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Basic Intelligence Officer Training and Gender-Based Analysis Training

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JCSP 49

Service Paper

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PCEMI n° 49

Étude militaire

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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 49 - PCEMI n° 49
2022 - 2023

Service Paper – Étude militaire

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Basic Intelligence Officer Training and Gender-Based Analysis Training

AIM

1. The Training Plan (TP) currently governing the production of Intelligence Officers from the ranks of Second Lieutenant to Captain does not include Gender-Based Analysis (GBA) in any form.¹ The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has invested considerable time and effort in delivering GBA training in various professional development curriculums, and it is common for Gender Advisors (GENADs) to now deploy on staffs.² Such an investment has not been mirrored in the current Basic Intelligence Officer Course (BIOC), which was last revised in 2020. By extension, concepts such as the intersection between gender and human terrain and/or human securities are unarticulated. This service paper recommends the immediate introduction of GBA concepts into basic intelligence training, formalised particularly into the Operational Planning Process (OPP) and the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB).

INTRODUCTION

2. The Government of Canada's (GoC) approach to GBA provides analysts a methodology to identify inequalities stemming from the generalised experiences of men, women, children and diverse peoples related to policy.³ In some form across all federal departments, GBA has been applied to policies and programmes since 1995.⁴ Specific to the military domain, it was the United Nations (UN) that spearheaded the analysis between conflict and gender with Resolution 1325 which – among several recommendations – noted the concern that "... civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict..." and posited that these vulnerable groups must be considered in the reestablishment of peace.⁵ The importance of this resolution was emphasised in the CAF by the

¹ Department of National Defence, A-P3-099-213/PG-H01, *Training Plan, Basic Intelligence Officer DP2 (Air)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2020). Note that the Air Intelligence TP is specifically mentioned here, but the core phase of the programme is synonymous with Land and Maritime training at the basic officer level. The gap is common across elements. Basic or junior Intelligence officer denotes an officer in rank from Second Lieutenant to Captain. It should be noted, too, that the author was previously the Officer Commanding of Senior Occupational Training at the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence (CFSMI), which delivered the Basic Intelligence Officer Course (BIOC).

² The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was the first entity to field GENADs, in direct response to UNSCR 1325. For more on this, see Chief of the Defence Staff, "CDS Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions into CAF Planning and Operations," 29 Jan 16, 6-7.

³ More recently, the GoC has adopted the term GBA+ wherein the plus "... acknowledges that GBA Plus is not just about differences between biological (sexes) and socio-cultural (gender)" dimensions. The term GBA is used in this document as it matches specific CAF references to exercises such as the Operational Planning Process (OPP). For more on GBA+, see Government of Canada, "What is Gender-based Analysis Plus," last modified 16 Jun 22, <https://women-gender-equality.canada.ca/en/gender-based-analysis-plus/what-gender-based-analysis-plus.html>.

⁴ Government of Canada / Department of National Defence Departmental Plan 2022-23, "Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus)," last modified 16 Mar 22, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-plans/departmental-plan-2022-23/supplementary-information/gba-plus.html>.

⁵ United Nations Security Council S/RES/1325, "Resolution 1325 (2000)," 31 October, 2000.

Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in 2016 in an initiating directive which provided guidance and direction pursuant to the adoption of UNSR 1325 into CAF operations and planning.⁶

3. The directive provided specific guidance to Force Generators (FG) that GBA was to be incorporated into all planning and operations by 31 Aug 17. As a Level 1 (L1) organisation, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) was beholden to this direction. In a recent departmental report, however, CFINTCOM has reported that GBA is not currently tethered to future intelligence force development, nor is it collecting associated data.⁷ CFINTCOM, moreover, is the authority for all intelligence training within the CAF. As above, GBA remains absent from the core Intelligence Officer curriculums. Prior to making recommendations about GBA and training, this paper will analyse *ad hoc* efforts by the CAF to introduce GBA into intelligence analyses. Firstly, it will discuss the basic intelligence curriculum in detail and consider, specifically, the absence of GBA in the methodology of operational analysis currently taught.

DISCUSSION

4. In its entirety, the extant BIOC core phase (which is common for Air, Land and Maritime students) does not contain a single reference to gender or gendered analysis. Human terrain, as an extension of concept, is likewise absent. This is a significant handicap when considering that IPB⁸ predicates and catalyses significant staff efforts and focus areas during operational planning since blue forces often respond to an unacceptable red force initiative. Moreover, intelligence staffs are responsible to provide commanders and planners a fulsome understanding of the operational environment, not just its physical features, but the socio-cultural elements which animate local populations and inform probable responses to Allied operations. Consider, as an example, Air Intelligence Officers who – upon completion of the BIOC – are qualified to lead or support targeting efforts overseas. At no point has standardised training occurred that will force them to consider GBA when evaluating possible effects from kinetic or non-kinetic targeting. In fact, the programme does not assess political, social, cultural or religious analyses, and only briefly references them in later steps of the IPB as subordinate to evaluations of adversary capability and intent.⁹ The lack of GBA inclusion as an analytical methodology and key planning consideration – especially for asymmetric or Peace Support Operations (PSO) where most Intelligence Officers are jointly employed – is a significant dearth given the centrality of IPB to the OPP. In other words, the definition of the operating environment, its peoples and effects, evaluation of the adversary and analysis of likely enemy action informs commanders and his/her

⁶ This specific directive has been criticised by some in academia for its lack of perceived specificity (guiding principles and a value framework). Such criticisms may reflect an ignorance or misunderstanding by academia for how direction is passed in the military. See, as an example, Rachael Johnston and Bessma Momani, “Gender Mainstreaming in the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence: Lessons on the Implementation of Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+),” *Armed Forces and Society* 48, no. 2 (2020): 251.

⁷ DND, “Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus).”

⁸ The CAF uses several terms depending on the level of headquarters supported. IPB is the term used in basic Intelligence officer core training. Commonly, the CAF uses the term Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), or IPOE (Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment).

⁹ DND, A-P3-099-213/PG-H01, 4-118/144.

planning staff at the outset of the OPP. The people on the ground – men, women, and children – have the potential to inform these actions to at least an equal extent as does the adversary.

5. Upon review of the BIOC curriculum, it is this author's assessment that it is geared towards preparing students for force-on-force conventional warfare. This is likely the reason that socio-cultural factors such as gender disappear beneath classroom emphasis on enemy capability (inventory) and intent. Descriptions and assessments of the battlespace likewise stress the importance of the medium through which the enemy must move his/her forces in the physical domain only: key terrain, weather and infrastructure. This would be the necessary analytical approach to massed, conventional warfare. In asymmetric operations, however, the medium through which the adversary needs to force project includes human terrain. The CAF must always prioritise is preparedness for conventional warfare. Still, this emphasis does not reflect recent operational theatres in the Middle East and Africa. Overall, operational realities are misaligned from extant intelligence officer training.

6. At this point, it should be noted that the absence of GBA in IPB has been previously articulated, but its analysis was too myopic. Two years after the CDS initiating directive, as an example, Major Owen Savage presented several merits for the inclusion of GBA.¹⁰ He argued that a GENAD should be included in IPB development, and further recommended that the lack of feminist perspectives handicapped overall GBA integration into the CAF writ large.¹¹ There are a number of issues with these recommendations, especially as they are not grounded in training curriculum revisions, which would proffer Intelligence Officers with at least a comparable orientation to GBA as a GENAD advisor. Intelligence drives operations. Personnel in this field must be trained to intrinsically intersect gender analysis with adversary courses of action from the earliest phase of training. Current training plans do not reinforce this, which likely forces – as Savage recommends – a casual (not codified) relationship between intelligence staff and a GENAD. Savage's consideration of GBA is, moreover, too restrictive, dealing almost exclusively with female perspectives.¹² The majority of the CAF's recent major operations – from Afghanistan to Libya to Mali – deal with an asymmetric adversary that, while targetable, may be representative of the people and reflective of their gendered, cultural roles. These assessments must come from intelligence staffs at the outset of planning. Operational success and whole of government peace stability efforts must be anchored to intelligence-driven operational design.

7. This discussion must not suggest that the CAF – in the spirit of 2016's initiating directive – has not made significant inroads for GBA in operational planning and, by extension, intelligence activities; again, it asserts that these efforts are not formalised; they are *ad hoc* and

¹⁰ Owen Savage, "Implementing a CAF Gender Perspective: The Merits of Integrating GBA+ into the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment," (Solo Flight Course Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2018).

¹¹ Savage, "Implementing a CAF Gender Perspective," 21.

¹² Savage's point, specifically, was that female voices need better representation in IPB. This is not a unique argument. Some writers, for example, have noted the underutilised value of females in Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations during German Army operations in Afghanistan. See, as an example, Stephan Lau and Farina T. S. Bauer, "What About Her? Increasing the Actionability of HUMINT in Paternalistic Cultures by Considering Female Intelligence," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence* 35, no. 4 (2022): 726-743.

not derivative of a standard of intelligence training. A precis was issued by National Defence in 2019 on the integration of gender perspectives into OPP. However, it assigns the responsibility for gender integration in the IPB to the GENAD or Gender Focal Point (GFP).¹³ It does not identify any additional responsibilities for intelligence staff. If, however, training was standardised, gender analysis would be organic to intelligence staffs and more firmly rooted in the OPP. As examples, in Stage 1 Orientation of OPP, it is recommended (not mandated) that the GENAD “identify and provide gender-related questions to the J2 (Intelligence) to inform the development of the JIPOE.”¹⁴ Later, in Stage 2 Orientation, it recommends an consideration of whether or not the JIPOE “improved the understanding” of cultural and social factors to include: differences and inequalities between men, women and children, roles and norms, access to avenues of power and influence and agency.¹⁵ There are no further recommendations provided beyond GENAD consideration of the JIPOE.

8. A GENAD, however, is not necessarily an Intelligence Officer. Access to the IPB and asking questions is valuable, but it does not constitute the nature of analysis for which the intelligence function is specifically trained and responsible for. Empowering the GENAD to cross staff functions is key for the incorporation of GBA into planning and for reinforcing the importance of GBA within the CAF. Still, there are several limitations that reinforce the need to introduce GBA analysis and training into intelligence curriculums. Firstly, at the operational and strategic level, the nature and sensitivity of information captured by intelligence staffs may be highly classified and, more importantly, beholden to need-to-know access. Secondly, while the Initiation phase of OPP triggers planning efforts, it is normally preceded by a significant amount of intelligence analysis and IPB development, often in silo. Therefore, socio-cultural factors underpinning gender and its many intersections must be performed before staff advisors like a GENAD are situated to the problem set. The fact that gender-based intersections – especially in an asymmetric theatre like the CAF normally operates that is defined by significant deltas between male and female agency – must be thoroughly analysed at the front-end of OPP to inform both orientation and adversary courses of action firmly attests to the need for subject matter experts on gender to be present within the intelligence staff, itself.

9. To assign informal responsibility to the GENAD to inform the IPB process by simply asking probing questions misconstrues the role of this advisor. Again, the collaborative effort of staff planning with expert advisors is important, but there is no consideration given in the aforementioned precis (or any documentation this author could find) about preparing a GENAD to understand intelligence in OPP. While pointed questions will certainly provide necessary vector checks to intelligence staff, they do not constitute a fulsome analysis of the people within the operating environment. Furthermore, unique to intelligence at the outset of OPP is that

¹³ A GFP role is tactical; GENAD advisors work at the operational or strategic level.

¹⁴ Government of Canada / Department of National Defence Departmental Plan 2022-23, “Integrate Gender Perspectives through the Operational Planning Process,” last modified 18 Jul 19, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/integrating-gender-perspectives-operations/operational-planning-process.html>

¹⁵ DND, “Integrate Gender Perspectives through the Operational Planning Process.”

enemy courses of action are designed first.¹⁶ These estimates are derived from analyses of the operating environment, physical and human. Considering men and women, as an example, their respective agencies and social standing is neither synonymous with analysis, nor does it represent fulfillment of IPB wherein intersections between people within the operations area inform adversary capability, intent and responses.

10. It is not analytically fair to criticise Canadian intelligence doctrine for the absence of GBA, especially as the CDS formally directed its integration after much was written. Doctrine is normally slow to respond. It likely explains the absence in of such analysis being taught on the BIOC, however. In addition to a training doctrine deviation from CAF directives on GBA, it is worth noting that GBA analysis of human terrain will likely need to be reinvigorated in further doctrinal updates. Concepts such as gender and human terrain are absent from Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) 2-1: Intelligence Operations.¹⁷ The much older Joint Intelligence Doctrine comes closer to GBA consideration in planning than formal training documentation for the BIOC; specifically that J2 staff "... must understand the adversary's character, culture, social norms, customs and traditions, language and history."¹⁸ These considerations are explicitly stated as duties for intelligence staff, required for the proper identification of adversary centres of gravity, the conduct of joint operations and descriptions of attainable military objectives.¹⁹ Allied doctrine, such as the American Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, is more robust, with specific cultural examples employed to remind intelligence staffs of the importance of socio-cultural intersections to operations, but a specific gender nexus remains absent.²⁰ Without a revision of intelligence training plans, the inclusion of GBA into OPP risks continuing as an informal exercise, wholly dependent on available GENAD engagement and – crucially – intelligence staff led by an officer who is comfortable operating beyond his or her formal training, and one who demands that socio-cultural factors underpinning GBA take equal precedence in the determination of the battlespace effects and adversary responses to friendly operations. The formalisation of GBA analysis within a training curriculum is crucial for standardised intelligence support across joint operations and joint headquarters.

CONCLUSION

11. Even after its revision in January 2020, the BIOC curriculum has failed in incorporating GBA analysis and, by extension, failed in standardising this methodology across intelligence training. At present, across the core phase of training for Land, Air and Maritime students entering the intelligence profession, there is simply no GBA analysis within the programme. This absence presents a number of risks for the commander. Above all, the nature of asymmetric or non-conventional warfare means that the effects of the operational area are quite distinct from

¹⁶ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-500/FP-00, *Joint Doctrine Manual: CF Operational Planning Process* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2002), 4-10.

¹⁷ Department of National Defence, CFJP 2-1 SD 3, *Intelligence Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2015).

¹⁸ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 6-1.

¹⁹ DND, B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, *Joint Intelligence Doctrine*, 6-1.

²⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (CJCS, 2014): III-36.

those of traditional warfare. Regarding the former, in its analysis of the effects of the battlespace, intelligence staffs must give equal weighting to demographic and gendered factors as they have traditionally given to key physical terrain. As they currently stand, BIOC training curriculums are misaligned from the majority of CAF operational reality. Traditional massed engagements, of course, prioritised enemy capabilities and intent. Below that threshold, however, it is the local populace – and its many social intersections of which GBA is a significant part – that will partly define and inform enemy strengths and weaknesses. At the time of this submission, commanders continue to inherit Intelligence Officers whose analytical framework for gender may largely dependent on access to an outside expert throughout IPB development.

RECOMMENDATION

12. The following recommendation is presented:

a. CFINTCOM is advised to convene a working group at the earliest possible opportunity under the auspices of a Training Development Officer (TDO) to design a GBA module common to all BIOC elements. The intent of this module is three-fold, as follows:

- 1) To orient students to GBA analysis and instruct them on how to introduce this methodology to intelligence analysis;
- 2) To update training curriculums specifically to include elements of GBA into IPB; and
- 3) To formalise GBA inputs into the OPP apart from GENAD networking. Specifically, students will be instructed to on how to develop enemy operational design to incorporate GBA considerations.

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