



## REAR AREA SECURITY: A PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING ADVISORS WITHIN THE SERVICE BATTALIONS

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### JCSP 50

#### Service Paper

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# **REAR AREA SECURITY: A PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING ADVISORS WITHIN THE SERVICE BATTALIONS**

## **AIM**

1. The aim of this paper is to propose an establishment change to the Service Battalions (Svc Bn) of the three Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups (1,2 and 5 CMBG) that will see the addition of a Rear Area Security (RAS) advisor to CO Svc Bn in order to (IOT) enable them in their mandated RAS responsibilities and the conduct of related operations within a Brigade (Bde) context. This paper argues that there is a significant and urgent operational necessity for this establishment change to take place IOT begin pooling together the proper expertise, develop standing operating procedures (SOP) and ultimately lay the foundation for the required collective training to take place.

## **INTRODUCTION**

2. In October 2022, the commander of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center (CADTC) released the Canadian Army Doctrine Note (CADN) 22-01 pertaining to Rear Area Security in the form of an approved draft. While this document still needs to proceed through official translation and publication by the Army Publishing Office (APO), it currently serves as an interim document IOT to provide insight to the Canadian Army (CA) formations and units regarding the tactical considerations and factors that impact operations within the rear area. More importantly, it lays the foundation for a common understanding and is meant to trigger the implementation of RAS operations within a Brigade (Bde) context, where the CO Svc Bn will be asked to take on the responsibilities as Comd RAS.<sup>1</sup> Although the concept of RAS is not new, the character of warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (i.e asymmetrical threats) and the advancements in technology have forced us to reconsider the concepts of RAS as a whole and update our doctrine.<sup>2</sup>

3. Moving ahead, it is essential to emphasize the importance of incorporating RAS through all stages of planning. The Svc Bn isn't currently enabled, nor does it have the required knowledge and training experience to efficiently do so. This paper will demonstrate that there is a strong case to be made for the permanent integration of a RAS advisor to CO Svc Bn, capable of assuming the responsibilities of OC RAS Coy when required. This integration aims to initiate the development of SOPs, coordinate common training and ensure that the Svc Bn is ready to "fight tonight" if called upon.

## **DISCUSSION**

4. The recent conflict in Ukraine is also a stark reminder that success or failure of logistics at lower levels of war (i.e.. tactical) will have a direct and critical influence on

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<sup>1</sup> Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center, "CADN 22-01, Rear Area Security" (Army Publishing Office, 2022), 5.

<sup>2</sup> Andy Breach, 'The "Rear Area" No Longer Exists' (Wavell Room, 2021), 1.

the operational and strategic objectives.<sup>3</sup> In the early stages of the Ukraine-Russia war, Russian forces failed to reach their stated objectives because they essentially ran out of critical, yet basic supplies, such as water, food, fuel and munition. One of the main reasons for this was because they failed to protect their extended lines of communication, and ultimately, their rear area. They were poorly trained, improperly equipped and lacked coordination IOT effectively protect their depth. They rapidly became victims to attacks on multiple fronts by the Ukrainian forces, who were quick to exploit their vulnerabilities.<sup>4</sup>

5. Stocks and logistical hubs are now more vulnerable than ever to long range precision fires, drones, surveillance, unconventional attacks and ultimately interdiction operations on logistical lines of communications.<sup>5</sup> Amidst these threats, it will be nearly impossible for Bde/Div support areas (BSA/DSA) to continue operating in a static and contiguous fashion, ultimately forcing CSS elements to operate in a more dispersed, nodal structured, mobile and adaptive fashion. It will be imperative that the rear area and lines of communication remain secured IOT maintain freedom of movement and allow the CSS elements to conduct their operations. The integration of FP elements and key enablers will be absolutely critical IOT protect the rear area (RA) and mitigate the associated risks. Furthermore, CADN 22-01 states:

The RAS must also have a clear command and control within assigned areas of responsibility, based on a single commander (generally CO Svc Bn)...which would therefore allow for greater synchronization with the Bde Area Of Common Operating Picture (AO COP) and Bde efforts<sup>6</sup>

6. As depicted in figure 1 and dictated in the doctrine note, CO Svc Bn is tasked as both Comd BSA as well as Comd RA when operating in a level 1 (agents, terrorism, riots) and level 2 (guerillas, unconventional) environment. Any additional security elements that may be required are placed OPCON to Svc Bn. When dealing with a level 3 (conventional) environment, the CO Svc Bn is tasked as Comd BSA and a Cbt Arms Unit CO *should* be tasked as Comd RA.<sup>7</sup> That being said, it is imperative that CO Svc Bn be prepared and able to take on the role of Comd RA in a level 3 environment since a Cbt Arms unit Comd may not always be available and/or the situation may rapidly evolve to a higher threat environment.

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
<sup>3</sup> Manuela Tudosia, 'Lessons Learned from Ukraine: Logistics' (European Security & Defence, 2023), 381, <https://euro-sd.com/2023/06/articles/31845/lessons-learned-from-ukraine-logistics/>.

<sup>4</sup> Bradley Martin, Sean Barnett, and Devin McCarthy, 'Russian Logistics and Sustainment Failures in the Ukraine Conflict' (RAND Corporation, 2023), 7.

<sup>5</sup> Tudosia, 'Lessons Learned from Ukraine: Logistics', 11.

<sup>6</sup> Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center, 'CADN 22-01, Rear Area Security', 9.

<sup>7</sup> Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center, Annex A.



**Figure 1 – Comd RAS Transition Criteria**

Source : CADN 22-01, Annexe A


7. The CADN 22-01 identifies the following objectives for the RAS Comd :
- a. Counter adversarial actions and incursions.
  - b. Minimize the impact of those incursions that occur.
  - c. Protection of lines of communication.
  - d. Protection of the support area and bases/installations.
  - e. Control of the civilian population in conjunction with CIMIC authorities.
  - f. Minimize the damage caused by natural causes or enemy interdiction.
  - g. Surveillance of the entire RA and active intelligence collection on enemy activities to include sympathetic civilians predominantly via convoy Ops.
  - h. Development of contingency plans for all likely tasks, including :
    - i. Relief and rescue of attacked installations and units.
    - ii. Patrolling of routes and protection of convoys.
    - iii. Surveillance and possible assembly areas for guerrillas or infiltrators.
    - iv. Defense of drop and landing zones.
    - v. Responsibility for finding, fixing and destroying enemy forces operating in the rear area.<sup>8</sup>

8. As depicted in figure 2, “the Log Ops of the Svc Bn would be responsible to CO Svc Bn for planning, execution and control of sustainment operations and the RAS Coy operations cell would be responsible to CO Svc Bn (*through an OC RAS Coy*) for the planning, execution and control of RAS”.<sup>9</sup> There is currently very limited doctrine available, aside from CADN 22-01, and even less SOPs when it comes to RAS operations and the integration of FP elements and enablers. It is safe to say that Svc Bn isn’t currently enabled or trained to take on this role and is even less in position to fight tonight. As the CAF stand strong in Latvia (OP REASSURANCE) as the lead nation for


<sup>8</sup> Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center, 8,9.

<sup>9</sup> Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center, 8.

the Bde Group, including the Multinational Logistic Unit (see figure 3)<sup>10</sup>, they face a situation where RAS will most definitely be contested if the conflict were to escalate to a full-blown war with Russia under NATO article 5. This situation needs to be taken seriously and Svc Bn needs to start developing SOPs, conduct collaborative training, and apply doctrine as it becomes available. It is also crucial that corporate memory is maintained as we move forward IOT facilitate the integration of FP elements and enablers into a RAS Coy, under command of the Svc Bn, when activated. To achieve this, a RAS advisor, who can also serve as OC RAS Coy when required, should be permanently and immediately added to the Svc Bn REMAR through an establishment change.



**Figure 2 –RAS Concept of Operations**  
Source : CADN 22-01, Annexe A



**Figure 3 – ORBAT Op REASSURANCE 2402**  
Source : G3 2 Div CA Brief (Plan d'emploi PRES vs MRP)

<sup>10</sup> G3 2 Div CA, 'Présentation Du Plan d'emploi PRES vs MRP', 8.

9. Position details: The position must be low/high rank of Major and could be assigned to any combat arms trade. Possible exceptions could be entertained for a senior captain with the right attributes and nearing promotion, pending a waiver.

10. Sourcing: Further studies are required to determine exactly where the three RAS advisor positions (1,2 and 5 Svc Bn) would come from but four possible avenues are being suggested:

- a. Creation of three new RAS Advisor positions by the Army for 1,2 and 5 Svc Bn.
- b. The identification of three positions, through the annual establishment change review, to be transferred to the 3 x Svc Bn.
- c. Internal reshuffle of one position within each of the three CMBGs IOT transfer a position to their respective Svc Bn. The Svc Bn are currently going through the re-alignment of Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountabilities (ARA) between field and institutional support, so this could be an opportunity to rescope a position.<sup>11</sup>
- d. This could potentially be a good employment opportunity for a reservist through a class A/B contract.

11. ORBAT and Concept of Employment:

- a. The positions of RAS Advisor would fall under full command of CO Svc Bn, as depicted in figure 4,<sup>12</sup> and they would assume the following responsibilities:
  - i. Consolidation of all relevant doctrine (Canadian and foreign) as well as lessons learned pertaining to RAS IOT begin developing situational awareness and expertise. It will also be important to maintain close contact with CADTC regarding new RAS doctrine as it becomes available.
  - ii. Conduct threat analysis and identify vulnerabilities pertaining to RAS for the various types of operating environments across the spectrum of conflict.
  - iii. Develop SOPs and identify the different RAS Coy configurations (TO&E) required IOT overcome/mitigate the various threats associated with RAS operations.
  - iv. Identify the various enablers and bring them into working groups to develop SOPs, common understanding and plan relevant collective training (plans to be approved by CoC thereafter).


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<sup>11</sup> 2 Div CA, 'Directive de Mise En Œuvre Du Projet Pilote de Réalignement Des Pouvoirs, Responsabilité et Obligations (PRO) de Soutien de La 2 Div CA', 2023.

<sup>12</sup> 2 Div CA, 18.

Memorandums of understanding (MOU) would need to be established IOT set the conditions and guarantee the participation of the enablers during exercises and operations.

- v. Work in close collaboration with the Senior Logistic Operations Officer (SLOO) and the Cbt Arms Advisor WO (depicted in figure 4)<sup>13</sup> to develop training plans that would integrate and operationalize RAS in Svc Bn exercises at the unit and sub-unit level. This would require collaboration with other units IOT integrate the various required enablers during exercises.
- vi. Serve as the Cbt Arms SME (with the Cmbt Arms WO) for the Svc Bn and ensure proper training is conducted so that CSS members acquire the proper soldier skills required to defend themselves when employed in a contested RA.
- vii. Work in close collaboration with the G3 of the Bde IOT integrate and effectively employ RAS elements in Bde exercises. The advisor would also ensure that RAS is not overlooked and that appropriate assets are provided, when required.



**Figure 4 – Proposed ORBAT with addition of RAS Advisor**

Source : Directive de mise en œuvre du projet pilote de réalignement des Pouvoirs, Responsabilité et Obligations (PRO) de soutien de la 2 Div CA.

- b. During Bde exercises or on operations where CO Svc Bn has been assigned as Comd RAS, the Advisor RAS could be mandated to assume the position of OC RAS Coy. The RAS Coy would typically be composed of a task tailored group of RAS FP Elements and enablers that would be

<sup>13</sup> It is to be noted that the position of Cbt Arms Advisor (rank of WO) under the Ops NCO (rank of MWO) depicted in Figure 4 has not been implemented or approved yet. It was formally proposed by 2 Div CA for the re-alignment initiative of Authorities, Responsibilities and Accountabilities (ARAs) between field and institutional support and is pending approval.



attached under operational command (OPCON) to OC RAS Coy and ideally be platoon sized for Battle Group operations and Coy size for Bde Group operations.<sup>14</sup> The exact configuration of the RAS Pl or Coy will vary depending on the situation and could hold various combination of the following elements:

- i. Mechanized infantry (between pl and coy size) for convoy escorts, area/infrastructure security and patrolling.
- ii. Combat Engineers for route clearance and mobility.
- iii. Fires personnel to call in fire support and conduct anti-air operations.
- iv. Psyops Operators IOT conduct influence activities.
- v. Intelligence capabilities, which can be leveraged from the Svc Bn Int O.
- vi. CIMIC operators to enable the control the movement of civilian populations and displaced personnel.
- vii. MP for the handling of prisoners, traffic control and control of displaced personnel within the RA.<sup>15</sup>

## CONCLUSION

12. The concepts of RAS have been considerably neglected by the CAF since the last major conflict (ie. WW2) and the threats have often been wished away during the conduct of our exercises. Furthermore, in Afghanistan we benefited from a relatively secure RA, thus making our lessons learned not as relevant for the conflicts to come. The threat is however very real and recent conflicts have reminded us that the RA will be a target of primary interest moving forward. If the CO Svc Bn is to take on the critical task of Comd RA for the Bde, it is essential that they are properly enabled to do so by providing them a RAS advisor detaining the proper skillsets and competencies. Not only would the RAS advisor be responsible for developing SOPs and coordinating relevant training for the integration of RAS within the bde context, but they could also be employed as OC RAS Coy when required.

13. Bringing together the required forces and enablers to properly address and mitigate the posed RAS threats will without a doubt be a treacherous task. The challenge lies in balancing the available forces required to fulfill primary combat missions and those necessary to fulfill the secondary, yet critical, protection tasks. Having a RAS advisor will significantly contribute to achieving balance, as they will be able to provide sound recommendations to CO Svc Bn and, ultimately, the Bde Comd regarding which force packages should be employed, and more importantly, why. It will be the RAS Advisor's role to continually nurture the relationships with enablers and their units IOT

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<sup>14</sup> Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center, 'CADN 22-01, Rear Area Security', 6.

<sup>15</sup> Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center, 8.

to set the conditions and allow for a smooth integration when the time comes, whether it be on exercise or for an operation.

14. The creation of a RAS Advisor position will not only profit the Svc Bn but it will also be a great opportunity for Cbt Arms to post one of their senior majors within a Svc Bn, which will ultimately widen their field of expertise regarding CSS. The knowledge gained will surely provide them with invaluable tools and situational awareness for when they become CO of a unit and/or Bde Comd.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

15. In addition to the recommendations already provided within this document, it is recommended that approval for the proposed establishment change be granted as soon as possible so that by the end Fiscal Year (FY) 24/25, the three positions of RAS Advisor have been filled by members detaining the proper rank, qualifications, and competencies. It is acknowledged that further studies are required to determine where these three positions would come from.

16. It is also recommended that a working group, consisting of the three RAS Advisors and a few selected members of CADTC, be established to collaborate on the publication a future RAS doctrine and the development of common SOPs among the three Bde. This process would be iterative and continuous, incorporating lessons learned from various exercises and operations, such as up OP REASSURANCE.

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