



## THE RUSSIAN MARITIME THREAT TO EUROPE

Commander Roland Spahr

### JCSP 49

#### Exercise Solo Flight

##### Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2023.

### PCEMI n° 49

#### Exercice Solo Flight

##### Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté le Roi du chef du Canada, représenté par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2023.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 49 - PCEMI n° 49  
2022 - 2023

Exercise Solo Flight – Exercice Solo Flight

**FOG AT SEA AND THE RUSSIAN MARITIME THREAT TO EUROPE**

**Commander Roland Spahr**

*“This paper was written by a candidate attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

*« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »*

# FOG AT SEA AND THE RUSSIAN MARITIME THREAT TO EUROPE

*“To compete globally, we must be strong at home.”<sup>1</sup>*

- General Glen D. VanHerck

## INTRODUCTION

The ocean has an innate ability to captivate man by its sight, sound, and when it turns, its sheer power. But the farther one casts their gaze from the coast to where ships disappear over the horizon, the more difficult it becomes to grasp what lies beyond, on the other side.<sup>2</sup> For the mariner, once lines are cast, and departure is made, the unknown security implications abroad are nothing new. But for the rest who stay in port, or cling to shore, the immense security significance and influence of the ocean is a vast unknown.<sup>3</sup>

As war rages on the battlefields of Eastern Europe, many civilians can draw on the past and recall cratered landscapes and trench warfare of the First World War; far more can look upon the images of charred Russian and Ukrainian tanks and think of the Second World War.<sup>4</sup> What is often missed in public discourse is linking these images to a failure of European security preparedness and deterrence.<sup>5</sup> The 24th of February 2022, the day Russia launched its invasion, marks the end of an era.<sup>6</sup> Since then, thousands of wounded and dead soldiers litter the battlefields of Ukraine. Russia, under the protection of a nuclear shield, is waging a bitter war against the Ukrainian armed forces with

---

<sup>1</sup> US Northern Command, “Strategy “To Compete Globally, We Must Be Strong at Home.,” March 1, 2021, <https://www.northcom.mil/Strategy/>.

<sup>2</sup> Emily Dickinson, “I Started Early – Took My Dog,” May 8, 2023, <https://www.marine.ie/sites/default/files/MIFiles/Images/Comms/Emily%20Dickinson.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> National Geographic, “All About the Ocean,” May 8, 2023, <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/all-about-the-ocean>.

<sup>4</sup> AP News, “AP PHOTOS: Images of War in Ukraine from Cutting-Room Floor,” AP NEWS, February 20, 2023, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-unseen-photos-77b065812a639def8a72e0c262363a66>.

<sup>5</sup> Aderito Vicente, “Why Europe Slept? The Failure to Prevent the War in Ukraine,” May 4, 2022, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/why-europe-slept-the-failure-to-prevent-the-war-in-ukraine/>.

<sup>6</sup> Olaf Scholz, “Olaf Scholz Government Statement on Russian Invasion of Ukraine and New Armament Measures (English and German Texts-Audio-Video),” February 27, 2023, <https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/olafscholzstatementtoonukraineandgermanarmament.htm>.

extensive military aid from Western democratic states.<sup>7 8</sup> Deterrence has failed; what lies over the horizon is unknown.<sup>9</sup>

A regional conflict in Eastern Europe, which undoubtedly has global implications, is currently determining European security policy.<sup>10</sup> Despite the attention paid to conventional land-based military deterrence in Europe, the continuing and even increased Russian maritime threat potential risks being misinterpreted by the limited successes achieved by Ukraine in the Black Sea.<sup>11</sup> However, it must not be overlooked that the security and economic interests of states or confederations are ensured by naval forces and, above all, constitute an essential pillar of conventional deterrence. In particular, economic dependence on the ocean has increased as a result of the Ukraine war and is the strategic asset for European energy security, and thus for the economy as a whole, which must be protected.<sup>12</sup>

Contrary to media reports that might suggest Russian naval warfare capabilities have lost their maritime threat potential for the European continent, their maritime capabilities in fact continue to pose a significant threat for European democracies in the Black, Baltic, North, and Mediterranean Seas, and the entirety of the Atlantic Ocean.<sup>13</sup> Contrary to oft cited media reports, in which one could get the impression that Russia has lost the capability to conduct either amphibious landing operations, or conventional maritime strike, there remains a high threat potential in the maritime domain, which is aimed squarely at European democracies. As such, this paper will examine in detail

---

<sup>7</sup> UN Security Council, “Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use Higher Than at Any Time Since Cold War, Disarmament Affairs Chief Warns Security Council | UN Press,” March 31, 2023, <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15250.doc.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> US Department of Defense, “Contact Group Meeting Signals Long-Term Support for Ukraine,” U.S. Department of Defense, September 7, 2022, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3151644/contact-group-meeting-signals-long-term-support-for-ukraine/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defense.gov%2FNews%2FNews-Stories%2FArticle%2FArticle%2F3151644%2Fcontact-group-meeting-signals-long-term-support-for-ukraine%2F>.

<sup>9</sup> Eugene Rumer, “THE WEST: NO GOOD OPTIONS Russia Has Suffered Multiple Strategic Setbacks in This War. It Has Lost Its Position as Europe’s Preeminent Energy Supplier, Some Maintain, for Good. Russian Leverage against Europe Has Diminished Dramatically. Its Reputation as a Re-Emerging Military Power Has Been Damaged. Its Position in the Baltic Was Dealt a Serious Blow When Sweden and Finland Announced Their Plans to Join NATO. May 5, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/17/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-end-of-beginning-pub-89071>.

<sup>10</sup> European Council, “How the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Has Further Aggravated the Global Food Crisis,” May 4, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/how-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-has-further-aggravated-the-global-food-crisis/>.

<sup>11</sup> AFP and AP, “Spurred by Russian Threat, Germany Okays \$100 Billion Fund to Beef up Army,” accessed May 8, 2023, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/spurred-by-russian-threat-germany-okays-100-billion-fund-to-beef-up-army/>.

<sup>12</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, “Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The Economic Fallout,” March 7, 2023, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-economic-fallout.html>;

<sup>13</sup> Al Jazeera, “Russia’s Lavrov Warns of EU Militarisation, Says Similar to NATO | News | Al Jazeera,” April 26, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/26/russias-lavrov-warns-of-eu-militarisation-says-similar-to-nato>; Nicholas J. Myers and Steve, “Russian Navy Activity in the North Sea » Wavell Room,” *Wavell Room* (blog), August 6, 2020, <https://wavellroom.com/2020/08/06/russian-navy-activity-in-the-north-sea/>.

Russian naval capabilities and its sea power, which it can and likely will, use to advance its interests.<sup>14</sup> Russian land-based air defense and coastal defense systems, and second-strike nuclear capabilities on the European continent, are not considered.<sup>15</sup>

## QUANTITY HAS A QUALITY OF ITS OWN

The quality of Russian Marines capable of amphibious landing operations are dying in significant numbers on the battlefield in Eastern Europe.<sup>16</sup> The ranks of Marines are significantly depleted.<sup>17</sup> Their military sea transport in the Black Sea, though largely tied-up, remain a threat for European democracies.<sup>18</sup>

Ukraine's fight against Russia has implications for European democracies beyond the currently localized battles, specifically in the Baltic Sea region.<sup>19</sup> According to three senior European defense officials, of the original 30,000 estimated Russian troops once stationed just along the border with the Baltics and Finland, up to 80 percent have been withdrawn to Ukraine, "[t]hey threw almost everything they had at Ukraine," said Jonatan Vseviõv, secretary general of the Estonian Foreign Ministry, in September 2022.<sup>20</sup> Thus, even before the Russian winter offensive in the first quarter of 2023, Russia had only a skeleton crew in an area where Russia once had the most concentrated force in close proximity to the borders of European democracies.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, Russia's losses, including its Marines, should not be overlooked as a loss of their entire military capability.

---

<sup>14</sup> Britannica, "Sea Power | Military | Britannica," March 10, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/sea-power>.

<sup>15</sup> Robbie Gramer, "This Interactive Map Shows the High Stakes Missile Stand-Off Between NATO and Russia," *Foreign Policy* (blog), January 12, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/12/nato-russia-missile-defense-stand-off-deterrence-anti-access-area-denial/>.

<sup>16</sup> David Axe, "Russian Marines Just Attempted Another Frontal Assault On Ukrainian Positions Around Pavlivka. The Result Was Predictably Bloody.," *Forbes*, accessed April 24, 2023, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/01/30/russian-marines-just-attempted-another-frontal-assault-on-ukrainian-positions-around-pavlivka-the-result-was-predictably-bloody/>.

<sup>17</sup> Ministry of Defence GB [@DefenceHQ], "Latest Defence Intelligence Update on the Situation in Ukraine - 3 April 2023. Find out More about Defence Intelligence's Use of Language: [#StandWithUkraine UA](http://Ow.Ly/2IpN50NykWUA) <https://T.Co/1pzOOeIMjg>," Tweet, *Twitter*, April 3, 2023, <https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1642765768453505027>.

<sup>18</sup> Christopher Woody, "Russia's Northern Neighbors, Long Wary of What Moscow Is up to, Are Increasing Military Readiness amid Tension over Ukraine," *Business Insider*, accessed April 26, 2023, <https://www.businessinsider.com/russias-nordic-neighbors-increase-military-readiness-amid-ukraine-tension-2022-2.; Russian Amphibious Assault Beach Landing>, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xDt0qZ6bbxI>.

<sup>19</sup> Robbie Gramer Detsch Jack, "Russia's Stripped Its Western Borders to Feed the Fight in Ukraine," *Foreign Policy* (blog), September 28, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/28/russia-ukraine-war-nato-eastern-flank-military-kaliningrad-baltic-finland/>.

<sup>20</sup> Detsch.

<sup>21</sup> AFP-Agence France Presse, "100,000 Russian Dead, Wounded In 5 Months In Ukraine: W.House," May 1, 2023, [https://www.barrons.com/news/us-intel-says-100-000-russian-dead-wounded-in-bakhmut-ab0bee4b.](https://www.barrons.com/news/us-intel-says-100-000-russian-dead-wounded-in-bakhmut-ab0bee4b.;); Statista, "Length of Russia's borders with neighboring countries," Statista, April 26, 2023, <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1306576/umfrage/laenge-der-grenzen-von-russland/>.

Thousands of Russian Marines met their deaths far from the coast in Ukraine's interior, as reinforcements for Russian land forces were already decimated by Ukrainian forces.<sup>22</sup> The significant casualty figures of the Vladivostok-based 155th Marine Brigade on Russia's Pacific coast on the battlefield in Ukraine, and its loss of 300 soldiers per day in the 2023 Russian winter offensive at Vuhledar, is emblematic of the depletion of the quality and professionalism in their ranks.<sup>23</sup> Russia's need to maintain operational tempo on the battlefield forced it to replace its well-trained and well-equipped troops with an equal number of new recruits, but without the time required to train and equip them properly.<sup>24</sup> As a result, the Russian army is becoming less and less competent, even though more and more citizens have been recruited. Incompetence on the battlefield leads to even greater losses, which requires the Russian MOD to recruit ever more troops, who are ultimately sent to war with even less training, in order to send them to the front even faster.<sup>25</sup> While this is a doom loop, Russian history is replete with countless examples of such folly, but also of the willingness to take massive casualties in order to achieve its objectives. In comparison, The Royal Navy requires one year to train basic skills as a Marine for land to sea and sea to land combat.<sup>26</sup> The training time required for Royal Marine Officers is even more arduous, and takes two years to certify a platoon commander.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, it will take years to reform the Russian Marines as they deplete lost quality at all levels of their force. In the interim for the Baltic region, this is a positive outcome, as with Russia bleeding in Ukraine it is limited (for now), in its ability to pose as a threat from its enclave in Kaliningrad. But as stated, while Russian quality is significantly depleted, their quantity and risk tolerance remain a significant threat to European democracies.

As late as April 2023, Russia launched another wave of recruitment, which will supplement the 300,000 men already drafted in September 2022, and will not only fill the trenches in Crimea, but may also fill personnel gaps in the Russian Marines in Kaliningrad oblast.<sup>28</sup> Undoubtedly, a Russian autocratic society, whose military leadership is digging up positions in Ukraine in the contaminated area of Chnerobyl, or sending infantry over open terrain to fortify their front lines, should not be

---

<sup>22</sup> Axe, "Russian Marines Just Attempted Another Frontal Assault On Ukrainian Positions Around Pavlivka. The Result Was Predictably Bloody."

<sup>23</sup> David Axe, "A Russian Attack On Odessa Could Be Naval Suicide," *Forbes*, April 4, 2022, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/04/04/a-russian-attack-on-odessa-could-be-naval-suicide/>; Ministry of Defence GB [@DefenceHQ], "Latest Defence Intelligence Update on the Situation in Ukraine - 3 April 2023. Find out More about Defence Intelligence's Use of Language: [#Http://Ow.Ly/2IpN50NyfkWUA](http://Ow.Ly/2IpN50NyfkWUA) #StandWithUkraine UA <https://t.co/1pzOOeIMjg>."

<sup>24</sup> Mark F. Cancian, "What Does Russia's 'Partial Mobilization' Mean?," September 26, 2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-russias-partial-mobilization-mean>.

<sup>25</sup> Vitaly Shevchenko, "Russian Army Launches Campaign Encouraging Men to Join," *BBC News*, April 21, 2023, sec. Europe, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65351271>.

<sup>26</sup> Royal Navy, "Your First Year as a Marine | Basic Training & Passing Out," Your first year as a marine, April 28, 2023, <https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/careers/royal-marines/whats-it-like/your-first-year-as-a-marine>.

<sup>27</sup> Royal Navy, "Become a Royal Marines Officer in the Royal Navy," accessed May 8, 2023, <https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/careers/royal-marines/what-can-i-do/royal-marines-commando-officer>.

<sup>28</sup> The Moscow Times, "In Photos: Russian Military Ramps Up Army Recruitment Drive," *The Moscow Times*, April 12, 2023, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/12/in-photos-russian-military-ramps-up-army-recruitment-drive-a80794>.

underestimated in their risk tolerance—amphibious assault or strike on new front cannot be dismissed.<sup>29</sup>

In addition to Crimea being a strategic maritime position within the Black Sea, the Swedish Baltic island of Gotland is also a key strategic maritime position in the Eastern Baltic Sea, centrally located by sea between the Russian heartland with the naval port of St. Petersburg and the home port of the Baltic fleet in Kalinigrad oblast.<sup>30</sup> The Swedish island of Gotland thus has a strategic added value for Russia, which requires security precautions and likely one of Sweden's motives for joining the NATO alliance.<sup>31</sup>

Even before Russian Marines died on the battlefield in Ukraine, this endeavor was considered generally possible but logistically extremely difficult.<sup>32</sup> Russia's biggest obstacle to maritime expeditionary operations, according to the report, is limited military sea lift and airlift capabilities in the Baltic Sea region.<sup>33</sup> This limited transportation capacity means that Russia could not move its forces from Kaliningrad to Gotland quickly enough to achieve a favorable attacker-defender ratio. Only with the involvement of additional Russian airborne troops from the heartland did the authors see the possibilities in 2021. The remaining Russian airborne troops, like the Marines, have been regrouped and are to ensure future Russian offensives on the territory of Ukraine.<sup>34</sup> This may reduce an immediate threat, but Russia's maritime strategic positions in the Baltic will remain. The quality of poorly trained Russian soldiers, with the imprinted ethos of being able to match their great fathers, may be low, but still possess significant quantity. It does not matter whether the soldier is storming out of a landing ship or straightening the front in a winter offensive in eastern Ukraine—risks abound from the Crimea to the Baltic.<sup>35</sup>

Just as Russia's strategic maritime positions remain in the Baltic Sea, Gotland remains an island, for which floating specialized military transport capabilities are needed for an amphibious assault. Since January 2022, the Russian Baltic Fleet has been missing three out of four main capability carriers in the form of the ROPUCHA-class tank landing

---

<sup>29</sup> The Moscow Times, “Russian Soldiers Dug Trenches in Chernobyl Zone’s Radioactive Soil – Ukrainian Official,” The Moscow Times, April 7, 2022, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/04/07/russian-soldiers-dug-trenches-in-chernobyl-zones-radioactive-soil-ukrainian-official-a77255>.

<sup>30</sup> Suzanne Freeman, “Are Current Russian Expeditionary Capabilities Capable of a Coup de Main in Sweden?,” September 30, 2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-current-russian-expeditionary-capabilities-capable-coup-de-main-sweden>.

<sup>31</sup> Marc Pfitzenmaier, “Gotland, The Swedish Island Standing Between Russia And NATO Vulnerability - Worldcrunch,” October 18, 2023, <https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/sweden-gotland-russia>.

<sup>32</sup> Suzanne Freeman, “Are Current Russian Expeditionary Capabilities Capable of a Coup de Main in Sweden?,” September 30, 2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-current-russian-expeditionary-capabilities-capable-coup-de-main-sweden>.

<sup>33</sup> Freeman.

<sup>34</sup> Tom Watling, “Russia Lost ‘50% of Its Airborne Forces’ in First Six Months of War,” Express.co.uk, February 1, 2023, <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1729319/Russia-war-in-Ukraine-airborne-forces-offensive-VDV>.

<sup>35</sup> James Wertsch, “Russia’s Narrative of a Great Patriotic War in Ukraine Must Be Buried,” South China Morning Post, March 4, 2023, <https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3212065/russias-narrative-great-patriotic-war-ukraine-must-be-buried>.

ships needed for this purpose, which had been transferred to the Black Sea by sea in the run-up to the attack on Ukraine.<sup>36</sup> Due to their flexible capabilities, beyond purely amphibious ones, the Russian tank landing ships of the Baltic Fleet seem hardly expendable in the Black Sea at present due to their logistical added value for resupplying Crimea by sea. Besides non-military shipping, only warships returning to a home base in the Black Sea are explicitly allowed to pass.<sup>37</sup> Thus, the possibility of an amphibious landing operation will not be possible at least until the end of the war in Ukraine and the reopening of the Bosphorus by Turkey to the Baltic Fleet.<sup>38</sup> Until anti-ship missiles handed over to Ukraine reduce the force potential, there is currently not enough landing ships in the Baltic Sea area, but the quality within the Russian naval forces continues to prevail.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the capability of Russian naval forces to go on the offensive will be maintained as long as a large number of landing ships are not sunk.<sup>40</sup>

The narrative set in media coverage, such as David Axe in *Forbes*, who spoke of how a Russian attack on Odessa could well have been suicide for the Russian Navy, lacks significant depth of analysis, as this simply cannot be proven.<sup>41</sup> The fact that an amphibious assault in the Black Sea on the coastal areas around the Ukrainian port of Odessa did not take place may have manifold reasons, which can only be classified in the aftermath of the war.<sup>42</sup> It is unclear whether Russia refrained from a landing operation due to a possibly too strong fortification of the defenders, or Marines had to fill gaps in the lines of Russian land forces.<sup>43</sup> Such narratives disseminated by the media, without knowing exactly the ultimate motivations of Russian military leadership, reassure Western value-oriented societies. This may lead to the unjustified neglect of maritime security funding and requisite attention to counter Russian sea power. While printing stamps with the image of a brave Ukrainian soldier standing in the foreground of the

---

<sup>36</sup> Thomas Newdick, "Flotilla Of Russian Landing Ships Has Entered The English Channel," *The Drive*, January 19, 2022, <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43942/flotilla-of-russian-amphibious-warships-has-entered-the-english-channel>; Tony Roper, "Russian Navy Moves Large Landing Ships to Black Sea as Exercise Deployments Continue," *Janes.com*, accessed May 8, 2023, <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russian-navy-moves-large-landing-ships-to-black-sea-as-exercise-deployments-continue>.

<sup>37</sup> Britannica, "Montreux Convention (1936) | Turkey & Dardanelles | Britannica," accessed April 28, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Montreux-Convention>.

<sup>38</sup> Britannica.

<sup>39</sup> Sam LaGrone, "Ukraine Deploys Anti-Ship Harpoon Missiles to the Edge of Black Sea, MoD Says," *USNI News* (blog), June 10, 2022, <https://news.usni.org/2022/06/10/ukraine-deploys-anti-ship-harpoon-missiles-to-the-edge-of-black-sea-mod-says>.

<sup>40</sup> Michael Starr, "Russia Navy Concerned Vital Supply Ships Vulnerable to Ukraine Attack -U," *The Jerusalem Post* | *JPost.com*, November 22, 2022, <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-723065>.

<sup>41</sup> Axe, "A Russian Attack On Odessa Could Be Naval Suicide."

<sup>42</sup> Walker Mills Heck Timothy, "What Can We Learn about Amphibious Warfare from a Conflict That Has Had Very Little of It? A Lot," *Modern War Institute*, April 22, 2022, <https://mwi.usma.edu/what-can-we-learn-about-amphibious-warfare-from-a-conflict-that-has-had-very-little-of-it-a-lot/>.

<sup>43</sup> V. O. A. News, "Elite Russian Forces Said to Suffer Losses in Ukraine," *VOA*, February 26, 2023, <https://www.voanews.com/a/elite-russian-forces-said-to-suffer-losses-in-ukraine-/6979443.html>.



sunken *MOSKVA* makes for good propaganda, this does nothing to bolster a sober assessment of Russian power projection at sea.<sup>44</sup>

## IT'S NOT WHAT YOU SAY, BUT HOW YOU SAY IT

The loss of a destroyer in the Black Sea, while a tactical success, is limited in its strategic impact.<sup>45</sup> According to *The Royal Navy Lookout*, “[t]he sinking of the old cruiser *MOSKVA* and the Russian Navy's poor performance in the Black Sea indicate that the threat across the spectrum of non-nuclear capabilities has significantly diminished.”<sup>46</sup> While the Royal Navy news and analysis may be correct about the reduction in force levels of Russian surface combatants, it does not capture the increasing risks to maritime force postures. The Russian Navy still possesses significant surface warfare forces, which are capable of acting across spectrum of non-nuclear capabilities.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, after the sinking of the destroyer *MOSKVA* in the Black Sea, The Northern Fleet, the largest Russian maritime force, maintains its strategic maritime position from the Barents Sea, with significant logistics capabilities in the form of a fleet tanker. The fleet tanker *KAWA*, together with four surface combat units of the Baltic Fleet, forms a Russian Force (MTF) in the North Sea.<sup>48</sup> In this case, the frigate *ADMIRAL GRIGOROVICH* of the Black Sea Fleet could be recalled in the event of a closure of the Bosphorus from its patrols of Tartus, Syria, in the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>49</sup> The units from the Baltic Fleet complement the effectiveness across the spectrum of non-nuclear capabilities of Russian surface combatants in the North Sea. The STEREGUSHCHIY-CLASS corvettes and KARAKURT-CLASS CORVETTES, as well as the GRIGOROVICH-CLASS FRIGATE, can jointly act against underwater targets, surface targets, and land targets, including the Russian KALIBR-missile system.<sup>50</sup> In sum, Russian surface capabilities remain substantial, and their ability to relocate currently deployed fleets could significantly alter the balance of naval power.

According to public sources, the Russian missile with a 450 kg fragmentation warhead, or even a tactical-nuclear warhead, has a range of up to 2500 km and represents Russia's maritime power projection capability through surface combat forces against any

---

<sup>44</sup> India Today, “Ukraine’s ‘Russian Warship Go F\*\*\* Yourself’ Stamp Fetches \$165,000 in Charity Auction,” India Today, April 23, 2022, <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/ukraine-prints-russian-warship-moskva-stamps-1941089-2022-04-23>.

<sup>45</sup> H I Sutton, “H I Sutton - Covert Shores Concentration Of Five Russian Warships In North Sea,” May 3, 2023, <http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-Navy-North-Sea-2023-05.html>.

<sup>46</sup> Navy Lookout, “Has the Russian Submarine Threat Been Diminished by the Ukraine War? | Navy Lookout,” April 11, 2023, <https://www.navylookout.com/has-the-russian-submarine-threat-been-diminished-by-the-ukraine-war/>.

<sup>47</sup> Jonas Kjellén, “The Russian Baltic Fleet – Organisation and Role within the Armed Forces in 2020,” The Russian Baltic Fleet, February 1, 2021.; Office of Naval Intelligence, *The Russian Navy* (Washington D.C., 2015).

<sup>48</sup> H I Sutton, “H I Sutton - Covert Shores Concentration Of Five Russian Warships In North Sea.”

<sup>49</sup> Military-Today, “Admiral Grigorovich Class Frigate | Military-Today.Com,” April 30, 2023, [http://www.military-today.com/navy/admiral\\_grigorovich\\_class.htm](http://www.military-today.com/navy/admiral_grigorovich_class.htm).

<sup>50</sup> Kjellén, “The Russian Baltic Fleet – Organisation and Role within the Armed Forces in 2020.”

European capital.<sup>51</sup> The deployment in the North Sea is not only a visible element of Russian maritime strength, but the will to overcome Western air defense systems. Of course, such missiles can also be fired from land.<sup>52</sup> Looking more closely at the buildup of naval forces in the North Sea, one realizes that a coordinated missile attack from a position in the North Sea shortens the response capability of European air defenses. The closer the KALIBR-Missile is launched to the intended target, the later the air defense can detect and counter the threat. In this way, Russia's naval forces with existing capabilities are capable of projecting deep into Europe.<sup>53</sup>

The 2021 German study, "The Essence of Maritime Power," identifies three basic interests of naval forces in the context of geopolitical influence: 1) protection of populations and strategic assets; 2) de-escalation and peace enforcement through military forces, including military deterrence; 3) conflict prevention to enforce the measures necessary to preserve and restore a peaceful world order.<sup>54</sup> While these are lofty pronouncements, Europe must face Russia's alternative narrative. With the speech to the nation of the Russian president, one year after the invasion started in February 2023, the tone is set, "They (the West) started the war."<sup>55</sup> Russian President Vladimir Putin accuses the West and Ukraine of having provoked the conflict, thereby exaggerating the perpetrator-victim role. If one tries to interpret the three valid basic interests for naval forces for geopolitical influence from the Russian perception, it becomes clear that Russia has numerically lost a surface combatant, but still its surface forces are able to act with relative freedom of maneuver. The Russian surface forces represent not only symbolically the will in the North Sea to ensure the protection of the Russian population against NATO and EU, but the will to fight. The Russian MTF, with the possibility of using sub-strategic missiles from the North Sea, is an expression of power.

Russian military deterrence and strategic messaging is done on land as it is at sea. Even the coronation of the heir to the British throne, Charles III, in London in May 2023, will require the UK to keep an Air Defence Frigate on hand for air defense during the coronation ceremony in the port of London.<sup>56</sup> Not least in order to protect itself due to the maritime threat potential from Russian KALIBR-missiles on Russian warships in the North Sea. The military deterrent, perhaps only incidentally understood in the context of the coronation, makes it clear to British society, as well as to all state guests and world public opinion, that Russian naval strength is by no means lost. It may be perfidious from

---

<sup>51</sup> Military Today, "Kalibr Naval Cruise Missile Family | Military-Today.Com," May 8, 2023, <http://www.military-today.com/missiles/kalibr.htm>.

<sup>52</sup> Military Today.

<sup>53</sup> Anna Voitenko, "In Pictures: Russian Missile Hits Ukrainian Mall | Reuters.Com," *Reuters*, accessed May 8, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/news/picture/in-pictures-russian-missile-hits-ukraini-idUSRTS921PO>.

<sup>54</sup> Thorsten Albrecht, Carlo Masala, and Konstantinos Tsetsos, "The Essence of Sea Power," ZMSBw, 2021, <https://zms.bundeswehr.de/de/zmsbw-publikationen-potsdamerschriften-seemacht-5324124>.

<sup>55</sup> Jenni Reid, "'They Started the War': Russia's Putin Blames West and Ukraine for Provoking Conflict," CNBC, February 21, 2023, <https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/21/russias-putin-blames-west-and-ukraine-for-provoking-conflict.html>.

<sup>56</sup> Stephen Pitts, "UK's Leading Warship to Stand Guard on Thames during King's Coronation | Royal | News | Express.Co.Uk," May 4, 2023, <https://www.express.co.uk/news/royal/1765952/Warship-guard-Thames-King-s-Coronation>.

the Russian perspective to have to deduce from the fleet-wide composition of a Russian MTF in the North Sea that it was sent to prevent conflict and, if necessary, to preserve and restore a peaceful world order from the Russian perspective.<sup>57</sup> As a tool of geopolitical influence, Russia is able to deploy credible naval forces to European waters even without the lost destroyer *MOSKVA*. Russia has only lost one warship, and its maritime power projection remains. This is what happens in war. The Royal Navy had also lost surface forces in the Falklands War during the Cold War.<sup>58</sup> After the loss of HMS *SHEFFIELD*, was the Royal Navy no longer considered a threat to the Soviet Union because the full range of non-nuclear capabilities of the Royal Navy had significantly diminished after the Falklands War? Of course not. The Russian maritime threat remains significant.

Of course, Russia's weaknesses are obvious outside the range of land-based air defenses and without the support capability of Russian naval air forces in the North Sea, without the only non-operational Russian aircraft carrier.<sup>59</sup> Russian fighter jets from the densest Russian airfield to the North Sea, would have to fly from Kaliningrad Oblast in the Baltic Sea over the airspace of Poland and Germany or Denmark to support maritime Russian forces in the North Sea. Thus, should the Russian surface combatants in the North Sea fire missiles on European nation states, a return to the home bases of the surface combatants is unlikely, even with the use of non-nuclear warheads. Especially in view of the very last visit of a top Western politician to Russia by British Defense Minister Ben Wallace, shortly before Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In a published documentary aired April 2023, Wallace stated that he had deliberately expanded his entourage to include top British military Officers in order to demonstrate to the Russian defense minister and his leadership who would give the order to fire back.<sup>60</sup> The expressed resilience of the United Kingdom is the created hurdle besides the Article 5 of the NATO alliance for Russia in case of an attack out of the North Sea to have to consider the sinking of the surface forces.<sup>61</sup>

Pierre Morcos and Colin Wall's January 2022 analysis, titled, "Are European Navies Ready for High Intensity War?" rather weakens credibility by pointing out missed European maritime security preparedness.<sup>62</sup> The elaborated facts of missing missiles from the experience of NATO Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR 2011 in Libya and the highlighting of overstretched European naval forces in order fulfillment, serves the impression of weak West, rather than Russian weakness. Missed European security

---

<sup>57</sup> Albrecht, Masala, and Tsetsos, "The Essence of Sea Power."

<sup>58</sup> HISTORY LISTS, "List of 6 British Ships Sunk During the Falklands War - History Lists," May 8, 2023, <https://historylists.org/other/list-of-6-british-ships-sunk-during-the-falklands-war.html>.

<sup>59</sup> Naval News, "Russian Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov Will Not Be Operational before 2024," June 9, 2022, <https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2022/june/11818-russian-aircraft-carrier-admiral-kuznetsov-will-not-be-operational-before-2024.html>.

<sup>60</sup> ARTE.TV, "Who is Vladimir Putin? (3/3) - All in one card - The whole documentary," ARTE, March 14, 2023, <https://www.arte.tv/de/videos/107803-000-A/wer-ist-wladimir-putin-3-3/>.

<sup>61</sup> NATO, "Collective Defence and Article 5," NATO, accessed May 5, 2023, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm).

<sup>62</sup> Pierre Morcos and Collin Wall, "Are European Navies Ready for High-Intensity Warfare?," War on the Rocks, January 31, 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/are-european-navies-ready-for-high-intensity-warfare/>.

precautions rather strengthen Putin's credibility internally to have sufficient deterrent military means at hand to let the commander of a Russian warship. Believing in a Patriotic War 2.0, and the order to fire the KALIBR missile from a central position in the North Sea, is a sobering thought. The attacks of the Russian infantry in Bakhmut are warning enough that the Russian soldier is ready to die as a patriot for his country.<sup>63</sup>

The destroyer *MOSKVA*, for whatever reason, was simply unable to repel two anti-ship missiles from presumably greater distances offshore, even though the ship had sufficient surface warfare capability.<sup>64</sup> Consequently, it is not acceptable to extrapolate the apparent weakness of a single Russian warship in a marginal sea to the general Russian capabilities to operate across the entire spectrum of non-nuclear capabilities. The maritime threat of Russian sea power to the European continent is real and continues to test the European democratic nations.

## THE UNSEEN THREAT

The maritime threat potential of Russia's sea power poses an even more serious challenge to European maritime security preparedness against the capabilities of Russian Surface Forces.<sup>65</sup> The European democracies have demonstrated their competence and determination in the course of the war against Ukraine launched by Russia, and not only through extensive arms deliveries. Within a short period of time, a large number of European countries managed to break their energy dependence on Russia and differentiate to other sources, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is transported to Europe by sea.<sup>66</sup> As a result, the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea have become the center of strategic goods for an entire continent. "We need to flatten the curve," announced Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission in September 2022 and meant the energy prices.<sup>67</sup> *The Economist* headlined that rising energy prices were a test of European solidarity against Wladimir Putin.<sup>68</sup> Sabotage of maritime infrastructure, especially offshore wind farms or oil rigs, is thus an attempt to weaken

---

<sup>63</sup> Roman Petrenko, "Medvedev Calls War with Ukraine 'New Patriotic War,'" *Ukrainska Pravda*, January 21, 2023, <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/01/21/7385925/>.

<sup>64</sup> Heather Mongilio, "UPDATED: Russia Says Damaged Cruiser Moskva Sank Under Tow Headed to Black Sea Homeport," *USNI News*, April 14, 2022, <https://news.usni.org/2022/04/13/russian-navy-confirms-severe-damage-to-black-sea-cruiser-moskva-crew-abandoned-ship>.

<sup>65</sup> Cook, "Multiple Russian Submarines Moving in 'Strange Routes,' U.K. Says," *Newsweek*, April 19, 2023, <https://www.newsweek.com/russian-submarines-north-sea-irish-sea-pacific-ocean-ben-wallace-uk-defense-1795357>.

<sup>66</sup> European Council, "Energy Prices and Security of Supply," March 31, 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/energy-prices-and-security-of-supply/>.

<sup>67</sup> European Commission, "Statement by the President on Energy," Text, European Commission - European Commission, September 7, 2022, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech\\_22\\_5389](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_22_5389).

<sup>68</sup> THE ECONOMIST, "Europe Scrambles to Protect Citizens from Sky-High Energy Prices," *The Economist*, accessed May 3, 2023, [https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/09/08/europe-scrambles-to-protect-citizens-from-sky-high-energy-prices?utm\\_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm\\_source=google&ppccampaignID=18798097116&ppcadID=&utm\\_campaign=a.22brand\\_pmax&utm\\_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7cPM67fa\\_gIVd8fjBx0ArQHmEAMYASAAEgJR9PD\\_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds](https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/09/08/europe-scrambles-to-protect-citizens-from-sky-high-energy-prices?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=18798097116&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7cPM67fa_gIVd8fjBx0ArQHmEAMYASAAEgJR9PD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds).

European societal resilience against defense preparedness.<sup>69</sup> For Russia, sabotage of maritime critical infrastructure offers concrete added value. Especially against the background of rising energy prices due to sabotage to financially limit the European societies in their determination to help Ukraine. Russia's recognized submarine operations are therefore on a par with maritime power projections by surface warfare forces in a central position of the North Sea with KALIBR-missiles. However, the difficulty of attributing such sabotage can already be seen in the course of the investigation of the perpetrators of the Nordstream pipelines in the Baltic Sea region.<sup>70</sup> The clarification of the perpetrators from the sabotage in September 2022 is still open for debate. If one classifies the available capabilities primarily according to the possibility of operating covertly, submarines are a proven means.<sup>71</sup>

From 176 submarines formerly available in the Cold War by the Soviet Union, only 6 conventional submarines (SSK) and 21 nuclear-powered submarines (7xSSBN/9xSSN/5xSSGN) will be available to the Russian Northern Fleet in 2023.<sup>72</sup> The Baltic Fleet does not maintain submarines and Russian SSK's are only built and tested in the Baltic Sea area.<sup>73</sup> There are also 6 conventional submarines in the Black Sea Fleet and they are used for firing KALIBR-missiles at Ukraine from the Black Sea.<sup>74</sup> Navy Lookout estimates that 25 to 30 percent of the SSNs and SSGNs are available to the Northern Fleet operationally prepared to meet the conventional threat in the Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, and North Sea approaches. This corresponds to about 3 to 5 Russian submarines for underwater warfare permanently on patrol from the Barents Sea waters out to the Arctic waters or the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent sea areas.<sup>75</sup> The sheer number of Russian submarines in the Northern Fleet therefore seems manageable even at first glance by European navies alone. Especially in view of the number of existing European submarines from the analysis "Are European Navies Ready for High Intensity War?" of a total of 66 submarines.<sup>76</sup> The sending of strategic messages of Western democracies by the joint construction of submarines by England, Australia and USA, (AUKUS) will have been heard not only in China, but also in Russia. This strengthens the impression for the European security precaution to be able to counter Russian power projection sufficiently by underwater warfare forces with further modern British nuclear submarines in the future, or by the German-Norwegian cooperation for the construction

---

<sup>69</sup> Susannah Savage, "Protests over Food and Fuel Surged in 2022 — the Biggest Were in Europe," *POLITICO* (blog), January 17, 2023, <https://www.politico.eu/article/energy-crisis-food-and-fuel-protests-surged-in-2022-the-biggest-were-in-europe/>.

<sup>70</sup> Brian Neely, "The 'Act of Sabotage' Hit Europe's Energy and Stock Markets - Business News," September 28, 2022, <https://biz.crastr.net/the-act-of-sabotage-hit-europes-energy-and-stock-markets/>.

<sup>71</sup> Evan Gottesman, "Putin's Silent Service: 5 Most Deadly Submarines in Russia's Navy," Text, The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, August 20, 2018), <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/putins-silent-service-5-most-deadly-submarines-russias-navy-29297>.

<sup>72</sup> Navy Lookout, "Has the Russian Submarine Threat Been Diminished by the Ukraine War?"

<sup>73</sup> Kjellén, "The Russian Baltic Fleet – Organisation and Role within the Armed Forces in 2020."

<sup>74</sup> H. I. Sutton, "Sudden Surge In Russian Navy Ships And Submarines In Black Sea," *Naval News* (blog), January 11, 2023, <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/sudden-surge-in-russian-navy-ships-and-submarines-in-black-sea/>.

<sup>75</sup> Navy Lookout, "Has the Russian Submarine Threat Been Diminished by the Ukraine War?"

<sup>76</sup> Morcos and Wall, "Are European Navies Ready for High-Intensity Warfare?"

of modern conventional submarines.<sup>77</sup> Some may argue that it is currently precisely in the interest of European security policy and the European defense industry for high-ranking uniformed or top politicians to overstate Russia's maritime threat underwater. It is precisely at this interface that a view of only the Russian navy falls short and would not allow maritime security preparedness to do justice to Russia's underwater threat potential.

The Navy's submarine focus will most likely be patrol, as it was in Soviet times, and will still be able to draw on state-of-the-art submarine technology in its capability portfolio.<sup>78</sup> Admiral James Stavridis (ret.) of the U.S. Navy, and previous commander of U.S. forces in Europe clarified in April 2023, states that the U.S. Navy maintains the most combat-ready fleet of submarines in the world, and immediately after that sees the Russian Navy as the second most powerful submarine fleet in the world.<sup>79</sup> Against the background of the size of the coastlines of the European continent, only in the Atlantic Ocean from Norway to the entrance Mediterranean in Gibraltar. To find five submarines which, if necessary, could even carry out a coordinated KALIBR-missile attack on value-based democracies at any time from a covert advantageous strategic maritime position, like the Russian MTF sent to the North Sea.

The three most fundamental interests of naval forces in the context of geopolitical influence by naval forces are thus transferable to submarines in the competence of the Russian Navy.<sup>80</sup> Even more, submarines in the role of maritime power projection will most likely continue to increase, against the backdrop of the not yet foreseeable end of the Russia-Ukraine war. After a year of war, top Western militaries cannot identify any limitations in the readiness of Russian submarines.<sup>81</sup>

## **IT HAPPENED IN BROAD DAYLIGHT**

Thus, the threat potential of the Russian Navy alone remains a challenging problem on Europe's coasts and is potentiated by the Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research Russia, also known by the Russian acronym GUGI (Glavnoye Upravleniye Glubokovodnykh Issledovaniy).<sup>82</sup> The main base is in close proximity to the naval base of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea. GUGI is directly subordinated to the Russian

---

<sup>77</sup> Fatima Bahtić, “TKMS Unveils Design of New German-Norwegian Subs,” *Naval Today* (blog), August 31, 2021, <https://www.navaltoday.com/2021/08/31/tkms-unveils-design-of-new-german-norwegian-subs/>.

<sup>78</sup> Tanmay Kadam, “‘Crown Jewel’ Of Russian Navy, Putin Mulls Permanently Stationing Its Yasen-Class Submarines Near US Shores,” *Latest Asian, Middle-East, EurAsian, Indian News*, March 26, 2023, <https://eurasianimes.com/crown-jewel-of-russian-navy-putin-mulls-permanently-stationing-its-yasen-class-submarines-near-us-shores/>.

<sup>79</sup> *Sub Hunt: NATO on Patrol for Russian Subs*, 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfPbZLeuxgk>.

<sup>80</sup> Albrecht, Masala, and Tsetsos, “The Essence of Sea Power.”

<sup>81</sup> Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Report: Russian Sub Activity Returns to Cold War Levels,” *Washington Post*, October 27, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/02/04/report-russian-sub-activity-returns-to-cold-war-levels/>.

<sup>82</sup> MARITIME EXECUTIVE, “Netherlands Accuses Russia of Spying on Offshore Wind Farms,” *The Maritime Executive*, accessed May 4, 2023, <https://maritime-executive.com/article/netherlands-accuses-russia-of-spying-on-offshore-wind-farms.>; Tim McMillan, “With The Belgorod, Russia Bulks Up Its ‘Other,’ Secret Navy,” *The Debrief*, July 28, 2022, <https://thedebrief.org/with-the-belgorod-russia-bulks-up-its-other-secret-navy/>.

Ministry of Defense in the force structure of Russian armed forces.<sup>83</sup> In early January 2022, the Chief of the Defense Staff and Chief of the British Armed Forces, Sir Tony Radakin, spoke of a "phenomenal increase in Russian submarine and underwater activity, "adding that Moscow could" compromise and potentially exploit the world's real information system, namely the underwater cables that run around the world."<sup>84</sup> The Commander Norwegian Navy reinforces the security concerns and also highlights the threat to the Norwegian natural gas pipeline in February 2023, as well as the Commander German Navy, who wants to rely increasingly on drones without delay due to the present threat situation from Russia.<sup>85</sup>

It has been adequately demonstrated by acknowledged experts, such as Senior Research Scientist at Center for Naval Analyses Michael Kofman or H I Sutton Covert-shores, with publicly available information that GUGI is fully capable of sabotaging critical maritime infrastructure from any Russian naval base in the world.<sup>86</sup> GUGI can threaten the maritime prosperity of nations, states, and entire continents at any time.<sup>87</sup> If this happens together militarily coordinated with Russian surface forces in the North Sea and Russian Navy submarines in strategic positions on the coasts of Europe, the Russian maritime threat potential of non-nuclear capabilities across the spectrum becomes more threatening than ever.

While nothing new, it is well known the Russian leadership distorts the truth by concealment as in the case of the invasion of unmarked Russian soldiers into the territories such as Luhansk and Donesk in 2014 into Ukraine. The "little green men" are now also at sea, conducting ocean exploration in direct subordination to the Minister of Defense.<sup>88</sup> Thus, in the hierarchy of the Russian military there is only one degree of separation between the President and GUGI.<sup>89</sup> A prime example of the failure to

---

<sup>83</sup> Thomas Nilsen, "From This Secret Base, Russian Spy Ships Increase Activity around Global Data Cables," *The Independent Barents Observer*, accessed May 5, 2023, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/node/3381>.

<sup>84</sup> P. A. Media, "UK Military Chief Warns of Russian Threat to Vital Undersea Cables," *The Guardian*, January 8, 2022, sec. UK news, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jan/08/uk-military-chief-warns-of-russian-threat-to-vital-undersea-cables>.

<sup>85</sup> Tom Costello, Dan Ded Luce, and Joel Seidman, "Norway Watches as Russian Subs and Aircraft Step up Arctic Patrols," *NBC News*, March 28, 2023, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/norway-russian-submarines-planes-military-ukraine-arctic-rcna76368>.; NDR, "Fit for the future: Commander German Navy wants drone force," May 5, 2023, <https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/schleswig-holstein/Fit-fuer-die-Zukunft-Marinechef-will-Drohnentruppe-,marine1318.html>.

<sup>86</sup> Michael Kofman, "GUGI," *Russia Military Analysis*, July 3, 2019, <https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/tag/gugi/>.; H I Sutton, "H I Sutton - Covert Shores Yantar," October 9, 2016, <http://www.hisutton.com/Yantar.html>.

<sup>87</sup> Thomas Nilsen, "Military Research Ship Returns after Months on Secret Arctic Mission," *The Independent Barents Observer*, September 30, 2020, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/09/military-research-ship-returns-after-months-secret-mission-arctic>.

<sup>88</sup> Vitaly Shevchenko, "'Little Green Men' or 'Russian Invaders'?" *BBC News*, March 11, 2014, sec. Europe, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154>.

<sup>89</sup> Drummer, "You Need to Know About Russia's Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) | The Lyncean Group of San Diego," May 21, 2018, <https://lynceans.org/all-posts/you-need-to-know-about-russias-main-directorate-of-deep-sea-research-gugi/>.

recognize the threat posed by Russian research vessels and research submarines as part of Sea Power was on 2 August 2007, when Russia succeeded in installing a 1 meter titanium Russian flag on the seafloor of the Arctic below 4300 meters.<sup>90</sup> The photo went viral and was furthered Russia's territorial claim of the Lomonosov ridge in the Arctic.<sup>91</sup> The claim to raw materials in a habitat under the ocean was the focus of media attention in the same year that Putin warned of an arms race.<sup>92</sup> The reason for the dispute between Moscow and Washington was the planned American missile defence system in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the only coincidental security connection between the two events becomes clear only when the perspective is changed, which was not available to the US Naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan in the 19th century.<sup>93</sup>

Mahan focused on fighting and winning decisive battles as a sea power with capital ships, where the victor gains dominion over the ocean and the vanquished has no means to challenge it.<sup>94</sup> Mahan, in defining sea power, did not have the ability to see the seabed of the ocean in all its perfection. However, he succeeded in creating a dictum that has lasted for two centuries and yet needs to be broadened in definition in order to fully grasp the Russian threat potential. The domination of the ocean through the ability to operate on the seabed will therefore only be achieved by those who are able to fight and win decisive battles under the sea. The forces are surrounded by mountain ranges, canyons, valleys and underwater cables and in a largely unexplored area of the blue planet.<sup>95</sup>

Russian undersea technology is among the most advanced in the world and, in 2023, with the fear of endangering strategic goods in Europe, proves the claim as a sea power to continue to be fully capable of maritime power projection, starting from the seabed.<sup>96</sup> The Russian maritime threat potential through the submarines of the Russian Navy together with the Russian Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research has never been greater. Particularly when an attack by surface and submarine missiles and the simultaneous sabotage of critical maritime infrastructure is coordinated.<sup>97</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> Associated Press NBC, "Russia Defends North Pole Flag-Planting," NBC News, August 8, 2007, <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna20169307>.

<sup>91</sup> Tom Parfitt, "Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed," *The Guardian*, August 2, 2007, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic>.

<sup>92</sup> Ian Traynor, "Putin Hits at US for Triggering Arms Race," *The Observer*, February 11, 2007, sec. World news, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/11/usa.russia>.

<sup>93</sup> Thomas Beall, "Why Are We Still Reading Mahan?," *USNI Blog* (blog), August 12, 2021, <https://blog.usni.org/posts/2021/08/12/why-are-we-still-reading-mahan>.

<sup>94</sup> William R Sprance, "THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: THE EMERGENCE OF JAPANESE IMPERIAL POWER" 6, no. 3 (2004).

<sup>95</sup> Adrienne Bernhard, "Deep Impact," *Earth Island Journal*, April 1, 2018, [https://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/magazine/entry/deep\\_impact/](https://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/magazine/entry/deep_impact/).

<sup>96</sup> Sebastien Roblin, "Russia Is Building New Subs to Launch Its Terrifying Apocalypse Torpedoes," *Popular Mechanics*, April 9, 2023, <https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a43501232/russia-building-submarines-to-launch-poseidon-torpedo/>.

<sup>97</sup> Bruno Waterfield and Oliver Moody, "The Times: Nord Stream: Russia Has Mined European Undersea Pipelines and Cables, Nato Fears," May 3, 2023, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/nord-stream-pipeline-report-russia-putin-ships-site-explosion-3xx50vgbh>.



## CONCLUSION

The almost unbearable sight of the daily horrors of the war in Eastern Europe against the brave Ukrainian people slowly lifts the fog of war already at sea and threatens to lose sight of the ocean and its dangers.<sup>98</sup> The sounds of the ocean are drowned out by the breaking spray from the bow of Russian naval vessels in the North Sea. The wave breaks on the shore of a fortified coast in the Black Sea.<sup>99</sup> If man is immersed in his thoughts and dives down into the ocean, Russian research submarines become visible that can launch nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicles and act as mothership for further nuclear powered submarines.<sup>100 101</sup>

The maritime threat posed by Russia to Europe has never been greater and must be resolutely confronted both under the sea and at sea.<sup>102</sup> Underwater, the combination of GUGI and naval forces currently makes it a sea power superior to the European naval forces. Learning from Ukraine means being able to defend itself as a defensible democracy, and the potential of drone use at sea and under the sea must be exploited. The European continent's dependence on maritime prosperity has become apparent in the wake of the Corona pandemic, with disrupted global supply chains via sea-routes, and has been exacerbated by Russia's war against Ukraine.

Stating that “Russia must not win,” means rethinking on the maritime battlefield in the face of a recognised Russian battle formation from the bottom of the seafloor and setting it up as a military counterweight.<sup>103</sup> In this context, it will be crucial to enable existing research drones from deep-sea research for military effect without delay, in order to be able to deter militarily.<sup>104</sup> The failure to adapt maritime forces to the technological demands of the 21st century maritime battlefield is the acceptance of leaving the ocean to the strong.<sup>105</sup> As Russia suffers significant degradation of its air and land forces, a

---

<sup>98</sup> Eugene Rumer, “Putin’s War Against Ukraine: The End of The Beginning,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed May 5, 2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/17/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-end-of-beginning-pub-89071>.

<sup>99</sup> Inder Singh Bisht, “Ukraine Deploys Harpoon Anti-Ship Missile Against Russian Navy,” *The Defense Post* (blog), June 14, 2022, <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/06/14/ukraine-harpoon-anti-ship-missile/>.

<sup>100</sup> TASS, “Belgorod Submarine Completes Throw Tests of Poseidon Torpedo Model — Source,” TASS, accessed March 26, 2023, <https://tass.com/defense/1560311>.

<sup>101</sup> Kate Dennett, “Russia’s Submarines Circling Britain’s Coastline’, Says Ben Wallace,” Mail Online, May 23, 2021, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9609343/Russias-submarines-circling-Britains-entire-coastline-says-Defence-Secretary-Ben-Wallace.html>.

<sup>102</sup> H I Sutton, “H I Sutton - Covert Shores Evgeny Gorigledzhan,” January 27, 2022, <http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-GUGI-Evgeny-Gorigledzhan.html>; H I Sutton, “H I Sutton - Covert Shores Belgorod,” June 29, 2021, <http://www.hisutton.com/Belgorod-Class-Submarine.html>.

<sup>103</sup> DW, “Scholz: ‘Russia Must Not Win This War’ – DW – 05/19/2022,” dw.com, May 19, 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/chancellor-olaf-scholz-tells-german-parliament-russia-must-not-win-this-war/a-61845874>.

<sup>104</sup> AWI, “Alfred Wegener Institut,” May 8, 2023, <https://www.awi.de/en/>; NOC, “National Oceanography Centre | Making Sense of Changing Seas,” May 8, 2023, <https://noc.ac.uk/>.

<sup>105</sup> Isabel van Brugen, “Russia’s Submarine Strategy—How Putin Plans to Rule beneath the Waves,” Newsweek, March 4, 2023, <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-submarine-strategy-putin-rule-beneath-waves-1785412>.

dangerous risk for the west is a potential turn to the sea. As Mahan reminds us, control of the global commons is control of the sea—it is time for Europe to focus on command of the sea.<sup>106</sup> Continuing to hope that it will not come to an end and that maritime security preparedness will have to be weighed against missed security preparedness of European land forces through security policy must not end up again in the realization that we have been lied to only when the consequences occur. Europe must learn to be strong at home is to be strong at sea.<sup>107</sup>

---

<sup>106</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Alfred Thayer Mahan | Biography, Significance, Books, & Facts | Britannica,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 03 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alfred-Thayer-Mahan>.

<sup>107</sup> Helene Dr Lavoix, “When Seas and Maps Impact Geostrategy and the Future,” The Red Team Analysis Society, September 15, 2021, <https://redanalysis.org/2021/09/15/when-seas-and-maps-impact-geostrategy/>.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AFP and AP. "Spurred by Russian Threat, Germany Okays \$100 Billion Fund to Beef up Army." Accessed May 8, 2023. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/spurred-by-russian-threat-germany-okays-100-billion-fund-to-beef-up-army/>.
- Al Jazeera. "Russia's Lavrov Warns of EU Militarisation, Says Similar to NATO | News | Al Jazeera," April 26, 2023. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/26/russias-lavrov-warns-of-eu-militarisation-says-similar-to-nato>.
- Albrecht, Thorsten, Carlo Masala, and Konstantinos Tsetsos. "The Essence of Sea Power." ZMSBw, 2021. <https://zms.bundeswehr.de/de/zmsbw-publikationen-potsdamerschriften-seemacht-5324124>.
- American Oceans. "How Deep Is the Ocean? 7 Miles Down in the Mariana Trench - American Oceans," June 16, 2021. <https://www.americanoseans.org/facts/deepest-part-of-ocean-mariana-trench/>.
- AP News. "AP PHOTOS: Images of War in Ukraine from Cutting-Room Floor." AP NEWS, February 20, 2023. <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-unseen-photos-77b065812a639def8a72e0c262363a66>.
- ARTE.TV. "Who is Vladimir Putin? (3/3) - All in one card - The whole documentary." ARTE, March 14, 2023. <https://www.arte.tv/de/videos/107803-000-A/wer-ist-wladimir-putin-3-3/>.
- AWI. "Alfred Wegener Institut," May 8, 2023. <https://www.awi.de/en/>.
- Axe, David. "A Russian Attack On Odessa Could Be Naval Suicide." Forbes, April 4, 2022. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/04/04/a-russian-attack-on-odessa-could-be-naval-suicide/>.
- . "Russian Marines Just Attempted Another Frontal Assault On Ukrainian Positions Around Pavlivka. The Result Was Predictably Bloody." Forbes. Accessed April 24, 2023. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/01/30/russian-marines-just-attempted-another-frontal-assault-on-ukrainian-positions-around-pavlivka-the-result-was-predictably-bloody/>.
- Bahtić, Fatima. "TKMS Unveils Design of New German-Norwegian Subs." *Naval Today* (blog), August 31, 2021. <https://www.navaltoday.com/2021/08/31/tkms-unveils-design-of-new-german-norwegian-subs/>.
- BBC News. "Russia Reveals Giant Nuclear Torpedo in State TV 'Leak.'" *BBC News*, November 12, 2015, sec. Europe. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34797252>.
- Beall, Thomas. "Why Are We Still Reading Mahan?" *USNI Blog* (blog), August 12, 2021. <https://blog.usni.org/posts/2021/08/12/why-are-we-still-reading-mahan>.
- Bernhard, Adrienne. "Deep Impact." *Earth Island Journal*, April 1, 2018. [https://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/magazine/entry/deep\\_impact/](https://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/magazine/entry/deep_impact/).

- Bisht, Inder Singh. "Ukraine Deploys Harpoon Anti-Ship Missile Against Russian Navy." *The Defense Post* (blog), June 14, 2022. <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/06/14/ukraine-harpoon-anti-ship-missile/>.
- Britannica. "Montreux Convention (1936) | Turkey & Dardanelles | Britannica." Accessed April 28, 2023. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Montreux-Convention>.
- . "Sea Power | Military | Britannica," March 10, 2023. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/sea-power>.
- Brugen, Isabel van. "Russia's Submarine Strategy—How Putin Plans to Rule beneath the Waves." *Newsweek*, March 4, 2023. <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-submarine-strategy-putin-rule-beneath-waves-1785412>.
- Cancian, Mark F. "What Does Russia's 'Partial Mobilization' Mean?," September 26, 2022. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-russias-partial-mobilization-mean>.
- cerespost. "Russia Nuclear War: Experts Say Putin's Poseidon Nuclear Bomb COULD Kill Millions," March 15, 2023. <https://cerespost.com/russia-nuclear-war-experts-say-putins-poseidon-nuclear-bomb-could-kill-millions/>.
- Cook. "Multiple Russian Submarines Moving in 'Strange Routes,' U.K. Says." *Newsweek*, April 19, 2023. <https://www.newsweek.com/russian-submarines-north-sea-irish-sea-pacific-ocean-ben-wallace-uk-defense-1795357>.
- Costello, Tom, Dan Ded Luce, and Joel Seidman. "Norway Watches as Russian Subs and Aircraft Step up Arctic Patrols." *NBC News*, March 28, 2023. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/norway-russian-submarines-planes-military-ukraine-arctic-rcna76368>.
- Dennett, Kate. "Russia's Submarines Circling Britain's Coastline', Says Ben Wallace." *Mail Online*, May 23, 2021. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9609343/Russias-submarines-circling-Britains-entire-coastline-says-Defence-Secretary-Ben-Wallace.html>.
- Detsch, Robbie Gramer, Jack. "Russia's Stripped Its Western Borders to Feed the Fight in Ukraine." *Foreign Policy* (blog), September 28, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/28/russia-ukraine-war-nato-eastern-flank-military-kaliningrad-baltic-finland/>.
- Dickinson, Emily. "I Started Early – Took My Dog," May 8, 2023. <https://www.marine.ie/sites/default/files/MIFiles/Images/Comms/Emily%20Dickinson.pdf>.
- D-Mitch. "INFOGRAPHICS #17: Russian Navy Submarines (Collection)," May 6, 2023. <https://www.navalanalyses.com/2015/08/infographics-17-russian-navy-submarines.html>.
- Dr Lavoix, Helene. "When Seas and Maps Impact Geostrategy and the Future." *The Red Team Analysis Society*, September 15, 2021. <https://redanalysis.org/2021/09/15/when-seas-and-maps-impact-geostrategy/>.

- Drummer. “You Need to Know About Russia’s Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) | The Lyncean Group of San Diego,” May 21, 2018. <https://lynceans.org/all-posts/you-need-to-know-about-russias-main-directorate-of-deep-sea-research-gugi/>.
- DW. “Scholz: ‘Russia Must Not Win This War’ – DW – 05/19/2022.” dw.com, May 19, 2022. <https://www.dw.com/en/chancellor-olaf-scholz-tells-german-parliament-russia-must-not-win-this-war/a-61845874>.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica. “Alfred Thayer Mahan | Biography, Significance, Books, & Facts | Britannica.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 03 2023. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alfred-Thayer-Mahan>.
- Erdogan\*, Dr Aziz. “Poseidon-A Doomsday Scenario Stands Out | Beyond the Horizon ISSG,” May 7, 2020. <https://behorizon.org/poseidon-a-doomsday-scenario-stands-out/>.
- European Commission. “Statement by the President on Energy.” Text. European Commission - European Commission, September 7, 2022. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech\\_22\\_5389](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_22_5389).
- European Council. “Energy Prices and Security of Supply,” March 31, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/energy-prices-and-security-of-supply/>.
- . “How the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Has Further Aggravated the Global Food Crisis,” May 4, 2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/how-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-has-further-aggravated-the-global-food-crisis/>.
- Freeman, Suzanne. “Are Current Russian Expeditionary Capabilities Capable of a Coup de Main in Sweden?,” September 30, 2021. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-current-russian-expeditionary-capabilities-capable-coup-de-main-sweden>.
- . “Are Current Russian Expeditionary Capabilities Capable of a Coup de Main in Sweden?,” September 30, 2021. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-current-russian-expeditionary-capabilities-capable-coup-de-main-sweden>.
- Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. “Report: Russian Sub Activity Returns to Cold War Levels.” *Washington Post*, October 27, 2021. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/02/04/report-russian-sub-activity-returns-to-cold-war-levels/>.
- Gottesman, Evan. “Putin’s Silent Service: 5 Most Deadly Submarines in Russia’s Navy.” Text. *The National Interest*. The Center for the National Interest, August 20, 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/putins-silent-service-5-most-deadly-submarines-russias-navy-29297>.
- Gramer, Robbie. “This Interactive Map Shows the High Stakes Missile Stand-Off Between NATO and Russia.” *Foreign Policy* (blog), January 12, 2017. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/12/nato-russia-missile-defense-stand-off-deterrence-anti-access-area-denial/>.

- H I Sutton. "H I Sutton - Covert Shores Belgorod," June 29, 2021. <http://www.hisutton.com/Belgorod-Class-Submarine.html>.
- . "H I Sutton - Covert Shores Concentration Of Five Russian Warships In North Sea," May 3, 2023. <http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-Navy-North-Sea-2023-05.html>.
- . "H I Sutton - Covert Shores Evgeny Gorigledzhan," January 27, 2022. <http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-GUGI-Evgeny-Gorigledzhan.html>.
- . "H I Sutton - Covert Shores Losharik," September 22, 2021. <http://www.hisutton.com/Spy%20Sub%20-%20Project%2010831%20Losharik.html>.
- . "H I Sutton - Covert Shores Yantar," October 9, 2016. <http://www.hisutton.com/Yantar.html>.
- Heck, Walker Mills, Timothy. "What Can We Learn about Amphibious Warfare from a Conflict That Has Had Very Little of It? A Lot." Modern War Institute, April 22, 2022. <https://mwi.usma.edu/what-can-we-learn-about-amphibious-warfare-from-a-conflict-that-has-had-very-little-of-it-a-lot/>.
- HISTORY LISTS. "List of 6 British Ships Sunk During the Falklands War - History Lists," May 8, 2023. <https://historylists.org/other/list-of-6-british-ships-sunk-during-the-falklands-war.html>.
- India Today. "Ukraine's 'Russian Warship Go F\*\*\* Yourself' Stamp Fetches \$165,000 in Charity Auction." India Today, April 23, 2022. <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/ukraine-prints-russian-warship-moskva-stamps-1941089-2022-04-23>.
- Jenkins, Brian Michael. "Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The Economic Fallout," March 7, 2023. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-economic-fallout.html>.
- Kadam, Tanmay. "'Crown Jewel' Of Russian Navy, Putin Mulls Permanently Stationing Its Yasen-Class Submarines Near US Shores." Latest Asian, Middle-East, EurAsian, Indian News, March 26, 2023. <https://eurasianimes.com/crown-jewel-of-russian-navy-putin-mulls-permanently-stationing-its-yasen-class-submarines-near-us-shores/>.
- Kjellén, Jonas. "The Russian Baltic Fleet – Organisation and Role within the Armed Forces in 2020," The Russian Baltic Fleet, February 1, 2021.
- Kofman, Michael. "GUGI." Russia Military Analysis, July 3, 2019. <https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/tag/gugi/>.
- LaGrone, Sam. "Ukraine Deploys Anti-Ship Harpoon Missiles to the Edge of Black Sea, MoD Says." *USNI News* (blog), June 10, 2022. <https://news.usni.org/2022/06/10/ukraine-deploys-anti-ship-harpoon-missiles-to-the-edge-of-black-sea-mod-says>.
- MARITIME EXECUTIVE. "Netherlands Accuses Russia of Spying on Offshore Wind Farms." The Maritime Executive. Accessed May 4, 2023. <https://maritime->

executive.com/article/netherlands-accuses-russia-of-spying-on-offshore-wind-farms.

- McMillan, Tim. “With The Belgorod, Russia Bulks Up Its ‘Other,’ Secret Navy.” *The Debrief*, July 28, 2022. <https://thedebrief.org/with-the-belgorod-russia-bulks-up-its-other-secret-navy/>.
- Media, P. A. “UK Military Chief Warns of Russian Threat to Vital Undersea Cables.” *The Guardian*, January 8, 2022, sec. UK news. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jan/08/uk-military-chief-warns-of-russian-threat-to-vital-undersea-cables>.
- Meredith, Sam. “All You Need to Know about the Nord Stream Gas Leaks — and Why Europe Suspects ‘Gross Sabotage.’” *CNBC*, October 11, 2022. <https://www.cnb.com/2022/10/11/nord-stream-gas-leaks-what-happened-and-why-europe-suspects-sabotage.html>.
- Military Today. “Kalibr Naval Cruise Missile Family | Military-Today.Com,” May 8, 2023. <http://www.military-today.com/missiles/kalibr.htm>.
- Military-Today. “Admiral Grigorovich Class Frigate | Military-Today.Com,” April 30, 2023. [http://www.military-today.com/navy/admiral\\_grigorovich\\_class.htm](http://www.military-today.com/navy/admiral_grigorovich_class.htm).
- Ministry of Defence GB [@DefenceHQ]. “Latest Defence Intelligence Update on the Situation in Ukraine - 3 April 2023. Find out More about Defence Intelligence’s Use of Language: [Http://Ow.Ly/2IpN50NyfkW](http://Ow.Ly/2IpN50NyfkW) UA #StandWithUkraine UA [Https://T.Co/1pzOOeIMjg](https://T.Co/1pzOOeIMjg).” Tweet. *Twitter*, April 3, 2023. <https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1642765768453505027>.
- Mongilio, Heather. “UPDATED: Russia Says Damaged Cruiser Moskva Sank Under Tow Headed to Black Sea Homeport.” *USNI News*, April 14, 2022. <https://news.usni.org/2022/04/13/russian-navy-confirms-severe-damage-to-black-sea-cruiser-moskva-crew-abandoned-ship>.
- Morcos, Pierre, and Collin Wall. “Are European Navies Ready for High-Intensity Warfare?” *War on the Rocks*, January 31, 2022. <https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/are-european-navies-ready-for-high-intensity-warfare/>.
- Myers, Nicholas J., and Steve. “Russian Navy Activity in the North Sea » Wavell Room.” *Wavell Room* (blog), August 6, 2020. <https://wavellroom.com/2020/08/06/russian-navy-activity-in-the-north-sea/>.
- National Geographic. “All About the Ocean,” May 8, 2023. <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/all-about-the-ocean>.
- NATO. “Collective Defence and Article 5.” NATO. Accessed May 5, 2023. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm).
- Naval News. “Russian Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov Will Not Be Operational before 2024,” June 9, 2022. <https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2022/june/11818-russian-aircraft-carrier-admiral-kuznetsov-will-not-be-operational-before-2024.html>.

- Navy Lookout. "Has the Russian Submarine Threat Been Diminished by the Ukraine War? | Navy Lookout," April 11, 2023. <https://www.navylookout.com/has-the-russian-submarine-threat-been-diminished-by-the-ukraine-war/>.
- NBC, Associated Press. "Russia Defends North Pole Flag-Planting." NBC News, August 8, 2007. <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna20169307>.
- NDR. "Fit for the future: Commander German Navy wants drone force," May 5, 2023. <https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/schleswig-holstein/Fit-fuer-die-Zukunft-Marinechef-will-Drohnen-truppe-,marine1318.html>.
- Neely, Brian. "The 'Act of Sabotage' Hit Europe's Energy and Stock Markets - Business News," September 28, 2022. <https://biz.crastr.net/the-act-of-sabotage-hit-europes-energy-and-stock-markets/>.
- Newdick, Thomas. "Flotilla Of Russian Landing Ships Has Entered The English Channel." The Drive, January 19, 2022. <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43942/flotilla-of-russian-amphibious-warships-has-entered-the-english-channel>.
- News, V. O. A. "Elite Russian Forces Said to Suffer Losses in Ukraine." VOA, February 26, 2023. <https://www.voanews.com/a/elite-russian-forces-said-to-suffer-losses-in-ukraine-/6979443.html>.
- Nilsen, Thomas. "From This Secret Base, Russian Spy Ships Increase Activity around Global Data Cables." The Independent Barents Observer. Accessed May 5, 2023. <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/node/3381>.
- . "Military Research Ship Returns after Months on Secret Arctic Mission." The Independent Barents Observer, September 30, 2020. <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/09/military-research-ship-returns-after-months-secret-mission-arctic>.
- NOC. "National Oceanography Centre | Making Sense of Changing Seas," May 8, 2023. <https://noc.ac.uk/>.
- Office of Naval Intelligence. *The Russian Navy*. Washington D.C., 2015.
- Parfitt, Tom. "Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed." *The Guardian*, August 2, 2007, sec. World news. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic>.
- Petrenko, Roman. "Medvedev Calls War with Ukraine 'New Patriotic War.'" *Ukrainska Pravda*, January 21, 2023. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/01/21/7385925/>.
- Pfitzenmaier, Marc. "Gotland, The Swedish Island Standing Between Russia And NATO Vulnerability - Worldcrunch," October 18, 2023. <https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/sweden-gotland-russia>.
- Pifer, Steven. "Crimea: Six Years after Illegal Annexation." *Brookings* (blog), March 17, 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/>.



- Pitts, Stephen. "UK's Leading Warship to Stand Guard on Thames during King's Coronation | Royal | News | Express.Co.Uk," May 4, 2023. <https://www.express.co.uk/news/royal/1765952/Warship-guard-Thames-King-s-Coronation>.
- Presse, AFP-Agence France. "100,000 Russian Dead, Wounded In 5 Months In Ukraine: W.House," May 1, 2023. <https://www.barrons.com/news/us-intel-says-100-000-russian-dead-wounded-in-bakhmut-ab0bee4b>.
- Reid, Jenni. "'They Started the War': Russia's Putin Blames West and Ukraine for Provoking Conflict." CNBC, February 21, 2023. <https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/21/russias-putin-blames-west-and-ukraine-for-provoking-conflict.html>.
- Roblin, Sebastien. "Russia Is Building New Subs to Launch Its Terrifying Apocalypse Torpedoes." Popular Mechanics, April 9, 2023. <https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a43501232/russia-building-submarines-to-launch-poseidon-torpedo/>.
- Roper, Tony. "Russian Navy Moves Large Landing Ships to Black Sea as Exercise Deployments Continue." Janes.com. Accessed May 8, 2023. <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russian-navy-moves-large-landing-ships-to-black-sea-as-exercise-deployments-continue>.
- Royal Navy. "Become a Royal Marines Officer in the Royal Navy." Accessed May 8, 2023. <https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/careers/royal-marines/what-can-i-do/royal-marines-commando-officer>.
- . "Your First Year as a Marine | Basic Training & Passing Out." Your first year as a marine, April 28, 2023. <https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/careers/royal-marines/whats-it-like/your-first-year-as-a-marine>.
- Rumer, Eugene. "Putin's War Against Ukraine: The End of The Beginning." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed May 5, 2023. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/17/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-end-of-beginning-pub-89071>.
- . "THE WEST: NO GOOD OPTIONS Russia Has Suffered Multiple Strategic Setbacks in This War. It Has Lost Its Position as Europe's Preeminent Energy Supplier, Some Maintain, for Good. Russian Leverage against Europe Has Diminished Dramatically. Its Reputation as a Re-Emerging Military Power Has Been Damaged. Its Position in the Baltic Was Dealt a Serious Blow When Sweden and Finland Announced Their Plans to Join NATO. Its Anti-Access and Area-Denial (A2/AD) Bubble over Crimea, Once Thought to Be Formidable, Has Been Pierced, Reducing It to yet Another Potemkin Village. NATO Has Been Re-Energized," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed May 5, 2023. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/17/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-end-of-beginning-pub-89071>.
- Russian Amphibious Assault Beach Landing*, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xDt0qZ6bbxI>.

- Savage, Susannah. "Protests over Food and Fuel Surged in 2022 — the Biggest Were in Europe." *POLITICO* (blog), January 17, 2023. <https://www.politico.eu/article/energy-crisis-food-and-fuel-protests-surged-in-2022-the-biggest-were-in-europe/>.
- Scholz, Olaf. "Olaf Scholz Government Statement on Russian Invasion of Ukraine and New Armament Measures (English and German Texts-Audio-Video)," February 27, 2023. <https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/olafscholzstatementtoonukraineandgermanarmament.htm>.
- Shevchenko, Vitaly. "'Little Green Men' or 'Russian Invaders'?" *BBC News*, March 11, 2014, sec. Europe. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154>.
- . "Russian Army Launches Campaign Encouraging Men to Join." *BBC News*, April 21, 2023, sec. Europe. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65351271>.
- Sprance, William R. "THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: THE EMERGENCE OF JAPANESE IMPERIAL POWER" 6, no. 3 (2004).
- Starr, Michael. "Russia Navy Concerned Vital Supply Ships Vulnerable to Ukraine Attack -U." *The Jerusalem Post* | JPost.com, November 22, 2022. <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-723065>.
- Statista. "Length of Russia's borders with neighboring countries." Statista, April 26, 2023. <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1306576/umfrage/laenge-der-grenzen-von-russland/>.
- Sub Hunt: NATO on Patrol for Russian Subs*, 2023. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfPbZLeuxgk>.
- Sutton, H. I. "Sudden Surge In Russian Navy Ships And Submarines In Black Sea." *Naval News* (blog), January 11, 2023. <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/sudden-surge-in-russian-navy-ships-and-submarines-in-black-sea/>.
- TASS. "Belgorod Submarine Completes Throw Tests of Poseidon Torpedo Model — Source." TASS. Accessed March 26, 2023. <https://tass.com/defense/1560311>.
- THE ECONOMIST. "Europe Scrambles to Protect Citizens from Sky-High Energy Prices." *The Economist*. Accessed May 3, 2023. [https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/09/08/europe-scrambles-to-protect-citizens-from-sky-high-energy-prices?utm\\_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm\\_source=google&ppccampaignID=18798097116&ppcadID=&utm\\_campaign=a.22brand\\_pmax&utm\\_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7cPM67fa\\_gIVd8fjBx0ArQHmEAMYASAAEgJR9PD\\_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds](https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/09/08/europe-scrambles-to-protect-citizens-from-sky-high-energy-prices?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=18798097116&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI7cPM67fa_gIVd8fjBx0ArQHmEAMYASAAEgJR9PD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds).
- Times, The Moscow. "In Photos: Russian Military Ramps Up Army Recruitment Drive." *The Moscow Times*, April 12, 2023. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/04/12/in-photos-russian-military-ramps-up-army-recruitment-drive-a80794>.

- . “Russian Soldiers Dug Trenches in Chernobyl Zone’s Radioactive Soil – Ukrainian Official.” *The Moscow Times*, April 7, 2022. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/04/07/russian-soldiers-dug-trenches-in-chernobyl-zones-radioactive-soil-ukrainian-official-a77255>.
- Traynor, Ian. “Putin Hits at US for Triggering Arms Race.” *The Observer*, February 11, 2007, sec. World news. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/11/usa.russia>.
- UN Security Council. “Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use Higher Than at Any Time Since Cold War, Disarmament Affairs Chief Warns Security Council | UN Press,” March 31, 2023. <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15250.doc.htm>.
- US Department of Defense. “Contact Group Meeting Signals Long-Term Support for Ukraine.” U.S. Department of Defense, September 7, 2022. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3151644/contact-group-meeting-signals-long-term-support-for-ukraine/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defense.gov%2FNews%2FNews-Stories%2FArticle%2FArticle%2F3151644%2Fcontact-group-meeting-signals-long-term-support-for-ukraine%2F>.
- US Northern Command. “Strategy "To Compete Globally, We Must Be Strong at Home.,"” March 1, 2021. <https://www.northcom.mil/Strategy/>.
- Vicente, Aderito. “Why Europe Slept? The Failure to Prevent the War in Ukraine,” May 4, 2022. <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/why-europe-slept-the-failure-to-prevent-the-war-in-ukraine/>.
- Voitenko, Anna. “In Pictures: Russian Missile Hits Ukrainian Mall | Reuters.Com.” *Reuters*. Accessed May 8, 2023. <https://www.reuters.com/news/picture/in-pictures-russian-missile-hits-ukraini-idUSRTS921PO>.
- Waterfield, Bruno, and Oliver Moody. “The Times: Nord Stream: Russia Has Mined European Undersea Pipelines and Cables, Nato Fears,” May 3, 2023. <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/nord-stream-pipeline-report-russia-putin-ships-site-explosion-3xx50vgbh>.
- Watling, Tom. “Russia Lost ‘50% of Its Airborne Forces’ in First Six Months of War.” *Express.co.uk*, February 1, 2023. <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1729319/Russia-war-in-Ukraine-airborne-forces-offensive-VDV>.
- Wertsch, James. “Russia’s Narrative of a Great Patriotic War in Ukraine Must Be Buried.” *South China Morning Post*, March 4, 2023. <https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3212065/russias-narrative-great-patriotic-war-ukraine-must-be-buried>.
- Woody, Christopher. “Russia’s Northern Neighbors, Long Wary of What Moscow Is up to, Are Increasing Military Readiness amid Tension over Ukraine.” *Business Insider*. Accessed April 26, 2023. <https://www.businessinsider.com/russias-nordic-neighbors-increase-military-readiness-amid-ukraine-tension-2022-2>.

