



A CASE STUDY OF MINUSMA AND THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS

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JCSP 49

Exercise Solo Flight

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UNDERSTANDING GERMANY'S COMMITMENT TO GLOBAL PEACE: A CASE STUDY OF MINUSMA AND THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS

INTRODUCTION

Since 2013, with its participation in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Germany returned to contributing a sizeable contingent to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).¹ Previously, Berlin had withdrawn from this field for nearly two decades and largely restricted its contributions to symbolic ones. It is premature to determine if this renewed contribution represents a paradigm shift in Germany's security policy. Notably, this reversal is consistent with the priorities outlined in the 2016 White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, which identifies UN support for peacekeeping as a central task within Germany's security policy.²

The White Paper 2016 and other security policy documents lack specificity in outlining the foreign policy objectives of Germany, particularly in regards to its participation in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations. This is surprising given that other security policy documents provide detailed information on the objectives and extent of Germany's military involvement in the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)^{3,4} and cooperation within the framework of NATO.⁵

In principle, a variety of factors can induce states to provide contingents for UN missions.⁶ Such participation can serve a number of purposes including a military expression of political solidarity with allies; a demonstration of commitment to the international order and multilateral action; a demonstration of a state's ability to act in international politics; and an improvement of the security situation in a strategically significant region, mitigating the effects of security policy developments in this region on the state sending peacekeepers.⁷ Oftentimes, however, these objectives cannot be pursued simultaneously or with equal effort; they are frequently constrained by existing political guiding principles. Without clarity about the goals and how they should be prioritised,

¹ Deutscher Bundestag, 'Antrag Der Bundesregierung' (Berlin, 5 June 2013).

² German Federal Government, 'Weissbuch 2016' (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2016).

³ Federal Foreign Office Germany, 'Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)', German Federal Foreign Office, accessed 7 March 2023, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europe/gsvp-start/209178>.

⁴ Dick Zandee, Adaja Stoetman, and Bob Deen, 'The EU's Strategic Compass for Security and Defence', *Policy File* (Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2021), <https://search.proquest.com/docview/2552826270>.

⁵ Tobias Bunde, 'Defending European Integration by (Symbolically) Integrating European Defence? Germany and Its Ambivalent Role in European Security and Defence Policy', *Journal of European Integration* 43, no. 2 (2021): 243–59.

⁶ Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, 'Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions', in *Providing Peacekeepers*, ed. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (Oxford University Press, 2013), 416–36.

⁷ Alexander Bellamy and Paul D Williams, 'Explaining the National Politics of Peacekeeping Contributions', 2013.

there is a void that makes it hard for the security policy debate to give guidance on how to measure the success of peace operations.⁸

This paper will demonstrate that the shortcomings in the German government's approach to the MINUSMA mission are illustrative of the lack of strategic orientation in Germany's foreign policy regarding UN missions.

To meet this aim, this essay reviews general motives for contributions to UN Missions, as well as the history of Germany's contributions to UN peacekeeping missions and explains Germany's motivations and limitations as a first step. The second section of the paper reconstructs and evaluates the motivations behind the Federal Republic's turn to peacekeeping since 2013 through Germany's participation in MINUSMA and the policy of 'Zeitenwende'⁹. In this section mandate debates in the Bundestag from 2013 to 2022 and publicly accessible government documents serve as the primary source material. Finally, potential paths for this aspect of German UN policy are examined.

THE MOTIVES TO ENGAGEMENT IN UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS

In 1963 in one of the first comparative case studies of UN peacekeeping operations, Herbert Nicholas, Rhodes Professor of American History and Institutions at the University of Oxford, described UN operations and member states' contributions as a series of happy accidents.¹⁰

Over the past years, policy- and theory-oriented scholars have become interested in the country's troop deployment motivations and rationales. Earlier studies in the 1990, examined motives like 'idealism' and 'self-interest' or 'realism'.¹¹ At that time motives like 'liberal institutionalism' and 'humanitarianism and peacekeeping' were found to contrast with power-politics-driven use of UN peacekeeping for national interest.¹² Idealist nations sent troops or 'cosmopolitan militaries'¹³ to keep the peace or establish, preserve, or expand a state's own position and powerbase in the world.¹⁴ Academics believed a nation could pursue prestige and peace. Public goods theory and military-bureaucratic approaches emphasised idealist/liberal and realist self-interest can influence contributions. Other Scholars said that countries send troops to UN PKO in order to

⁸ Nicholas Sambanis, 'Short-and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations', *The World Bank Economic Review* 22, no. 1 (2008): 9–32.

⁹ "Zeitenwende" can be translated as "turning point". An analysis of this concept comes later in this essay.

¹⁰ Herbert Nicholas, 'UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe: The Lessons of Suez and Congo', *International Organization* 17, no. 2 (1963): 320–37.

¹¹ Laura Neack, 'UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?', *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 2 (1995): 181–96.

¹² Michael Pugh, 'Humanitarianism and Peacekeeping', *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations* 10, no. 3 (1996): 205–24.

¹³ Lorraine M Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, *Forces for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-First Century* (Manchester University Press, 2004).

¹⁴ Neack, 'UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?', 188.

improve their socially constructed national interest, their status within the UN.¹⁵ They also said that countries send troops to UN PKO to either work with other powers or to stop other regional powers from getting too much power.¹⁶

Over the past ten years, studies which discuss rationales have developed. Philip Cunliffe, Associate Professor of International Relations at University College London, criticised Western and UN Security Council global south peacekeeping intended to maintain the status quo.¹⁷ He also claimed that peacekeeping can be used to enhance a state's standing when vying for one of the rotating seats on the Security Council, a strategy which has been common among European nations.¹⁸ Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams¹⁹ argued that five rationales—political, economic, security, institutional, and normative—provide a systematic and comprehensive framework for studying the politics, challenges, and future of UN peacekeeping contributions.²⁰ The specific circumstances and characteristics of an operation and the complex interaction of a wide range of internal motivations and external factors at the international, organisational, inter-organizational, national, bureaucratic, and public opinion levels remain important. Moreover, it was shown member states handle bilateral and regional cooperation requests differently.²¹ Thus, domestic and external factors determine outcomes.

These factors alone cannot explain the country's decision-making rationales but can be helpful in understanding Germany's motives.

GERMANY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

As in many other areas of foreign policy, the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany marked a turning point for the question of Germany's participation in UN peacekeeping.²² As a result of the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement in regard to Germany's reunification, the four-power responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole ended, and Germany's internal and external sovereignty was fully restored.²³ The allies insisted that Germany assume greater responsibilities and

¹⁵ Maria do Ceu Pinto, 'A Small State's Search for Relevance: Peace Missions as Foreign Policy', *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 3 (2014): 390–405.

¹⁶ Arturo C Sotomayor Velazquez, 'Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations', *Security Studies* 19, no. 1 (2010): 160–95.

¹⁷ Philip Cunliffe, *Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South* (CH Hurst & Co., 2013).

¹⁸ Cunliffe.

¹⁹ Alex J. Bellamy is Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at The University of Queensland, Australia and Paul D. Williams is a professor of International Affairs and Associate Director of the M.A. Security Policy Studies program

²⁰ Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams, *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (OUP Oxford, 2013).

²¹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, 'Denmark and UN Peacekeeping: Glorious Past, Dim Future', *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 5 (19 October 2016), 755.

²² Joachim A Koops, 'Germany and United Nations Peacekeeping: The Cautiously Evolving Contributor', *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 5 (2016): 652–80.

²³ Four Powers, 'Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany', 12 September 1990.

burdens in international politics beyond alliance and national defence.²⁴ Starting in 1989, the German government had begun making small Bundeswehr contingents available to the United Nations for several missions, including the international transitional administrations in Namibia in 1989/1990 (UNTAG) and in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992/1993.²⁵ In quantitative terms, the German contingents were always manageable. In qualitative terms, too, prudence prevailed: medical care and the performance of police duties dominated German activity.²⁶ Thus, these early UN missions, with their humanitarian and risk-averse orientation, demonstrated a narrow conception of Bundeswehr missions.²⁷

The graph below (Figure 1) shows Germany's participation in UN PKOs since 1993. Germany's contributions to UN Operation in Somalia II in 1993, UN Interim Force in Lebanon in 2006-2007, and MINUSMA since 2016 are three peaks. Since 2021 Germany is has commanded the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).²⁸




Figure 1: Contribution by month, from 1993 to 2023 (Feb)

Source: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>

²⁴ Franz-Josef Meiers, 'A Change of Course? German Foreign and Security Policy after Unification', *German Politics* 11, no. 3 (2002): 195–216.

²⁵ Thierry Tardy, 'The European Union and UN Peace Operations: What Global–Regional Peace and Security Partnership?', *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order*, 2019, 231–51.

²⁶ Dalatou Mamane, 'Niger Says Germany Can Build Military Logistics Base There', *The Washington Times*, 10 October 2016.

²⁷ Franz-Josef Meiers, 'Germany: The Reluctant Power', *Survival* 37, no. 3 (1995): 82–103.

²⁸ 'UNIFIL's Maritime Task Force Command Passes to Germany', UNIFIL, 15 January 2021, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil%E2%80%99s-maritime-task-force-command-passes-germany>.

The robust phase

The second phase of Germany's peacekeeping policy began with a policy shift in 1993 with the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia. First, the Bundeswehr deployed for the first time a sizeable contingent of soldiers to an UN-led operation.²⁹ This was a departure from the practise of earlier participations, which consisted of so-called 'token-contributions'.³⁰

At the same time, the nature of the missions changed. After the end of the Somali civil war, the objective of the follow-on UN mission became to monitor the ceasefire between the warring parties and coordinate humanitarian aid for the Somali civilian population.³¹ Even though the German support unit consisted only of a reinforced supply and transport battalion³², the security situation in the country and the mandate of the Security Council, which explicitly referenced Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter with its coercive military measures³³, left no room for doubt that this was not a conventional humanitarian effort. The same held true for Germany's participation in UN operations in the Balkans, particularly in United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia/Bosnia/Herzegovina and in United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization (UNCRO) in Croatia. In these instances, the Bundeswehr provided sizeable contingents of 1700 soldiers and operated in an environment that was not completely at peace.^{34,35} All these contingents served distinct purposes: they strengthened the multilateral crisis management of the United Nations, met the increased expectations of Western allies for greater security policy burden sharing, and laid the groundwork for the normalisation of Germany's security policy.

Turning away from UN missions

Two factors then led to Germany's withdrawal from active participation in UN peacekeeping after 1994. First, Germany, like other Western allies, was dissatisfied with the limited military and political impact of United Nations operations.³⁶ Second, Germany preferred the alternative international crisis management forums that had emerged during the 1990s, namely NATO (including KFOR) and the EU (including EUFOR Althea and

²⁹ Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 48.

³⁰ Katharina P. Coleman, 'Token Troop Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', *Providing Peacekeepers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Coleman defines 'token contributions' as symbolic troop deployments intended to demonstrate the country's political commitment to a crisis zone, but without necessarily being militarily effective.

³¹ United Nations, 'UN Security Council Resolution 814', 26 March 1993.

³² 'The Bundeswehr as an Army on Operations', accessed 8 March 2023, <https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/about-bundeswehr/history/army-on-operations>.

³³ United Nations, 'UN Security Council Resolution 814'.

³⁴ Meiers, 'Germany: The Reluctant Power'.

³⁵ 'Übersicht: Die UN-Einsätze der Bundeswehr', accessed 9 April 2023, <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/aktuelles/bundeswehr-un-einsaetze-uebersicht>.

³⁶ Muggi Tuvdendarjaa, 'Challenges of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', *Security Nexus* 23–2022 (7 October 2022).

EUFOR RD Congo).³⁷ Thus, the maritime UNIFIL II mission (since 2006) remains the only substantial example of German participation in UN peacekeeping for many years until the PKO in Mali in 2013.³⁸

With the German contribution to the MINUSMA in Mali, a paradigm shift appears to have occurred.³⁹ Since July 2013, the Bundeswehr has participated in this multidimensional mission, which has two primary objectives: assisting the Malian government in implementing the peace agreement with the separatist Tuareg rebels in northern Mali, protecting the civilian population and re-establishing state authority in the country's centre. In addition, MINUSMA is tasked with supporting confidence-building measures, monitoring the respect of human rights, and ensuring humanitarian aid.⁴⁰ In accordance with the mandate of the German Bundestag, up to 1100 Bundeswehr soldiers may be stationed in Mali or the surrounding region as part of the over 12,000-strong UN contingent. As of November 2022, with 609 soldiers deployed, this mandate is by no means exhausted.⁴¹

³⁷ Koops, 'Germany and United Nations Peacekeeping: The Cautiously Evolving Contributor'.

³⁸ Federal Foreign Office Germany, 'UN Peace Missions and Germany's Engagement', German Federal Foreign Office, accessed 19 March 2023, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/internationale-organisationen/vereintenationen/germanys-engagement-un-peace-missions/229116>.

³⁹ Liana Fix and Steven Keil, 'Berlin's Foreign Policy Dilemma: A Paradigm Shift in Volatile Times', *The New York Times*, 2016, 11.

⁴⁰ United Nations, 'Resolution 2100 (2013) /: Adopted by the Security Council at Its 6952nd Meeting, on 25 April 2013', 25 April 2013.

⁴¹ United Nations, 'Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Country, Mission, and Personnel Type', n.d., https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/03_country_and_mission_56_november_2022.pdf.

GERMANY'S MOTIVES FOR CONTRIBUTING TO UN MISSION

As previously stated, Germany has been a large donor to UN missions since 1993. Promoting international peace and security, furthering its own interests, meeting commitments as a UN member, and projecting itself as a responsible global actor have all been and continue to be motivations. Germany contributes financial help and expertise to UN missions in addition to personnel and logistical support.

This section investigates the reasons behind Germany's participation in PKOs, beginning with an examination of the government's broad motivations. The 'migration and terrorism' motivation for MINUSMA in Mali is briefly acknowledged but dismissed as insufficient to explain Germany's geopolitical drive towards a larger UN deployment.

The paper then delves into the rationales advanced during political debates in Germany's Bundestag and debated at the 2015 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping in New York and the 2016 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London. The Munich Consensus, reached at the 2014 Munich Security Conference, is presented as one basis for Germany's participation in MINUSMA, as is the concept of 'Zeitwende,' emphasising the importance of responding to shifts in global security issues and adapting to new threats and hazards.

Overall, Germany's participation in UN missions reflects the country's commitment to UN values and determination to actively impact global affairs.

The Munich Consensus and the 'Zeitenwende'

As stated by Dr. Tobias Bunde⁴² et al one reason for Germany joining MINUSMA can be explained by the 'Munich Consensus'.⁴³ At the 2014 Munich Security Conference, Federal President Joachim Gauck,⁴⁴ Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier,⁴⁵ and Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen⁴⁶ urged Germany to play a larger role in international politics in light of the changing security environment. Additionally, UN peacekeeping requirements discussed at the 2015 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping in New York and the 2016 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London gave Germany the opportunity to increase participation in PKO.⁴⁷

This motive will not be considered further, as it is insufficient to explain Germany's strategic orientation towards a greater UN presence in relation to MINUSMA. First, the argument does not support participation in a particular mission. Thus, one could conceive of a compensation deal in which German participation in MINUSMA would be terminated and replaced by participation in another UN peacekeeping mission. Second, demonstrating a willingness to assume greater responsibility does not necessarily lead to a long-term involvement in UN PKOs. Germany could demonstrate this willingness by assuming greater military responsibilities within the EU or NATO.

⁴² Dr. Tobias Bunde is Director of Research & Policy of the Munich Security Conference and Postdoctoral Researcher am Centre for International Security of the Hertie School in Berlin.

Seven years after the Munich Security Conference in 2014 after Russia's annexation of Crimea, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Social Democratic Party, SPD) again took up the aspect of responsibility and emphasised it in his speech on the 'Zeitenwende' in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.⁴⁸ The term 'Zeitenwende' refers to a fundamental shift in global power dynamics as well as a realignment of international relations. These changes may have a variety of effects on Germany's motivation to participate in UN missions. Changes in global power structures are one of these factors, motivating Germany to focus more on cooperation with other European countries in order to ensure a stronger European presence in international affairs. Growing global security challenges, such as the Ukrainian conflict, may encourage Germany to participate more in UN missions to help stabilise the situation and provide humanitarian aid.

Germany's participation in MINUSMA and other UN missions demonstrates its commitment to promoting peace and stability in conflict-affected areas. In this context, the concept of 'Zeitenwende' is also relevant, as it recognises the importance of responding to fundamental shifts in global security challenges, as well as the need for nations to adapt to new threats and risks.

Nevertheless, none of the speeches on the 'Zeitenwende' explicitly state how Germany plans to participate in UN missions. It is limited to vague statements about Germany shouldering more responsibility and strengthening Europe. As a result, this issue will not be pursued further.

The Security Council seat

In 2016, the Federal Republic applied for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for 2019-2020. Germany had to commit to significantly expanding and restructuring its contributions to UN peace operations on three levels – political, strategic, and operational – in order to have a realistic chance of winning the seat. This understanding guided the Foreign Office when it highlighted peacekeeping as

⁴³ Tobias Bunde et al., 'Zeitenwende | Wendezeiten: Sonderausgabe des MSR zur deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik', 2020, <https://securityconference.org/publikationen/msr-special-editions/germany-2020/>.

⁴⁴ Joachim Gauck, 'Speech: Speech to Open 50th Munich Security Conference' (Munich, 31 January 2014).

⁴⁵ Frank Walter Steinmeier, 'Speech by Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier at the 50th Munich Security Conference' (Munich, 1 February 2014).

⁴⁶ Ursula von der Leyen, 'Speech by the Federal Minister of Defense, Dr. Ursula von Der Leyen, on the Occasion of the 50th Munich Security Conference' (Munich, 31 January 2014).

⁴⁷ Markus Kaim and Lena Strauß, 'Mehr Deutsche Blauhelme: Vier Gründe Für Ein Stärkeres Engagement Der Bundesrepublik Im VN-Peacekeeping', 2017.

⁴⁸ This term referred to a number of documents published by the Federal Government: German Federal Government, 'Regierungserklärung in der Sondersitzung zum Krieg gegen die Ukraine vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am in Berlin' (Berlin, 27 February 2022). German Federal Government, 'Europa-Rede an Der Karls-Universität' (Prag, 29 August 2022). German Federal Government, 'Rede Anlässlich Der 77. General_debatte Der Generalversammlung Der Vereinten Nationen' (New York, 20 September 2022).

one of four priorities in Germany's campaign.⁴⁹ The German contribution to MINUSMA strengthened the United Nations in the field of peace missions both politically and militarily. Thus, it served to emphasise Germany's ongoing commitment in this area. This strategy was done not out of altruism, but in the hope that Germany would be able to exert a greater influence on UN decisions. In addition, Germany contributed significantly to the financing of peace missions as Figure 2 shows.




Figure 2: Contributions to the United Nations regular* budget in percent

Source: Federal Foreign Office Germany, 'Background Information: Contributions to the United Nations Budget', German Federal Foreign Office, accessed 18 April 2023, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussepolitik/internationale-organisationen/vereintenationen/-/281336>.

So far as these two policy fields can be clearly distinguished, Germany's participation in MINUSMA should be viewed primarily as a building block of German United Nations policy and less as an indication of security policy priorities.

One's "own" security - migration and terrorism

In the debate in the German Bundestag, additional reasons were cited to justify Germany's participation in MINUSMA. The deployment would not only improve the security situation in the Sahel, but it would also serve Germany's interests by mitigating two security threats directly affecting Germany and Europe: Migration and Terrorism.⁵⁰ And yet, even a cursory examination of the relevant indices casts doubt on the severity of the threat posed by terrorist groups from Mali to Germany and Europe. The Global

⁴⁹ Federal Foreign Office Germany, 'Deutschland - Kandidat Für Den Sicherheitsrat Der Vereinten Nationen 2019-2020', n.d.

⁵⁰ German Parliament, 'Fortsetzung Der Beteiligung Bewaffneter Deutscher Streitkräfte an Der Multidimensionalen Integrierten Stabilisierungsmission Der Vereinten Nationen in Mali (MINUSMA)' (Berlin, 21 April 2021).

Terrorism Index 2020, for instance, does not include Mali among the ten nations most affected by terrorist attacks globally.⁵¹

Similarly, closer examination of the migration argument reveals its fallacy; it is completely indisputable that the insecure situation in Mali compels the population to seek protection; however, the majority of resulting migration occurs within Mali or to neighbouring countries in the region as shown in Figure 3.⁵² Future migration waves from Africa cannot be predicted, but Mali currently plays a secondary role in migration flows to Germany and the European Union.




Figure 3 Malian emigrants' destinations

Source: <https://www.casademali.org/en/mali/malian-diaspora/>

European solidarity

Germany did not actively seek military involvement in Mali, but instead responded to the wishes of a key ally, France. In contrast to the Afghanistan engagement, which was initiated by the United States, or more specifically Germany's considerations of transatlantic solidarity following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks⁵³, in 2013 France urged Germany to deploy alongside France in Mali. The French government, under the leadership of President Francois Hollande, made its position clear: despite the

⁵¹ Institute for Economics and Peace, 'Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism - World | ReliefWeb', 8 June 2021.

⁵² Integral Human Development, 'Mali', accessed 21 March 2023, <https://migrants-refugees.va/country-profile/mali/>.

⁵³ N Kohtamaki, 'Germany's Involvement in Afghanistan', URL: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/103497/A4-2009.Pdf>, 2009.

fact that France had, out of necessity, taken the lead in this operation, it expected other European nations to join.⁵⁴ On the one hand, these nations should militarily support Paris and lend political legitimacy to the French approach, while on the other, they should demonstrate Europe's expanded security role through their participation.⁵⁵ Smaller EU member states' support was also appreciated, but only Germany's participation promised the desired double political signal. This motivation of Germany's alliance solidarity and the demonstration of a European footprint became the driving forces behind Germany's policy towards MINUSMA.⁵⁶

The second security policy aspect of Germany's Mali policy, its participation in the EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali), emphasises the desire of a bigger European footprint. Since 2013, this EU mission has been training and advising Malian armed forces in their fight against Islamist militias in the region. The Bundestag extended the German mission of 600 soldiers until May 31, 2022.

The mandates of the German Bundestag do not reflect this dual goal of alliance solidarity and display of a strong European footprint. Rather, they emphasise only the French intervention and how important it is for Germany to stand with Paris, but say nothing of the European footprint:

Rainer Stinner (Free Democratic Party, FDP): The French have acted in an acute emergency situation. ... The question now is: What contribution can we make to this? ... What is at stake here is that Germany, the large, important European country, in cooperation with important European partners, should. We are convinced that the French-led mission is contributing to stability in a region that is important for us.

Kerstin Müller (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen): We think it is right to support this French change of course away from a French backyard policy in general. It is in our foreign and security policy interest and also in the interest of the EU to Europeanise Africa policy in general.

⁵⁴ Denis M Tull, 'French - German Cooperation in the Sahel: Consequences of and Perspectives for Germany's Turn to Africa', *Strategic Studies* 17, no. 2 (2016): 60–69.

⁵⁵ Wolfram Lacher, 'Unser Schwieriger Partner: Deutschland Und Frankreichs Erfolglloses Engagement in Libyen Und Mali', 2021, 26-27.

⁵⁶ Carolin Hilpert, *Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security Policy: Germany and the Bundeswehr's Deployment to Afghanistan* (Springer, 2014), 182.

Rolf Mützenich (Social Democratic Party, SPD): At the beginning of a mandate, we must always ask ourselves the question: Is such a mandate sufficient for German interests? - Of course, we still have a German foreign policy. But I have learned that it is actually about more than that, it is about Germany's international responsibility, so to speak. If we think we can't contribute to the situation, we at least support our partners.⁵⁷

Since 2013, alliance solidarity in political justifications for Germany's MINUSMA participation has decreased but never disappeared.

Since President Emmanuel Macron took office in May 2017, the motive of alliance solidarity has become more prevalent in German government argumentation, as the French government has been more aggressive in presenting its expectations of Berlin, not least because France's Mali policy has produced few successes.⁵⁸ In this context, French government representatives frequently cite then Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer's speech at the Bundeswehr University in Munich on 7 November 2019, in which she called for a strengthening of the Franco-German partnership and more engagement by Germany in the world in order to protect western values and interests.⁵⁹ If the Bundeswehr was required for missions abroad, it would remain involved. Berlin would not always be able to refuse. She already had a specific deployment site in mind at the time: the Sahel.⁶⁰

Former German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas had also emphasised the importance of Franco-German relations for Germany's Sahel policy, as well as their integration into the EU's external relations, when speaking to the UN Security Council on June 11, 2020:

France has begun the process of forming an inter-national coalition for the Sahel. This includes a security and stability partnership in the Sahel launched by Germany and France, in which the European Union will play a key role. ... To me, this is a classic example of France and Germany cooperating for peace and security.⁶¹

⁵⁷ German Federal Government, 'Deutscher Bundestag - Breite Zustimmung für Mali-Einsatz der Bundeswehr', Deutscher Bundestag, accessed 4 April 2023, Translation by the author. https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2013/43167387_kw09_de_mali-211134.

⁵⁸ Benedikt Erforth and Denis M. Tull, 'The failure of French Sahel policy: an opportunity for European cooperation?', Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), accessed 20 March 2023, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/mta-spotlight-13-the-failure-of-french-sahel-policy>.

⁵⁹ Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, 'Rede der Ministerin' (University of the Bundeswehr Munich, 7 November 2019), <https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/rede-der-ministerin-an-der-universitaet-der-bundeswehr-muenchen-146670>.

⁶⁰ Kramp-Karrenbauer.

⁶¹ Heiko Maas, '»Rede von Außenminister Heiko Maas Im VN-Sicherheitsrat Zur VN-Mission MINUSMA«' (UN Security Council, 11 June 2020), <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/news-room/maas-sicherheitsrat-minusma/2352018>.

The fact that Germany's engagement in West Africa is primarily motivated by French expectations has two dimensions: The question is not only whether Germany will participate in MINUSMA (and also EUTM Mali) at all, but also 'how' will it participate. Thus, the respective desires of allies, particularly France, for Mali and the Sahel define the framework of Germany's policy in this region.

The declarations of principle for Franco-German Sahel cooperation cannot hide how far apart in practise Paris and Berlin are in developing this cooperation. Paris values Germany's participation in MINUSMA, but French reservations permeate bilateral Sahel policy; these reservations concern engagement scope and contingent rules of engagement. For instance, the idea that Bundeswehr soldiers should be exposed to minimal risks to their own security has gained traction.⁶² The contingents' safety has been the top priority, so they have been kept away from the locals. By delaying its commitment during the 2017-2021 legislative period, the German government reinforced this perception.

At the end of 2019, the German government only pledged political support for the Takuba Task Force, a coalition of eleven European states—Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, and Sweden—that would use special forces to fight Jihadists in Mali.⁶³ However, this recurring misalignment of aims between France and Germany is more fundamental and reflects different political and military premises, such as the use and extent of military force.⁶⁴

This lack of alignment calls Germany's support for France and Germany's alliance solidarity into question. The French military mission is losing traction: Despite goals set in 2013 to combat Islamist terrorism and stabilise the region, political instability and insecurity have grown. The French operation Barkhane ended in Mali in June 2021. In August 2022, the 5,100 French soldiers withdraw from Mali, and President Macron stated the French military would seek a different format for its presence.⁶⁵ If the solidarity argument is correct, the French withdrawal from Mali should certainly have contributed to the decision by the Bundestag on Germany's withdrawal from MINUSMA.⁶⁶ The adage 'in together, out together' applies to this and other foreign missions.⁶⁷

⁶² Rainer L Glatz et al., 'Missions in a Changing World. The Bundeswehr and Its Operations Abroad', 2018.

⁶³ Nicole Koenig and Yann Wernert, 'Can France and Germany Relaunch Europe's Security Agenda?' (Jacques Delors Centre, 12 April 2021).

⁶⁴ Denis M Tull, 'Deutsches Und Internationales Krisenmanagement Im Sahel: Warum Sich Die Diskussion Über Die Sahelpolitik Im Kreis Dreht' (SWP-Aktuell, 2020),2.

⁶⁵ Elise Vincent, 'Before French Soldiers Leave Mali, Paris Seeks to Redefine Its Strategy in Africa', *Le Monde*, 14 July 2022.

⁶⁶ Friedrich Merz and Alexander Dobrindt, 'Antrag Der Fraktion Der CDU/CSU Den MINUSMA-Einsatz Der Bundeswehr Rasch Aber Geordnet In Diesem Jahr Beenden – Unser Zukünftiges Engagement Im Sahel Mit Einer Gesamtstrategie Auf Eine Solide Und Tragfähige Grundlage Stellen', Antrag der Fraktion der CDU/CSU (Berlin, 7 February 2023).

⁶⁷ Lorenz Hemicke, 'Mali-Einsatz Vor Prüfung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 February 2022.

From the foregoing, several observations can be made. First, this alliance solidarity argument appears to assume that the presence of the Bundeswehr (MINUSMA and EUTM) in Mali shows Germany's solidarity with Paris, despite existing legal and operational constraints and French demands for a more robust engagement. As a result, Germany's reputation as a trustworthy partner among its allies and in the context of international crisis management, grows. In exchange for this presence, Germany can expect concessions in other areas of policy.

However, the longer the mission lasts, the less likely it is that Germany's participation in MINUSMA will achieve its stated goal of demonstrating effective solidarity with France. This concern undoubtedly guided Germany's action, particularly at the outset, and it would be unfair to accuse those involved in 2013 of not believing in the efficacy of this assistance when it was first authorised. The problem is that the French leadership views solidarity as participation in military action in the French sense rather than as political support declarations.⁶⁸ While the German Armed Forces are involved in a more traditional United Nations peacekeeping operation in Mali, the French military operation is focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency outside of this multilateral framework.⁶⁹

This lack of agreement between France and Germany prevents Germany's Mali engagement from becoming political capital in Paris, which would benefit Germany's interests elsewhere. In sum, Germany's policy risks accomplishing the opposite of what it set out to do, namely, establishing in Paris the impression that Berlin can be trusted.

The security of the "others" - The motive of regional security

While alliance solidarity dominated the initial mandate for the German Armed Forces' mission in Mali in 2013⁷⁰, the security situation in Mali and the Sahel region did not come to the forefront until later, as evidenced by debates on the mandate in the German Bundestag.⁷¹ Occasionally, the relevant contributions in the Bundestag lack specific comments on the tense security situation in the region. In contrast, the vast majority of speakers associate Germany's participation in MINUSMA with Germany's Africa policy and situate the deployment of the Bundeswehr contingent within the context of a more civilian, development-based engagement. MINUSMA's expansive mandate facilitates this perspective.

⁶⁸ Erforth and Tull, 'The failure of French Sahel policy'.

⁶⁹ Jordi Bernal Fabra, 'Analysis of the United Nations Peace Operation in Mali: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in MINUSMA', *Revista Análisis Jurídico-Político* 4, no. 8 (2022): 17–50.

⁷⁰ United Nations, 'Resolution 2100 (2013) /'.

⁷¹ Jan Eisel, 'Deutscher Bundestag - Fraktionen uneins über Bundeswehreinsätze in Mali', Deutscher Bundestag, accessed 21 March 2023, <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2022/kw07-de-aktuelle-stunde-bundeswehr-mali-881488>.

The debates in the Bundestag also demonstrate that those politicians who support the mandate are well aware of the limited achievement. Since at least 2018, MINUSMA supporters have repeatedly voiced their discontent in mandate debates about the rise in terrorist attacks, the poor implementation of the peace agreement, the general deterioration of the security situation, and the refusal of Mali's ruling elites to assume sufficient responsibility for the emergence of statehood.⁷² In light of the political environment in which Germany and the United Nations must operate in Mali, it is questionable what contribution the two can make. According to country and regional specialists who see little room for manoeuvre on this issue, the status quo provides a balance that is acceptable to both the international community and the Malian government.⁷³

In addition to that complex situation, the Algiers Peace Agreement⁷⁴, negotiated in 2000 and signed in 2015, has not yet been implemented, and the security situation in the country has steadily worsened. This agreement seems to be the most important success criterion for Germany's MINUSMA mission, but it is not being met. In addition, the mission's mandate, as set by the UN Security Council, is not being met. This unstable situation has been caused not only by jihadist organisations, but also by local, partly ethnic, conflicts, as well as armed militias, and organised crime.⁷⁵

Furthermore, there is no possibility of restoring state authority over the entire country. In certain regions, the government has lost control, corruption is rife, and economic development is minimal.⁷⁶ The coup against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keta in August 2020⁷⁷ and the overthrow of interim President Bah Ndaw and head of government Moctar Ouane in May 2021⁷⁸ have shattered the notion that the international community has any influence over Mali's political developments. Accordingly, the question is whether MINUSMA and EUTM can continue operations in Mali.⁷⁹

⁷² Sören Christian Reimer, 'Deutscher Bundestag - Bundeswehr bleibt länger im westafrikanischen Mali', Deutscher Bundestag, accessed 21 March 2023, <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2018/kw50-de-bundeswehreinsatz-mali-533414>.

⁷³ Denis M Tull, 'Rebuilding Mali's Army: The Dissonant Relationship between Mali and Its International Partners', *International Affairs* 95, no. 2 (2019): 420–21.

⁷⁴ The Algiers Agreement was a peace treaty signed on December 12, 2000, in Algiers, Algeria, by the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia to formally end the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, a border war fought by the two countries from 1998 to 2000. 'PA-X: Peace Agreements Database - Site', accessed 4 April 2023, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/>.

⁷⁵ T Schiller, 'Die Lage Im Sahel. Konsequenzen Für Das Internationale Engagement', *KAS-Auslandsinformationen* 36, no. 2 (2020): 61–70.

⁷⁶ Isaline Bergamaschi, 'The Fall of a Donor Darling: The Role of Aid in Mali's Crisis', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52, no. 3 (2014): 347–78.

⁷⁷ 'Mali: Coup Leaders Must Release President Keita, Restore the Rule of Law, and Respect Human Rights, Says UN Expert', OHCHR, accessed 21 March 2023, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/08/mali-coup-leaders-must-release-president-keita-restore-rule-law-and-respect>.

⁷⁸ 'Mali Timeline: From Military Coup to Interim Leaders Removed | News | Al Jazeera', accessed 21 March 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/25/timeline-what-happened-in-mali-since-a-military-coup-in-august>.

⁷⁹ C Klatt, 'Nach Dem Coup d'État. Hoffnungen Und Herausforderungen in Mali', 2020.

In this regard, the record of Germany's participation in MINUSMA cannot serve as a compelling argument for maintaining or expanding Germany's participation in UN peacekeeping. Even a cursory examination of other UN peacekeeping operations reveals that many of these operations face identical obstacles. It is no consolation that this is not unique to UN missions, and that EU- or NATO-led missions also face the problem that desired successes do not materialise, local partners do not cooperate, and missions appear to last forever.

European capacity to act

Germany's involvement in MINUSMA is part of a renewal of European contributions to UN peacekeeping.⁸⁰ Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are cautiously resuming their participation in UN peacekeeping missions for a variety of reasons after decades of reduced participation.⁸¹ This return is due in part to the EU's desire to return to playing a greater role in foreign and security policy. The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS)⁸² and the German Security Policy White Paper from 2016⁸³ both emphasise European support for UN peacekeeping operations. In the last 15 years, the EU has conducted more peacekeeping missions in Africa than any other organisation, including the UN and African regional organisations. As a result of the complex political and military challenges, as well as the geographical environment in which most UN peacekeeping operations are conducted, the EU has gained significant experience as an independent actor in peacekeeping.⁸⁴

EU member states contribute up to 40% of UN peacekeeping funding, and the African Peace Facility, succeeded by the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, provided assistance to African regional organisations.⁸⁵ Since its first peacekeeping mission in 2003, the EU has emerged as a key peacekeeping actor, supporting the operations of the majority of African organisations.⁸⁶ As a result of its defence policy, EU members now have exclusive control over a multilateral partnership, which is ostensibly a more attractive alternative to direct participation in UN peacekeeping missions.

Unlike UN missions, the majority of EU missions are specialised in their tasks. The EU assists the UN in a variety of ways but European niche approach is influenced by

⁸⁰ Koops, 'Germany and United Nations Peacekeeping: The Cautiously Evolving Contributor'.

⁸¹ United Nations, 'Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Country, Mission, and Personnel Type'.

⁸² European Union, 'A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy', *EU: Brussels*, 2016.

⁸³ German Federal Government, 'White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr'.

⁸⁴ Günther Unser, 'Die EU Und Die Vereinten Nationen' (Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2009, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2009), 480–91.

⁸⁵ 'European Peace Facility', 24 March 2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/>.

⁸⁶ Manuela Scheuermann, *VN-EU-Beziehungen in Der Militärischen Friedenssicherung* (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2012) 99- 101.

EU or member state preferences.⁸⁷ Creating this peacekeeping niche is simple. It avoids as many UN mission flaws as possible, including the creeping change of mandate, the adoption of high-risk missions in seemingly hopeless conflicts, the deployment of missions with no clear time limit, and overly ambitious mandates.⁸⁸

Despite Europe's return, UN operations lack the sophisticated military equipment available to EU and NATO operations.⁸⁹ To maximise the EU's specialised capabilities, EU-UN cooperation must be more systematic. Both organisations formalised their relationship with two joint declarations issued in 2003 and 2007, which established communication channels and coordination mechanisms.⁹⁰ The 2012 Plan of Action to Strengthen EU CSDP Support for UN Peacekeeping and the 2018 UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management⁹¹ identified several key areas of cooperation for peacekeeping operations: rapid intervention capabilities, African Union policy support, increased EU contributions to UN missions, rule of law development and security sector reform, and lone wolf operations.⁹²

To determine whether MINUSMA is capable of achieving these goals, it is necessary to determine whether Germany's participation in MINUSMA is intended to strengthen the European Union's or Europe's ability to act. Specifically, with regard to Mali, the argument that MINUSMA represents a special footprint of the EU is difficult to defend, both in institutional and quantitative terms: firstly, the EU is conducting its own, separate operation in Mali with the EUTM; secondly, the EU as an institution is not involved in MINUSMA; and thirdly, of the EU members participating in MINUSMA, only Germany is among the ten largest and thus significant troop contributors. As of 31 December 2022, the remaining participating EU states were largely restricted to token contributions.⁹³ Therefore, the argument that the deployment provides an opportunity to gain and expand experience with military interoperability lacks credibility. This argument would apply primarily to the EU's partners, who are also present in Mali as part of Europe's return to peacekeeping, and is only convincing in the case of the United Kingdom's MINUSMA contingent of 250 soldiers, and then only in reference to a European partner or former EU member.

⁸⁷ Malte Brosig, 'EU Peacekeeping in Africa: From Functional Niches to Interlocking Security', *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 1 (2014): 75.

⁸⁸ Tardy, 'The European Union and UN Peace Operations: What Global-Regional Peace and Security Partnership?'

⁸⁹ Christopher Spearin, 'UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and Security Industry', *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 2 (April 2011): 196–209.

⁹⁰ 'Cooperation and Trust', deutschland.de, 2 May 2019, <https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/politics/un-and-eu-cooperation-for-peace>.

⁹¹ Council of European Union, 'European External Action Service', 9 July 2018.

⁹² Tobias Pietz, 'Die EU Und Das UN-Peacekeeping: Halbzeit Bei Brüssels Aktionsplan', *Zentrum Für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF)*, 2013.

⁹³ United Nations, 'Troop and Police Contributors', United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 20 March 2023, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Two essential goals of participation in MINUSMA, namely using the mission to demonstrate alliance solidarity with France and ensuring regional security in Mali and the Sahel, have not been met, or met insufficiently. The mission is also of limited value as evidence of Europe's capacity to act. From the standpoint of Germany's security policy, the mission is a clear failure. On the other hand, it sends a clear and powerful message that Germany supports the UN system and accepts responsibility. In this regard, the mission is unquestionably a success. As an apparent paradox, Germany's MINUSMA mission is successful without being successful.

In light of the stated reasons for Germany's participation in MINUSMA, it must be acknowledged that some, but not all of the objectives could be met.⁹⁴ The fact that not all desired objectives can be achieved with the same degree of success by deploying troops to other UN missions stems from the political complexity of such multidimensional deployment decisions. The process of determining whether and what to contribute can be viewed as a competition between factors that motivate or inhibit such decisions. Ultimately, political leaders are responsible for making these decisions within the confines of a limited set of options, preferences, and anticipated benefits, all of which are contextualised within a specific situation.⁹⁵

Given this intersection, there are essentially four possible paths for Germany's policy. Although their respective advantages and disadvantages can be evaluated scientifically, the ultimate decision rests with policymakers:

- The withdraw option: Germany would leave all UN peacekeeping missions, either immediately or at the mission's end, citing MINUSMA's poor performance in Mali and the Sahel. The Bundeswehr could focus on national and alliance defence since the crisis management issues could affect NATO or EU operations. Germany's global image as a multilateralist and conscientious middle power would suffer. Germany's actions could harm the security and prosperity system that benefits the country most.
- The symbolic option: The Federal Republic would revert to its previous level of participation in UN peacekeeping operations, whereby it would dispatch troops in a symbolic capacity to showcase its dedication to a crisis region, rather than to attain military efficacy. Germany intends to further enhance the United Nations' status as the primary political entity for peace and security, while refraining from military involvement, through the implementation of this policy. Simultaneously, the establishment of institutionalised collaboration with European counterparts would enhance Europe's capacity to

⁹⁴ Christian Patz, 'Peacekeeping Labor Mali: Deutschland Und Der MINUSMA Einsatz', *Sirius-Zeitschrift Für Strategische Analysen* 3, no. 4 (2019): 339–61.

⁹⁵ Bellamy and Williams, *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*, 418.

participate in global affairs.

- The status quo option: Under this scenario, Germany would continue on its current path of greater involvement in UN peacekeeping, with national contributions at a constant level and the expectation of achieving multiple foreign policy objectives simultaneously, such as strengthening multilateralism and containing crises and conflicts.
- The intensified option: Due to MINUSMA's modest success, Germany would use this option to increase its commitment to UN peacekeeping, including its military involvement. With Germany's and European contributions, the objective would be to transform the United Nations into an effective provider of security in the long term. As a result, Germany's security policy would make UN peacekeeping a top priority, to which all military planning and procurement projects would have to be tailored.

Regardless of the preferred option, both Germany's domestic policy and international partners require greater strategic clarity on this issue. The objectives of Germany's contributions to UN-led peace operations remain inadequately reflected from a strategic standpoint. Consequently, numerous declarations are ambiguous and encourage an ad hoc approach. A German government strategy paper on Germany's UN contingents would serve as a bridge between Germany's UN policy and Germany's security policy, as well as provide continuity to operational planning and security planning for partners. This strategy-paper would have to consider, for example, the changed demands on peacekeeping and the altered structure of the international system when choosing partners.⁹⁶ The drafting of the strategy document ought to be coordinated with the EU's Strategic Compass and NATO's new Strategic Concept. In fact, Germany's UN contingents would reflect multinational action more than ever before. A corresponding prioritisation of the crisis management-related sections of these two key documents would lay the groundwork for this concept. The question of partnerships and the division of labour between global security institutions will be of particular importance in this context.

Compounding this situation, Germany's participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations is frequently limited to providing logistical and financial support, ignoring the need for active participation in the operational aspects of the mission. This focus on non-operational contributions, limits Germany's capacity to effectively utilize its personnel and resources in making a substantial contribution to the peacekeeping mission.

The lack of a clear and consistent policy framework that defines the roles and responsibilities of Germany's personnel, as well as the coordination and management of their activities, have led to this gap between policy and operations. In the absence of a unified strategy, Germany's personnel are frequently deployed without a unified vision of

⁹⁶ Adriana Erthal Abdenur, 'UN Peacekeeping in a Multipolar World Order: Norms, Role Expectations, and Leadership', *United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order*, 2019, 45–65.

the end state, a circumstance which can militate against the desired effects of Germany's contribution to UN missions.

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