



## Arctic Crossroads: Navigating China's Goals and Canada's Security

Major Anonymous

### JCSP 50

#### Exercise Solo Flight

##### Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2024.

### PCEMI n° 50

#### Exercice Solo Flight

##### Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté le Roi du chef du Canada, représenté par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2024.

Exercise Solo Flight – Exercice Solo Flight

**Arctic Crossroads: Navigating China’s Goals and Canada’s Security**

**Major Anonymous**

*“This paper was written by a candidate attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

*« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »*

# Arctic Crossroads: Navigating China's Goals and Canada's Security

## INTRODUCTION

On 11 February 2023, NORAD shot down an 'unidentified object' over northern Canada.<sup>1</sup> The CF were deployed to support the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the search and recovery of the unidentified object in the Yukon. Despite the deployment of numerous airframes to search the area,<sup>2</sup> the search was eventually called off six days later due to a combination of mountainous terrain and snowfall reducing the likelihood of locating the object.<sup>3</sup> All of this occurred shortly after the US military destroyed "a Chinese surveillance balloon that had traversed the continent" on 04 February 2023.<sup>4</sup> China asserted that the device that the US shot down was "a weather balloon that was blown off course"<sup>5</sup> and denied that it sent a spy balloon.<sup>6</sup> This incident highlights China's engagement in the Arctic, the unique challenges of Arctic security, the importance of cooperation in the region.

For years the Government of Canada (GoC) has identified the importance of security in the arctic as an important contributor to maintaining its place in the world.

During the Cold War the construction of the North Warning System was seen as an essential counter to the risk of Soviet bombers and missiles attacking North America crossing over the arctic. Similarly, Canada has been steadfastly maintaining that the Northwest Passage (NWP) is internal territorial waters.

In recent decades, the *Canada First Defence Strategy* identified arctic sovereignty as a priority.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, the 2017 defence policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (SSE) emphasized the importance of arctic security and sovereignty to Canada.<sup>8</sup> Most recently, the GoC released the defence policy update to SSE, entitled *Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence*<sup>9</sup> (ONSF), on 08 April 2024.

<sup>1</sup> Christian Paas-Lang, "NORAD Shoots Down 'Unidentified Object' Over Yukon," *CBC News* 11 February, 2023. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/norad-monitoring-airborne-object-north-1.6745575>.

<sup>2</sup> The search reportedly included "a large CC-130H Hercules search and rescue plane, two smaller CC-138 Twin Otter planes, and CH-148 Cyclone and CH-149 Cormorant helicopters." "What we Know about the Search for Two Flying Objects Shot Down Over Yukon and Near Ontario." *CTVNew*. 13 February 2023. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/what-we-know-about-the-search-for-two-flying-objects-shot-down-over-yukon-and-near-ontario-1.6272475>.

<sup>3</sup> "Yukon Search for Debris Suspended," last modified 17 February, accessed 28 April, 2024, <https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news/2023/yukon-search-debris-suspended>.

<sup>4</sup> Paas-Lang, "NORAD Shoots Down 'Unidentified Object' Over Yukon,"

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> BBC News, "US and Canada Abandon Search for Three Flying Objects Shot Down," *BBC News* -02-18, 2023. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-64687038>.

<sup>7</sup> *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, [2008]). [http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES\\_Internet/docs/en/about/CFDS-SDCD-eng.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about/CFDS-SDCD-eng.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy," last modified -05-31, accessed Sep 24, 2023, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canada-defence-policy.html>.

<sup>9</sup> "Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence," last modified -04-08, accessed Apr 8, 2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/04/our-north-strong-and-free-a-renewed-vision-for-canadas-defence.html>.

ONSF highlights three major trends that threaten the stability and safety of Canada. Firstly, the impact of climate change, particularly in the arctic. Secondly, the threat “challenging the international order” to better suit their goals – specifically, China and Russia.<sup>10</sup> And, finally, “new and disruptive technologies”.<sup>11</sup>

While Russia is an arctic state and will, inevitably, form an important part of any analysis of the arctic region, this paper focuses primarily on China’s arctic ambitions and explores Canada’s efforts in the arctic to deter China. This paper explores whether ONSF enables Canada to address the emerging challenges and heightened competition with China in the Arctic region.

This paper suggests that China uses diplomacy, trade, and scientific research to increase its arctic access until such strategies are no longer advantageous. At that point China may pursue a more confrontational approach. This paper also asserts that ONSF correctly frames the contemporary geopolitical scenario as complex and concerning, and that Canada needs to be prepared to meet that challenge. However, despite many promising commitments to improving arctic security and capabilities, the GoC has missed an opportunity to accelerate its efforts in the north to address the anticipated challenges of climate change and an assertive China.

This paper will proceed in three sections. The first explores China’s geopolitical goals and ambitions. The second and largest section focuses on China’s objectives in the arctic, by analysing its 2018 Arctic white paper. In the third section, this paper examines ONSF, lauds its successes, and argues that the GoC should have announced additional, specific maritime infrastructure projects in the arctic.

## **CHINA’S AMBITION**

China’s aims in the Arctic must be understood as part of its broader geostrategic ambitions.

In their book, *Danger Zone: the Coming Conflict with China*, Hal Brands and Michael Beckley argue that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intends “[...] to make China whole again, turn the East China and South China Seas into Chinese lakes, and grab regional primacy as a springboard to global power.”<sup>12</sup>

According to Brands and Buckley, “the CCP is pursuing a determined, multilayered grand strategy with four key objectives.”<sup>13</sup> First, to maintain the CCP in power; second, “to make China whole again by regaining territories lost in earlier eras of internal upheaval and foreign aggression”; third, to create a regional sphere of influence

---

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* This view is also consistent with that of our closest ally, the USA, who states “the U.S. and its allies face global competitors that seek to rewrite rules that underpin global security as the Arctic quickly becomes a leading region of great power competition.” See Joseph Clark "Pentagon Arctic Policy Official Underscores Critical Role of Alliances in Evolving Region," last modified April 15, accessed Apr 22, 2024, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3741920/>

<sup>11</sup> *Supra* note 9.

<sup>12</sup> Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, *Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China*, 2022). at 125.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.* at 3.

in Asia where it is the dominant power; and, fourth, to achieve “global power and, eventually, global primacy.”<sup>14</sup> Thus, China’s attention is principally focused domestically, then regionally, and finally further abroad.

Similarly, in a 2018 report on an Academic Outreach Workshop, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) also noted that China employed a multilayered geopolitical strategy. In the Executive Summary, CSIS writes:

President Xi Jinping is driving a multi-dimensional strategy to lift China to global dominance. This strategy integrates aggressive diplomacy, asymmetrical economic agreements, technological innovation, as well as escalating military expenditures.<sup>15</sup>

Despite pursuing global prominence via “a grand strategy of national rejuvenation”, Andrew Scobell argues that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is comprised of “profoundly insecure leaders” that seek to preserve their grip on power by conceiving of the world in concentric rings of security.<sup>16</sup> Scobell argues that the PRC is not concerned with “regime survival” as it is frequently described, but instead with “regime perpetuation”.<sup>17</sup> The key distinction is that the PRC is not concerned with collapse in the immediate term, but with ensuring the PRC’s continued rule in the medium to long term. As such, Scobell, argues that the PRC leadership is “ambitiously alarmist” and “extremely ambitious, they think big, and plan for the long term.”<sup>18</sup>

Additionally, Scobell asserts that “China possesses a ‘nested’ conception of its place in the world and its national security posture”<sup>19</sup> that places Beijing at the center of four concentric circles: the first includes the territory in the PRC that is under effective control of the CCP, the second comprises all 14 states that neighbour the PRC, the third is the Asia-Pacific region, and the fourth is the broader world.<sup>20</sup>

In a similar vein, Moyer, et. al., argue that China is applying a broader brush to achieve prominence, rather than focusing solely on coercive levers of power such as the military.<sup>21</sup> Instead, Moyer, et. al., state that China “exert[s] influence through economic, political, and security relations.”<sup>22</sup> Key findings from this report include that global influence is dispersing away from the USA and Europe, and that China is beginning to

---

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.* at 4-6.

<sup>15</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service . *Rethinking Security: China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry* (Canada: Government of Canada,[2018]). <https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/china-and-the-age-of-strategic-rivalry.html>. at 5.

<sup>16</sup> Andrew Scobell, "China's “Nested” Worldview," in *China's Strategic Arsenal*, eds. JAMES M. SMITH and PAUL J. BOLT (United States: Georgetown University Press, 2021), 23-44.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, at 39.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, at 25.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, at 23.

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, at 26.

<sup>21</sup> Jonathan D. Moyer et al., *Power and Influence in a Globalized World* (Washington DC: Atlantinc Council,[2018]).

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*, at 26.

“wield greater amounts of influence over larger geographical distances than before”.<sup>23</sup> While Moyer et. al. indicate that China’s influence is predominantly in Asia and Africa, they also note an increased influence in NATO member states.<sup>24</sup> As such, China’s ambition to become a great power is driving it to adopt a diverse set of tools and to extend its influence further and further around the globe – including the polar regions.

This approach is consistent with the arguments advanced by Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui in their book *Un-Restricted Warfare*.<sup>25</sup> Briefly stated, Liang and Xiangsui argue that the interconnectedness of globalization has made the entire world the battlefield.<sup>26</sup> As such, modern warfare will involve economic, psychological and diplomatic warfare to achieve a state’s objectives, not just military might. In turn, bankers, scientists, politicians and hackers are key actors in modern warfare. Since the scope of warfare has broadened to include multiple domains, the authors argue that states should seek to achieve limited objectives that are within their means, employing synchronistic effects, and by employing “unlimited measures”.<sup>27</sup> Stated another way, “Unrestricted Warfare” can be seen as “outside-the-box thinking on war.”<sup>28</sup>

Critically, Brands and Beckley argue that Americans, and by extension Canadians, need to begin seeing the rivalry between China and the West “less as a 100-year marathon and more as a blistering, decade-long sprint. That’s because China will be a *falling* power far sooner than most people think.”<sup>29</sup>

They argue that China is at or nearing the peak of its power and influence, and this presents the greatest risk of conflict. Brands and Beckley assert that many conflicts in history arise from rising states that perceive their imminent decline as motivation for seizing the opportunity before it is beyond reach. As evidence of the looming decline, they argue that China is facing declining demographics resulting from its one-child policy, which will generate reduced economic productivity at a time when its economy is at risk of faltering.<sup>30</sup> While Brands and Beckley do not anticipate the economic collapse of China, they point to the massive debt, domestic ecological damage, government inefficiency, “ghost cities and bridges to nowhere”, “a looming demographic catastrophe”, “vulnerable supply lines and a dearth of domestic consumption” as indicative of a looming economic slump that may be destabilizing for the CCP.<sup>31</sup> In Brands and Beckley’s assessment, a rising state that views its opportunity for success as fleeting may pose a greater risk than a rising state with a more optimistic outlook.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.*, at 2.

<sup>25</sup> Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America* (Beijing: Medina University Press International, 2021).

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, at 190.

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, at 180.

<sup>28</sup> Dean Cheng, "Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 11, no. 1 (2000), 122-129., at 125.

<sup>29</sup> *Supra* note 12. at xi. Italics in original.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.* at 34-51.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.* at 50-51.

<sup>32</sup> *ibid.* at 79-104.

Accordingly, they argue that America needs to adopt a sense of urgency that is not prevalent in most discourse regarding China.

Thus, the CCP is focused on regime perpetuation, and seeks to do so by aspiring to make China a global power. To achieve these aims, China develops long-term plans and employs a multi-faceted strategy that incorporates diplomacy, economics, and science, as well as more coercive levers of power such as the military. This strategy is described as ‘un-restricted warfare’ and involves identifying limited aims and pursuing unlimited means to achieve them. Finally, China is facing its own challenges in the next decade that may drive them to adopt a more reckless strategy. As such, Canada needs to cultivate a sense of urgency in evaluating plans to compete with and deter China. However, when considering China’s objectives in the Arctic, one naturally wonders if the same sense of urgency applies.

### **CHINA’S ARCTIC OBJECTIVES**

Since 2018, there has been considerable ink spilt about China’s Arctic ambitions. A review of academic literature indicates a lack of consensus on whether China’s Arctic objectives should be met with trepidation or with cautious optimism. Helpfully, Anne-Marie Brady, the leading western scholar on China-Arctic issues, writes that China’s goals in the Arctic can be grouped in three categories, ranked as follows:

- Security;
- Resources; and,
- Science and Technology.<sup>33</sup>

While her book, *China as a Polar Great Power*, was published prior to the release of China’s Arctic Policy white paper<sup>34</sup> it provides an excellent framework to explore this topic.

Using Brady’s three categories, this section evaluates China’s Arctic Policy and summarizes scholarly perspectives. This section ultimately concludes that China’s objectives in the Arctic form an integral part of their broader geostrategic plan to become a global power. Moreover, while China is currently satisfied to collaborate and cooperate with Arctic states to increase its presence in and access to the region, it is equally willing to adopt a more assertive strategy in the future. Accordingly, Canada must prepare itself for the competition in the Arctic to come.

Notoriously, despite being over 1,400km away from the Arctic, China declared itself an “important stakeholder in Arctic affairs” and “a Near-Arctic State”.<sup>35</sup> While this

---

<sup>33</sup> Anne-Marie Brady, "China’s Geostrategic Interests in the Polar Regions," in *China as a Polar Great Power*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 60-113.

<sup>34</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *China's Arctic Policy* (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, [2018]).  
[https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/wjzcs/201801/t20180126\\_679659.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/201801/t20180126_679659.html).

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.* at 2.

claim has been disputed by the US,<sup>36</sup> it sends a clear message to Arctic states that China sees the Arctic region as important to future geopolitical affairs. China states that the impact of climate change, and its disproportionate impact on the Arctic, has global significance due to its “rising strategic, economic values and those relating to scientific research, environmental protection, sea passages, and natural resources.”<sup>37</sup>

While some states may be concerned with the asserted ‘near-Arctic state’ status as threatening territorial sovereignty, China is careful to attempt to allay those concerns by acknowledging that non-Arctic states do not enjoy territorial sovereignty while simultaneously asserting limited rights in the region. Specifically, it states

States from outside the Arctic region do not have territorial sovereignty in the Arctic, but they do have rights in respect of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines in the high seas and other relevant sea areas in the Arctic Ocean, and rights to resource exploration and exploitation in the Area, pursuant to treaties such as UNCLOS and general international law.<sup>38</sup>

Importantly, China clearly lays out its policy goals and what it sees as the basic principles on the Arctic:

China’s policy goals on the Arctic are: to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development on the Arctic.<sup>39</sup>

The white paper then explains that China will pursue scientific research to understand the Arctic, combat climate change and respect indigenous cultures to protect the Arctic. It commits to technological innovation, the development of Arctic shipping routes, and to improve the living conditions of local peoples by contributing to economic and social development in the region. Critically, as part of its approach to governance in the Arctic, China writes that it “is committed to the existing framework of international law including the UN Charter, UNCLOS, [...]”<sup>40</sup> Finally, the paper states “[...], China will participate in Arctic affairs in accordance with the basic principles of ‘respect, cooperation, win-win result and sustainability.”<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, *Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy* Government of the United States of America, [2019]).

<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF>. The Report states, “Despite China’s claim of being a ‘Near Arctic State,’ the United States does not recognize any such status.” at 5.

<sup>37</sup> *Supra* note 34.

<sup>38</sup> *ibid*, at 2.

<sup>39</sup> *ibid*.

<sup>40</sup> *ibid*, at 3.

<sup>41</sup> *ibid*.

Importantly, China clearly states that it intends to participate in Arctic governance by emphasizing trust building with Arctic states by respecting international law.<sup>42</sup> However, what is unsaid in the white paper is respecting international law *in the region*. Famously, China has “built three unsinkable aircraft carriers on reclaimed coral reefs in the contested waters of the South China Sea” (SCS).<sup>43</sup> China has continued to maintain its de facto and illegal control over these islands and the region, despite a 2016 Arbitration Tribunal that decided in favour of the Philippines.<sup>44</sup> In applying the Scobell model of how China conceives security, we can discern that these islands would be within the first circle (territory controlled by the CCP) and the SCS within the third (the Asia-Pacific region); whereas, the Arctic falls within the fourth circle (global influence). Accordingly, the Arctic is not likely an immediate priority for China nor at risk of similar illegal action. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the merit of maritime claims in both the SCS and the Arctic, it is important to note that China’s activity in the SCS risks undermining the legitimacy of international law by breaking trust in the dispute resolution processes of UNCLOS and increasing the risk of potential conflict by condoning coercive actions.<sup>45</sup>

As such, the white paper’s assertions that China will abide by international law, including UNCLOS, must be taken with a grain of salt. Instead, this commitment should be viewed as an attempt to diffuse tensions in the region, to enable Canada to prioritize resources away from securing the Arctic. Arguably, this would provide opportunity for China to increase its Arctic access through continued diplomatic, scientific research, and economic efforts while, perhaps, biding its time until the situation changes.

Although China’s Arctic white paper strikes a conciliatory tone aimed at reassuring the Arctic states, it also clearly articulates a view that China sees the Arctic as strategically important in the future. Since its release, states, commentators, and academics have been wrestling with what to make of China’s Arctic Policy. Especially, as it relates to China’s broader geopolitical and security goals.

## Security

David Wright notes in his article from 2018, the academic response to China’s Arctic Policy has run the gamut – from hawkish to doveish.<sup>46</sup> In the years since the white paper was published, articles continue to range from those supportive of China’s position, to skeptical, to opposed.

On the supportive end of the spectrum, Yubing Shi (from the South China Sea Institute at Xiamen University), contends the white paper provides transparency to Arctic

---

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Supra* note 33, at 75.

<sup>44</sup> Jeffrey Becker, "China, UNCLOS and the Future of International Maritime Law in the South China Sea," in *The United Nations, Indo-Pacific and Korean Peninsula: An Emerging Security Architecture*, eds. Shin-wha Lee and Jagannath Panda (Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group, 2023), 107-122.

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> David Curtis Wright, "The Dragon and Great Power Rivalry at the Top of the World: China’s Hawkish, Revisionist Voices within Mainstream Discourse on Arctic Affairs," *Canadian Global Affairs Institute* (September, 2018). [https://www.cgai.ca/the\\_dragon\\_and\\_great\\_power\\_rivalry\\_at\\_the\\_top\\_of\\_the\\_world](https://www.cgai.ca/the_dragon_and_great_power_rivalry_at_the_top_of_the_world).

states because it articulates the role China identifies for itself in the region.<sup>47</sup> While not supportive of the white paper, Wright acknowledges that China issuing a formal policy on the Arctic is a positive development.<sup>48</sup>

However, as noted by Shi, the white paper is silent on China's national security interests in the region<sup>49</sup> and omits any reference to the Peoples' Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). In Wright's view, the omission of military or strategic matters in the Arctic is important. Wright notes that "China sometimes says one thing for international consumption and quite something else for domestic consumption".

Wright canvasses contemporary sources in Chinese academics and state supportive media outlets. He concludes that China acknowledges the military and strategic value of the Arctic to domestic Chinese audiences.<sup>50</sup> However, such messaging is conspicuously absent from communications oriented towards foreign audience. Wright argues that China intends to open the Arctic through investment, cooperation, and other soft approaches, while holding a more militaristic strategy in reserve "until the time is right for it."<sup>51</sup> Based on his review and analysis of Chinese sources, Wright states:

This paper's main contention and conclusion is that the military and strategic dimensions of China's interests in the Arctic are part and parcel of mainstream Chinese discourse on the Arctic today. One important motivation behind China's burgeoning interest and engagement in Arctic affairs is the eventual utilisation of the region as strategic space from which to threaten the security of North America. China's activities in the Arctic bear close, careful, and continuous scrutiny.<sup>52</sup>

In a similar vein, Brady highlights that Chinese maritime specialists have identified the Arctic shipping routes as a "golden route" for maritime transportation.<sup>53</sup> These alternative Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) would allow China to avoid the maritime chokepoints at the Strait of Malacca, the eastern entrance to the South China Sea, and the Miyako Strait, which is "the main passage for the PLAN North and East Sea Fleets to access the Pacific Ocean."<sup>54</sup> As part of her argument, Brady uses a well-known quote from a Chinese maritime scholar, Li Zhenfu, that is widely supported by other Chinese academics: "Whoever controls the Arctic Ocean will control the new corridor for the world economy."<sup>55</sup> Brady says China is seeking alternative SLOCs not just for military purposes, but in large part to assure that it will continue to benefit from being "the world's largest shipping nation with the world's largest economy".<sup>56</sup> However,

---

<sup>47</sup> Yubing Shi, "China: China's Arctic Policy: Implications and Implementation," *Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy* 4, no. 1 (2019), 86-92.

<sup>48</sup> *Supra* note 46.

<sup>49</sup> *Supra* note 47, at 90.

<sup>50</sup> *Supra* note 46.

<sup>51</sup> *ibid*, at 3.

<sup>52</sup> *ibid*, at 2.

<sup>53</sup> *Supra* note 33, at 63.

<sup>54</sup> *ibid*, at 62.

<sup>55</sup> *ibid*, at 64.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid*, at 62

she cautions that as China increases its Arctic shipping and the associated increase in other areas, such as tourism, scientific expeditions, and resource exploration, “so too will the PLAN become more active in protecting Chinese interests in the Arctic.”<sup>57</sup>

### Natural Resources

Another key principle identified by China in its Arctic white paper is the right to pursue natural resource exploration and exploitation through international cooperation.<sup>58</sup> Those Arctic natural resources sought by China include oil, gas, minerals, as well as participation in fisheries.<sup>59</sup> In all of these endeavours, China states that it will be in accordance with international and domestic law, and with the goal of preserving ecologically sensitive environments and wildlife populations.

This represents a shift from the years prior to the release of the Arctic white paper, when China was reluctant to openly disclose its Arctic ambitions. Recognizing that Brady’s book predates the China’s Arctic white paper, she states “China has a strong interest in accessing polar natural resources in both the Arctic and Antarctic, but current policy is to downplay or deny this interest in discussions with foreigners.”<sup>60</sup> Similarly, Lackenbauer characterizes China’s Arctic policy during the period of 2011 to 2018 as “Discipline and Control”, and emphasizes the narrative shift that occurred with the release of the white paper.<sup>61</sup> Specifically, he writes

In contrast with the subdued narrative that defined the period of control, China’s 2018 white paper trumpets Chinese ambitions for the polar Silk Road, suggesting that Beijing believes that it has normalized China’s presence for Arctic states and can return to a more assertive position vis-à-vis Arctic resources and sovereignty.<sup>62</sup>

While China expresses a willingness to work with all Arctic states to build a Polar Silk Road,<sup>63</sup> its success thus far has been limited to Russia. Following the Russian war in Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden joining NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively<sup>64</sup>, China is seeing its opportunity to negotiate access to the Arctic.<sup>65</sup> Accordingly, China has made considerable efforts to sooth the traditionally sharp Russian response to its efforts to gain access in the region.<sup>66</sup> To that end, China and Russia have begun working together to

---

<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, at 75.

<sup>58</sup> *Supra* note 34, at 4.

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*, at 5.

<sup>60</sup> *Supra* note 33, at 87.

<sup>61</sup> Bryan J. R. Millard and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "Trojan Dragons? Normalizing China’s Presence in the Arctic," *Canadian Global Affairs Institute* (June 2021).

[https://www.cgai.ca/trojan\\_dragons\\_normalizing\\_chinas\\_presence\\_in\\_the\\_arctic](https://www.cgai.ca/trojan_dragons_normalizing_chinas_presence_in_the_arctic), at 8-11.

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, at 11.

<sup>63</sup> *Supra* note 34, at 2.

<sup>64</sup> "NATO Member Countries," last modified 11 March, accessed May 3, 2024,

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52044.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm)

<sup>65</sup> Matthew P Funaiole, Brian Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Aidan Powers-Riggs, "Frozen Frontiers: China’s Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions," last modified April 18, accessed Apr 19, 2024,

<https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-polar-research-facility>.

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*

build the Arctic Silk Road, also called the Polar Silk Road. Since 2018, they “have signed 20 bilateral cooperative documents and agreements to invest in the region.”<sup>67</sup> As part of this initiative, China will improve the ports in several northern Russian towns to improve Arctic shipping and the export of Russian energy resources that are linked to the ports via over 500km of new railway.<sup>68</sup> As a result, China can be seen to be using economic development and trade as a lever to influence Russia into adopting a more conciliatory posture towards China’s access to the Arctic.

Similarly, China asserts it has a right under international law to engage in polar fishing in international waters beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone of a state. While commercial fishing in the Arctic was frustrated by the physical barrier of ice, climate change is making this region more and more accessible. Similarly, Brady indicates that fish stocks may be migrating further north in pursuit of colder water and abundant foods. As such, she hypothesises that “China’s fishing interest are likely to expand into the Arctic Ocean in the future”.<sup>69</sup> Brady contends that this is likely to address food security, which she describes as “a top priority in China’s national security strategy.”<sup>70</sup> Ipso facto, China would be able to leverage its increased presence in the Arctic for polar fishing to achieve greater influence in Arctic affairs.<sup>71</sup>

Thus, China sees the melting sea ice in the Arctic as an opportunity. An opportunity that it is pursuing via new SLOCs, development of the Arctic Silk Road with Russia, and increased fishing in the north. All of this is a key expression of China’s aspiration to become a global power.

### Science and Technology

The third and final category identified by Brady is science and technology. China has been conducting expeditions to the Arctic and Antarctica since the 1980s, which it has used to gain access and influence in the polar regions.<sup>72</sup> For example, the Arctic scientific collaboration between China and Iceland has gradually increased and resulted in the creation of the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory in October 2018.<sup>73</sup> It is jointly managed by the Polar Research Institute of China and the Icelandic Center for Research.<sup>74</sup> Interestingly, Iceland is also the first European country to sign a free trade agreement with China.<sup>75</sup> While joint scientific research did not cause Iceland to sign a free trade deal with China, the trust built through scientific collaboration was arguably

---

<sup>67</sup> *Why Russia is Building an Arctic Silk Road*, YouTube, directed by Fred Mills the BIM, (2022) at 4:15.

<sup>68</sup> *ibid*, at 4:23.

<sup>69</sup> *Supra* note 33, at 100.

<sup>70</sup> *ibid*, at 97.

<sup>71</sup> *ibid*, at 100.

<sup>72</sup> "The Arctic Institute: China (Facts & Figures)," last modified 01 August, accessed May 4, 2024, <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/country-backgrounders/china/>.

<sup>73</sup> BBC, *BBC World Service - the Documentary, Stories from the New Silk Road: Iceland*, Anna Holligan, podcast, 2023 C60Media. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3ct68nq>.

<sup>74</sup> *ibid*.

<sup>75</sup> *ibid*.

effective. In China's view, this would be an excellent example of the 'win-win' scenario it is advocating for in the Arctic white paper.

Despite China's assurances that its scientific efforts are for the benefit of all, many western states and academics are concerned with the dual-use of that research for military purposes.

Whitney Lackenbauer, one of Canada's leading academics on the Arctic, and Bryan Millard point to the activities of the Chinese icebreakers *Xue Long 1* and *Xue Long 2* and the Chinese national Arctic research expeditions (CHINARE) to "normalize its presence in the region for skittish Arctic nations."<sup>76</sup> They highlight that many of the CHINARE activities include officers from the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA), and that *Xue Long 2* has a 'moon pool' that allows scientist to access the water from inside the ship, which they contend renders many of its operations unobservable.<sup>77</sup> Lackenbauer also cites the concentration of Chinese scientific research in the vicinity of the Bering Strait and surrounding seas as supporting the concerns that "Arctic marine scientific research (particularly hydrography) is inherently dual-use and designed to enable Chinese naval operations in the North Pacific or Arctic waters."<sup>78</sup>

Yet another example of the dual-use application of polar science is the electronic/radio/magnetic field monitoring equipment, including weather balloons<sup>79</sup> (like the one shot down by NORAD, discussed above). From a scientific point of view, this equipment can gather data on upper atmospheric conditions and space weather. However, it can also be utilized to develop command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities that are able to operate in the challenging Arctic conditions.<sup>80</sup>

In contrast, Adam Lajeunesse, argues that concerns over China's scientific efforts and economic partnerships are overblown.<sup>81</sup> While Lajeunesse is clear-eyed about the risks associated with collaboration and partnerships with China, Chinese organizations and companies, he concludes that on the balance the benefits of such cooperation outweigh the risks.<sup>82</sup>

However, based on China's illegal actions in the SCS, combined with double talk for domestic and international audiences, and the prolific use of scientific expeditions for dual-use, one can conclude that the cautious optimism expressed by Lajeunesse is misplaced.

---

<sup>76</sup> *Supra* note 61.

<sup>77</sup> *ibid*, at 14.

<sup>78</sup> *ibid*, at 19.

<sup>79</sup> *Supra* note 65.

<sup>80</sup> *ibid*.

<sup>81</sup> Adam Lajeunesse, "Finding "Win-Win" China's Arctic Policy and what it Means for Canada," *The School of Public Policy Publications (SPPP)* 11 (2018a) <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/finding-win-china-s-arctic-policy-what-means/docview/2199193225/se-2?accountid=9867>

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*.

Therefore, despite omitting mention of security and the military from its Arctic white paper, China views the Arctic as key terrain to its strategic security in the future and is diligently and gradually moving to secure access. It is doing so by employing levers of soft power. China's Arctic white paper is an example of softer diplomacy with Arctic states. Moreover, its continued scientific research partnerships with Arctic states, and the creation of the Arctic Silk Road, demonstrates a willingness by China to employ a multifaceted strategy to gain increased access to the Arctic. Yet, China is equally prepared to adopt a more assertive posture in the future. It is simply waiting for the conditions to change. Ultimately, as Wright articulates, it is vital that Canada maintain vigilance against China's security objectives in the Arctic. Similarly, he counsels against complacency and inaction in the region.<sup>83</sup>

## **CANADA, SECURITY, AND DETERRENCE IN THE ARCTIC**

ONSF provides a stark assessment of the global security environment. It highlights the ongoing challenges to the rules based international order, increased strategic competition, tensions in the Indo-Pacific (specifically the SCS), the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and its impact in Europe, as well as the impact of accelerating technological challenges. Despite these complex and layered challenges, the GoC identifies the CAF's top priority as the defence of Canada and Canadians.<sup>84</sup> ONSF also states:

The most urgent and important task we face is asserting Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic and northern regions, where the changing physical and geopolitical landscapes have created new threats and vulnerabilities to Canada and Canadians.<sup>85</sup>

The above quote from ONSF indicates that the GoC recognizes the importance of the Arctic to Canadian security, and that it is facing accelerating challenges with the combination of climate change and the return of great power competition. In particular, ONSF notes that the Arctic Ocean may be the most efficient shipping route linking Europe, East Asia and North America by 2050.<sup>86</sup> ONSF also highlights that the Arctic is already becoming more accessible and that:

competitors are not waiting to take advantage – seeking access, transportation routes, natural resources, critical minerals, and energy sources through more frequent and regular presence and activity. They are exploring Arctic waters and the sea floor, probing our infrastructure and collecting intelligence.<sup>87</sup>

Critically, ONSF acknowledges that China has ambitions to “become a ‘polar great power’ by 2030” and states that it:

---

<sup>83</sup> *Supra* note 46, at 3.

<sup>84</sup> *Supra* note 9, at 11.

<sup>85</sup> *ibid*, at viii.

<sup>86</sup> *ibid*, at 4.

<sup>87</sup> *ibid*.

is demonstrating an intent to play a larger role in the region. The steady growth of its navy, including its conventional and nuclear-powered submarine fleet, will support this ambition. China is also expanding its investments, infrastructure and industrial scientific influence throughout the Arctic region.<sup>88</sup>

Accordingly, the GoC commits in ONSF to “[establish] greater presence, reach, mobility, and responsiveness in the Arctic”.<sup>89</sup> The purpose of this increased presence and responsiveness in the Arctic is to safeguard Canadian Arctic waters, airspace and territory to protect Canadian sovereignty, and provide northern security to the USA and western flank security to our NATO allies.<sup>90</sup> The GoC intends to achieve this through a suite of new sensors and capabilities that are intended to provide advanced situational awareness and warning so that the CAF can deploy forces on a ‘just-in-time’ approach.

Specifically, the ONSF commits to developing polar over the horizon radar, and building a new satellite ground station in the Arctic, and acquiring new specialized maritime sensors.<sup>91</sup> Importantly, the ONSF does not commit large number of military personnel or capabilities to be permanently located in the north. Instead, it is wisely choosing to leverage its limited resources to respond to incidents or crises in the Arctic as they occur.

Accordingly, the ONSF reminds the reader of the NORAD Modernization Plan and reiterates its commitments to expanding the runways and improving the infrastructure at its Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Inuvik, Yellowknife, Iqaluit and CFB Goose Bay.<sup>92</sup> Additionally, ONSF reminds Canadians of the GoC’s commitment to procure the F-35 next generation fighter aircraft,<sup>93</sup> and celebrates the delivery of four of the planned six *Harry DeWolf*-class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPS).<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, ONSF commits to extending the service life of the *Halifax*-class frigates<sup>95</sup> and to exploring options to renew and expand the submarine fleet.<sup>96</sup> Many of the initiatives to secure the Arctic that are detailed in ONSF involve the refurbishment of existing infrastructure and retrofitting existing capabilities to extend its service life. This represents sound and achievable plan to address the challenges in the near term. However, such efforts should be viewed as an interim plan.

To counter China’s multifaceted Arctic strategy, the GoC should invest now. Accordingly, the GoC’s commitment to pursue multi-purpose infrastructure projects in

---

<sup>88</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *ibid.*, at 35.

<sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, at 32.

<sup>94</sup> *ibid.*, at 32. For a review of the AOPS capabilities, mission sets, and impact on the RCN, see Adam P. MacDonald, "Becoming an "Arctic-Capable" Navy: Not just the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship,"

*Canadian Military Journal* 22, no. 2 (2022). <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ222Ep7.pdf>

See also, "Unarmed Warships: What are the AOPS for?" last modified June, accessed Dec 13, 2023,

[https://www.cgai.ca/unarmed\\_warships\\_what\\_are\\_the\\_aops\\_for](https://www.cgai.ca/unarmed_warships_what_are_the_aops_for).

<sup>95</sup> *Supra* note 9, at 27.

<sup>96</sup> *ibid.*, at 24.

cooperation between the GoC, the Territories, and indigenous peoples is promising. Specifically, ONSF commits to establishing northern operational support hubs, which will consist of “airstrips, logistics facilities and equipment and stockpiles of spare parts”,<sup>97</sup> and “roadways and infrastructure in cooperation with local and indigenous partners.”<sup>98</sup> Distressingly, infrastructure deficits in the north combine with and amplify socio-economic challenges, including colonialism, a housing crisis and food insecurity, to create a complex web of human security challenges that make the north vulnerable to exploitation.<sup>99</sup> As such, new multi-purpose infrastructure projects benefit local communities by providing required infrastructure for their use when not required for defensive purposes.<sup>100</sup> As such, investment multi-purpose infrastructure is a positive step forward to address the most pressing security concern – human insecurity in the north.

Regrettably, Canada has a troubling history of causing harm to indigenous communities to advance defence priorities.<sup>101</sup> As such, commitment in ONSF to pursuing infrastructure projects in coordination with indigenous communities is a positive step. Yet, meaningful consultation also likely means increased timelines. When China is aiming at becoming a polar Arctic power by 2030, and the Arctic Ocean may be the most efficient shipping route by 2050, time is in short supply.<sup>102</sup>

As such, the omission of improvements to maritime infrastructure in ONSF is concerning. With the anticipated increase in maritime traffic in the NWP, and the potential for increased natural resource extraction, Canada needs ports and harbours in the Arctic that are connected to the rest of Canada.<sup>103</sup> While economic development of the north is not the mandate of DND nor the CAF, the importance of ports to increase the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard’s presence, reach, mobility, and responsiveness in the future cannot be overstated. While the specific site of any such port would need to be explored in depth, and engage in meaningful consultation with

---

<sup>97</sup> *ibid*, at 25.

<sup>98</sup> *ibid*, at 35.

<sup>99</sup> Standing Senate Committee on National Security Defence and Veterans Affairs, *Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent Needs in a Changing Geopolitical and Environmental Landscape* (Ottawa, ON: Government of Canada, [2023]. [https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/SECD/reports/2023-06-28\\_SECD\\_ArcticReport\\_e.pdf](https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/SECD/reports/2023-06-28_SECD_ArcticReport_e.pdf)

<sup>100</sup> Unfortunately, dual-use property also carries the risk that an adversary may target that infrastructure if an armed conflict breaks out. While ONSF anticipates that the risk of armed conflict in the arctic is low, the dependence on that infrastructure in remote regions places those local communities at risk of increased harm if they are disrupted, damaged or destroyed. While this factor is beyond the scope of this paper, it is an important consideration for the GoC to communicate to Indigenous Communities as part of meaningful consultations.

<sup>101</sup> *Supra* note 99. At 11, the Senate Report states “In the past, some Government of Canada actions aimed at increasing military security in the Arctic, such as the forced relocation of Inuit to secure Canadian Arctic sovereignty during the Cold War, have harmed Indigenous communities in the region. For that reason, decisions relating to Arctic security and defence must be made with the full involvement of local and Indigenous governments.”

<sup>102</sup> Prime Minister Trudeau reinforced this sentiment when he said “The Northwest Passage could become the most efficient shipping route between Europe and Asia by 2050. That’s just 26 years away” [underline added]. Christopher Nardi, "New Defence Policy to Focus on Arctic Security, Fixing 'Unsustainable' Gap in Force Size," *National Post*, 8 April 2024. <https://www.coldlakesun.com/news/canada/canada-to-focus-on-securing-arctic-improving-personnel-recruitment-and-retention-in-new-defence-policy>

<sup>103</sup> *Supra* note 81, at 3.

indigenous communities, two leading options include Churchill, MB<sup>104</sup> and Tuktoyaktuk, NWT due to their ground linkages to the rest of Canada.<sup>105</sup>

The absence of any inclusion of specific port infrastructure project in ONSF is troubling because of the length of time it takes to negotiate and break ground in the North. The maritime refuelling station at Nanisivik demonstrates the challenges associated with defence projects in the Arctic. This project was announced in 2007 and is managed through Defence Construction Canada in cooperation with Nunavut. Originally, it was intended to include a runway and heated fuel tanks, but increasing costs resulted in a reduced scope and limited operational window each year.<sup>106</sup> Despite the reduction in scope, it is nine years behind schedule.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, no construction was completed in 2021 because the only access road was washed out.<sup>108</sup> All of this demonstrates the complexity of establishing new infrastructure projects, managing shifting scope, and the challenges in completing them. These problems do not get easier with time, but the amount time available for Canada to meet these challenges continues slip by. Hence, any delay in identifying and commencing infrastructure projects in the Arctic needs to be minimized, which is why its absence from ONSF is concerning.

While the GoC must vigilantly guard against the ‘say/do gap’ – meaning over promising and underdelivering – that port projects were not included in ONSF suggests that Canada will not have the infrastructure in place in time to meet the demands of identified future challenges. The result will be maritime vessels that need to travel longer distances to resupply and, as a result, have reduced time in the Arctic to demonstrate Canadian presence to deter China from adopting a more assertive posture in the region.

In sum, while ONSF represents a frank assessment of the geopolitical risks facing Canada, especially in the Arctic region, and provides a realistic approach to address the

---

<sup>104</sup> The Port of Churchill is the only deep-water arctic port that is linked to the North American ground lines of communication (GLOCs). Additionally, “[t]he provincial and federal government have pledged \$30 million a piece [*sic*] to finish work on the Hudson Bay Railway and to start redeveloping the Port of Churchill.” Daniel Halmarson, "\$60M Announced for Churchill’s Railway, Port," *CTVNews Winnipeg* - 02-23T13:49:00.000-05:00, 2024. <https://winnipeg.ctvnews.ca/60m-announced-for-churchill-s-railway-port-1.6781001>.

<sup>105</sup> Tuktoyaktuk is a port town on continental Canada, near the western approaches to the NWP. As of 2017, the Inuvik-Tuktoyaktuk Highway (officially Northwest Territories Highway 10) is an all-weather road that connects the port of Tuktoyaktuk with southern Canada. See *supra* note 81. See also, Wikipedia "Inuvik–Tuktoyaktuk Highway," last modified 3 November 2023, accessed 23 April, 2024, [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Inuvik%E2%80%93Tuktoyaktuk\\_Highway&oldid=1183294559](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Inuvik%E2%80%93Tuktoyaktuk_Highway&oldid=1183294559).

<sup>106</sup> Steven Chase, "Long-Delayed Naval Facility in the High Arctic Now Postponed to 2023 - the Globe and Mail," *The Globe and Mail* 30 March 2022. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-long-delayed-naval-facility-in-the-high-arctic-now-postponed-to-2023/>. See also, "Report 6—Arctic Waters Surveillance," accessed Apr 28, 2024, [https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att\\_e\\_44160.html#hd5g](https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att_e_44160.html#hd5g), at para 6.63.

<sup>107</sup> CBC News, "Arctic Naval Refuelling Station Set to Open in 2024, 9 Years Behind Schedule," *CBC News* 19 January 2023. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nanisivik-naval-base-nunavut-2023-update-1.6717971>.

<sup>108</sup> *ibid.*

most likely challenges in the mid-term, the lack of specified defence infrastructure projects in the maritime domain is concerning.

## CONCLUSION

Canada is protected by two oceans and is faced with the need to secure a third - the Arctic Ocean - due to increased trade and shipping. Previously considered a distant concern for most Canadians, the speed of climate change in the Arctic is shrinking that perception. This paper has demonstrated that China intends to become a great power and is likely to seize the opportunity to assert itself before it sees its opportunity disappear. Because China identifies the Arctic within the fourth security circle, it is content to adopt a cooperative approach emphasizing soft power approaches such as diplomacy, trade, and scientific research. However, China also makes long term plans to achieve its desired goals.

As such, China is positioning itself as a “near Arctic state” and messaging that it will comply with international law and respect state sovereignty in the region. However, China is also taking steps to enable a more assertive posture in the future, including dual-purpose scientific research, emphasising polar mapping to enable increased Arctic shipping, creating the Polar Silk Road with Russia, and increasing its conventional navy and nuclear-powered submarines to increase its reach in the Arctic.

As such, the Canada needs to prioritize the north. In this regard, ONSF effectively conveys the challenges that Canada faces – particularly in the Arctic. It also provides a reasonable and measured interim plan to meet the those challenges that Canada will likely face in the next decade. This includes the commitment to NORAD Modernization, the refurbishment of the *Halifax*-class frigates, obtaining underwater sensors, and Arctic over-the-horizon radar.

However, ONSF suffers from limited scope in envisioning new infrastructure projects in the north – particularly in the maritime domain. While ONSF does include commitments to new dual-purpose infrastructure projects in the north, they are largely oriented towards airports. Absent from ONSF was any announcement that the GoC would improve or create new ports in anticipation of increased shipping and economic opportunities that benefit the local community. Such a project has the potential to address some of the human security challenges in the north, including infrastructure deficiencies, while also enabling the RCN and Coast Guard to have increased presence, persistence, and reach.

Considering the glacial pace of projects in the north and the speed of change resulting from climate change, Canada has little time to prepare for a less certain future.

## Bibliography

- . *Rethinking Security: China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry*. Canada: Government of Canada, 2018. <https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/china-and-the-age-of-strategic-rivalry.html>.
- "What we Know about the Search for Two Flying Objects Shot Down Over Yukon and Near Ontario." *CTVNews*, 13 February 2023. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/what-we-know-about-the-search-for-two-flying-objects-shot-down-over-yukon-and-near-ontario-1.6272475>
- BBC. *BBC World Service - the Documentary, Stories from the New Silk Road: Iceland*. Holligan, Anna. 2023. C60Media. (podcast). <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3ct68nq>.
- BBC News. "US and Canada Abandon Search for Three Flying Objects Shot Down." *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-64687038>.
- Becker, Jeffrey. "China, UNCLOS and the Future of International Maritime Law in the South China Sea." In *The United Nations, Indo-Pacific and Korean Peninsula : An Emerging Security Architecture*, edited by Lee, Shin-wha and Jagannath Panda, 107-122. Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group, 2023.
- Beckley, Michael and Hal Brands. *Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China* 2022.
- Brady, Anne-Marie. "China's Geostrategic Interests in the Polar Regions." In *China as a Polar Great Power*, edited by Brady, Anne-Marie, 60-113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- CBC News. "Arctic Naval Refuelling Station Set to Open in 2024, 9 Years Behind Schedule." *CBC News*, 19 January 2023. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nanisivik-naval-base-nunavut-2023-update-1.6717971>.
- Chase, Steven. "Long-Delayed Naval Facility in the High Arctic Now Postponed to 2023 - the Globe and Mail." *The Globe and Mail*, 30 March 2022. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-long-delayed-naval-facility-in-the-high-arctic-now-postponed-to-2023/>.
- Cheng, Dean. "Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 11, no. 1 (2000): 122-129. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592310008423266>
- Clark, Joseph. "Pentagon Arctic Policy Official Underscores Critical Role of Alliances in Evolving Region." Accessed Apr 22, 2024. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3741920/>
- Funaiole, Matthew P., Brian Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Aidan Powers-Riggs. "Frozen Frontiers: China's Great Power Ambitions in the Polar Regions." Accessed Apr 19, 2024. <https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-polar-research-facility>.

- Government of Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada. "Report 6—Arctic Waters Surveillance." Accessed Apr 28, 2024. [https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att\\_e\\_44160.html#hd5g](https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/att_e_44160.html#hd5g).
- Halmarson, Daniel. "\$60M Announced for Churchill's Railway, Port." *CTVNews Winnipeg*, 23 February 2024. <https://winnipeg.ctvnews.ca/60m-announced-for-churchill-s-railway-port-1.6781001>.
- Lajeunesse, Adam. "Finding 'Win-Win' China's Arctic Policy and what it Means for Canada." *The School of Public Policy Publications (SPPP)* 11, (2018a). <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/finding-win-china-s-arctic-policy-what-means/docview/2199193225/se-2?accountid=9867>
- Lajeunesse, Adam. "Unarmed Warships: What are the AOPS for?" . Accessed Dec 13, 2023. [https://www.cgai.ca/unarmed\\_warships\\_what\\_are\\_the\\_aops\\_for](https://www.cgai.ca/unarmed_warships_what_are_the_aops_for).
- MacDonald, Adam P. "Becoming an "Arctic-Capable" Navy: Not just the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship." *Canadian Military Journal* 22, no. 2 (2022). <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/PDFs/CMJ222Ep7.pdf>
- Millard, Bryan J. R. and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. "Trojan Dragons? Normalizing China's Presence in the Arctic." *Canadian Global Affairs Institute* (June, 2021). [https://www.cgai.ca/trojan\\_dragons\\_normalizing\\_chinas\\_presence\\_in\\_the\\_arctic](https://www.cgai.ca/trojan_dragons_normalizing_chinas_presence_in_the_arctic).
- Why Russia is Building an Arctic Silk Road*. YouTube. Directed by Mills, Fred. the B1M, 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvy9usF7ohE>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. *China's Arctic Policy*. Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2018. [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/wjzcs/201801/t20180126\\_679659.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/201801/t20180126_679659.html).
- Moyer, Jonathan D., Tim Sweijjs, Mathew J. Burrows, and Hugo Van Manen. *Power and Influence in a Globalized World*. Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2018. [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Power\\_and\\_Influence.pdf](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Power_and_Influence.pdf)
- Nardi, Christopher. "New Defence Policy to Focus on Arctic Security, Fixing 'Unsustainable' Gap in Force Size." *National Post*, 08 April, 2024. <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-to-focus-on-securing-arctic-improving-personnel-recruitment-and-retention-in-new-defence-policy>.
- National Defence. "Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence." Accessed Apr 8, 2024. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/04/our-north-strong-and-free-a-renewed-vision-for-canadas-defence.html>.

- National Defence. "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy." Accessed Sep 24, 2023. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canada-defence-policy.html>.
- NATO. "NATO Member Countries." Accessed May 3, 2024. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52044.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm).
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. *Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy*: Government of the United States of America, 2019. <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF>.
- Paas-Lang, Christian. "NORAD Shoots Down 'Unidentified Object' Over Yukon." *CBC News*, 11 February, 2023. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/norad-monitoring-airborne-object-north-1.6745575>.
- Qiao, Liang and Xiangsui Wang. *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America*. Beijing: Medina University Press International, 2021.
- RCMP. "Yukon Search for Debris Suspended." . Accessed 28 April, 2024. <https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news/2023/yukon-search-debris-suspended>.
- Scobell, Andrew. "China's "Nested" Worldview." In *China's Strategic Arsenal*, edited by James M. Smith and Paul J. Bolt, 23-44. United States: Georgetown University Press, 2021. [https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/171/edited\\_volume/chapter/2823583/pdf](https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/171/edited_volume/chapter/2823583/pdf)
- Shi, Yubing. "China: China's Arctic Policy: Implications and Implementation." *Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy* 4, no. 1 (2019): 86-92. [https://brill.com/view/journals/apoc/4/1/article-p86\\_86.xml](https://brill.com/view/journals/apoc/4/1/article-p86_86.xml)
- Standing Senate Committee on National Security Defence and Veterans Affairs. *Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent Needs in a Changing Geopolitical and Environmental Landscape*. Ottawa, ON: Government of Canada, 2023. [https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/SECD/reports/2023-06-28\\_SECD\\_ArcticReport\\_e.pdf](https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/SECD/reports/2023-06-28_SECD_ArcticReport_e.pdf).
- The Arctic Institute. "The Arctic Institute: China (Facts & Figures)." Accessed May 4, 2024. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/country-backgrounders/china/>.
- Wikipedia. "Inuvik–Tuktoyaktuk Highway." Accessed 23 April 2024. [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Inuvik%E2%80%93Tuktoyaktuk\\_Highway&oldid=1183294559](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Inuvik%E2%80%93Tuktoyaktuk_Highway&oldid=1183294559).
- Wright, David Curtis. "The Dragon and Great Power Rivalry at the Top of the World: China's Hawkish, Revisionist Voices within Mainstream Discourse on Arctic Affairs." *Canadian Global Affairs Institute* (September 2018). [https://www.cgai.ca/the\\_dragon\\_and\\_great\\_power\\_rivalry\\_at\\_the\\_top\\_of\\_the\\_world](https://www.cgai.ca/the_dragon_and_great_power_rivalry_at_the_top_of_the_world)

