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# MA SDMP

## DIRECTED RESEARCH PAPER

## CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM -CAUSES OF PATHOLOGY, DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH, PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES AND CURATIVE REMEDIES

### By/par

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**ABSTRACT**

The phenomenon of terrorism has attained a new virulence and salience in contemporary era due to a combination of factors that include globalization, advances in communication, ease of transportation, end of Cold War, media effect, and the enhanced lethality of the munitions including weapons of mass destruction. The lack of a universally acceptable definition of terrorism by the global community has led to varying interpretations of the phenomenon by the several actors. The act as well as the threat of violence by the non state actors against the non combatants for attainment of political objectives however comes across as the commonly understood contemporary definition. This research paper seeks an explanation of the underlying causes of terrorism just like the diagnosis of a pathology in order to propose measures for its cure.

The phenomenon of terrorism can be truly understood by analyzing the root causes of the grievances propelling the terrorists on their gory path. These include the political, economic, psychological, and ideological causes depending on the obtaining socio-political environment. In order to find a lasting cure the phenomenon of terrorism has to be treated like a disease. Correct diagnosis of the root causes of the malady followed by suitable prophylactic and curative measures is the proper approach to finding a lasting solution to the problem. The important root causes of the contemporary terrorism are the unresolved political conflicts, struggle for national liberation, religious extremism tied to grievances against the repressive and unjust apostate as well as imperial states and the denial of economic opportunities.

The solution to the problem of terrorism lies in adoption of a comprehensive approach at global, regional and local levels aimed at alleviating the fundamental injustices and the grievances that actually fuel the violent struggle. A simultaneous targeting of the agents (militants, organizations), hosts (organizations/cells), vectors (madrassahs, prisons, internet etc) and environment (social, political, and economic conditions) should be attempted to prevent as well as cure the malady in a comprehensive manner.

**CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM -CAUSES OF PATHOLOGY, DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH, PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES AND CURATIVE REMEDIES**

"However incomprehensible the acts of the terrorists appear to be, our judges, our policemen, and our politicians must never be allowed to forget that terrorism is an activity of the fellow human beings"

(Edmond Leach)

**Introduction**

Terrorism is the most inscrutable and lethal contemporary phenomenon that thrives on novel tactics, gruesome strategies and doctrines by its practitioners who are dignified by epithets such as asymmetric fighters, fourth generation combatants and non Trinitarian warriors[1]. The scourge has been facilitated by the phenomenon of globalization .The global pervasiveness of terrorist threats is a result of modern means of communications and weaponry that allow the cellular structure of terrorists to operate with stealth and cunning. The global reach, connectivity, and lethality of the modern day terrorism are evident in the shape of Al Qaeda type organizations that strike with impunity across continents.

The end of Cold War resulted in unraveling of atavistic and nihilistic iconoclasms of communities that had lain dormant due to stability induced by client protégé world of bipolar balance of power. The phenomenon of terrorism might be confused with violent crime, cyber warfare, gang wars, and societal conflict. It is for this reason that writers like Walter Laqueur caution against defining terrorism due to its hydra headed nature.[2] Others like Bruce Hoffman have defined terrorism as the achievement of

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[1] Martin Van Creveld, *The Art of War and military* Thought, ed. John Keegan (London :Cass,2000),213.
[2] Walter Laqueur, *No End To War:Terrorism in the Twenty First Century*(New York, 2003),2.

political change by violent acts.[3] Writers like Tore Bjorgo, Jerrold Post and Joshua Sinai the have analyzed terrorism from the angle of root causes and proposed their resolution in order to make the conditions less propitious for the fructification of grievances driving the phenomenon.[4] The approach adopted by the scribe to identify the root causes and remedies also fits in with the above model.

Terrorism has remained part of the global threat matrix since long but its current manifestations have resulted in an unprecedented reach and lethality. The advancements in technology have now enabled the terrorists to operate with greater freedom of action. Their ability to operate and act globally through diffused cellular structures, leveraging all the modern means of communications, invests them with a global character. It has mutated in a form that requires a common regional and global strategy employing a comprehensive approach. In order therefore to find a most efficacious response the nature of the terrorism has to be properly understood. The causal linkages between the cause and the effect have to be identified in order to devise a most puissant response to this insidious phenomenon. The response has to be articulated at preventive as well as consequence management levels. It can be safely summarized in the light of above discussion that the classical approaches that confront terrorism through an analysis based upon its manifestations are not capable of dealing with the ingrained virulence and complexity of the phenomenon that is best explained through a causal examination of the phenomenon.

There is a need to identify the causes of contemporary wave of terrorism afflicting the world. A process of inductive reasoning can help shortlist the causes that have always

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[3]Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*(New York, Columbia University Press, 2006), 2.
[4] Tore Bjorgo, *Root Causes of Terrorism, Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (Routledge, New York and London,2005),5.

inspired a terroristic response. The knowledge of such causes would help understand the nature of contemporary terrorist threats with an ultimate aim of crystallizing the response options. A comprehensive global anti terrorism strategy with strong regional linkages involving all countries of the world in a global counter terrorism regime is de rigueur.

So what are the causes and defining features of contemporary terrorism? And what are the best strategies to fight and defeat the new brand of terrorism? An analytical overview of the history of the terrorism shows that in every era the causes of the terrorism are essentially the political, economic, and psycho-social deprivations which have to be understood in the context of specific environmental conditions. The causes of the contemporary terrorism also reside in the political, economic, and psychosocial deprivations exacerbated by the new political and technological opportunities created by the forces of the globalization. The linkage between the true causes (alethestate prophasis) and the immediate/accelerating causes therefore needs to be properly understood in order to truly comprehend the nature of the beast.[5] An example of sectarian terrorism in Pakistan is apposite. The sectarian cleavages in Pakistani society always existed since independence but the trend was exacerbated during the early eighties due to three political catalysts or the immediate causes i.e the Iranian revolution (Shia majority), a military dictator's use of religious symbolism for political purposes, and the Soviet Afghan war. The defensive reaction of sectarian outfits in response to perceived threat of ingress of Shia ideology, active encouragement of a religiously minded military dictator, the US need for religious activism for Afghan Jihad and the ready supply of arms and cash acted as the immediate causes that spawned a wave of sectarian terrorism that continues rearing its ugly head in several forms of religious terrorism even now.

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[5] Thucydides, *Peloponnesian Wars*.

The defining features of contemporary terrorism include the transnational character, technological innovations, adroit handling of media, and ideological empowerment of the loyal cadres. The most efficacious strategy to fight terrorism therefore is a global compact to address the root causes of the problem through a synergistic orchestration of all instruments of national and international power like defense, diplomacy, and development. For the purposes of limiting the research to a specific area the acts of terrorism by the non state actors as opposed to the states shall be the focus of this discourse. It is the considered view of this scribe that issue of state sponsored terrorism has yet to be properly defined by the international community, fact evidenced by the lack of an agreed definition on the issue. A polemical debate can easily ensue with Iran on one end of the spectrum and the United States on the other detracting the main discourse from the new menace of emerging transnational terrorist threats.

An attempt shall be made in this paper to analyze the causes of contemporary terrorism along with an exposition of its defining features and the dominant characteristics. In order to distill relevant conclusions a few case studies of modern terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eilam (LTTE), Irish Republican Army, Hamas, and Tehreek –e- Taleban Pakistan have been consulted. Part I of the paper shall set the stage for the main discourse by discussing few definitional issues, historical context and the contributory factors to contemporary terrorism. Part II of the paper shall primarily consist of the analysis of the causes of the terrorism and the conclusions crystallized in the form of principal features of the phenomenon. After a distillation of the causes and the dominant characteristics of the insidious phenomenon

the most effective approaches, strategies/tactics, and technologies to counter it shall be prescribed in Part III in the shape of diagnostic, prophylactic, and curative measures.

While carrying out research for this topic primary reliance has been placed on scholarly journals, published reports, and books by an eclectic mix of the authors. A few conclusions have been imbibed through presentations by some speakers at different fora with their express permission. The analytical newspaper articles of some well known writers in South Asia have also been consulted due to their first hand knowledge and insights about terrorism. The author has had access to some classified information having been a part of counter terrorism operations and has therefore relied on that experience for fructification of some of the conclusions, albeit in consonance with the entire corpus of scholarly literature germane to the issue.

**PART I**

**CHAPTER 1**

**Definitional Issues**

The notion of terrorism entered the lexicon of historians during the "reign of terror" in French revolution (1792-1794). Since then it has been debated at various international fora including the UN where the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over terrorism cases has been continually debated. The only reason a decision could not be reached was because the members could not agree on a definition for terrorism.[6] The lack of international consensus on the definition of terrorism underscores the complexity of a phenomenon which, of late, has been given the colour of a symptom that had to be treated by delinking it from the underlying pathology. There has emerged a school of thought that believes in segregating the act from the cause or the underlying motivation/ideology.[7] While such de- ideologising of the issue has helped international community to direct the full force of legal and moral principles against the act it has clouded the visage behind which lurks an alternate reality.

One of the reasons for a lack of international consensus on the definition of the terrorism is of course the differing perspectives of various stakeholders. There are different requirements for the politicians as are for the lawyers, and the police. One of the definitions suggested by Brenda and James Lutz appears perspicacious enough to encompass the nature and scope of terrorism. They aver that "the terrorism involves the use of violence or threat of violence by an organized group to achieve political objectives

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[6] Shaukat Qadir, Daily Times Pakistan, 17 January, 2009.
[7] Ramesh Thakur, *War In Our Time* (United Nations University Press, Tokyo/New York, 2007), 146.

by directing that violence against a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims who are often innocent civilians."[8] The organized group however shall not be construed as a state. The issue of state sponsored terrorism is a contentious one. The acts of state if overt segue into the realm of active hostilities, whereas the covert acts remain clouded in secrecy. The Iranian action in 1979 to take over the US embassy falls in the former category while the US help to anti Sandinista Contra rebels falls in the latter.

Alex Schmid has consulted over 100 experts on terrorism and has reached the conclusion that four elements are common to all definitions of the terrorism. These four elements include the abstract nature of the terrorism, inability of a single definition to encompass terrorism, sharing of few common elements by many definitions and the derivation of the meaning of the terrorism from the victims or the target.[9]According to Bruce Hoffman a terrorist act is political in objectives, violent, designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions, conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command, and perpetrated by a sub national/non state actor.[10]

The differing perspectives are brought in sharp relief in the definitions of different government departments of the US government. According to the State Department's definition, "terrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against the non combatant targets by the sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."[11]The US Department of Defense (DOD) also sums up the nature of contemporary terrorism in the following definition; "The calculated

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[8] Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, 'Terrorism." In *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Allan Collins,289-310 (Oxford University Press,2007), 292.
[9] Clifford E Simonsen and Jeremy Spindlove, *Terrorism Today, The Past The Players The Future* (Pearson Prentice Hall, New Jersey),8.
[10] Ibid.,9.
[11] Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006), 5.

use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear: intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."[12] The definition of the State department mentions violence against non combatants whereas the DOD definition removes that restriction. However in all the above definitions the ineluctable conclusion is that the terrorism is a violent act perpetrated against the innocent in pursuit of power with a political aim.[13]

Here it is deemed appropriate to highlight a linkage between terrorism and the irregular warfare. The two terms are at times treated as one. Dr Colin Gray quotes the British Army Colonel Calwell who a century ago coined the term small war for the conflict between the state and a non state actor.[14] According to Gray "the legal and political status of the belligerents decides the irregularity and a territory may be locked in a condition of permanent war and peace."[15]The distinction between regular and irregular warfare is deemed necessary by the pedantic military scholars who subscribe to the Jominian credo of the primacy of doctrines in winning wars. Another distinguishing feature of the irregular warfare is the mode of warfare that is "waged with such irregular methods as guerilla warfare preponderantly, probably with precursor and then adjunct terrorism."[16] *

The definitional issues have been discussed with a view to set the stage for an analytical discourse. It is evident that the lack of consensus on the definition has resulted in a continual quest by the scholars to offer new vignettes on the issue. The coercive

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[12] Ibid.,11.
[13] Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Defined", In Terrorism and Counter Terrorism, ed. Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 1-24 (McGraw Hill/Dushkin, USA, 2002),4.
[14] Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare, One Nature Many Characters," *Strategic Studies Quarterly,* 35-56(Winter 2007), 42.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare, One Nature Many Characters,"…, 42.

aspect, the use of violent means, and the identity of victims are the three important elements that shape all the terrorism matrices proposed by different theorists. It is hoped that some of these elements shall continue to capture the readers' attention while going through the main discourse.

**Historical Context**

Before embarking on the journey of discovery of the causes of contemporary terrorism it is deemed necessary to present a historical overview of the phenomenon. The history of terrorism goes back to antiquity. During 66-73 A.D. "the highly organized sect of religious zealots, belonging to lower order, called *Sicarri* committed acts of terrorism against Romans to protest against denial of their socio political rights in Palestine."[17]  In medieval times there was a cult called "Hashashshins"(The term Assasin is derived from this cult) comprising the most feared terrorists led by Hasan bin Sabah in an area located in Northern Persia. These terrorists were the religiously inspired and assassins who were used to kill religious and political opponents of Hasan bin Sabah.[18] The term terrorism however gained currency during the French revolution. Unlike the contemporary terrorism however the term did not signify an act of violence by non state actors against a legitimate government it was "an instrument of governance employed by a revolutionary government."[19]

After industrial revolution another kind of terrorism emerged as a reaction to exploitative conditions engendered by the capitalist system. This was the well known first wave of the modern terrorism. According to Carlo Piscane, a nineteenth century Italian

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[17] Enders and Sandler…,14.
[18] Clifford E Simonsen and Jeremy Spindlove…,53.
[19] Bruce Hoffman…,4.

extremist ideologue, an act of terrorism was "the propaganda by deed".[20] The organization that put Piscane's ideas into practice was the "People's Will" comprising Russian political activists called anarchists. Through the random assassinations the "People's Will" wished to draw the state in an exhausting conflict with it. Its chief ideologue Sergie Kravchinsky believed that, "the strong is vanquished, not by the arms of his adversary, but by the continuous tension of his own strength, which exhausts him, at last, more than he would be exhausted by the defeats."[21] The anarchists were avowed terrorists who assassinated Tsar Nicholas II in 1881 and were dubbed as the alchemists of the revolution by Lenin.

The anarchists claimed themselves to be the legatees of the French revolution according to whom the recourse to terrorism, in the Jacobin tradition, was a means to defend as well as instigate revolution. According to Carr they were product of an era when the governments no longer appeared the sole monopolizers of "the political violence in consonance with laws, customs, and authority. The terrorists competed with them for this monopoly to further their political objectives."[22] According to their ideological vision the recourse to violence was a self appropriated carte blanche to achieve the desired political end state. Political injustice and repression by the corrupt monarchy was the source of their grievance pool that sedulously impelled them on a violent ye t surreptitious confrontation with the symbols of state power. This first wave petered out by 1920s.[23]

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[20] Ibid...,6.
[21] Matthew Carr, *The Infernal Machine* (New York/London: The New Press, 2006),15.
[22] Mathew Carr...,15.
[23] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel terror and September 11," in The new Global Terrorism, ed.Charles W. Kegley, Jr.,36-52 (Prentice Hall, New Jersey,2003),37.

The phenomenon of terrorism reared its head in many forms after the communist revolution in Russia. This was the second wave of terrorism that started in 1920s and continued till 1960.[24] The struggle of Arabs under the stewardship of T E. Lawrence in Arabian Peninsula and Armenians in Europe against the decadent Ottoman Empire assumed the character of a kind of war that employed stealth, cunning, and guerilla attacks as the tactics to wear down a militarily superior adversary.[25] The travails of the regular colonial armies were brought in sharp relief after wars like the British Boer war and the Algerian struggle for independence. The recourse to terrorism as a weapon of the weak to challenge the legitimacy of an illegitimate government was encouraged by World War II leaders like Churchill also. In his exhortation to the Labour minister of economic warfare, Dalton, he is supposed to have directed him to "Set Europe ablaze."[26] The result was the creation of a Special Operations Executive that employed two leaders that had observed IRA's methods during its struggle against the British Empire.

After the Second World War the bipolar world got emerged with the two super powers jockeying for the world wide influence. The politics of patronage and confrontation resulted in a world riven by proxy wars and ideological one upmanship. This was the beginning of the third wave of terrorism that petered out with the exception of few examples by 1990s. The struggle for political rights was the dominant theme of anti government terrorism during this wave by organizations like Beider Meinhof, Italian Red Brigade, Japanese Red Army, and Palestinian Liberation Organization/Abu Nidal Organization. The struggle for political rights by Mau Mau in Kenya, Irish Republican

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War and Military Thought,ed. John Keegan (Cassell, Washington House London,2000), 201.

[26] Mathew Carr…,64.

Army in Ireland, and communist insurgents in Malaya were all justified by their leadership cadres as legitimate struggles for deliverance from tyranny.

Historically the phenomenon of terrorism can be viewed through the prism of cause and the means for its amelioration. The struggle of the American militias' to fight the British military colonists and the endeavors of French resistance against occupation armies of Germany could easily be lumped in the category of terrorism if not viewed from the angle of the cause of struggle.[27] The dialectics between the politics and morality therefore need to be properly understood in their historical context in order to understand the true nuances of this insidious phenomenon.

The raising of the threat profile of terrorism that has been in vogue since ages began after 1970s when the linkage of the phenomenon with Soviet Union was the dominant theme of Western academic and political forces.[28] The objective was to present and magnify the threat in a subjective manner by appealing to a sense of moral abhorrence of international community. This trend was supported by the advancements in the communication means that helped "manufacture a consent"[29] by international community. According to Mathew Carr, "the confluence of so many terrorist events in the 1970s was a historical novelty and their impact was magnified by an increasingly pervasive mass media, whose coverage enhanced the impression that the world had

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[27] Ibid.,72.

[28] Matthew Carr, *The Infernal Machine, A History of Terrorism* (New York,Londo: The New Press, 2006), 205.

[29] Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent* (New York: Pantheon Books,2002),XV,1-2.

entered a new age of terror".[30] The above writer has argued effectively in his book about the linkage of the acts of terrorism to specific causes.

The wave of terrorism that began in 1979 is dubbed as the fourth wave of terrorism linked with the religious terrorism. The contemporary religious terrorism personified by transnational organizations is not dissimilar to the *Sicarri* Jewish zealots' revolt against Rome in 62-73 A.D or the Hashashshins' depredations in the eleventh century A.D. It retains the virulence of Kravchinsky's anarchists and the ruthlessness of Jewish terrorist gangs like Stern and Irgun. The difference however is the transnational character, global mobility/operability, global propaganda reach and much enhanced lethality of the contemporary terrorism.

There are further classifications of religious terrorism into four generations as identified by scholars like Bernard Finel. While the distinction of terrorism by waves is pertains to all kinds of terrorism the term generations is employed for religious terrorism only. The main objective of the first generation that announced its arrival with the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 was the internal reform. It imbibed the combative ideology of Syed Qutb who based his arguments on 13th century commentaries of scholars like Ibn Taymiyya. His main arguments were that the Arab rulers needed to be cured of their dissolute practices and polities in order to initiate the spiritual and political renaissance of Islam. His "central innovation was the claim that the Jihad was an individual obligation rather than a collective responsibility under a legitimate Islamic

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[30] Matthew Carr,…2005.

government."[31] The second generation consisted of ideologically motivated Jihadis that participated in Soviet Afghan War in 1979-85 and were supported by the US as well the Arab regimes. The important distinction between the first generation and the second is the internal focus of the first on the Arab states where the state system and polity had to be cleansed of dissolute and secular practices out of sync with the spirit of pristine Islam. The second generation however developed a transnational focus due to expeditionary experience during Afghan Jihad. The third generation was the generation of "men like Osama bin Ladin and his followers who had been radicalized in Afghan Jihad and later on turned against the USA and other apostate states (Muslim states that do not follow Islamic way of life as interpreted by Salafists like Syed Qutb). The states that withdrew support after initial sympathy like Pakistan were bracketed in the same category.[32] The fourth generation comprises adherents of militant ideology as espoused by Osama bin Ladin who do not follow a central leadership but conduct isolated acts of terrorism in response to socio-political deprivations.[33]

The above historical tour d'horizon indicates that in every era the political, economic, and psychosocial deprivations emerge as the causes of terrorism with interesting regularity. Every era has specific contextual problems of individuals and societies that in the absence of a cathartic or ameliorative mechanism get transmuted into deprivations that manifest themselves in the shape of violent acts. The festering cesspool

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[31] Bernard I. Finel, "The Causes of Violent Jihadism," American Security Project (Washington D.C/New York, May 2007), 12.

[32] Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*(Berlin and Berlin: Globusz Publishing,2006),108: http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/Milestone/00000011.htm:Internet:Accessed on 25 March,2009.

[33] Bernard I. Finel, "The Causes of Violent Jihadism," American Security Project (Washington D.C/New York, may 2007), 13.

of deprivations and a sense of hopelessness engendered by apathetic socio political power structures have always resulted in these propagandas by deed. The moral of the above short historical story of terrorism is that symptoms do not really matter the pathology does. Hence instead of getting mired in explanation of symptoms we shall start with an examination of the contributory factors to the contemporary problem of terrorism before delving into the causes of the phenomenon.

**CHAPTER 2**

**Contemporary Terrorism-The Contributory Factors**

In order to understand the phenomenon of contemporary terrorism certain contributory factors need to be understood. These contributory factors include political developments, technological development, ideological upheavals, globalization, black economy, enhanced lethality and greater global connectivity. These factors shall be examined in this chapter in some detail to set the stage for a better understanding of the causes of the modern terrorism.

First factor that has contributed towards a spurt of terrorist activity in current era is the end of the Cold War. The Cold War had kept the simmering ethno nationalisms in check. The stability was a conflictual concomitant of super powers' rivalry that had divided the world in areas of influence. Latin America was one such arena of conflict. While the Americans sponsored right wing groups in El Salvador and the Contras in Nicaragua the Soviets patronized terrorist groups like the Tupamaros, the FARC, and ELN. Despite wars by proxy the super powers strove to keep the secessionist elements in control in order not to destabilize their allies/proxies. According to Feldman and Perala there was a marked decline in non governmental terrorism in countries like Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay.[34]

The end of Cold War removed the lid off the cauldron of ethno-linguistic particularisms that boiled over in an implacable wave of demands for separate political

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[34] Andreas E. Feldmann, Maiju Perala, "Reassessing the Causes of Non governmental Terrorism in Latin America," *Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 46, No. 2* (Summer, 2004):109.

identities.[35] This trend was augmented by a "second wave of globalization in the latter third half of twentieth century where the innovations in communications and removal of politico-economic barriers resulted in loosening of state control on cross border movement."[36] The rise of the US unipolarism and concomitant dominance of global politics combined to create a pool of grievances amongst radicalized religious cadres that were sedulously nurtured during the Cold war to fight the Soviet aggression. The US, according to such radicals, is a global hegemon whose policies are resulting in growing political marginalization of the poor countries. The growing politico-military power asymmetries in the world have resulted in a feeling of powerlessness amongst the modern day zealots who consider terrorism as an asymmetric way of waging war against the global hegemons. The preference is in response to a growing conventional dissymmetry in military capability between the powerful states and their non state adversaries.

The globalization has resulted in a greater fluidity in motion of ideas, people, and goods. The people and their radical ideology (if any) therefore do not feel constrained or inhibited by geographical isolationism. The kindred souls in ideas and deeds are therefore available in greater number to gel as a group. The fast paced technologically driven forces of change are rapidly changing social and economic relations inviting a reactionary attitude by the socially and ideologically conservative segment of population. The income inequality and the concomitant end of economic egalitarianism has ushered in an era where a curious mélange of people comprising culturally threatened, religiously inspired, economically deprived and entrepreneurially challenged segments form a pool of

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[35] Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, in *"Transnational Crime," Contemporary Security Studies,*ed. Alan Collins,346-366(Oxford University Press, New york,2007),354.

[36] Walters Enders and Todd Sandler, *The Political Economy of Terrorism* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 36.

aggrieved ready to challenge the new hated realities, ironically with the same enablers that have shaped these realities.

Another political enabler ironically is the declining direct state sponsorship of the terrorists.[37]When the terrorists rely more on indirect sponsorship they become less amenable to influence as they do not remain beholden to a state authority for material and moral support. Several states that indirectly support the terrorist organizations do so surreptitiously due to fear of international opprobrium, thereby loosening their bonds with such organizations. Such loose coupling allows adequate leeway to such organizations to plan and execute their attacks without normal restraints. The above facilitates a new virulent brand of terrorism characterized by enhanced lethality and indiscriminate targeting.[38]

The combination of technology and doctrine was the most significant enabler of the first wave of terrorism.[39] The doctrinal bedrock for the anarchists was the writings of Russian writers like Nuchev, Bakunin, and Kroptkin while the improvements in transportation means, communication system, and explosive technology served as the immediate technological enablers. The contemporary terrorism bears much the same imprint. The ideological foundations have been provided by a revanchist religious rhetoric enshrined in the training manuals of Al Qaeda while the technological support has been provided by modern means of transportation, communication, and propaganda. According to Moises Naim, "the international mobility, funding sources, and recruiting

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[37] Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill?* (New York:Harper Collins,2003),xxii.
[38] Mathew J. Morgan, "The Origins of New Terrorism," *Parameters*, Spring, 2004, 37.
[39] David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," In *The New Global Terrorism,* ed .Charles W. Kegley, Jr.,36-52 (Prentice Hall, New Jersey,2003),38.

prowess of terrorists are greatly enhanced by the forces that drive globalization i.e. ease

of travel, transportation, and communication: economic liberalization: and porous

borders."[40]The relationship between the globalization and terrorism therefore is one of

complementary nature with continually expanding opportunities and possibilities for the

practitioners of this grisly act.

The phenomenon of globalization has unleashed forces that have led towards

weakening of the state structure especially in case of the developing countries. This has

happened due to inability of the governments in the global south to develop their

economies and law enforcement capacities. This weakness has indirectly contributed

towards facilitation of the international terrorism.[41] Another aspect of globalization is the

issue of weak globalizers who are left politically and economically marginalized. These

disaffected groups develop a psychological aversion to global integration due to a feeling

of being left behind. This feeling of deprivation contributes towards a refractory attitude

and truculence towards global symbols of progress leading towards a cultural alienation,

the precursor of militancy.[42]According to Moises Naim although no casual linkage has

been established between globalization and the income inequality the phenomenon of

globalization is primarily seen as a contributor to widening income inequalities in the rich

and poor countries.[43]

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[40]  Moises Naim, "Globalization," *Foreign Policy,*Washington Iss 171 (Mar/Apr, 2009)

[41]  Ted Robert Gur, "Economic Factors" *Confronting Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,(2005),22.

[42] Martha Crenshaw, *"Terrorism and Global Security," in Leashing the Dogs of War,*ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson,and Pamella Aall,67-82(United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.,2007),70.

[43] Moises Naim, "Globalization," *Foreign Policy,*Washington Iss 171 (Mar/Apr, 2009)

The globalization has resulted in an interconnected world where the people, goods, and money move freely across continents blurring the national boundaries. The financial integration and fluid commerce has made the job of money launderers easy whereas the ease of travel has opened new vistas for criminal activities.[44] The ability to stay connected while remaining dispersed allows greater freedom of action to criminals and the terrorists alike. The emergence of human networks in contemporary society has been influenced by the business models. In the business world the bureaucracies are giving way to networks. These networks thrive on information and communication technology revolution. These promote decentralized decision making and flat hierarchies with maximum initiative to different nodes on the network. According to John Arquilla et all, the decision making design at times "may appear *acephalus* (headless) at times and *polycephalus* (Hydra headed) at other times."[45]The concept of networks is relevant to the contemporary terrorism environment where a new kind of human network glued together by a common shared intent/ideology and acting without a centralized control is emerging. In this network the decision making capability is diffused rather than concentrated with every node suitable empowered leveraging full range of informational and expertise benefits.

Media as a global purveyor of the political message has been in the forefront of a debate about contemporary terrorism. The media while spreading the images of a grisly event such as terrorist attack acts as an unwitting accomplice to the acts of terrorism.

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[44] Ibid.

[45]John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism", in *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism,* ed. Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer,96-119 (McGraw Hill/Dushkin, USA, 2002),103.

Terrorists use media for propaganda effects while the media thrives on sensational news in order to earn higher viewer ratings and larger audience.[46] This symbiotic relationship creates a bond between the act and its propagation facilitating the terrorists in their attempts to create panic and spread propaganda. According to Jonathan Power the journalists behave like "patsies to the terrorist giving their dirty deeds every bit of publicity they could ever dare to hope for."[47] Terrorism etymologically speaking is about influencing perceptions of key targets. It is not the act of violence but its impact that matters for the terrorists, a veritable violent strategic communication. Media therefore is its natural ally. The example of 1972 Munich Olympic attack on sportsmen is quite apt for understanding the impact of a combination of violence and media on spread of terrorists' message.

Technological developments have resulted in enhanced lethality of munitions as well as sophistication in communication and transportation means. The possibility of the use of a radiological device or dirty bomb by the terrorists cannot be ruled out due to possible access of non state actors to the fissile material. As highlighted earlier the fourth wave terrorism is not characterized with self restraint due to a variety of factors and may actively seek weapons of mass destruction (WWD).[48] Terrorism experts like Walter Laqueur opine that the use of WMD poses an existential threat to the global community.[49] Such weapons include the biological and chemical varieties also. The foretaste of the chemical attacks has been felt by the Japanese during the Tokyo subway

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[46] Walters Enders and Todd Sandler,…38.
[47] Jonathan Power, "Press and Terrorist Propaganda," *Daily Times Pakistan*, 6 April 2007.
[48] Brian M. Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? A Reappraisal," in Harvey W. Kushner, *The Future of Terrorism*,(London: Sage Publications,1998), 225.
[49] Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism; Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford Press, 2000),49.

attacks by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. The small scale manufacture of biological toxins in an obscure laboratory by employing the services of ideologically motivated scientists is a possibility that is full of ominous portents. Similarly the uranium deposits in the ex Soviet republics that have become insecure after the collapse of Soviet Union can be accessed by criminal gangs and sold to any prospective buyer with enough purchasing power. The uranium can easily be converted into a dirty bomb with prospects of indeterminate number of casualties due to unpredictable radiation effect. The element of fear associated with such weapon systems is also much more compared to other weapons employed by the terrorists.

The emergence of global black economy has facilitated a linkage between the organized crime, the money laundering, and terrorism. The organized crime normally thrives upon fake identity that gives it space to expand its reach and capacity while fending off the law enforcing apparatus. The cover of business, philanthropy, and trade is normally employed to conceal the real source of the pelf. In order to generate and preserve these fake identities the money laundering becomes de rigueur. The lax banking rules and privacy policies facilitate the process of money laundering that some times thrives on corrupt management of private banks.

It can be safely concluded here that the contributory factors like the end of Cold War, communication revolution i.e internet/satellite communications etc, lethality/accessibility of munitions, ease of global transportation, black economy, and the technology enabled ubiquitous reach of media have made terrorism an attractive proposition with aggrieved people like politically excluded minorities, putative freedom fighters, religious particularists, and ethnic separatists. After having had a tour d'horizon

of the contributory factors we will have a look on the causes of terrorism in the next chapter.

## PART-II

**CHAPTER 3**

**Causes of Terrorism**

In order to understand the phenomenon of terrorism an examination of the causes is essential. The determination of the causal relationship between the acts and the motivations driving these acts is necessary to find lasting solutions to the problem of terrorism. As will be shown in this chapter the causes of the terrorism span a wide gamut of political, religious, and economic grievances which when combined with a sense of hopelessness give rise to the violent response. The central thread that moves through the entire narrative however is the feeling of injustice spurring on the terrorism which if left unassuaged almost invariably leads to a recourse to violence.

If terrorism is to be treated as pathology then the diagnosis of the causes is essential. If it is to be treated as a crime then the determination of the motive is vital. Though the causes always differ there is a ubiquity in their nature. Like Clausewitz who believed that war has the same nature but different grammar in its various forms the phenomenon of terrorism has also the same nature but different grammar manifested in its variegated forms. Similar to all forms of human conflict the causes have various layers i.e political, social, economic, and cultural. And since all terrorist organizations demand group loyalty and subsuming of personal identity in a greater whole the focus on political

grievances might not present a holistic picture of the mosaic of grievances that act as the causes of terrorism.

There is a need to identify the causes of contemporary wave of terrorism afflicting the world in order to understand the nature of the phenomenon. A process of inductive reasoning can help shortlist the causes that have always inspired a terroristic response. The knowledge of such causes would help understand the nature of contemporary terrorist threats with an ultimate aim of crystallizing the response options. Several attempts have been made to determine the causes of terrorism by different scholars. One such study divides the causes into the structural, psychological, and rational choice categories.[50]

The structural causes are further divided into *permissive* and *precipitant* causes. The rational choice causes depend on cost benefit calculations by a terrorist in order to indulge in the act. The structural causes are deemed quite wholesome as these include a large number of independent variables that impact upon the dependent variable i.e. terrorism. The permissive causes include the geographic location (Urban or Rural), type of political system (Democracy or Authoritarianism), and the level of modernization. According to Ross the terrorism finds easy targets in urban areas, democratic governments, and modern states.[51] Amongst the precipitant factors of the structural causes i.e socio cultural unity, organizational splits, political unrest, external support, failure of counter terrorism efforts, availability of weapons, and the grievances the last factor is

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[50] Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Casual Model," *Journal of Peace Research.* Vol. 30, No. 3(Aug, 1993), 317.

[51] Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Casual Model,".,322

deemed most important. The grievances can be further "divided into seven categories i.e economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious, and social.[52]

According to British political scientist Mary Calder the forces of globalization are promoting a revolution in social relations of warfare much like the technology driving the revolution in military affairs.[53] There is a widening gulf between the globalized world and the communities being excluded from the process. The resulting conflict is being exploited by a class of ideological warriors who seek their political objectives by mobilizing popular support on the basis of proximate identities and the cultural fault lines comprising linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences.[54] The forces of modernization though have not resulted in above conflicts have definitely contributed towards their aggravation.  .

Another factor that can act as a potent cause for terrorism is the cultural alienation. The feeling of social deprivation engendered due to "longstanding and deep cultural conflict constitutes an underlying condition for terrorism to flourish."[55] The lack of cultural integration and feelings of alienation can be exploited by radicalized religious proselytizers for their own ends. Momin Khawaja's example who considered himself as an outcast in Canadian society is a case in point. He resented being reviled as a "Fatso" by his class mates and ultimately sought refuge in the religion to assuage the agony of alienation.[56]  As a consequence of his radicalization he got involved with a terrorist organization. A similar example is that of Hasib Mir Hussain who was involved in

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[52] Ibid.,325.

[53] Mary Kaldar, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Globalized Era* (California: Stanford University Press,1999),4.

[54] CFLI Project Team, "BroadSword or Rapier?The Canadian Forces Involvement in 21st Century Coalition Operations," *CDS Critical Topic Number 6 Project Report, CFLI TR 2008-01*(April,2008),16.

[55] Jessica Stern, "Culture", *Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*, (2005),35.

[56] Colin Freeze, "Khwaja Sentenced to 10 Years on terror Charges," The Globe and Mail, 13 March, 2009

London bombings in 2005. He was a misfit born and raised in Leeds where he got frustrated primarily due to racial discrimination in his school.[57] There are a large number of enclaves of disaffected and socially withdrawn people in every major city of the world who have not come to terms with their cultural identity. Cultural alienation combined with economic deprivation leads to a frustrated community that could be preyed on easily by the ideologically motivated terrorists.

The causes of terrorism according to Carr were palpable in case of each different violent movement that employed terrorism as a technique to obtain its political objectives. The cause of Mau Mau terrorism in Kenya against British colonial rule was a consequence of class conflict and sense of deprivation amongst the Kikuyu community.[58] The reasons of Malayan insurgency included political grievances like the absence of full citizenship to the non Malay population.[59]Algerian freedom fighters were reviled for long as terrorists because of their choice of tactics in fighting the colonial might of France without letting the world know that the reason of purported terrorism was the suppression of legitimate aspiration for national independence by the Algerians. For decades Irish republican Army was portrayed as an entity possessed of "irrational and groundless hatred" whereas it only responded to an equal if not greater hate campaign by Protestant organizations such as Ulster Defense Association and Ulster volunteer Force.[60]Similarly the Hezbullah militants have been portrayed as the products of religious fanaticism

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[57] David Williams, "Young and British: The London Suicide Bombers," Daily Mail, July 13, 2005.
[58] Matthew Carr.,88.
[59] Matthew Carr,…83.
[60] Matthew Carr,…168.

without acknowledging the reasons, such as removal of Shia villagers from south of Lebanon to Israeli prisons, that could have led towards their violent acts towards Israel.[61]

The causes of the terrorism interestingly are not entirely dissimilar to the causes of other grievances that cause civil wars and social conflicts. There is no single cause for terrorism as it is a "complex phenomenon with many facets."[62] The important question to ask therefore is not about the causes of the terrorism but the timing of the acts. Various enabling factors combine to present the terrorists with the options of violence based upon a cold calculation of opportunities and costs. The political and social grievances act as the tender saplings that are nurtured under a semi repressive political dispensation which is repressive enough to deny political space to the aggrieved but not strong enough to control their violent struggle for political rights.

Two apt examples of political and social grievances leading towards terrorism are Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eilam (LTTE) and Palestinian struggle for independence. In both cases the political deprivations and social exclusivism acted as the main causal variables for violent struggle. In case of Tamil community the structural causes included the slow political marginalization of the Tamil community whose job share fell from 24.7% in 1948 to 13.1% in 1981.[63]Sinhalese government also resorted to the demographic alteration by settling Sinhalese into Tamil areas. With the adoption of the new constitution in 1972 Sinhala became the official language while Buddhism became

[61] Carr.,227
[62] Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, in *Transnational Crime, "Contemporary Security Studies,*ed. Alan Collins,289-310(Oxford University Press, New York,2007),298.
[63] Shri D.R. Kaarthikeyan, "Root Causes of Terrorism? A Case Study of the Tamil Insurgency and LTTE," in *Root Causes of Terrorism, Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, ed.Tore Bjorgo,131-140 (London and New York:Routledge, 2005),132.

the state religion. The Tamils were also denied access to universities and some specific

job categories that fuelled their anger towards central government policies.

The disenfranchisement of Indian Tamils and the introduction of discriminatory

requirements for admission into educational institutions exacerbated the deprivations

further. The trigger cause was the death of LTTE leader Selan followed by the nation

wide riots. The armed insurgency and terrorism wracked the country for nearly three

decades and now the government forces have liquidated the last vestiges of resistance.

The main reasons for the LTTE desperation were the Sri Lankan government's

insensitivity to the legitimate political and social rights the infringement of which

presented the Tamil community with an existential crisis. The insurgency was sustained

for so long due to the donations by the Tamil Diaspora, business activities of LTTE and

the narco trafficking.[64]Some terrorism analysts have argued that LTTE guerillas were

trained by the Palestine Liberation Organization.[65] Their argument does not however

lessen the importance of the fundamental grievance that impelled Tamils to resort to

suicide bombings even employing women for the gory self immolation.

The political, social and economic marginalization of the Palestinians is a slow

process that continues in the shape of denial of territorial rights and the right to return in

their native lands. The two state solution that was purportedly meant to create lebensraum

for the beleaguered Palestinians has withered on the vine due to the political obduracy of

the main political stakeholders. The Palestinian community has therefore been

continually sinking in a morass of despondency resulting in increased radicalization. The

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[64] Shri D.R. Kaarthikeyan, "Root Causes of Terrorism?...,135.
[65] John C.Thompson, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: Essential Points," MacKenzie Briefing Notes, Issue 25(25 April,2009):http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com?2009/tamil-tigers-040609.htm:Internet: Accessed on 22 May,2009.

growing propensity of suicide terrorism amongst Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad cadres is a direct consequence of lack of hope. When the rational cost benefit analysis of a radical Palestinian confronts misery and hopelessness in this world with the recompense of a martyr in the life hereafter the result is obvious. A psychiatrist who studied the suicide bombers in Gaza concludes that the motive behind suicide bombings is invariably some psychological trauma like the death of a relative or a close friend.[66] It was highlighted by scholars like Sageman that there was neither any "evidence of depressive disorder" nor any "evidence of psychopathology" amongst these bombers.[67]

The Irish Republican Army's (IRA) struggle for an independent Irish Republic after the Easter uprising in 1916 is also a classic case study underlining the reality that unless a mutually acceptable political solution to the grievances is found the violence continues. The Irish nationalism was the main cause of struggle that culminated in the creation of the Irish Republic. The British diplomacy however managed to extract a separate political status for Northern Ireland from the IRA leader Michael Collins that ultimately led to his assassination by the IRA.[68] The status of Northern Ireland as the British governed province therefore sowed the seeds of another conflict between the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority.

The Irish nationalism gave rise to a virulence strain of republican nationalists who vowed to continue the struggle for independence till reclamation of Northern Ireland as part of Irish Republic. The proliferation of terrorist organizations representing Irish

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[66]Hisham H. Ahmed, "Palestinian Resistance and the Suicide Bombing," in *Root Causes of Terrorism, Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, ed.Tore Bjorgo,87-102 (London and New York: Routledge, 2005),97.

[67] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia;University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)

[68] Philip Zelikow, *Policing Northern Ireland (A): A Question of Primacy*, Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Harvard University(C16-93-1229.0),5.

republicans like Provisional IRA (PIRA), Real IRA (RIRA), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) owed its origin to the unjust partition of the Catholic majority island. The rise of Protestant terrorist organizations like Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Ulster Defence Associates (UDA) and Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) was another manifestation of the ethno-sectarian particularism that fueled a 120 years of violent struggle that ultimately got resolved in 1998 after Good Friday Agreement that was concluded to at least the partial satisfaction of all stakeholders in the conflict.

The search for psychological causes of terrorism yields the interesting fact that "the terrorists subordinate their individual identities to the collective identity. Hence it is not individual psychology but group, organizational and social psychology that provides the greatest analytical power in understanding this complex phenomenon."[69]According to Crenshaw the group psychology has its own rationality wherein the illegitimacy of the adversary is equated with a sub human status.[70]The phenomenon of terrorism is rooted in specific historical, political, and cultural contexts and thus cannot be explained away as a personality defect.[71] The terrorists have proven that they are not clinically psychotic but rational choice actors. According to Jerrold "there is a multiplicity of individual motivations. For some, it is to give a sense of power to the powerless; for others, revenge is a primary motivation; for still others, it is to gain a sense of significance. Within each group, there are motivational differences among the members, each of whom will be

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[69] Jerrold M. Post, "Psychology,"*Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,(2005),7.

[70] Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 21, No 2, (2000),410.
[71] Ibid.,409.

driven to differing degrees by group interest versus self-serving actions, as well as those inspired by ideology."[72]

An analysis of several case studies of terrorism yields an interesting conclusion that the political and religious factors combine to shape terrorist ideology. Religion per se is not deemed as the cause of terrorism but acts as an enabler for those seeking to find a leaven to bind the loose strands of political grievances. According to Crenshaw the "religious doctrine is a tool of mobilization or a justification for terrorism rather than a direct cause" that might act as a fig leaf for the basic cause i.e a discontent with the political and economic status quo.[73]Other than religion certain political ideologies can also be manipulated to serve the ends of terrorists. The varied political deprivations manifested in the shape of ethno-racial particularism, revolutionary movements, religious/right wing extremism, and xenophobic nationalism might act as the harbingers of terrorism. The politically aggrieved community therefore might employ terrorism both as a tactic and strategy based on a "rational calculation of its costs and benefits vis- a- vis a political strategy."[74] The rational choice motive invests act of terrorism with a causal dependency and thus emphasizes the role of a cause as the raison d'être of terrorism.

The accumulation of political deprivations and pent up frustrations, as a consequence of inadequate channels for their redressal, inexorably leads highly motivated and politicized organizations/individuals towards recourse to violence. The salience of

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[72] Jerrold M. Post, "Psychology,"*Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I,* Report Prepared for the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security,(2005),7.

[73] Martha Crenshaw, "Political Explanations," *Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,( 2005),15.

[74] Ted Robert Gur, "Economic Factors," *Confronting Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I,* Report Prepared for the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security,(2005),19.

political deprivation is borne out by the fact that 124 out of 399 terrorist groups are the affiliates of the political groups. Also 27 out of 50 most active current terrorist organizations are segments of ethno nationalist Diasporas.[75]   The ideal seed bed for terrorism is a weak state where unresolved grievances inexorably find a violent expression with a view to either discredit the government and win over the political capital(residing in population) or to compel the government to follow a policy course in line with their political objectives. The terrorists attempt to achieve the above by provoking the governments into unpopular overreactions, mobilizing international support for their cause, polarizing vulnerable societies, and compelling governments to act in a particular manner (Madrid bombings that sought to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq are an example).[76] The linkage therefore between terrorism and the political causes is amply clear that can be mitigated or exacerbated depending upon the government will and political savvy.

The internal as well as external policies of states contribute towards their susceptibility to acts of terrorism. Domestic injustice and grievances result in internal security vulnerabilities which are compounded by the external policies of the state. The state's susceptibility therefore is "not only determined by how it treats its citizen at home but by its actions abroad also."[77]Besides above the highly contentious and divided

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[75] Ibid.,…20.

[76]  Martha Crenshaw, "*Terrorism and Global Security,*" *in Leashing the Dogs of War,*ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamella Aall,67-82(United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.,2007),73-76.

[77] Martha Crenshaw, "Political Explanations," *Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security,*(2005),15.

societies are especially vulnerable to the prevalence of terrorism.[78] While the causes

might vary the conditions necessary for terrorism are mostly similar. Let us consider few

examples to illustrate the variety in causes. In case of Iraq, the nationalism is the

motivating force while in case of Afghanistan the complex interplay of the nationalism

with a supra national ideology (Al Qaeda that professes international Jihad or struggle

against global injustice spawned by Western imperialism) is the driving force behind the

insurgency. In case of the Basque separatist organization Euzkadi Ta Aakatasuna (ETA)

and Irish Republican Army (IRA) the motivation is the ethnic and linguistic identity

while in case of the Rashtrya Swamak Singh (RSS) in India, it is purging of mother India

of alien religions like Christianity, Judaism and Islam.[79]

The role of extremist ideologies in fomenting terrorism also needs to be

considered in the right context. According to Bjorgo "the presence of charismatic

ideological leaders able to transform widespread grievances and frustrations into a

political agenda for violent struggle is a decisive factor behind the emergence of a

terrorist movement."[80] The extreme ideologies like religious dogma have the power to

alter the cost –reward equation to convince the terrorists that the pay offs are in their

favour.[81] The religious identity and ideology some times contribute towards radicalism

and concomitant violence. The declaration of Gush Emunim (a radical Jewish settler

group) that, "I am a settler (identity) and my aim is to settle all of the land of Israel

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[78]Jerrold M. Post, "Psychology," *Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*, (2005),12.

[79] Brenda Lutz and James Lutz, in *"Transnational Crime," Contemporary Security Studies,* ed. Alan Collins,289-310(Oxford University Press, New york,2007),300.

[80] Tore Bjorgo quoted by Ted Robert Gur, "Economic Factors", *Confronting Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,(2005),21.

[81] Ted Robert Gur, "Economic Factors",…,21.

(Ideology)" has to be viewed as a conflation of the religious identity with the ideology leading towards a violent act.[82]It needs however to be understood that it is not the religion itself but its extremist interpretation that is the reason of such virulent obscurantism and that the religion itself cannot be blamed for its wrong use.

The sectarian terrorism in Pakistan perpetrated by extremist Sunni and Shia religious parties can also be bracketed in above category where the religious factor is the prime motive for the violence. It can however be argued that purely religious considerations are not enough to nourish a political identity for the terrorist organizations. In Pakistan for instance all sectarian organizations had to conflate their exclusivist ideology with a popular cause. This compulsion is due to the requirement of winning the sympathy of population that fundamentally decides the character and nature of terrorism employed by such organizations.[83] Terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Toiba, and Jamat-ud-Dawa have had to espouse Kashmir cause in order to gain domestic support and sympathy. In the similar vein the narrow religious totalitarianism of Maulana Fazalullah (Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat Chapter) and Baitullah Masud (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) is pegged on struggle for Afghan national liberation in Afghanistan.

The religious terrorism can also be viewed as a reaction to the secularization of the state and the society. The religious organizations are prone to violence when they are faced with a sense of powerlessness in the face of relentless wave of technology that

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[82] Mark Juergensmeyer, "Religion", *Addressing the Causes of Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol I, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,(2005),30.

[83] Sir Lawrence Freedman, "Military Responses," *Confronting Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol II, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,(2005), 22.

threatens old truths and verities. Some examples include the Japanese sect Aum's violence that was a consequence of a combined sense of persecution and powerlessness.[84] An example of the fear of powerlessness is the Jonestown suicides in 1978 where the People's Temple named cult ordered its follower to commit suicide as a consequence of defection of some influential followers.[85]A dangerous aspect of the religious terrorism is the possibility of its delinking from the causes and mutation into a violence craven entity addicted to gore. The motive could be a cathartic effect of empowerment through acts of violence in order to define and assert one's identity.[86]

The examples of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hizbullah, the Sikh extremists, and the White Supremacists can also be cited to underline their xenophobia and the fear psychosis of being culturally subsumed by the morally dissolute forces of modernization. The threat of secularization from within the same society also acts as the trigger for violence for such groups with a closed particularistic outlook. The statement of the Palestinian Jihad 's leader , Fathi al Shaqaqi in response to the Gaza-Jericho agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, "Arafat has sold his soul for the sake of his body and is trying to sell the Palestinian people's soul in return for their remaining alive politically."[87]The decision by the Pakistan under President Pervez Musharraf to join the US war on terrorism in Afghanistan was also confronted with a virulent reaction by the religiously indoctrinated tribal leadership sympathetic to the Afghan Taliban. The attacks on the life of the President and a wave of terrorism against

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[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.,…31.

[86] Mark Juergensmeyer, "Religion"…,27.

[87] Magnus Ranstorp, "Religion", in *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Understanding the New Security Environment,* ed. Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer,120-134 (McGraw Hill/Dushkin, USA, 2002),124-125.

the state and civil society by the terrorists were a direct consequence of the fear that
Pakistan's alignment of its anti terrorism policy in sync with the US would deprive the
country of its religious identity.[88] Having analyzed the role and scope of religious factors
in national and regional context it is pertinent to have a look on the transnational religious
particularism.

Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda also thrives on the images of global injustice
against Muslims. Its web site cites Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, atrocities in
Gaza, US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan as some of the fundamental reasons for its
global Jihad (Holy Struggle) against terrorism. Al Qaeda owes its origin to Afghan Jihad
or the struggle for independence against Soviet occupying forces. According to Peter
Bergen it was established in 1988 by ex Afghan Mujahideen who had fought Soviet
troops during 1980s.[89] The World Trade Center attacks that have been linked with Al
Qaeda were supposed to have been conducted through the help of an Al Qaeda training
manual based upon CIA training manuals during Afghan struggle for independence.[90]

The extremist ideology of Al Qaeda thrives on a welter of deprivations in the
Muslim world. The lack of political freedoms, economic exploitation, pervasive poverty,
and the poor human development indicators in the Muslim countries have created a large
pool of discontented people susceptible to the lure of political and social empowerment in
a proselytizing message couched in religious terms. According to Bernard Finel "the
differential policies of repression for groups fomenting domestic disruptions compared to

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[88] Asad Munir, "An Eye Opener for the Pakistan," *The News Pakistan*, 1 April,2009.
[89] Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden* (NewYork: Free Press, 2001),59.

[90] John. K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars* (London: Sterling, VA: Pluto Press,2000),223.

those calling for international Jihad."[91] According to Esposito, "Osama bin Laden has always shown a keen awareness of the wider grievances in the Muslim world."[92] Some of these include repression in Chechnya, Palestinian issue, invasion of Afghanistan/Iraq and isolation of Sudan. Al Qaeda's ire is also reserved against those Muslim countries that do not subscribe to a puritan version of Islam prescribed by its religious ideologues.

The issue of suicide terrorism that has gained primacy over other modes of attack in contemporary era requires to be explained separately in terms of its motivational appeal and causal triggers. The rise of suicide attacks as a preferred weapon in the repertoire of terrorists is evidenced by the fact that these attacks have increased from 25 attacks in 1985 to 535 in 2007 (See Annex B).[93] There are indications of an increased number of organizations adopting these tactics as the average number of organizations resorting to these attacks has gone up from 1.6 per year between 1991 and 2001 to 14.3 between 2001 and 2007.[94] There are different scholarly versions on the causes of the suicide attacks. The individual attacker focused analysis describes revenge and a strong dedication to a cause as the motivational factors. The employment of suicide attacks by the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan can be branded as revenge attacks in retaliation for government and international forces' action against insurgents. The strong religious dedication to Salafi brand of Islam is also a strong motivator that inebriates the suicide attackers with images of paradise in the life hereafter.[95] The terrorist leadership

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[91] Bernard I. Finel, "The Causes of Violent Jihadism," American Security Project (Washington D.C/New York, may 2007), 13.

[92] J. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (Oxford University Press, New York),22.

[93] Assaf Moghadam, "Motives for Martyrdom," *International Security, Vol. 33, No. 3* (Winter 2008/09), 48-49.

[94] Assaf Moghadam, "Motives for Martyrdom…,48-49.

[95] Ibid.,56.

that motivates the actual executioners of suicide attacks makes a very effective use of religious ideology while distorting it to obtain sanction for self immolation.

According to Mia Bloom the suicide attacks besides attaining rational political objectives induce internal cohesion in the organizations.[96] She believes that the terrorists at times resort to this behaviour because of a compulsion to out bid each other. The incidence of terrorism in organizations like Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a consequence of an outbidding competition with groups like Hamas.[97]Pape believes that the suicide terrorism is primarily a result of a reaction against foreign occupation instead of religious grievances.[98]While the Taliban and Hamas suicide attacks can be rationalized in terms of above argument those by LTTE in Sri Lanka and sectarian terrorists in Pakistan cannot be similarly explained. The definition of foreign occupation by Al Qaeda also complicates the simplicity of above argument. It believes occupation as the exploitative control of the policies and economies of Muslim states by the West.[99]

Al Qaeda's globalized vision of self immolation in the cause of the greater glory of Islam has been inspired by the Salafi ideology[100] and facilitated by the radicalized "Jihadi Diaspora" from Middle East and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda's objectives unlike other terrorist organizations like LTTE that resort to suicide attacks at local level are to continue struggle globally for end of political dominance of US and West. The idea that drives it is the Salafist brand of Islam and the grievances that nourish it are the Western injustices against Palestinians, Iraqis and Afghans. The increased share of Salafi brand of

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[96] Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing:Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No 1 (Spring 2004),61-68.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Robert A.Pape, *Dying to* Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism(New York: Random House, 2005),23.

[99] Assaf Moghadam…,56.

[100] A puritannical version of Islam believing in literal interpretation of Quran and adherence to the lifestyle of rightly guided Caliphs

suicide attacks by different radical Islamic groups is indicated by the fact that, "of 788 suicide attacks from December 1981 to March 2008 in which the identity of the groups could be recognized, the Salafi jihadist groups carried out 37.7% attacks followed by nationalist-separatists 18.5% and hybrid groups 17.8%.[101]

A logical question that begs an answer is the timing of the violent articulation of the Muslim world's grievances in Post Cold war era. That why did these grievances not morph into violent rage earlier is a conundrum that needs to be unraveled in order to discern the true nature of the new radicalism. According to Noam Chomsky there are two versions of scholarly discourses for explaining the terrorist phenomenon. One is the propagandist version while the other is the literal version.[102] According to the former version the new wave of Muslim terrorism is an ideological based apocalyptical struggle between the good and the evil. As per the latter the phenomenon is a natural expression of the deprivations of a way of life threatened by the unipolar global political architecture. The grievances did exist before the Cold War but were not global in scope due to a balance of ideological power between the West and the East. The removal of the threat of communist ideology from the global political arena brought the next most powerful ideology i.e Islam in conflict with the untrammeled capitalist imperialism. The timing of the clash was facilitated by the forces of globalization and modern technology.

When the religious ideology is utilized as a justification for the extremist acts because of political, economic, and social grievances the focus is wrongly and disproportionately shifted towards ideology. It needs to be remembered that pitting the state resources against an esoteric and nebulous threat such as religious ideology shall

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[101]Assaf Moghadam, "Motives for Martyrdom…,64.

[102]Noam Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors, Old and New, International Terrorism in the Real World (Southend Press Cambridge,MA, 2002),119.

always result in a mismatch of ends and means. According to a US Army officer, "the ideas only justify the violent impulse, they do not provoke it." [103] The religious ideology is not the grundnorm per se for a diverse array of Muslim sects like Wahabism and Salafism spread throughout the world.[104]It is a particular understanding of religion by politico-religious ideologues like Syed Qutb (Enshrined in his book "Milestones") that is no different from the violent interpretation of political theories by the secular leftists and anarchists. According to this interpretation all mankind has to follow a uniform religious code as in the medieval times. [105] The current brand of international jihadism is therefore a desperate response to perceived global injustices and powerlessness of the Muslim world against the insuperable barriers of technological and political advancements of the West.[106] The global terrorism does not emanate out of Islam but the socio-political inequalities engendered by the globalization.

One of the political reasons for the rise of the global jihadists is the seething discontent in the Muslim world especially the Middle East due to repressive and undemocratic regimes. The repressive polities that are non participatory and discriminatory have contributed towards a political discontent that in the absence of a political space has been constrained to rely on religious particularisms of Salafi as well as Shia sects. Due to the income inequalities and concomitant poverty a large number of economically disadvantaged and politically disempowered people seek refuge in religion

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[103] Lieutenant Colonel Hohn Cheryl L. Smart, US Army, "The Global War on Terror: Mistaking Ideology as the Centre of Gravity,"*Centre for Strategic  Leadership,* US Army, Volume 08-09 (July,2005).
[104] Mohammad Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2004, 1.
[105] Syed Qutb, "First Quranic Generation and Jihad_e-fi Sabilillah," *Mualim-Fil-Tariq*
[106] Michael Radu, "Futile Search for the Root Causes of Islamic Terrorism," Foreign Policy Research Institute, 23 April, 2002:http://www.fpri.org/enotes/americawar.20020423.radu.futilesearchfor rootcauses.html/:Internet: Accessed on 20 February, 2009,2.

providing global jihadis with an unlimited reservoir of human resource to conduct a long

drawn asymmetric warfare.

An analysis of the educational and poverty indicators of Tehrik-e-Taliban

Pakistan, Al Qaeda, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad shows that poverty and

education are only the contributory factors and not the main causes of the terrorism. The

educated professionals (43%) for instance outnumber the laborers (34%) in the West

Bank terrorism.[107]According to Krueger and Maleckova "any connection between

poverty, eduation, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak."[108]

The terrorist profile features an eclectic mix of educated and affluent terrorists like

Doctor Ayman al Zawahri (Deputy Chief Al Qaeda) as well as the impoverished and

poorly educated products of madressah (religious schools) system in

Pakistan/Afghanistan. According to a Library of Congress research "for profiling

purposes there does not appear to be a single terrorist personality."[109]In countries like

Somalia and Pakistan the impoverished segment of the population depends on religious

seminaries or madressahs for the education of their children. In these seminaries the

children are educated in theological subjects and are heavily indoctrinated in extremist

version of religion.  According to Karin Von Hippel around 30% of the Taliban have

been educated in such madressahs.[110] An expenditure of around "$1 billion per year has

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[107] Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR)-
2001:http://pcpsr.org/survey/index.html:Internet" Accessed on 20 March 2009.
[108]  Kruegar, A.B., and J. *Maleckova,* "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal
Connection*?*"*Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Volume 17, Number 4, 119-144(Fall 2003)
[109] "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism:Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?" *Federal Research
Division, Library of Congress(1999).*
[110] Karin Von. Hippel, "Dealing With the Roots of Terror," in The Making of a Terrorist, Recruitment,
Training, and Root Causes, ed. James J. Forest,266-277 (Westport, Connecticut,London:Praeger Security
International, 2006),269.

been estimated for such maddressahs out of which three fourths of the funds come from abroad, and mostly from Saudi Arabia."[111]

Though poverty has not been found to be amongst the prime causes of terrorism it certainly contributes towards the phenomenon in the shape of exploitable and vulnerable human resource to be employed as a cannon fodder by the artful ideologues. Since the lower socio economic status and poverty reduce the opportunity cost of participation in the terrorism we find a greater number of poor members of terrorist organizations.[112] The large number of religious seminaries called Madressahs is proliferating with frightening speed enlisting the poor and the dispossessed that might become the future foot soldiers of terrorism masquerading as the global Jihad. According to Shireen Mazari there are some 508 such incubators of hatred and violence with a membership of 54677 in just one part of a province in Pakistan i.e Southern Punjab.[113]

It can also be argued that the political, economic, cultural and ideological reasons do not always explain the causes of terrorism. It can have such simple primordial urge as revenge against injustice or persecution as a motivation that might later metamorphose into a political or pecuniary objective. The example of Columbian terrorist organization FARC and its linkages with drug cartels is a case of pecuniary motives clearly trumping the ideological objectives. The example of terrorist bombings in Pakistan by ex students/inmates of Red Mosque in Islamabad is a clear case of revenge terrorism. Some times the sense of vengeance is so overwhelming that it transcends any rational cost benefit calculations by the terrorists. According to Carr, "from Emile Henry to Timothy

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[111] Ibid.

[112] Alan B. Kreuger, *What Makes a Terrorist? Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 49.

[113] Shireen Mazari, "Barbarism and the Desensitised Leadership," *The News Pakistan*, April 8, 2009.

McVeigh and Osama bin Ladin, the history of modern terrorism is filled with groups and individuals who believed themselves acting in response to intolerable wrongs."[114] A classic example is the militant named Abdullah who in response to a request to spare innocent lives replied haughtily, "Where were these innocent civilians when the innocent girls were being massacred in Red Mosque?"[115]As a consequence of government action against the militants in Red Mosque in July 2007 there was a spate of terrorist attacks in the country in 2008. A total of 2148 terrorist attacks were carried out in the country in 2008 which was a 43% increase in such incidents compared to the year 2007.[116]

The unresolved conflicts coupled with political, social, and economic deprivations are incontestable causes in nearly all terrorism case studies. The tipping point between the deprivations and the desperation however is dependent upon the perception of the aggrieved about the probability of amelioration. Different cultures and polities respond differently to these putative injustices. The liberal democracies would perhaps see a political activism followed by rioting at best. According to Bernard Lewis one cause of a violent response to a perceived injustice might be the psycho social make up of a people. In case of the Muslims Islam acts as the social code that imbues its adherents with a quiet dignity and pride. While that dignity in most cases under normal circumstances leads to a dignified treatment of other peoples and faiths it metamorphoses into a rage in response to a threat to the same dignity. The thesis of latent aggression is borne out by desultory incidents of violence exemplified by burning of US embassy in Pakistan and seizure of

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[114] Mathew Carr…,325.
[115] Hamid Mir, "Qalam Kaman," *Daily Jang Pakistan*,12 Feb, 2009.
[116] Pakistan Security Report 2008, Prepared by Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies Islamabad,4.

Great Mosque in Mecca.[117]Such a psychosocial proclivity can be exploited by extremists for their nefarious ends.

The security environment in FATA was vitiated due to Pakistan's support to coalition operations in Afghanistan in 2001. Pakistan's support for the US led war on terrorism infuriated the religious militants and Taliban sympathizers who started networking in an anti coalition resistance using Pakistan's territory as a base. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan comprises a loose agglomeration of forty religiously inspired militant factions in Pakistan's Federally Administered tribal Area (FATA) and Swat Valley.[118] The leader of the movement is a Mehsud tribesman named Baitullah Mehsud. The movement inspires an insurgency in FATA as well as Swat led by different groups. In Swat the movement is led by Mullah Fazalullah. The ability of religious militants to "self organize" like a starfish inspired by a common ideology is a familiar feature of modern religious militants. The terrorists that were involved in train bombings in Madrid (2004) and in London (2005) had no operational links with Al Qaeda but shared its ideology.[119]

The Taliban insurgency thrives on guerilla warfare and terrorism. The linkage of its leadership with Al Qaeda is also a cause of its heightened radicalization. The movement has its base in the rugged mountainous terrain and derives sustenance from the Afghan insurgency. It has spawned a wave of terrifying acts of terrorism throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan including attacks on law enforcement agencies. By the end

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[117] Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," in The New Global Terrorism, ed.Charles W. Kegley, Jr.,194-201 (Prentice Hall, New Jersey,2003),200.

[118] Faryal Leghari, "Dealing With FATA: Strategic Shortfalls and Recommendations", *Perspectives on Terrorism,* Volume II, Issue 10, 2008.

[119] Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacoubian, "Terrorism as an Epidemiological Model For Countering Islamic Extremism," Mattew B.Ridgway Center for International Security Studies'Working Group Co Chaired by Jame. E. Nolan, (University of Pittsburgh,2007).

of 2007, suicide strikes from this region had killed 597 security force personnel and 1,523 civilians, including Benazir Bhutto on December 27. [120]The ever spiraling extremism and terrorism is a consequence of failure to reintegrate the ex Mujahedeen after the ouster of Soviets, failure to improve the socio economic conditions, loose writ of the government and an anachronistic political system suited more to colonial administration than an independent country.

An analysis of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan reveals a complex interplay of several causes of motivation for terrorism. The chief cause of course is the opposition to the governmental policy of supporting US led war on terrorism in Afghanistan. The struggle against the occupying forces and the purportedly illegitimate Karzai regime in Afghanistan is the main narrative of the terrorist organization. The combination of social, economic, and religious causes has turned the terrorist phenomenon into a veritable "wicked problem". The public support for the terrorists is garnered through presentation of the terrorist quest for power in terms of a war for the revival of the pristine Islamic glory. The public disenchantment with the poor governance, weak law enforcement, corrupt bureaucracy and ineffective judiciary has resulted in an environment where the militant demands for an alternative system of judiciary and governance in areas like Swat have actually resonated well with the public.[121]

The example of Tehrik-e-Taliban clearly indicates that one of the causes of terrorism is the perceived weakness of the state by the terrorists. The inability of the state to provide basic public goods like security and justice enables the terrorists to reinforce

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[120] Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, "On the Trail of Pakistan's Taliban," *The Guardian*, 10 January,2009.
[121] Nazir Naji, *Daily Jang Pakistan*, 12 February,2009.

the public lack of faith in the structures of governance. They strive to achieve that objective through acts of terrorism directed against the symbols of state power. The killing of 2000 policemen and soldiers in 2007 and the attacks on police stations and training centers by Tehrik-e-Taliban indicates their attempts to wrest control of the governance from an effete state.[122] The above discussed reason however does not act as the basic cause but a precipitant one that catalyzes the terrorists into taking an action in an opportunistically perceived window of opportunity.

At operational level the one of the most important factors sustaining the Taliban insurgency is the popular support for their cause and the lack of an effective information operations campaign by the coalition forces. The chief cause of above is the excessive reliance of US/NATO on aerial attacks. Out of 700 people killed in Pakistan's tribal areas due to drone attacks recently only 14 were terrorists.[123] The proclivity to avoid casualties has forced US/NATO to rely on indirect ground firepower, missile attacks and aerial attacks. The lack of discrimination between militants and the innocent people results in heavy collateral damage fuelling public indignation. Due to frequent drone attacks and civilian casualties the battle for hearts and minds becomes a lost cause.

The main causes of terrorism highlighted in above discourse include nationalism, ethnic particularism, religious radicalism, struggle for political rights, and socio cultural alienation. All of the above causes however have a contextual relevance to obtaining socio-economic realities, technological advancements, and regional/global political milieu. It may also have been subliminally perceived by the readers that the true and

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[122] Moeed Yousaf, 'Politics and Tackling Terrorism,"Friday Times, 3-9 April, 2009.
[123] Hamid Mir, David KilCullen's statement quoted by the author in his Op Ed piece in *The News Pakistan*, May 8 2009.

precipitant causes have their own niche roles that play their respective parts in the onset, intensity, and longevity of the disease. Having had a sufficiently clear idea of the causes it is now pertinent to highlight the principal features of contemporary terrorism in the next chapter before attempting to find antidotes for the disease in the final part of the paper.

**CHAPTER 4**

**Principal Features of the Contemporary Terrorism**

One of the distinguishing features of contemporary terrorism is the combination of two dangerous factors i.e the enhanced lethality of the weapons and the willingness of the terrorists to inflict maximum damage. Ideologically motivated terrorists seek catastrophic effects without concern for the collateral damage seeking destruction both as an end as well as means[124]. According to Crenshaw, "the new terrorists are thought to be more inclined to use highly lethal methods in order to destroy an impure world and bring about an apocalypse."[125] The new brand of fanatically inclined terrorists is outnumbering the politically minded purveyors of this grisly act. The capability to inflict catastrophic damage has been enhanced due to possibility of weapons of mass destruction falling into their hands. The suitcase nuclear bombs, radiological devices, chemical and biological weapons have all graduated beyond the science fiction stage onto the scenes of possible action. It however remains unclear if the terrorists seek the catastrophic effects as a big message or a coercive pain to be inflicted on the socio-political entities to achieve their objectives. In the scribe's opinion the terrorists ideally seek a combination of messaging and coercion as a strategy of compellence to force the governments into compliance with their objectives.

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[124] Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, (November-December, 1998),80-94.
[125] Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 21, No 2, (2000),411.

Asymmetric use of technologies and means of destruction have come to dominate the contemporary terrorists' agenda. The reason for above is the availability of technologies that enable the terrorists to fight the traditionally organized state security apparatus in a manner that renders the overmatched power of the conventional power structures irrelevant. The contemporary terrorism is employed both as a tactic as well as a strategy by the asymmetric warriors that challenge conventional armies with strategies that render the strengths of these armies irrelevant. The asymmetric warriors in amorphous networks, unburdened by law of armed conflict challenge the informational age armies, still organized hierarchically, with an enviable freedom of action.[126] An analysis of the asymmetric conflicts reveals that in conflicts where a superior conventional army fights an irregular force with conventional tactics the irregular force mostly wins.[127] Another interesting trend that is worth highlighting is the asymmetry of will. It proves effective when one antagonist views its survival at stake while the other pursues less than a vital interest. Examples include Vietnam, Somalia and Russo-Afghan conflict. An asymmetry of will helps the antagonist with the higher stake to bear greater cost/risk and undertake actions untrammeled by legal/moral grounds.

According to Colin Gray the terrorism is a mode of waging irregular warfare. It is a warfare waged by the non state actors to secure the political objectives. The military defeat of such an elusive enemy should be desirable but not an essential requirement. The political defeat should be the overall aim. The decisive war in such kind of warfare is won in the minds of people.This kind of warfare thrives on ideology and requires actionable intelligence for successful conduct of operations. In this kind of warfare the

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[126] CFLI Project Team, "BroadSword or Rapier?...,17.

[127] Ivan Arreguin – Toft, *How the Weak Win War? A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*( Cambridge University Press,2003),13.

military operations are conducted for "political effects which in the minds of the public constitute the true field of decision."[128]The quest for political effects and winning of the hearts and minds in contemporary conflict environment have emerged as the most important elements of the battle space that needs to be dominated for controlling the terrorist threats. In the opinion of this scribe there is a better term than battle space that is evocative of modern terrorism i.e *soft space*. And when we discuss the hearts and minds approach let us not forget the difficulties associated with the process of winning this soft space from the ideological practitioners of this grisly trade.

The ideologically driven terrorists operate with a pre modern mindset in a modern world employing post modern organizational expertise (Starfish like networks). According to Laquer "the specter of hydra headed networks has been conjured up that are not easily decapitated."[129] The ideological terrorism is on the rise with organizations like Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbullah, and Palestinian Jihad accounting for bulk of terrorist attacks and casualties.  The international linkages and the ubiquity of religiously inspired terrorist organizations are also palpable more in the nature of franchise terrorism throughout the world. The glue that binds these local and international franchises is the shared understanding or intent due to a common adherence to political Islam. Most of these international actors are second generation jihadists and radicals from the Middle East as well as West that travelled to the zones of conflict like Afghanistan in

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[128] Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare, One Nature Many Characters," *Strategic Studies Quarterly,*35-56(Winter 2007), 44.

[129] Walter Laquer, The New Terrorism:Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford University Press, 1999),262.

1990s.[130]The examples of Algerian, Chechen, Uzbek, and Arab militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan attest to the global nature of the network. According to George Tenet after the fall of Kunduz in Afghanistan in November 2001 the Taliban prisoners in one fort (Qila Jangi) alone included fifty Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iraq and several militants from China, Russia and Africa.[131] Unshackled by temporal and spatial identities and attracted by global jihadist causes these universal fighters move from theatre to theatre considering the world as their oyster. The example of European Algerian Jihadists is also apposite who having migrated from Algeria have gone on to fight in all parts of the world except returning to the folds of their parent Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria.[132]

The three kinds of societies i.e. pre modern, modern and post modern exist cheek by jowl. The grand narratives of the pre modern society that were weakened by the forces of modernization and completely atomized by the post modernism are being resurrected by ideologically propelled fourth generation warriors. These global networks are not bound by geography and rely on their connectivity, mobility and criminal entrepreneurship. They present new challenges for the strategic communicators of states equipped with the modern and post modern communication tools. According to Brafman and Becksform the modern terrorist organizations are akin to a starfish while the modern

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[130] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004),92.

[131] George Tenet, *At the Center of The Storm, My Years at the CIA*(Harper Collins Publishers,2007),221.

[132] Jonathan Schanzer, *Al Qaeda's Armies: Middle East affiliate Groups and the Next generation of Terror* (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004 ),111.

armies/law enforcement agencies resemble a spider.[133] These starfish like organizations

have the liberty of action to operate on modern as well as post modern lines.

Like a starfish the terrorist organizations do not have a centralized brain and have

the capability to grow back a severed limb. The spiders on the other hand have a

centralized command and control system and do not have the capability to repair or re

grow a severed limb. The modern terrorist organizations therefore do not have a

centralized leadership and are only bound through a common ideology articulated by

charismatic leaders who act as catalysts for the followers.[134] In such organizations, "the

headquarters does not conceive the attacks, rather the members adopt the ideology and

copy what has worked in the past."[135]In case of Al Qaeda the edicts of Syed Qutb act as

the ideology, Osama bin Laden as the catalyst and Taliban/Iraq insurgents as the

implementers. According to Brafman and Becksform whenever a decentralized

organization is attacked it tends to be even more open and decentralized. [136]In such

organizations the adherents are motivated by a common cause and are willing to fight and

sacrifice for that ideology of their own volition.[137]The leaderless organizations therefore

symbolize a small hard core surrounded by a large core of loosely networked affiliates

that are not under the direct command of the leadership, hence enjoying maximum liberty

of action without presenting a recognizable target to hierarchically organized counter

terrorist organizations pitted against them.

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[133]Ori Brafman and Rod A. Becksform. *The Starfish and the Spider, The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organization*(New York: Portfolio,2006),35.
[134] Ibid,93.
[135] Ibid,140.
[136] Ibid,25.
[137] Ibid,94-95.

The contemporary terrorists organize themselves as dispersed small groups networked through modern communication means employing information age technologies and doctrines.[138] The shift from hierarchical to flat organizational structures with decentralized leadership will be accompanied by the use of new technologies and strategies. The terrorist organizations like Hamas and Al Qaeda exemplify the shift from hierarchical organizations like Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and IRA to a networked and adaptive structure. The dispersed and multi cellular organizational structure of such outfits would allow greater use of information technology and employment of swarm tactics.[139] The new communications technologies like satellite phones and the internet enable terrorists to marshal resources and coordinate activities around the planet with unbelievable precision. According to Thomas Homer, "the complex terrorism operates like jujitsu—it redirects the energies of our intricate societies against us. Once the basic logic of complex terrorism is understood (and the events of September 11 prove that terrorists are beginning to understand it), we can quickly identify dozens of relatively simple ways to bring modern, high-tech societies to their knees."[140]A similar chilling foreboding is embodied in one of the sayings of the spiritual mentor of Hamas Shiekh Ahmad Yasin i.e "the Israelis will fall to their knees.You can sense the fear in Israel already, they are worried about where and when the next attacks will come. Ultimately, Hamas will win."[141] The challenge to modern law enforcement

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[138] John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism", in *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism,* ed. Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer,96-119 (McGraw Hill/Dushkin, USA, 2002),101.

[139] Ibid,105.
[140] Thomas Homer -Dixon, "The Rise of Complex Terrorism," Foreign Policy(January-February,2002)
[141] A Statement attributed to Shiekh Ahmad Yasin the spiritual mentor of Hamas, 2001.

agencies therefore by the spider like networks with shared intent but independent action is one of the most serious threats to the modern state system.

The use of media and the informal communication channels like web sites and blog has become an integral part of the terrorism. Some of the examples include Al Qaeda's web sites, Hezbullah's Al Manas satellite TV network, Palestinean's Voice of Al Alqsa.[142] The graphic and real time coverage of the terrorist acts has contributed towards enhancement of the lethality index of the acts. In their quest for sensationalism the journalists unwittingly become enablers for the terrorists. In deeply conservative societies the media is hamstrung in its efforts to shape public opinion through presentation of facts inimical to the interests of the religiously motivated terrorists. The reluctance of mainstream media to support full tilt the state's counter terrorism drive against Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan is a case in point.

Cyber terrorism is another important characteristic of modern terrorism. It indeed is the true exemplar of information age terrorism. It not only resorts to physical attacks on the information structures to cause disruption and paralysis but employs these networks to conduct terrorist activities resulting in death and damage. The example includes train accidents due to tampering of digital alarming systems.[143]. The international networks of terrorists might enter into a symbiotic relationship with the state sponsors of terrorism, criminal organizations and mercenary hackers. The ability of the hackers to attack the critical infrastructure like the airport security and guidance systems and the sensitive

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[142] Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and The Media (New York:Columbia University Press,1994)

[143] George J. Rattray, "The Cyberterrorism Threat", in *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism,* ed. Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer,96-119 (McGraw Hill/Dushkin, USA, 2002),223.

security locks of defense installations opens up the possibility of a digital Pearl

Harbor.[144] As per the claim of an unnamed US intelligence official the entire country

could be shut down with only$1 billion and 20 hackers.[145] Cyber links are also employed

by the terrorists to remain connected and to propagate their message. Al Qaeda's web

messages and their impact on the audience are an all too familiar phenomenon. It is

because of this web dependence that some scholars feel that the terrorists would not be

interested in attacking the cyber networks in future.[146] According to Kiras "terror is no

longer based on the prospect of violence: information and the ability to control it has

become a form of power."[147] The above soft power of terrorists is a veritable quicksand

that can sink any ham handed response by states or societies.

Another important feature of contemporary terrorism is increasing possibility of

the use of WMD. The possibility of the use of the chemical, biological, and nuclear

terrorism causing mass casualties coupled with the new brand of terrorism aiming at

maximum destruction sans proportionality raises the specter of a catastrophic WMD

attack. The employment of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons (CBRN) by

the terrorists has not been too frequent due to technological limitations and unpredictable

results.[148]The fear however of a mass destruction capability with the terrorists has a huge

psychological impact that needs to be assuaged through sound prophylactic as well as

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[144] Ibid,235.

[145] Walter Laqueur, "Post Modern Terrorism," in The new Global Terrorism, ed.Charles W. Kegley, Jr.,151-159 (Prentice Hall, New Jersey,2003),158.

[146]John Mackinlay, Defeating Complex Insurgency, beyond Iraq and Afghanistan(RUSI, Whitehall Paper Series),20.

[147] J. Kiras, "Terrorism and Irregular Warfare," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, ed. John Baylis et al,161-190(New York, Oxford:Oxford University Press,2007)

[148] Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context*, Report for Congress(Congressional Research Service Web, 28 March,2003),6.

consequence management capability. The use of radioactive isotopes for purposes such as food/blood sterilization and smoke detection makes their availability to the terrorists more likely.[149]

According to British intelligence agency MI5 it was only a matter of time that the terrorist organizations acquired a weapon such as a dirty bomb to wreak the desired level of havoc.[150] The acquisition of enriched uranium from research reactors and loose stockpiles in ex Soviet republics by the terrorists is a distinct possibility. The terrorists have been toying with the idea of a dirty bomb and use of red mercury technology (Capable of vaporizing a football field sized stadium). The weapons like dirty bomb can be smuggled through vehicles as well by ship based containers due to the modular nature of the components. The dirty bomb would wreak more disruption than destruction. The economic effects of IRA bombings in London in 1992, Bishopgate in 1993, and Canary Wharf in 1996 amounted to 2000 million pounds sterling.[151] The economic effects of a similar attack by dirty bomb would be much greater than the IRA attacks.

The choice of weaponry available to terrorists is linked to their functional use. An analysis of the data by Rand Corporation about the use of different weapons by the terrorists indicates graphically the general trends in the use of weapons as given below:-

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[149] Maxim Worcester, "International Terrorism and the Threat of a Dirty Bomb," *Institut fur Strategic-Politic-Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung, Berlin*,2: http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=10&fileid=A50B1B86-5D8D-B740-3910-39BD8E3C2C8F&lng=en.:Internet:Accessed on 1 March, 2009.
[149] Ibid,3.
[150] Ibid,2.
[151] Ibid,3.

Figure1- Distribution of Weapon Types Used in a Sample of Terrorist Operations, 1980-2005[152]



The employment of weapons by the terrorists depends on primarily on the nature of targets, accessibility to the targets, ease of acquisition and impact generated. The use of rockets and mortars though smaller in percentage amongst majority of terrorists however becomes very important for Hamas due to the extended nature of Israeli security perimeter. Due to difficulty of access to the targets the remotely delivered rockets attain importance. In case of Al Qaeda and Taliban attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan the use of explosive attains primacy due to the ease of access of the terrorists to intended targets.

Since the phenomenon of terrorism thrives on shock and terror hence the use of explosives find most favor with the terrorists. The terrorist bombings by the anarchists in

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[152] Brian A. Jackson and David R. Frelinger. "Rifling Through the Terrorists' Arsenal Exploring Groups' Weapon Choices and Technology Strategies," *Forthcoming in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Rand Corporation, October 2007.

Russia and the Irish Republic Army attest to this compulsion of the terrorists to create a pervasive feeling of fear alongside causing deaths/injuries. The analysis of the weapons used by the terrorists also explains the intended effect of their attacks. The explosive mixed with steel balls in Afghanistan and Pakistan indicates a propensity to cause maximum human casualties to maximize the feeling of insecurity amongst the general populace.

It however needs to be understood that the choice of weapon and tactics of terrorists depend to a large extent on the terrorists' need for surprise and shock effect. There is an insidiously dialectical relationship between the use of weapons and the prophylactic measures adopted by the anti terrorism apparatus of the states. When the roadside Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan were countered by the US/NATO forces the insurgents reverted back to use of traditional firearms.

The globally networked nature of terrorism manifests itself in the shape of shared tactics. The IED attacks perfected in Iraq are being used with equal lethality in Afghanistan by Taliban and in Nepal by Maoist guerillas[153]. In Mumbai attacks in India and Lahore attacks in Pakistan a new dimension of use of automatic rifles, pistols and grenades was added which was a departure from the much preferred suicide explosive attacks by the terrorists. The motive here was to take hostages and to show case the impotence of law enforcement agencies to generate maximum fear and despondency in the population besides highlighting the cause throughout the world.

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[153] Lieutenant Colonel Hohn Cheryl L. Smart, US Army, "The Global War on Terror: Mistaking Ideology as the Centre of Gravity," *Centre for Strategic  Leadership,* US Army, Volume 08-09(July,2005)

The linkage of terrorism with the organized crime is a unique feature of modern terrorism. The terrorists resort to criminal activities in order to fund their operations while the criminals seek terrorists' patronage to resist state interference with their lucrative business.. The linkage of FARC, LTTE, Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban with the criminal gangs has been proven. The FARC has close links with the drug cartels while LTTE has been involved in drug and arms smuggling.[154] The Afghan drug trade of around $730 million per month is being controlled by Taliban to finance their operations against NATO/US.[155] The annual profit from poppy cultivation to the farmers is $1 billion whereas the finished product sells for $58 billion in Western markets.[156] There is also news of Al Qaeda's involvement in trade of counterfeit items.[157] The violent movements often develop a criminal character. When that happens and the political motives of a terrorist are trumped by pecuniary motives the political solution of the issue becomes increasingly difficult.[158]

The money generated by the terrorist organizations through legal as well illegal means is laundered through banking channels. When the money laundering becomes risky the terrorists resort to informal channels to move money. According to an International Herald Tribune report in 2001, the estimates of the total money laundered around the world range from $500 billion to $1.5 trillion, most of it from the illegal drugs

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[154] G H Peiris, **"Clandestine Transactions of the LTTE and the Secessionist Campaign in SriLanka,"** **;**http://scholar.google.ca/scholar?hl=en&q=author:%22Peiris%22+intitle:%22Clandestine+Transactions+of+the+LTTE+and+the+...%22+&um=1&ie=UTF-8&oi=scholarr;Internet: Accessed on 2 April,2009.

[155] Man Mohan, "Afghan Drug Trade is Taliban's Lifeline," *The Tribune India*, 3 April.2009.
[156] Michael Chossudovsky, American War On Terrorism(Global Research,2005),232.
[157] Jon Ungoed-Thomas, "Designer Fakes Are Funding Al Qaeda," *Sunday Times*, 20 March,2009.
[158] Steven Metz, "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency," *Paramaters* (Winter 2007-8),23.

trade." [159]According to Chossudovsky the drug money is laundered through several offshore banking havens in Switzerland, Luxembourg, British Channels Islands and more than 59 other locations in the world. The whole activity takes place through collaboration of drug smugglers and the banking officials who develop a vested interest in the business.[160]There are no regulations against money laundering in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan whereas in case of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries these are lax.[161]The European countries suffer from restrictive regulations that do not facilitate free investigation of money laundering at international level.[162]According to a US National Intelligence Estimate in 2006 the terrorists would rely with increasing efficacy on the internet for global financing of their operations.[163] After establishing a link between financial crime and terrorism networks let us have a look on the nature and architecture of these networks.

Like all networked organizations the terrorists have weak as well as the strong nodes. The non hierarchical and amorphous nature of the modern terrorist threat might ultimately prove to be its weakness especially in case of expansion of the network. Weak nodes are susceptible to collapse or split due to poor bonding with the main network. The need for excessive secrecy is another weakness with terrorist organizations that generally split in political and military wings to preserve a balance between secrecy and effectiveness.[164]The terrorists' reliance on organized crime for funding of their activities

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[159] Jermyn Brooks,"Terrorism, Organized Crime, Money Laundering," International Herald Tribune, 31 October, 2001.
[160] Michael Chossudovsky, *American War On Terrorism*(Global Research,2005),233
[161] Jermyn Brooks, "Terrorism, Organized Crime, Money Laundering…
[162] Ibid.
[163] Michael Jacobson, "Grading US Performance Against Terrorism Financing," *Policy Watch*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 5, 2007.
[164] US Field Manual 3-24, Counter Insurgency, 1-14.

also renders them vulnerable to anti terrorism efforts of the state. Like all cabals the

terrorist organizations continually jockey for power resulting in internal

divisions/differences that render them vulnerable to counter terrorism operations.

Terrorist organizations rely on weak provision of public goods and services by the states.

According to Berman, "an efficient market economy and a functioning secular state

undermine the network of affiliations that support the internal economies of radical

religious sects."[165] The functioning governments "reduce the reliance of members on

terrorist organizations for provision of social services, reducing thereby the influence of

the organizations upon the members."[166] An example of a governmental attempt to

reduce the terrorists' clout is illustrated below.

An analysis of the British counter terrorism efforts against the IRA and the

Protestant Ulster terrorists yields certain important lessons about the most puissant

counter terrorism approaches. The primacy of the intelligence based policing in the

British counter terrorism efforts was the most successful antidote to IRA's sustained

bombings and assassination attempts. The use of the Army as the lead counter terrorism

agency was discontinued after 1976 after it was found to be exacting high social and

psychological costs without commensurate advantages.[167] Its role was limited to the

support of the Royal Ulster Police in extreme emergencies. The empowerment of police

was accompanied by the necessary modifications in the criminal justice system .The

famous Diplock courts allowed a measure of coercion in the interrogation of terrorists

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[165] Eli Berman, "Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias", *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper* Number 10004(September,2003), 36.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Philip Zelikow, *Policing Northern Ireland (A): A Question of Primacy*, Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Harvard University(C16-93-1229.0),11.

that was necessary to get their conviction.[168] The British treatment of terrorists as

criminals led to a diminished appeal of the terrorist message besides restoration of public

faith in law enforcement agencies. Despite the apparent successes of above approach the

sporadic violence remained alive shattering the tenuous peace intermittently. The police

and other security agencies had been able to manage the terrorism to a tolerable level

thereby creating space for a political solution.[169] It was only a political solution in Belfast

in 1998 that finally exorcised the demons of animus that had remained untamed despite

the most nuanced and comprehensive counter terrorism approach adopted by the British.

The principal characteristics of modern terrorism identified in this chapter include

a networked nature of terrorist organizations with transnational appeal due to a shared

intent, enhanced survivability due to ease of communication/transportation, media' role

as a propaganda accomplice, and the linkage between organized crime and the terrorist

funding. Interestingly the enhanced lethality of the weapons and the willingness of

ideologically oriented terrorists have combined to present the specter of catastrophic

terrorism, a foretaste of which was experienced by the modern world on 9/11. The use of

terror weapons (Chemical, radiological, biological and nuclear) though not evidenced in

the shape of actual attacks is very much on the agenda of terrorist organizations. The

choice of weaponry by the contemporary terrorists has shown an emphasis on shock and

surprise through novel employment of a mix of weapons suited to specific situations.

Having discussed the main enablers earlier and the chief characteristics of the

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[168] Ibid.,18.

[169] Philip Zelikow, *Policing Northern Ireland (B): A Question of Balance*, Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Harvard University(C16-93-1229.0),25.

phenomenon in this chapter the stage is set for a discussion for finding the most effective solution to the problem in the ensuing chapter.

## PART III

## CHAPTER 5

### Countering Terrorism-Main Approaches

Before undertaking an appraisal of the ways and means to counter terrorism it is deemed appropriate to highlight the three main contemporary approaches to tackle terrorism. The first approach relies on treating terrorism as a crime, the second regards it as a war, and the third counters it as a disease. Treating terrorism as a crime entails use of police and legal apparatus in concert with all available intelligence resources to deny freedom of action to terrorists. Though the legal action and retribution is in response to an act of terrorism, still it does not preclude the preemptive measures to bust the terrorist gangs through proactive police action. The advantages of this approach are the high moral ground with law enforcement agencies, non deification of terrorists as charismatic warriors, proportionality of response, absence of operational dilemmas while employing police resources, and absence of complications concerning law of armed conflict as well as time constrained objectives. The disadvantages of this approach include the possible escalation of terrorist activities beyond the capabilities of police, the legal constraints to indict terrorists, and the non resolution of fundamental grievances or the causes of the conflict.

The second approach i.e. war on terror entails military action both pre emptive as well as reactive by use of military forces to destroy the organizational base/infrastructure

of the terrorist organizations. The examples include Israeli punitive military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. The impact of the military action is aptly captured by an Israeli Defence correspondent i.e "When you have bombs coming down on your heads you cannot carry out planning and suicide attacks."[170] The advantages of this approach include a pro active disruption of terrorist network, elimination of terrorists without being hamstrung by normal legal procedures, and a quick regaining of lost territory to terrorists/insurgents. The disadvantages include an acceptance of terrorists as combatants(Unlawful or lawful), losing of moral high ground due to risks of collateral damage, and operational dilemmas while prosecuting irregular warfare with the conventional force structures and tactics. According to Sir Lawrence Freedman, "once it becomes necessary to rely on military means, it can be said that the terrorists have already been granted a propaganda victory."[171] Historical examples like Napoleon's pacification campaign in Spain, US foray in Vietnam, Iraq war and the current Afghanistan war show that the military interventions and policing are hardly ever the counter terrorism panaceas. Some of the perceptive observations about the use of military force by Lieutenant Colonel Conrad et al, are listed below[172]:-

- The more force is used, the less effective it is.

- The more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.

- The war on terror mitigates the effectiveness of military power.

- Rapid decisive operations are seldom, if ever, strategically decisive.

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[170] Dennis Zinn, Israeli Defence correspondent for Channel 11.

[171] Sir Lawrence Freedman, "Military Responses," *Confronting Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol II, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,(2005) ,22.

[172] Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane et all, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (March-April, 2006)

- Tactical success guarantees nothing.

- Many important decisions are not made by generals.

- Some of the best weapons for Counter-Terrorism do not shoot

The third approach is the treatment of terrorism as a disease. In order to tackle a pathology it is necessary to understand the symptoms and causes. While short term measures like policing, and even use of military instrument in extreme cases, might be necessary to contain the malady, its cure doubtlessly depends on treatment of the root causes. The cure might involve an accurate diagnosis and holistic treatment by attacking the underling causes of the issue. A prophylactic treatment is also part of the counter terrorism strategy wherein any imagined or actual grievances are mitigated before morphing from a Casus belli into a Casus célèbre' for the terrorists.

According to Stares and Yacoubian, "just as modern medicine has completely eradicated very few diseases; it remains unlikely that any efforts to combat Islamist militancy will find complete success. The best that can be hoped for is for it to transform the threat into a manageable, low probability, albeit sometimes deadly, nuisance much like many other social ills."[173]The epidemiologists first seek clarity on the causes of the disease, followed by an enquiry into the linkages between pathogen, people, and the environment. The antidote to a disease lies in a multipronged approach targeting the constituent elements of an epidemic that include a host, an agent, an environment and the

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[173] Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacoubian, "Terrorism As a Disease: An Epidemiological Model For Countering Islamist Extremism," Ridgeway Center on the Determinants of Security Policy in the 21st Century,2007, http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=47&fileid=AD000900-75A7-5790-3E30-EC98DFFA7B65&lng=en:Internet:Accessed on 5 March,2009,6.

vectors.[174] In case of religious or ideological terrorism however the epidemiological

metaphor does not always explain the disease due to differential nature of the members.

There are some unwitting recipients of the disease while others are fanatic adherents.

Both have to be treated differently. The model and its linkage to the disease are explained

in the figure below[175]:-        Figure 2 Epidemic Model And Terrorist Linkages

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                          ┌─────────────────┐
                          │ HOST            │
                          │ Individuals/Cells/ │
                          │ Organizations   │
                          └─────────────────┘
                  ┌────────────────┬───────────────┐
                  │   ┌─────────────────┐          │
                  │   │ VECTORS         │          │
                  │   │ Mosques,        │          │
                  │   │ Madrassahs,     │          │
                  │   │ Internet, Prisons, │       │
         ┌──────────┐ │ Media, Social   │   ┌──────────────┐
         │ AGENT    │ │ Networks        │   │ ENVIRONMENT  │
         │ Militant │ └─────────────────┘   │ Conflict, Political, │
         │ Ideology │                       │ Economic, Social │
         └──────────┘                       │ Conditions   │
                                            └──────────────┘
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        In order to treat terrorism as a disease with the capability of spreading as an

epidemic the three step approach is deemed most effective. The first step includes

prevention through early warning and preventive measures that ameliorate the conditions

that facilitate terrorism. Second step includes properly timed and carefully targeted

treatment interventions. Too early or too late an intervention would boomerang instead of

a positive outcome. Care should be taken in this stage to resolve the root causes instead

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[174] Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacoubian, "Terrorism As a Disease: An Epidemiological Model For
Countering Islamist Extremism,"…,7.
[175] Ibid,8.

of a "band aid approach to conflict management."[176] Third step is the "management of what could not be cured."[177]The above steps offer a flexible menu of curative options for a counter terrorist approach just like the options available to a physician for curing a disease.

Another approach in addition to the three main counter terrorism approaches discussed above is a legal approach. This in actuality is a supporting approach to all three approaches discussed above and employs international law to mitigate the effects of terrorism. It is a legal remedy to cure a disease by a combination of prophylactic as well as curative strength of international law evolved by international community. An understanding of this approach is necessary to develop an understanding of long term legal regime being evolved as a collective will of the global community to find legal cure for the malady. The details of the international legal regime evolved so far are given below.

The international community under the aegis of the UN has introduced twelve basic conventions to counter terrorism. While the UN Conventions were being discussed the 9/11 happened. That cataclysmic event resulted in hastening of the process of development of international law on terrorism. The twelve treaties and conventions on terrorism (Refer Annex A) are in the nature of law making treaties and therefore are not a constituent component of an implementing organization.[178] The definition of the

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[176] Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacoubian, "Terrorism As a Disease: An Epidemiological Model For Countering Islamist Extremism,"…,19.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Ahmar Bilal Soofi, "Terrorism and International Law," *The Citadel*, Professional magazine of Command and Staff College Quetta, Vol XXI, No. 2/2003,54.

terrorism was different in each convention due to its linkage with a specific act that the convention targeted.

The problem with these conventions is that there is no international organization set up to ensure their implementation. In certain cases in the event of a dispute on the interpretation the option of arbitration by the ICJ has been given but the administration of the text and implementation has entirely been left to the states .This is chiefly due to lack of international consensus on the definition of the terrorism. In each of these conventions the definition of the terrorism has been ambiguous which according to some nations could be interpreted in a manner inimical to their national interests. Three UN resolutions prior to 9/11 i.e 1267, 1363, and 1333 established a coherent regime of enforcement of anti terrorism measures. All these resolutions were passed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and have the requisite legal and constitutional force for implementation.

A set of UN resolutions in the wake of 9/11 have further strengthened the existing corpus of international law on terrorism. Security Council resolution 1373 besides establishing a counter terrorism committee comprising all member states has instituted obligations on these states to prevent the acts of terrorism. UN resolution 1377 besides reaffirming the criminal status of terrorism has delinked the cause from the violent act of terrorism. The resolution also urges the member states to resolve all regional disputes that are hurdles in the fight of terrorism. The issue of addressing the cause of the act has therefore been recognized albeit without an international implementation mechanism. It can be surmised from the above that adequate volume of international law on terrorism has been created that however requires an organization to monitor and ensure its implementation.

**Diagnostic Measures**

The first step to counter terrorism should be the diagnosis of the problem. The diagnosis needs to be conducted through a detailed analysis of the symptoms of the malady. An accurate diagnosis should leads towards a clear understanding of the underlying causes of the problem and the contributory factors that enable the growth of the malady. The efficacy of the prophylactic and the curative measures to deal with the malady would be directly proportional to the accuracy of the diagnosis. The wrong diagnosis of the causes leads towards wrong prescriptions. Care should be taken by the political leadership to avoid two serious pitfalls of decision making. The first being an erroneous understanding of the root causes of the terrorism and the second being an unrealistic assessment of the resources and the timeframe required to cure the malady.[179] The infinite patience of the terrorists however should be kept in mind while crafting a counter terrorism strategy.

In order to be able to diagnose the malady the focus on the effects of the terrorist acts is vital. According to Bruce Jenkins the terrorists want most of the people watching and not killed.[180] Since many of the causes of terrorism are indistinguishable from other forms of political violence there is a need for circumspection while diagnosing terrorist maladies. The distinguishing feature of terrorism i.e "its criminal and norm less character, with deliberate attacks on civilians needs to be kept in view while looking for a

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[179] Brian A. Jackson, "Counter Intelligence in a Long War, The British Experience in Northern Ireland," *Military Review* (January-February 2007), 75.
[180] Michael Stohl, "The Mystery of the New Global Terrorism; Old Myths, New Realities," in *The new Global Terrorism*, ed.Charles W. Kegley, Jr.,84-91 (Prentice Hall, New Jersey,2003),85.

solution."[181]Another important aspect of the diagnosis is the understanding of some factors that sustain terrorism regardless of remedial measures.

The first factor sustaining terrorism is the cycle of revenge that ensues as a consequence of a counter terrorism campaign. A spate of suicide bombings in Pakistan after 9/11 is a classical example of revenge terrorism. The non state actors with totalitarian proclivities for instance may not be amenable to deterrence since their objective in most cases is to provoke overreactions by the governments in order to discredit those.[182]The policies of anti terrorism may actually stiffen the resolve of the terrorists. Similarly the profitable criminal activities might give a lasting stake to the terrorists to continue with the acts to protect their economic interests. And lastly a point of no return mentality might take over a group that had been involved in acts of extreme bloodshed. A differential diagnosis therefore is de rigueur in order to make the right prescription in line with the peculiarities of different types of terrorism.

The diagnostic capacity has to be sedulously nurtured through a synergistic combination of the academic, intelligence, and community police resources. Owing to the transnational nature of the phenomenon the capacities should be developed and shared at international level as well. It is recommended that two indices to monitor the vulnerabilities to terrorism be developed by a think tank of social scientists and terrorism experts under the aegis of the UN in consultation with regional and local governments.

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[181] Tore Bjorgo, "Conclusions," in *Root Causes of Terrorism, Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, ed.Tore Bjorgo,256-263 (Routledge, London and New York, 2005),261.

[182] Ibid., 260.

The two indices should be named the Human Deprivation Index (HDI) and the Amelioration Probability Index (API).

The HDI should be a cumulative indication of pent up grievances of people particular to a country, religion and culture. The indicators should span a wide gamut of factors including politics, social relations, economics and religion. The study should especially cover the regions historically most vulnerable to violent conflicts. Also the societies undergoing rapid change should be the special focus of attention due to greater potential for conflict amongst those profiting from modernization and those being left behind. It should a wholesome mapping of grievances to diagnose the potential causes of terrorism to crystallize prophylactic response options.

The API should act as a barometer for the success of curative interventions. It should accurately gauge the prospects of winning back the estranged population serving as the support base of the terrorists. The index of grievances and the factors sustaining terrorism should be viewed together to assess the possibility of amelioration of the causes leading to violent behaviour. The amelioration index would benefit immeasurably the crafting of a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy employing defense, development and diplomacy. The index should be an accurate guide to the weightage to be accorded to military, political, economic, informational, public diplomacy and social elements of national and international power while countering terrorism.

In the realms of law enforcement the monitoring of the grievances at the community level by the intelligence and police sources should be an important diagnostic strategy. The measuring of the temperature of public discontent at local community level

is the most accurate barometer of potential conflict. The inputs at community level should

regularly be utilized by the experts and the academics at national and international level

to update HDI and API. Care however should be taken that the think tanks of experts and

academics should comprise an eclectic mix of view points and ethnic nationalities to

arrive at an unbiased assessment. The views of the terrorist organizations, howsoever

difficult to procure, should also be garnered in order to acquire the most balanced

perspective.

**CHAPTER 6**

**Prophylactic Measures**

**"**The battle against terrorism must never be just about tactics. We will never get

ahead of the problem unless we penetrate the terrorist breeding grounds and do

something about promoting honest government, free trade, economic development,

educational reform, political freedom and religious moderation"

(George Tenet)

In order to minimize the probability of terrorism certain measures need to be

taken based upon an accurate assessment of the nature of the terrorist threats and the

human deprivation index. These measures should be aimed at the root causes of the

terrorism and might therefore place minimum reliance upon a comprehensive approach to

alter the conditions leading towards violent expression of the grievances. The political,

diplomatic, economic, and socio cultural initiators of the terrorism need to be targeted for

soft pre-emption as compared to a hard pre-emption. While the hard pre-emption aims at

disruption of the terrorists' sanctuary and support infrastructure the soft pre-emption aims

at conditions that are propitious for spread of terrorists' message. Terrorists thrive in a

rarefied environment sanitized of a benign state presence. Soft pre-emption should strive

to make that terrorist friendly rarefied environment thick through ameliorative measures

in order to decrease the speed and intensity of terrorists' intended message. The example

of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Afghanistan is an example where

weak government writ was not strengthened before launching the state security apparatus

into the region for countering terrorism. Contrarily the British employed soft pre-emption

quite successfully in Northern Ireland by establishing a functioning civic and police

infrastructure with the military in the reserve. The approach resulted in a proper

conditioning of the terrorists for an ultimate political solution to the problem.

The need for regional and global response to terrorism has gained ground

due to the transnational nature of terrorist threats that calls for defensive as well as

proactive anti terrorism measures. According to Enders and Sandler, "the international

cooperation will not only conserve resources but also make for more effective resource

allocation."[183] The lack of international coordination can result in certain conditions that

may redound to the advantage of the terrorists. If the United States for example invests

heavily in domestic protection but little in proactive international counter terrorist

measures the terrorists might shift attention towards a lesser protected country.[184] An

adherence to international law and promotion of interstate relations based upon an

egalitarian and symbiotic political relationship shall contribute significantly towards

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[183] Walters Enders and Todd Sandler, *The Political Economy of Terrorism* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 159.
[184] Ibid.,109.

mitigation of conditions giving birth to violence and crime. An ideal counter terrorism approach in contemporary era should therefore combine political, economic, and diplomatic strategies with military action. The multi tracked counter terrorism approach should include multi agency as well as multinational cooperation to combat terrorism.

Every terrorist act is a violent political statement that might differ in its objectives. The success of the terrorists does not lie in their grisly acts but the strength of their message and how that resonated with the populace. Soft pre-emption through prophylactic measures should aim at functional dislocation of the terrorists' strength i.e their ability to influence the minds of population[185]. Consider for instance the example of Israel-Palestine issue. The violent acts of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are likely to lose their appeal with the masses if the issue is resolved equitably. Similarly the Taliban terrorism in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan will lose its appeal with a large sympathetic population that conflates their violence with a legitimate struggle for national liberation in the event of US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The solution of Kashmir Conflict would similarly result in significant reduction of the militant rhetoric in the Jihadi organizations that conflate their radicalism with Kashmiri nationalism.

On a political plane therefore the best prophylactic initiative is deemed to be the resolution of all intractable local, regional and international political conflicts in keeping with the principles of fairness and justice. According to Immanuel Kant, "the violent abrogation of law and justice in one place ricochets across the world."[186] The unresolved

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[185] Robert R. Leonhard, *The Art of Manoeuvre* (Novoto, CA:Presidio Press,1991), 66.
[186] David Held, "Bringing International Law to Bear On the Control of the New Terrorism in the Global Age," in *The New Global Terrorism*, ed.Charles W. Kegley, Jr.,253-266 (Prentice Hall, New Jersey,2003),262.

Israel-Palestine conflict, the Iraq invasion (without plausible WMD evidence), the

Afghanistan issue, the persecution of Kashmiris and the Chechen plight all pool into a

well spring of Muslim collective angst from which springs the pathological rage and

hopelessness giving rise to an extremist ideology. The best antidote to counter the

extremism is the resolution of the intractable political conflicts that have reduced the

space for a liberal political maneuver by the moderates. And even if the final resolution

appears difficult the sincere attempts at resolving the issues might also reduce the

grievance index of the aggrieved pool of potential terrorists. And the best prophylactic

response to the rise of militant extremism is the empowerment of the moderate majority

through accommodation of genuine Muslim political demands.

At state level a balance must be struck between the present and the future

security. Care should be taken to ensure that the ham handed treatment of current crisis

does not create a popular revulsion against the government and the state. The

Governments must always keep the coercive acts within the bounds of legitimacy and

proportionality so as to always retain the moral high ground as a "Moral Leviathan."

While recruitment to the cause of terrorists should be discouraged through various means

the concept of blanket amnesties to be eschewed in favour of selective amnesties. This is

essential to ensure the sense of fair play and accountability in keeping with national and

international norms of justice.

In order to assuage the genuine grievances of a radicalized segment of Muslim

community the Muslim countries should be encouraged to open up their political systems

and to accommodate the genuine popular demands for political participation. The international community needs to unite in order to ensure the universal rule of law. Promotion of democracy, liberalism, and rule of law requires adherence to these concepts by all nations regardless of the asymmetries of political, military and economic power. The loss of moral capital by members of international community should be a cause of concern for all and therefore international community should assert itself to redress the wrongs, both perceived and actual, through a process of international cooperation under the rubric of United Nations.

In order to minimize the virulence of religious particularism and xenophobia a compact with the silent majority of moderates in the Islamic countries needs to be encouraged. The religious dogma should be countered on an intellectual plane through an informed dialogue and well planned rebuttal of the extremist interpretation of the religion. The suicide attacks on the Muslims and the divisive nature of Takfiri doctrine of Salafi ideologues should be the main themes to mobilize the moderate Muslims. Alongside above the interfaith dialogue and inter cultural education should be promoted through generous international funding in order to remove cultural barriers and misunderstandings. The concept of religious freedom should be encouraged as an essential element of human rights. Since religious indoctrination is the strongest possible motivation, due care should be taken to ensure that the sublime message of religion is never used in an expedient manner to further national or imperial interests. An example of the expedient use of religion was the Soviet Afghan War in the eighties where anti communist sentiment got the better of the foresight while unleashing the sanguinary force

of religion. The genie of religious motivation uncorked in the eighties refuses to be bottled despite all attempts.

On economic plane measures should be taken to ensure that the basic economic causes of discontent are addressed. All states and international community should take measures to ensure that the income inequalities within and between the states are minimized. An equitable global trade regime and targeted aid disbursement can mitigate some of the exploitable vulnerabilities of the states. This can be done under bilateral/ multilateral intergovernmental arrangements or through Non Governmental Organizations/financial institutions. The adherence to the Millennium development Goals (MDGs) by the international community can be an important step in that direction. In addition to above measures a system of international monetary regulation should be devised to deny the flow of funds to the terrorists. An adherence to all UN conventions on terrorist funding and money laundering should be the leitmotif of that regulatory system.

The intelligence gathering means need to be coordinated at national, regional, and global level in order to effectively deal with the terrorist threats. According to Jenkins, "the old boundaries between law enforcement and counter-intelligence, between domestic and foreign intelligence already have begun to blur."[187] There is a need therefore to restructure the intelligence gathering agencies in keeping with the new threats and changed global environment. Lean and agile organizations with flatter structure capable

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[187] Brian Michael Jenkins, "Intelligence" *Confronting Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol II, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,(2005),(2005),14.

of penetrating the cellular and non hierarchical organization of terrorists are the need of the hour. In order to facilitate international intelligence sharing it should be ensured that all legal hurdles to the process be removed by streamlining the national as well as international legal regimes. The intelligence gathering centers should be created at national, regional, as well as the global level to share and disseminate intelligence amongst all stake holders.

All international efforts to starve the terrorists of funds are contingent upon the respective nations' ability to enforce the desired financial regulations, to monitor and control the illegal flow of money. In India for example as compared to an annual $42 billion cash inflow through banking channels some $16 billion are sent through informal channels called Havala and Hundi.[188] IMF and the World Bank help the international community in fighting the menace of money laundering that acts as a steady source of income for the terrorists. IMF actively supports the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that was established in 1989 by the G 7 countries to curb money laundering. It also helps all countries that are willing to undertake suitable measures to curb the terrorist funding. Their efforts however can only bear fruit if all countries actively and willingly cooperate with the international organizations. The regular monitoring of high risk enablers of financial irregularities like the money services businesses should be institutionalized at the international level. [189]There is a need for all countries to adhere to international

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[188] Daily Times Pakistan, "Havala money in India linked to terror funding: US," 1 March, 2009.

[189] Antonello Biagioli, "Financial Crime As a Threat to the Wealth of Nations; A Cost Effectiveness Approach," *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, London, Vol. 11.Iss, 1(2008)

conventions that seek to regulate the flow of money by aligning national financial regulations with global rules.[190]

There is a need on part of all countries to cooperate proactively in counter terrorism efforts both at regional as well global level. The joint consequence management mechanisms need to be evolved at regional and global level to minimize the potential impact of the terrorist attacks. Some countries have already taken initiative to create such cooperative mechanisms. The examples include Regional Coordination Center for Crisis Management in Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kirghyzstan, Tajikstan, and Turkemanistan. and European Union Urban Search and Rescue Program.[191]There are proposals afoot to create a dedicated Civil Protection Force for EU having heavy airlift capability for emergency response along with a Command Support System for a common operational picture. Though the above measures fall under multi national consequence management approach for all kinds of disasters, man made as well as natural these can be fine tuned to respond to specific anti terrorism requirements.

In this age of cyber terrorism where hacketivism and cyber terrorism can result in disproportionate losses the concept of terrorism insurance acts as the stabilizing element amidst growing risk and uncertainty. The availability of a robust insurance market fully supported by the government might alter the cost benefit equations for the potential terrorists whose political objectives might be rendered ineffectual due to absence of post

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[190] Lorietta Napoleoni and Rico Carisch, "Terrorist Finance," *Confronting Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Volume II, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,27.

[191] "Improving Multinational Exercising and Technology," *RUSI/Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor*, Vol 8, No 1(January, 2009)

incident collapse of the normal market activity. The active involvement of the government in shoring up the insurance market also signals a resolve to the terrorists that their attempts to drive a wedge between the governments and the people would not be successful. The government can significantly alleviate terrorism uncertainties to engender a climate of trust for the investors by "insurance subsidies, information support, and being the insurer of the last resort."[192]

The WMD threat is to be countered through a multilayered approach on top of which is the non proliferation regime. The global powers should ensure that the global nuclear disarmament and not only the non proliferation should be the focus of their efforts. The linkage between vertical and horizontal proliferation and the security concerns of the countries in close proximity of a nuclear armed country should be considered while planning a global non proliferation regime. The danger of fissile material falling into the hands of non state actors and its conversion into a weapon needs to be viewed realistically in order to devise effective counter measures. All steps in the process of acquisition of the capability i.e collection of material, payments arrangements, employment of scientists to manufacture the weapon, transportation of the weapon to the site should be targeted to minimize the possibility of detection failure.

The strategy to prevent smuggling of fissile material should be predicated upon a global intelligence network and frequent sting operations. The sting operations should be conducted regularly to raise the probability of detection of WMD. The regular monitoring of terrorist finances, use of better equipment to scan bulk cargo, strict vigilance at air/sea ports and Proliferation Security Initiatives should form an integrated endeavour at global

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[192] Bogdan Kolarov and Ugurhan Berkok, "Political Incentives and Terrorism Insurance: A Framework For Analysis", Royal Military College of Canada Kingston, (December 2006), 26.

level to make the task of a nuclear terrorist difficult.[193] Detection technology and intelligence should be the main planks of a counter WMD campaign.

In order to minimize the adverse effects of globalization and misuse of media coordinated efforts should be made at international level to counter the propaganda of extremist organizations. An international code of journalistic conduct and self regulation by the media is needed to minimize the access of terrorists to the global media. The divided and ambivalent media response to terrorist challenge can actually redound to the advantage of the terrorists. The example of Pakistan is a clear case where the sympathy of the segments of media seriously impairs national anti terrorism efforts.[194]

There is a need for an international organization under the UN aegis to monitor and implement the anti terrorism laws enshrined in UN Resolutions and Conventions on Terrorism. A separate secretariat under UN anti terrorism branch in Vienna should be established to act as the monitoring, coordinating and implementing directorate. Besides overseeing the implementation of international laws on terrorism the domestic laws of each state should also be brought in line with the requirements of international law as stipulated in the UN Conventions and resolutions. And lastly to achieve international consensus on implementation of anti terrorism laws a mutually agreed comprehensive definition of terrorism should be finalized a priori.

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[193] Michael Levi,, "Stopping Nuclear Terrorism; The Dangerous Allure of a Perfect Defence," *Foreign Affairs*, ol. 87, Iss. 1(Jan/Feb 2008)
[194] Editorial, Daily Times Pakistan,"Countering Terrorism In a Divided Land," 5 April, 2009.

**CHAPTER 7**

**Curative Measures**

The curative measures come into play when the terrorism actually surfaces as a malady to be cured. Though the boundaries between some of the prophylactic and curative measures are blurred still these measures do no supplant but complement the prophylactic measures. All counter terrorism efforts need to be comprehensive yet discriminating enough to place proper reliance upon the most appropriate instrument of state power. The development and diplomacy for instance would always need a certain degree of security to actualize their potential optimally. The Amelioration Probability Index (API) might come in handy while apportioning resources to each instrument of national power to combat terrorism.

According to Brafman and Beckstorm the most important part of a decentralized organization such as a terrorist organization that should be targeted is the ideology.[195] The ideology can be attacked through an alternative idea and its positive manifestations such as a better way of life, egalitarian ethos, and provision of public goods for the economically under privileged strata of society. The second recommended feature of the counter terrorism strategy is the attempts to centralize the terrorist organizations through inducements of material gains like money and property. The acquisition of material goods in whatever form creates a propensity amongst decentralized organizations to centralize their decision making. The third recommended feature is the decentralization of counter terrorism structure. The counter terrorism networks with tacit government

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[195] The Starfish and the Spider…, 144.

support and oversight but without centralized control stand better chances of success against a networked terrorist organization.[196] In this context counter ideology narratives and psychological initiatives need to be nationally evolved and globally coordinated through pooling and sharing of ideas through properly resourced strategies.

In this new Non Trinitarian Warfare by terrorists the governments and the armed forces do not clash. A conventional Clausewitzian trinity when pitched against a complex adaptable non governmental and non hierarchical network of people it would need to reframe its traditionally held notions of strategy. The center of gravity of a network for instance might not be found in any node or hub but the will of the human web to fight and to sacrifice. The will in turn is nourished by a cause and the sympathy of the people on whose behalf the terrorists take up cudgels. The prime requirements for a successful counter terrorism strategy therefore are the legitimacy, moral high ground and popular support.

All future counter terrorism strategies to be formulated after a thorough understanding of the political, social, economic and cultural dimensions of the threats. The concept of logical lines of action should inform all anti terrorism endeavors. These lines of action should focus on an end state and might comprise information operations, combat operations, development/reconstruction, economic support and governance support.[197] In selecting the lines of operation the joint, inter agency or the multinational nature of the resource base should also be a major determinant in addition to the desired

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[196] The Starfish and the Spider…, 157.
[197] US Field Manual 3-24, Counter Insurgency , 5-7.

end state. The final aim and the end state of the counter terrorism effort should be flexible enough to permit changes in the aim as well as the lines of operation.

In order to tackle terrorism as a crime the police have to act as the lead agency leveraging fully the intelligence and judicial resources of the country. Due to the complexity of the terrorist phenomenon the police have to adopt a comprehensive approach in synergy with all elements of national power.[198] The care however should be taken to ensure that the anti terrorism measures are within the bounds of international humanitarian law, human rights, and principles of the UN Charter.

The terrorist threat is best dealt through an intelligence based policing. In order to ensure accurate and timely threat assessment a vast data base of terrorist threats is essential. The need for a comprehensive and accurate threat matrix entails bilateral and multilateral sharing of crime data. There should be national threat analysis centers that collect and collate criminal intelligence from all government departments duly plugged into regional and global threat analysis centers. The police being closest to the local population should develop a capability to monitor the deprivation index and criminal propensities of the population with a view to preempt terrorist actions. The importance of human intelligence should be recognized by allocating adequate resources for marshalling the right talent for the onerous task.

The care however should be taken to ensure that the anti terrorism measures are within the bounds of international humanitarian law, human rights, and principles of the

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[198]Jurgen Storbeck, "Policing," *Confronting Terrorism, The Club de Madrid Series On Democracy and Terrorism, Vol II, The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security*,7.

UN Charter. The terrorist threat is best dealt through an intelligence based policing. In order to ensure accurate and timely threat assessment a vast data base of terrorist threats is essential. The need for a comprehensive and accurate threat matrix entails bilateral and multilateral sharing of crime data. There should be national threat analysis centers that collect and collate criminal intelligence from all government departments duly plugged into regional and global threat analysis centers. The police being closest to the local population should develop a capability to monitor the deprivation index and criminal propensities of the population with a view to preempt terrorist actions.

It is a truism that the best weapons do not fire bullets. The use of military instrument to counter terrorism should be the least preferable option. It should be resorted to in the event of failure of other law enforcement agencies. A situation in which the terrorists start transforming their struggle into an insurgency is ripe for military intervention. The military involvement has to be under a political oversight and in accordance with the national as well as the international legal regimes. The political framework has to be the overarching guide for the strategic and tactical objectives for the counterinsurgency operations by the military. The military objectives should be realistic and achievable. The long term employment on counter terrorism missions and the right number of troops should be kept in sight while committing military resources to the task. As per Colin Gray the historical analyses show that a security personnel to people ratio of 20/1000 is essential for successful counter terrorism operations.[199] A reasonable management of insurgency might serve as a pragmatic military objective to create

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[199] Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare, One Nature Many Characters," *Strategic Studies Quarterly,*35-56(Winter 2007), 49.

adequate space for a political solution of the problem. While combating terrorism the military should adopt "Public Support" as a new principle of war.

The military instrument should be used as part of an integrated strategy where every operation contributes not only to military success but to political and psychological success as well. Though the military should be properly trained and configured to fight the terrorists the choice of tactics and the weaponry should reflect the necessity to win the hearts and minds of the population. The over reliance on technology and tactics that might result in civilian casualties should be avoided. A propensity to target areas with large civilian populations through long range artillery, missiles or the unmanned aerial drones should be curbed as in the long run some blood spilled might be a better bargain than a lot of bad blood earned.

The cultural education of all participants of counter terrorism campaign is vital.[200] Whether civilian or military every one involved in counter terrorism operations needs to be culturally aware of the socio-cultural dynamics of the area of operations. Since all future counter terrorism operations are going to be "Whole of the Government" (WOG), all government departments engaged in such operations should ensure proper cultural education of their members. Since a best anti dote to a network is a network the asymmetric tactics of terrorists and insurgents be dealt with a human network with a decentralized command and leadership model. This model should rely more on shared

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[200] Statement of General Richard Meyers former US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff during a lecture to NSP-1 at Canadian Forces College Toronto on 12 March 2009 Quoted with his permission.

intent amongst the nodes of human network working with trust and maximum initiative.[201]

While in the counter terrorism role the military should leverage its communication capability, mobility, and precision weaponry to strike at the strongholds of the terrorists the preferred military role in consequence management should be rescue/relief operations after catastrophic terrorist (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) attacks. Special Operation Forces of military should be configured and ideally tasked for hostage rescue and raid operations against urban terrorism. The winning of population's support along with denial of the same to the terrorists should be the essential element of all counter terrorism operations. And finally the military equipment, weaponry and organization should be intelligently tailored according to peculiar requirements of urban or rural based operations. Light, adaptable, and intelligence enabled networked structures would be more suited to counter terrorists' human network.

The vulnerability of geographically distributed multi cellular network of terrorists should be exploited through a "strategy of disaggregation" by a counter terrorist network[202]. The interdiction of the links between the geographically separated terrorists and impeding the flow of information between the links in the chain of command should be ensured through international cooperation. The formation of a virtual community of believers in the same cause through internet and other communication means is the strength as well as the weakness, which can be exploited to break into terrorist networks.

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[201] Allan English, Richard Gimblett, and Howard Coombs, Networked Operations and Transformation, Context and Canadian Contribution (McGill's Queen's University Press, Montreal. Kingston, London, 2007),26.

[202] John Makinlay, *Defeating Complex Insurgency, beyond Iraq and Afghanistan*(RUSI, White Hall Paper Series, 2005),22.

A technological solution that enables monitoring of all suspicious internet traffic needs to be specifically designed to identify and catch the terrorist networks.

The exploitation of the internal differences both within the terrorists and between their criminal allies would result in significant weakening of these organizations. The internal differences between the foreign origin terrorists from Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Arab countries and the native Taliban militants need to be exploited to weaken their cohesion. These differences can be cultural, ethnic and political. The Arab impatience with the local Pakhtunwali code could be a fissure worth exploiting. Similarly the tribal differences like traditional Ghilzai-Durrani split should be exploited to divide the Taliban resistance. Another apt example could be the exploitation of the differences in political approach of the two main protagonists of Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat, Maulana Sufi Muhammad and his militant son in law Maulvi Fazalullah. Another ideological cleavage that could be exploited is the difference in interpretation of waging the armed struggle form of Jihad. As per the belief of a vast moderate Muslim majority the armed Jihad could only be waged through a declaration by an Islamic state. The fanatic non state actors that rely on religious ideology to galvanize their cadres obviously repudiate this belief, an omission that should in fact lead to their apostatization by the moderate Muslim majority.

The battle for hearts and minds should be the center of gravity of all information operations in support of a counter terrorism campaign. The scope of information operations should transcend the psychological operations, electronic warfare and media management. The information operations need to be conceived as a meta narrative right

at the conception stage of the counter terrorism strategy at the politico-strategic level.[203]

Several sub narratives should flow from the main theme corresponding to the area of desired influence. Nothing beats an idea like an idea. The rebuttal of terrorist propaganda should be based on ideas stronger than the terrorists. Care should be taken however that the anti thesis to terrorists' thesis should result in a synthesis favourable to the state or an international coalition.  The coordination of  strategic communication efforts at multinational level are therefore necessary to optimize the impact of strategic messaging.

The denial of funds and material resources is vital for defeating terrorism. The example of LTTE illustrates the effect of severance of logistic support and funding on terrorist organizations. Till the time the LTTE had unimpeded access to weapons and material supplies due to its adroit use of illegal shipping vessels called Sea Tigers it effectively kept the government forces at bay. After Sri Lankan Navy's effective interdiction of sea lanes the supply of resources to LTTE was choked the violent insurgency and terrorism of LTTE were dealt a grievous blow.[204] An example of Canada's severance of funding links of Tamils by Tamil diaspora in Canada can be cited that resulted in tangible reduction in the efficacy of LTTE terrorists in Sri Lanka. There is a requirement to interdict the flow of funds and weapons to Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. The drug trade that is the chief source of funds for Taliban needs to be targeted through international cooperation. A holistic counter drugs strategy including interdiction of drug trafficking, discouragement of cultivation, destruction of heroin

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[203] CFLI Project Team, "Broad Sword or Rapier?...,39.

[204] Tim Fish, "Sri Lanka Learns to Counter Sea Tigers' Swarm Tactics," *Jane's Navy International* (March,2009),20.

factories, and demand management at user end should be formulated to cut the life line of terrorists..

An intelligence based assessment of the donations to the terrorist organizations should be carried out at national and international level after taking international community on board under the aegis of the UN. All countries should be required to meticulously map out the donation profile of the donors and the recipients and share the information with the international community. The banking and financial system at national/international level should follow the anti money laundering regulations punctiliously to reduce the possibility of illegal transactions.

The complex, transnational, and multidimensional nature of the terrorism requires demands a whole of the government as well as multinational response. The counter terrorism strategy should primarily rely on a comprehensive approach with law enforcement agencies like police in the lead duly supported and led by a dedicated intelligence organization. In the event of a terrorist take over of territory the military instrument might take the lead but should cede the responsibility to non military law enforcement agencies as soon as the objectives are achieved. The terrorist organizations morphing into crime mafias should be dealt with non military instruments with military's involvement restricted to specialized operations.

**CONCLUSION**

The terrorism is a contemporary phenomenon that relies on modern technology and is rooted in the changed socio economic and political verities of the contemporary era. A thorough analysis of changes in social relations and ways of waging wars is necessary to find a sustainable solution to the problem. The problem of terrorism has emerged as a consequence of the perceived injustices and the growing global and regional inequalities that are exacerbated by the forces of globalization that threaten to subsume the cultural identity of the people in addition to political dominance. The enhanced reach and influence of media has brought the above mentioned inequalities in greater relief than heretofore, contributing significantly to the precipitous rise in the perceived deprivation index. The combination of the deprivations and the enablers has made the asymmetric warfare or terrorism as the most preferred and economical mode of warfare against a militarily superior foe.

The enablers that have made terrorism a most attractive mode of warfare for a weak protagonist in conventional conflict equation include technological advancements like internet, satellite communication, modern transportation means, lethal munitions, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking/money laundering, and the post Cold War unipolarity in global politics. The rise of fourth wave terrorism characterized with ideological terrorism using religion as an ideology has given rise to a form of terrorism that conflates political motives with religious fervour with such skill that makes the de confliction of the two extremely difficult for an effective counter terrorism strategy.

A comprehensive strategy to combat a phenomenon as complex as contemporary terrorism is de rigueur in view of the technological and political enablers available to non

state actors in this globalized world. The improved communications, technological advancements, enhanced lethality of weapons, a fluid global financial market, and sophistication of organized crime have made the terrorism a lucrative premium for political pay offs. It has assumed the status of a most preferred tactic in the repertoire of asymmetric warriors who charged with the pent up grievances have risen globally to challenge the might of repressive states and perceived global hegemons. The transcendental appeal of religious ideology has been duly pressed into service to retain the loyalty of militant cadre as well as the religiously inclined masses.

There are three approaches to combat terrorism i.e fighting it as a war, fighting it as a crime and treating it like a disease. It needs to be remembered however that the three approaches are by no means mutually exclusive. These can be used in tandem or simultaneously depending on the specific context and the nature of the problem. For a long term solution the terrorism needs to be treated like a pathology in order both to manage its current manifestations as well as the future variants. The objective in a sustainable counter terrorism strategy should be the containment of the problem through continual retributive action by law enforcement agencies. In such an approach the question of winning or losing does not burden the state with the problem of asymmetry of will vis a vis the terrorists that proves to be the main weakness in a military operations focused approach against terrorism. The best anti terrorism approach however is a cumulative employment of all three approaches, according to the nature and character of the terrorism, which is essentially determined by the public support or opposition to the terrorists' cause.

The need for regional and international cooperation was never felt more than in the contemporary globalized world due to the distributed and multi cellular structure of terrorist organizations. Like the flapping of a butterfly's wings the impact of factors contributing towards terrorism is felt equally regardless of geographical, racial, and political barriers. There is therefore a greater need for cooperation in intelligence sharing and law enforcement between states at regional and international level. The respect for international humanitarian law, human rights, and UN charter should be the veritable Grundnorm of a future anti terrorism approach.

The diagnostic measures to counter terrorism aim at early identification of the symptoms that might cause the malady. The indices such as *Human Deprivation Index* and the *Amelioration Possibility Index* should act as the important signposts for a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy. There is a need to understand the factors like revenge, pecuniary motivations, and desperation that sustain the cycle of violence during the diagnostic phase. A holistic diagnostic is only possible through enlisting support of all law enforcement and academic resources. The requirement for regional as well as international cooperation also needs to be ensured while framing a diagnostic strategy.

For prophylactic measures to succeed an international counter terrorism effort is required. Like a disease it should be understood that the terrorism might not be eliminated altogether but could be managed to tolerable limits. A combination of political, diplomatic, economic and socio cultural measures can arrest the initiation of terrorism. The solution of intractable conflicts in Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Kashmir might significantly reduce the animus that turns the dreamy eyed idealists into

flint stone fascists. The political and economic reforms in Muslim countries also retain the promise of whittling down the growing wave of anger by the disempowered and the impoverished populace that becomes a willing accomplice to the violent agenda of politico-religious ideologues. The choking of terrorist funding and severance of its linkage with the lucrative crime activities is also necessary for a successful counter terrorism strategy. The eliciting of willing cooperation by the media is another preventive measure that can dampen the virulence of the scourge through denial of a medium that has become a life support of terrorists to propagate their gory message.

The curative measures are akin to invasive medication and thus require a direct countering of the threat. The best curative measures should be based on the Whole of the Government approach and be aimed simultaneously at winning the hearts and minds of the population besides targeting the terrorists. The ideal counter terrorism strategy should be based upon fighting the terrorists' ideology through better ideas followed by decentralized execution of anti terrorism operations. The ideal strategy is to fight a network with a network. The preferable use of force is the police operations based upon actionable intelligence and the shared threat analysis at national, regional, and international level. The military operations should be conducted as a last resort option and with adequate force ratio vis- a- vis insurgents/terrorists. The political oversight, proportionality of response and adherence to national as well as international laws should be ensured to retain the legitimacy of the use of force. The internal differences within the terrorist organizations should be exploited through a combination of ruse, inducement, and coercion. While conducting military operations the aim should be achievement of political and psychological effects.

The phenomenon of terrorism despite all the panaceas and nostrums offered retains a mystique that can only be partially unraveled. It is indeed a disease that can be prevented in some cases, cured in some cases and to be endured in few cases. According to Colin Gray there would always be some insurgencies that would not be won despite following all tenets of successful counter insurgency.[205]Similarly all forms and manifestations of terrorism might not be amenable to a solution. It is therefore necessary that a continual stock of threat be taken to monitor its indicators and trends. There is therefore a need to attain a comprehensive knowledge of the phenomenon. There are several blind spots indeed in our quest for mapping the terrorism genome. There is very sparse evidence for instance of the linkage between the popular beliefs and the active involvement in terrorism.

In addition to above there is a very limited understanding of the terrorist support structures and their depth that sustains and nourishes terrorism. The role of charities, organized crime, and the friendly state support are also some blind spots that need to be illuminated in order to uncover the exploitable vulnerabilities of terrorist organizations. There is also a requirement of understanding the role and impact of silent sympathizers to the cause of terrorists. There is also a need to identify the factors responsible for the silent support of terrorism and their psycho-social impact on the counter terrorism efforts of the state.

Another blind spot in mapping the terrorism genome is the limited knowledge about the different theological interpretations and the religious discourse amongst the

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[205] Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Warfare, One Nature Many Characters," *Strategic Studies Quarterly,*35-56(Winter 2007), 51.

Muslim world. In order to enlist the support of moderate majority it would have to be delivered from the puritanical tyranny of a minority that presents itself as the self anointed custodians of the revealed truth in its pristine form. There is a need to map the concerns of the moderate majority in addition to assuagement of their genuine grievances in order to encourage them in opposing the virulent ideology of the fanatics.

# TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS ON TERRORISM

1. Convention on Offences on Board Aircraft, Tokyo,1963.

2. Convention of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Hague,1973.

3. Convention of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal, 1971.

4. Protocol for Acts of Violence at Airports, 1988.

5. Convention on Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 1973.

6. Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, 1979.

7. Protocol on Safety of Six Platforms in Conventional Shelf, 1988.

8. Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1980.

9. Convention against Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 1989.

10. Convention on Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 1994.

11. Convention against Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, 1997.

12. Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999.

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