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URGENCY OF CAPABILITIES**

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COMBINED JOINT INTELLIGENCE MODERNIZATION: URGENCY OF CAPABILITIES

AIM

1. The Combined Joint Intelligence Modernization (CJIM) is a key project that will provide updated intelligence infrastructures at home and abroad, but is being slowed down by conflicting visions of its two co-sponsors, the Canadian Army (CA) and the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM). The purpose of this service paper is to stress the urgency of the project completion and identify the obstacles to its rapid delivery.

INTRODUCTION

2. In the last decades, the army intelligence branch has been resourced and organized ad hoc according to the dominating operational requirements.¹ While the creation of the Canadian Army Intelligence Regiment (CA Int Regt) has addressed the organizational issue, the resource process remains heterogeneous. The requirement for modern intelligence systems and infrastructures has been identified with the initiation of CJIM in 2013. This project is directly aligned with the objectives of *Strong, Secure, Engaged* to “Integrate assets in networked joint systems of systems that will enable the flow of information (...)”² and “Modernize Land C4ISR program”.³ In order to do so, CJIM has three components: standardizing deployed information management/information technologies (IM/IT) intelligence systems, acquiring deployable secure shelters and ensuring force generation training support. CJIM will provide resources at home and in operations to support the intelligence process.

3. The concept of CJIM has greatly evolved over time. In the 2013 initial project brief, the expected deliverables were up to four level III shelters for deployment, up to four level III shelters for force generation training with associated IM/IT equipment and networks, and level III infrastructures for training in multiple bases.⁴ This requirement evolved multiple times and is now limited to the level III shelters, IM/IT systems, and a central training location in Kingston rather than infrastructures in multiple locations. Under the 2018 Defence Investment Plan, the funding allocated to CJIM is 100 to 249 million.⁵ The initial delivery was initially expected for 2021, but as of March 2023, the call for industry submissions has yet to be issued, and the project is in the options analysis stage.⁶ While CJIM lead rested with the CA since the inception of the project, CFINTCOM (at the time Chief Defence Intelligence) was assigned as a co-sponsor given the role of this organization in force generation of intelligence personnel, as well as their ownership over Level III systems. CFINTCOM attempted to disengage from their

¹ Department of National Defence, “Strategic Context Document: Combined Joint Intelligence Modernization,” 2019, 5.

² Government of Canada, “Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy,” *Department of National Defence*, 2017, 65.

³ Government of Canada, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁴ Department of National Defence, “Project Brief: Combined Joint Intelligence Modernization (CJIM) Project,” 2013, 3.

⁵ Department of National Defence, “Strategic Context Document: Combined Joint Intelligence Modernization,” *op. cit.*, 18.

⁶ Department of National Defence, “Project Brief: Combined Joint Intelligence Modernization (CJIM) Project,” *op. cit.*, 7.

sponsor role in 2015 but was directed to continue to assume the role by the VCDS.⁷ The CA would be the primary user of CJIM with most deployments of formed units being force generated out of the CA under the All Source Intelligence Centre (ASIC) or Intelligence Support Team (IST) constructs. Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) would also be users of the capabilities acquired through CJIM. To express the requirement for a sole sponsor for this project, the urgency of the capacity, the impact on the interoperability of the continuous ad hoc acquisition of IM/IT intelligence systems, as well as the absence of infrastructure for the centralization of the CA Int Regt will be described.

DISCUSSION

3. The delay in CJIM completion significantly impacts CA intelligence capabilities. Given the current infrastructures and training resources, intelligence personnel cannot train on level III systems in a collective training environment regularly. Even prior to deployment in which they will primarily work at that level of classification, there is no capacity to conduct collective sub-unit training on level III systems prior to being in the theatre. This directly results in personnel having to familiarize themselves and be trained on the systems only once deployed, which limits their operational effectiveness in the initial deployment period.⁸ This issue will only become more salient given the expanding footprint of intelligence personnel deployed with the ongoing OP IMPACT commitment, the increased personnel commitment in OP REASSURANCE and the future deployment of intelligence personnel in the Indo-Pacific region.⁹ While the future intelligence commitment to the Indo-Pacific region may not rest directly under the CA, the level III training infrastructures requirement is less salient for the other Level 1 organizations (L1s). By construct, the RCN, the RCAF and CANSOFCOM tend to deploy smaller teams of intelligence personnel which can be trained collectively in smaller spaces that are integral to the current infrastructures of these respective L1s.¹⁰ CA simply does not have level III spaces that can accommodate a formed intelligence sub-unit to train prior to deployment, and the training component of CJIM could address this crucial deficiency, which is only becoming more critical as the commitment of intelligence personnel to expeditionary operations is increasing. Furthermore, the CJIM secure shelter component could contribute to the rapid deployment of intelligence personnel in new and existing theatres given their modular nature and integral systems. Early completion of CJIM would ensure that intelligence personnel deploy with appropriate infrastructure instead of outdated ones and adequate pre-deployment training on the systems they will use in operations.

4. Training in a level III environment is critical prior to deployment, but would also greatly enhance intelligence personnel proficiency if it was conducted on a regular basis as part of annual collective training for military intelligence companies (MI Coys). Given the current limited level III infrastructures in garrison, very few intelligence personnel have access to this

⁷ Department of National Defence, "Strategic Context Briefing: Combined Joint Intelligence Modernization," 2015, 2.

⁸ Department of National Defence, "Strategic Context Document: Combined Joint Intelligence Modernization," *op. cit.*, 13.

⁹ Government of Canada, "Canada's Strategy for the Indo-Pacific," *Global Affairs Canada*, 2022, 14.

¹⁰ Based on author's discussions with RCAF, RCN and CANSOFCOM intelligence personnel. Specific infrastructure data is at higher classification level.

level of system.¹¹ Given the specificities of programs and applications available at this level that cannot be replicated at a lower classification level, intelligence personnel cannot become proficient at operating with them. Intelligence officers and operators have significant shortcomings in their training as they do not get exposure to the tools required for their fundamental work once deployed. Following CJIM completion, this deficiency will be addressed through the training infrastructure that MI Coys will use for their collective training. The level III training infrastructure could also provide reach-back support to deployed personnel. CFINTCOM, as the authority on level III systems, has been opposed to a significant expansion of the capability domestically and does not see the value in regular training exposure to level III systems for CA intelligence personnel.¹² Their desire to limit the expansion of level III systems is directly impeding CJIM completion as CFINTCOM has constantly pushed for the redefinition of the project, notably in order to restrict the number of shelters and training space. This opposing view between the co-sponsors is a significant obstacle to the project's advancement. CA requires the level III training infrastructure in order to effectively fulfill the mandating of force generating capable intelligence personnel with the necessary skillsets associated with working with these systems. The restriction on the expansion of domestic level III infrastructures for intelligence training by CFINTCOM is a direct obstacle to this force generation process.

5. Interoperability and integration of IT/IM systems are becoming increasingly crucial given the interconnected nature of modern conflict and the requirement to ensure a short decision-action cycle for the commanders. The IT/IM intelligence systems acquisition process has been ad hoc for an extended period with various organizations using different systems based on local needs and specific operational requirements.¹³ This result in a vast array of IT/IM intelligence systems across intelligence organizations that cannot necessarily communicate with each other and creates interoperability challenges. Currently, information is contained in various databases, collation file structures and applications resulting in difficulty in sharing information amongst CAF intelligence organizations, international partners, and other government departments.¹⁴ The current IT/IM intelligence systems are so challenging to navigate that intelligence operators have to dedicate a significant amount of their time to the collation and research of information to the detriment of the production of intelligence and analysis. As a result, most intelligence structures in garrison and in deployed operations include a sizeable section strictly dedicated to IM. The CJIM component of standardizing deployed IM/IT intelligence systems would enhance operability at least in deployed operations. The CJIM training component should also use the same systems in order to train personnel more effectively. While the IT/IM intelligence systems included under CJIM will remain modular according to the specific operational requirements of the mission, a baseline will be established. As an example, if a specific mission requires geomatics support, the necessary programs will be added to the existing structure, but the system basis will be standardized to maximize interoperability. Additionally to the IT/IM interoperability requirement, CJIM will cover a capability gap currently existing between Canada and the rest of the Five Eyes with the acquisition of secure shelters and training facilities. Under ABCANZ standard 2138(R), CA intelligence personnel must be able to perform level III fusion

¹¹ Department of National Defence, "Strategic Context Document: Combined Joint Intelligence Modernization," *op. cit.*, 13.

¹² Conversation with DLR CJIM Project Officer based on his communications with CFINTCOM project sponsor.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

and deploy with their own secure infrastructure in order to work in an ABCANZ Division.¹⁵ A fast CJIM completion will ensure that the ad hoc process of acquiring IT/IM intelligence systems is halted and that a standardization process is established to enhance interoperability and ensure the fulfilment of intelligence alliance commitment.

6. The CJIM training component will require an infrastructure investment as there is currently no level III space permitting collective training within the CA building portfolio. As part of Force 2025, the centralization of the CA Int Regt in Kingston is being considered.¹⁶ The MI Coys are currently dispersed in Edmonton, Petawawa, Valcartier, Ottawa, and Kingston where one company is co-located with the regimental headquarters. The current space occupied by the existing unit in Kingston is insufficient to host the remaining MI Coys, and the requirement for a new building for 300 PYs has been identified for the centralization, while acknowledging that ADM (IE) has a shortage of funding and cannot accommodate new projects until 2030.¹⁷ Combining the CJIM training facility with the CA Int Regt facility would be optimal as it would combine two infrastructure projects and co-locate the CJIM facility with its primary user. This would facilitate regular training of CA intelligence personnel and enhance proficiency with level III systems. Under the current CJIM construct, the training facility will be built in Kingston as the proximity to the CA Int Regt has been taken into consideration.¹⁸ The co-location of the CA Int Regt and CJIM would also address the CFINTCOM concern of expanding the domestic level III infrastructures as the CA Int Regt could use the training facility rather than build extensive additional level III facilities in their lines. The CJIM training facility could regardless be used by other L1s as the training space could be distinct from the unit lines. Capitalizing on the quick completion of CJIM could facilitate its integration into the CA Int Regt infrastructure plan and could minimize costs associated with the construction and maintenance of the facility. Further analysis of this option should be taken in order to evaluate its viability.

7. The urgency of obtaining the CJIM capabilities is more critical in the CA than in the other L1s. CFINTCOM's involvement in CJIM as a co-sponsor is detrimental to the project's advancement as their focus on the needs of other L1s and their reticence to extend the level III infrastructure footprint are severely impeding CJIM's progress. The CA will be the main CJIM user, and the lack of infrastructure for level III training is impeding the force generation of intelligence personnel, while the lack of standardized IM/IT intelligence systems leads to an ad hoc acquisition process having an adverse impact on interoperability. In the current operating environment, the development of modern intelligence capabilities supported by secure shelters and effective IM/IT intelligence systems is crucial in maintaining modern intelligence capabilities adapted to the current and future threat environment characterized by interconnectivity and a fast decision-action cycle. CFINTCOM personnel are slowing the project's progress by asking for additional evaluations and consultations even if the project has

¹⁵ ABCANZ, "ABCANZ Standard 2138(R): Statement of Requirement for Five Eyes Intelligence Fusion and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance with an ABCANZ Division," 2020, 6.

¹⁶ Canadian Army, "Force 2025 (F2025) Proposed Intelligence Corps Modernization Structure," Briefing Note for Army Council, 2022, 1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Department of National Defence, "Strategic Context Document: Combined Joint Intelligence Modernization," *op. cit.*, 51.

been underway for over a decade with the options analysis step entering its fourth year, while the average length of this step is two years.¹⁹ CFINTCOM simply does not have urgency in the completion of the project, while the CA has a salient need for the capabilities provided by CJIM. CFINTCOM does not require CJIM completion to perform its role, while the CA intelligence force generation depends on it. In 2022, CFINTCOM raised several concerns related to the project including questioning the requirement for CA intelligence personnel to train at level III and the value of the project for other L1s.²⁰ Following discussions with DLR, CFINTCOM overcame their apprehensions, but the lack of common understanding of requirements between the two co-sponsors has slowed down the options analysis process. Furthermore, contrary to the CA, CFINTCOM has no personnel working full-time on the project and considers the role a secondary duty.²¹

9. The CA simply cannot wait for CFINTCOM's tergiversations on the project and must move forward in acquiring appropriate intelligence resources to face the threat of tomorrow. CFINTCOM will not be a user of any of the components under CJIM and is disconnected from the requirements of the tactical and operational levels. Regardless of the involvement of CFINTCOM as a co-sponsor, the CA will continue to consult stakeholders from RCAF, RCN and CANSOFCOM to ensure that CJIM fits their needs and is adapted to their requirements. It is in the interest of the CA to ensure interoperability with intelligence organizations under other L1s and will acquire resources that can be tailored to their specific needs while preserving interoperability. The delay in CJIM completion is inciting other L1s, notably CANSOFCOM, RCAF and CJOC, to undertake their own projects instead of waiting for CJIM completion.²² These L1s already have more capabilities than the CA, but they are assessed as insufficient. This highlights how salient and crucial the capabilities that will be provided by CJIM are for the intelligence field. The CA is not able to follow suit and create a separate project to address the capabilities deficiency given their involvement in CJIM. Removing CFINTCOM as a co-sponsor would permit the CA to address this capability gap more rapidly.

CONCLUSION

10. CJIM has been delayed given competing visions for the project caused by the presence of two co-sponsors with diverging interests and visions. The urgency of the project completion is crucial to ensure appropriate force generation of intelligence personnel training on level III systems, standardize IM/IT intelligence systems to ensure interoperability, and provide secure shelters to deployed operations. As the completion of the project is less salient for other L1s and as CFINTCOM is slowing down project completion by adding consultations and processes, the CA should be the sole CJIM project sponsor. Furthermore, the CA could capitalize on CJIM to

¹⁹ Conversation with DLR CJIM Project Officer based on his communications with CFINTCOM project sponsor.

²⁰ Directorate of Land Resources, "CFINTCOM Concerns and DLR Answers," Unpublished Working Document, 2022.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Conversation with DLR CJIM Project Officer based on his communications with CANSOFCOM and CJOC.

cover the infrastructure required for the centralization of the CA Int Regt following further analysis.

RECOMMENDATION

11. It is recommended that the CA becomes the sole CJIM sponsor and argues for the removal of CFINTCOM as co-sponsor of the project in order to ensure the timely completion of the project and capability delivery. Combining CJIM and the infrastructure project for the CA Int Regt centralization should be considered in order to limit the expansion of the domestic level III infrastructure footprint.

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