



**The Brazilian Presence in MINUSCA:
Benefits for Defence Policy**

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JCSP 50

Exercise Solo Flight

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THE BRAZILIAN PRESENCE IN MINUSCA: BENEFITS FOR DEFENSE POLICY

INTRODUCTION

UN peace keeping missions play a crucial role as one of the various instruments used by the Brazilian state for the peaceful resolution of conflicts on a global scale.¹ Brazil reiterates its commitment to promoting stability and harmony among nations through peacekeeping missions.² The 1988 federal constitution plays a fundamental role in establishing the guidelines that govern Brazil's international relations.³ Within this context, the Federal Constitution not only outlines the basic principles that guide Brazilian diplomacy but also consolidates the country's commitment to peace and security on a global scale.⁴

After the end of the Cold War, the change in the balance of power that marked the bipolar dynamics of the world led to the increase of internal conflicts in several regions, with particular emphasis on the African continent.⁵ In this unstable environment, Brazil resumed an active role by deploying troops to African territories after a considerable absence since Angola in 1989-1990.⁶ The peace missions in Mozambique (1994) and Angola (1995) marked the resumption of Brazilian involvement.⁷ These operations reflected the commitment stipulated by the 1988 Constitution, demonstrating the Brazilian state's willingness to expand its presence and contribution internationally.⁸

From 2003 onwards, the Brazilian government adopted the "Solidarity Diplomacy" strategy to promote Brazil's image around the world.⁹ From this perspective, the country assumed leadership of the military component of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for approximately thirteen years.¹⁰ During this period, the government created several defense documents, notably the National Defense Policy (PND), the National Defense Strategy (END), and the National Defense White Book (LBDN).¹¹ These documents outlined Brazil's

¹ Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*, Brasília, 2012, 17.

² Brasil, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*, 17.

³ Brasil, *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil*, Brasília, 1988, 11.

⁴ Brasil, *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil*, 11.

⁵ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Desequilíbrio de poder," *O Estado de São Paulo*, São Paulo, 2007, Coluna Espaço Aberto, 2.

⁶ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Desequilíbrio de poder," 2.

⁷ Norberto Moretti, "As Operações de Manutenção da Paz como Instrumento da Política Externa Brasileira," *Revista Integração - CCOPAB*, Rio de Janeiro, 2013, 26.

⁸ Norberto Moretti, "As Operações de Manutenção da Paz como Instrumento da Política Externa Brasileira," 26.

⁹ Ricardo Seitenfus, "Gouverner l'intégration: Les politiques nationale et international du Brésil de Lula," *Le Sud deviant le Nord*, In. S. Monclair e J. F. Deluchey, *Paris: Editions Pepper*, 2006, 11.

¹⁰ Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*, Brasília, 2012, 105.

¹¹ Brasil, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*, 7.

various objectives regarding the national defense sector, including its participation in peace missions.¹²


With Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH ending in 2017, the United Nations (UN) consulted Brazil maintaining the continuity of its contribution to international stability.¹³ In this context, the Central African Republic presented itself as a prominent option for the new deployment of the national contingent, provoking the Brazilian state to respond, which could increase its soft power.¹⁴

In this sense, it is up to Brazil to analyze the benefits of the country's participation in the United Nations Integrated Multidimensional Mission for the Stabilization of the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in relation to the National Defense Policy. The successful experience at MINUSTAH provides support for the decision-making process at the political and strategic level, obviously adapted to the conditions of the new components of the current scenario in the MINUSCA.

This study aims to analyze the prospective scenario arising from the possibility of deploying a Brazilian contingent in a peace operation within MINUSCA. In conducting this analysis, this work will examine the Central African Republic, MINUSCA, Brazilian diplomacy, and the strategic Brazilian circumstances to make conclusions regarding how participation would meet the objectives of the National Defense Policy and its influence on Foreign Policy.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The Central African Republic (CAR) is a country located in the central region of Africa, bordering to the east with South Sudan, to the northeast with Sudan, to the north with Chad, to the south with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with the



¹² Brasil, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*, 7.

¹³ Roberto Caiafa, "ONU oficializa pedido de tropas ao Brasil," Infodefensa.com, accessed February 20, 2024, <https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3076456/onu-oficializa-pedido-tropas-ao-brasil>.

¹⁴ Roberto Caiafa, "ONU oficializa pedido de tropas ao Brasil."

Republic of Congo, and to the west with Cameroon.¹⁵ Bangui is the capital, and according to the United Nations (UN), the country has 4.6 million inhabitants (Figure 1).¹⁶

Figure 1 - Central African Republic Political Map

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica. "Central African Republic," accessed February 22, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic>.

The region in which the CAR is located became a French colony in the 19th century.¹⁷ In 1889, France installed an outpost in Bangui, and in 1894, created the territory of Ubangui-Chari.¹⁸ In 1910, the French unified Ubangui-Chari with the territories that today belong to Chad, Congo, and Gabon to form French Equatorial Africa. In 1948, France established a Parliament in Ubangui-Chari, and in 1958, the territory gained its sovereignty, changing its name to the Central African Republic and became independent in 1960.¹⁹

After around three decades of military governments involving significant political instability, elections took place in 2005.²⁰ General François Bozizé, leader of an army coup in 2003 and responsible for establishing a transitional government, was confirmed as president.²¹ He was re-elected in 2011 in an electoral process suspected of fraud, resulting in the emergence of groups unhappy with the situation.²²

At the end of 2012, an armed conflict broke out between the national government and rebels. From then on, several rebel groups emerged focused on issues of ethnic and religious sectarianism between Christian and Muslim groups, increasing instability to the region.²³ Armed opposition groups in the northeast of CAR allied to form the *ex-Seleka* to attack the country's capital and increase their political influence.²⁴ *Seleka* was a coalition that emerged in August 2012 in the Central African Republic.²⁵ It was comprised of various political factions and militias that opposed President François Bozizé's government.²⁶ Although *Seleka* had a Muslim religious

¹⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Central African Republic," accessed February 22, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic>.

¹⁶ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Central African Republic."

¹⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Central African Republic," accessed February 22, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic>.

¹⁸ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Central African Republic."

¹⁹ Ligia Maria Caldeira Leite de Campos et al, "O conflito na República Centro-Africana," *Série Conflitos Internacionais. Observatório de Conflitos Internacionais da Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências (FFC) da Universidade Estadual Paulista Julio de Mesquita Filho (UNESP)*, 2016, 1.

²⁰ Ligia Maria Caldeira Leite de Campos et al, "O conflito na República Centro-Africana," 1.

²¹ Campos et al, "O conflito na República Centro-Africana," 1.

²² Campos et al, "O conflito na República Centro-Africana," 2.

²³ Campos et al, "O conflito na República Centro-Africana," 2.

²⁴ ACAPS, "Central African Republic," accessed February 25, 2024, <https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/car/>.

²⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Central African Republic," accessed March 22, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic>.

²⁶ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Central African Republic."

orientation, the majority of the country's population was Christian (80%).²⁷ However, the coalition did not have a specific political ideology, demands, or agenda.²⁸ Another group that stood out was *Anti-Balaka*, which was seen favorably by political authorities, and the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) supported it.²⁹

As a result of the conflict between the groups above, there were mass atrocities, with executions, rapes, and looting, in addition to the promotion of religious tension, where 80 percent of the population was Christian.³⁰ This reality resulted in a large number of deaths and injuries as the result of acts of violence against civilians, leading thousands of Central Africans to move or take refuge in nearby countries (Figure 2).³¹



Figure 2 - Refugee Camp in Kabo

Source: Ligia Maria Caldeira Leite de Campos et al, “O conflito na República Centro-Africana,” *Série Conflitos Internacionais. Observatório de Conflitos Internacionais da Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências (FFC) da Universidade Estadual Paulista Julio de Mesquita Filho* (UNESP), 2016, 3.

The situation in the country caused the UN Security Council (UNSC), through Resolution 2127 of December 5, 2013, to unanimously approve the creation of the African Union peacekeeping mission, called Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine (MISCA), later transformed into the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission of the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).³²

²⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Central African Republic.”

²⁸ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Central African Republic.”

²⁹ ACAPS, “Central African Republic,” accessed February 25, 2024, <https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/car#>.

³⁰ Ligia Maria Caldeira Leite de Campos et al, “O conflito na República Centro-Africana,” *Série Conflitos Internacionais. Observatório de Conflitos Internacionais da Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências (FFC) da Universidade Estadual Paulista Julio de Mesquita Filho* (UNESP), 2016, 2.

³¹ Campos et al, “O conflito na República Centro-Africana,” 2.

³² Ligia Maria Caldeira Leite de Campos et al, “O conflito na República Centro-Africana,” *Série Conflitos Internacionais. Observatório de Conflitos Internacionais da Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências (FFC) da Universidade Estadual Paulista Julio de Mesquita Filho* (UNESP), 2016, 3.

MINUSCA

Recently, based on resolution No. 2709 (2023), the Security Council renewed MINUSCA's mandate until November 15, 2024, reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the CAR.³³ The UN further reinforced the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defense and defense of the mandate, recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country in question.³⁴

Seeking to help the country, MINUSCA is also supporting the electoral process.³⁵ On January 26, the CAR National Assembly approved a new electoral code, a framework for the following local, presidential, and legislative elections in 2025.³⁶ The code determines quotas and a seven-year term for elected representatives, imposes eligibility criteria that exclude members of armed groups and instigators of rebellions, and reinforces nationality, education, and physical presence requirements for presidential and legislative candidates.³⁷

Regarding security in CAR, there are disagreements between the two main rival groups, the *ex-Seleka* and the *Anti-Balaka*, throughout the interior. Despite the presence of around 17,126 blue helmets throughout the country, the MINUSCA contingent's troops cannot adequately confront the armed groups and bands that operate with a certain freedom in almost the entire Central African territory (Figure 3).³⁸

³³ Secretary-General, "Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General," *UN*, S/2024/170, 1.

³⁴ Secretary-General, "Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General," 4.

³⁵ Secretary-General, "Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General," 4.

³⁶ Secretary-General, "Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General," 4.

³⁷ Secretary-General, "Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General," 1.

³⁸ Secretary-General, "Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General," *UN*, S/2024/170, 26.

Political Agreement violations, 2022

Political Agreement violations, 2023



Figure 4 – Political Agreement Violations

Source: Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” UN, S/2024/170, 30.

Also, according to the report, protection challenges related to explosive devices continue.⁴² Between October 2, 2023, and February 1, 2024, the number of explosive device incidents and casualties increased compared to the previous period.⁴³ On January 15, near the village of Mbindali, Ouham-Pendé province, a MINUSCA patrol hit an explosive device while returning from Paoua after escorting aid workers assisting Nzakoundou. One peacekeeper died, and six workers were injured.⁴⁴ The total number of casualties caused by hostile actions since the activation of MINUSCA demonstrates the lack of security for UN troops, 164 military personnel, of which 15 only in 2017 (Figure 5).⁴⁵ According to a statement released on May 1st, 2018, by the Ministry of Defense of Brazil, two Brazilian officers were injured, one of them seriously, after being attacked with stones inside a UN vehicle in a Muslim neighborhood of the city of Bangui.⁴⁶

⁴² Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” 4.

⁴³ Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” 6.

⁴⁴ Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” 6.

⁴⁵ UN, “United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic,” accessed February 22, 2024, <https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/facts-and-figures>.

⁴⁶ Renato Souza, Correio Braziliense, “Militar do Exército Brasileiro que foi ferido na África passa por cirurgia,” accessed February 25, 2024, <https://www.correio braziliense.com.br/app/noticia/brasil/2018/05/02/interna-brasil.677843/militar-brasileiro-que-foi-ferido-na-africa-passa-por-cirurgia.shtml>

Security incidents targeting MINUSCA personnel




Figure 5 – Security Incidents Targeting MINUSCA Personnel

Source: Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” UN, S/2024/170, 27.

As of February 1, 2024, MINUSCA has a contingent of 14,132 military personnel, approximately 82 percent of a total authorized force of 17,126, comprising 11 infantry battalions, a special forces company, a quick reaction force company, unmanned aerial vehicles, in addition to a military police company, four engineering companies, and a heavy transport company.⁴⁷ In addition to this contingent, three level II hospitals, a signal company, and three helicopter units, including a combat helicopter unit, are distributed, as shown in Figure 6.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” UN, S/2024/170, 30.

⁴⁸ Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” 30.




Figure 6 - MINUSCA Troop Distribution

Source: Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” UN, S/2024/170, 30.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic: military and police strength as at 1 February 2024

Country	Military component				Police component	
	Experts on mission	Staff officers	Troops	Total	Formed police units	Individual police officer
Argentina	–	2	–	2	–	–
Bangladesh	12	36	1 398	1 446	–	4
Benin	4	3	–	7	–	16
Bhutan	2	5	180	6	–	–
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2	4	–	6	–	–
Brazil	3	6	–	9	–	1
Burkina Faso	0	7	–	7	–	51
Burundi	8	12	744	764	–	–
Cambodia	4	6	338	348	–	–
Cameroon	3	7	748	758	320	12
China	–	–	–	–	–	5
Colombia	1	–	–	1	–	–
Congo	3	7	–	10	179	–
Côte d'Ivoire	0	3	180	183	–	35
Czechia	3	–	–	3	–	–
Djibouti	–	–	–	–	180	20
Ecuador	–	1	–	1	–	–
Egypt	8	30	988	1 026	140	44
France	–	4	–	4	–	–
Gambia	3	6	–	9	–	1
Ghana	3	9	–	12	–	5
Guatemala	2	2	–	4	–	–
Guinea	–	–	–	–	–	11
India	–	3	–	3	–	–
Indonesia	4	10	215	223	140	17
Jordan	3	7	–	10	–	62
Kazakhstan	–	2	–	2	–	–
Kenya	7	9	–	18	–	–
Madagascar	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mali	–	–	–	–	–	8
Mauritania	8	9	448	465	319	4
Mexico	1	1	–	2	–	–
Mongolia	–	3	–	3	–	–
Morocco	5	21	745	771	–	–
Nepal	5	17	1 219	1 241	–	–
Niger	–	6	–	6	–	53
Nigeria	–	6	–	6	–	8

Country	Military component				Police component	
	Experts on mission	Staff officers	Troops	Total	Formed police units	Individual police officer
Pakistan	9	31	1 275	1 315	–	–
Paraguay	2	2	–	4	–	–
Peru	7	8	220	235	–	3
Philippines	2	1	–	3	–	–
Portugal	–	10	215	225	–	8
Republic of Moldova	2	1	–	3	–	–
Romania	–	–	–	–	–	8
Russian Federation	2	7	–	9	–	–
Rwanda	9	30	2 110	2 149	638	58
Senegal	–	12	179	191	497	37
Serbia	2	4	71	77	–	–
Sierra Leone	2	3	–	5	–	–
Spain	–	–	–	–	–	3
Sri Lanka	–	3	110	113	–	–
Togo	4	6	–	11	–	39
Tunisia	3	12	758	773	–	57
Türkiye	–	–	–	–	–	11
United Republic of Tanzania	–	7	510	517	–	–
United States of America	–	11	–	11	–	–
Uruguay	–	3	–	3	–	–
Viet Nam	1	6	–	7	–	–
Zambia	7	17	910	934	–	–
Zimbabwe	2	2	–	4	–	–
Total	148	423	13 561	14 132	2 413	581

Figure 7 – Military and Police Strength

Source: Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” UN, S/2024/170, 30.

According to United Nations data, Rwanda had the highest number of military personnel in MINUSCA as of February 2024, followed by Bangladesh and Pakistan (as shown in Figure 7). Moreover, the same data indicates that Brazil had only nine soldiers in the force as of February 2024.⁴⁹

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND BRAZIL'S PARTICIPATION

The international geopolitical situation has influenced UN peacekeeping Operations. The existence of traditional peace operations characterized the Cold War period.⁵⁰ On the other hand, the New World Order has changed the demands and conditions of the UN's actions to alleviate controversies, causing the evolution of the concept into Multidimensional Peace Operations.⁵¹

The distinguishing characteristic of traditional peace missions was that the military did not directly participate in efforts at the political level to resolve the conflict.⁵² This role was performed by diplomats or other representatives of individual states and regional organizations, in addition to special UN envoys, who provided negotiations for a possible long-term solution.⁵³ Further, in traditional peace operations, the use of the military component was predominant.⁵⁴ Support for the control mechanisms of a ceasefire agreement, the deployment of troops, the supporting verification mechanisms, and the establishment of buffer zones were how the United Nations provided the international community's contribution to conflicts resolution.⁵⁵ Peacekeeping forces operated in the country to play the role of international guarantor in containing the escalation of violence between the two actors.⁵⁶

⁴⁹ Secretary-General, “Central African Republic: report of the Secretary-General,” UN, S/2024/170, 1.

⁵⁰ Kai Michael Kenkel, “Cinco gerações de operações de paz: de ténue linha azul a pintar um país de azul,” *Revista Brasileira Política*, Int. 56 (2013), 125.

⁵¹ Kai Michael Kenkel, “Cinco gerações de operações de paz: de ténue linha azul a pintar um país de azul,” 125.

⁵² Øyvind Dammen, *Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials*, Harvey Langholtz, J (Org.), 1^a Ed, 346 f. Williamsburg, VA, EUA: Peace Operations Training Institute, 2014, 41.

⁵³ Dammen, *Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials*, 41.

⁵⁴ Alex J Bellamy, *The ‘Next Stage’ in Peace Operations Theory?*, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2004, 17.

⁵⁵ Alex J Bellamy, *The ‘Next Stage’ in Peace Operations Theory?*, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2004, 17.

⁵⁶ Bellamy, *The ‘Next Stage’ in Peace Operations Theory?*, *International Peacekeeping*, 17.

The Brazilian government was a founding member of the UN, with Africa being the first continent to receive the deployment of Brazilian blue helmets. The Suez Battalion was created in 1956 to supervise peace negotiations during the conflict over control of the Suez Canal in Egypt.⁵⁷ Brazil also contributed to other missions, such as the United Nations Operation in Congo between 1960 and 1964.⁵⁸

The United Nations (UN) mandate created traditional peace operations to intervene in conflicts between states; however, since the military component was predominant and the military was not involved at the political level to resolve the dispute, the failure of some missions in terms of their primary objectives became evident.⁵⁹ The superficial treatment of the consequences of the conflicts did little to address their deep causes, motivating the readjustment of the new interventions that followed after the fall of the Berlin Wall.⁶⁰

Multidimensional peacekeeping missions began in the in the first half of the 1990s following the end of the Cold War.⁶¹ This type of peacekeeping mission was an evolution driven by the sensitive changes in the geopolitical scenario in the New World Order.⁶²

Brazilian action in Multidimensional peace operations had its most striking example in MINUSTAH.⁶³ During this mission, Brazil sent 37 thousand soldiers to Haiti, organized into 26 contingents on a rotational basis. Throughout the period in which Brazil sent its contingents, the force commander of the UN forces in Haiti was always a general of the Brazilian Army, characterizing an unprecedented commitment for the country.⁶⁴

The military component did not act exclusively to establish security in Haiti.⁶⁵ Using engineering means to construct Haiti's critical infrastructure was an example of

⁵⁷ Priscila Liane Fett Faganello, *Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU: de que forma os direitos humanos revolucionaram a principal ferramenta internacional da paz*, Brasília: Fundação Alexandre Gusmão (FUNAG), 2013, 59.

⁵⁸ Priscila Liane Fett Faganello, *Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU: de que forma os direitos humanos revolucionaram a principal ferramenta internacional da paz*, 61.

⁵⁹ Faganello, *Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU: de que forma os direitos humanos revolucionaram a principal ferramenta internacional da paz*, 63.

⁶⁰ Faganello, *Operações de Manutenção da Paz da ONU: de que forma os direitos humanos revolucionaram a principal ferramenta internacional da paz*, 63.

⁶¹ Kai Michael Kenkel, "Cinco gerações de operações de paz: de tênue linha azul a pintar um país de azul," *Revista Brasileira Política*, Int. 56 (2013), 128.

⁶² Kai Michael Kenkel, "Cinco gerações de operações de paz: de tênue linha azul a pintar um país de azul," *Revista Brasileira Política*, Int. 56 (2013), 128.

⁶³ Norberto Moretti, "As Operações de Manutenção da Paz como Instrumento da Política Externa Brasileira," *Revista Integração - CCOPAB*, Rio de Janeiro, 2013, 3.

⁶⁴ Carlos Augusto Ramires Teixeira, and Eduarda Passarelli Hamann, "A participação do Brasil na MINUSTAH (2004-2017): percepções, lições e práticas relevantes para futuras missões," *Revista Brasil - MINUSTAH – 2004* (CCOPAB e Instituto Igarapé), Edição especial - Coletânea de artigos, Rio de Janeiro, 2017, 2.

⁶⁵ Norberto Moretti, "As Operações de Manutenção da Paz como Instrumento da Política Externa Brasileira," 3.

the alignment of Brazilian foreign policy with the new understanding of the multilateral effort to consolidate peace in degraded States.⁶⁶ In this sense, it is worth highlighting the work of the Peace Force Engineering Company in Haiti (Cia E F Paz), in UN terminology this group was the Brazilian Engineering Company (BRAENGCOY). The Engineering Company's mission was to support construction work, installations (infrastructure and superstructure), and provide protection for Peace Force contingents throughout the country (Figure 8).⁶⁷ In addition, BRAENGCOY provided humanitarian assistance in works for schools, orphanages, hospitals, police units, and roads.⁶⁸

Order	Service description	Accumulated
1	Explosive destruction	3.050 Kg
2	Remblais extraction	83.691 m ³
3	Topographic surveys	106
4	Trench cleaning	20.135 m
5	Container movement	803
6	Well drilling	64
7	Prefabricated	2.246 m ²
8	Water production	364.708 m ³
9	Crushed powder production	39.150 m ³
10	Asphalt production	24.088 m ³
11	Crushed stone production	72.774 m ³
12	Land regularization	61.025 m ²
13	Removal of rubble/rubble	24.262 m ³

⁶⁶ Norberto Moretti, "As Operações de Manutenção da Paz como Instrumento da Política Externa Brasileira," 17.

⁶⁷ Verde-Oliva, "Brasil no Haiti - Um Caso de Sucesso / 2004 – 2017," *Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército*, Edição especial, nº 241, Brasília-DF, 2018, 30.

⁶⁸ Verde-Oliva, "Brasil no Haiti - Um Caso de Sucesso / 2004 – 2017," *Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército*, Edição especial, nº 241, Brasília-DF, 2018, 31.

14	Road repair	815.905 m2
15	Facility repair	7.230 m2
16	Water supply	39.632 m3
17	Earthmoving	518.222 m2
18	Asphalt works	349.882 m2
19	Demolition works	3.049 m2
20	Static Point	37
21	Others (inspections, recognition, meetings, training and visits)	1.066

Figure 8 – Summary of works by BRAENGCOY

Source: Verde-Oliva, “Brasil no Haiti - Um Caso de Sucesso / 2004 – 2017,” *Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército*, Edição especial, nº 241, Brasília-DF, 2018, 32.

Given the various forms of power, Multidimensional Peace Operations have a more significant role in supporting the rebuilding of the state than traditional operations.⁶⁹ When the United Nations stopped being mere monitors of peace agreements and ceasefires between two or more countries, peacekeepers began to influence a complex system of interests that often go beyond the parties involved in the agreement to establish the mission mandate, increasing the risk to troops and civilians.⁷⁰

The deployment of Brazilian military contingents in Multidimensional Peace Operations covers different types of approaches, not restricted only to establishing security in a given country, but must be in accordance with Brazilian National Defense Policy.

⁶⁹ Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business,” December 19, 2017, accessed February 20, 2024, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf

⁷⁰ Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business,” December 19, 2017, accessed February 20, 2024, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.pdf

NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE OBJECTIVES RELATED TO PEACE MISSIONS

The National Defense Policy is the highest-level document related to defense matters which fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense (MD).⁷¹ The National Defense Policy is primarily focused on external threats, establishing objectives for preparing and using all expressions of national power in favor of national defense.⁷² Understanding the national defense objectives is the basis for developing a public policy to project national power abroad. Among the National Defense Objectives (OND), two directly related to Peace Operations stand out: OND 7 – Contribute to regional stability and international peace and security and OND 8 – Increase Brazil's projection in the concert of nations and their insertion in global decision-making processes.⁷³ Regarding OND 7 and OND 8, the country's contribution to maintaining international peace and security through UN peace operations demonstrates, in a practical way, the willingness and capacity to assume a share of responsibility for the defense of peace, which is fundamental to expanding Brazil's influence on the world stage.⁷⁴ In this case, it is essential to highlight that Brazil's participation in MINUSCA would fully meet National Defense Objectives 7 and 8, helping to enhance the country's image on the world stage.

The Federal Constitution of 1988, in Article 4, makes it clear that the nation's international relations point towards more significant interaction with the global community:

Art. 4º Art. 4 The Federative Republic of Brazil is governed in its international relations by the following principles:

I – [...]

II – Prevalence of human rights;

III – [...]

IV- Non-intervention;

V- Equality between States;

VI - Defense of peace;

VII- Peaceful resolution of conflicts;

VIII- Repudiation of terrorism and racism;

IX- Cooperation between people for the progress of humanity; [...].⁷⁵

⁷¹ Brasil, *Política Nacional de Defesa*, Brasília, 2020, 7.

⁷² Brasil, *Política Nacional de Defesa*, 7.

⁷³ Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, *Livro Branco de Defesa*, Brasília, 2020, 35.

⁷⁴ Norberto Moretti, "As Operações de Manutenção da Paz como Instrumento da Política Externa Brasileira," *Revista Integração - CCOPAB*, Rio de Janeiro, 2013, 22.

⁷⁵ Brasil, *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil*, Brasília, 1988, 3.

The legal foundation for establishing the PND's objectives is clear. The White Paper on National Defense emphasizes that peace operations are the primary instruments available to the international community to deal with conflict threats and prevent countries in post-conflict situations from experiencing a resurgence of armed violence.⁷⁶ In this sense, the Central African Republic, one of the world's poorest countries facing significant economic and security challenges, can be an essential option to increase Brazilian diplomacy and peacebuilding.

THE BRAZILIAN APPROACH TO DIPLOMACY AND PEACEBUILDING

Solidarity Diplomacy

Solidarity Diplomacy is a concept recently adopted in Brazil by the academic community based on the diplomatic stance of the Brazilian government in international relations within Brazilian strategic surroundings.⁷⁷ Author Ricardo Seitenfus defines Brazilian diplomatic action as the process of implementing global collective action under the guidance of the United Nations Security Council (SC). This intervention involves third-party nations intervening in an internal or international conflict. This action is carried out without personal gain and is motivated solely by a sense of duty and morality.⁷⁸

This concept is also related to the Kantian theoretical tradition of the theory of international relations, which seeks cooperation between States to establish a world community.⁷⁹ The state of peace would not be part of human nature but would result from the voluntary effort of world society.⁸⁰

Based on solidarity diplomacy, the Brazilian state has begun to adopt the principle of non-indifference, a counterpoint to the constitutional principle of non-intervention.⁸¹ The Principle of Non-Indifference was created by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim, as he sought justification for using Brazilian troops in Haiti, an opportunity in which Brazil once again employed the Brazilian approach to peacebuilding.⁸²

⁷⁶ Brasil, *Livro Branco de Defesa*, Brasília, 2020, 17.

⁷⁷ Gabriela Daou Verenhitch, "A MINUSTAH e a política externa brasileira: motivações e consequências," *Dissertação (Mestrado em Direito da Integração)* – Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2008, 43.

⁷⁸ Ricardo Seitenfus, "Gouverner l'intégration: Les politiques nationale et internationale du Brésil de Lula," *Le Sud deviant le Nord*, In. S. Monclaire e J. F. Deluchey, *Paris: Editions Pepper*, 2006, 8.

⁷⁹ Thales Castro, *Teoria das relações internacionais*, Brasília: FUNAG, 2012, 90.

⁸⁰ Castro, *Teoria das relações internacionais*, 90.

⁸¹ Eduarda Passarelli Hamann, *O envolvimento de civis em contextos pós- conflito: oportunidade para a inserção internacional do Brasil*, In *O Brasil e as Operações de Paz em um mundo globalizado: entre a tradição e a inovação*, Brasília: IPEA, 2012, 307.

⁸² Eduarda Passarelli Hamann, *O envolvimento de civis em contextos pós- conflito: oportunidade para a inserção internacional do Brasil*, 307.

Brazilian Approach to Peacebuilding

How Brazilians participate in peace operations has become known as the Brazilian approach to peacebuilding.⁸³ The expression became very broad not only due to the Brazilian government's stance but also mainly due to the conduct of the troops.⁸⁴ Regarding the government's stance, the country focuses its contribution on immaterial values, that is, without concern based on its actions' material or economic return, endorsing the alignment of Brazilian foreign policy with the Kantian theory tradition, which values international cooperation.⁸⁵

The conduct of the troops can be considered, in addition to military expression, as a tool of psychosocial expression. Coexistence with cultural and racial diversity in Brazilian territory, combined with the identification by Brazilian soldiers with the reality of sacrifice and the need to overcome social inequalities, generates a natural identification with the host country's population.⁸⁶ It is worth highlighting that Brazilian cooperation goes beyond deploying contingents in peacekeeping missions but also through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), a division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE), demonstrating that Brazil's foreign policy consists of solidarity. In Haiti, for example, the ABC contribution expanded to the field of technical cooperation, with the development of projects in agriculture, civil defense, sports, elections, health, combating violence against women, and support for the formulation of public policies through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency.⁸⁷

In this sense, the Brazilian government has a particular way of managing its participation in peacekeeping missions, not only through the conduct of deployed troops but through the set formed by all initiatives. However, the Brazilian government must always prioritize using troops in its strategic surroundings.

THE BRAZILIAN STRATEGIC SURROUNDINGS

According to the Defense White Paper, Brazilian foreign policy considers international dialogue and cooperation essential for overcoming obstacles, bringing people closer, and strengthening trust between states.⁸⁸ Furthermore, the Defense White Paper brings the idea that, in geopolitical terms, Brazil prioritizes the strategic

⁸³ Charles T. Call and Adriana Erthal Abdenur, "A Brazilian Way? Brazil's Approach to Peacebuilding," Order from Chaos Foreign Policy in a Troubled World, *Foreign Policy at Brookings*, Geoeconomics and Global issues, Paper 5, February 2017, 4.

⁸⁴ Charles T. Call and Adriana Erthal Abdenur, "A Brazilian Way? Brazil's Approach to Peacebuilding," 4.

⁸⁵ Brasil, *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil*, Brasília, 1988, 11.

⁸⁶ Sérgio Aguilar, *Uma Cultura Brasileira de Missões de Paz*. In: Brigagão, Clóvis e Fernandes, Fernanda (Org.), *Diplomacia Brasileira para a Paz*. Brasília: FUNAG, 2012, 221.

⁸⁷ Sérgio Aguilar, *Uma Cultura Brasileira de Missões de Paz*, 216.

⁸⁸ Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, *Livro Branco de Defesa*, Brasília, 2020, 27.

environment, consisting of South America, the South Atlantic, the western coast of Africa, and Antarctica, instead of the rest of the world.⁸⁹

In addition, the National Defense Policy mentions that Brazil establishes as an area of priority interest in the Brazilian strategic surroundings, which includes South America, the South Atlantic, the countries on the West African coast, and Antarctica.⁹⁰

In this sense, the issue of defining the understanding of the limits of the Brazilian strategic surroundings is necessary for establishing the geographic reference for the analyses proposed by this work. The countries on the west coast of Africa do not include the Central African Republic. The Atlantic Ocean is the primary reference for determining the countries defined as part of the Brazilian strategic environment, starting in the south with South Africa and ending in the north with Senegal.⁹¹ Thus, despite the Central African Republic not being part of the countries on the west coast of Africa and, therefore, initially not included in the Brazilian strategic environment, it is on the immediate edge of this region, and this imposes some challenges for the deployment of Brazilian troops.⁹²

CHALLENGES FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF BRAZILIAN TROOPS TO MINUSCA

The Central African Republic geography presents a series of conditions for deploying a Brazilian contingent in Peacekeeping Operations. Geographic distance is a determining factor in the use of troops in the CAR. This characteristic proves to be a complicating factor for the planning and execution of logistical support to MINUSCA by the UN.⁹³ The country has an area of around 622,000 km² and is one of the few African countries with no access to the ocean.⁹⁴ The mission requires different transportation needs for personnel and material, creating a paradox.

In the case of sending a Brazilian contingent to the RCA, preparing the infrastructure necessary for reception, installation, maintenance of personnel and material, and redeployment is a very complex and expensive task. In this context, there is a need to use resources from the Brazilian Armed Forces in this type of operation. As in Haiti, material and personnel would be moved to the CAR using Brazilian Air Force aircraft and Brazilian Navy ships. In this sense, the Atlantic

⁸⁹ Brasil, *Livro Branco de Defesa*, 27.

⁹⁰ Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, *Política Nacional de Defesa*, Brasília, 2020, 11.

⁹¹ Brasil, *Livro Branco de Defesa*, 11.

⁹² Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, *Política Nacional de Defesa*, Brasília, 2020, 11.

⁹³ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Central African Republic," accessed March 11, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic>.

⁹⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Central African Republic."

Ocean serves as a barrier to air travel due to the lack of refueling options, limiting air transport efficiency between Brazil and the CAR.⁹⁵

Regarding the air transport aspect, the Central African Republic has an international airport in its capital, Bangui, and a secondary airport in Berberati. In addition, the CAR has unpaved runways throughout its territory, but only 12 of these have a runway of between 1500 and 2000 meters.⁹⁶ Bangui and Berberati Airports are the only ones that have a paved runway. Figure 9 shows the cities where the airstrips are working.⁹⁷ Bangui Airport is the only one with international requirements (Figure 10).⁹⁸ It has external connections to Paris Airport in France, Douala Airport in Cameroon, and Brazzaville Airport in Congo, among other cities on the African continent.⁹⁹ Among its main capabilities, this airport has various infrastructures, such as a cargo terminal, fuel availability, passenger terminal, and customs.¹⁰⁰




Figure 9 – RCA - Airstrip Network Map - December 2023

Source: Logistics Cluster, RCA - Airstrip Network Map - December 2023, accessed March 11, 2024, <https://logcluster.org/en/node/45500>.

⁹⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Central African Republic.”

⁹⁶ Logistics Cluster, “RCA - Airstrip Network Map - December 2023,” accessed March 11, 2024, <https://logcluster.org/en/node/45500>.

⁹⁷ Logistics Cluster, “RCA - Airstrip Network Map - December 2023.”

⁹⁸ Logistics Cluster, “RCA - Carte de Concept des Operations, Mars 2023,” accessed March 11, 2024, <https://logcluster.org/en/node/455https://logcluster.org/en/document/rca-carte-de-concept-des-operations-mars-2023>.

⁹⁹ Logistics Cluster, “RCA - Carte de Concept des Operations, Mars 2023.”

¹⁰⁰ Logistics Cluster, “RCA - Airstrip Network Map - December 2023.”




Figure 10 – RCA - Carte de Concept des Operations, Mars 2023

Source: Logistics Cluster, “RCA - Carte de Concept des Operations, Mars 2023,” accessed March 11, 2024, <https://logcluster.org/en/node/455https://logcluster.org/en/document/rca-carte-de-concept-des-operations-mars-2023>.

Still on the aerial aspect, the Northeastern salient region of Brazil has great potential as a launch pad for air crossings across the Atlantic (Figure 11).¹⁰¹ The distance between *Natal-RN* (Brazil) and Dakar, Senegal, is approximately 3017 km, which makes it possible to create a supply stopover, increasing the cargo capacity to the final destination in Bangui.¹⁰² The distance between *Natal* and Bangui is 6100 km. Despite enabling aircraft landing and take-off, logistics activities in the Central African Republic are limited by the reduced ground support infrastructure, with main support restricted to just two airports.

¹⁰¹ Wikipedia, “Northeastern salient,” accessed March 11, 2024, https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saliente_nordestino#/media/Ficheiro:Saliente_nordestino.png

¹⁰² Wikipedia, “Northeastern salient.”



Figure 11 – Northeastern salient

Source: Wikipedia, “Northeastern salient,” accessed March 11, 2024, https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saliente_nordestino#/media/Ficheiro:Saliente_nordestino.png

The Atlantic crossing's maritime aspect is less complex but poses logistical challenges for reaching the destination in Bangui, as the most accessible port is in Douala, Cameroon.¹⁰³

The most complex problem in land transport is the unloading of cargo in Douala, Cameroon and its delivery to the capital of the CAR (Figure 13). The road network in the Central African Republic has a total length of 24,000 kilometers, of which only 700 km are asphalt (Figure 12).¹⁰⁴ National roads span 4,500 km, regional roads span 3,900 km, and rural roads connecting small villages make up 60% of the total or 15,600 km.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Central African Republic,” accessed March 11, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic>.

¹⁰⁴ Logistics Cluster, “RCA - Access Constraints Map, August 2023,” accessed March 11, 2024, <https://logcluster.org/en/document/rca-carte-des-contraintes-dacces-aout-2023>.

¹⁰⁵ Logistics Cluster, “RCA - Access Constraints Map, August 2023.”




Figure 12 – RCA - Access Constraints Map, August 2023

Source: Logistics Cluster, “RCA - Access Constraints Map, August 2023,” accessed March 11, 2024, <https://logcluster.org/en/document/rca-carte-des-contraintes-dacces-aout-2023>.

The dependence on roads for land connections for logistical support is significant. Only one paved road is available to transport materials and supplies for the deployed troops.¹⁰⁶ The estimated land travel time for one vehicle is two days to cover 1415 km (Figure 13).¹⁰⁷ In addition, this route to the Port of Douala is used by all countries involved in MINUSCA. It is worth noting that to calculate real-time, travel, refueling, loading, unloading, overnight, and customs time must be considered, which would take around 15 days from the port of Douala to the city of Bambari under normal shipping conditions—transportation, which would require detailed transportation planning. Therefore, the maritime mode requires complex integration with the road mode, making the supply operation sensitive.

¹⁰⁶ Google Maps, “Port Authority of Duala to Bangui,” accessed March 11, 2024, <https://www.google.com/maps>.

¹⁰⁷ Google Maps, “Port Authority of Duala to Bangui.”




Figure 13 – Port of Duala to Bangui

Source: Google Maps, “Port Authority of Duala to Bangui,” accessed March 11, 2024, <https://www.google.com/maps>.

It is essential to highlight that RCA has a climate with well-defined rainy seasons.¹⁰⁸ This period occurs between May and October, directly influencing the quality of road pavement.¹⁰⁹ This generates demand for considering the type of troop transport vehicle that will be used in the mission since mobility on the ground is a decisive factor for success in military operations. In this sense, overcoming the current logistics challenges is necessary to meet the National Defense Policy and prepare for potential deployment to the Central African Republic.

OTHER NATIONAL BENEFITS FROM PEACE OPERATIONS

Brazil's deployment of soldiers to peace operations is a significant source of national benefits extending beyond national defense's primary objective. Two important national objectives indirectly relate to Brazil's participation in Peace Operations: OND 2 – Ensure defense capacity to fulfill the constitutional missions of the Armed Forces, and OND 3 – Promote technological and productive autonomy in the defense area. Regarding OND 2, participation in Peace Operations provides a unique opportunity for joint action by the Armed Forces. It allows exchange with other countries, generating new techniques and procedures and promoting their professionalization. As for OND 3, the country's participation in Peace Operations can generate the expansion of the Defense Industrial Base (BID) through the development of research, employment, and sale of military equipment, promoting the

¹⁰⁸ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Central African Republic,” accessed March 11, 2024, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic>.

¹⁰⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Central African Republic.”

national defense sector. During the MINUSTAH mission in Haiti, Brazil spent almost R\$2 billion, with a significant portion of the funds allocated towards modernizing equipment.¹¹⁰ Brazil purchased vehicles (R\$162.3 million), explosives and ammunition (R\$24.3 million), armaments (R\$22 million), and equipment for ships and vessels (R\$18.1 million), which helped develop the Brazilian Defense Industrial Base.¹¹¹

In this sense, it is worth highlighting the possibility of using the KC-390 aircraft in a MINUSCA Peacekeeping Operation. It is manufactured by the Brazilian Aeronautics Company (Embraer), with participation from other countries, such as Argentina, Portugal, and the Czech Republic.¹¹² The KC-390 is a new-generation multi-mission transport aircraft that combines a highly flexible platform with the lowest life cycle cost in the medium transport market.¹¹³ Furthermore, the KC-390 can transport cargo and troops, and also conduct a wide range of missions, such as aeromedical evacuation, search and rescue, firefighting, aerial refueling, and humanitarian aid. It has a self-defense system and ballistic protection for hostile environments.¹¹⁴ The constant flow of flights between Brazil and the African continent, carried out by KC-390 aircraft, for supplying and replacing various materials would give significant visibility to that Military Employment Material (MEM) in the context of foreign military and civilians in the Central African Republic.



Figure 14 – Embraer KC-390

Source: Embraer, “KC-390,” accessed February 25, 2024, <https://defense.embraer.com/br/pt/kc-390>.

¹¹⁰ Reinaldo Azevedo, “Brazil has already spent almost R\$2 billion in Haiti,” accessed March 26, 2024, <https://veja.abril.com.br/coluna/reinaldo/brasil-ja-gastou-quase-r-2-bilhoes-no-haiti>.

¹¹¹ Reinaldo Azevedo, “Brazil has already spent almost R\$2 billion in Haiti.”

¹¹² Embraer, “KC-390,” accessed February 25, 2024, <https://defense.embraer.com/br/pt/kc-390>.

¹¹³ Embraer, “KC-390.”

¹¹⁴ Embraer, “KC-390,” accessed February 25, 2024, <https://defense.embraer.com/br/pt/kc-390>.

Another factor in the projection of National Power if Brazil took over MINUSCA could be the commercialization of the new IA2 Family Assault Rifle.¹¹⁵ Recently, the Brazilian Army decided to replace its standard weapons with the 5.56 mm IA2 Assault Rifle, manufactured with national technology, by *Indústria de Materiel Bélico* (Imbel), a public company linked to the Ministry of Defense.



Figure 15 – Assault Rifle 5,56 mm IA2

Source: Imbel, “Assault Rifle 5,56 mm IA2,” accessed February 25, 2024, <http://www.imbel.gov.br/index.php/index.php/fuzis>.

The Guarani Armored Vehicles Family has the same focus on the possibility of employment at MINUSCA and, consequently, the improvement of the Brazilian Defense Industrial Base. The Guarani Project is a Brazilian program for developing military vehicles designed and manufactured in Brazil, with its primary vehicle being the VBTP-MR (Medium Armored Personnel Transport Vehicle on Wheels).¹¹⁶ This armored vehicle has amphibious capability, 6X6 traction, and the possibility of traveling on sandy and asphalt terrain. Furthermore, its armor provides safety against ammunition with a caliber of up to 7.62mm armor-piercing, shrapnel from artillery grenades, and protecting mines.¹¹⁷ Regarding firepower, the Guarani can also come with a turret for a 30 mm automatic cannon or a .50-inch Browning machine gun, controlled manually or remotely, allowing more excellent protection for the shooter.¹¹⁸ The possibility of being used on any terrain and offering armored protection corroborates the possibility of positive promotion of this vehicle, both within MINUSCA and in the international community.

¹¹⁵ Imbel, “Assault Rifle 5,56 mm IA2,” accessed February 25, 2024, <http://www.imbel.gov.br/index.php/index.php/fuzis>.

¹¹⁶ Exército Brasileiro, “Projeto GUARANI - Projeto Estratégico do Exército,” Departamento de Ciência e Tecnologia, accessed February 26, 2024, <http://www.dct.eb.mil.br/index.php/component/content/article?id=88:projeto-guarani>.

¹¹⁷ Exército Brasileiro, “Projeto GUARANI - Projeto Estratégico do Exército.”

¹¹⁸ Exército Brasileiro, “Projeto GUARANI - Projeto Estratégico do Exército.”



Figure 16 – VBTP-MR (Medium Armored Personnel Carrier on Wheels)

Source: Exército Brasileiro, “Projeto GUARANI - Projeto Estratégico do Exército,” Departamento de Ciência e Tecnologia, accessed February 26, 2024, <http://www.dct.eb.mil.br/index.php/component/content/article?id=88:projeto-guarani>.

In this way, it is possible to project gains in the Brazilian economy related to using these materials in a Peace Operation, such as MINUSCA, providing benefits for the national economy with the possible commercialization of materials for military use to friendly countries. Participating in Peace Operations allows Brazil to achieve several objectives outlined in its National Defense Policy. Deploying Brazilian troops in foreign countries, such as the Central African Republic, requires a thorough analysis to ensure that the ultimate goal of bringing peace to those in need is met. Participating in such missions also provides valuable experience while increasing international recognition of the professionalism of the Brazilian soldier.¹¹⁹

CONCLUSION

Brazil's participation in Peacekeeping Operations became an active instrument of Brazilian foreign policy during the first two decades of the 21st century. Using national troops in MINUSTAH integrated a large part of the country's total contribution to the various UN missions, increasing the specific weight of the largest nation in South America in United Nations discussions.

Still, regarding a nation's specific weight in discussions at the UN, it is consistent to state that the level of influence of this international organization is measured in two ways: the value of the annual financial contribution available in the budget or the total number of troops that the country contributes on field missions. Brazil is not prominent as a financier, and there is no expectation of changing this status in the short and medium term.

However, the effective and efficient leadership of the military component of MINUSTAH, combined with the fact that it was the country with the most significant

¹¹⁹ Brasil, Ministério da Defesa, *Livro Branco de Defesa*, Brasília, 2020, 17.

contribution of troops to the mission, elevated Brazil to an unprecedented level in the history of the UN. The efficiency and reliability of the Brazilian military led to invitations to deploy troops in other missions around the planet, attesting to the potential of participation in Peace Missions in achieving the National Defense Policy (PND) objectives.

The end of MINUSTAH brought some consequences for the country. The validity of participation in Peacekeeping Missions as a tool for achieving national objectives began to be questioned. In this context, the invitation for Brazil to join MINUSCA with troops emerged. The materialization of the invitation by the UN Secretary-General to the Brazilian government has encouraged the present study. The idea is to understand how Brazil's participation in the Central African Republic would impact the National Defense Policy. Regarding International Politics, sending troops to MINUSCA can help to enhance Brazil's image on the world stage and contribute to international peace and security, which is one of the broader objectives of the National Defense Policy.

The African continent is where half of the UN Peacekeeping Missions are occurring. Participation in the Central African Republic would demonstrate to the international community that the country is contributing to efforts to alleviate the most socially backward region on the planet, in addition to meeting the natural vocation of the Brazilian people through Solidarity Diplomacy, a fact that justifies unremitting support need for an economic or commercial counterpart.

The Brazilian government's hypothesis of deploying a military contingent in MINUSCA is in itself an action to promote the achievement of the PND's objectives. Deploying troops in MINUSCA would encourage the development of several national economic sectors, such as the Defense Industrial Base, in addition to offering the Armed Forces the opportunity to operate jointly. Furthermore, this participation would keep troops in constant doctrinal and preparedness updating, in addition to the deterrent effect caused by satisfactory results in multinational missions.

Finally, Brazil has a cultural tradition of non-intervention in the internal issues of other countries. At the same time, it has always acted in solidarity with humanitarian issues within its capabilities. In this way, participation in Peacekeeping Missions represents a natural vocation of the Brazilian people, in the same way that it brings together several benefits and positive aspects to achieve the various objectives of the National Defense Policy, strengthening the Brazilian nation.

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