



**SOUP TO NUTS:  
INFANTRY BATTALIONS SHOULD SEEK OUT AND CREATE SOLDIERS**

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**JCSP 50**

**Service Paper**

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## Soup to Nuts: Infantry Battalions Should Seek Out and Create Soldiers

“NUTS” – General McAuliffe’s response to the German commander considering it “CRAZY” that they would think allied forces possible of surrender in Bastogne;<sup>1</sup>

### AIM

1. The aim of this service paper is to present an argument that would see Infantry Battalions conduct force generation from recruiting through to full developmental phase (DP) 1 qualification followed by immediate operationalization. The fundamental issue being addressed is the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) attested personnel crisis. At first glance the concept may be *NUTS* because of the breadth of affected CAF organizations and the inferred reductions to local economies which would be politically and strategically unpalatable. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a concept that aligns within the *CDS/DM Reconstitution Directive* and relies on the MOS at the heart of the Canadian Army (CA) Center of Gravity (CoG), vital ground and key terrain. The concept also reduces unpalatable concerns and has an inherent depth of efficiencies that could be achieved by relying on current trends, policies, and procedures.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, the recommendation herein will have positive secondary affects to other CDS priorities including retention, culture, training, pers tempo, quality of life, as well as resource and financial cost saving. Should this proposal be deemed feasible for further investigation and concept development, access and involvement from the organizations and resources at Annex A would be required.

### INTRODUCTION

2. During the bipolarity of the first Cold War and while engaged in proxy wars, Canadian Infantry Battalions had four Rifle Companies.<sup>3</sup> The fourth company sometimes substituted as a training company. With the security a global hegemon provides, Canadian infantry battalions saw force reductions, restructuring, a crisis of identity & culture, COVID-19, private sector competition and a host of other factors that have them struggling to field three rifle companies. *The situation has changed* from U.S. unipolarity to the much more complex state of global multipolarity. There are more actors: state, non-state, violent extremists, non-violent non-state, more supra-national organizations, sub-national groups, national and transnational companies, and more expectations from a domestic populace. To counter this increased threat environment, “the number of operational tasks increases [yet] the number of available CA personnel decreases.”<sup>4</sup> The fourth rifle company needs to be returned; yet with enhanced responsibilities, resources, and authorities.

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<sup>1</sup> McAuliffe, Kenneth J. Jr. “The Story of NUTS!” U.S. Army. 8 December 2013.

[https://www.army.mil/article/92856/the\\_story\\_of\\_the\\_nuts\\_reply](https://www.army.mil/article/92856/the_story_of_the_nuts_reply)

<sup>2</sup> Eyre, Wayne and Bill Mathews. CDS/DM Directive For CAF Reconstitution. Government of Canada. Accessed 8 Feb 2024. Last modified, 6 Oct 2022. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/dm-cds-directives/cds-dm-directive-caf-reconstitution.html>

<sup>3</sup> Horn, Bernd. *From Cold War to New Millennium: The History of The Royal Canadian Regiment, 1953-2008*. Dundurn Press, 2011. p. 62.

<sup>4</sup> 1948-2 (DAS 2-2), Canadian Army, “Commander Canadian Army’s Planning Guidance: Operating Plan Fiscal Year 2024-2025”. National Defence, May 2023. P 17.

3. To be clear, infantry battalions are not the only unit of measure and importance facing personnel deficiencies and the requirement to reconstitute. That said, infantry battalions remain the focal point of the CA, force generation, operations, and readiness. They are therefore the metric to assess the general health of the CAF in fulfilling Government of Canada strategic commitments and obligations. First, this paper will briefly highlight the importance of the infantry battalion, as well as their slow degradation. Second, it will assess MPC as the functional authority for recruiting. It will then look to the *CDS Reconstitution Directive* and highlight already granted authorities to discern potential opportunities. Finally, it will propose a concept that sees infantry battalions producing strategic effects from the tactical level to support CA reconstitution and the CAF personnel crisis.

## DISCUSSION

4. 6 Oct 2022, the CDS stated that the “military personnel shortage will get worse before it gets better” and enacted the *CDS Reconstitution Directive* to counter this dilemma.<sup>5</sup> More than a year later news agency reporting, Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) metrics, The Minister of National Defence and many L1’s support this claim.<sup>6</sup> For the CA, reconstitution efforts have paralleled increased operational demands from the Government of Canada’s (GoC) commitment to expand its contributions to OP REASSURANCE.<sup>7</sup> This is counter intuitive to reconstitution and infantry battalions are at the forefront and intersection of this predicament.

5. In truth, the concern of personnel shortages from the perspective of the infantry battalion has long been reported. In his two-part history of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), Bernd Horn indirectly describes the history The Royal Canadian Infantry Corps (RCIC) undergoing significant reductions and transformations from WW2 to Afghanistan. After WW2, infantry battalions had four rifle companies which was reduced to three rifle companies in 1968.<sup>8</sup> Afterward and throughout the decades, The RCIC had been systemically reduced with the disbandment of 3 Mechanized Commando, restructuring of 4 CIBG to 4 CMBG then its disbandment, the Airborne Regiment disbandment in 1995, and creating of 10/90 battalions

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<sup>5</sup> Brewster, Murray and ·, Richard R. ·. C. N. "Military Personnel Shortage Will Get Worse before it Gets Better, Top Soldier Says | CBC News." CBC., accessed Oct 15, 2023. Last modified, 6 Oct 2022.

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/eyre-shortage-directive-1.6608107>. and, Eyre, Wayne. Mathews, Bill. CDS/DM Directive For CAF Reconstitution. Government of Canada. Accessed 8 Feb 2024. Last modified, 6 Oct 2022.

<sup>6</sup> Reports of a 35% decline in recruitment numbers from 8,069 to 5,242 with 21,472 applicants with only 77 total enrolments between Nov 22 and Nov 2023, Postmedia News. Few immigrant applicants to Canadian military get enlisted: Report. Toronto Sun. Accessed, 8 Feb 2024. <https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/politics/few-immigrant-applicants-to-canadian-military-get-enlisted-report/ar-AA1nca6> Comd Royal Canadian Navy highlights naval recruitment deficiency in many trades at over 20% articulating CFRG has not met recruiting intake in over 10 years, The Royal Canadian Navy, The state of the Royal Canadian Navy. YouTube. Accessed, 8 Feb. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6zTgpd7s0>.

<sup>7</sup> See, 1948-2 (DAS 2-2), Canadian Army, “Commander Canadian Army’s Planning Guidance: Operating Plan Fiscal Year 2024-2025”. National Defence, May 2023. & Major, Josh. "Comd 4 Cdn Div Planning Guidance for FY 24-25." 4 Canadian Division, Toronto, Ontario.

<sup>8</sup> Horn, Bernd. *From Cold War to New Millennium: The History of The Royal Canadian Regiment, 1953-2008*. Dundurn Press, 2011. p. 62.

which relied on reservist augmentation to regular component units.<sup>9</sup> The RCR and RCIC, have a commendable history of adaptation, flexibility and a no-fail culture.

6. Recent authors have focused their writing on describing the effects of systemic reduction. Ironically, Colonel Shane Murphy; now retired after commanding the Combat Training Center, forecasted the senior officer retention issues and the personnel crisis in his master's dissertation on JCSP 38.<sup>10</sup> Major Jeremy Hiltz articulates the loss of cohesion in infantry battalions due to staffing deficiencies in his service paper from JCSP 44.<sup>11</sup> Major Jesse van Eijk goes to great length in his MDS dissertation to demonstrate the mathematical metrics of PY reductions against the tasks & tempo of infantry battalions.<sup>12</sup> All of these flags regarding the plight of the infantry battalion had come before the CDS attribution of personnel deficiencies to a changing demographic, COVID-19, a culture crisis, workforce expectations and private sector competition.<sup>13</sup> But how important are infantry battalions?

7. The health of the infantry battalion and RCIC writ large is the standard by which the CAF should assess its ability to meet GoC strategic obligations. As a unified collective whole, infantry battalions and infanteers represent the single largest MOS that is operationally functional and not a support trade. As such, data mining of Monitor Mass and a power BI data pull from 2CMBG from 2021 to the present will demonstrate that this group is most heavily relied upon for training, taskings, domestic and expeditionary operations. When assessed considering the CA's limited and recently reduced armor and artillery from Ukraine donations, the RCIC is the grouping that is both the CA vital ground and key terrain with supremacy standing in the CA CoG.

*Key Canadian Army Training Definitions:*

*(a) Centre of Gravity (CoG). The CA's CoG, its source of strength, is the junior and mid-level leadership across all our Army's components. The CA's expertise and ability to get the job done rests on their shoulders. The recruitment, development, and retention of junior and mid-level leaders is essential to the generation of forces to meet the imperatives of concurrent operations.*

*(b) Vital Ground. The CA's success in delivering its core competency is in the ability at the sub-unit level to live, train, and fight as part of a combined arms team (level 5). A combined arms team is a sub-unit headquarters that commands two or more platoon-sized manoeuvre and effects elements. The current expression of the most lethal direct fire combined arms team in the CA is the combat team, which includes a mix*

<sup>9</sup> For 3 Mech Commando see Ibid, p. 95. For 4 CMBG see Ibid, p. 62, 151. For Airborne Regiment see, Ibid, p 186, 283. For 10/90 battalions see, Ibid, p. 158.

<sup>10</sup> Murphy, Shane. "The Fight to Retain Talent: Senior Officer Retention and the Next Canadian Forces Personnel Crisis." MDS, Canadian Forces College. 2012. <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/298/286/murphy.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> Hiltz, Jeremy. *The Hollow Battalion: A Struggle for Platoon and Section Cohesion*. MDS, Canadian Forces College. 2018. <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/192/hiltz.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> Van Eijk, Jesse, Doing Too Much with Too Little, All the Time: The Effects of Tempo on Canadian Infantry Battalions." MDS, Canadian Forces College. 2018. <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/286/vaneijk.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> Eyre, Wayne. Mathews, Bill. *CDS/DM Reconstitution Directive*. Last Modified: 6 Oct 2022, Date Accessed 8 Feb 2024. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/dm-cds-directives/cds-dm-directive-caf-reconstitution.html>

*of mechanized infantry and tanks at the company or squadron level enabled by artillery providing indirect and joint fires, afforded the benefit of combat engineers and supported with lethal and non-lethal effects in a self-sustained and connectivity enabled manner. The combined arms team is the fusion of our people, equipment, training, and sustainment; and it is central to our modernization efforts. As our core output for operations, the combined arms team is the vital ground for the CA.*

*(c) Key Terrain. The CA's ability to integrate and synchronize the various capabilities of the CA, the CAF, other government departments, allies and coalition members within the battle group (level 6) and the brigade group (level 7) is paramount given Canada's operational commitments.<sup>14</sup>*

While the Armored Corps, Artillery or others may infrequently fill Immediate Response Unit (IRU) HQ or Vanguard positions for domestic operations (DOMOP), the preponderance of tasks and readiness requirements is always infantry centric.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, under the structure of an OP LENTUS response for a DOMOP the regular force normally hands off to a reserve force Territorial Battle Group (TBG); again with the infantry at its center. With DOMOPS on the rise and it is unlikely the infantry will see respite.<sup>16</sup> Recently with OP SAVANNE, the RCR was relied upon for a short notice deployment to satisfy GoC strategic interests and facilitated non-combatant evacuations from Sudan. Moreover, the RCIC is the central component of OP REASSURANCE, with other capabilities bolted on to compliment the infantry battalion.<sup>17</sup> Continuing, the collective training expenditure in planning, funding and work hours from CADTC and CMTC has historically had the infantry battalion as its focal point whether preparing battle groups at Ex Maple Resolve, Afghanistan deployments, an Exercise Unified Resolve series or more recent EXPED OPs. Again, the infantry has historically been the principal component of OP UNIFIER and although the headquarters component may now be drawn from another MOS the largest component remains the infantry deployment. All of this does not account for the centrality of the infantry in other small missions or throughout key components of the institutional hierarchy. The RCIC proves itself a source of strength in the CA war chest.

8. On the other hand, "MPC has functional authority"<sup>18</sup> for recruiting and enjoys monopoly status in its control of this portfolio within the larger organization. Yet, MPC did not win its position through insightful business practice, an enticing marketing strategy or strong competitive performance in human resource markets; it won through policy and authorities. In fact, the underperformance of this monopoly has been assessed as historical fact through subsequent audits in 2002, 2006, and 2016 from the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) while

<sup>14</sup> 1948-2 (G5), 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group "Commanders Planning Guidance – Operative Plan Fiscal Year (FY) 2024/2025". Petawawa 7 July 2023. P. 2

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, Annex A.

<sup>16</sup> Richie, Sarah. "Canadian military 'will be there' in emergencies despite concerns." The Canadian Press. Posted: 25 Jan 2024. Accessed: 8 Feb 2024. <https://globalnews.ca/news/10251503/bill-blair-canadian-military-emergencies/>

<sup>17</sup> 1948-2 (G5), 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group "Commanders Planning Guidance – Operating Plan Fiscal Year (FY) 2024/2025". Petawawa 7 July 2023, Annex A.

<sup>18</sup> Office of the Auditor General of Canada. 2016 Fall Reports of the Auditor General "Report 5 – Canadian Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention". National Defence. 5 November 2016. Tab 5.4 [https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/english/parl\\_oag\\_201611\\_05\\_e\\_41834.html](https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/english/parl_oag_201611_05_e_41834.html)

also being scrutinized the Standing Senate Committee of National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (SECD).<sup>19</sup>

*5.6 Previous findings indicated ongoing, systemic recruiting challenges for the Regular Force in its efforts to counter higher rates of attrition and fill certain chronically understaffed occupations. Recruiting targets did not match the needs of the Royal Canadian Navy or the Royal Canadian Air Force, and there was no comprehensive plan to attract more applicants, particularly women, Aboriginal peoples, and visible minorities. The audits also identified issues with training recruiting staff, the quality of the tools used to assess applicants, and applicant processing, which caused many potential candidates to withdraw their applications.<sup>20</sup>*

When the OAG, the SECD, journalists, the CDS, L1 element commanders, JCSP students and academics have all highlighted recruiting deficiencies pitted against a backdrop of situational change and growing threats there exists an opportunity to redo mission analysis and explore new radical courses of action – *Soup to Nuts* is just that radical.

## RECOMMENDATION

9. If the problem is recruitment, then it follows that it should become the target of the GoC, CAF & CA most reliable silver bullet; the infantry. The overall recommendation is to task the infantry as the main effort in bringing about CA reconstitution. The aim is to implement a nested plan from *Recruitment-to-Operational Functional Point (OFP) with a Training & Validation cycle* inside and off-set to the newly *Evolved Managed Readiness System (MRS)*. In 2022, CCA had directed a similar yet not so robust experiment with OP PARADIGM; where an effort was made:

*to train up to an additional 1000 infantry non-commissioned recruits in Developmental Period One (entry level CAF employment training), per year. Recruits will be exposed to the best aspects of early military life, including mentorship and regimental affiliation and identity. Instructors will benefit by limiting time away from home and family, as well as preventing gaps in the Field Force.<sup>21</sup>*

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<sup>19</sup> Government of Canada, “Standing Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (SECD) – Arctic Security.” National Defence. 24 April 2023. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/proactive-disclosure/secd-april-24-2023/recruitment-retention.html>

<sup>20</sup> Office of the Auditor General of Canada. 2016 Fall Reports of the Auditor General “*Report 5 – Canadian Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention*”. National Defence. 5 November 2016., Tab 5.6. <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/PACP/Reports/RP9018422/pacprp30/pacprp30-e.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> Department of National Defence. Departmental Plan 2023-24: “Core Responsibilities: Planned Results and Resources, and Key Risks. Departmental Result 3.1 – Canadian Armed Forces is growing towards its end state of 101 500 personnel”. Government of Canada, Last Modified: 3 Sept 2023, Accessed 8 Feb 2024.

The experiment, tasked to the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion of The Royal Canadian Regiment did not achieve the intended result having only produced “61 new infantry soldiers”.<sup>22</sup> From personal observation, the experiment disappointed primarily because MPC delivered far less than 1000 recruits. Had it done so, more operationally functional infanteers would exist. Contributing to the unsuccessful attempt was a lack of combat power (appropriate #s of personnel) to manage OP PARADIGM training against OP REASSURANCE 23-02 pre-deployment training. Additionally, no suitable & competent Officer In-Charge (OIC) of OP PARADIGM was available. Finally, the endeavor lacked centralized authorities delegated to the CO some of which had been retained by CADTC, schoolhouses, MPC or otherwise. This fact leads one to believe CCA was unable to wrestle well-guarded monopoly powers from the empire and that the effort was perceived an existential threat to organizations in CMP. Summarily from the tactical perspective, the disappointment of OP PARADIGM was not due to CA but due to compounding factors emanating from a plan that was not comprehensive nor wholesomely centralized in *ONE* operationally functional command. This failed to match responsibilities to authorities, resources to requirements, and lacked necessary precondition setting to centralize combat power. The experiment was much less a failure than it was a misfire, as recruits were in fact exposed to the best aspects of early military life, received mentorship and immediate affiliations while staff did benefit from increased proximity to home and family by avoiding taskings at schoolhouses removed from their primary residences.<sup>23</sup>

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<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-plans/departmental-plan-2023-24/planned-results/defence-team.html>


<sup>22</sup> Robinson, Scott. 2023. Pro Patria 2022. 1 RCR. 104th ed. Petawawa, Ontario: The Royal Canadian Regiment. P22-23. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-plans/departmental-plan-2023-24/planned-results/defence-team.html>

<sup>23</sup> Department of National Defence. Departmental Plan 2023-24: “Core Responsibilities: Planned Results and Resources, and Key Risks. Departmental Result 3.1 – Canadian Armed Forces is growing towards its end state of 101 500 personnel”. Government of Canada, Last Modified: 3 Sept 2023, Accessed 8 Feb 2024.



10. The CDS reconstitution priorities are *People and Operations*.<sup>24</sup> the evolved MRS indicates three phases: *Build, Committed to NATO, & Committed to Other*.<sup>25</sup> The proposed solution would see Infantry Regiments conducting an off-set and nested *Recruitment-to-Operational Functional Point (OFP) Training & Validation cycle* within the MRS, visually depicted below.

The recommendation herein is a three-year comprehensive *Band of Brothers* type force generation process. This recommendation utilizes the GoC, CAF, CA silver bullet to get after the #1 problem facing the CAF. It is complimented by the current standard initial offering of a three-



year contract to non-commissioned recruits from CFRG and requires no process change. This process sees the infantry becoming the CA main effort, with all recruits first becoming infanters. To the benefit of the CA, recruits will receive the base-level soldier skills necessary for employment in any MOS or operational theater and would be exposed to a culture of no-fail adaptation & flexibility. From the fourth rifle company; a recruitment and training company, these new recruits will move through the phased cycle of Recruitment, Training, and Operations Validation with the same faces (instructor and peer) thereby enhancing familiarity and bonds both necessary to culture and retention improvement.<sup>26</sup> Finalizing the cycle from recruitment to training will result in their first operational deployment; a job-satisfaction and reinforcement mechanism. At the end of the operational validation, recruits, staff, and external SMEs can leverage assessments and make future employment selections to either remain in the infantry or complete a standardized VOT based on competencies. This the method for resourcing other CA

<sup>24</sup> Eyre, Wayne and Bill Mathews. *CDS/DM Reconstitution Directive*. Last Modified: 6 Oct 2022, Date Accessed 8 Feb 2024.

<sup>25</sup> For MRS, see 1948-2 (DAS 2-2), Canadian Army, “Commander Canadian Army’s Planning Guidance: Operating Plan Fiscal Year 2024-2025”. National Defence, May 2023. P 17. and Annex F, p 6/13.

<sup>26</sup> Eyre, Wayne. Mathews, Bill. *CDS/DM Reconstitution Directive*. Last Modified: 6 Oct 2022, Date Accessed 8 Feb 2024. Para 4.

trades which will create a robust central culture in the CA. This 3-year timeline is congruent with a contract renewal timeline and should enhance retention of junior soldiers as they would have just received the benefits of operational pay, a promotion, and the opportunity to remain in the infantry or explore more interesting/suitable MOS employment. Those desiring to remain infanteers could be enticed/rewarded by leveraging *CDS Reconstitution Directive para 13,C,20* where CMP is directed to “work with RCN, CA, and RCAF to grant equivalencies for PLQ.”<sup>27</sup> Complimenting and in-line with their subsequent contract renewal offer a high performing new recruit could be offered a leadership position within the fourth rifle company. If executed adequately over the next 3-year cycle, Primary Leadership Qualification (PLQ) performance objective equivalencies could be granted as a standardized practice.

11. A trial force generation process such as this would assuage political and strategic concerns of affecting local economies and bases by ensuring its temporary nature.<sup>28</sup> Further, it would capitalize on other positive attributes. Infrastructure at those locals could receive focused efforts in preparation for a return to status quo without the complication of parallel training. Like OP PARADIGM, during the trial period current regular force infanteers would benefit from increased proximity to home and family thereby achieving the CDS focus on people.<sup>29</sup> Centralization of combat power and the recruit/training company offer tempo changes within a command. Reconstitution of the infantry would centralize combat power and alleviate concerns of operational shortfalls both for expeditionary and domestic ops in an ever-increasing environment.<sup>30</sup>

12. After reviewing Annex A - Initial Concept Development Requirements, CCA is recommended to adjust from the OP PARADIGM misfire, reorient and reinforce the infantry as a projectile with comprehensive authorities, overlaid resources, take aim and fire through the window of opportunity provided in the *CDS Reconstitution Directive*.<sup>31</sup> They then should spare no horses in supporting path of flight as it is assessed these immediate action and stoppage drills to develop and resource a comprehensive plan based on OP PARADIGM foundations will put rounds on target and solve CA reconstitution.

## CONCLUSION

13. The CAF is currently plagued with a host of nearly debilitating persistent problems including recruitment, retention, culture, training, tempo, quality of life expectations, resource and funding constraints, an incongruent domestic relationship and diminishing perceptions from global partners. Yet it retains the ability to meet domestic and expeditionary operational requirements. At the center of this success resides the infantry. At base level investment and devoid of high training costs associated with becoming a pilot, a special operator, a ship going to sea or expensive high-tech munitions, the infantry accomplishes this feat at a low-cost comparison due to the flexibility and no-fail culture identifiable in EXPED & DOMOP task completion. With the correct application of supporting fires (funding, policy, authorities –

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid, Para 2.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, Para, 11, d. describes 2030 as the endpoint of reconstitution efforts.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, Para 3, A-1&2. Describes CDS priorities

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, Para 9, e. describes increasing operational commitments.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, Para 13 - B1, B6, C6, C10, G4, G7 all allow for the VCDS to amend and make establishment changes to execute such a reconstitution effort.

extracted from the monopoly) this MOS has the unique potential to cut across all problems and challenge/support the monopoly.

**Annex: A. Initial Concept Development Requirements.**

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## Annex A – Initial Concept Development Requirements

Organizations	Resources
Canadian Military Personnel Command (CMP)	1x dedicated planner (indefinitely)
Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG)	1x dedicated planner (indefinitely)
Career Managers (CMs)	HQ planning support prioritization to the Personnel Crisis Tiger Team (PCTT)
A number of Recruiting Centers (RCs)	HQ planning support prioritization to the Personnel Crisis Tiger Team (PCTT) shifting to dedicated support after concept development.
Strategic Joint Staff	Security Clearance prioritization for requisite clearances to plan with CANSOF, and Navy Seal Recruiting.
Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM)	HQ planning support prioritization to the Personnel Crisis Tiger Team (PCTT) Planning support coordination with U.S. Department of the Navy and Regional Naval Special Warfare Mentors.
Joint Task Force 2	HQ planning support prioritization to the Personnel Crisis Tiger Team (PCTT) 1x dedicated planner (period of 3-6 months)
U.S. Department of the Navy Recruiting & specifically Regional Naval Special Warfare/Special Operations Mentors and Coordinators	1x dedicated Mentor to advise, provide planning support & coordination (period of 3-6 months)
Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center	1x dedicated planner (indefinitely)
Canadian Defence Academy	1x dedicated planner (indefinitely) transitioning to supporting doctrine publications and amendments.
Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS)	HQ planning support prioritization to the Personnel Crisis Tiger Team (PCTT) 1x dedicated planner (6 months)

Organizations	Resources
	Prioritization of coordination with 1x operations officer (period 6 months subsequent to planner)
All Land Force Training Centers (LFTCs)	HQ planning support prioritization to the Personnel Crisis Tiger Team (PCTT) 1x dedicated planner (6 months) Prioritization of coordination with 1x operations officer (period 6 months subsequent to planner)
Director of Infantry & the Infantry School	Director in Infantry Oversight (indefinite) 2x dedicated planners (indefinite) HQ planning support prioritization to the Personnel Crisis Tiger Team (PCTT)
Canadian Forces Training and Development Center	3-4x dedicated TDA's
2nd Division (Div), 3 Div, 4 Div, 5 Div, subordinate RegF CMBG's and Infantry Battalions	1x dedicated planner from each lvl 2& 3 HQ (3-6 months) followed by Prioritization of coordination with 1x operations officer (period 6 months subsequent to planner). HQ planning support prioritization to the Personnel Crisis Tiger Team (PCTT). 1x Recruitment team (4 personnel indefinite) from each Regiment (selective process) 1x Coy (cycled through MRP) to conduct training (basic to MOS DP qualification).
Other.	1x Senior FSA, 1x Senior HRA (indefinite), 1x LEGAD planner (indefinite).

\* Financial resource requirements would be outlined in a business plan after greenlit to conduct concept development. Requirements would include TD & travel to all geographic locations, a central workplace geographic location, hardware, software, and connectivity for PCTT as well as TD, travel, marketing, and hospitality funding for a trial recruitment phase.