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**CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
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**My Neighbours' Keeper?  
Canada's Role in Enhancing Security within the Caribbean Community**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The study analyses Canada's role in enhancing security within the Caribbean region, contending that while it is an expression of Canada's national values to proactively engage in such an endeavour; to be its neighbours' keeper, it is also in its national interest to do so. This latter motive for engagement is borne out of the current and likely future impact of region's security threats on Canada's national security.

The analysis looks at these regional security threats, assessing current and emerging trends, and focusing primarily on the nexus with Canada's security and well-being. It also assesses, in a comparative analysis, how other traditional stakeholders such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and an emerging player like China, are engaged on the regional security agenda.

The study is based on the thesis that given the historical and current linkages through trade relationships and the regional diaspora, the significant potential for regional insecurity and instability, and the proximity of Canada to the region, Canada is not sufficiently engaged in the regional security agenda.

From the research and analysis done it was found that Canada's regional engagements are passive and primarily focused on development and capacity building, which while contributory to addressing the security issues, are not as effective in addressing them, particularly in the short-term.



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*Small states by their nature are weak and vulnerable... Sometimes it seems as if small states were like small boats pushed out into a turbulent sea, free in one sense to traverse it; but, without oars or provision, without compass or sails, free also to perish. Or perhaps, to be rescued and taken aboard a larger vessel.*<sup>1</sup>

## **Part 1: Introduction**

The above quote by Sir Shridath Ramphal, former Commonwealth Secretary General, provides a good if somewhat stark analogy of the challenges faced by small states like those in the Caribbean Community in what is a turbulent global space defined by a dynamic security environment. This dynamic and evolving world security environment has served to make the development of foreign policy and long-term strategies to address these issues, challenging at best. States have come to realise that the world is a ‘global village,’<sup>2</sup> and any attempts to isolate oneself in a ‘secured bubble’, fire-walled from the economic and security challenges ‘out there’, is futile. Any second thoughts about this reality would have, no doubt, been removed by the recent world financial crisis, not to mention the fallout from the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States.

This ‘globalness’ is not a new phenomenon and, in fact, was central to the Cold War experience where ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ defined the reality of the face-off between the polarised antagonists, and the non-aligned spectators alike. The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of hope for peace and stability, a hope which was quickly trumped by an anarchical interplay of multiple and decentralised agendas, causes, and

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<sup>1</sup>Ivelaw Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean, Problems and Promises in Subordinate States*. M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 1993, 3. Quoting Sir Shridath Ramphal former Commonwealth Secretary General.

<sup>2</sup>Marshall McLuhan, *War and Peace in the Global Village* McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York/Toronto 1968.



long suppressed grudges. Added to this mix, was another post-Cold War legacy, the apparent rise of the Russian mafia and its subsequent spread around the world;<sup>3</sup> unrest and instability between, and within States of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, as the unifying banner of communism faded; and the difficult adjustment to the new paradigm of a unipolar world. The cocktail, no doubt, makes evident the extent of the rapid transformation of the world security environment, and ultimately the impact on world stability.

Apart from transforming the security threat environment, the era also ushered in ‘Globalization’, the new way the world does business. Globalization, would ultimately redefine trade practices, through competition between states and the integration of their economies and societies. It facilitated rapid growth in countries like India and China but conversely contributed to economic decline and instability in other developing countries, particularly those with smaller, more vulnerable economies.<sup>4</sup> The regional security researcher and author, Ivelaw Griffith, highlights the impact of globalization on the security environment, in quoting the acknowledged terrorism authority, Audrey Kurth Cronin, who said, “... international terrorism, characterised by unpredictable and

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<sup>3</sup>Annelise Anderson “The Red Mafia: A Legacy of Communism,” in *Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform*, edited by Edward P Lazear. Stanford California: The Hoover Institution Press, 1995. <http://andrsn.stanford.edu/Other/redmaf.html> Internet Site accessed on 28 January 2009. In her discourse Anderson asserts that the Russian underworld was long established in the Soviet Union and served the informal economy – improving efficiency and consumer satisfaction. The end of the Cold War just provided the means for their ‘corporate’ expansion.

<sup>4</sup> The World Bank Group, “Globalization.” <http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/> Internet Site accessed January 10, 2009.

unprecedented threats from non-state actors, is not only a reaction to globalisation, but is facilitated by it.”<sup>5</sup>

This facilitation is manifested through the declining economic growth in more vulnerable states, resulting in the inevitable lack of opportunities, and alienation of youths. This is a growing reality and the lack of developmental opportunities (or the ability to exploit those available), sometimes exacerbated by the competitive global environment have contributed, through an evolving security/development interplay, to the increasing number of failed and failing states around the world. It is in this dynamic and complex security environment, with its multiplicity of issues, players, and motivating factors that all countries attempt to chart their paths towards stability and development. Developed countries around the world have long been relied upon for assistance in achieving these developmental goals by less developed and more vulnerable states. This assistance, as history and current trends have shown, ought not to be borne solely out of pure altruism, or just linked to national values but in fact, as the ‘global village’ dictates, also for national interest motives. Developed countries are in effect stakeholders, globally and more specifically, regionally.

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<sup>5</sup>Ivelaw Lloyd Griffiths, “Understanding Reality, Interpreting Change,” in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror*, edited by Ivelaw Griffiths. Ian Randle Publishers, 2004, xxv.



Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

**Figure 1: Map showing the Caribbean Basin.**

In the region of the Americas, the Caribbean Community<sup>6</sup> represents a group of fifteen regular members and five associate members (in *Figure 1*<sup>7</sup>), all developing countries which look to Canada, one of its wealthy neighbours to the north, for assistance.

Canada and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have had a long standing track record of mutual cooperation, and the majority of CARICOM states are, like Canada, former British colonial dominions, and hence share a common political heritage. This long friendship and alliance was initially formalised through the Canada-West

<sup>6</sup>‘Caribbean Community’ ( and Common Market – CARICOM) – Fifteen member states are Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. Associate member states (and their effective date of membership) are Anguilla - 4 July 1999, Bermuda - 2 July 2003, British Virgin Islands - 2 July 1991, Cayman Islands - 15 May 2002, and Turks and Caicos Islands - 2 July 1991. [http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member\\_states.jsp?menu=community&prnf=1](http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member_states.jsp?menu=community&prnf=1) Internet Site accessed January 10, 2009.

<sup>7</sup> Source: United States Library of Congress, Report by J F Hornbeck, “CARICOM: Challenges and Opportunities for Caribbean Economic Integration,” January 7, 2008. *Congressional Report Service, Report for Congress.* <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl34308.pdf> Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

Indies Trade Agreement of 1925, and continued through its successor, the Canada-CARICOM Trade and Economic Agreement of 1979.<sup>8</sup> The relationship between Canada and the Caribbean Community continues to grow and both are now engaged in free trade negotiations.<sup>9</sup>

The CARICOM diaspora in Canada is significant and has played its role in Canada's development, though even more importantly, is the role played in inextricably linking Canada to the region,<sup>10</sup> for better or for worse. Like any 'marriage' some negative aspects come interwoven with the good and the realities of the Canada/CARICOM relationship are no different. Transnational organised criminal enterprises, for example, have long exploited the diaspora to further their illicit activities. The spectre of externally nurtured and home-grown terrorism, which some suggest, is festering in South<sup>11</sup> and Central America,<sup>12</sup> and in a number of CARICOM States, is likely to similarly exploit these linkages to carry out its execrable activities in Canada.

There have already been documented examples of Canadian society being exploited through this and other regional diasporas. The Jamaican/Caribbean organised

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<sup>8</sup>CARICOM Press Release, "Security Cooperation to Underline CARICOM-Canada Relations" [http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres201\\_04.htm](http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres201_04.htm) Internet Site accessed on 26 January 2009.

<sup>9</sup>Office of the Prime Minister, "Prime Minister Harper urges CARICOM Nations to Embrace Free Trade as the Path to Prosperity." *Speech given in Barbados on 19 July 2007.* <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1762> Internet Site accessed January 29, 2009.

<sup>10</sup>In the context of this paper the term 'region' will, unless otherwise specified refer to the Caribbean Community and/or CARICOM and the broader geographical area within which it is located.

<sup>11</sup>Rex Hudson "Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America." Library of Congress, July 2003, 1. [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/TerrOrgCrime\\_TBA.pdf](http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf) Internet Site accessed April 03, 2009.

<sup>12</sup>Renee Novakoff "Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned," *Air & Space Power Journal July 01, 2008.* <http://ciempre.com/bin/content.cgi?news=160> Internet Site accessed January 25, 2009.

crime syndicates and the Colombian Cartels,<sup>13</sup> for example, have used their connections in Canada for a host of illicit enterprises, as have Sikh extremists<sup>14</sup> and the Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil Tigers.<sup>15</sup> These activities have ranged from fund raising for nefarious causes to the sale and distribution of illicit products, and have impacted negatively on Canada's national security.

Canada's rich multicultural mosaic has given rise to many such 'regional diasporas', which increases the likelihood for these potential security challenges. It is however its 'backyard' – the Caribbean Community and the wider Americas, which potentially creates the clearest present danger. This is so because of the significant diaspora linkages, Canada's proximity to the region, and the significant potential for threat development and security instability there. As the analysis will show there is a price to be paid for living in an insecure neighbourhood!

It is against this background that this paper seeks to analyse Canada's role as an involved stakeholder and partner in enhancing security within the Caribbean Community. Security threats to CARICOM are as many as they are varied, encapsulating a plethora of transnational criminal enterprises, and as evidence will indicate, the apparently emerging threat of terrorism. Addressing them and their effects will no doubt require a multi-dimensional approach if the effort is to have any significant utility.

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<sup>13</sup>Department of Public Safety, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "2006 Canada/US Organised Crime Threat Assessment," <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/oc-co/octa-mlco-eng.htm> Internet Site accessed January 26, 2009.

<sup>14</sup>"The Bombing of Air India Flight 182," *CBC News Online September 26, 2006.* <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/airindia/bombing.html> Internet Site, accessed January 28, 2009.

<sup>15</sup>Stewart Bell, *Cold Terror, How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World*, John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd. 2007. In Chapter 2 'The Snow Tigers' which is the name given to the Canadian branch of the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the author shows how members of the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada, linked to LTTE continue to support the organisation and its campaign of terrorism.

Canada's motives for engagement in the CARICOM security dynamics are likely to be multifaceted and influenced by national interests, national values and the country's emerging status as a middle power. Evidence indicates that Canada has been significantly engaged within CARICOM in many ways, including assisting in building capacities of regional security forces, in security cooperation, and in joint venture initiatives. The research will, however, pursue the question, that given the historical and current linkages through trade relationships and the regional diaspora, the significant potential for regional insecurity and instability, and the proximity of Canada to the region; is Canada sufficiently engaged as a stakeholder in seeking to address these security challenges? The paper will present arguments aligned with the view that, these realities considered, Canada is not sufficiently engaged.

While the paper focuses on security within CARICOM, this politically defined group is located in, and its security realities are significantly influenced by, a larger region, the Americas. It is therefore prudent that an appreciation of the extent of this impact is included in the analysis of the issues here. Another issue that requires an assessment of its impact is developmental aid. To this end, an analysis of how the Canadian development effort, as a component of its foreign policy, is used to enhance regional development and assuage the security threat environment within CARICOM.

In order to achieve the aim of the paper, the adopted methodological approach includes the analysis of Canadian foreign policy towards CARICOM. This provides an insight into how Canada views the region and more specifically how it sees its role in enhancing regional security. Additionally, this also provides the basis for a comparison between Canada's articulated foreign policy towards the region, and the effectiveness of

its implementation, or in fact, the effects of its implementation. The paper also analyses the current regional security environment, assesses how it will likely develop and its impact, or potential impact on Canada. This analysis provides insights into Canada's level of vulnerability to regional security threats, and thus its motivation or need to take prudent actions to address the situation. The paper also looks at the role of other traditional stakeholders like the United States and the United Kingdom within the region, and how their regional engagement compares to that of Canada. Canada's response to China's increasing influence in the Caribbean region is also assessed; specifically how its policy direction and ultimately its engagement in the regional security agenda may be affected.

The literature on Caribbean security issues and, in fact, security within the wider region (Central and South America) is broad, covering and defining the problems, and outlining some weaknesses in the existing systems and mechanisms to address them. The works of security researchers and analysts like Ivelaw Griffith and Norman Girvan, while being more CARICOM centric, provides good insights into the regional security dynamics as a whole. As Canadian foreign policy forms a core component of the analysis of the issues covered here, credible works on this subject are referenced throughout. The work of Kim Nossal in particular, gives an evolving historical perspective on Canadian foreign policy in general, with some insights into region-specific issues. These and other works are complimented through the referencing of official documents, security journals and reports, and Canadian, US and UK foreign policy

journals and papers.<sup>16</sup> Publications from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) highlight the initiatives within the region and provide some insights into their impact on the security dynamics, as well as providing a sense of where in order development assistance and foreign policy priority, the region falls. The analysis of statistics on aid and assistance provided by CIDA, the Department of National Defence (DND), and other Canadian agencies, to the CARICOM region and elsewhere around the world, provides a means of validating the trends seen in the articulated foreign policy and development focus.

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<sup>16</sup>Papers published by the ‘Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute’ were widely referenced – providing insights into current foreign policy priorities.



## Part 2: Sun, Sea & Security Threats

*The enlightened sovereign and the capable commander conquer the enemy at every move and achieve successes far surpassing those of ordinary people because they possess “fore-knowledge”. This “fore-knowledge” cannot be obtained from ghosts or spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from astrological calculations. It can only come from men who know the enemy situation.*

Sunzi<sup>17</sup>

An understanding of the regional security realities is the first step in assessing the utility of the measures implemented to address the problems. The above quote by the Chinese philosopher and scholar Sunzi, encapsulates the principles and methodologies involved in gaining such an understanding. The dynamism of the regional security landscape, interlinked with global realities, creates an environment with differing views, opinions, and assertions about the security realities. The study attempts to navigate this complex environment to arrive at a true description of the security problem.

The regional security issues are as varied as they are insidious. Some aspects are well known, investigated and documented, while other aspects remain in the realm of best guesses, or even outright speculation. Some of these security issues have over the years become embedded in the social, cultural and economic fabric of the region, in what has become a complex and complicated security/threat paradigm. The Caribbean, possibly the ultimate melting pot, has traditionally been subjected to the influences of far off lands, for better or for worse. Ralf Premdas probably best sums up this multi-racial, multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural reality when he states:

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<sup>17</sup>Sunzi, *Sunzi: The Art of War Sun Bin: The Art of War*, Edited and translated by Wu Rusong, Wu Xianlin and Lin Wusun, Library of Chinese Classics, Foreign Language Press – Hunan People’s Publishing House, 2005, 109.

In this Caribbean place ... it is usually visualized as an area populated by a diverse polyglot of peoples. There are whites, blacks, browns, yellows, reds, and an assortment of shades in between. There are Europeans, Africans, Asian Indians, Indonesian Javanese, Chinese, Aboriginal Indians, and many mixes. There are Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Jews, Rastafarians, Santería, Winti, Vudun, etc. They speak in a multitude of tongues – Spanish, English, Dutch, French, ... and a diverse number of Creoles such as papiamentu, sranan tongo, ndjuka, saramaccan, kromanti, kreyol, as well as Hindustani, Bhojpuri, Urdu, etc. In whatever combinations of race, religion, language, and culture they cohere and coexist, they dwell on small islands and large, some poorly endowed with natural resources, others abundantly. Perhaps, no other region of the world is so richly varied.<sup>18</sup>

It is this *mêlée* of culture, politics, language, religion and transnational threat activities, which defines the security dynamics of the region. To navigate this complex environment, the discussions and analysis focuses on the interplay within the CARICOM security dynamics, the influences of the wider region – the Americas, and ultimately the impact on Canada.

### **From Buccaneers to Jihadists?**

The Caribbean has long since been a hotbed of nefarious activities conducted by organised criminal enterprises ranging from the exploits of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Centuries' Buccaneers, Pirates, and Privateers (state sponsored pirates);<sup>19</sup> through the rum-runners of the 1920s,<sup>20</sup> which sought to satisfy the thirst of Americans throughout the Prohibition years; to the more current narcotics, arms and human traffickers. The region through its

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<sup>18</sup> Ralf Premdas, "Ethnicity and Identity in the Caribbean: Decentering a Myth," Working Paper # 243, December 1996, 2. <http://www.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/234.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 28, 2009.

<sup>19</sup> Sheppard Software "Piracy in the Caribbean." <http://www.sheppardsoftware.com/caribbeanweb/factfile/Unique-facts-Caribbean6.htm> Internet Site accessed on March 21, 2009.

<sup>20</sup> Lavidia Lifestyle "100 Years of Wooden Glory – The Rum Runners," September 6, 2007 <http://www.lavidaocean.com/the-rum-runners/> Internet Site accessed March 21, 2009.

geography and geographic location has proven to be an ideal staging area, transshipment way-point, and support base for the execution of these activities. This reality has over the centuries also made ‘policing’ these activities difficult, and despite the advent of technological advances, these challenges remain.

Today, the Caribbean continues to be engrossed in the activities of transnational criminal enterprises as these organisations seek to function in the market driven environment which defines their illicit trades. These transnational organised criminal activities include narcotics and arms trafficking, money laundering, human smuggling, and a plethora of other associated vices, corruption not being least among them. The net effects of these transnational organised criminal activities on the region are potentially dire, and as Albert Ramdin, Assistant Secretary General of The Organization of American States (OAS) states:

... Organized crime acts as a catalyst for several other forms of violence and crime, it affects directly or indirectly all sectors of society and undermines linkages between governments and their citizens. If unchecked organized crime ruptures social cohesion, divides families and people, corrupts institutions, destabilizes, and eventually destroys societies and governments... organized crime has the potential of undermining the very social and economic fabric of our society...<sup>21</sup>

These effects have already become evident within some regional states, particularly those where the scourge of narcotics has taken root. The region has for almost three decades, been a major transshipment route for Colombian cocaine destined for markets in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Europe. While the cultivation, processing and trafficking of marijuana to these same markets have long been

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<sup>21</sup>Organisation of American States, Address by Albert Ramdin, “Organized Crime: A Threat to the Caribbean,” March 20, 2007. Montego Bay, Jamaica.  
<http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.asp?sCodigo=07-0028> Internet Site accessed April 25, 2009.

an established trend within the Caribbean, particularly in Jamaica, the advent of the cocaine trade has redefined the impact of narcotics on security within the region.

The trafficking of cocaine through the Caribbean to markets in North America, Europe and the UK, significantly took off in the early 1980s<sup>22</sup> when United States law enforcement counter-narcotics efforts targeted the Central American overland, and the Pacific maritime trafficking routes. The Caribbean, through its long political and trade links with the main user states, became a convenient alternative vector for these illegal drugs, and cultural and language barriers were quickly overcome in the face of opportunities for significant illicit earnings. As these new arrangements flourished in the early 1980s, the Caribbean, and particularly Jamaica saw significant increases in crime associated with the drug trade. Jamaican Political scientist, Dr Trevor Munroe in his discourse on the menace of drugs, makes the point that Jamaica's homicide rate, which is among the top five in the world, is significantly influenced by drugs. He adds that drug-related murders, reprisal killings and turf wars [the latter two, more often than not, themselves inspired by drug-related motives] account for almost half of all murders.<sup>23</sup> Mark Sullivan in his 'Congressional Report' supports the drug/homicide nexus, when he states:

Rising crime is a major security challenge throughout the Caribbean, including Jamaica, which had the highest murder rate in the world in 2005 with a rate of 60 persons per 100,000 inhabitants. Gangs involved in drug

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<sup>22</sup>Laurie Gunst, *Born Fi Dead*, Caledonian International (1998), 41 – 42. In her discourse, Gunst highlights the effects of fledging cocaine trade on the political violence which marred the 1980 general elections in Jamaica.

<sup>23</sup> Trevor Munroe, "The Menace of Drugs," in *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror*, edited by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffiths, 154 - 175. Ian Randle Publishers, 2004, 162.

trafficking, extortion, and violence are responsible for much of the crime.<sup>24</sup>

This quote highlights the significant negative impact of the illicit trade once it has taken root in a country, a trend which continues to be the reality within Jamaica and a number of other Caribbean States. The Caribbean researcher Antony Harriott also adds to the drug/effect dialogue when he makes the point that:

...successful transshipment of large quantities of illicit drugs is usually a complex business requiring international cooperation...and transactional arrangements ...transactions in this market are regulated by violence and the threat of violence.<sup>25</sup>

This drug/violence paradigm has impacted negatively on the security of nearly every state in the region and also defined the accepted mode of operations, as these criminal enterprises interact and compete in the drug marketplaces of North America, Europe, and the UK. Additionally, as the scourge of cocaine trafficking has spread throughout the Caribbean, significant linkages have been established between criminal organisations operating within CARICOM states and their Latin American neighbours. This is an interesting phenomenon as it vividly illustrates how transnational criminal organisations can quickly adapt to exploit opportunities such as those provided by the trade and political linkages of the Caribbean. These linkages have made the Caribbean an ideal vector for the trafficking of these illicit products.

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<sup>24</sup> US Congress Research Service, Mark P Sullivan, *Jamaica: Political and Economic Conditions and US Relations*, Report for Congress, February 3, 2006, 4. <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22372.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 28, 2009.

<sup>25</sup>United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, Report by Anthony Harriott, *Crime Trends in the Caribbean and Responses*, (November 12, 2002), 11. [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/barbados/caribbean\\_report\\_crime-trends.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/barbados/caribbean_report_crime-trends.pdf) Internet Site accessed March 29, 2009.

Another interesting narcotic ‘trade’ link has blossomed over the last few years between Jamaica and Haiti. The so-called “Guns for Ganja” trade thrives as the demand for weapons to supply the Jamaican inner-city gang conflicts, is met by a seemingly high availability of these items in Haiti.<sup>26</sup> Criminal entrepreneurs, a lot of whom are ‘simple’ fishermen, have exploited this demand for weapons in Jamaica, while simultaneously filling a separate demand for ganja (marijuana/marihuana), particularly the cheaper more affordable quality, in Haiti.<sup>27</sup> This seemingly unsophisticated trade, executed by fishermen from both Haiti and Jamaica, has developed in to what is now viewed by law enforcement officials as the major source of illegal firearms entering Jamaica.<sup>28</sup> In fact, The Major Crimes and Counter Narcotics Task Force, better known as ‘Operation Kingfish’ has specifically targeted the trade and has enjoyed some success in suppressing it. This success is evident in the following statement by Senator Trevor MacMillan, at the time, Jamaica’s Minister of National Security, in reference to the efforts of Operation Kingfish:

...As a result of these drug interdiction activities, there has been a reduction in the number of boats traversing the Jamaica-Haiti corridor indicating that there is a disruption in the trade. The close monitoring of several of the players in the guns for drugs trade, as well as the detention and profiling of many of the players, and frequent visits by the security

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<sup>26</sup>“Jamaica: Cops seize 5,000 lbs of ganja in Clarendon (Jamaica – Haiti Gun Trade)” Sunday, February 11, 2007. [On-line forum]. [http://www.haitiwebs.com/forums/diaspora\\_news/42508-cops\\_seize\\_5\\_000\\_lbs\\_ganja\\_clarendon\\_jamaica\\_haiti\\_gun\\_trade.html](http://www.haitiwebs.com/forums/diaspora_news/42508-cops_seize_5_000_lbs_ganja_clarendon_jamaica_haiti_gun_trade.html) Internet Site accessed March 30, 2009.

<sup>27</sup>Nick Davis “Haiti and Jamaica’s Deadly Trade” *BBC News On-line*, October 25, 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7684983.stm> Internet Site accessed March 30, 2009.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

forces to areas in which they operate, would have contributed to the decline in the trade...<sup>29</sup>

Senator MacMillan, however, highlights the ever present trait of these criminal entrepreneurs, that is, the ability to adapt to changes in *their* ‘threat’ environment, when he states that “...with pressure of law enforcement activities focussed along the south east coast [of Jamaica]; the traders now appear to be shifting their activities to the south western coast in an effort to elude law enforcement interdiction activities...”<sup>30</sup> The ‘game of strategy’ continues, and so does the trafficking of weapons and marijuana through this vector. There is, after all, money to be made, and while these illicit funds are currently not likely to be in the quantities that warrant significant ‘laundering’ operations, this could well change as the trade develops further, and cocaine which is reportedly now more available in Haiti,<sup>31</sup> replaces guns going west to Jamaica.

Money laundering, the attendant ‘sidekick’ of transnational criminal activities, is particularly evident as a spinoff of the cocaine trade and its high returns in illicit earnings. The region has not been spared the deleterious effects of these activities, as the corruptive influence of drug money, and the operations of front companies impact on security and stability. According to Griffith, “...for the Caribbean, money laundering is a headache that involves the dynamics of all the geonarcotics factors – drugs, geography, power, and

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<sup>29</sup>Jamaica House of Parliament, [Press Release], “Public Display of Confidence in Kingfish Hotline”, January 27, 2009. [http://www.japarliament.gov.jm/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=100:public-displays-confidence-in-kingfish-hotline&catid=1:news&Itemid=8](http://www.japarliament.gov.jm/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=100:public-displays-confidence-in-kingfish-hotline&catid=1:news&Itemid=8) Internet Site accessed March 30, 2009.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup>Lydia Polgreen and Tim Weiner, “Drug Traffickers Find Haiti a Hospitable Port of Call” *The Miami Herald* [On-line], May 16, 2004. <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/drugs/hospitable.htm> Internet Site accessed April 03, 2009.

See also US Department of State, Embassy News, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for Haiti – 2006 INCSR”. [http://haiti.usembassy.gov/narcotics\\_report\\_for\\_haiti2.html](http://haiti.usembassy.gov/narcotics_report_for_haiti2.html) Internet Site accessed April 03, 2009.

politics.”<sup>32</sup> Griffith adds that in 1995 of the seventeen countries world-wide, which were ranked by the US Department of State as ‘high priority’ because of money laundering vulnerability or activities, six were in the Caribbean Basin, and this number went up by two in 1996.<sup>33</sup> A comparison with more current figures (2005) indicates that the situation has not improved. In fact, according to statistics presented by the Inter-American Development Bank, the region scores 5.46 for money laundering through bank channels, and 6.57 for nonbank channels, this on a scale of 0 – 10.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, “...among the top ten countries with the greatest pervasiveness of money laundering via bank channels, six are in Latin America... [and in the nonbank] category, seven are in Latin America...”<sup>35</sup>

Money laundering has also impacted negatively on the function of legitimate business throughout the region, as it out-competes these enterprises with ‘cheap’ money, ultimately leading to dire economic consequences. The use of front companies like used car dealerships, enterprises engaged in real estate development and sales, and a host of other schemes, are evident throughout Latin America and the Caribbean,<sup>36</sup> and according to Ricardo Alba the ‘black’ economy of the major drug producers in Latin America

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<sup>32</sup>Ivelaw Griffith, *Drug and Security in the Caribbean. Sovereignty Under Siege*. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, 92. The countries were Aruba, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. Antigua-Barbuda and the Netherlands Antilles were the countries added in 1996.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, 109.

<sup>34</sup>Inter-American Development Bank Report on Latin America, “Chapter 17 – Money Laundering: What Do We Know?” in *IPES 2005, Unlocking Credit the Quest for Deep and Stable Bank Lending*. <http://www.iadb.org/res/ipres/2005/docs/Chapter17Eng.pdf> Internet Site accessed March 30, 2009.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, 243. The countries are Argentina, Colombia, Haiti, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Bolivia for money laundering through bank channels. Guatemala is added to this list for nonbank channels.

<sup>36</sup>US Department of the Treasury, “Money Laundering in the Commercial Real Estate Industry,” Financial Crime Enforcement Network, December 2006. [http://www.fincen.gov/news\\_room/rp/reports/html/CREassessment.html](http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/reports/html/CREassessment.html) Internet Site accessed March 30, 2009.



creates a fertile ground for laundering of a conservatively estimated US\$13 billion per year.<sup>37</sup>

While these money laundering activities are, based on the statistics presented, primarily concentrated in Central and South America, the Caribbean has been a significant conduit for the movement of these illicit earnings. Jamaican law enforcement agencies, for example, have over the last eight years seized significant sums of US currency being moved by money couriers (often times to Panama). These funds were suspected to be the proceeds of narcotics (cocaine) trafficking, and were believed to be ultimately destined for the cocaine suppliers in Colombia. A recent seizure by Jamaica Custom officials of US\$565, 160 at the Sangster International Airport in Montego Bay, represents the 136<sup>th</sup> such seizure since June 1, 2008. These monies (a total of approximately US \$1, 766, 000) were all found under similar circumstances and have been forfeited to the Crown.<sup>38</sup>

The proceeds from the activities of these illicit enterprises have served to corrupt law enforcement and other officials of various States within the region. In fact, these activities often foster a culture of corruption, and according to researcher and writer, Anthony Bryan, “Corruption can be an important tool and facilitator for crime groups that successfully corrupt government law enforcement officials as well as various legitimate

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<sup>37</sup>Ricardo Alba, “Evolution of Methods of Money Laundering in Latin America” *Journal of Financial Crime* volume 10 no 2, (2002), 137 - 140.  
<http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=/published/emeraldfulltextarticle/pdf/3090100206.pdf> Internet Site accessed March 29, 2009.

<sup>38</sup>Jamaica Information Service “Custom Seizure Net US\$500, 000,” January 14, 2009.  
[http://www.jis.gov.jm/officepm/html/20090114t150000-0500\\_18029\\_jis\\_customs\\_seizures\\_net\\_us\\_500\\_000.asp](http://www.jis.gov.jm/officepm/html/20090114t150000-0500_18029_jis_customs_seizures_net_us_500_000.asp) Internet Site accessed March 30, 2009.

markets and businesses.”<sup>39</sup> Bryan adds: “Corruption is widespread in the Caribbean as elsewhere and is not detected or measured easily, thereby increasing the difficulty of countering it.”<sup>40</sup> Griffith adds to the discourse on corruption in the region, stating that: “... While public sector corruption gets the most press and greatly affects the state, there is also a great deal of corruption in the private sector as well.”<sup>41</sup>

There have also been suggestions of the political infrastructure and the judiciary of some regional states being compromised by the corruptive influences of transnational organised crime. Olga Nazario provides some insights into the existence of judicial corruption within unspecified regional courts, when she asserts that there have been evidence of the misuse of judicial funds and power; biased case allocation and compromised other pre-trial procedures (court clerks bribed to ‘lose’ files and evidence). She adds that the acceptance of bribes by lawyers, court officials and judges for different ‘services’ are practices to which the region is not immune.<sup>42</sup> The corruptive influence of drug money has also undermined the security of regional air and sea ports, as these threat organisations set up mechanisms to facilitate their illicit activities. Seizures in the 1990s

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<sup>39</sup>Anthony Bryan, “Transnational Organized Crime: The Caribbean Context,” *The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Working Paper Series*, Working Paper No. 1, October 2000, 7. University of Miami.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>41</sup>The Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, “Organized Crime and the Corruption of State Institutions,” Summary of Proceedings – Prepared by Bill Lahenman and Matt Lewis, November 18, 2002. <http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/organizedcrime.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 12, 2009.

<sup>42</sup>Olga Nazario, “Conference on the Caribbean: A 20/20 Vision, A Strategy against Corruption,” Washington, DC June 19 – 21, CARICOM, 2007, 9. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOECS/Resources/NazarioPaper.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 12, 2009.

on regional airlines, including Air Jamaica vividly highlight this trend.<sup>43</sup> The trend continues and according to the RCMP in its 2005 assessment of drug trafficking in Canada, air transport, including commercial services, remains the most prominent method for the importation of cocaine and other narcotics into the country.<sup>44</sup> Referring specifically to cocaine trafficking, the RCMP report states:

The most common transit countries for cocaine en route to Canada are the Caribbean islands of Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Antigua; as well as the United States, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Panama and Costa Rica... Originating from South America, cocaine is typically transited through the Caribbean to Canada via direct international flights.<sup>45</sup>

Facilitation through these commercial-flight vectors invariably requires the outlay of illicit funds to corrupt potential facilitators. Sometimes coercion in the form of threat of violence is used in conjunction with monetary rewards to ensure cooperation - the old offer of 'Silver or Lead.'<sup>46</sup> Given these options adhering to the wishes of these traffickers is often a reality.

The net deleterious effects of these illicit funds on the credibility and integrity of the security infrastructure, and ultimately the stability within the affected states, is

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<sup>43</sup>Amir Lechner, "Flying High" Intersec Magazine [On-line], June 2006. <http://www.threatrate.com/Portals/0/ArticlesImagesAndDocs/Intersec-Flying-%20High%20Article-June%202006.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 25, 2009. Seizures on Air Jamaica included 300 kg of Marijuana disguised as 'Spices' found in cargo hold at Heathrow in 1997, 20 pounds of marijuana found hidden in a panel in the aircraft cabin in Miami (1997), and 162 pounds of marijuana found in 'postal service bags'. This latter incident resulted in a fine of US\$1.3 million against the carrier.

<sup>44</sup>Department of Public Safety, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Drug Situation in Canada – 2005." <http://www.rcmp-grc.ca/drugs-drogues/drg-2005-eng.htm> Internet Site accessed April 25, 2009.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup>This scenario is often played out in 'negotiations' to facilitate the trafficking of contraband through air and sea ports in Jamaica. The Author has personal knowledge of a number of such scenarios having been involved in counter-narcotics intelligence gathering for many years.

potentially significant. This corruption when combined with the fallout from the laundering of these proceeds can further undermine state institutions.

From the foregoing discourse it should be evident that the tentacles of transnational criminality are firmly embedded in the region, and most if not all regional states are affected in some way, shape, or form. Transnational criminal activities it seems have laid the foundation for the development and spread of a potentially more pernicious threat, transnational terrorism. There is already some evidence of the growth of this threat activity, but as history shows, terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the region. Marxists-Leninist insurgency groups operating primarily in Central and South America were arguably among the earliest proponents of the use of terror in the region, as they engaged in an asymmetric conflict with US-backed, right leaning governments or groups, who themselves arguably used terror as a means to an end.

Researcher and writer Michael Radu argues that the majority of these early insurgencies were generally politically motivated, and represented Fidel Castro's expansionist revolution. These Cuban backed groups, and others with similar ideals, fought to spread the communist ideology, and to accomplish their shared aim, "...the defeat of American influence and power in the Western Hemisphere."<sup>47</sup> Radu also argues that the anti-American aims still exists within the region, and is best manifested in President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, who has seemingly taken over the baton from Castro.<sup>48</sup> Current trends in the region, in a number of cases continue to show the

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<sup>47</sup>Michael Radu "The Latin American Vortex," *The Journal of International Security Affairs* [Online], Fall 2005, no. 9. [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jisa/jisa\\_2005\\_fall/jisa\\_2005\\_fall\\_d.pdf](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/jisa/jisa_2005_fall/jisa_2005_fall_d.pdf) Internet Site accessed April 2, 2009.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*

trappings of political ideology, but more often than not with new twists, the influence of the narcotics trade and of radical Islam. There is some evidence that the legacy of politically motivated terror still lingers in the region, primarily in Latin America where the activities of the leftist group, Ejército Popular Revolucionario (Popular Revolutionary Army) in Mexico has recently surged.<sup>49</sup> The narco-terrorist organisation, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) has also seemingly re-engaged (or is renewing) its leftist ideological fight in Peru, as was recently demonstrated with the killing of twelve soldiers and seven civilians in Huancavelica Province in October 2008,<sup>50</sup> and the tragic sequel on April 9, 2009, when thirteen soldiers were ambushed and killed in the Ayacucho region.<sup>51</sup> Despite these ‘legacy motivators,’ it is religious radicalism and extremism which is seemingly emerging and taking centre stage as the motivator for these potentially deadly activities within the region. The analysis now looks at this trend.

The potential for the growth of Islamic extremism and radicalism in the Caribbean and the wider region, the Americas, is significant. In keeping with recent global trends, which according to Angela Gendron is attributable to a “...global Salafi jihad [that] is now a ... worldwide religious revivalist movement, which aims to re-establish past

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<sup>49</sup>W. Alejandro Sanchez “E.P.R Targets Mexico’s Energy Industry,” *Power and Interest News Report* [On-line]. October 02, 2007. [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_report&report\\_id=690&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=690&language_id=1) Internet Site accessed April 02, 2009.

<sup>50</sup>“19 Killed in Southern Peru Suspected Shining Path Attack,” *Voice of America* [On-line], October 10, 2008. <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-10/2008-10-10-voa58.cfm> Internet Site accessed April 2, 2009.

<sup>51</sup>“Rebels kill 13 Soldiers in Peru,” *BBC News* [On-line], April 12, 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7995524.stm> Internet Site accessed April 12, 2009.

Muslim glory in a great Islamic state,”<sup>52</sup> the region has experienced a leaning towards this brand of Islam. This reality holds significant potential consequences for regional stability and security, going forward.

The extremist rhetoric of Jamaican-born Islamic convert and radical Cleric, Sheik Abdullah el-Faisal (Trevor William Forrest), which calls for young Muslim men to attack Jews, Hindus and other non-Muslims with the ‘bullet’ and chemical weapons, clearly highlights the potential for these radical ideals to take root in the Caribbean.<sup>53</sup> This is also vividly demonstrated when the participation of individuals with linkages to the region in acts of terrorism around the world is considered. The list is instructive and includes terrorists like Richard Reid, the ‘Shoe Bomber’, son of a Jamaican father; and Germaine Lindsay, the July 7, 2005 – London suicide bomber, who was born in Jamaica. Lindsay detonated the bomb in the ‘tube’ near Kings Cross station which killed 26 people.<sup>54</sup> The list also includes Trinidadians Barry Adams and Wali Mohamed, alleged members of Jamaat al Fuqra, a militant Pakistani based terrorist group, who were convicted in Canada in 1994 of conspiracy to bomb a Hindu Temple and cinema in Toronto.<sup>55</sup> A more recent event, the failed 2007 John F Kennedy (JFK) International Airport terrorist plot,

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<sup>52</sup>Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, Paper by Angela Gendron “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment,” *ITAC Presents*, Volume 2006 – 4. (The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies – the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University). [http://www.itac-ciem.gc.ca/pblctns/tc\\_prsnts/2006-4-eng.asp](http://www.itac-ciem.gc.ca/pblctns/tc_prsnts/2006-4-eng.asp) Internet Site accessed April 20, 2009.

<sup>53</sup> “UK Islam – Faces of Fanaticism Part Two,” *Western Resistance*, February 14, 2006. <http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/001652.html> Internet Site accessed April 02, 2009.

<sup>54</sup>“Profile: Germaine Lindsay,” *BBC News* [On-line]. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4762591.stm> Internet Site accessed April 02, 2009.

<sup>55</sup>Renee Novakoff, “Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned” ... July 01, 2008. <http://ciempre.com/bin/content.cgi?news=160> Internet Site accessed January 25, 2009.

reportedly involving Trinidadian and Guyanese nationals, reinforces the point.<sup>56</sup> The growing presence of radical Islamic groups within some Caribbean states and the wider region is also cause for concern. Groups like Jamaat al Muslimeen, operating in Trinidad & Tobago (T&T), reportedly has links to Sunni Terrorism, and has the distinction of being the only terrorist subversive group to attempt a coup d'état, when it took over the Twin-Island Republic's (T&T) Parliament in 1990.<sup>57</sup> The group has remained as a significant threat, and in March 2007 three members confessed to kidnapping, raping and murdering an Indo-Trinidadian businesswoman. Additionally, according to the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the group shipped heroine from Afghanistan to the US via Trinidad. The group is also believed to be linked to the JFK bombing plot previously discussed.<sup>58</sup>

Other groups with suspected or known presence in the region include Hezbollah, with cells in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America,<sup>59</sup> Argentina and also reportedly Venezuela.<sup>60</sup> Reports also indicate that Al Qaeda has a regional presence, coordinated through its 'regional operatives' like Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who

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<sup>56</sup>United States Department of Justice, Press Release, "Four Individuals Charged with Plot to Bomb John F Kennedy International Airport," (The US Attorneys' Office, Eastern District, New York), June 02, 2007. <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/pr/2007/2007jun02.html> Internet Site accessed April 02, 2009. Agents from the FBI Joint Terrorist Task Force arrested one of the defendants, former JFK employee RUSSELL DEFREITAS, a U.S. citizen and native of Guyana, in New York. ABDUL KADIR, a citizen of Guyana who has served as a member of the Guyanese Parliament, and KAREEM IBRAHIM, a citizen of Trinidad, are in custody in Trinidad. A fourth defendant, ABDEL NUR, is a citizen of Guyana.

<sup>57</sup>Nicole Ferrand, "Islamic Terrorism in Latin America." *The American Report, Center for Security Policy*, March 12, 2009. <http://204.96.138.161/p17937.xml> Internet Site accessed April 03, 2009.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Rex Hudson, "Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America." ... July 2003, 1. The TBA is the border area where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet.

<sup>60</sup>Renee Novakoff, "Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned" ... July 01, 2008.

according to credible reports visited Brazil in the mid to late 1990s;<sup>61</sup> Al-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman, who was arrested in Foz do Iguacu in April 2002;<sup>62</sup> Adnan el Shukrijumah, who is currently on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 'be on the look out for' list, and who is known to have transited Central American and a number of Caribbean States;<sup>63</sup> and well known al Qaeda follower, the Jamaican Cleric, Sheikh Abdullah el-Faisal, who was deported to Jamaica from the UK in May 2007.<sup>64</sup> El-Faisal was convicted in Britain in 2003 on three counts of racial incitement, and three counts of soliciting murder.<sup>65</sup> Since his deportation he has been nurturing his new 'flock' at a Masjid in Western Jamaica.<sup>66</sup>

The discourse so far has established the significant and growing presence of transnational organised crime, and radical Islamic organisations within the region. The presence of these threats not only portends security problems for the region going forward, but also for every country where diaspora linkages provide exploitable avenues. The 'transnationality' of these threats has also served to establish linkages within the region and it is not uncommon to encounter Colombians on the streets of Kingston, Jamaica, or for that matter Jamaicans in Cartagena, Cali or Bogota, right alongside the ubiquitous Bahamians as they discuss and plan their nefarious activities. This reality

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<sup>61</sup>Rex Hudson, "Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America." ... July 2003, 15.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>63</sup>Renee Novakoff, "Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned" ... July 01, 2008.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup>"Profile: Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal," *BBC New* [On-line], May 25, 2007. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/6692243.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6692243.stm) Internet Site accessed April 03, 2009.

<sup>66</sup>"Sheikh 'Faisal vows to Islamise Jamaica," *Sheikyermami*, January 8, 2008. <http://sheikyermami.com/2008/01/08/sheikh%E2%80%99-faisal-vows-to-islamise-jamaica/> Internet Site accessed April 02, 2009.



leaves no doubt that what happens in Latin America impacts the Caribbean, and as the study will show, ultimately the US, Canada and the UK through the diaspora linkages.

The TBA in particular highlights this regional nexus, as well as the nexus between both transnational crime and terrorism. This area, according to researcher and writer Rex Hudson, has been established by a number of Islamic terrorist groups “...as a haven for fund-raising, recruiting, and plotting terrorist attacks.”<sup>67</sup> Terrorist groups, including “Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, Al-Jihad, al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hizbollah, and al-Muqawamah” have all established operations in the TBA, and the area is also widely used for money laundering operations, where in excess of an estimated US\$12 billion is laundered annually.<sup>68</sup>



**Figure 2: Map showing the Tri-Border Area in circle.**<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America.” ... July 2003, 1.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 1 - 3.

<sup>69</sup> Source: Jeffrey Fields, “Islamist Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Region” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Issue Brief, October 2002. [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/e3\\_16a.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_16a.html) Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

The TBA is also a haven for a host of transnational organised crime groups, and the list of these criminal stakeholders reads like a ‘who is who’ in international organised crime. The list includes the Chinese mafia,<sup>70</sup> Russian mafia, and criminal enterprises from Japan, Korea, Nigeria, Italy, Taiwan, and elsewhere, all engaged in illicit activities including copyright and intellectual property crimes, drug smuggling, money laundering, and other vices.<sup>71</sup>

Money laundering and the nexus with terrorist financing in the TBA was brought into the limelight with the 2002 arrests, for financial related offences, of reported major Hizbollah operative and financial organiser, Assad Ahmad Barakat, and also reported al Qaeda point man Ali Nizar Darhough, by Paraguayan officials.<sup>72</sup> The terrorist funding is believed to be significant and estimates suggest that groups engaged in terrorist financing in the TBA, send between US\$300 million and US\$500 million per year to radical Islamic groups in the Middle East. These funds are the profits from drug trafficking, arms dealing and product piracy.<sup>73</sup> Investigations ultimately led to the seizure, by the US authorities, of assets of identified Hizbollah financiers in the region.<sup>74</sup>

The TBA raises significant regional security concerns, as it seemingly represents the nexus, or at the very minimum – a geographical space which facilitates interaction,

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<sup>70</sup> Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America” ... July 2003, 3. At least two Chinese mafia groups in the TBA – the Sung-I and the Ming families – engage in illegal operations with the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>72</sup> Renee Novakoff, “Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned” ... July 01, 2008.

<sup>73</sup> General James T Hill, US SOUTHCOM, “U.S. General: Rebels Get Cash from Latin America Gangs,” Orlando Sentinel, March 10, 2003, quoted in Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area of South America.” ... July 2003, 4.

<sup>74</sup> Renee Novakoff, “Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned” ... July 01, 2008.

between politically motivated left-wing terrorist organisations, Islamic extremist groups, and transnational criminal organisations involved in the trafficking of narcotics and weapons, intellectual property crime,<sup>75</sup> money laundering, and alleged terrorist financing. It is seemingly also the ‘breeding ground’ for development and spread of extremism throughout the region. In the way of a push back, researchers Thomaz Costa and Gaston Schulmeister makes the point that “...it is widely accepted that the Tri-Border Area ... is a nexus in global terrorist support, and perhaps even operations. However, it is rather more difficult actually to provide evidence of this connection...”<sup>76</sup> While conceding that there is evidence that the TBA is a smuggling haven, they contend that there is a significant lack of evidence to support the terrorist links. It seems that the crux of the concerns put forward by these researchers surround the issue of “... lack of transparency or situational data that can be used as a proxy to reveal the links and operations of terrorist in the TBA.”<sup>77</sup> Renee Novakoff, possibly seeking to navigate this ‘evidential’ or ‘transparency’ dilemma, states, “... there are many myths about terrorist activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Most literature ... paints a dire threat ... Just as much literature downplays the threat ... As is usually the case, the truth is somewhere in the middle.”<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Ronald K Noble, “The links between intellectual property crime and terrorist financing” July 16, 2003. Public testimony of Ronald K Noble, Secretary General of Interpol, before the United States House Committee on International Relations One hundred eighth Congress. <http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/BASCAP/Pages/links.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 03, 2009.

<sup>76</sup> Thomaz Costa & Gaston Schulmeister, “The Puzzle of the Iguazu Tri-Border Area: Many Questions and Few Answers Regarding Organised Crime and Terrorism Links,” *Global Crime Journal*, volume 8 no 1 (February 2007), 26 – 39. [http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/477563\\_731515095\\_771043619.pdf](http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/477563_731515095_771043619.pdf) Internet Site accessed January 25, 2009.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>78</sup>Renee Novakoff, “Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned” ... July 01, 2008.

This also seems to be the position taken by researchers from the Centre of Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, who contend that there are pockets of ideological supporters here, in the region, which may be facilitators, or providers of financial, logistic and moral support to terrorist groups. They add,

...there are high levels of illicit trade in drugs, weapons, and other materials, which may provide resources to terrorist... One such area... is the Tri-Border Area ... a source of revenue for criminals and there is concern that it may also be a source of support for terrorist groups.<sup>79</sup>

Stephen J. Randall, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Calgary, also chimes in on the side of 'justified concern' with regards to the terrorist nexus in the TBA when he states:

This region has had a long history as a major source of smuggling and contraband, but the events of 9/11 have made U.S. and regional officials more acutely aware of the fact that the tri-border region has a large Arab immigrant population with strong Islamic fundamentalist leanings and suspected links to Islamic terrorists. There is basis for this concern. A map of the area was recovered from an Al-Qaeda safe house in Kabul after the U.S.-led invasion, and in 2002 the Paraguayan press reported that Al-Qaeda had established terrorist training camps in the area, although no intelligence reports have confirmed this contention.<sup>80</sup>

Whatever is the real extent of this threat activity in the TBA and its spread throughout the region, there is a growing perception, and in fact some evidence of a trend towards Islamic extremism. The truth is, for reported 'terrorist cells,' if they exist in the TBA and wider region, to be effective they must operate 'under the radar' as they plan

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<sup>79</sup>“Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Americas,” *Centre of Global Counterterrorism Cooperation*. <http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/discussion/americas.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 04, 2009.

<sup>80</sup>Stephen Randal, “United States-Latin American Relations in the Post-Cold War, Post-9-11 Years,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Summer 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 4. <http://www.jmss.org/2004/summer/articles/randall.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 29, 2009.

their terror activities. If these cells are effective, then the lack of so-called hard evidence surrounding their activities may not be such a surprise after all.

The assertions of the Commander of US Southern Command, Admiral James Stavridis, made to the House Armed Services Committee with regard to these linkages, aptly illustrate the concerns, as he states: “We see a great deal of Hezbollah [Hizbollah] activity throughout South America, in particular, [the] tri-border of Brazil is a particular concern, as in Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, as well as [other] parts of Brazil and in the Caribbean Basin.”<sup>81</sup> Given all that has been considered, the concerns are seemingly appropriate and justified.

The Caribbean too should be concerned as it will continue to be impacted through its inextricable links to its Latin American neighbours. The region will continue to be a conduit and facilitator for illicit enterprises targeting Canada and the United States, as well as Europe and the UK. The exploitation of the diaspora linkages will continue, and inter-gang conflicts initiated within regional states, or the effects of the developing trends in Islamic radicalisation, may well be played out on the Streets of Toronto, London or New York.

## **Impact on Canada**

Canada, like the US has been and will continue to be impacted by the security issues of the region for a number of reasons, including the significant diaspora linkages,

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<sup>81</sup> United States Department of Defence, Press Release, Donna Miles, “Iranian Influence, Terrorist Links, Threaten Latin America Security,” March 17, 2009. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53521> Internet Site accessed April 3, 2009.

See also “US Military Commander Warns of Iran-Hezbollah Influence in Latin America” *Voice of America News*, March 17, 2009. <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-03/2009-03-17-voa44.cfm?CFID=160054956&CFTOKEN=38630373&jsessionid=6630441fba85fd6de82f302f31255b10e517> Internet Site accessed April 3, 2009.

the existing trade links, and its proximity to the region. These are factors which influence the relational dynamics, and form the basis of the analysis of the impact of the regional security threats on Canada.

Any analysis of transnational criminality in Canada will highlight linkages to the various ethnic groups making up the Canadian multicultural mosaic. The Caribbean community in Canada is no exception and links to the criminal underworld are well known and document. These linkages are particularly evident among Jamaican youth gangs; some of which are affiliates of more organised transnational criminal groups like the Jamaican Posses. These gangs operate across Canada and according to statistics presented on gang activities covering 2006, there were over twelve major Jamaican gangs (both Street gangs and more organised networked groups) operating in various regions of the country. These areas included the Prairies, Greater Toronto Area, Greater Vancouver Area, and Montreal.<sup>82</sup> In fact, while research done by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), reinforces the existence of the urban gang phenomenon in Canada, it also highlighted the existence and influence of US gang ‘models’ like the ‘Bloods’ and ‘Crips,’ and also Jamaican posse groups in the Canadian gang dynamics.<sup>83</sup>

There is clear evidence that these Jamaican gangs, both at the ‘Street’ level, and at the transnational organised crime level, have impacted on security within a number of Canada’s major cities. These groups have figured significantly in the increase in violent crimes in Toronto and Montreal, particularly those incidents involving the use of

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<sup>82</sup>“A Snapshot of Prison Gangs and Youth Gangs in Canada: Well-known Gangs, Membership, Offences, Risk, and Reconviction,” Insideprison.com, May 2006. <http://www.insideprison.com/prison-gangs-canada.asp> Internet Site accessed April 3, 2009.

<sup>83</sup>Department of Public Safety, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “2006 Canada/US Organized Crime Threat Assessment.” <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/oc-co/octa-mlco-eng.htm> Internet Site accessed January 26, 2009.

firearms. In relation to this growth of gang violence in Canada, statistics show that by the end of 2005, "...there had been 78 murders in Toronto, 52 by shooting... a 400 percent increase from the previous year."<sup>84</sup> In commenting on this sharp increase, Jamaican researcher, Glendene Lemard reinforces the Jamaican influence, when he asserts that: "Between 1996 and 2002, 10 per cent of all violent crimes committed in Toronto were linked to young men and women of Jamaican origin. This is high, considering that Jamaicans make up only 3.5% of the city's population."<sup>85</sup> Lemard cited the links to the drug trade and the propensity to use guns, as being contributory to the significant role played by Jamaican gangs.<sup>86</sup>

The impact of these incidents of gang violence stimulated fear and led to crackdowns by the police; like that against the 'Malvern Crew' and the 'Galloway Boys,' which included Jamaican members. Both gangs had been 'terrorising' parts of the Scarborough area since 2002.<sup>87</sup> Other high profile violent incidents like the "Boxing Day shootings' in 2005, which resulted in the killing of innocent bystander, 15 year-old Jane Creba, as rival Street gangs exchanged gunfire, has served to bring the significance of the problem sharply into focus.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>"Guns and Gangs: Toronto Fights Back," *CBC News in Review*, January 2006.  
<http://www.cbc.ca/newsinreview/jan06/PDFs/guns.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 3, 2009.

<sup>85</sup>Glendene Lemard, "Guns and poses: Coming down hard won't stop violence," *The Globe and Mail*, November 10, 2005.  
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20051110/COGANGS10/TPComment/TopStories> Internet Site accessed April 11, 2009.

<sup>86</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup>Eddie Grant, "J'cans among gang members arrested by Toronto Police" *Jamaica Gleaner*, May 08, 2005. <http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20050508/lead/lead4.html> Internet Site accessed April 3, 2009.

<sup>88</sup>"Guns and Gangs: Toronto Fights Back," *CBC News in Review*, January 2006.  
<http://www.cbc.ca/newsinreview/jan06/PDFs/guns.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 3, 2009.

In spite of law enforcement efforts, the activities of these gangs continue to negatively impact on Toronto and other Canadian cities. The recent arrest of the alleged 'kingpin' and leader of the 'MNE' [Markham 'n Eglinton] and '400 Crew,' both Toronto based Jamaican gangs, highlights these ongoing activities.<sup>89</sup>

Violent incidents like those involving the murders of Winston Watson in March 2008 and Glenford Reid in June 2008 reinforces the apparently unending Jamaican gang violence and criminal activities. Both men are believed to have been killed in reprisal for an 'incident' which occurred in Jamaica,<sup>90</sup> a clear example of the exploitation of the diaspora links. 'Transnational reprisals' have long been a tactic of the Jamaican Posse and there are many instances of reprisals for gang killings in Jamaica being carried out in the UK or the US and visa versa. This mode of operation was pointed out in the report on the Jamaican gang phenomenon, presented to the Organisation of American State – Committee on Hemispheric Security:

In the USA, Canada and the UK clones of the Jamaican gangs were created for the same basic purposes, but with emphasis on eliminating enemies, rivals, and protection of turf. In the USA for example there are gangs like the "Shower Posse" with direct links to their counter parts in Jamaica, while in the UK there was the "Yardies". Members of these gangs maintain control of the gangs back home by sending to them guns, ammunition, cash and instructions.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup>Sam Pazzano, "2 gangs, 1 'feared' leader," *Toronto Sun*, Saturday April 11, 2009. <http://www.torontosun.com/news/torontoandgta/2009/04/03/8986286-sun.html> Internet Site accessed April 11, 2009.

<sup>90</sup>"Peel Police: Two 2008 Murders Have Links to Mysterious Incident in Jamaica," *City News*, Friday February 20, 2009. [http://www.citynews.ca/news\\_32273.aspx](http://www.citynews.ca/news_32273.aspx) Internet Site accessed April 11, 2009.

<sup>91</sup>Organisation of American States, "Comments by Member States on their Vision and Experience Regarding the Phenomenon of Gangs." January 17, 2008. Presented by the Delegations of the Bahamas, Canada, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and the United States. [http://sem.oas.org/doc\\_public/ENGLISH/HIST\\_08/CP19593E07.doc](http://sem.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_08/CP19593E07.doc) Internet Site accessed April 11, 2009.



If in fact the Reid and Watson murders are reprisals for an incident in Jamaica, then more killings are likely as the cross-border tit-for-tat escalates. Cross-border reprisals may well have happened before in Canada, and given the traditional and ongoing rivalry between Jamaican gangs at home and abroad, it will no doubt happen again, particularly in the high stakes conflicts surrounding narcotics trafficking.

The trafficking and distribution of narcotics will, as long as the demand exists, continue to support transnational organised crime in Canada. The drug business has led to corporate arrangements between various drug trafficking organisations (DTO) in North America, and as stated by the US National Drug Intelligence Center:

... Jamaican gangs, commonly referred to as posses, are the source of Jamaican criminal activity in the United States. These criminal gangs typically distribute large quantities of marijuana and cocaine in regional drug markets [including Canada]; they obtain drugs from Mexican and Colombian DTOs.<sup>92</sup>

This ‘corporateness’ is further illuminated when the network of one DTO, the Shower Posse, possibly Jamaica’s most organised criminal gang, is looked at: “In addition to Toronto, Shower Posse has been reported across the US, including Boston, New York, Pennsylvania, Miami, Houston, Minnesota, Portland Oregon, and Milwaukee.”<sup>93</sup> The drug trade is evidently the mainstay of these gangs, and according to the 2008 Report on Organised Crime, cocaine continues to be one of the most significant illicit drug markets in Canada. The drug is imported from South America through source

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<sup>92</sup>United States Department of Justice, “National-Level Gang-Drug Trafficking Organization Connections,” *Attorney General Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban Area*, (National Drug Intelligence Center), April 2008. <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs27/27612/national.htm> Internet Site accessed April 3, 2009.

<sup>93</sup>“A Snapshot of Prison Gangs and Youth Gangs in Canada: Well-known Gangs, Membership, Offences, Risk, and Reconviction,” *Insideprison.com*, May 2006. <http://www.insideprison.com/prison-gangs-canada.asp> Internet Site accessed April 3, 2009.

countries such as the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, and Mexico.<sup>94</sup> The marijuana trade also involves trafficking from the region, with Mexico and Jamaica being key source countries.<sup>95</sup> These drug trafficking vectors illustrates how Canada's proximity to the source countries and diaspora linkages are exploited by these DTOs.

From the impact analysis thus far, one could be forgiven to think that Jamaican gangs and narcotics trafficking are the main regional security threats to Canada. The truth is that while Jamaican organised criminal gangs have impacted significantly, other regional groups, along with ethnic (Chinese) gangs which have established themselves in the region are also impacting on the Canadian national security environment. The reported activities of the Central American gangs, Mara Loca and Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS 13) in the Greater Toronto Area and Vancouver, are examples of these other regional 'exports' to Canada.<sup>96</sup> In fact, according to author Michael Chettleburg: "... More than one large police agency in Canada now reports that membership of the notorious U.S. – based gangs like MS-13, the Latin Kings and 18<sup>th</sup> Street have recently moved into its jurisdiction."<sup>97</sup> The potential impact is significant, and according to the RCMP:

... Mara Salvatrucha, or MS 13, and the 18<sup>th</sup> Street Gang, or M-18, are transforming themselves into global, or at least hemispheric entities ...

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<sup>94</sup>Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, "2008 Report on Organized Crime," May 21, 2009. [http://www.cisc.gc.ca/annual\\_reports/annual\\_report\\_2008/document/report\\_oc\\_2008\\_e.pdf](http://www.cisc.gc.ca/annual_reports/annual_report_2008/document/report_oc_2008_e.pdf) Internet Site accessed April 11, 2009.

<sup>95</sup>Department of Public Safety, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "2006 Canada/US Organized Crime Threat Assessment." <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/oc-co/octa-mlco-eng.htm> Internet Site accessed January 26, 2009.

<sup>96</sup>"A Snapshot of Prison Gangs and Youth Gangs in Canada: ..." *Insideprison.com*, May 2006.

<sup>97</sup>Department of Public Safety, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Michael Chettleburgh, "Gazette – Street gangs in Canada: the shape of things to come," *RCMP Gazette*, Vol. 70 no. 2. May 30, 2008. <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/gazette/vol70n2/gang-bande-canada-eng.htm> Internet Site accessed April 11, 2009.

acquiring a major of the local [Central America] share of the cocaine and crack cocaine trade in the process.<sup>98</sup>

One ethnic group which is seemingly establishing a regional network is the Chinese Triad gangs. These gangs include the ‘Big Circle Boys’ which operates on the west coast of Canada<sup>99</sup> and also in the ‘den of iniquity,’ the TBA of South America.<sup>100</sup> Is there a nexus between their regional operations? Logic would dictate that there has to be; possibly a yet to be documented narcotics trafficking, or money laundering vector. These possible linkages are worthy of further analysis.

Another issue worthy of further analysis is the possible linkages of these gangs with the Jamaican organised crime groups in the distribution of narcotics and other contraband in Canada. There is precedence of corporate arrangements between the Jamaican posses and other transnational organised crime groups like the Colombian and Mexican Cartels. Are there similar arrangements between the Jamaican posse and the Triads and the Latino gangs? The fact that there have not been reports of major conflicts in Canadian cities between them may be an indicator that there are ‘corporate arrangements’ in play.

So while there are still some unanswered questions about the gangs’ corporate interplay, there should be no doubt about the significance of the negative impact of the organised crime and narcotics paradigm on Canada’s national security. There should also be no doubt about how the diaspora, traditional trade linkages, and proximity are

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<sup>98</sup>Department of Public Safety, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “2006 Canada/US Organized Crime Threat Assessment...”

<sup>99</sup>“A Snapshot of Prison Gangs and Youth Gangs in Canada: ...” *Insideprison.com*, May 2006.

<sup>100</sup>Department of Public Safety, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Report No. 2000/07: Transnational Criminal Activity: A Global Context.” <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/200007-eng.asp> Internet Site accessed April 4, 2009.

exploited by these transnational organised gangs. There is however another brewing regional threat; the threat of radical Islam and its common tool, terrorism. The previously discussed case of Trinidadian converts, Wali Mohamed and Barry Adams who were convicted of the 1994 bombing conspiracy in Canada represents one clear example of the manifestation of this pernicious threat.<sup>101</sup> Are similar terrorist actions involving regional converts being planned? With the trends observed and highlighted in the study so far, such an eventuality cannot be ruled out.

While there is some evidence of the spread of Islam within the region through coordinated efforts by organisations like the ‘Islamic Missionaries Guild’ and the ‘Association of Islamic Communities of the Caribbean & South America,’<sup>102</sup> the extent of the growth and spread of its radical and extreme interpretation is yet to be fully assessed. Though the linkages of ‘citizens’ from the region to radical Islamic terrorist activities is cause for some concern, it is the presence of influential individuals with radical views and terrorist antecedence, which potentially has more impact on the development of this dangerous brand of Islam within the region. The region provides a vast pool of potential recruits for radicalisation; the same pool which has traditionally provided the practitioners of transnational organised crime. These angry, alienated, and marginalised youths are a growing resource in the region and many are fertile minds, yearning for a cause to believe in, the radical Islamic Clerics who have established themselves here may well be providing that cause. This creates significant concerns,

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<sup>101</sup>Renee Novakoff, “Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned” ... July 01, 2008.

<sup>102</sup>Mtiaz Ali, “Muslim in the Caribbean, Towards Increased Co-operation and Integration,” February 2005. <http://www.centralzakah.org/muslimforum/2005/2005/cmfl.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 12, 2009.

especially when the roles played in actual terrorist incidents by previous converts with regional links are considered. Angela Gendron in her reference to converts such as London suicide-bomber, Germaine Lindsay, states: "...they are usually eager to accept dangerous assignments as a way of proving their new-found commitment. They are among the most aggressive of Islamist activists."<sup>103</sup>

Warranted or not, the concerns about terrorism in the region exists and in fact, logic would suggest that the perceptions are credible, particularly when viewed against the backdrop of a hardened and more secured US border. The potential for the displacement of these threats to more vulnerable targets, many with a US nexus, within the region is real. This potential displacement, and again the diaspora linkages also make Canada potentially vulnerable to this seemingly emerging threat. What is more critical though, is as the nexus between transnational organised crime, particularly drug trafficking, and the threat of terrorism becomes further cemented, the drug trafficking 'cottage industries' and trafficking methods previously discussed could be exploited by terrorists. Imagine the impact on Canada and the region if a 20 pound explosive device (instead of 20 pounds of marijuana) is placed on regional or Canadian airline! It could happen today even without the full knowledge of the corrupt airport employee who is paid or coerced to hide the package onboard, possibly believing it to contain narcotics as usual. This scenario has stimulated significant concerns, and as Amir Lechner states: "...insiders might help narco-terrorist organizations – knowingly or unknowingly – to

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<sup>103</sup>Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, Paper by Angela Gendron "Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment," ... *ITAC Presents*, Volume 2006 – 4.

deliver more than just narcotics on board an aircraft.”<sup>104</sup> There is precedence as Lechner adds:

In November 1989, a bomb exploded on board a Colombian Avianca Airlines’ Boeing 727 just minutes after takeoff, killing all 107 passengers and crewmembers onboard. An anonymous caller claimed that a group called the ‘Extraditables,’ composed of drug traffickers liable for extradition to the US and led by then-drug Lord Pablo Escobar, was behind the bombing.<sup>105</sup>

The potential vulnerability of Canada and the region to security breaches of this nature was recently demonstrated in the ‘hijacking’ incident in Montego Bay, Jamaica. While that situation was an isolated incident which apparently had no links to terrorism or transnational criminality, it still evoked fear and concerns worldwide, and particularly in Canada.<sup>106</sup> These potential terrorist activities should be considered as credible possibilities in Canada’s assessments as it determines how to engage in the region’s security dynamics, particularly against the background of seemingly emerging threat of radical Islam within the region. Canada’s assessment should also be influenced by the long established, and much highlighted threat of transnational organised crime within the Caribbean and the wider region.

The study assessed the actual and potential future negative impacts of these threats on Canada’s national security, evaluating how they are, or can be facilitated through diaspora and trade linkages, as well as through Canada’s proximity to the region.

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<sup>104</sup> Amir Lechner, “Flying High,” *Intersec Magazine*, June 2006.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> “Unarmed guards couldn’t stop Montego Bay hijack suspect: Report,” *CBS News*, April 20, 2009. <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/04/20/plane-jamaica-hijack.html> Internet Site accessed April 25, 2009.

Having done this analysis the question arises, what is Canada's role in addressing these threats or mitigating against their effects? It is the answer to this question that the study now pursues.

### **Part 3: Canada's Role and Policy**

Development has to be the first line of defence for a collective system that takes prevention seriously. Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives but also strengthen States' capacity to combat terrorism, organised crime and proliferation. Development makes everyone more secure.<sup>107</sup>

The above quote taken from the 2004 United Nations' Secretary General's 'High Level Report on Threats' is profound, and seemingly sets the 'rules for engagement' and the underpinning motives for the provision of developmental assistance and aid. The statement highlights the links between development and security, and also the fact that these issues are at least discussed at the highest level of the United Nations. Canada, as articulated in its International Policy Statement (IPS), has evidently bought into the concept that an inextricable link exists between security and development. The following assertions made in its IPS on 'Development' illustrate this view:

Canadians cannot be safe in an unstable world, or healthy in a sick world; nor can we expect to remain prosperous in a poor world. Failure to achieve significant political, economic, social and environmental progress in the developing world will have an impact on Canada in term of both our long-term security and our prosperity.<sup>108</sup>

These assertions are in line with views central to the theme of the analysis being undertaken in this study. The key argument however, contends, for the reasons previously

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<sup>107</sup>Canadian International Development Agency, *Canada's International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Development*, Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2005, 1. Quote from the UN Secretary General's Report on the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change – December 2004.

<sup>108</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.

discussed, that it is the failure to address these issues within the developing countries of the region, which poses the most significant danger to Canada's security and prosperity. With this in mind, Canada's regional developmental engagement will now be considered.

### **Aid, Trade and Foreign Policy**

Canada's development policy and programmes aim, among other things, to advance Canadian values of global citizenship; and to advance its interests regarding security, prosperity and governance.<sup>109</sup> The programme aims are aligned to the accomplishment of the UN/Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which includes the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, investing in health and education, promoting gender equality, and achieving environmental sustainability.<sup>110</sup>

As the following historical overview shows, Canada, in keeping with the stated mandate, has long been involved in capacity building through the provision of developmental aid to countries around the world. Statistics from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 2002 report shows the global spread of Canadian aid, when it asserts that: "Canadian aid reaches virtually every one of the approximately 120 developing countries in the world (those with a medium or low Human Development Index)."<sup>111</sup> Canadian developmental aid is focussed on poor countries which are committed to improved governance that facilitates the effective use

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<sup>109</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>110</sup>Canadian International Development Agency Report. "Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness," September 2002. <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/aideffectiveness> Internet Site accessed April 24, 2009.

<sup>111</sup>*Ibid.*



of the aid provided.<sup>112</sup> Inflow of Canadian aid to the region has fluctuated over the years, and as the figures for the 2003/2004 fiscal year show, of the 25 top countries in receipt of Canadian aid in the 2003/2004 fiscal year, Haiti was the only CARICOM state which featured, while Honduras and Peru were the only other representatives from the Americas.<sup>113</sup> The poverty and poor governance conundrum subsequently resulted in the removal of Haiti (albeit temporarily), one of the world's poorest countries from the top 25 list of recipients of Canada developmental aid.<sup>114</sup> It is evident that at the time when this decision was taken, the security implications which could result from Haiti's diaspora and other linkages with Canada were not considered as being significant. The 'new 25,' which was then listed, were selected based on their level of poverty and their ability to use aid effectively. This list included Guyana as the sole CARICOM member state, and Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua as the other states of the Americas. It could be argued that the absence of other CARICOM and regional states from the list is a good sign, as abject poverty does not define the realities of the majority of countries of the region. This is of course assuming they were not like Haiti, desperate for aid, but excluded because of poor governance.

It is clearly not the potential impact of a degraded CARICOM security environment on Canada's national security, which drives the provision of Canadian developmental aid. The focus, it seems, is more aligned to the Canadian value of global citizenship, rather than national interest regarding the security of the Canadian state.

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<sup>112</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup>Danielle Goldfarb and Stephen Tapp "How Canada Can Improve Its Development Aid, Lessons from Other Aid Agencies," *C. D. Howe Institute Commentary*, no. 232, April 2006, 7. [http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary\\_232.pdf](http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_232.pdf) Internet Site accessed April 28, 2009.

<sup>114</sup>*Ibid.*, 11.

While these motivating concepts should be complimentary, they are apparently not in this case, as the former has diverted Canada's developmental aid focus globally, while the latter, of necessity, demands regional priority.

In what is a criticism of the dispersion of the Canadian aid programme, Goldfarb and Tapp asserts, "... it is unfortunate, then, that CIDA has allocated aid so widely over the past few decades, with little focus on particular regions or themes."<sup>115</sup> They point out that in the 2003/04 fiscal year, "...Canada gave aid to 161 countries [an increase over the 120 in 2002], with 60 percent of its bilateral aid flowing to Africa, just over 20 percent to the Americas, and 13 percent to Asia."<sup>116</sup> This, they add, is in spite of a diversion (and concentration) of aid to Afghanistan since 2002. They also contend that CIDA's plan to concentrate two thirds of its aid in 25 countries by 2010 is hardly a major change, as it already gives approximately two-thirds of its bilateral aid to its top 25 recipients.<sup>117</sup>

In terms of the size of the aid package, Canada ranks twelfth out of 21 OECD donor countries; a ranking based on overall contributions to development.<sup>118</sup> Canada contributed an amount equivalent to 0.27% of its Gross National Income (GNI), a share far less than countries like the United Kingdom (0.36%), Netherlands (0.73%), Norway (0.87%), and Sweden (0.78%). Assertions were made by the then new Conservative government (2006) to increase this aid figure to the OECD average of 0.45% of GNI by 2010.<sup>119</sup> However, according to Brian Tomlinson of the Canadian Council for

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<sup>115</sup>*Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>116</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>117</sup>*Ibid.*, 9 – 11.

<sup>118</sup>*Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>119</sup>*Ibid.*, 8.

International Cooperation, Canadian development aid performance stagnated at 0.28% of GNI in 2007 and 0.30% in 2008, with no plans for increases beyond 2010. He adds, “After three consecutive budgets, it seems clear that the current Conservative Government in not living up to its election promises on aid made in January 2006.”<sup>120</sup>

It is apparent from the assessment conducted so far of Canada’s developmental aid programme that it serves little utility in addressing the pressing security issues of the region. This is so partly because of the limited pool of funds available for aid provision, and also because the programme is focused on MDGs in general, and poverty alleviation in particular. While not taking away from the positive externalities to be expected from alleviating poverty, the fact is, from the evidence seen, the lion’s share of Canada’s developmental aid, because of the global perspective taken, goes elsewhere and thus does not significantly impact the region. As Table 1 show, data on CIDA’s planned spending on ‘program activities’ for 2007/2008 assigned the Americas only approximately 30% of the value of aid funding allotted to Africa, and just about 58% of that allotted to Asia.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>120</sup>Canadian Council for International Cooperation – Report, Brian Tomlinson, “2009 Federal Budget, CCIC Pre-Budget Backgrounder,” December 2008, 1 -2. [http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002\\_aid\\_2008-12\\_2009\\_pre\\_budget\\_backgrounder.pdf](http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_2008-12_2009_pre_budget_backgrounder.pdf) Internet Site accessed April 30, 2009.

<sup>121</sup>Treasury Board Secretariat, “Report on Plans and Priorities 2007 – 2008, Canadian International Development Agency.” <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2007-2008/cida-acdi/cida-acdi03-eng.asp> Internet Site accessed May 4, 2009.

Resource Requirement by Organization and Program Activity						
(Thousands of dollars)	2007-08					
Program Activities	Countries of Concentration	Fragile States and Countries in Crisis	Selected Countries and Regions	Institutions	Canadians	Total Planned Spending
Organizational Branches						
Africa	506,713	72,215	220,743			799,671
Asia	181,857	140,449	88,809			411,115
Americas	46,627	93,557	97,854			238,038
Source: Report on Plans and Priorities 2007 – 2008 ( <a href="http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2007-2008/cida-acdi/cida-acdi03-eng.asp">http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2007-2008/cida-acdi/cida-acdi03-eng.asp</a> )						

**Table 1: Resource Requirement by Organization and Program Activity**

It is evident that the CARICOM and the wider region, the Americas, is not the priority for Canadian developmental aid. This it seems is due mainly to the criteria governing the provision of such aid, which is based on the focus on poverty and related issues previously discussed. There is also no evidence that there is, or has been a regional priority for the provision of such aid. Aid is provided to the neediest countries (based on the criteria), be they in Africa, Asia, the Americas, or any other world region. But is there a change afoot? According to Consultant, Sir Ronald Sanders, there is, as in the midst of the financial crisis, Canada has decided to make the region [Americas] one of the 20 ‘countries’ for the focus of its aid.<sup>122</sup> Saunders assertion was in response to an announcement by the Government of Canada to make CIDA’s international assistance more focussed, by moving forward “...on another element of its Aid Effectiveness Agenda. It will be focusing its efforts in 20 countries by concentrating resources,

<sup>122</sup> Sir Ronald Saunders, “Engaging Canada,” *BBC Caribbean*, March 4, 2009 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/03/090227\\_sanders\\_canada.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/03/090227_sanders_canada.shtml) Internet Site accessed April 29, 2009.

focusing programming and improving coordination.”<sup>123</sup> According to the news release, the 20 countries included the ‘Caribbean’ which was listed as a country, and Haiti, with Honduras, Peru and Colombia completing the Americas group of five. Seven African and six Asian countries, along with Ukraine and the West Bank/Gaza were also listed.<sup>124</sup> This refocusing is a trend in the right direction, it could be argued, but reflecting on comments made by Goldfarb and Tapp in their 2006 assessment, is there really a significant change? This seems not to be the case, the trends in Haiti excepted, but as Saunders notes: “The point is that Canada has begun to act on its commitment made in 2007 by Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, to ‘re-engage’ with the Americas ...this refocusing of aid is being regarded as a part of that commitment.”<sup>125</sup>

The situation in Haiti is worthy of further mention here. Canada is now fully committed to the development of this struggling CARICOM state and according to CIDA’s ‘Departmental Performance Report’ (2007 – 2008):

Haiti is CIDA’s second-largest country program in 2007–2008. CIDA continued to participate in Canada’s overall efforts to deal with fragility and promote security and stability in the country. CIDA’s Haiti program helps reaffirm Canada’s re-engagement in the Americas. Canada has increased funding for Haiti from \$520 million to \$555 million for 2006–2011.<sup>126</sup>

The efforts in Haiti are indeed admirable and are seemingly achieving the developmental goals. These efforts represent one of Canada’s key engagements in the

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<sup>123</sup>Canadian International Development Agency, Press Release, “Canada Moves on Another Element of its Aid Effectiveness Agenda,” February 23, 2009. <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NAT-223132931-PPH> Internet Site accessed April 29, 2009.

<sup>124</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup>Sir Ronald Saunders, “Engaging Canada,” *BBC Caribbean*, March 4, 2009...

<sup>126</sup>Canadian International Development Agency, “Canadian International Development Agency, Departmental Performance Report,” (Period ending March 31, 2008), 17. <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2007-2008/inst/ida/ida-eng.pdf> Internet Site accessed May 4, 2009.

Americas, as the following statement from the 'Departmental Performance Report' asserts:

Canada pays special attention to Haiti in its Strategy for the Americas. It remains committed to Haiti on a long-term basis. CIDA plans to continue to play a leadership role in coordinating aid around Haiti's priorities. CIDA also plans to strengthen the effectiveness of its activities and to achieve even more sustainable results.<sup>127</sup>

From the analysis of the Canadian developmental aid programme and its regional impact, it is evident that while other world regions (Africa and Asia) benefit more significantly, the programme has impacted on the region. This impact is felt mainly in countries like Haiti which fits the criteria for the provision of such aid. However, from the perspective of this study, the real litmus test of effectiveness of Canada's developmental aid programme would be the extent to which it directly impacts the regional security situation. As the criteria for the disbursement of developmental aid remains the same, its utility, as previously established in addressing these pressing security issues also remains unchanged. Canadian developmental aid does not address, in an effective and direct way, the regional security threats previously highlighted.

There is one Canadian assistance project where there is some evidence of a more direct regional impact. This initiative, the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP), has done a lot to build professional competence and capacity within both military and police organisations of CARICOM. The programme has facilitated professional development and training in Canada, including at the Canadian Forces

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<sup>127</sup>*Ibid.*, 42.

College (CFC), for service personnel from the region,<sup>128</sup> and has assisted with projects in the region, including the establishment of the Caribbean Junior Command and Staff College in Jamaica. MTAP has also assisted with the establishment of the Jamaica Military Aviation School (JMAS),<sup>129</sup> which is envisioned to be the central training centre for military aviators and aviation technicians of the region. Another MTAP capacity building initiative is the ‘Tropical Hammer’ series of exercises in Jamaica which began in 2006. These exercises facilitate construction of, and repairs to MTAP project facilities and Jamaica Defence Force infrastructure, and also meet critical Canadian Forces pre-deployment training requirements for engineers going to Afghanistan.<sup>130</sup>

MTAP currently includes 68 member countries, 20 of which are in the Americas and of this number, six are CARICOM states. The CARICOM region received 9% of the programme’s funding for the fiscal year 2007/2008. Latin America also received a similar slice. The other regional recipients are Europe – 49%, Africa – 20%, Asia – Pacific – 11%, and Middle East – 2%.<sup>131</sup> MTAP has been an effective foreign policy tool for Canada and has, it seems, been very effective in the accomplishment of its stated objectives, which include the following:<sup>132</sup>

- Promotion of Canadian foreign and defence policy interests.
- Direct assistance to achieve influence in areas of strategic interest to Canada.

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<sup>128</sup>Being a current beneficiary and CFC student, the Author can attest to the utility of the programme.

<sup>129</sup>Department of National Defence, *Directorate of Military Training Assistance Programme, 2007 – 2008 Annual Report*, 6. [http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/downloads/MTAP\\_AR07-08\\_final\\_e.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/newsite/downloads/MTAP_AR07-08_final_e.pdf) Internet Site accessed April 27, 2009.

<sup>130</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>131</sup>*Ibid.*, 17 - 18.

<sup>132</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.

- Promote Canadian bilateral defence relations.
- Raise Canada's independent national profile as a valuable player in the international arena.
- Build capacity among Canada's peace-support-operations partners.
- Contribute to the international campaign against terrorism through select assistance.
- Promote democratic principles, the rule of law, international stability, and the protection of human rights.

From a CARICOM perspective (and particularly Jamaica's), MTAP has assisted significantly in building regional capacity and professional competence. The programme, however, only provides a part of the solution to the security issues at hand; not as a result of inefficiencies or ineffectiveness, but because of mandate, manifested in its global spread, and like the previously discussed developmental aid programme, no centralised focus or regional (CARICOM) priority.

Another significant capacity building initiative with which Canada is involved is the 'Aid for Trade' programme. This programme, a World Trade Organisation (WTO)/OECD initiative seeks to build trading capacity through the provision of aid. In principle this initiative represents a trend towards sustainable development within vulnerable states, including those in the region. The key messages of the initiative surround the facilitation of trade through capacity building to overcome barriers which



preclude poor countries from competing in the global marketplace.<sup>133</sup> Admirable as this initiative is, its efforts may have been overtaken by the global economic crisis, as trade becomes an early causality of the fallout. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its ‘Regional Economic Outlook,’ summarises the economic realities of the region (Latin America and the Caribbean – LAC)<sup>134</sup> going forward. It asserts that the stronger fiscal positions and more credible monetary policy frameworks have made the region more robust to external shocks.<sup>135</sup> The report, however, concedes that in spite of this, the worsening global financial realities are increasingly clouding the regional outlook.<sup>136</sup> The effects on trade, and ultimately the aspirations of the ‘Aid for Trade’ initiative also come in for negative reviews, as the report outlines:

The United States, Europe, and Japan – which together account for about 70 percent of the [LAC] region’s exports – are set to slow sharply over the next couple of years. This will affect all economies in the region, but especially those that have close economic linkages with advanced economy partners, such as Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Further, many countries, including especially in the Caribbean, are being affected by a reduced demand for tourism services from both the United States and Europe. Additional downdrafts are set to arise from already weakening remittances from the United States, and especially so for Mexico and some in Central America and the Caribbean. This reflects the slowdown in the United States, especially in the construction sector, which employs many migrants from Mexico.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>133</sup>United Kingdom Department for International Development, “Aid for Trade, Sharing the benefits of trade, Strategy 2008 – 13.” [http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/aid\\_for\\_trade\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/aid_for_trade_strategy.pdf) Internet Site accessed April 28, 2009.

<sup>134</sup>Latin America and the Caribbean include all South and Central America states, the Caribbean Islands, and Mexico.

<sup>135</sup>International Monetary Fund, “Regional Economic Outlook: Western Hemisphere, Grappling With the Global Financial Crisis,” October 2008, *World Economic and Financial Surveys*. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2008/whd/ENG/wreo1008.htm> Internet Site accessed April 29, 2009, 9.

<sup>136</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>137</sup>*Ibid.*, 20.

The impact is reinforced as the Caribbean has been caught up in what the Assistant Secretary General of the CARICOM Secretariat, Dr Edward Green, calls a ‘global hurricane’ in reference to the current economic crisis. Green lists the region-wide shortfalls in tourist arrivals and the attendant downturn in supporting industries, the losses in oil revenue in Trinidad & Tobago, and the halting of expansion projects in Jamaica’s bauxite industry as foreign investments have dried up, as indicators of the negative regional impact.<sup>138</sup> The impact on regional security is likely to be significant.

Canada’s Prime Minister, The Right Hon. Stephen Harper, in his address to the Parliament of Jamaica on April 20, 2009, acknowledged the impact of the crisis on Jamaica’s and other CARICOM economies, and reiterated Canada’s commitment to assist, including by “...a doubling of Canada’s callable capital subscription to the Inter-American Development Bank. This measure will effectively increase the banks lending capacity by four billion dollars.”<sup>139</sup> Prime Minister Harper also spoke at length about Canada’s historical trading links with the English-speaking Caribbean and made the point that the time is now right to move forward with a Canada-CARICOM trade agreement, pointing out that he was aware of the concerns about proceeding with this agreement when “...our economies are struggling with the impact of the global recession.”<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>138</sup>“Caught in a Global Hurricane: Debating the Caribbean’s Development Challenges in an Uncertain World” Speech delivered by Dr Edward Green, Assistant Secretary-General, Human and Social Development, Caribbean Community Secretariat, at The Brookings Institute/Woodrow Wilson Conference Center, Washington DC, March 24, 2009. <http://www.caribbeanpressreleases.com/articles/4865/1/Caught-in-a-Global-Hurricane-Debating-the-Caribbeans-Development-Challenges-in-an-Uncertain-World/Page1.html> Internet Site accessed April 29, 2009.

<sup>139</sup>Office of the Prime Minister, “Notes for an Address by the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, to the Parliament of Jamaica,” April 20, 2009. <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2534> Internet Site accessed April 29, 2009.

<sup>140</sup>*Ibid.*

Canada/CARICOM trade relations, which date back to the colonial period and the trade of cod fish for rum, have not been significant in terms of volume or value, particularly from a Canadian perspective, and relative to other trading partners. According to statistics presented by the CARICOM Secretariat, Canada accounted for 5.1% of CARICOM's total export to all destinations in 1996, declining to 4.8% in 2001. There was also a decline in import from Canada over the same period (3.7% in 1996 to 3.0% in 2001).<sup>141</sup> The relatively diminutive trade relationship has continued, and statistics show that in 2005, only 0.2% of Canada's total import expenditure was spent with CARICOM exporters.<sup>142</sup> The report continues, outlining a positive trend – the 14% growth per annum in CARICOM exports to Canada between 2001 and 2005.<sup>143</sup> It adds that, "...Canadian investments in the region, concentrated in the financial, mining and energy sector, stands at US\$25 billion, making it CARICOM's third most important source of investment after the United States and the United Kingdom."<sup>144</sup>

It is evident from the assessment of Canada/CARICOM trade relations that it is CARICOM which has benefitted more. The 1985 one-way duty-free Caribbean-Canada (CARIBCAN) agreement has ensured a favourable trading position for the region, and in fact, in both goods and services, Canada has had a trade deficit, totalling approximately

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<sup>141</sup> Caribbean Community Secretariat, "CARICOM's Trade 1996 – 2001, Section 1 – CARICOM's Trade with Canada," Fourth Edition, Statistics Sub-Programme, December 2005. <http://www.caricomstats.org/Files/Publications/Quick%20Ref%20Files/Updated%20files/Section%201-%20Canada.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 29, 2009.

<sup>142</sup> "Exploring CARICOM – Canada Trade," Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery – Report Volume 21, May – June 2007. [http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:MjZ8nolLs1gJ:www.crnw.org/documents/private\\_sector/CRNM\\_Trade\\_Brief\\_Volume\\_21.pdf+Caricom%27s+trade+summary+data+2002+-+2007&cd=14&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca](http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:MjZ8nolLs1gJ:www.crnw.org/documents/private_sector/CRNM_Trade_Brief_Volume_21.pdf+Caricom%27s+trade+summary+data+2002+-+2007&cd=14&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca) Internet Site accessed April 30, 2009.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

\$1.0 billion annually over the last five years.<sup>145</sup> The proposed Canada/CARICOM Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has stimulated reluctance in some quarters within the region. Caribbean researcher and scholar, Norman Girvan justifies this reluctance, as he states that the main reason given for the proposed FTA is that CARIBCAN expires in 2011, and Canada wants to replace it with a new agreement, which will provide reciprocal trade.<sup>146</sup> Girvan argues that such an agreement would prompt the US to terminate the non-reciprocal duty-free treatment granted under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and enhanced CBI arrangements, and to replace it with a US/CARICOM FTA.<sup>147</sup> He adds that the European Union would also be entitled to invoke the EPA's (Economic Partnership Agreements) 'Most Favoured Nation Clause' to demand similar treatment.<sup>148</sup> This clause, 'Article 19 of the Cariforum-EC EPA "commits Cariforum to grant Europe the same treatment it grants to any 'major trading economy' in subsequent free trade agreements.'"<sup>149</sup>

Girvan continues, making the point that replacing CARIBCAN is not critical, as only 12% of Canadian imports from the English-speaking Caribbean enter under these arrangements. Most of the regions exports enter Canada under Canadian Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, which is available without CARIBCAN. "In other words only a small portion of Caricom's exports would be affected by the unavailability of

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<sup>145</sup> Peter Richards, "Caribbean: Region Cautious on Free Trade with Canada," *Global Issues*, April 3, 2009 <http://www.globalissues.org/news/2009/04/03/1110> . Internet Site accessed April 29, 2009.

<sup>146</sup> Norman Girvan, "The Caricom-Canada FTA: What's the Hurry?" <http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/the-caricom-canada-fta-whats-the-hurry.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 03, 2009.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>149</sup> Norman Girvan, "The EPA's Contentious 'Most Favoured Nation' Clause," *Norman Girvan – Caribbean Political Economy*. <http://www.normangirvan.info/the-epas-contentious-most-favoured-nation-clause/> Internet Site accessed May 4, 2009.

CARIBCAN.”<sup>150</sup> Jamaica’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs & Foreign Trade, the Hon. Dr Kenneth Baugh also weighed in with his concerns in a recent meeting with Canada’s Minister of International Cooperation, the Hon. Beverly Oda, albeit from a different perspective. Dr Baugh outlined the fact that impact analysis showed that opening up trade with Canada [under the current FTA proposals] could be detrimental unless a development component was included.<sup>151</sup> In a subsequent address to Canadian parliamentarians, Dr Baugh emphasised the development agenda while giving assurances of the commitment of Jamaica and other CARICOM states to the FTA negotiations, stating:

While Canada speaks of negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement, CARICOM Heads speak of a Trade and Development Agreement. We feel strongly that any trade agreement with the region should have a strong development component to help us build capacity. This is not a matter merely of nomenclature, but is rather a policy distinction. Perhaps, the positions will not be far apart when the negotiations get under way.<sup>152</sup>

All things considered the negotiations will likely presents a major international trade relation conundrum for CARICOM, and in spite of the urgings of PM Harper during his recent address to the Parliament of Jamaica, caution may be CARICOM’s watchword.

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<sup>150</sup>Norman Girvan, “The Caricom-Canada FTA: What’s the Hurry?” <http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/the-caricom-canada-fta-whats-the-hurry.pdf> Internet Site accessed April 03, 2009.

<sup>151</sup>“Deputy Prime Minister voices Concerns Over Free Trade Agreement with Canada,” Wednesday March 25, 2009. *Jamaica Labour Party*. <http://www.jamaicalabourparty.com/main/content/deputy-prime-minister-voices-concerns-over-free-trade-agreement-with-canada> Internet Site accessed March 26, 2009.

<sup>152</sup>Jamaica, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Foreign Trade, “CARICOM Committed to Free Trade Negotiations with Canada,” (Jamaica Information Service), April 16, 2009. [http://www.jis.gov.jm/foreign\\_affairs/html/20090416T190000-0500\\_19237\\_JIS\\_CARICOM\\_COMMITTED\\_TO\\_FREE\\_TRADE\\_NEGOTIATIONS\\_WITH\\_CANADA\\_.asp](http://www.jis.gov.jm/foreign_affairs/html/20090416T190000-0500_19237_JIS_CARICOM_COMMITTED_TO_FREE_TRADE_NEGOTIATIONS_WITH_CANADA_.asp) Internet Site accessed April 30, 2009.

With regards to specific relevance to the security issues being discussed here, trade is a double edged sword of sorts. While increased trade improves economic growth and ultimately the security condition in the long-term, it can also have negative short-term consequences as these linkages are exploited by transnational criminals and terrorist groups. It is, however, not so much the volume of trade that is critical here, but the existence of these trade links – routes, vectors and conveyances, which are exploitable by these organisations. This exploitation is the Canada/CARICOM reality, and in fact, a reality of trading relationships the world over. It would be prudent therefore that whatever is ultimately negotiated in terms of a trade agreement, consider the potential organised crime and terrorism nexus. The security agenda and implications should not be overlooked.

The analysis so far has shown a somewhat uncoordinated, ‘ad hoc,’ though arguably improving, approach to Canadian developmental programmes, capacity building efforts, and trade relations with CARICOM and the wider region. Given these findings, it would be prudent to establish what constitutes the aim of Canada’s foreign policy towards the region, and where the region sits in order of priority.

The political scientist Keith Nossal, in reflecting on the following quote by former Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, attempts to analyse the underpinning guidelines of Canadian foreign policy:

Foreign policy, after all, is merely domestic policy with its hat on. The donning of some headgear, and going outside, doesn’t itself alter our nature, our strengths, and our quality very much ... Canada’s foreign policy, in so far as it is Canadian policy at all, is, in fact, largely the

consequences of domestic factors, some of which remain constant and other which are not easily altered.<sup>153</sup>

Nossal continues qualifying the above statement, suggesting that these domestic underpinnings do not mean that foreign policy is just an extension of domestic policy. He argues instead that the essentially anarchical nature of the international system, where independent states pursue their own political objectives, results, in the final analysis, in each state being "...the ultimate arbiter of its own interests..."<sup>154</sup> Understanding how Canada's domestic security realities, drives its national interests and ultimately its foreign policy towards the region, is a critical element of the analysis, which now look at present trends.

Declarations made by the current Canadian government clearly demonstrate a high foreign policy priority for the Americas, none more so than the July 17, 2007 statement by Prime Minister Harper, who stated: "Canada's government has made it clear that re-engagement in the Americas is a critical international priority of our country... Canada is committed to playing a bigger role in the Americas and to doing so for the long term."<sup>155</sup> This position of commitment was reinforced, as the 'Americas Priorities & Progress' report asserts, with the appointment in November 2008 of Minister of State with special responsibility for the Americas.<sup>156</sup> Canada has also articulated its reasons for this re-engagement and why the Americas matter to Canadians. These include the fact

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<sup>153</sup>Kim Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, Third Edition, Prentice Hall, Canada Inc., Scarborough, Ontario, 1997, 21.

<sup>154</sup>*Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>155</sup>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada and the Americas Priorities & Progress," 2009, 3. Quoting Prime Minister Stephen Harper. [http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/pdf/Americas\\_report\\_ENG.pdf](http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/pdf/Americas_report_ENG.pdf) Internet Site accessed April 19, 2009.

<sup>156</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

that geographically Canada is a part of the Americas, and in terms of trade, immigration, culture, and social exchanges, the region (Americas) is of strategic domestic and international interest to Canada.<sup>157</sup> The diaspora connections previously discussed at length also seemingly influences this Canadian re-engagement, and as statistics indicate, 11% of Canadian immigrants come from Latin America and the Caribbean including Mexico, and there are over 70 LAC diaspora organisations across Canada.<sup>158</sup>

Canada's interests in the Americas are aligned with three main objectives, namely, democratic governance, prosperity and security.<sup>159</sup> On the security agenda, it is the 'people-to-people' ties between Canada and the region which stimulates the concerns – through vulnerability to the activities of transnational organised crime, and securitized issues like pandemics and natural disasters. As the 'Americas Priorities & Progress' report states: "What affects the Americas has a direct impact on Canada. Canada is well placed, by our location, our contacts and by our reputation, to make a difference."<sup>160</sup>

The increased people-to-people interface, while influenced by the CARICOM diaspora in Canada, is also more and more resulting from the travel of Canadians to the region. Jamaica for example, is celebrating its fifth straight year of growth in Canadian visitors, with a 23% increase in 2008 (45,543 more visitors than in 2007).<sup>161</sup> The rest of the region also benefited with nearly 2.5 million Canadian visitors experiencing Caribbean hospitality in 2008. This represents an overall 14% increase over the previous

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<sup>157</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>158</sup>*Ibid.*, 4 The three largest diaspora communities are from Jamaica, Haiti and El Salvador.

<sup>159</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>160</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>161</sup>Janet Silvera, "Jamaica celebrate fifth year of Canadian tourist growth," *The Gleaner*, April 19, 2009. <http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20090419/news/news1.html> Internet Site accessed April 19, 2009.



year, and a near doubling of the numbers since 2005.<sup>162</sup> Tourism and security threats are not compatible.

The articulated foreign policy of the Government of Canada towards the Americas is in amity with the arguments presented throughout the paper with regards to motivation for engagement. The effectiveness of engagement, however, is another matter, particularly on the security agenda. Additionally, as the analysis has shown, in terms of trade relationship and developmental efforts, the region is not so highly placed in order of priority. It is also apparent that the current efforts to reengage with the region are more inspired by Canada's values and its ideals of good global citizenship. It seems the security implications which would prompt an interest-based motive to engage, while being generally articulated by Canadian policy makers, ultimately does not significantly influence the policies implemented. The paper now looks at the manner in which two other traditional stakeholders, and one emerging one, are engaged in the region, comparing their efforts and methodologies with that of Canada.

### **US, UK, China, and Regional Security Policy**

A comparison of Canada's regional role with that played by the United States and the United Kingdom, gives an interesting insight. While all three countries are important regional stakeholders, and OECD donors, there are substantial differences in the amounts they provide. In so far as volume of developmental aid is concerned, it would be imprudent to make any definitive judgement based on a comparison with the US; however, for the sake of analysis the figures are presented. The United States provided US\$21.753 billion to OECD projects worldwide in 2007, while the United Kingdom

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<sup>162</sup>*Ibid.*

contributed US\$9.921billion and Canada US\$3.922 billion.<sup>163</sup> The percentage of gross national income (GNI) donated, provides another perspective of the commitment by these donors. GNI figures for 2007 show that the UK donated .36%, Canada .28% and the US .16%.<sup>164</sup> US foreign affairs specialist, Larry Nowels, in his comments on the low US GNI, makes the following point: “The fact that the United States ... is the leading donor in terms of volume, but nearly last in terms of GNI percentage, sharpens a continuous debate over whether the U.S. provides an appropriate share of international ODA [Official Developmental Aid].”<sup>165</sup> Nowels adds, “... that those who argue that the United States is the largest provider ... emphasizes the volume of ODA disbursement as the most relevant indicator, pointing out that U.S. ODA in 2005 represented 25.8% of ... total DAC [Development Assistance Committee] disbursements.”<sup>166</sup>

While such comparisons are instructive in assessing commitment to global aid and development efforts, they provide little insight into how such aid impacts on the security threats previously discussed, be they regional (CARICOM or wider region) or global. The point was previously made that the OECD developmental funds are primarily focussed on the accomplishment of MDGs and ‘aid for trade’ capacity building. It was also established previously that the state of poverty and development in the region (relative to other world regions) has caused it not to be a priority beneficiary for such aid.

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<sup>163</sup>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Assessment of Foreign Aid Spending by Donor Countries in 2007,” *Development Cooperation Directorate, Background of Overall Donor Performance*. <http://www.results.org/website/article.asp?id=3558> Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

<sup>164</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup>Library of Congress, Report by Larry Nowels, “Foreign Aid: Understanding Data Used to Compare Donors,” *CRS Report for Congress – Congressional Research Service*. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22032.pdf> Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*

A true assessment of impact then would have to be made by an evaluation of tangible engagements on the security, or related agendas. The US Coast Guard (USCG) for example, has played a significant hands-on role in interdicting maritime drug trafficking activities within the region. According to Admiral James Loy in his 2001 address to the ‘Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control,’ the USCG benefits from 22 bilateral agreements (Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking – ‘Shiprider’ Agreement) with LAC states which improves its effectiveness in counter-drug missions.<sup>167</sup> He adds that in addition to deploying on UN Navy ships, USCG Law Enforcement Detachments “...also deploy aboard British and Dutch naval ships involved in counter-drug operations ... recently we signed an agreement to also deploy aboard Belgian naval ships.”<sup>168</sup> Canadian Forces (CF) ships and maritime patrol aircrafts were not similarly engaged until 2006. Since being committed the CF has made an impact, and most recently HMCS MONTREAL, deployed on ‘Operation Caribbe’ in 2009 enjoyed success (on February 9<sup>th</sup>) when it assisted the French warship FV VENTOSE to interdict a ‘go-fast’ boat carrying 600 kilograms of cocaine. A CF CP-140 Aurora involved in the same operation had previously (January 15<sup>th</sup>) tracked a semi-submersible carrying seven metric tonnes of cocaine, valued at US\$242 million.<sup>169</sup> With successes like these in what could be viewed as a period of downturn in ‘go-fast’ and

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<sup>167</sup>United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Report by Admiral James M. Loy, “The Transit Zone: Strategy and Balance” May 15, 2001. <http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/transitloy.html> Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>169</sup>Department of National Defence, “CF Assist Drug Busts Valued at \$272M” (Canadian Navy: Operations & Exercises). [http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a\\_eng.asp?id=713](http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/4/4-a_eng.asp?id=713) Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

semisubmersible activities in the Caribbean, imagine what could have been the impact on regional drug trafficking had Canada been involved earlier.

The USCG has also been involved for many years in capacity building as Admiral Loy points out, "... the great success being realized by our Caribbean Support Tender. This ship operates out of Miami, with an international crew, and visits Caribbean nations to conduct law enforcement, security assistance, and international engagement operations."<sup>170</sup> The UK through the Royal Navy too has been engaged in the hands-on approach for many years, and has been a significant partner in the counter-narcotics campaign. A June 2007 report, announced that HMS OCEAN seized cocaine valued at around £29 million in the Caribbean. This brought the total estimated value of drugs seized by Royal Navy assets over a 15 month period (working with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and foreign agencies) to £1 billion.<sup>171</sup>

The US has also taken the initiative in establishing a number of information sharing networks within the region. The Caribbean Information Sharing Network (CISN) is a subsidiary entity of the Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC), another US sponsored event. CISN is a "...protected, multilateral, interagency network permitting a collaborative approach to transnational threats and other common interests through the sharing of information among military forces and law enforcement agencies

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<sup>170</sup>United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Report by Admiral James M. Loy, "The Transit Zone: Strategy and Balance" May 15, 2001...

<sup>171</sup>Ministry of Defence, "Ocean thwarts drug smugglers in the Caribbean," *A Military Operation news article*. Jun 26, 2007.  
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/OceanThwartsDrugSmugglersInTheCaribbean.htm> Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

throughout the Caribbean.”<sup>172</sup> Another is the Caribbean Regional Intelligence Conference (CARIC), the third iteration of which was recently hosted by the Jamaica Defence Force.<sup>173</sup> CARIC, a US Southern Command initiative brings together regional military intelligence organisations to discuss current regional security issues, and possibly more importantly, to establish working relationships and practical sustainable protocols for information and intelligence sharing. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is also very engaged in the region, and they actively participate in international forums to promote international law enforcement cooperation. The annual International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) is a DEA initiative that brings together counter-drug “...law enforcement officials from North America, Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe, and the Far East to share drug related intelligence and develop operational strategies that can be used against international drug traffickers.”<sup>174</sup> IDECs are preceded by a series of meetings of the Caribbean working group, events that provide opportunities for the coordination of regional counter-drug efforts.

UK law enforcement agencies have also actively participated in countering security threats in the region. Her Majesty Revenue and Custom (HMRC) effectively implemented Operation Airbridge in Jamaica in 2001. The operation involved the actual deployment of UK law enforcement officer to work with and mentor their Jamaican

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<sup>172</sup>CDERA News Centre, “CDERA Participates in Caribbean Information Sharing Network Conference (CISN)” January 8, 2004. [http://www.cdere.org/cunews/news/article\\_230.php](http://www.cdere.org/cunews/news/article_230.php) Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

<sup>173</sup>Jamaica Defence Force Web Site, “3<sup>rd</sup> Caribbean Regional Intelligence Conference” Jamaica Defence Force Diary of Events. [http://www.jdfmil.org/info/events/events\\_home1.php](http://www.jdfmil.org/info/events/events_home1.php) Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

<sup>174</sup>Department of State, “DEA Moscow” <http://moscow.usembassy.gov/drug.html> Internet Site accessed April 28, 2009.

counterparts. The results have been very good and the project is to be used as a model elsewhere, as this quote from a UK Cabinet Office report indicates:

Operation Airbridge has reduced the numbers of drug ‘swallowers’ or ‘mules’ from just under 1,000 detected in the UK in 2001 to fewer than 10 last year. HMRC has worked closely with the Jamaican authorities to detect perpetrators before embarkation, enhance the skills of Jamaican officers, and educate people about the risks and consequences of attempting to smuggle drugs. Because of its success, the approach has been extended to Ghana.<sup>175</sup>

It is evident from the comparisons done that when it comes to implementing the security agenda the US and UK are hands-on partners in the effort. In their quest to address the security problems before they reach home to the US and UK, a more proactive, involved approach is adopted by these countries. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is a significant regional partner in law enforcement initiatives to address regional transnational security threats. While the RCMP provides effective liaison and resources, training of police and other agencies, and opportunities for capacity building in general, no evidence of a proactive approach similar to the other nations could be found. Like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), it is seemingly only involved in a passive liaison role. CSIS of course is restricted by policy from engaging in active intelligence collection overseas.

It is necessary to divert slightly from the current line of argument to explore the issue of overseas intelligence collection as it potentially has some relevance to the perceptions of threats among Canadian policy makers. In an article written by Mr. Reid

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<sup>175</sup>UK Cabinet Office, “Security in a Global Hub: Establishing the UK’s new border arrangements.”  
[http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/corp/assets/publications/reports/border\\_review.pdf](http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/corp/assets/publications/reports/border_review.pdf)  
Internet Site accessed May 1, 2009.

Morden, the former head of CSIS, a strong argument was put forward, citing ‘the volatile world of 2006,’ for the establishment of a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service.<sup>176</sup>

Morden suggests that such a Service would focus on terrorism, military intelligence where Canadian forces are engaged, organised crime, arms trafficking, and nuclear proliferation.<sup>177</sup> In his response to a comment made by Sir Richard Dearlove, the former head of the British Security Intelligence Service (MI-6) at the University of Toronto in April 2006, where Canada was ‘chided as an intelligence freeloader,’ Morden concedes that while “Canada is a net beneficiary of allied foreign intelligence, Canadian contributions are neither paltry nor non-existent, as ... [Dearlove’s] remarks suggest.”<sup>178</sup> Morden makes an additional point which has some bearing on the issues being discussed here, when he states:

The human animal is very good at adapting to its environment. In my experience, one area where the Canadian sub genus of policy or decision-maker has not been able to adapt, is in absorbing a steady diet of intelligence. Unlike their counterparts in other countries, there is little uptake by senior bureaucrats and Ministers for this material. The upper echelons of the UK government use intelligence product as a matter of course.<sup>179</sup>

The development and implementation of effective policies to combat regional security threats is contingent of the perception of these threats and the realities of the potential impact on Canada. This is an interesting point and according to the security theorist Giovanni Manunta: “A threat exists only if the protector perceives it as a threat

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<sup>176</sup>Reid Morden, “A Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service, A new necessity or an expensive frill?” *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, 2006.  
<http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Should%20Canada%20Enter%20The%20Business%20of%20Gathering%20Foreign%20Intelligence.pdf> Internet Site accessed May 5, 2009.

<sup>177</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>178</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>179</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

with relation to the asset(s) [anything worthy of protection].”<sup>180</sup> So following this reasoning if Canadian foreign policy makers have not perceived such threats, then from their perspective they do not exist. Is this the ostrich ‘head in the sand’ scenario? Is the reported inability to absorb the ‘diet of intelligence,’ as Morden puts it, responsible for the seeming lack of perception of these regional threats? Or is this apparent lack of perception a manifestation of the fact that Canada is not currently so engaged in getting an accurate intelligence reality check of the region? The Morden assertion may well be the case, as the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute report on Canada’s future strategic environment clearly illuminates these threats, albeit from a global perspective. The report cites for example, the increasing number of powerful non-state actors, the development of sophisticated transnational guerrilla warriors, and the prevalence of environments which encourage alienation – most notably of young males.<sup>181</sup> But what is most revealing from the report is a view which is inline with the core argument of this paper, that is, Canada’s tendencies towards a passive capacity building approach, or as these authors put it:

In this general context, there is a tendency in Canada, and indeed in Norway and other smaller countries of similar mind, to emphasize policies that target the root causes of conflict, including those highlighted, implicitly or explicitly ... and to leave more forceful forms of defensive intervention to others.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>180</sup>Giovanni Manunta, *Security: An Introduction*, Cranfield University Press, 1998, 55.

<sup>181</sup>J L Granatstein, Gordon Smith and Denis Stairs, “A Threatened Future: Canada’s Future Strategic Environment and its Security Implications,” *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, 2007. [http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/Contemporary\\_Studies/2007/2007-Oct/2007-10-01\\_A\\_Threatened\\_Future.pdf](http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/Contemporary_Studies/2007/2007-Oct/2007-10-01_A_Threatened_Future.pdf) Internet Site accessed May 2, 2009.

<sup>182</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.



They continue, making the point that “...while these measures can sometimes be an important adjunct of military or other security-enhancing capabilities ... they cannot be a substitute for them.”<sup>183</sup> They add that many of these purported “...root causes are not amenable to quick and easy remedy by acceptable public policy means ... particularly in the short term.”<sup>184</sup> The authors contend that while they support addressing root causes, the arguments they present are meant to remind Canadians,

...that tackling conflict by emphasizing root cause strategies is usually a very long-term enterprise and is likely to be highly unreliable as a peace-inducer in the short term, even if the resources required to do the job are mounted both effectively and in sufficient quantity, which they rarely are.<sup>185</sup>

It is these proactive, more forceful, hands-on activities that from the perspective of the core arguments of this paper represent ‘sufficient engagement’ on the regional security agenda. The US and the UK, for example, have consistently over many years committed defence resources (ships and maritime patrol aircrafts) to counter the activities of transnational narcotics traffickers, an effort that Canada has only relatively recently joined.

While the motives for the proactive involvement in the regional security agenda may include national values, and good global citizenship responsibilities, it is evident that the countries involved are acting primarily in their national interests. The involvement of the French, Dutch and Belgian navies in the campaign against narcotics trafficking in the Caribbean is likely not based on altruism, but out of a national interest to keep these drugs and their deleterious impacts out of their respective nations. While similarly

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<sup>183</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>184</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>185</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

impacted by these threats, Canada has for many years been a relatively passive participant in the campaign. On the evidence of history and also on many current trends, it would have to be concluded that of the major stakeholders assessed, Canada has been, and remains the least engaged.

That said, the efforts by stakeholders when they are engaged, have not always been consistent, particularly when other national interests intervene. For example the deportation of criminals from the US, UK and Canada back to the region, some of whom have not lived there since they were children, has been a vexing issue, and one which has stimulated much debate surrounding the short-sightedness of this policy. This issue is broad and has been the subject of a number of studies. While there are conflicting views about the actual impact of these deportees on regional security, the fact is, however, that a significant number of these individuals have a criminal history. Statistics analysed by a University of the West Indies research team at the Mona Campus in Jamaica, shows that of the 8,228 'assessable' cases of persons deported from the US to Jamaica over the period 1997 to the first three months of fiscal year 2003/04, a total of 5,174 or 62.9% were convicted for crimes in the US (59.8% - drug offences, 9.2% - theft and 6.8% - assault).<sup>186</sup>

With these statistics, it would not be unreasonable to assume that this influx of criminals, some versed in methodologies of international crime learned in the US, UK and Canada, negatively impacts the already overburdened regional security apparatus.

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<sup>186</sup>Bernard Headley, "Giving Critical Context to the Deportee Phenomenon." *Social Justice*, (Spring) Vol. 33, no. 1, 2006, 49. [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_hb3427/is\\_1\\_33/ai\\_n29297930/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3427/is_1_33/ai_n29297930/) Internet Site accessed May 5, 2009.

The study has already shown how regional security issues have implications for these same stakeholders. The paradox is obvious.

The position taken by the United States with regards to the International Criminal Court (ICC) issue also exhibits inconsistencies. So far twelve regional states (three from CARICOM), including some critical to the efforts to address the current and emerging regional threats, are subjected to U.S. sanctions under the 2003 American Service-members' Protection Act and the 2005 'Nethercutt Amendments' for having ratified the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, but refusing to sign the bilateral immunity agreement, the so-called 'Article 98'.<sup>187</sup>

The sanctions include the suspension of funding for the International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programmes, and Excess Defence Articles (EDA). The Nethercutt Amendment prohibits making available Economic Support Funds (ESF) to provide assistance to countries party to the ICC and that have not signed an Article 98 Agreement.<sup>188</sup> Again it seems that conflicting U.S. interests are at play.

The US stance in objecting to the long-standing European quota system for bananas imported from African, Pacific and Caribbean countries – the so-called 'Banana Wars' – is another good example of the inconsistency in policy. Acting in the interest of the US multinationals including 'Chiquita,' the US government challenged the European Union's position and called in the World Trade Organisation in 1996. The US prevailed,

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<sup>187</sup>Peter DeShazo, "The Impact on Latin America of the American Service members' Protection Act," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs, March 8, 2006, 1. [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts060308\\_deshazo.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts060308_deshazo.pdf) Internet Site accessed May 2, 2009.

<sup>188</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

getting its free trade but ultimately putting banana farmers throughout the region out of business. According to Observer reporter Sarah Ryle, "... by 2000 only a third of the Windward Island farmers recorded in 1993 were still growing bananas... it is estimated that a third of the survivors have since gone under."<sup>189</sup> Not to be daunted, displaced farmers of St Vincent and the Grenadines have simply turned to the cultivation of marijuana for their survival. The problem has gotten so bad that a recent US State Department report states that, "St. Vincent has also become one of the region's largest marijuana producers. However, even some U.S. officials attribute that partly to the United States' own trade policies."<sup>190</sup> As Mark Fineman of the Los Angeles Times states, one opposition leader wryly observed: "Thanks to the Americans, ganja has become our most successful agricultural diversification project."<sup>191</sup>

While Canada had no part in the 'banana wars,' its strong support for multilateral agencies like the WTO, and for the concepts of globalisation and free trade would likely not have encouraged it to intercede, even for the provision of morale support, on behalf the disenfranchised regional states.

The US-Regional impasse caused by the 'Article 98' issues was, however, another matter. It presented a missed opportunity for Canada to 'take the helm' and become more engaged as a respected and credible regional stakeholder to offer some leadership, and to support and actively mentor the efforts to address the pressing security

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<sup>189</sup>Sarah Ryle, "Banana war leaves the Caribbean a casualty," *The Guardian/The Observer*, November 24, 2002. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2002/nov/24/corporateaccountability.theobserver1> Internet Site accessed May 2, 2009.

<sup>190</sup>Mark Fineman, "On St Vincent, Marijuana Grows Into a Campaign Issue," *Los Angeles Times*, June 12, 1998. Internet Site accessed May 2, 2009. <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jun/12/news/mn-59262>

<sup>191</sup>*Ibid.*

threats which existed at the time. A role it seems that Canada was, and from all indication still is, reluctant to undertake.

This is an unfortunate perception given that one of the roles of the Canadian Forces (CF), as articulated in the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) is, “contributing to international peace and security – *projecting leadership abroad*.”<sup>192</sup> The situation which existed in the region it seems was tailor-made for this role, which advocates that Canada tackles such security threats at their source, “...as this is an important element in protecting Canada.”<sup>193</sup> The CFDS continues, stating that the provision of such leadership is vital to Canada’s credibility as a player on the world stage, adding that, “this will require the Canadian Forces to have the necessary capabilities to make a meaningful contribution across the full spectrum of international operations, from humanitarian assistance to stabilization operations to combat.”<sup>194</sup>

It is evident that this policy does not rule out the proactive actions alluded to so far in the analysis, at least in so far as the CF role is concerned. Canada’s reluctance to be more proactive is evidently linked to other issues, possible including a lack of perception as alluded to earlier, or just the realities of the complexity of the regional security paradigm, which Griffiths defined as the interplay of the geonarcotics factors – drugs, geography, power, and politics.<sup>195</sup>

It should by now be evident that the region is a complex environment where issues of trade, aid, politics and foreign policies are all variables influencing the security

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<sup>192</sup>Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, 2008, 8.

<sup>193</sup>*Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>194</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>195</sup>Ivelaw Griffith, *Drug and Security in the Caribbean. Sovereignty Under Siege ...* 92.

dynamics. The growing influence of China in the region has added yet another dimension to this already complex situation. It is this element that the study now looks at.

China's involvement in the Americas has inspired considerable suspicion surrounding its motives. While there is seemingly a consensus that China's demand for resources stimulates its regional interests, researchers Jubany and Poon asserts that there is a political dimension to the regional relationship, manifested mainly through the 'One-China Policy.'<sup>196</sup> This policy is supported by all Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) countries except, all seven Central American, four Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines), and one South American country, Paraguay.<sup>197</sup> According to these researchers the efforts to woo the hold-outs continue, and the region has become "the arena where China and Taiwan are playing their competitive game of dollar-diplomacy."<sup>198</sup> China they assert uses its 'Third World Solidarity' pitch with catch phrases such as 'strategic partnership' and 'peaceful rise' to show its commitment to the developing countries of the region.<sup>199</sup>

China's engagement in the region has borne significant economic results and statistics show that between 2000 and 2005 exports to China grew at an average annual rate of 38%.<sup>200</sup> A look at the *Table 2* vividly illustrates the growth of China's share of regional trade relative to other more traditional trade partners.

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<sup>196</sup>Florence Jubany and Daniel Poon, "Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Canadian Perspective." *FOCAL (Canadian Foundation for the Americas) Research Report*, March 2006, 3.

<sup>197</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>198</sup>*Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>199</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>200</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

COUNTRY	1990	1994	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003
US	13.3	15.3	18	18.8	19.1	18.9	18.4
EU	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.1	1.9
Canada	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.3
China	1.7	1.9	2.5	2.5	2.9	2.8	3.1
Japan	3.6	4	4.3	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.1

Source: Adapted from Funakushi and Loser 2005.

**Table 2: Share of trade with Latin America and the Caribbean (as % of total trade) <sup>201</sup>**

A comparison with Canada's trade share over the period shows that while China's share has almost doubled, Canada's only increased by around 37%. Not that this comparison is critical, given the conclusions drawn from the analysis previously conducted regarding the relatively low importance from Canada's perspective of the regional trade. The table also highlights the fact that US trade with the region declined between 2001 and 2003, and in fact, in 2003 was only approximately 5.6 times that of Canada, which is significantly low, in relative terms to size of population and economy (US being approximately nine times as populous and its economy averaging around nine times that of Canada).<sup>202</sup> Trade with the EU (UK figures included) also declined

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<sup>201</sup>*Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>202</sup>In 2003 based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the US economy (\$10, 960, 800) was approximately 9.03 times that of Canada's (\$1, 213, 175). See Statistics Canada. [http://www41.statcan.ca/2007/3764/grafx/htm/ceb3764\\_000\\_1-eng.htm#table](http://www41.statcan.ca/2007/3764/grafx/htm/ceb3764_000_1-eng.htm#table) Internet Site accessed May 10, 2009.

See also United States Bureau of Economic Analysis <http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=2003&LastYear=2007&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no> . Internet Site accessed May 10, 2009.

See also United States, "Central Intelligence Agency – The 2008 World Fact Book." <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html> Internet Site accessed May 11, 2009. The nominal GDP of the U.S. was \$14.33 trillion in 2008, approximately 9.16 times that of Canada's (\$1.564 trillion).

significantly, the outcome of the ‘banana wars’ previously discussed possibly having an impact here.

Jubany and Poon raise what they term ‘security concerns’ regarding China’s military engagements in the region.<sup>203</sup> While the arguments they present highlights the concerns from a US perspective, these could well form the basis of Canadian misgivings also. The concerns surround China’s apparent (or presumed) effort to fill the void created by the weakening US-LAC military links resulting from the ‘Article 98’ issues previously discussed. This concern is encapsulated in the following comments made to the United States Congress in 2005 by General Craddock, (then) commander of US Southern Command: “We now risk losing contact and interoperability with a generation of military classmates in many nations of the region, including several leading countries.”<sup>204</sup> This concern was again expressed by General Craddock when he addressed the Senate Armed Services Committee in March, 2006, stating: “Other nations are moving in. The PRC [People’s Republic of China] has made many offers, and now we are seeing those who formally would have come to the United States going to China.”<sup>205</sup>

The concerns as articulated by General Craddock include the fact that the lack of training opportunities “...has prevented the sharing of US military attributes and characteristics with LAC militaries, including concepts of military subordination to civilian leaders, and principles of democracy.”<sup>206</sup> If Canada perceives these concerns to be credible then it may well view China’s engagements as a threat to regional stability,

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<sup>203</sup>Florence Jubany and Daniel Poon, “Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Canadian Perspective.” ... March 2006, 6.

<sup>204</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>205</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>206</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.



given its focus in the Americas and around the world on fostering good governance and democracy.

Though the apparent suspicions of China's motive and possible negative influences are not unexpected, no evidence was found to suggest that the Chinese military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has been actively involved in a proactive 'hands-on' way in assisting with the regional security issues previously discussed. Though, because of the activities of Chinese organised crime groups like the Triads within the region, there may well be some utility of closer cooperation with China on the security agenda. From the evidence gleaned, it seems that like Canada, China has only been involved in regional capacity-building. Fears that China is passing on undemocratic practices and possibly even sewing the seeds of 'military insubordination' within the region is also seemingly unfounded. While the range of Chinese activities within the Americas have seemingly stimulated Canadian suspicions surrounding motives, and concerns surrounding impact, there is no clear indication if and how Canada's regional policy have been, or will be adjusted to militate against the growing trends.

## **Part 4: Findings and Conclusions**

The study set out to analyse Canada's role as an involved stakeholder in enhancing security within the Caribbean Community. The analysis was framed by the research thesis that given the actual and potential impact on Canada's national security of significant regional threat entities, Canada is not sufficiently engaged. This security-threat-nexus with Canada is evident, and as the research showed, diaspora and trade linkages between Canada and the region have been exploited, particularly by transnational organised criminal enterprises in the execution of their criminal undertakings. While the volume of trade provides more opportunities for exploitation of routes, vectors and conveyances, the mere existence of these linkages is sufficient to perpetuate these illicit activities. Canada's proximity to the region has also served to facilitate this exploitation and the potential for similar abuse by other threat entities, including radical Islamic groups is assessed to be significant and ought not to be overlooked. Evidence uncovered by the research suggests that such groups are establishing themselves within the Caribbean Community and in the wider region – the Americas, particularly in the Tri-Border Area of South America. There have also been some indications of linkages between a number of these groups and known terrorist organisations like al Qaeda and Hizbollah. This, the study contends, is an ominous sign, and there is already a precedent of radical Islamic terrorist activities with a Caribbean nexus being undertaken in Canada.

The study established that Canada's engagement in the region on the security agenda has primarily been passive, more aligned to building capacity, improving infrastructure and enhancing good governance. While these undertakings ultimately

impact on the security dynamics, the effects are mainly long-term and do not address the problems directly or ‘in the here and now.’ Relative to other stakeholders like the United States and the United Kingdom, the research showed that Canada’s engagement is passive, not hands-on, and are seemingly in line with the assertions of Granatstein et al, that Canada tends to leave the more forceful forms of defensive intervention to others. The evidence uncovered in the analysis supports this assertion.

The research also found that while Canada’s developmental aid programme is noteworthy; its impact on the region, particularly on the security issues which are discussed here, was not significant. The research found that this was for two main reasons, firstly, the criteria for provision of such aid was linked mainly to MDGs and poverty alleviation, thus the focus was on other arguably more deserving countries, particularly in Africa. Secondly, such aid was not directly focussed on addressing the threats of transnational crime and terrorism.

The study also found that while the articulated motive for Canada’s aid and development agenda is to advance Canadian values of global citizenship; and to advance its interests regarding security, prosperity and governance, its aid activities in the region is seemingly more aligned to the former motive. The national interest motive is evidently not a signal consideration of Canada’s regional engagement, an observation which brings the question of threat perception to the fore. The extent to which Canadian policy makers have perceived the true nature of the regional threats and their current and future impact on Canada remains inconclusive. On one hand, utterances about the threat realities signify awareness, but on the other, the lack of decisive action to address these threats suggests complacency, or more likely an underestimation of the full potential impact and

of their insidious nature. This apparent ‘sensory malaise’ could well be attributable to the nonexistence of the means to develop such awareness, that is, through a Canadian foreign intelligence service. The research found strong support among a number of Canadian scholars, and at least one practitioner to justify such an endeavour, case in point being this statement by Granatstein et al: “Given these and other conditions [dangerous global threats] likely to prevail over the next two decades and more, a number of initiatives are suggested in this report, among them: enhanced investment in an efficient intelligence-gathering apparatus abroad...”<sup>207</sup>

The study looked at the growing influence of China within the region and found that while Canada may well be mistrustful about China’s motives, particularly regarding its engagement with regional military organisations, no indication of how this modified Canada’s regional policy, particularly on the security agenda, was identified. Canada’s engagement posture was seemingly not influenced by China’s regional incursions. However, this was not surprising as the research identified no incident or activity which would warrant or justify such a response to China’s regional activity.

In keeping with the stated aim, the study has established that given the significance of the regional threats, and the nexus with Canada, it is in Canada’s national interest to act to enhance the security of the region in a more direct and engaged manner. Canada can do more; it can adopt a more proactive posture to regional security, and become more involved like the US and UK, limitations in capacity notwithstanding, in the regional counter-narcotics campaign. Canada can become more involved in leading

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<sup>207</sup>J L Granatstein, Gordon Smith and Denis Stairs, “A Threatened Future: Canada’s Future Strategic Environment and its Security Implications,” *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, 2007. [http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/Contemporary\\_Studies/2007/2007-Oct/2007-10-01\\_A\\_Threatened\\_Future.pdf](http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/Contemporary_Studies/2007/2007-Oct/2007-10-01_A_Threatened_Future.pdf) Internet Site accessed May 2, 2009.

and mentoring through active participation in efforts to counter these regional threats – a more involved engagement not just a ‘fire-and-forget’ training package delivery. This as the research has highlighted would be in keeping with the CFDS articulated role of ‘Projecting Leadership Abroad.’ Canada with a change in policy, and with the development of a foreign intelligence capacity, can through collaborative efforts with both regional and allied intelligence organisations begin to actively influence the security dynamics of the region. It is through such cooperative initiatives that the solutions to the regional security problems are best found, it is the way forward both through the sharing of intelligence as well the coordination of kinetic action, after all the criminals do it – work together across borders. Doing it better is one way to defeat them.



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