



The Double-Edged Sword of International Interventions in Haiti: Progress, Pitfalls, and Potential

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JCSP 50

Exercise Solo Flight

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The Double-Edged Sword of International Interventions in Haiti: Progress, Pitfalls, and Potential

Study the past, if you would divine the future.

- Confucius¹

INTRODUCTION

On 1 January 1804, Haitians achieved victory over French forces ruled by Napoleon Bonaparte, becoming the first black nation and the second country in the Americas to win their independence.² General Dessalines, who led the final battle of the revolution, became the first ruler of an independent Haiti. This new nation was then able to abolish slavery, becoming a symbol of freedom for all other enslaved nations. Unfortunately, these glorious events did not culminate in a fairy-tale ending; Haiti did not live happily ever after. Quite the opposite occurred, this once inspirational nation has since been continuously plagued by extreme poverty, political unrest, coups, corruption, violence, revolutions, and assassinations. Haiti has witnessed over 30 presidents who have either been assassinated or overthrown.³ These sobering figures trace back to the inception of leadership under General Dessalines, whose tenure was tragically cut short by assassination just two years into his rule. They span to the most recently elected president, Jovenel Moïse, whose presidency met a similar fate with his assassination in 2021⁴ This latest event has plunged the country into a deeper political crisis, exacerbating economic hardship and social unrest. As a result, Haiti's government has completely collapsed, creating a power vacuum that has been exploited by gangs now controlling the majority of the country.⁵ Haiti is currently in dire straits.

The dramatic divergence between Haiti's triumphant beginnings and ensuing hardships shed light on the intricate and multifaceted history of this nation's story. Since gaining its independence 220 years ago, Haiti's status as a proud sovereign nation has been compromised not only by internal strife but also by a multitude of international interventions led by foreign powers. The commonly stated justifications for these

¹ Parekh, Anant B., and Lord Bhikhu C. Parekh. "Study the Past If You Would Define the Future."-Confucius'. *Function (Oxford, England)* 4, no. 1 (2023): zqac073–zqac073. <https://doi.org/10.1093/function/zqac073>.

² Payton, Claire Antone. 'In Moral Debt to Haiti: In the World's First Independent Black Republic, Cholera Victims and Their International Allies Continue to Fight the UN for Their Basic Right to Clean Water and Monetary Reparation'. *NACLA Report on the Americas: #BlackLivesMatter Across the Hemisphere*. Vol. 49. Routledge, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2017.1298247>.

³ Wilson (Moderator). 'List of Haitian Presidents'. *Traveling Haiti*, 13 January 2016. <https://www.travelinghaiti.com/list-of-haitian-presidents/>.

⁴ Graham, Dave, and Andre Paultre. "He Never Stood a Chance": The Fateful Downfall of Haiti's President'. *Reuters*, 22 August 2021, sec. Americas. <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/he-never-stood-chance-fateful-downfall-haitis-president-2021-08-22/>.

⁵ Munch, Regina. 'Chaos in Haiti'. *Commonweal* 151, no. 4 (2024): 6–7.

interventions have generally been centered on the need to restore and maintain stability and security.⁶

Research Question and Thesis Statement

This essay will attempt to address the following thesis question: Did these international interventions, ranging from military occupations to humanitarian missions, actually improve the stability and security of this nation, or have they done the opposite? Given the substantial number of external interventions and the nation's chronic descent into chaos, it is a question worth considering, especially in light of the dramatic situation it currently faces.

This paper will endeavor to assess the effectiveness of these interventions, aiming to demonstrate that they have served as both a response to and a cause of Haiti's never-ending struggles. Each intervention, therefore, can be seen as a double-edged sword, cutting through immediate chaos but often leaving behind deep scars that undermine Haiti's path towards stability and autonomy.

Presentation of the Structure

This study will be based on the critical analysis of the last ten international missions in Haiti, which will serve as case studies to support the main argument's demonstration. It will start with the United States (U.S.) occupation of Haiti in 1915 and will end with the emerging Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission. An overview of each mission will detail the background, mandates, objectives, key players, duration and major actions of the intervention, providing a comprehensive context for analyzing its effectiveness. The goal is to identify challenges, positive and negative outcomes, and potential lessons from each of these past interventions that could guide ongoing and future efforts toward sustainable stability and self-determination for Haiti. While this may seem ambitious, given that the last nine international interventions have not been successful, especially considering Haiti's current state of affairs, it is crucial to undertake this analysis to better understand the factors contributing to these outcomes. In line with Confucius's wisdom, analyzing previous interventions may provide valuable insights into effective strategies for tackling this nation's never-ending challenges.

1915-1934: UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF HAITI

Background

During the mid-1910s, in a context marked by the First World War, the growing influence of Germany in the Panama Canal Zone, the expansion of its own regional ambitions, and the influence of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States became interested

⁶ Mobekk, Eirin. *UN Peace Operations: Lessons from Haiti, 1994-2016*. 1st ed. Book, Whole. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY; Routledge, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315881638>, 34.

in the young Haitian republic, which was grappling with internal issues.⁷ During this period, Haiti faced severe financial difficulties, primarily due to a heavy debt imposed by France to compensate French ex-colonists for damages caused by their independence. This debt is equivalent to approximately \$30 billion in today's currency, and it took 122 years for Haiti to repay it.⁸ “Between 1911 and 1915, seven presidents were assassinated or overthrown in Haiti.”⁹ In 1915, the assassination of President Sam and the brutal massacre of 167 elite Haitians launched this country into deep political chaos and anarchy. This is what prompted the U.S. to intervene with the goal of restoring order and maintaining its hegemony in the Caribbean.¹⁰

Scope and Justification

The Americans claimed the intervention aimed to restore stability in Haiti, but it was actually motivated by imperialistic ambitions to safeguard their financial interests and prevent German influence in the region.¹¹ This occupation was sanctioned by U.S. President Wilson and justified by adherence to Roosevelt's Corollary, which allowed the U.S. to intervene in turbulent countries of the Western Hemisphere.¹² The invasion was led by the U.S. Marines, and the occupation lasted 19 years, from 1915 to 1934.¹³

Major Actions

The creation of a U.S.-Haitian treaty in 1915 was the first major action taken during this intervention, marking the end of the invasion and the start of the occupation. It was followed by the establishment of a Haitian gendarmerie composed of Haitians and Americans. Just like Haitian finances, the U.S. also completely controlled the Haitian gendarmerie until the end of the occupation.¹⁴ The U.S. installed a pro-American president, whom they controlled, to lead the country, while the U.S. Marines enforced martial law. Additionally, this period saw improvements in infrastructure, financial systems, and public health initiatives.¹⁵

⁷ Maclean, Frances. “They Didn’t Speak Our Language; We Didn’t Speak Theirs.” *Smithsonian* 23, no. 10 (1993).

⁸ Webmaster. ‘When France Extorted Haiti – the Greatest Heist in History’. *National African American Reparations Commission (NAARC)* (blog), 17 June 2022. <https://reparationscomm.org/reparations-news/when-france-extorted-haiti-the-greatest-heist-in-history/>.

⁹ Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs. ‘U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-34’. Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs., 13 July 2007. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/88275.htm>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Maclean, “They Didn’t Speak Our Language. ”, 3.

¹³ Ibid., 3.

¹⁴ Department of State, *U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti*.

¹⁵ Davidson, Matthew. ‘Empire and Its Practitioners: Health, Development, and the U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934’. *ProQuest Dissertations Publishing*, 2014, Abstract, 32.

Challenges

This occupation faced several challenges: significant Haitian resistance, cultural and linguistic barriers between Haitians and U.S. troops and finally, a perception of racial discrimination and imperialistic motives attributed to the United States.¹⁶

Positive Outcomes

From a Haitian perspective, one of the only perceived positive outcomes was an improvement in health and sanitation, which helped combat Caribbean diseases. For a short period Haitians did benefit from the many transportation improvements, such as new roads, bridges, and harbours.¹⁷

Negative Outcome

Throughout the entire occupation, Haitian finances were completely controlled and managed by the U.S. To make matters worse, their economy did not experience any significant growth, which did not benefit Haitians. The resistance to the occupation led to violent and deadly uprisings, riots and massacres.¹⁸ Haitians expressed a profoundly negative stance towards this intervention and were ecstatic once the U.S. left in 1934. They were not provided with the knowledge to maintain all of the new infrastructure; Two decades later, it was all in shambles.¹⁹ To make matters worse, all of this new infrastructure was funded by Haitian taxes, yet the Haitians had no say in what was to be built. The U.S. exploited Haiti's economy in a way that served its own interests and reinforced Haiti's dependency on foreign aid. The Marines behaved like military dictators, which undermined Haiti's sovereignty and self-determination.²⁰ This occupation left a legacy of resentment and mistrust towards foreigners, which will negatively impact future interventions.

The Americans failed to achieve their primary objective, which was to turn "Haiti into a stable, pro-American, prosperous, and reasonably democratic society."²¹

Lessons Learned

From this initial foreign intervention in Haiti, it emerges that the neglect of cultural sensitivity resulted in substantial political fallout.²² Dr. Girard argues that "the U.S. government's single most important mistake in 1915–1934 was its failure to understand the centrality of race and history in Haitian politics."²³ It appears that

¹⁶ Girard, Philippe R. *Paradise Lost: Haiti's Tumultuous Journey from Pearl of the Caribbean to Third World Hot Spot*. 1st ed. Book, Whole. New York; Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England; Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403980311>, 77.

¹⁷ Davidson, *Empire and Its Practitioners*, 16.

¹⁸ Girard, *Paradise Lost*, 77.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 90.

²⁰ Davidson, *Empire and Its Practitioners*, 110.

²¹ Girard, *Paradise Lost*, 89.

²² Girard, *Paradise Lost*, 86.

²³ *Ibid.*

sustainability, which should have been a priority, was not a consideration in the solutions implemented by the U.S. The changes made to the Haitian economy and political system failed because the reforms were externally enforced rather than originating from within.²⁴

The U.S. pursued its own national interest, and a radical systemic reform within Haiti did not occur.²⁵ The U.S.'s behavior aligned with that of a realist state, acting in its own interest rather than those of Haiti.

1994-1995: UNITED STATES OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Background

In December 1990, Jean-Bernard Aristide, a former Haitian priest, became Haiti's first democratically elected president, bringing a sense of hope to this country.²⁶ His short-lived presidency ended on 29 September 1991, when a military coup led by junta leader General Cédras overthrew him, forcing exile in Venezuela.²⁷ This General ruled Haiti as a dictator and sent the country into further turmoil. In September 1993, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established to improve Haiti's situation. However, in October 1993, Cédras' men blocked the country's main port in Port-Au-Prince, preventing the arrival of U.S. troops and preventing the full deployment of UNMIH.²⁸ For these reasons, on 31 July 1994, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 940 authorized the U.S. to lead a multinational force (MNF) into Haiti and "to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership."²⁹ The U.S. armed forces named it Operation Uphold Democracy.

Scope and Justification

This intervention, which some may consider an invasion, lasted six months from September to March 1995. Prior to deploying, the U.S. took approximately one year to develop their plan.³⁰ It was justified by the requirement to restore democracy, maintain order, prevent a refugee crisis and abuses of human rights, and enable UNMIH to continue with its mission.³¹ The mandate had three main objectives: "1) Neutralize armed opposition and create a secure environment for restoration of the legitimate government

²⁴ Ibid., 89.

²⁵ 'Realism | Definition, Theories, Examples, Problems, & Facts | Britannica'. Accessed 20 April 2024. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/realism-political-and-social-science>.

²⁶ 'Haiti: The Impact of the September 1991 Coup (June 1992)'. *International Journal of Refugee Law* 4, no. 2 (1992): 217–29. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/4.2.217>.

²⁷ Kretchik, Walter E., Robert F. Baumann, John T. Fishel, Army Command and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth KS. 'Invasion, Intervention, Intervention: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy', no. Generic (1998), 27.

²⁸ *Washington Post*. 'Haitians Block U.S. Troop Arrival'. 11 October 1993. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/12/haitians-block-us-troop-arrival/ad1839e7-c4e2-4ae0-9104-c43d66d4d60b/>.

²⁹ Girard, Philippe and SpringerLink (Online service). *Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 US Invasion of Haiti*. Book, Whole. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2004. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-7931-5>, 20.

³⁰ Bentley, David and NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON. 'Operation Uphold Democracy: Military Support for Democracy in Haiti', no. Generic (1996), 2.

³¹ Kretchik et al., *Invasion, Intervention, Intervention*, 184-185.

of Haiti; 2) Restore and preserve civil order; and 3) Be prepared to pass responsibility for military operations in Haiti to the UNMIH.”³²

Major Actions

The U.S. forces strategically planned and prepared for one year prior to putting boots on the ground in Haiti. An exit strategy with a clear end state was formulated to avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1914 occupation in Haiti, which lasted far too long without one.³³ Immediately before sending troops to invade, the U.S. sent former president Jimmy Carter and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to strike a last-minute agreement to avoid an invasion that would lead to unnecessary bloodshed. It was successful; General Cédras unofficially agreed to let the U.S. in without fighting back and would eventually allow President Aristide to return as president.³⁴ Only minimal fighting occurred, and an invasion was prevented. At its peak, the MNF had 21,000 U.S. forces and 2,000 forces from other allied nations.³⁵ Upon arrival, the U.S. troops focused on securing the environment by disarming the Junta and re-establishing law and order. They also initiated a weapons buyback program. Following the disarmament, the U.S. began training new recruits to establish the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), which would eventually become the Haitian National Police (HNP).³⁶ Essential services and establishments such as sanitation, electricity, airports, food distribution, and markets were restored. Finally, the MNF created an environment conducive to the UNMIH's takeover. As the transition occurred, the U.S. troops gradually withdrew.³⁷

Challenges

One of the major challenges incurred by the U.S. forces was to determine the amount of force protection required to create a stable environment in Haiti during this peace operation, which led to major controversy.³⁸ The U.S. troops faced a complex cultural landscape and complex humanitarian challenges. Their roles were a combination of traditional military and humanitarian, which frequently clashed. Warfighting is very different than enforcing civil law and order.³⁹ Due to the recency of negative experiences in Somalia, the U.S. government feared disarming the Forces Armées d’Haïti (FAd’H), which could result in body bags and the undermining of U.S. foreign policy.⁴⁰ Gathering

³² Bentley, *Operation Uphold Democracy*, 1.

³³ Kretchik et al., *Invasion, Intervention, Intersasion*, 185.

³⁴ Girard, *Paradise Lost*, 150-151.

³⁵ Bentley, *Operation Uphold Democracy*, 2.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 4-6.

³⁸ Kretchik et al., *Invasion, Intervention, Intersasion*, 196.

³⁹ McGrady, E. D., John S. Ivancovich. ‘[Operation Uphold Democracy: Conflict and Cultures](#). A Summary of Material from CNA’s 1995 Annual Conference, “Military Support to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: From Practice to Policy”’, no. Generic (1998), 6-7.

⁴⁰ Mobekk, Eirin. *UN Peace Operations: Lessons from Haiti, 1994-2016*. 1st ed. Book, Whole. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY; Routledge, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315881638>, 58-59.

reliable intelligence on who to disarm became a challenge as they relied only on the FAd'H, resulting in "conflicting and unclear information."⁴¹

Positive Outcomes

From a Western point of view, the U.S. Army was successful in achieving its primary objectives: the Junta left, Aristide was restored as president, a stable enough environment was established, paramilitary organizations were eventually disarmed, a new vetted Haitian police force was created, and a handover to UNMIH was completed.⁴² This was all accomplished within six months, which is impressive.

From a Haitian perspective, compared to the U.S. occupation of 1915, this U.S. intervention left a more favorable opinion among Haitians.⁴³

Negative Outcome

Just like in the first U.S. occupation, the U.S. failed to train and educate Haitians on how to effectively maintain the country's stability and infrastructure, leading to short-term fixes.⁴⁴ A UN report indicated that even though the environment became safer, "insecurity and fear remained significant in Haiti."⁴⁵ Many Haitians believed that their right to bear arms for self-defence, as provided by the 1987 Haitian constitution, was violated when the U.S. troops required them to surrender their weapons. Haitians understood; however, they did not appreciate being told what to do without being involved or consulted.⁴⁶

Lessons Learned

Improved interagency cooperation and communication would have helped the U.S. forces avoid receiving contradictory and ambiguous information during the disarmament process.⁴⁷ The International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) had pertinent information and intelligence on this matter. However, U.S. troops failed to engage and learn from them.⁴⁸ Local ownership must be a primary consideration when implementing changes such as the disarmament process. To ensure the undertakings are sustainable, locals must be involved in the solutions and processes.

U.S. literature generally views this intervention as being more successful than not. However, from a holistic point of view, while pressing issues were suppressed, the root causes were not adequately addressed.

⁴¹ Ibid., 58-59.

⁴² Kretchik et al., *Invasion, Intervention, Intersession*, 196.

⁴³ Ibid., 197.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 35.

⁴⁶ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 58-60.

⁴⁷ Kretchik et al., *Invasion, Intervention, Intersession*, 196.

⁴⁸ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 59.

1993-1996: UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH)

Background

An overview of the chaotic environment in Haiti prior to this intervention is described in the previous Operation Uphold Democracy background. To mitigate this situation, the Organization of American States (OAS) recommended a trade embargo to prevent the sale of fuel and arms to Haiti. This motion was endorsed through the UNSCR 841 in June 1993.⁴⁹ Prior to this intervention, the Government of Haiti requested UN assistance to help them “in creating a new police force and in modernizing the Haitian armed forces.” This led to the UNSCR 867, which authorized UNMIH in September 1993.⁵⁰

Scope and Justification

The military coup that overthrew Haiti’s first democratically elected president helped justify UNMIH. Its overarching objective was to reinstate democratic order in Haiti. At the security level, its mandate was “to assist in the training of a new police force and with the modernization of the army.”⁵¹ It started in September 1993 and ended in June 1996, following five extensions. At its peak, this mission had approximately 900 civilian police and 6,000 military troops.⁵² UNMIH's key players were from the U.S., Canada and France, and it cost \$320 million USD.⁵³

Major Actions

Many significant actions marked this intervention, including the blocking of the capitol’s main port, which completely halted this mission and led to the creation of Operation Uphold Democracy in 1993. In October 1994, Aristide was reinstated as president, and the embargo against Haiti was lifted.⁵⁴ UNMIH fully took over from the MNF in March 1995. It held democratic legislative elections in June 1995 and presidential elections in December 1995. The new president, René Préval, officially took over in February 1996.⁵⁵ Security reform included establishing the HNP and disbanding the Haitian army in April 1995 due to fears of another coup.⁵⁶ An information campaign and public outreach enhanced understanding of Haitian society, culture, and experiences.

⁴⁹ ‘Security Council Resolution 841 - UNSCR’. Accessed 26 April 2024.

<http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/841>.

⁵⁰ ‘Security Council Resolution 867 - UNSCR’. Accessed 26 April 2024.

<http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/867>.

⁵¹ Koops, Joachim Alexander. *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 541.

⁵² ‘UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH) - Facts and Figures’. Accessed 27 April 2024.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unmihfacts.html>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Koops, Joachim Alexander. *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 542.

⁵⁵ ‘UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI (UNMIH) - Mandate’. Accessed 27 April 2024.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unmihmandate.html>.

⁵⁶ Girard, *Paradise Lost*, 157-158.

Pertinent information was distributed to the Haitian public through radio, TV, and news outlets which benefited the UNMIHs strategic goals.⁵⁷

Challenges

Latin American states of the UN Security Council expressed significant concerns and disapproval of the authorization of Chapter VII operations for this intervention. In addition, since Haiti officially recognized Taiwan as a separate state, China and Russia, who are both permanent members of the UN Security Council, wanted the scope of this mission to be reduced. This significantly reduced crucial support required for this intervention.⁵⁸ The lack of leadership within the HNP and the limited and poor state of Haitian prisons also negatively affected this mission.⁵⁹

Positive Outcomes

Overall, improvements were noticed in Haiti's security and stability, the HNP's performance, democratic processes, infrastructure, and human rights. Cooperation with the OAS and the inclusion of the head of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the chain of command improved interagency cooperation, synergy, and the mission's sustainability.⁶⁰ From a UN perspective, this mission was a success as it was commended through UNSCR 1063 for successfully completing its mandates.⁶¹

Negative Outcome

Haiti's dependence on foreign aid significantly increased.⁶² The Haitian President's political independence was weakened by the large number of foreign troops controlling strategic assets.⁶³ Although Haiti experienced slight economic growth due to foreign aid, the government did not reorganize the economy to address the root causes of its economic challenges.⁶⁴

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from this intervention, which saw “the transition from a regional multinational operation to a UN operation,” could be of great value to the future Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti.⁶⁵ A force commander admitted

⁵⁷Lehmann, Ingrid A. ‘The Information Campaigns of UNMIH in Haiti, 1994–96 1’. In *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, 1st ed., 110–28. Routledge, 1999. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315038148-7>, 114-120.

⁵⁸ Koops, *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 544.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 544-545.

⁶¹ ‘Security Council Resolution 1063 - UNSCR’. Accessed 29 April 2024. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1063>.

⁶² Koops, *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 543-544.

⁶³ Girard, *Paradise Lost*, 156-158.

⁶⁴ Malone, David. *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997*. Book, Whole. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198294832.001.0001>, 128.

⁶⁵ Koops, *The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 542

that the UNMIH faced mission creep and that, following the success of the MNF, it underestimated the challenges in the political and economic development.⁶⁶

Overall, even with its challenges, UNMIH is seen as successful from a UN and partial Haitian perspective. One of the main contributing factors can be attributed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) during UNMIH, Lakhdar Brahimi. He provided strong political leadership, understood Haitian culture, maintained the mission's focus, and achieved its objectives.⁶⁷

1996-2000: UNMIH FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS

Scope

After UNMIH, the UN completed four smaller-scale missions. These missions, with reduced scopes compared to previous interventions, require a straightforward overview rather than a comparative analysis.

1996-1997: United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)

Authorized by UNSCR 1063, UNSMIH lasted from June 1996 to July 1997 and was mandated to professionalize the HNP, maintain stability, and “promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti.”⁶⁸ It cost approximately \$62.1 million USD and had a peak personnel of 1,297 military and 291 civilian.⁶⁹ This mission saw Haiti’s first smooth presidential transition. The UN noted progress, but it recommended a scaled-down follow-on mission.

1997: United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)

Authorized by UNSCR 1123, UNTMIH lasted from August to November 1997. UNTMIH was established to continue working on its predecessors’ initiatives and prepare for the next police-focused UN mission. It had a significantly smaller force of 250 civilian police and 50 military personnel.⁷⁰

1997-2000: United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)

Authorized by UNSCR 1141, started in December 1997 and ended in March 2000. Its mandate focused on the HNPs leadership and on creating specialized police

⁶⁶ Malone, *Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997*, 132 & 150.

⁶⁷ Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information*, 115.

⁶⁸ UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN HAITI (UNSMIH) - Mandate. Accessed 1 May 2024. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unsmihmandate.html>.

⁶⁹ ‘UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN HAITI (UNSMIH) - Facts and Figures’. Accessed 1 May 2024. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unsmihfacts.html>.

⁷⁰ ‘UNTMIH’. Accessed 1 May 2024. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/untmih.htm>.

units.⁷¹ It involved a force of 300 police officers with no military personnel, which was a first. Costing \$20.4 million USD, it was acknowledged by the UN that MIPONUH was a success and that the Haitian government was now to bear responsibility for its nation's fate.⁷²

2000-2001: International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH)

Authorized by UNSCR 1277, this mission lasted from March 2000 to February 2001.⁷³ MICAH's role was to act as an advisor rather than a peacekeeper, focusing on police and human rights.⁷⁴ A transition was made from peacekeeping to peace-supporting.⁷⁵ For the first time, judicial reform was finally part of the mandate, a crucial reform component missing in all previous missions.⁷⁶ Unfortunately, this mission was too short to have positive lasting judicial effects.⁷⁷ The end of MICAH marked the end of a continuous eight-year involvement of UN missions in Haiti.

2004-2017: UN STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI (MINUSTAH)

Background

Following the departure of foreign interventionists in 2001, Haitians finally had the chance to exercise their right to self-determination. On 7 February 2001, Aristide was sworn in as president for the second time and could lead a sovereign Haiti.⁷⁸ Aristide promised the world to Haitians but failed to deliver. His elections were deemed fraudulent as major oppositions boycotted it, which heavily undermined the legitimacy of his presidency.⁷⁹ The combination of economic mismanagement, corruption, political instability and rising violence led to challenging times for Aristide and Haiti.⁸⁰ To make matters worse, a gang associated with Aristide's political party was being accused by the U.S. of committing targeted political assassinations to suppress opposition.⁸¹ In 2004, Aristide's local and international support plummeted to an all-time low. A rebellion led by several powerful Haitians, including a former police chief, gained strong momentum and significant control over Haiti. This once again resulted in another coup, forcing Aristide into exile once more.⁸² Yet again, Haiti was without a president and without a police force capable of maintaining order, creating a severe security vacuum.⁸³ Haiti's

⁷¹ 'MIPONUH'. Accessed 1 May 2024. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/miponuh.htm>.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ 'Resolution 1277'. Accessed 3 May 2024. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1277>.

⁷⁴ 'International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) - UNARMS'. Accessed 3 May 2024. <https://search.archives.un.org/international-civilian-support-mission-in-haiti-micah>.

⁷⁵ Defence, National. 'Multinational Interim Force (MIF)', 11 December 2018. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/caribbean/halo-i.html>.

⁷⁶ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 112-115.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Girard, *Paradise Lost*, 182.

⁷⁹ Defence, National. 'Multinational Interim Force (MIF)'

⁸⁰ Ibid., 190.

⁸¹ Girard, *Paradise Lost*, 193.

⁸² Ibid., 194-195.

⁸³ Ibid., 185-186.

drug trade, gangs, and migration issues, all transnational threats, were creating significant concern for the international community.⁸⁴ A situation that closely resembles its current dire state.

Multinational Interim Force (MIF) in Haiti

Prior to launching MINUSTAH, a *peacemaking* operation was required with the primary purpose of stabilizing the country through military intervention. UNSCR 1529 authorized the immediate deployment of an MIF in Haiti to meet this requirement.⁸⁵ Its ninety-day mandate was to create a secure and stable environment, protect key installations like airports and ports, and support humanitarian aid activities.⁸⁶ Sanctioned as a chapter seven mission, the MIF was authorized to use “all necessary means” to fulfill its mandate.⁸⁷ It was composed of roughly 3,600 personnel, mainly from Canada, the U.S., France and Chile.⁸⁸ Canada contributed approximately 500 military personnel and 6 army tactical helicopters to this intervention, which they called Operation HALO.⁸⁹ This intervention ended on 1 June 2004 when it transferred authority to MINUSTAH in accordance with UNSCR 1542.

Scope and Justification

MINUSTAH, which was unanimously adopted by all permanent UN members, began in June 2004 and ended thirteen years later in October 2017.⁹⁰ It was initially composed of 6,700 troops, 1,622 police, and extra civilian and international personnel, many of whom were previous MIF personnel. Starting as a Chapter VII operation, MINUSTAH’s broad mandates included the following: “establish a secure and stable environment, support the political process, support human rights, and coordinate and cooperate with other international agencies in delivering humanitarian aid.”⁹¹ The total estimated cost for this mission was 8 billion USD, with the U.S. financing the largest share of 28.5%.⁹²

⁸⁴ Fernández Moreno, Marta, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, and Maíra Siman Gomes. ‘Trapped Between Many Worlds: [A Post-Colonial Perspective on the UN Mission in Haiti](#) (MINUSTAH)’. *International Peacekeeping* (London, England) 19, no. 3 (2012): 382.

⁸⁵ ‘Security Council Resolution 1529 - UNSCR’. Accessed 4 May 2024. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1529>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Defence, National. ‘Multinational Interim Force (MIF)’

⁸⁸ ‘A FRESH START FOR HAITI? CHARTING THE FUTURE OF U.S.-HAITIAN RELATIONS’. Accessed 4 May 2024. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108shrg94920/html/CHRG-108shrg94920.htm>.

⁸⁹ Defence, National. ‘Multinational Interim Force (MIF)’

⁹⁰ United Nations Peacekeeping. ‘MINUSTAH’. Accessed 4 May 2024. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah>.

⁹¹ Defence, National. ‘HAMLET (MINUSTAH)’, 25 October 2020. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/caribbean/hamlet.html>.

⁹² Ivers, Louise C., and Yodeline Guillaume. ‘The Price of Peace? Peacekeeping with Impunity Harms Public Health in Haiti’. *The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 97, no. 3 (7 September 2017): 639–40. <https://doi.org/10.4269/ajtmh.17-0582>, 639.

Major Actions

This mission supported Haiti through three separate democratic elections and supported four separate presidents. MINUSTAH, a multidimensional mission, was one of the first UN missions to utilize Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and robust peacekeeping.⁹³ They are all “key areas of support for the democratization process.”⁹⁴ Mobekk describes MINUSTAH’s approach to stabilization as the ‘new experience’ in peacekeeping.⁹⁵ Strengthening and professionalizing the HNP was still an important objective of this mission.⁹⁶ The DDR process eventually evolved and turned into a Community Violence Reduction (CVR) programme.⁹⁷ The cataclysmic 2010 earthquake was a pivotal event that reshaped the focus of the mission in Haiti. There were over 220,000 deaths, including 96 UN peacekeepers. MINUSTAH ramped up its personnel numbers and shifted from a stabilization mission to a humanitarian one focused on development and reconstruction.⁹⁸

Challenges

The UN faced a catch-22 challenge at the beginning of the mission. Gangs were the primary source of insecurity in Haiti, necessitating immediate intervention by peacekeepers. The UN was mandated to support the transitional government. However, this government was actively supporting their associated armed gangs, undermining the UN’s security efforts.⁹⁹ The aftermath of the earthquake caused MINUSTAH’s greatest challenge. It not only halted but also reversed much of the progress previously made, requiring a complete shift in focus and a significant increase in both resources and personnel. To make matters worse, after the earthquake, “an estimated 5,000–6,000 prisoners escaped,” with only 629 being recaptured one and a half years later.¹⁰⁰ Given that Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and suffers from widespread poverty, economic disparity is often the root cause of many of its challenges.¹⁰¹ MINUSTAH faced several serious incidents that called into question the mission’s legitimacy and eroded the trust of the Haitian people.¹⁰² In 2008, the Secretary-General summarized the country’s greatest challenge; “A poor, hungry and desperate population is simply not compatible with stability and security.”¹⁰³

⁹³ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 156-158.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 156.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁹⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping. ‘MINUSTAH’.

⁹⁷ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 10.

⁹⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping. ‘MINUSTAH’.

⁹⁹ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 36-38.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 128.

¹⁰¹ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 174.

¹⁰² Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 45-46.

¹⁰³ ‘Haiti in Desperate Need of Socio-Economic Development, Stresses UN Envoy | UN News’, 10 October 2008. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/10/277582>.

Positive Outcomes

According to the UN Secretary-General's report of MINUSTAH, the overall security situation improved and remained stable even after troops withdrew.¹⁰⁴ According to Dr. Dorn, with an "intelligence-led approach," gangs were dismantled even in the most dangerous parts of Haiti, and peacekeepers "managed to establish law, order, and government control."¹⁰⁵ The minimum daily wage increased, and efforts were made to improve Haitian living conditions. The HNP's strength and capacities increased, growing to approximately 15,000 officers. Although the judicial system still required improvement, some progress had been made. The increase in international aid was crucial in rebuilding the country's infrastructure following the earthquake.

Negative Outcomes

MINUSTAH failed to address the socio-economic disparity and extreme poverty, both root causes of Haiti's instability.¹⁰⁶ A significant number of peacekeepers were involved in incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), fathering children, and subsequently failing to provide any support.¹⁰⁷ In 2010, peacekeepers reintroduced cholera into Haiti due to poor sanitation practices. By 2019, this UN-imported cholera had killed over 10,000 Haitians and infected approximately 1 million.¹⁰⁸ Compounding the issue, the UN initially denied responsibility and took an extra six years to admit to any wrongdoing. Haitians were promised financial compensation and improved sanitation systems, but the UN failed to deliver on that as well.¹⁰⁹ These significant events demonstrated the UN's lack of accountability, eroding Haitians' trust and confidence in peacekeepers.¹¹⁰

Lessons Learned

Immediate accountability for any wrongdoing is crucial for any future intervention in Haiti, the UN must promptly acknowledge and address their mistakes. Any type of SEA must not occur; however, if it does, it must be dealt with swiftly and appropriately. Trust was lost and efforts need to be made towards re-earning it. Peacekeepers should not have the ability to act without consequences and impunity, nor should they be perceived as individuals who are above the law. The UN must exude full

¹⁰⁴ Secretary-General, Un. 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti', 5 October 2017. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1306299>.

¹⁰⁵ Dorn, A. Walter. 'Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006-07'. *Intelligence and National Security* 24, no. 6 (2009): 805–35. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520903320410>, 805.

¹⁰⁶ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 192.

¹⁰⁷ King, Carla, Greg Ferraro, Sandra C. Wisner, Stéphanie Etienne, Sabine Lee, and Susan A. Bartels. "'MINUSTAH Is Doing Positive Things Just as They Do Negative Things': Nuanced Perceptions of a UN Peacekeeping Operation amidst Peacekeeper-Perpetrated Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Haiti'. *Conflict, Security & Development* 21, no. 6 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2021.1997453>, 749-752.

¹⁰⁸ 'Broken UN Promises Lead to Haiti Cholera Resurgence – Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti'. Accessed 5 May 2024. https://www.ijdh.org/press_release/broken-un-promises-lead-to-haiti-cholera-resurgence/.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ King et al., Nuanced Perceptions, 765.

transparency with Haitians and avoid overpromising and underdelivering. Promising financial settlements to cholera victims and then not delivering on their words is completely unacceptable. Mobekk’s biggest lesson is described as the following: “This disregard for local ownership of reform processes by MINUSTAH was surprising and unfortunate – it increased distrust towards the mission by the government and civil society.”¹¹¹ For example, CVR programmes were much more successful than DDR. However, the government did not encourage the continuation of this process. If there is no desired political will, there is a strong chance that the undertaking will be unsustainable, leading to failure. Solutions must be owned by Haitians, not only by the UN.

2017-2019: UN MISSION FOR JUSTICE SUPPORT IN HAITI (MINUJUSTH)

Background

In April 2017, the UN recognized MINUSTAH for its major achievements and commended its support of “the political process in Haiti, the professionalization of the police and the maintenance of a secure and stable environment.”¹¹² With the achievement of MINUSTAH’s mandates, the UN decided to gradually withdraw all military personnel and proceed with a smaller-scale mission named MINUJUSTH.¹¹³

Scope and Justification

This mission began in October 2017 and lasted exactly two years, concluding fifteen straight years of peacekeeping operations in Haiti.¹¹⁴ MINUJUSTH was mandated to “assist the Government of Haiti to further develop the HNP; to strengthen Haiti’s rule of law institutions, including the justice and prisons; and to promote and protect human rights.” This mission was composed of 351 civilian staff and 1,275 police officers.¹¹⁵

Major Actions

The UN recognized mistakes made during MINUSTAH, putting heavy emphasis on a “New Approach to Cholera in Haiti,” and adopted a strong zero-tolerance policy on all forms of SEA.¹¹⁶ The MINUSTAH’s website also convey’s the same messaging.¹¹⁷ The

¹¹¹ Mobekk, *UN Peace Operations*, 94.

¹¹² ‘Security Council Resolution 2350 - UNSCR’. Accessed 5 May 2024. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2350>.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Kolbe, Athena R. ‘Prospects for Post-Minustah Security in Haiti’. *International Peacekeeping (London, England)* 27, no. 1 (2020): 44–57. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2020.1711557>.

¹¹⁵ MINUJUSTH. ‘Mandate’, 2 October 2017. <https://minujsth.unmissions.org/en/mandate>.

¹¹⁶ MINUJUSTH. ‘Security Council Statements’. Accessed 5 May 2024. <https://minujsth.unmissions.org/en/security-council-statements>.

¹¹⁷ MINUJUSTH. ‘MINUJUSTH’. Accessed 5 May 2024. <https://minujsth.unmissions.org/en>.

UN recognized that justice reform was not given enough emphasis during MINUSTAH; more efforts were made on judicial and corrections systems during this mission.¹¹⁸

Challenges

The HNP faced a significant challenge due to a high attrition rate, as many qualified and well-trained officers found higher-paying jobs abroad.¹¹⁹

Positive Outcomes

According to MINUSTAH's police commissioner, Serge Therriault, a senior RCMP member, the HNP was able to adapt to new environments and threats as a professional and gender-responsive police force. Even after the end of this mission, the HNP has proven itself time and time again.

Negative Outcomes

Even if improvements were finally made, the damage was done, trust was lost, and root causes were still ongoing. Haitians' appetite for UN peacekeepers was falling to an all-time low.¹²⁰

Lessons Learned

Therriault asserts that the future success and sustainability of the HNP depend on the Haitian government's commitment to providing sufficient and ongoing funding and human resources. Adequate oversight is essential to ensure HNP maintains the trust of the population as their sole public safety institution. Finally, emphasis is made on nationally owned solutions.¹²¹

One interesting correlation is that, like during MICAH, justice reform was instituted too late in the string of UN missions. The same mistake seems to have been committed twice.

MULTINATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT (MSS) MISSION IN HAITI

Background

Just like it was in 1993 and 2004, Haiti is without an elected president. The deteriorating and chaotic conditions in Haiti, marked by increasing homicides,

¹¹⁸ 'Security Council Resolution 2350 - UNSCR'.

¹¹⁹

¹²⁰ Agbedahin, Komlan. 'The Haiti Cholera Outbreak and Peacekeeping Paradoxes'. *Peace Review (Palo Alto, Calif.)* 31, no. 2 (2019): 190–98. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2019.1667568>, 192-196.

¹²¹ 'Serge Therriault (MINUJUSTH) on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - Security Council Open VTC | UN Web TV', 4 November 2020. <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1m/k1mgb6locx>.

kidnappings, sexual exploitations, extreme poverty and gang-controlled cities, prompted the UN to authorize the MSS mission in Haiti through UNSCR 2699.¹²²

Scope and Justification

The MSS's mandates include supporting the HNP, securing critical infrastructure, providing humanitarian aid, implementing temporary security measures, contributing and supporting human rights and child protection, protecting environmental and health safeguards, and reporting and overseeing.¹²³ In April 2024, after a year of uncertainty, the Kenyan president finally agreed to have Kenya lead the MSS mission.¹²⁴ Canada currently has "approximately 70 Canadian Armed Forces members deployed to Jamaica," known as Operation HELIOS¹²⁵ They are tasked with training "military personnel from Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations who are set to deploy to Haiti as part of the MSS mission."¹²⁶ Canada has pledged "\$123 million for projects to support Haiti, including \$80.5 million for a United Nations trust fund for the Kenyan-led MSS mission."¹²⁷ The U.S. will provide \$200 million in foreign assistance and in enabling support.¹²⁸

Positive Observations

Analyzing UNSCR 2699, it appears that the UN has learned from its past mistakes, emphasizing that Haiti must take primary responsibility for its security. The resolution highlights the need for a professional, self-sustaining HNP, an effective judicial system, and a politically-driven Haitian solution to address the root causes of instability.

Haiti has been without an elected government for practically three years; on 25 April 2024, a transitional council was finally sworn in.¹²⁹ This mission will have Kenyans

¹²² 'Security Council Authorizes "Historic" Support Mission in Haiti | UN News', 2 October 2023. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1141802>.

¹²³ 'Security Council Resolution 2699 - UNSCR'. Accessed 5 May 2024. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2699>.

¹²⁴ CHAIR CARDIN WELCOMES HAITI TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL, MULTINATIONAL SECURITY SUPPORT MISSION TO RESTORE PEACE." *US Fed News Service, Including US State News*, Apr 26, 2024. <https://login.cfc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/wire-feeds/chair-cardin-welcomes-haiti-transitional-council/docview/3047958056/se-2>.

¹²⁵ Canada: Canadian Armed Forces Members Deploy to Jamaica to Train CARICOM Troops for Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti." *Asia News Monitor*, Apr 02, 2024. <https://login.cfc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/canada-canadian-armed-forces-members-deploy/docview/3022906199/se-2>.

¹²⁶ *Asia News Monitor*, 'Canadian Armed Forces Members Deploy to Jamaica,' Apr 02, 2024.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*.

¹²⁸ Hansler, Jennifer. 'Blinken Says US Intends to Provide \$200M for Haiti Multinational Security Support Mission'. *CNN Wire Service*, 22 February 2024, sec. US Politics. <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2929976308/citation/82D2A72AAB6F4B1EPO/1>.

¹²⁹ *US Fed News Service*, Chair Cardin Welcomes Haiti Transitional Council.

helping out their “brothers and sisters” from Haiti.¹³⁰ Neighboring Caribbean nations, such as Jamaica, which have a vested interest in Haiti due to transnational threats, will also contribute troops dedicated to helping Haiti's situation. This is a different approach than the previous unsuccessful recipes where the white Western nations led the missions.

Potential Challenges

The UN authorized this Kenyan-led MSS mission on 2 October 2023. Seven months have since passed, Haiti's situation continues to deteriorate, and ‘boots on the ground’ have not yet been achieved. Kenyans will be faced with a language barrier as they do not speak French or Creole.

Kenya's plan is to send 1,000 National Police Service personnel to help the HNP deal with heavily armed gangs and restore stability to Haiti. In 1994, when Haiti was in a very similar situation, the U.S.-led MNF sent 21,000 troops to create some stability. Ten years later, in 2004, Haiti was once again in the same situation; the MIF sent 3,600 military personnel, which increased to 6,700 three months later, plus an additional 1,622 police. The current plan to deploy only 1,000 police officers, with no military personnel included, appears insufficient compared to the much larger contingents utilized in the two previous similar missions. Securing critical infrastructure as per the mandate, such as airports, ports, and hospitals, will most likely be challenging with such low numbers, especially if they are controlled by gangs.¹³¹

CONCLUSION

Over the last century, the string of interventions in Haiti can be divided into three separate periods: 1915–1934, 1993–2001, and 2004–2019. In all three instances, the stability and security situation in Haiti elusively improved during the intervention; however, these improvements were not sustained. The first period of interventions was followed by authoritarian regimes, coups and political upheaval. After both the second and third periods, within three years, the country plunged back into complete turmoil experiencing coups, extreme violence, government disintegration and gang control.

It is difficult to determine if these interventions are the primary cause of Haiti's never-ending struggles. However, it is clear that they failed to provide lasting stability and security. Each of these interventions has left deep scars through widespread human rights abuses, numerous cases of SEA, the spread of deadly diseases, peacekeepers-fathered children, unkept promises, impunity of peacekeepers, and racial and cultural insensitivity.

It is evident that Haiti does not wish to adopt the Western UN system imposed on them. Has the UN taken adequate time to listen to and comprehend what Haitians truly want? It appears much focus has been on the ‘How’ with far less attention to the ‘What’

¹³⁰ Cheruiyot, Kevin. "Haiti Mission: Kenya has Massive Support Despite Criticism, Says CS Alfred Mutua." *Daily Nation*, Sep 29, 2023. www.proquest.com/haiti-mission-kenya-has-massive-support-despite.

¹³¹ ‘Haiti Gangs Try to Take over Port-Au-Prince Airport’. 5 March 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68478718>.

and ‘Why.’ Perhaps the UN could learn from Albert Einstein's wisdom: “If I had only one hour to save the world, I would spend fifty-five minutes defining the problem and only five minutes finding the solution.”¹³² Thus, it might benefit the UN to spend more time defining and understanding Haiti’s problems before rushing to implement solutions.

An insightful analogy emerges when comparing Haiti, a failed state, to a violent individual addicted to drugs. Providing we wish for this person’s recovery just like we wish for Haiti’s betterment, literature suggests that for the treatment plan to be successful, the decision to follow it must be wanted and made by the individual themselves. Externally imposed solutions often result in relapse after the intervention ends, just like Haiti relapsed into chaos and turmoil following its interventions. Applying the same logic to Haiti, for these interventions to be successful, Haiti must want and desire to follow the UN ‘treatment plan’, however, history indicates that they are either not interested or not ready for it. For lasting, positive changes, the decision must come from within — a solution by Haitians for Haitians.

¹³²‘I Would Spend 55 Minutes Defining the Problem and Then Five Minutes Solving It – Quote Investigator®’, 22 May 2014. <https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/05/22/solve/>.

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