6 (1 November 2007): 1059-1066. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1404881121&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: The Free Press, 1990.

Coker, Christopher. "Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Multinational Co-operation, Afghanistan and Strategic Culture." *RUSI Journal* 151, no. 5 (October 2006): 14–19.

David, Fred. *Strategic Management: Concepts and Cases*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 1999.

Davis, Karen and Brian McKee. "Culture in the Canadian Forces: Issues and Challenges for Institutional Leaders". In *Institutional Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Contemporary Issues*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007.

Dion, Adèle. "Comprehensive Solutions: A 'Whole-Of-Government' Approach." *Forced Migration Review* no. 33 (1 September 2009): 28-29;

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1922479871&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed February 19, 2010.

Dyck, Rand. *Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches.* Toronto: Thompson-Nelson, 2008.

Edwards, John. "If I were president...up to the challenge." *Foreign Policy* no. 135 (1 March 2003): 52-54. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=298026491&Fmt=4&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

English, Allan and Howard G. Coombs, ed. *Effects-Based Approaches to Operations: Canadian Perspectives*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2008.

English, Allan, Richard Gimblett and Howard G. Coombs. *Networked Operations and Transformation: Context and Canadian Contribution*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007.

Evans, Paul. "Canada, Meet Global China." *International Journal* 61, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 283-297. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1079325731&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

Feaver, Peter. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23 (1996): 149-178.

Gizewski, Peter and Michael Rostek. "Towards a JIMP Capable Land Force." *Canadian Army Journal* 10, no. 1 (March 2007): 55-72.

Grattan, Robert F. *The Strategy Process - A Military Business Comparison*. Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002.

Gray, Peter W. and Jonathan Harvey. "Strategic Leadership Education." Chap. 3 in *In Pursuit of Excellence: International Perspectives of Military Leadership*. Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006.

Hays, Samuel H. and William N. Thomas. *Taking Command: The Art and Science of Military Leadership*. Harrisburg: Stackpole Company, 1967.

Hansen, Kenneth, ed. *Breaking the Box: The Increasing Demands of Non-combat Roles on Maritime Forces*. Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2009.

Heidenrich, John G. "The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community's Neglect of Strategic Intelligence." *Studies in Intelligence* 51, no. 2 (2007). https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/the-state-of-strategic-intelligence.html; Internet; accessed 19 April 2010.

Holloway, Steven Kendall. *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest*. Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006.

Holt, Robin. "Risk Management." *International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies*. SAGE Publications: 2007. http://www.sage-ereference.com/organization/Article_n475.html; Internet; accessed 17 May. 2010.

Hope, Ian. "Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War." Carlisle Papers in Strategic Studies. US Army Strategic Studies Institute, November 2008.

Hrychuk, Heather. "Combating the security development nexus? Lessons learned from Afghanistan." *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (July 1, 2009): 825-842; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1885117361&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

John, DeWitt, Donald F. Kettl, Barbara Dyer and W. Robert Lovan. "What Will New Governance Mean For The Federal Government?" *Public Administration Review* 54, no. 2 (1 March 1994): 170-175; http://www.jstor.org/stable/976526; Internet; accessed February 19, 2010.

Kaplan, Robert S. and Norton, David P. *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.

Kaplan, Robert S. and Norton, David P. *The Strategy-focused Organization: How Balanced Scorecard Companies Thrive in the New Business Environment*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001.

Kaplan, Robert S. and Norton, David P. *Strategy Maps: Converting Intangible Assets into Tangible Outcomes*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2004.

Kaplan, Robert S. and Norton, David P. *Alignment: Using the Balanced Scorecard to Create Corporate Synergies*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006.

Kaim, Markus. "Germany, Afghanistan, and the future of NATO." *International Journal*, 63, no. 3 (1 July 2008): 607-623. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1658980961&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

Kotter, John P. *Leading Change*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.

Kreiner, Kristian. "Collaboration and Cooperation." *International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies*. SAGE Publications: 2007. http://www.sage-ereference.com/organization/Article_n69.htm; Internet; accessed 12 May. 2010.

Lindquist, Everett. "How Ottawa Plans: The Evolution of Strategic Planning." In *How Ottawa Spends: Power in Transition: 2001-2002*, edited by Leslie A. Pal, 61-93. Ottawa: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Mahnken, Thomas G. "Strategic Theory." In *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, edited by John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen, 67-80. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Maltz, Richard. "The Epistemology of Strategy," unpublished paper presented at 20th Annual Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War College, 2009.

Martison, Karin. "Literature Review on Service Coordination and Integration in the Welfare and Workforce Development Systems." From the Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/publications/408026.html; Internet; accessed 22 March 2010.

McConkey, Dale D. *How to Manage by Results.* New York: American Management Associations, 1983.

Middlemiss, Danford W. and Denis Stairs. "Is the Defence Establishment Driving Canada's Foreign Policy?" Chap 4. in *Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre?* edited by Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen, 66-90. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008.

Moss, Daniel. "Strategies." *Encyclopedia of Public Relations*. SAGE Publications: 2004; http://www.sage-ereference.com/publicrelations/Article_n415.html; Internet; accessed 17 May. 2010.

Nye, John V.C. "Killing Private Ryan: An institutional analysis of military decision-making during World War II." *Economics of Governance* 8, No. 4 (Sep 2007): 281–308.

Olson, William J. "Interagency Coordination: The Normal Accident or the Essence of Indecision." Chap. 5 in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, edited by Gabriella Marcella, 215-254. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008.

O'Neal, Brian. "Reorganizing Government: New Approaches to Public Service Reform." Parliamentary Information and Research Service, January 1994. http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp375-e.htm#INTRO; Internet; accessed 4 December 2009.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. *Whole-of-government Approaches to Fragile States.* 2006. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf; Internet; accessed 14 October 2009.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. "Part 3: Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States." *OECD Journal on Development*, 8, no. 3 (1 January 2008): 179,181,183,185-189,191-193,195-223,225,227-232; http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1613824851&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

Osborne, David and Ted Gaebler. *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming America*. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1992.

Patrick, Stewart & Brown, Kaysie. *Greater Than The Sum Of Its Parts? Assessing 'Whole-of-government' Approaches to Fragile States*. New York: International Peace Academy, 2007.

Pettigrew, Andrew, Howard Thomas, and Richard Whittington. "Strategic Management: The Strengths and Limitations of a Field." In *Handbook of Strategy and* Management, edited by Andrew Pettigrew, Howard Thomas, and Richard Whittington, 3- 30. London: Sage Publications, 2006.

Pope, Colonel Maurice A. "Memorandum on a Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence: 8 March 1937." In *Canada's National Defence Volume 2: Defence Organization*, edited by Douglas L. Bland, 7-20. Kingston: Queen's University School of Policy Studies, 1998.

Posner, Roy. "The Great Secret: Organization." http://www.gurusoftware.com/Gurunet/Business/Topics/Organization.htm; Internet; accessed 22 March 2010.

Radford, K.J. *Complex Decision Problems - An Integrated Strategy for Resolution*. Reston: Reston Publishing Company, 1977.

Reddin, William J. *Effective Management by Objectives: The 3-D Method of MBO*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.

Richardson, Bill. "Comprehensive Approach to Strategic Management: Leading across the Strategic Management Domain." *Management Decision*, Vol 32, Issue 8 (1994): 27-41.

Rittel, H.W.J. and M.M. Webber. "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning." *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973): 155-169.

Robbins, Stephen P., Mary Coulter and Nancy Langton. *Management*. 9th Canadian Edition. Toronto: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009.

Rostek, Michael. "Managing Change within DND." In *The Public Management of Defence*, edited by Craig Stone, 213-236. Toronto: Breakout Education, 2009.

Savoie, Donald J. "Searching For Accountability In A Government Without Boundaries," *Canadian Public Administration* 47 no. 1 (Spring 2004): 1-26.

Schmitt, John F. "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design." from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/mcwl_schmitt_op_design.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 May 2010.

Schmitz, Gerald. "Reorganizing Government: The Reform Debate in Perspective." January 1994. http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp376-e.htm#MANAG; Internet; accessed 4 December 2009.

Scott, Richard. *Institutions and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2001.

Scratch, Lydia. "Management, Resources and Results Structure Policy." Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 23 August 2005. http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0523-e.htm; Internet; accessed 11 March 2010.

Sibii, Razvan. "Grand Strategy." *Encyclopedia of United States National Security*. SAGE Publications: 2005. http://www.sage-ereference.com/nationalsecurity/Article_n250.html; Internet; accessed 13 May. 2010.

Snowden, D.J. and M.E. Boone. "A Leader's Framework for Decision Making." *Harvard Business Review* (Nov 2007): 68-77.

Steiner, George A. *Strategic Planning – What Every Manager Must Know*. New York: The Free Press: 1979.

United States. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 5-0 – Joint Operation Planning*. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 March 2010.

United States. Department of Defense. *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations: Joint Operating Concept*. Norfolk: United States Joint Forces Command, December 2006.

United States. Department of Defense. *National Defence Strategy*. June 2008. http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

United States. Government Accountability Office. *Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2006; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06788.pdf; Internet; accessed 21 May 2010.

Wagner, David. "A Comprehensive Approach to Security." *MIT Sloan Management Review* 48, no. 4 (1 July 2007): 8. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1360146031&Fmt=6&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010.

Wass de Czege, Brig. Gen. Huba. "Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in Complex Missions." *Military Review* (January-February 2009): 2-12.

Williams, Bob. "Systems and Systems Thinking." *Encyclopedia of Evaluation*. SAGE Publications: 2004. http://www.sage-ereference.com/evaluation/Article_n537.html; Internet; accessed 17 May. 2010.

Williams, Phil. “Strategy for a New World: Combating Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime.” In *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, edited by John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray and Eliot Cohen, 192-208. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Winchell, Tim E. "Managing Change in the Federal Government-Part I." *Public Manager*, 38, no. 1 (1 April 2009): 37-42. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1708121531&Fmt=3&clientId=1711&RQT=309&VName=PQD ; Internet; accessed 19 February 2010