



TRANSFORMING THE CANADIAN JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO PAN-DOMAIN OPERATIONS

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JCSP 50

Service Paper

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AIM

1. The aim of this paper is to spur a holistic re-imagining of how the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) could be structured to better conduct Pan-Domain Operations¹ now and into the future. The vision within this paper would form an ‘end state’ of a hypothetical CJOC of the future. This paper will propose structural and role changes which would lay the groundwork for a CJOC which would act as a more complete and integrated Command, optimized for Pan-Domain Operations in a Canadian Context. There remain unanswered questions, gaps, but also opportunities to explore, which are unfortunately beyond scope of this paper and are acknowledged within.

INTRODUCTION

2. The *Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept* (PFEC) emphasizes the necessity of “An Integrated Operational Approach to act holistically against the full array of threats and challenges”². However, at this time, the primary Force Employer of the CAF, CJOC³, is not currently structured or enabled to effectively do this. As one of the three Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Force Employing Level 1 (L1) commands⁴ it occupies a critical position to influence the way in which the CAF conducts operations, and campaigns. Logically, alignment with the PFEC should begin here. While no organization is perfect, it is the premise of this paper that CJOC could stand to adopt some of the integrated aspects of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM)⁵ in order to position itself as a truly Joint Command, optimized for the conduct of Pan-Domain operations. However, it is also acknowledged that a ‘copy-paste’ approach to CJOC from CANSOFCOM will not simply equate to some magical transformation of the former.

3. This paper will examine the current CJOC paradigm and highlight the initial issues which stand in the way of CJOC conducting operations in accordance with the intent of the PFEC. These issues are broadly:

- a. Force Employment (FE) in Pan Domain Operations;
- b. Joint Requirements in elemental Force Development (FD), Force Management (FM), or Force Generation (FG); and
- c. Force Sustainment (FS) of deployed Joint forces.

¹ Department of National Defense, ‘Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept’.

² Department of National Defense, 7.

³ Department of National Defense, ‘Canadian Joint Operations Command’.

⁴ Defence, ‘Organizational Structure of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces’.

⁵ Department of National Defense, ‘Canadian Special Operations Forces Command’.

DISCUSSION

4. Context – Other CAF L1s

- a. Of the Force Employing L1s, the first and oldest is the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD)⁶, established in 1958⁷. As a binational command it is shared between Canada and the United States of America. In essence the role of NORAD is to warn “...of threats to the continent by monitoring and tracking man-made objects [...] in North American airspace and waters. NORAD also provides surveillance and operational control of Canadian and U.S. airspace”⁸, and is headquartered at Petersen Space Force Base in Colorado. In a Canadian Context, it involves predominantly Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) elements, but also has a mandate for Maritime surveillance.
- b. Next is CANSOFCOM. As an integrated L1 Command it not only conducts Force Employment (FE) of forces under its command, but is responsible for Force Generation (FG), Force Development (FD), Force Management (FM), and Force Sustainment (FS)⁹ of those forces. CANSOFCOM has an extremely high operational tempo, iterates rapidly in training, FD, and has recently established four new trades (three for NCMs, one for Officers) and now manages them internally. Owing to the integrated nature of CANSOFCOM, and its small size, CANSOFCOM possesses a remarkable ability to bring multi-domain effects to bear in support of Special Operations. As such, CANSOFCOM is the primary inspiration for the arguments put forth in this paper and the model drawn upon to inform proposed changes to CJOC structure.

5. Context - CJOC

- a. The remaining Force Employing L1 is CJOC. CJOC is responsible for FE of CAF forces globally, except for CANSOFCOM and NORAD missions¹⁰. CJOC currently has no effective mandate to FG, FD, FM any forces under its command. In the realm of FS, CJOC does coordinate sustainment of deployed forces; but does not directly provide it as it has no integral sustainment capability or forces.
- b. CJOC nominally has the six divisionally (Div) based Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTFs) for domestic operations, as well as 1st Canadian Division (1 Cdn Div). However, these Divs and RJTFs have no force employment authorities - or forces - until activated through a named operation.

⁶ Department of National Defense, ‘North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)’.

⁷ Department of National Defense.

⁸ Department of National Defense.

⁹ Department of National Defense, ‘Canadian Special Operations Forces Command’.

¹⁰ Department of National Defense, ‘Canadian Joint Operations Command’.

- c. The responsibility for FG, FM, FD remains with the parent element whether Army, Airforce, or Navy. This of course leads to scenarios where the RJTF Commander - who is also a Canadian Army (CA) Division Commander - is responsive to both the Commander of CJOC for an ongoing Operations, and the Commander of the Canadian Army (CCA) for routine matters.
- d. In the Case of 1st Cdn Division, it remains under CJOC completely, but has few forces under it until transferred for an operation – however most deployed taskforces are Commanded by Commander CJOC – leaving 1 Cdn Div in search of a role. The current structure of CJOC is outlined below and derived from JCSP50 Courseware¹¹:




Figure 1. CJOC Structure

6. Problem Space – FE in Pan Domain Operations
- a. Issue. CJOC cannot effectively conduct Pan Domain Operations as it lacks integral forces, and specifically those in non-traditional cross-cutting domains and environments (Information, Cyber, Space).
- b. Discussion
- 1) Currently, in contrast to CANSOFCOM, CJOC has no integral capability-specific or domain-based forces outside of those employed on named operations and assigned to CJOC. This lack of

¹¹ Lay, Col., 'Introduction to Operational Level Headquarters'.

ownership means that operations and associated tasks are often mis-matched to the capabilities and capacities available;

- 2) This lack of ownership of forces also translates into an ad-hoc employment of capabilities in these non-traditional domains which yield sub-optimal results due to mismatches in time-to-effect and which level of warfare they are most effective;
 - a) For example, the time it takes to bring Space, Cyber, Information, Land, Air, Maritime effects into synchronization to achieve desired effects may be on different timescales by orders of magnitude – from minutes to months. However, a kinetic strike may be most effective at the tactical level, and coordinated in a matter of hours or days, but a non-kinetic offensive cyber operation may be most effective at the operational or strategic level and take weeks or months to put in place.
 - b) The combination of these effects in different domains as part of a Pan-Domain operation may be incredibly effective – but require synchronization and condition setting that begins potentially well before ‘phase 1’ of that operation when shaping is required.
- 3) This mismatch in timescale creates a gap where shaping operations are unable to be effectively coordinated and conducted on a continuous basis to set conditions for future actions in areas of interest; and
- 4) Force employment of deployed task forces is problematic as there are ill defined relationships between deployed forces, 1Cdn Div, and the component commands.

c. Recommendations

- 1) Establish Commander Joint Multi-Domain Forces (CJMDF). The Commander of CJOC should own integral Information environment, Space, and Cyber domain forces under a single subordinate commander. These forces should not only be FE by CJOC, but also FM, FG, FD, and FS by CJOC. Having these integral forces would enable the commander of CJOC to directly task their own forces, to support operations in real-time better matching requirement with assets. This would see forces under a Joint Multi-Domain Force Commander who reports directly to Commander CJOC and would be considered a Level 2 (L2).

- a) Information Environment. A consolidation of all Information Domain forces, including Joint Taskforce X and the Influence Activities Task Force;
 - b) Space Domain. A consolidation of all space capabilities under a single commander. This would include all elements of 3 Canadian Space Division as well as relationships with United States Space Force and others; and
 - c) Cyber Domain. A consolidation of all CAF Cyber capabilities and forces under a single commander, to include Signals Intelligence (SI), joint Electronic Warfare (EW) forces, and Cyber Network Operations (CNO).
- 2) Streamlined C2
- a) Cut the Director General Operations position, and expand the Chief of Staff to include three DCOS positions focussing on Effects (Intelligence, Targeting, Special Effects Management), Ops, and Support; and
 - b) All RJTFs and Multi Domain Force Commanders should report directly to Comd CJOC, mediated through the operational Staff, with an attendant expansion of the staff to manage simultaneous Domestic, and deployed operations.
- 3) CJOC should seek authorities either standing or under regional & global expeditionary operations to conduct continuous shaping and collection operations leveraging the integral multi-domain forces;
- 4) Each traditional domain (land, sea, air) should have a standing Component Command under CJOC - as they currently do for force employment, as suggested below:
- 5) Create a Canadian Joint Expeditionary Division – East (CJED-E)
- a) The Land Component Command (LCC) (1st Cdn Div) should be re-rolled as a Joint Division HQ for expeditionary Operations;
 - b) It should divest domestic and expeditionary disaster response operations to the RJTFs. In particular, it should divest the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) task to RJTF-Atlantic owing to the presence of 1 Engineer Support Unit, 2 Royal Canadian Regiment, RCN and RCAF assets; and

- c) It should be adapted to Command and Control (C2) deployed joint forces in Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and Caribbean / South America, and have formal relationships with MARLANT.
- 6) Create a Canadian Joint Expeditionary Division (or Fleet) – West (CJED-W).
 - a) The Maritime Component Command (MARPAAC recommended) should be re-rolled as a Joint Division HQ for Expeditionary Operations; and
 - b) It should be adapted to C2 deployed joint forces in the Indo-Pacific.

7. Problem Space - Joint Requirements in elemental FG, FD, FM

- a. Issue. CJOC cannot effectively impose or influence Joint Requirements for FD, FM, or FG of the elemental forces, leading to a mismatch in forces and capabilities for the current and future fight.
- b. Discussion
 - 1) The current structure of CJOC has minimal ability to manage Joint Requirements or FD as a small cell under Director General Readiness. Contrasted with CANSOFCOM, which has an integral director of Force Development, subordinate Directors of Special Requirements (DSR), and integral Future Capabilities Integration teams at each line unit;
 - 2) There is currently minimal staff devoted to FG beyond those managing the requirements for deployments and declaration of Operational Readiness by the Force Generating elements. Contrasted with CANSOFCOM where each individual line unit has an integral training element, coordinated by CANSOF HQ, as well as an integral Training Centre designed for common training; and
 - 3) In the realm of Force Management, CJOC does not conduct this as it owns no forces beyond those it is deploying. In the case of CANSOFCOM, FM is conducted internally for all trades and forces owned by CANSOFCOM.
- c. Recommendations
 - 1) Re-Structure CJOC to include:

- a) Director General Joint Force Development (DGJFD). With an appropriate staff and mandate to drive Joint Requirements by portfolio. This would be similar to the CANSOF model for Force Development.
 - b) Director General Joint Force Generation (DGJFG). With an appropriate staff and mandate to manage the force generation of appropriately trained, equipped, and grouped forces for employment. Additionally, DJGFG should:
 - i. Own CAF Managed Readiness Plan;
 - ii. Input into element specific Force Generation efforts to ensure that Joint Requirements are met; and
 - iii. Oversight of FG of Multi-Domain forces integral to CJOC.
 - c) Director General Joint Force Management (DGJFM). With an appropriate staff and mandate to manage all integral CJOC forces including pay, programs, policy, individual training and development.
- 2) Under the Joint Multi-Domain Force Commander explored in the previous section, each domain should have an integral Future Capabilities team which would accelerate and enable force development along domain specific lines. These teams must be integral to the specific force.
8. Problem Space - FS of deployed Joint forces
- a. Issue. CJOC cannot effectively FS deployed forces because it lacks a robust integral sustainment capability currently, and unless this is remedied, the issue will become worse as operational demands increase.
 - b. Discussion
 - 1) Currently CJOC relies on forces assigned to it for operations to be sustained by a mixture of support from their home stations, as well as support coordinated by CJOC;
 - 2) CJOC however has no integral ‘sustainment brigade’ or forces, and must therefore task other CAF entities to provide operational support. This can create significant delays due to coordination requirements, and disjoint in sustainment planning as unless all sustainment entities are at the table. This also creates a situation where the paucity of support resources causes other elements to

have their support components pulled to support the deployed forces; and

- 3) This compounds when coupled with the lack of FD, FG, and FM ownership inherent to the current effects CJOC model, in that large and long-term projects to create robust sustainment capabilities often have little traction or must compete for resources against elemental priorities.

c. Recommendations

- 1) Director General Joint Force Sustainment. Re-role the existing Director General of Support in CJOC and expand the mandate to include contracting, procurement, and oversight of all sustainment efforts under CJOC with a focus on linking 3rd and 4th line support to the forces that need it; and
- 2) Establish a standing Joint Support Element (JSE), or multiples thereof, reporting directly to DGJFS as a grouping of all third line operational support organizations across the CAF. This JSE would be designed to augment deployed forces with third line support, project sustainment to deployed forces, and conduct limited domestic third line support as capacity allows.

9. Limitations of Analysis

- a. The recommendations put forward do not fully integrate all domains into a single Joint Force Command at the operational level, to include Land, Air, and Maritime. This is likely impossible to address fully given the size and resource restrictions of the CAF. Moreover, this would effectively recreate the CAF with a new intervening layer of command which would achieve little; and
- b. This analysis does not examine the ‘whole of CAF’ structural impacts but does obviously have linkages to entities outside of CJOC. These must be explored before any solutions are put in place.

10. Opportunities and Future questions

- a. Could the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) tasks to ‘operationalize intelligence’ be accelerated and realized by bringing large elements of CFINTCOM under the Joint Multi-Domain Forces Commander envisioned above?
- b. What savings in terms of PYs and synergistic effects can be achieved by consolidating Space, Cyber, and Information domain forces under a single command responsible for all 5 FS and with an operational mandate? and

- c. How would expeditionary and domestic operational effects be improved with the integral support of the CJOC Multi Domain Forces?

CONCLUSION

11. This paper has explored potential structural and role changes to CJOC that would address some existing issues in the employment of Joint forces in the context of Pan-Domain operations. Through some relatively comprehensive personnel investments and by expanding the role of CJOC to include all 5Fs, there exists significant potential to meet the demands of the PFEC. While CANSOFCOM is the primary inspiration, it must be noted that the contexts of the two commands are different, and CANSOFCOM itself suffers from its own challenges. All said, the changes recommended above within require additional analysis beyond the scope of this service paper. There are however new and exciting opportunities available if a re-imagining of CJOC is undertaken with the goal of making it fully integrated Command capable of conducting Pan Domain Operations.

RECOMMENDATION

12. The net result of the proposed changes can be best summarized as: making CJOC an Integrated Joint Force Command at the Operational Level, which is optimized to conduct and support Pan Domain-operations. The resultant structure would incorporate the current CJOC structure, but add integral forces and staff resources, and necessitate the associated structures related to managing them, as outlined in Annex A.

Annex(es).

Annex A – Proposed CJOC Macro Structure

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ANNEX A – Proposed CJOC Macro Structure

